Helmut Krasser, despite tragically passing away much too early in 2014, left his mark on more than one generation of scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. An eminent specialist on the so-called “logico-epistemological tradition,” he devoted his Viennese dissertation and early work to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, before broadening the scope of his research to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the tradition’s historical founders. In particular, he examined their ideas on the relationship between logic and soteriology. He also considered the very nature of their texts. Should they be understood as authored philosophical works? Or rather as edited lecture notes of students? Director from 2007 to 2014 of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Helmut Krasser left behind a multi-faceted body of work, including editions of ancient Sanskrit manuscripts today found in the Tibetan Autonomous Region that had never before been published. This commemorative volume with more than thirty contributions not only reflects the multiplicity of his interests, it is also evidence of the deep impression he left on all those who met him. It is a document to the faithful friendship and highest respect still held by his friends and colleagues almost ten years after his death.
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer,
Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.)

Burlesque of the Philosophers
Hamburg Buddhist Studies 19
Part I

Series Editors:
Steffen Döll | Michael Zimmermann
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.)

Burlesque of the Philosophers

Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser
In memoriam Helmut Krasser
Es spricht für sich, dass sich so viele Menschen zusammengeschlossen haben, um diesen Erinnerungsband entstehen zu lassen. Menschen aus aller Welt, mit unterschiedlichsten Hintergründen, Kollegen und Studenten, die zu einem überwältigenden Teil auch Freunde waren – denen es wichtig ist, sich an Helmut zu erinnern und dieser Erinnerung Ausdruck zu verleihen.

Mein Vater war ein großartiger Mensch, der mit seiner toleranten, gutmütigen und verständnisvollen Art, seinem Charme und Humor und natürlich nicht zuletzt seinem scharfen Intellekt, bei jedem einzelnen von uns eine bleibende Erinnerung hinterlassen hat.

Er war ein Freigeist, der wenig für Oberflächlichkeiten, gesellschaftliche Zwänge oder den Mainstream übrig hatte. Vielmehr schätzte er reflektiertes Denken, offenen Diskurs und Individualität. Dadurch verstand er es auch, wie wenige andere, seinem Gegenüber den Platz und Raum zu geben, ganz er selbst zu sein.

Helmut war ein Genießer und Optimist, ein kritischer Denker, hochangesehen Wissenschaftler, geschätzter Freund und geliebter Teil seiner Familie.

Er fehlt.

It speaks for itself that so many people have joined together to create this volume of remembrance, people from all over the world, from the most diverse backgrounds, colleagues, students—an overwhelming number who were also friends—people for whom it is important to remember Helmut and give expression to this memory.

My father was a wonderful man whose tolerant, amiable and understanding nature, his charm and humour, and of course his sharp intellect left a lasting memory with each and every one of us. He was a free spirit who cared little for superficialities, social constraints, or the mainstream. Rather, he valued reflective thinking, open discourse, and individuality. As a result, he also understood—as few others do—how to give his counterparts the space and room to be completely themselves.

Helmut was a bon vivant and an optimist, a critical thinker, a highly respected scholar, a valued friend and a beloved part of his family.

He is sorely missed.

Sarah Krasser
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Foreword

As the editors of the Hamburg Buddhist Studies series, we are greatly pleased to host this two-part volume dedicated to the memory of the Vienna Indologist and Buddhist Studies scholar Helmut Krasser (1956–2014). The number of contributions to this volume, the breadth of their topics, and the depth of their scholarship attests to Krasser’s importance and the reputation he commands in the international community of researchers. The renown of the contributors to the present collection reflects Helmut Krasser’s own scholarly excellence—the quality of his studies is rarely ever matched in the field. Being one of the most prominent representatives of the Vienna school of Indological and Buddhist Studies focusing on the logico-epistemological dimensions of ancient India, he inspired a whole generation of philosophically as well as philologically minded thinkers, both East and West. Succeeding Ernst Steinkellner in 2007, Helmut Krasser directed the famous Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, IKGA) at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Under his guidance, research flourished and many notable projects were realized. His impressive career as a scholar, visionary, and keen thinker came to an abrupt end in 2014 with his untimely death. These two dedicatory volumes give expression to the Buddhist Studies community’s continued respect and highest esteem for the lifetime achievements of this outstanding scholar.

Michael Zimmermann / Steffen Döll
Preface and Acknowledgments

Helmut Krasser was an extraordinary personality for all those who had the privilege of meeting him, however briefly, and still more, for all those who worked with him. His tragic death in the early hours of 30 March 2014, at not yet 58 years of age has left a huge void in our hearts, in our disciplines, and at our tables, whether in Europe, the United States, China, or Japan, where he counted so many dear and faithful friends. As soon as he died, several people close to him, particularly his students Patrick McAllister and Masamichi Sakai, had the idea of dedicating a volume of homage to him. They generously rallied their forces to the enterprise whose late result we find here, a project brought to the baptismal font in December 2016, more than six years ago now. Originally together with Leonard van der Kuijp, the editors contacted Helmut’s friends personally, and also made the decision to hold the volume to the stylistic standards he held dear. The just over thirty contributions that make up these two volumes are, we hope, a worthy tribute to the irreplaceable friend, teacher, and researcher that Helmut Krasser was during his all too short life. Helmut regarded philosophy and system-building as close to insanity, and was fond of satirizing the philosophers’ endeavors as absurd and ludicrous—hence the title of this tribute. This Burlesque of the Philosophers will certainly not bring him back to life, but it offers us the opportunity to keep his memory alive with the tenderness, admiration, and inspiration that it still inspires today, almost nine years after his death.

It remains for us the pleasant duty to thank the authors for the texts they have kindly honored Helmut with, and Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for making two beautiful volumes out of them. We would also like to address our heartfelt thanks to the following institutions, without which we would not have been able to carry out this project that was so dear to us: the École Pratique des Hautes Études (EPHE), the Groupe de recherches en études indiennes (GREI), and the Centre d’études interdisciplinaires sur le bouddhisme (CEIB), for covering the costs of copy-editing, formatting, and producing the final manuscript; Harvard University and, especially, the Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai (BDK financial assistance programs) for generously supporting the book’s production through the hands of the Numata Center for Buddhist Studies at Hamburg University. Finally, we would like to thank Noriko Nakagami for her original artwork for the
cover of these volumes, John Taber for his help in formulating the title, and Michael Zimmermann, whose support was particularly valuable in the final stages of this project, and for agreeing, with Steffen Döll, to publish it in the prestigious Hamburg Buddhist Studies series.

The Editors

Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu
Helmut Krasser was undoubtedly one of the most radiant and endearing figures among the scholars of the last forty years working on Indian and Buddhist philosophy. Trained in the discipline’s “Viennese school”—an expression whose relevance he contested—he became one of that school’s leading figures, following in the footsteps of his master Ernst Steinkellner, professor at the University of Vienna, whom he succeeded in 2007 as the director of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (IKGA, Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens) at the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Helmut Krasser was characterized by his unfailing logico-epistemological erudition and his intimate knowledge of Brahmanical philosophical systems, as well as his remarkable ability to shed new light on old problems and to question scholarly habits and prejudices. His incomparable sagacity in human affairs, his generosity, his humor, and his warmth earned him countless friends both inside and outside the academic world. He leaves behind a body of work of high scientific value, which, if not copious, should not let us forget what a tireless worker and generous collaborator Helmut was during his too short career.

Helmut Krasser was born on 27 April 1956 in Lustenau, Austria, the third of four children, his siblings all sisters. His parents were Rudolf Werner, with whom he early ceased all relations, and Margit (née Jennerwein), whom he loved and became closer to during the last ten to fifteen years of his life, and who watched over him with faithful affection during his agony at the end of March 2014. Helmut hated Vorarlberg, which he considered unbearably conservative. He had terrible memories of his primary and secondary education (Handelsakademie, Lustenau), which he interrupted without graduating in 1972, then moving to Burgenland. His view of Austria was very Bernhardian (in addition
to Thomas Bernhard, he loved Peter Altenberg as well as Karl Kraus, especially as read by Helmut Qualtinger), and he held grudges, such as against his Latin teacher, whom he described as a “Nazi.” He spent most of the 1970s in a commune, one of those self-managed and cooperative spaces that served as a laboratory and refuge for the Austrian non-institutional left, in the wake, in particular, of the Viennese Actionists, a loose group of performance artists of the 1960s—if memory serves, Helmut once met Hermann Nitsch at the Burgenland commune. He lived off odd jobs, in particular, work at a circuit board manufacturer and as an assistant to a graphic designer. From his experience at the commune, where he read and reflected on the works of psychologists, cultural theorists, and philosophers, Helmut developed a sure—and sometimes exaggeratedly pessimistic—intuition of the human being in its morose solitude and compromises with power, sex, and money. Gifted with a solid common sense, he possessed real practical abilities that lent him prowess in all sorts of domestic and technical work (he excelled in computing). An outstanding cook, he knew a lot about plants, especially mushrooms, which he could easily identify in the forest, and even cultivated a small garden on the Dachterrasse of his last apartment on Praterstrasse. In June 1978, Helmut graduated secondary school through an external Matura (Naturwissenschaftliches Realgymnasium, Vienna) and, as a committed pacifist, did a period of civilian service (1979–1980) with the Austrian Red Cross in lieu of Austria’s compulsory military service.

These years (1972–ca. 1978) of wandering, first in his native Vorarlberg and then, above all, in Burgenland, did not prepare him in any particular way for the study of Tibetology, Buddhism and Indology, which he nevertheless turned to in 1981 (he initially chose history as his major, but was soon to prefer the friendly atmosphere of Tibetology). Helmut liked to say that he had chosen this curriculum because it seemed to him an interesting and luxurious sinecure. But he was soon drawn into the orbit of his charismatic and brilliant mentor Steinkellner, becoming his assistant (Studienassistent) in the academic years 1983–1984 and 1985–1986.¹

¹ Courses taken by Helmut in the academic year 1981–1982: Introduction to Classical Tibetan I and II (4 hours per week [h/w]), Sources of Tibetan history I and II (3 h/w), Tibetan documents from Dunhuang (2 h/w), Reading of the Tibetan royal annals (3 h/w); 1982–1983: Introduction to Buddhism I and II (2 h/w), Mi la ras pa’i rNam thar I and II (2 h/w), Spoken Tibetan I and II (2 h/w), Reading of Tibetan texts I and II (2 h/w), Seminar (2 h/w); 1983–1984: Reading of Tibetan texts III and IV (2 h/w), Introduction to the history of the Tibetan language (2 h/w), Exercises on the history of the Tibetan language I and II (2 h/w), “Arbeitskreis” on literary history (2 h/w), Introduction to Mongolian (2 h/w);
Helmut’s dissertation, begun in 1985, was on the Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (Short Examination of Epistemic Validity) by the eighth-century Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, a brief treatise on the theory of knowledge preserved in its Tibetan version as well as in a few Sanskrit fragments and parallels. From 1987 onwards, he collaborated with Steinkellner in editing and translating into German an excursus by Dharmottara on the same subject in a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya (ca. 600 CE). In the winter term of 1987–1988, Steinkellner devoted a seminar to this excursus in which Helmut, Monika Pemwieser, Michaela Tauscher-Lamberg, Matsumoto Shiro, Motoi Ono, and Michael Torsten Much participated. This edition and translation, in which Helmut’s as yet incomplete doctoral dissertation was announced and already made use of, appeared in 1989 under the title Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramāṇaviniścaya (Vienna, VÖAW, BKGA 2). In the minds of both scholars, this critical edition constituted “a step toward a broader knowledge of Dharmottara’s contribution to the development of

1984–1985: “Arbeitskreis” on literary history (2 h/w), Reading of Tibetan texts V and VI (2 h/w), Exercises on Buddhist terminology (2 h/w); Doctoral colloquium (2 h/w), Seminar (2 h/w), Ratnākaraśānti’s Antarvyāptisamarthana (2 h/w), Privatissimum (2 h/w), Pre-Islamic art and culture (2 h/w), Later Indian Buddhist doctrinal systems (2 h/w); 1985/1986: Seminar (2 h/w), Doctoral colloquium (2 h/w), Privatissimum (2 h/w), Exercises on Buddhist terminology I and II (2 h/w); 1986–1987: Privatissimum, Seminar, Doctoral colloquium; 1987–1988: Pāli (2 h/w), Seminar, “Arbeitskreis” on literary history, Privatissimum, Doctoral colloquium; 1988–1989: Buddhist Sanskrit (1 h/w), Privatissimum, Doctoral colloquium, Seminar, “Arbeitskreis” on literary history.

Helmut chose Indology as his secondary major. For this, courses in the academic year 1981–1982 were: Introduction to Sanskrit (6 h/w), Translation exercises (2 h/w), Proseminar (3 h/w), Introduction to Vedic I (2 h/w); 1982–1983: Sanskrit I and II (3 h/w), Introduction to Vedic II (2 h/w); Selected texts from ancient Nyāya I and II (3 h/w); Linguistic reading of Sanskrit texts (1 h/w); 1983–1984: Sanskrit III, Linguistic reading of Vedic texts I and II (1 h/w); 1985: Konversatorium (3 h/w); 1986–1988: each year, Indology seminar (2 h/w).

Helmut did not write a Master’s thesis because it was not a requirement at the time.

1989, 10.

1989, 5, fn. 8: “A critical edition with translation of the shorter Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā is being prepared as a dissertation at Vienna University by Helmut Krasser.” Preliminary work on editing and translating the Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā must have begun as early as 1987–1989, if not before; at the time of submitting his 1995 article (“Dharmottara’s Theory of Knowledge,” see below), Helmut still hoped to complete his work on the Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (1995, 269, n. 2).

1989, 5: “Since the text is a digression only and can often only be understood with reference to the two Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā treatises, these works were also taken into consideration as far as possible at this time and without the intention of predetermining the results of future critical work on these texts themselves.”
the theory of cognitive validity (prāmāṇya).\textsuperscript{5} The year 1989 coincided with Helmut’s Promotion to the degree of doctor of philosophy\textsuperscript{6} for the dissertation entitled “Dharmottaras Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā,” which was published two years later (1991) in two volumes under the title Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis. Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā (Vienna, VÖAW, BKGA 7).\textsuperscript{7} In the meantime, in 1988, Helmut obtained a position as a research fellow (wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the IKGA (at that time, the “Forschungsstelle für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens,” which had been established in 1986). His first task was to complete the edition of the Chos ’byun of the Tibetan polymath Bu ston rin chen grub,\textsuperscript{8} which János Szerb, who tragically passed away in October of 1988, was unable to complete (János Szerb: Bu ston’s History of Buddhism in Tibet, Critically Edited with a Comprehensive Index, Vienna, 1990, VÖAW, BKGA 5). Helmut never forgot that he owed his first position to the untimely death of a scholar he held in high esteem. Also in 1989 he co-organized with Steinkellner the 2nd International Dharmakīrti Conference, which was held in Vienna at Schloss Neuwaldegg, 11–16 June 1989.\textsuperscript{9}

Helmut had not yet formally completed his doctorate when he participated in the International Seminar on Tibetan Studies in Narita, Japan (27 August–2 September 1989), in what appears to have been his first

\textsuperscript{5} 1989, 5.

\textsuperscript{6} Title awarded on 10 November 1989, after fifteen semesters of study (see above, n. 2, for details). The Rigorosum consisted of a two-hour examination on 24 October 1989 in Tibetology, Buddhist Studies, and Indology, with Linguistics as an additional subject, and a one-hour examination in Philosophy on 17 October 1989. Helmut was awarded ausgezeichnet (excellent) in both cases.

\textsuperscript{7} In volume I, p. 15, Helmut expresses his thanks to Steinkellner as follows: “Die Anregung zu dieser Arbeit stammt von meinem verehrten Lehrer, Professor Ernst Steinkellner, dem auch für die äußerst wohlwollende und gründliche Betreuung mein besonderer Dank gilt.”

\textsuperscript{8} Steinkellner’s preface (written in 1989): “The task of preparing Dr. Szerb’s work for publication was undertaken by Dr. Helmut Krasser. He corrected the final version of the text and compared it once again to ms. K, Szerb’s main manuscript. He completed the bibliography, corrected the index and added new names from the new footnotes to the index. Approximately 20% of the footnotes were indicated but still unwritten. Krasser completed most of these footnotes following Dr. Szerb’s procedure.”

\textsuperscript{9} The proceedings were edited by Ernst Steinkellner (Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition, Vienna, 1991, VÖAW, BKGA 8), who in his preface thanks “Dr. Krasser for the great care he took in processing the manuscripts and standardizing the bibliographies”, processing meaning that he had prepared the proceedings’ camera-ready copy.
of many visits to Japan. There he presented a paper on the comparative chronology of Śāntarakṣita, Dharmottara and Kamalaśīla ("On the Relationship between Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla," 1992), in which his aim was, on one hand, to refine certain research results of Takashi Iwata, Shiro Matsumoto, Masamichi Ichigo and Hiromasa Tosaki, and on the other hand, to consolidate, and modify slightly, the chronology established by Erich Frauwallner, whose arguments Helmut deemed not "really conclusive."10 According to Helmut, the period of Dharmottara’s activity ought to be situated between 760 and 790, that is, between Śāntarakṣita’s first journey to Tibet (coinciding with the completion of the Tattvasaṅgraha) and that of Kamalaśīla (coinciding with the completion of the Pañjikā). He concluded that, “[t]aking [all this] into consideration […] and assuming a life-span of 60 years I would suggest that Dharmottara lived from approximately 740–800 A.D.”11 The last lines of this first article praised historical-philological comparison for allowing “a fascinating glimpse into the workshop of these philosophers,”12 a remark that has a particular kinship to Helmut’s later work.

It was during these years that he met Sabine Pöhacker, who became his wife in February 1991. She gave birth to Sarah, his beloved daughter and only child, in March 1991. In April 1991, Helmut left Vienna with his family for Kyoto, where he stayed until April 1993,13 working under the benevolent guidance of Katsumi Mimaki, professor at Kyoto University, with whom he developed a lasting and fruitful friendship. He later made two more research and teaching visits to Kyoto, one May–July 2003, the other January–April 2006, the second time as a visiting professor.14

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12 1992, 158.
13 Funding: Japanese-German Center Berlin and Bukkyo Dendo Kyokai. During this first stay in Kyoto, Professor Hakuyu Hadano gave Katsumi Mimaki a microfilm of the Rig gnas kun ṣes (with raṅ 'grel) of sTag tshaṅ lotsāba Šes rab rin chen, a manuscript then preserved at Tohoku University. Mimaki then proposed that Helmut work jointly with him on the chapter tshad ma rig pa. Helmut read sTag tshan in Mimaki’s Tibetan text-reading seminars in the academic years 1994–1995 and 1995–1996, and in the summer term of 2009, as well as in Kyoto in 2003 (with Śaṅkaranandana’s Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa) and 2006 (see below). The two scholars continued to collaborate on this project almost until Helmut’s death. According to Mimaki (electronic communication, 21 December 2022), this work, almost completed in early 2014, could (“should”!) have been published very quickly after Helmut’s demise.
14 Helmut presented at least three papers during his 2006 stay in Japan: at Ryukoku University, Kyoto (“On critically editing texts: Jinendrabuddhi’s
During his initial stay, as a hermit allowing himself one weekly outing, he worked on a synthesis of Dharmottara’s epistemological ideas, which was published in 1995 under the title “Dharmottara’s Theory of Knowledge in his Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā.” As he explained in the introduction, “[t]he ideas developed by Dharmottara [...] in this treatise are somewhat difficult to grasp both because the main thoughts are often interrupted in order to explain the problems involved, and because he considers the same topics several times from various points of view. For this reason, and in order to facilitate access to the text for those who are not familiar with German, I have tried to present the relevant material more systematically, omitting the detailed discussion in some cases.”

His return from Japan seems to have coincided with a particular interest in one of the main arguments of Dharmakīrtian idealism, the sahopalambhāniyama or “necessary co-perception (of the object and its cognition).” This interest found its first expression in his review (1994) of Takashi Iwata’s eponymous book, and then in a paper devoted to how this argument was interpreted by the Tibetan translator and philosopher rNgog lobsāba Blo  ldan śes rab (1059–1109) (“rNgog lobsāba on the sahopalambhāniyama proof in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavinīscaya”). Here, Helmut examined the sahopalambhāniyama section as a sample of a then still unpublished treatise, the Tshad ma rnam ņes kyi dka’ gnas rnam par bšad pa (Explanation of the Difficult Points of the Pramāṇavinīscaya). In this article, published in 1997 but based on a paper delivered in 1994 at the International Seminar on Buddhist Studies (Liw/Warsaw, 25 June 1994), he claims to have edited this section of the manuscript “in order to gain some insight into [rNgog’s] style, into the development of textual analysis, the so-called sa bcad technique, and, of course, into his way of understanding the theme and his appropriation of the ideas of his Indian predecessors.”

In the research and publication cycle initiated by his dissertation, one can count “Zur buddhistischen Definition von gültiger Erkenntnis (pramāṇa) in Jayantabhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjari” (1997). On the basis of a

15 Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā); at Tokyo University (“On āgama”); and at Waseda University, Tokyo (“On the doctrinal status of Buddhist logic and epistemology”).

This work provided the material for several lectures during this stay: at Waseda University (Tokyo) on the invitation of Takashi Iwata; at Ryukoku University (Kyoto) on the invitation of Esho Mikogami; at the International Institute for Buddhist Studies (Tokyo) on the invitation of Akira Yuyama; at Hiroshima University on the invitation of Shoryu Katsura; and at Kyoto University on the invitation of Katsumi Mimaki.


17 1997, 63–64.
detailed examination of the section of the *Nyāyamañjarī* criticizing the Buddhists’ general definition of pramāṇa, Helmut was able to demonstrate that Jayanta’s opponent and main source was none other than Dharmottara, whose *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Apopraṇakaraṇa*, and *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā* were known and exploited by the Kashmiri Naiyāyika. Several other essays are related to this epistemological cycle of his work. Helmut devoted nearly half of his 1996 review of a book by Tom J. F. Tillemans (*Persons of Authority*, Stuttgart, 1993, Franz Steiner) to the interpretation of the epithet pramāṇabhūta. There he suggested that in the works of Dignāga, the adjective had the value of “like a pramāṇa” (following David Seyfort Ruegg), while in Dharmakīrti it should be interpreted as “[one] who has become a pramāṇa” (with Tillemans).  

His ideas on this topic are systematically presented in “On Dharmakīrti’s Understanding of pramāṇabhūta and His Definition of pramāṇa” (2001). In this paper, he was able to demonstrate that 1) Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, and Jinendrabuddhi interpreted pramāṇabhūta in the sense of “one who has come into existence being a pramāṇa,” with the very real metaphorical value remaining implicit; 2) the two definitions of a pramāṇa stated by Dharmakīrti, equivalent but conceptually distinct, corresponded to the Buddhist position in the case of the first (*avisaṃvādi jñānam*) and to Kumārila’s position in the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* in the case of the second (*ajñātārthaprakāśa*). With the second position, Dharmakīrti sought to prove to the Mīmāṃsakas that “even according to their own definition when understood properly, not the Veda, but the Buddha is to be regarded as pramāṇa.” The article “On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition,” published in 2003 on the basis of a paper presented at the international seminar “Argument and Reason in Indian Logic” (Kazimierz Dolny, Poland, 20–24 June 2001), dates to the same period. In the wake of the work of Ernst Steinkellner, Masahiro

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18 Helmut pointed out that this philosophically correct value was grammatically problematic, since it would better correspond to pramāṇībhūta, mentioning Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation: “[the Buddha] who is a pramāṇa and who has come into being,” “which in its meaning only slightly differs from that of pramāṇabhūta” (1994, 181).

19 The article is based on a paper presented at the 36th International Congress of Asian and North African Studies, held in Montreal 27 August–2 September 2000.

20 2001, 184.

Inami, Masaaki Hattori, and John Dunne, Helmut tackled the debate on the intrinsic or extrinsic nature of epistemic validity (prāmāṇya) in the Buddhist theory of knowledge. After a useful overview of the main positions taken by Indian Buddhist masters, he presented and discussed some Tibetan materials from the Tshad ma rnam ńes kyi dka’ gnas rnam bśad of rNg lobsāba and the Pramāṇaviniścaya commentary of gTsaṅ nag pa brTson ’grus seṅ ge (twelfth century). Finally, forming something of a transition to new questions, mention should be made of the important “Are Buddhist Pramāṇavādins non-Buddhistic? Dignāga and Dharmakīrti on the Impact of Logic and Epistemology on Emancipation” (2004), in which Helmut examined the relationship between epistemology and soteriology as suggested by the works of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and Dharmottara. Given the importance of this work for Helmut’s further reflections, here are its concluding remarks: “In conclusion we can thus sum up Dignāga’s, Dharmakīrti’s and Dharmottara’s concept of the role of epistemology as follows: 1) The addressees of epistemological works are primarily non-Buddhists. 2) The aim of these works is not to introduce the opponents to the teaching of Buddha, but to turn the adherents of heretical views away from these views by revealing the faults in the pramāṇa theories of the heretics and by revealing the good qualities of one’s own pramāṇas. 3) Although the Buddhist dharma is not subject to a critical analysis by means of conventional valid cognitions (pramāṇa), it has to be examined as long as confused opponents lead the world astray. Wisdom born of reflection (cintāmayī prajñā) operates with conventional valid cognitions, and hence they are indirectly a cause for the realization of the ultimate pramāṇa. Thus it is clear that in the intention of the promoters of pramāṇa studies this system apparently had a strong connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e., as the teaching of a path toward salvation, and that they never considered themselves to be involved in non-Buddhistic activities.”

It was probably on his return from Japan in 1993 that Helmut began work on a habilitation project dealing with a brief yet difficult treatise by the Kashmiri Buddhist Brahmin (sic) Šaṅkaranandana (tenth century?),

22 Helmut dedicated another paper to Tibetan indigenous epistemology: “Remarks on Red mda’ ba gZhon nu blo gros’ ‘Examination of the object and function of a valid cognition.’” Although the paper was submitted, it seems to have never been published. The original paper was delivered at the 8th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, 25–31 July 1998.

23 2004, 145–146. This article is based on a paper presented on 3 September 2003 at the symposium “Grammatik, Logik und Argumentation in buddhistischen Texten” (Düsseldorf, EKÖ-Haus der japanischen Kultur, 2–5 September 2003).
the Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa (ĪAS, verse and autocommentary). A Sanskrit manuscript of the text and an incomplete anonymous commentary had recently been identified in Benares (Banaras Hindu University) by Raffaele Torella. As its title indicates, this opuscule was devoted to refuting the existence of God, a theme that was the subject of a memorable intervention at the 3rd International Dharmakīrti Conference (Hiroshima, 4–6 November 1997). The article “Dharmakīrti’s and Kumārila’s Refutations of the Existence of God. A Consideration of Their Chronological Order” (1999) established for the first time the dependence of the Pramāṇavārttika on the Ślokavārttika by showing that Dharmakīrti borrowed part of his argument from his great rival Kumārila (ca. 600). Two years after that article’s publication, Helmut presented the historical and chronological conclusions of his research in “On the Dates and Works of Śaṅkaranandana” (2001). Following the work of Raniero Gnoli and Gudrun Bühnemann, he corrected and clarified the list and internal chronology of the works of Śaṅkaranandana, the “second Dharmakīrti,” and then turned to Śaṅkaranandana’s socio-religious and doctrinal affiliation. According to Helmut, Abhinavagupta’s high praise suggests that by the time Śaṅkaranandana was completing the Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī, in about 1014–1015, he had not yet abandoned “śivaism” (despite a clear and already old inclination toward Buddhism), nor had he composed those of his works that openly criticize the existence of God. Helmut set the dates of Śaṅkaranandana between 940/50 and 1020/30. It was in 2002 that his second monograph, Śaṅkaranandanasa Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa, mit einem anonymen Kommentar und weiteren Materialien zur buddhistischen Gottespolemik (Vienna, VÖAW, BKGA 39, 2 vols.), was published; it remains to this day the most accomplished synthesis on this important doctrinal controversy. While volume I presents the edition of the Buddhist sources (Pramāṇavārttika [PV], PVPañjikā, PVṬīkā, PVVṛtti [translations in volume II, appendices], Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā, ĪAS, and commentary), volume II offers a commented translation of PV 2.8–16, the Nyāya reactions (Śaṅkarasvāmin, Trilocana, Jayantabhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajña, Vittoka), and finally an annotated translation of the ĪAS with its autocommentary and the anonymous commentary. The work earned Helmut a habilitation (venia legendi) in Tibetology and Buddhist Studies, defended on 23 June 2002 and officially awarded a few days later.

From 1994 onwards and continuously until his death, Helmut taught classes as a lecturer at the Department of Tibetology and Buddhist Studies of the University of Vienna (which became the Department of South Asian,
Tibetan and Buddhist Studies [ISTB] in 2001). His teaching reflected the evolution of his interests, his gradual abandoning of strict Tibetology, the sudden availability of large numbers of Sanskrit manuscripts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region, and the supervisory work of the new “Univ. Doz. Dr.”—a doctor now entitled to be an advisor for doctoral research. Alongside the introduction to classical Tibetan (1996–1997, 1997–1998, 1998–1999) and the introductory proseminar in Tibetan studies (with his friend Helmut Tauscher, winter term [WT] 2003–2004), he taught courses on sTag tshaṅ lotsāba (on tshad ma, 1994–1995, 1995–1996 and summer term [ST] 2009; on sems tsam, 2002–2003), mKhas grub rje’s Yid kyi mun sel (1999–2000), and Sa skya Pañđita’s Tshad ma’i rig gter (chapter 10, 2000–2001, 2001–2002; chapter 1, with Go ram pa’s commentary, 2005–2006). Between the winter of 1999 and the summer of 2002, he offered terminological courses dealing successively with pramāṇa (with the Nyāyapraveśakasūtra as a reading), Yogācāra (with the Viṃśikā), and Abhidharma (with the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, chapter 1). The “Buddhist readings” he led beginning in 2002 focused on the Pramāṇasamuccaya and its Ţīkā (1.8–12; WT 2002–2003), on manuscripts photographed by Rāhula Sāṅkrṭyāyana (WT 2003–2004), on Jñānaśrīmitra’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya (ST 2004), and on the Tarkarahasyadīpikā of the Jaina scholar Guṇaratna (2004–2005). Beginning in 2006, his seminars were devoted to the texts that were the subject of his doctoral students’ dissertations: the vyāptiṇiyama section of the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Hisataka Ishida), the Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi section of the same text (Masamichi Sakai), and Ratnakīrti’s Apohasiddhi (Patrick McAllister).

With the completion of the diplomatic and critical editions of the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (see below), his teaching focused, as part of the Kreis he hosted every Friday morning at the IKGA (see below), on editing chapters 1–5 of the Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (completed by Horst Lasic, Xuezhu Li, and Anne MacDonald24), the Hetubindu (completed by Ernst Steinkellner25), and the Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, chapter 5 (which Horst Lasic and Patrick McAllister are currently completing).

24 Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya, Chapters 1 to 5, critically edited by Horst Lasic, Xüezhu Li and Anne MacDonald on the basis of preparatory work by Helmut Krasser, Beijing/Vienna 2022 (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 22).

25 Dharmakīrti’s Hetubindu, critically edited by Ernst Steinkellner on the basis of preparatory work by Helmut Krasser with a transliteration of the Gilgit fragment by Klaus Wille, Beijing/Vienna, 2016 (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 19).
This latter work was part of the *Kreis* tradition initiated by Ernst Steinkellner upon the unexpected arrival, in 1995, of photographs of a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s (eighth-century) *Pramāṇa-samuccayatīkā*, the “guhyatantra,” a manuscript that would soon become a sensation in the cosmopolis of Buddhist *pramāṇa* scholars. A patient editing process, still underway between Vienna and Japan, then began, which culminated in the publication of diplomatic and critical editions of the first two chapters under the general title of *Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (2005 and 2012). Together with his close friend Horst Lasic, Helmut was part of this whole adventure, punctuated by sensitive negotiations (for a long time the exclusive domain

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26 Steinkellner saw these images for the first time on the sidelines of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, which took place near Graz in 1995 (see below, fn. 38). Concerning the “*Kreis*,” Steinkellner has the following to say (email communication, 4 February 2023): “Den Arbeitskreis habe ich tatsächlich erst mit der PST begonnen, weil keiner damals noch diese Schrift lesen konnte, auch ich selbst nicht, und ich dachte, daß es gemeinsam lustiger sein könnte. Was sich auch schnell herausgestellt hat. Dann aber habe ich gefunden, daß wir im Team schneller und einander korrigierend effizienter arbeiten könnten und es ist seither dabei geblieben.”

27 The Steinkellner group’s interest in Sanskrit manuscripts preserved in the People’s Republic of China is already evident in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989, 6, fn. 10, according to which “important texts from this [epistemological and logical, VE] school have been reported as being available, e.g., *Nyāyumukha, Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā, Pramāṇaviniścaya, Hetubindu*.” Knowledge of these priceless materials owes much to the work of Luo Zhao in Lhasa in the 1980s. Still in relation with manuscripts, it may be noted that in 1999–2000, Helmut worked on the design of the exhibition “Buddhistische Manuskripte der Großen Seidenstraße. Das Lotossūtra und seine Welt” (Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Prunksaal, 25 March–24 April 2000). Unfortunately, I could not access a catalogue of this exhibition, which, if memory serves, stood on Helmut’s shelves in the Strohgasse.

28 The editorial work is now being coordinated by Motoi Ono (University of Tsukuba). Chapter 6 (*jāti*) is now in press, while work on chapter 4 (*drṣṭānta*) is expected to be completed in 2023; as for chapter 3 (*parārthānumāna*), the longest, on which Shoryu Katsura and his team have been working for a long time, its publication seems to be expected by the end of 2024.

frequent visits to the China Tibetology Research Center (CTRC) in Beijing, and the intensification of relations with young Chinese scholars (Junjie Chu, Xuezhu Li, Hong Luo). Among the many results of the cooperative arrangements established between the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the CTRC, mention should also be made here of the series of volumes *Sanskrit Manuscripts in China*, of which the first (2009) records the proceedings of the panel “Sanskrit Manuscripts in China: State and Prospects” (15–16 October 2008). For that volume, Helmut also authored an essay (pp. 167–178) on the contribution of original Sanskrit manuscripts to a better understanding of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Hetubindu*, entitled “Original text and (re)translation – a critical evaluation.” This cooperation was presented by Helmut in the article “Indic Buddhist Manuscripts in Vienna: A Sino-Austrian Co-operative Project, with Methodological Remarks on Śāstric ‘Urtexts’” (Vienna, 2014, VÖAW, BKGA 80), which he wrote for the conference “Indic Buddhist Manuscripts: the State of the Field,” held at Stanford University 15–19 June 2009 on the initiative of his friends Paul Harrison and Jens-Uwe Hartmann and hosting the world’s leading scholars of Indian Buddhist manuscriptology.

In 2007, Helmut succeeded Ernst Steinkellner as the head of the IKGA, but failed to succeed him as chair of Tibetology and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna, where Klaus-Dieter Mathes was appointed. Between 2007 and 2012, his life changed in many ways: increased administrative workload, successive relocations of the institute, co-direction of huge research projects, evaluations of all kinds, academic workload, and so forth. In 2007, the IKGA moved from Strohgasse 45/2A (4th floor) to Prinz-Eugen-Strasse 8–10 (1st floor), where it remained until the end of 2010, when it moved, via a stay in the limbo of Wohllebengasse 6 in the winter of 2010–2011, to Apostelgasse 23 (1st floor), where it remained until the end of 2015.

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30 A general cooperation agreement was signed between the CTRC and the Austrian Academy of Sciences in 2004 and extended in 2006. It is the result of the efforts of Professor Lhagpa Phuntshogs, director of the CTRC, and Ernst Steinkellner, director of the IKGA. On this subject, see Ernst Steinkellner, *A Tale of Leaves. On Sanskrit Manuscripts in Tibet, their Past and their Future*, 2003 Gonda Lecture, Amsterdam, 2004, Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences.

31 *Sanskrit Manuscripts in China. Proceedings of a panel at the 2008 Beijing Seminar on Tibetan Studies, October 13 to 17*, edited by Ernst Steinkellner in cooperation with Duan Qing and Helmut Krasser, Beijing 2009.

32 The papers presented in 2006 to the nomination committees of the University of Vienna and the Austrian Academy of Sciences are apparently identical: “Das Selbstverständnis der buddhistischen erkenntnis-theoretischen Schule und ihr Zugang zu Übersinnlichem.”

33 In 2007, the IKGA moved from Strohgasse 45/2A (4th floor) to Prinz-Eugen-Strasse 8–10 (1st floor), where it remained until the end of 2010, when it moved, via a stay in the limbo of Wohllebengasse 6 in the winter of 2010–2011, to Apostelgasse 23 (1st floor), where it remained until the end of 2015.
honors and invitations, fewer scientific publications with a partially new orientation, and increased material security with the acquisition of a beautiful penthouse apartment in Vienna at Praterstrasse 56.

The research projects included “Tradition and Transformation in Indian and Buddhist Logic” (FWF P21050–G15, 10 October 2008–9 October 2010), a continuation of the research projects previously led by Ernst Steinkellner; “Philosophy: Madhyamaka and Language Theory,” a sub-project of the National Research Platform directed by Helmut’s friend Deborah Klimburg-Salter at the University of Vienna, “The Cultural History of the Western Himalaya from the 8th Century” (FWF S9805–G08, 1 January 2007–31 December 2012), which resulted in Cultural Flows across the Western Himalaya (Vienna, 2015, VÖAW, BKGA 83), a volume he edited together with Patrick McAllister and Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, but which he never had a chance to hold in his hands; the “Tibet” part of the transdisciplinary research project VISCOM (“Visions of Community,” Sonderforschungsbereich, FWF P4204–G18, 1 March 2011–28 February 2015, extended for another four years in 2015) devoted to the comparative study of the Western, Islamic and Tibetan Middle Ages, led by Andre Gingrich, Helmut Krasser (Vincent Eltschinger from January 2014, Birgit Kellner from November 2015), Christina Lutter, Walter Pohl, and Oliver Jens Schmitt.

Helmut also accumulated editorial projects. From 2006 until his death, he co-edited the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies with Birgit Kellner, as well as the Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde series (WSTB, with Birgit Kellner and Helmut Tauscher). After Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995 (Vienna, 1997, VÖAW, BKGA 21, 2 volumes), which he co-edited with Michael Torsten

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34 On 23 April 2010, he was elected corresponding member of the “philosophisch-historische Klasse” of the Austrian Academy of Sciences on the nomination of Ernst Steinkellner.

35 Between 1 November 2004 and 31 October 2006, Helmut was the formal head of the project “Religion und Philosophie in brahmanischer Orthodoxie: Kumārilas Ślokavārttika, codanā-Kapitel,” in which his friend Kei Kataoka was employed.

36 The volume gathers the proceedings of the colloquium “Cultural Flows across the Western Himalaya,” which was held at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies, Shimla, 15–18 April 2009. This conference coincided with Helmut’s first trip to India. The excursion that preceded the conference, led by Helmut Tauscher, took the group through the Kinnaur Valley to Pooh and Nako (a landslide prevented them from reaching Tabo, the initial destination of the trip).
Much, Ernst Steinkellner, and Helmut Tauscher, and the two volumes of essays offered to Ernst Steinkellner on the occasion of his 70th birthday (Pramāṇakīrtiḥ. Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday, edited by Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Michael Torsten Much, and Helmut Tauscher, Vienna, 2007, ATBS, WSTB 70), he worked with Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, and Birgit Kellner on the edition of the proceedings of the 4th International Dharmakīrti Conference, which he had co-organized and convened in Vienna 23–27 August 2005 (Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference, Vienna, August 23–27, 2005, Vienna, 2011, VÖAW, BKGA 69). He also co-edited the proceedings of the panel “Scriptural authority and apologetics in the Indian Religio-Philosophical Environment,” co-organized with Vincent Eltschinger within the framework of the 14th World Sanskrit Conference (Kyoto, 1–5 September 2009), published under the title Scriptural Authority, Reason and Action (Vienna, 2013, VÖAW, BKGA 79).

In addition to these large-scale projects, Helmut strove to maintain a space for personal research. Beginning in September 2006, he joined forces with Vincent Eltschinger and John Taber (then the Numata Visiting Professor at the University of Vienna) to undertake, initially also with Ernst Steinkellner, a translation of the final section of PV 1, which presents the culmination of Dharmakīrti’s lengthy anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic. This work, which again in August 2008 brought the three scholars together in Vienna, resulted in an annotated translation of this passage under the title Can the Veda Speak? Dharmakīrti against Mīmāṃsā exegetics and Vedic authority (Vienna, 2012, VÖAW, BKGA 74). Illness and death prevented Helmut from participating in the translation of the apoha section, which, like a stay in New Mexico, he still believed possible and hoped for. Vincent Eltschinger, Michael Torsten Much, Isabelle Ratié, and John Taber have continued working on this section since 2015. Can the Veda Speak? provided Helmut an opportunity for clarifying Dharmakīrti’s position on scriptural authority. In “Logic in a Religious Context: Dharmakīrti in Defence of āgama” (2012), he showed that Dharmakīrti, unlike Vasubandhu and even Dignāga, denied any authority to āgama, Buddhist included, since no concomitance can be established

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37 The 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, which Helmut co-organized, took place in Graz (Schloss Seggau) 18–24 June 1995.

38 Along with Kazunobu Matsuda and Akira Saito, Helmut was a guest convener of the Buddhist Studies section of this conference.
between speech and truth in the supersensible realm. The four lectures he delivered in May 2009 at the École Pratique des Hautes Études on the invitation of his friend Cristina Scherrer-Schaub admirably reflect the ideas and research topics that were his in the years 2007 to 2012: 1) “Saska Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182–1251) and the introduction of the five sciences (vidyā) into the curriculum in Tibet”; 2) “Dharmottara’s theory of authority (prāmāṇya)”; 3) “Dignāga and Dharmakīrti about the tradition (āgama)”; 4) “Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti.”

But as this last lecture testifies, other problems gradually came to haunt him. The first of these problems was that of the chronology of Dharmakīrti, an author whose activity he believed—probably wrongly—to be in the mid-sixth century and not around 600–660, contrary to Frauwallner, whose chronology enjoyed a quasi-biblical authority. Helmut explained this in “Bhāviveka, Dharmakīrti and Kumārila” (2012), a contribution in which he attempted to show that Bhāviveka, whose chronology is quite secure, knew and criticized Kumārila and Dharmakīrti. The second, more nagging problem concerned the very nature of Buddhist philosophical texts (and soon more than that), in which Helmut was increasingly inclined to see students’ notes (“Abschriften”) taken during lectures and training, whereupon they were more or less edited, rather than authored texts written by monastic intellectuals in the privacy of their cells. Although he often referred to it orally and collected a great deal of material about it, illness unfortunately prevented him from substantiating this hypothesis beyond the few remarks to be found in one of his last texts, “How to Teach a Buddhist Monk to Refute the Outsiders. Text-critical Remarks on some Works by Bhāviveka” (2011).39 The texts of the Prajñāpradīpa and the Tarkajvālā that he examined in this contribution “were written down by students on the basis of a teacher’s oral instruction [and] thus [...] represent first-hand information about daily life in Indian Buddhist monasteries of the sixth century, giving us a fascinating glimpse of the education system of that time.”30 This audacious thesis earned him the skepticism, if not the hostility, of a part of the scholarly community, all the more so because he gave in to an enthusiasm that disposed him to shortcuts and monicausal explanations—the same enthusiasm that sometimes led him to overestimate (?) the turpitude of philosophers—sex, “cash” (a word he loved), and politics. It is fair to say that through provocation, he was

39 Paper delivered on 13 January 2010 at the workshop “Editing Buddhist texts” organized by the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath.

40 2011, 49.
looking less for assent than for debate, and with it, the deepening and consolidation of his positions, Helmut not being a man to sacrifice truth or plausibility on the altar of selfish interests. Because of his illness, he did not have enough time to demonstrate his hypothesis and respond to the objections, many of which were in bad faith. There is no doubt, however, that with what we know today about the relationship between written texts, intellectual practices, and teaching situations, especially in the late antique and medieval world, the question will inevitably have to be taken up again.

Although he was passionate about philosophy, Helmut did not hold it in high esteem. He readily denounced its—in one of his favorite expressions—*Wahnsinssysteme*. He saw philosophy close to madness, as reflecting a thirst for hegemony, an obsession with order, and a dulling of reality and experience. Helmut had no taste for comparative philosophy, especially in its analytical version. His penchant for psychology, his sense of rhetorical intention, of hidden references and intertextualities, made any attempt at formalization ludicrous, even though he knew better than anyone else how to evaluate the quality of an argument.

Illness suddenly broke out in the spring of 2012. The mysterious bout of dementia that led to his hospitalization was soon interpreted as the morbid work of metastasis of already very advanced lung cancer. Helmut, an eternal cigarette-roller, had been spending peaceful days with Jin (Jinkyoung Choi), who would be his last companion and would courageously accompany him in these difficult hours. Neither the chemotherapy nor the severe cortisone treatments could dampen his optimism. Helmut fought, tried to read and write, but a fall almost buried all hope at Christmas 2013. The last three months became a painful agony punctuated by seizures and disappearances. He died in the early hours of 30 March 2014 at St. Elisabeth Hospital, just a few hundred meters from his institute. His funeral took place on 14 April at Vienna’s Zentralfriedhof—where else?—in front of a large gathering, some friends even having traveled from the United States and Japan. Vincent Eltschinger, whom Helmut had appointed as deputy director at the end of 2013, acted as interim director of the IKGA until October 2015, when Birgit Kellner took over as the institute’s director.

Even more than the gifted, insightful and ever-questioning scholar, it is the calm, serene man, the jester who criticized the madness of the powerful (but himself certainly not insensitive to power), the man of warmth, wine and life, the generous man, who is missed today. I miss
him when remembering the warm welcome he gave me on my arrival in Vienna on 6 October 2003, or the joyful way he played, already very ill, with our six-month-old son Simon that November evening in 2013 “beim Inder.” Helmut belonged to a time when trial and error was an integral part of scientific endeavor. What remains of that, at a time when everyone finds refuge behind the akṣaras of reassuring manuscripts? About all this, Helmut did not care, he whose voice still invites us to think and live, here and now, far from metaphysical “backworlds,” occultism of all kinds, or intellectual fashions.

Vincent Eltschinger
Publications of Helmut Krasser

Monographs


Edited volumes


Articles


How to teach a Buddhist monk to refute the outsiders – Text-critical remarks on some works by Bhāviveka. Dhīḥ 51 (2011) 49–76.


**Book reviews**


Preparation for publication (editing, copy editing, indices, etc.)


**Editorship**

From 2006, general editor of the series *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde* (together with Birgit Kellner and Helmut Tauscher), ATBS.


From 2007, editor of the series *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens*, VÖAW.

From 2011, editor of the series *Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region* (together with Dramdul [Beijing] and Harunaga Isaacson [Hamburg]), China Tibetology Publishing House and VÖAW.
1. Introduction

In August 2012, at the 5th Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies, Ye Shaoyong presented a preliminary report on a single folio of an unknown commentary on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (hereafter VinSg), along with other discoveries. Since then, I have been editing and translating this manuscript fragment as part of a larger project in which I am currently engaged. At first, like any other scholar interested in Yogācāra philosophy and manuscript studies, the news of the appearance of a new Sanskrit fragment of an unknown commentary on the VinSg made me quite excited. This turned into still greater enthusiasm when permission was granted from Ye and Peking University to include this very fragment of the commentary on the VinSg, along with two other fragments of the VinSg, in my current project. However, the difficulty of the text, not only due to its lack of Tibetan or Chinese counterparts, but also because of its textual peculiarities and complexities, soon marred
the initial excitement as I started deciphering the manuscript fragment. Then, a silver lining to the cloudy situation appeared when Lambert Schmithausen agreed to take a look at an earlier version of the edition of this manuscript fragment and kindly provided his comments. This turn of events no doubt improved the understanding of the text on one hand, and on the other also further led me to think of the text itself as some sort of lecture notes on the VinSg passages. Still, there remained numerous problems and questionable elements in the text, which still cannot be well explained at present. Another inspiration came from Krasser’s article “How to Teach a Buddhist Monk to Refute the Outsiders” (2011), in which he claims that Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa (hereafter PP) displays certain “digressions” that seem to have been written down by students who were being trained to debate based on their teacher’s oral instructions. Despite the great difference in its style, contents, and genre from the PP, the text of our interest here also displays such elements, which could be interpreted as evidence for the possibility that this commentary reflected a monastic education system in much the same way as the PP’s digressions.

2. A new Sanskrit fragment of an unknown commentary on the Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī

Ye has given a preliminary report on the miscellaneous leaves preserved in bundle no. 15–17 of the collection of Sanskrit manuscripts formerly preserved in the China Ethnic Library, and his identifications were made based on a microfilm preserved at the Research Institute of Sanskrit manuscripts and Buddhist Literature at Peking University. The bundles contain various texts, such as the Sūtrālaṅkārapiṇḍārtha by Sajjana, the Sūtrālaṃkāraadhikārasaṃgati by Mahājana, the Sūtrālaṃkāraparicaya, the Mahāyānottaratantraparicaya, an unknown commentary on the

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3 My initial attempt to understand the first part of the text and more information on the manuscript fragment can be found in Choi 2017.


5 Ye 2013: 233.
A study on an unknown and unusual commentary on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*

Madhyamakāloka and so on. The unknown commentary on the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* belongs to bundle no. 17. It is a palm leaf folio of six lines on both sides, with two string holes. The folio number twelve is written on the verso side. Its script is Proto-Nāgarī, which could be dated back to ca. 8th–9th century. Despite the poor quality of the microfilm, one can read most of the text relatively well, except for the beginning of the first line and a few smudged spots on the verso side.

Unfortunately, neither Tibetan or Chinese equivalents of this commentary, nor information on its authorship is known to us. The root text of the commentary corresponds to the beginning part of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which does not have any extant Sanskrit witnesses. It covers about one folio of the Tibetan translation (VinSg, T 30 1579, 581a4–582b3; VinSg, T 30 1584 1020c03–24). It is difficult to gauge the entire length of the text itself, but its folio number ‘twelve’ and the fact that the corresponding Tibetan text begins at the end of the 8th folio of the VinSg section assures us that it represents a commentary on the beginning part, at least, of the VinSg.

3. Transliteration of folio no. 12

**Editorial remarks**

There are no *daṇḍa* symbols found in the folio. Punctuation is marked with dots (•) that are not easily distinguishable from filler marks (e.g., the one in front of the first string hole in v3 and those at the end of line v5 and v6 in the transliteration). Punctuation dots are all replaced with the *daṇḍa* mark ‘|’ in the following edition. There are also numerous occasions of mistakes in the punctuation, i.e., missing or unnecessarily added dots, which make the already often bewildering text even more complicated. In order to convey the content of manuscript with exact fidelity to how it was composed, no emendations have been made to the original text in this transliteration. Where there is a significant difference between the transliteration and the critical edition, I have added footnotes to the critical edition.

**Symbols used in the transliteration**

|. illegible *aṅgirā*

. illegible part of an *aṅgirā*

[...] unclear reading of *aṅgirā*(s)

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deletion of an akṣara(s) by a scribe
• punctuation mark or half daṇḍa (all switched to daṇḍas ‘|’ in the edition)
○ string hole
* virāma
× filler mark

recto
1 1 .. nn[e] .. [te] .[a sa]habh[āva i]ti • pradarśaya catuṣ[k]ot[i]kam ā[r]a[bh]a[t]e • .. .. .. .. ○ [ṣ]tam api mana ihālayavi[ṇā]naśabdena gṛḥyate • .. .. [ml]i [sy]ād upacāre kiṃ prayaṇanam iti • so yam adoṣaḥ ○ • pratipādyasya yena tenopāyena pratipādanat* ko hi pakṣapātas tadupāyeṣv apradāhāṃṣ[u] • cchandato hi vācāṃ pravṛtti-

2 r arthas tu parīkṣya iti • nirodhasamāpptisamāpannas[ye] mīti? • kāyasākṣīṇaḥ śaṭsaptimbhūmīsthitasya ca bodhisatvasya vipākalakaṣṇenālayaviṇāṇenaha samanvāgamaḥ samudācārasamanvāgamam cādhikṛtyāṃyaḥ vicārah yasmād āha • ālayaviṇāṇena na pravṛttivijñāṇeneti • ālayaviṇāṇenah hi • saty avaśyaṃ

3 jīvasamanvāgamena samanvāgatah avaiśittiko bodhisatva iti • aṣṭamyāṃ bhūmau paryavasthānasyaḥ○tyamtṃ asamudācāṛat* aliyaṃte utpattimantah sarva{[dha]} samkleśadharmās tad iti ca • tasya lakṣanaṃ na ca tataḥ prabhṛti • utpattimantam aliyaṃta iti • ālayārthasya prahāṇat prahāṇaṃ tataḥ kliṣṭaṃ tu

4 manaṃcaturthyaṃ eva prahāṇam • tathā hy ācāryena sahajā satkāyadrśis tadvipaksatvena • tadvyākhyaṇa uktā • ○ tatraivaṃ ca bhūmām uktam sarvāni sahajāni • kelāyitāni mamāyitāni • prahāṇatme • pūrvaṃ eva cāsaḥ drṣṭīkrocabandhanam vigataṃ bhavatīti • yat tarhy uktam vajropamena samādhīnā kliṣṭasya manasāḥ prahāṇam iti •

5 tat katham dvividho hi vajropamaḥ bodhisatvavajropamo buddhābhīmyaṇuttaryavajropamaḥ cety adosāḥ tasya ○ cālayaviṇāṇasya na svabhāvaprahāṇaṃ kin tarhy ālayavyaḥpadeśanīmittyaprahāṇat*

7 The location and the size of this anusvāra is slightly to the right compared to other cases, which are normally bigger and located in the centre or slightly to the left at the top of the akṣaras, except when there is not enough space (see the end of r2). This suggests that here this might not be a scribal error, but an accidental drop of ink or some unknown interlinear mark.

8 It seems that this was originally a ligature with -i, which later faded or was scraped off.
A study on an unknown and unusual commentary on the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī

6 ya vāsanā sa prapācavāsanety ucye at evoktaṃ samkleśā-śrayopādānam jahātiti • yataś ce tāyādi • anan[t]arād evāstādaśa-dhātunirdesat* sambamdhāḥ vijnānaviniścayo vā • prastuta iti prativinaya tascabhāva iti • laksasya laksāne niyatarūpatvāt* svakasvakena la[kṣa]ṇeneti laksāna[s] ..

**verso**

1 lakṣyaṇiyatarūpatvāt* śaṇ eveti • manodhātor agrahaṇaṃ tasyāvya-bhiriktatvād iti • caksurādayas tu • jāti○9to vyavasthāpitāḥ tathā hi yaq anekacaksuḥ kṣaṇaṃ samātānādi[bh]le10dena tad ekataḥ kṛtvā caksurdhātur eva vyavasthāpi ○taḥ vijnānajātya ca śaṇ api vijnānakāyaḥ • ekāṃ vijnānam bhavatiti • tad apy eko dhātur vyaktavya āṣīt* āśrayā-11

2 lambaṇa • sahāyata iti • tad eva jātisāḍrāyaṃ darśayati • caksur-vijnānāśrayatvena hi sarvacaksur aviśiṣṭa○m ityādi • dharmadhātur dvidhā sahāyaś cāvalambaranam ca caityānāṃ svabhāvabhade saty api nokaṭaḥ vijnānabhedād eva ○ tatpratīteḥ prakarsayuktam apakarsayuktaṃ madhyam ca kālam darśayati • teṣaṃ teṣaṃ iti • anekavidhā iti

3 āśrayālāmbaranākārabhedānā sukṣampalakṣaṇabhedatvāt ta eva prabhedato nirdīṣṭhā caksurādīnāṃ tu × ○ duravadhāro bheda iti • jātita evoktaḥ bhedam darśayati • tat ta nāma labhata iti • api ca vijnāna ○nām* vivaksitavāt* tadupakaraṇabhāvena caksurādīnāṃ nirdeśa iti • na teṣaṃ bhedo āṅgiyikriya •

4 yathā[gh]nyarthitvād indhanabhēdam anāḍṛtya tasyaiva bhedam pratipratipadyate • ekāṃtā vijnānajātīr ityādi • ○ jātyabhede pi tasya bhedam darśayati • nāhaṃ bhikṣava ekadharmam api sanunapasyāmi • laghuparivarttinaṃ ya ○ thedam cittam • cittam hi bhikṣavo laghupariva[ṛti tasmā] .. rhi bhikṣavaś cittākuśalāś ca bhaviṣyāmaḥ ceto-

5 vivarttakuśalāś cety asya sūttṛasya12 vyākhyaṇaṃ vijnānakāyapari-jñānam ārabhyeti • adhiṣṭhānataḥ pra ○ yojanataḥ svabhāvataś ca

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9 Unusual punctuation or filler mark in the space created by the string hole. It could possibly be just a drop of ink, but it is unfortunately hard to tell due to the quality of the digital image of the manuscript.

10 Compare with the akṣara ‘-bhe’ in svabhāvabhede in the following line (v2).

11 Cf. āśrayālāmbana- at the beginning of v3.

12 This is a ligature that seems at first glance to signify a long vowel ‘ā’, but is more likely to be an extended ligature of ‘-y’. 
sūtravyākhyānam • cetoviśuddhipratipannako bhikṣur adhiśṭhānam 
vijñānakāyaparijñānam pra○yojanam ttribhir ākārair ātita sva[bh]. .. [ḥ kaḥ 
puna] .. .[i]nn asya samābhavāḥ samkleśavinṛtvivasthāne ×

6 pravṛttivijñānalambanena manasikāreṇa • samkleśaprahāne 
prayujyata ity uktaṃ bhavati • vibhā•gārtham idam ārabdhāṃ ity eke • 
ālaya-vijñānam eva cīttaṃ ity uktaṃ pravṛttivijñāne pi cīttaṃ 
pravṛttivijñānalambanena manasikāreṇa • samkleśaprahāne 
prayujyata ity uktaṃ bhavati • vibhā•gārtham idam ārabdhāṃ ity eke • 

4. Critical edition and translation with its root text

Symbols used in the critical edition

(…) reconstructed text in a gap
‹…› reconstructed text without a gap
... correction of error(s)
{…} editorial deletion of superfluous akṣara(s) or mark(s).
.. illegible akṣara
. illegible part of an akṣara
daṇḍa
italics quotations from other texts

The commentary fragment can be divided into three sections in accordance 
with the division system in Hakamaya’s edition of the root text (Hakayama 
2001). Each section consists of four parts: (1) root text in Tibetan and 
Chinese (in the order of the translation of Xuanzang and Paramārtha), (2) 
English translation of the root text, (3) critical edition of the commentary 
fragment, and (4) English translation of the commentary. The phrases or 
words that are being commented in the commentary are marked in bold 
and quotations in the commentary from other texts are indicated by italics 
(only in the critical edition). Related primary sources are found in the 
footnotes to the critical edition. For referential convenience, recto and 
verso numbers are inserted in bold, both in the critical edition and in its 
English translation. The Tibetan version of the root text is marked in the 
footnotes. Gemination issues (e.g., avaivarttiko bodhisatva) and the usage 
of anusvāra (m) instead of n, ū have not been corrected in the critical 
edition, but presented in classical forms in the translation and discussion.
4.1. Section 1 r1–r6 corresponding to §II in Hakamaya’s edition

In the first section, the root text presents four propositions (mu bzhi, catuṣkoṭika*) regarding the question of whether all those with the store mind (kun gzhi rnam par shes pa, ālayavijñāna) have actual perception (’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa, pravṛttivijñāna) and vice versa. The commentary pays attention only to three points:

1. why the afflicted notion [of ‘I’] (kliṣṭamanas) is not separately mentioned in these four propositions (catuṣkoṭīka);
2. what “a person who has attained the attainment of cessation” (’gog pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa la snyoms par zhugs pa, nirodhasamāpattisamāpanna*) refers to (Hakamaya §III.2.[a]);
3. why “non-retrogressing bodhisattva” (avaivartiko bodhisattva) is mentioned in the root text.

4.1.1. Root text (Hakamaya 2001: 408–410 §II)

VinSg, D zhi 8b6–9a3; P zi 10a8–b6

1. gang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pa de ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dang yang ldan la | gang ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dang ldan pa de yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang yang ldan pa yin nam zhe na |

2. mu bzhi ste |
   (a) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang ldan pa la ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dang mi ldan pa ni gnyid log pa sems med pa dang | brgyal bar gyur pa sems med pa dang | ’du shes med pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa dang | ’gog pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa la snyoms par zhugs pa dang | ’du shes med pa’i sems can rnam pa sdb mi shes pa sdb sems kyi nang du skyes pa’o |
   (b) ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dang ldan la | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang mi ldan pa ni sems yod pa’i gnas skabs na dgra bcom pa dang | rang sangs rgyas dang | phyir mi ldog pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ dang | de bzhin gshegs pa’o |
   (c) gnyi ga dang ldan pa ni sems yod pa’i gnas skabs de las gzhan pa dag na’o |
   (d) gnyi ga dang mi ldan pa ni dgra bcom pa dang | rang sangs rgyas dang | phyir mi ldog pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ dang | de bzhin gshegs pa ’gog pa la snyom par zhugs pa dang | phung po’i lhag ma med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa’i dbyings na’o |
1. Are all those who are accompanied by the store mind (ālayavijñāna) accompanied by the [six forms of] actual perception (pravṛttivijñāna), or are all those who are accompanied by pravṛttivijñāna accompanied by ālayavijñāna?

2. [In this regard,] there are four propositions (mu bzhi, catuṣkoṭika*):
   (a) those who are accompanied by ālayavijñāna, but not by pravṛttivijñāna are:
       those who are in deep sleep without consciousness (gnyid log pa sens

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med pa); those who faint without consciousness (brgyal bar gyur pa sens med pa); those who attained the attainment of non-apperception (’du shes med pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa); those who attained the attainment of cessation (’gog pa’i snyoms par ’jug pa la snyoms par zhugs pa, nirodhasamāpatti*); and those who are born among non-apperceptive beings.

(b) those who are accompanied by pravṛttivijñāna, but not by ālayavijñāna are:

arhats, pratyekabuddhas, non-retrogressing bodhisattvas (phyir mi ldog pa’i byang chub sens dpa’); and tathāgathas in the state of being conscious (sens yod pa’i gnas skabs);

(c) those who are accompanied by both are the ones in the state of being conscious other than those [mentioned above] (sens yod pa’i gnas skabs de las gzhan pa dag);

(d) those who are accompanied by neither of them are:

arhats, pratyekabuddhas, non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, and tathāgathas who attained the samādhi of cessation, and those dwelling in the realm of nirvāṇa without remainder (phung po’i lhag ma med pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa’i dbyings na’o).

4.1.3. Critical edition of the commentary

Another possible emendation could be pradarśya (gerund), depending on the syntax of the previous sentence, which is impossible to reconstruct.

15 AKBh 54.2 on AK 2.22: chandato ’pi hi vācām pravṛttir arthas tu parīkṣyayā. Cf. AKVy 126.21: chandato hi vācām pravṛttih. arthas tu parīkṣyayi iti.

16 See fn. 7 above.

17 Ms. jīva-. The confusion might have occurred given the similarity between the akṣaras vu and ba and the familiarity of the word ‘jīva’, which might prove that
avaivartiko bodhisatva iti | aṣṭamāṃ bhūmau paryavasthānaprayāṃtām
asamudācārāt* ‹ | tad iti ca18 {]} tasya lakṣaṇam ‹ | na ca tataḥ prabhṛti {]} uttattimantā{m} ālayamta iti | ālayarthaṃṣa prahāṇat prahāṇam tat{aḥ} ‹ kliṣṭam tu (r4) manaś caturthāṃ eva prahāṇam | tathā hy ācāryena sahāja satkāyadrṣṭis tadvipaksatvena { }] tadvāyākyāna utkā | tatraiva{m} ca bhūm<y>ām19 uktam ‹ | sarvāni sahajāni {]] kelāyītāni mamāyītāni {]] prahāyamte prahāyamte | pūrvar eva cāṣya drṣṭikṛṭtabhandhānaṃ vigatam bhavatīti | yat tarhy uktam vajropamena samādhinā kliṣṭasya manasaḥ prahāṇam iti20 {]] (r5) tat kathaṃ ‹ | dvividhī hi vajropamaḥ ‹ | bodhisvatvavajropamo buddhabhūmyānuttaryavajropamaś cety adoṣaḥ ‹ | tasya cālayavijñānasya na svabhāvaprahāṇam ‹ | kin tarhy ‹ | ālayavapadesāṇimittaprahāṇat* ‹ | anyathā hy arhataḥ pravrīttiṣvijñānanam kuta utpadyeta { | tannimitam ca prapancavasanaan ‹ | abhinivīṣṭānaṃ ca pravrīttiṣvijñānanānām (r6) yā vāsanā sa prapancavasanety ucyate ‹ | ata evoktaṃ samklesāśrayopādānaṃ jahāti]| 4.1.4. Translation of the commentary

Having shown ... that [in contrast to the view of other traditions, according to which several viṇānas can] “occur at the same time (sahabhāva)”, [the author] begins [from here with] the four propositions (catuskotika).

... “the afflicted notion [of ‘I’]” (kliṣṭam api maṇaḥ) is also included (gṛhyate)23 here in the word “store mind” (ālayavijñāna). ... What is

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18 See the definition of ālayavijñāna in MSg I.3.
19 Ms. bhūmām.
20 Cf. AS 52.8–11 kāmadhātau bhāvanāprahātavāyāḥ satkāṣāḥ | sahajā satkāyasrṣṭiṣṭ antagrāhadrṣṭīḥ rāgah pratigho māna vidyā ca | rūpadhātau bhāvanāprahātavāyāḥ pañca kleśāḥ sthāpayītā pratīghan | rūpadhātuvad ārūpyadhātaḥ api | evam ca bhāvanāprahātavāyānākāvāḥ saṣṭih kleśāḥ |; AKBh 290.19–20: sahajā satkāyadrṣṭiṣṭiṣṭ avyakṛtā; DBhS R 39 Bhūmi IV.E: tasya khalu punar bhavanta jinaputrā bodhisvatasyāvāṃ arcīṣmatyāṃ bodhisvatavābhūmāh sūtaṃṣa yānāṁāni satkāyadrṣṭipārayānāmāni ātmasvāvapoṣapūgadalaskandadhāvatiṣṭiṣṭābh īnvēṣasamucchitānyā n miṣṣāāni n miṣṣāāni vicīntāāni viṭākāāni keliṣṭāāni mamāyītāāni dhānaṣṭhānāni nīketasthānāni tāni sarvāni vigatāāni bhavantī sma .
21 Hakamaya 2001: 407 (I.5.h.C.3) kun nas nyon mongs pa’i gnas ngan len (read len pa) thams cad spong ba.
22 Cf. Hakamaya 2001: 401–2 (§I-4); Waldron 2003: 182 (“concurrence”): gang sngar bstan pa’i yid gang yin pa de ni dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cīg ’byung zhir ’jug ste | ... 
23 PW s.v. grabh 21: in sich enthalten, ~ begreifen, zugleich bezeichnen.
the purpose (pravojana) of the unconventional usage (upacāra)\textsuperscript{24} (i.e., klišṭamanas is understood with the word ālayavijñāna)? This is not faulty (adoṣa) because what should be conveyed (pratipāda) can be conveyed with this or that [verbal] means (upāya). Why should there be a preference (paksapāta) in regard to the means for that [purpose] that are not principal (apradhāna)? It is [because], as stated [in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya] “the occurrence (pravṛtti) of words (vācāṃ) [could] happen as one desires (chandato)\textsuperscript{25} (r2) however, the meaning (artha) should be carefully examined (parikṣya).”

“Of a person who has attained the attainment of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti-samāpanna)”\textsuperscript{26} here refers to the accompaniment by the store mind (ālayavijñāna) [inasmuch as it is] characterized by the [result of] maturation [of previous karma] (vipākalakṣaṇa) of a bodhisattva who is a physical witness (kāyasākṣin)\textsuperscript{27} and who dwells on one of the levels [from the first six] to the seventh (saṭsaptamibhūmisthitasya).\textsuperscript{28} This

\textsuperscript{24} For more information about the term upacāra in the context of Yogācāra philosophy, see Tzohar 2018.
\textsuperscript{25} For the original text quoted in the AKBh, see fn. 15 above. Cf. Sakurabe 1969: 279 議論は[しようと]思えば「いくらでも」できる。[肝腎なのは、その正しい]意味を究明することである。; La Vallée Poussin 1923–1931: 1. 149 (II.22): Les mots obéissent au caprice, mais il faut examiner le sens.
\textsuperscript{26} Tib. ’gog pa'i snyoms par ‘jug pa la snyoms par zhugs (Hakamaya 2001: 409 [§II.2.(a)]). Cf. “the equipose of cessation” for nirodhasamāpatti in Cox 1995: 255f.
\textsuperscript{27} Lexicographical explanation of this term is found as follows: AKBh-Index I s.v. kāyasākṣin “Tib. lus kyis mngon <sum> du byed pa; 真諦訳: 身證; 玄奘訳: 身證、得滅定”; BHSD s.v. kāyasākṣin “personal, bodily, physical witness; one who has seen (the circumstance) in flesh”; SWTF s.v. kāyasākṣin “‘Körperzeuge’: der mit dem Körper (die Wahrheit) realisiert hat”. In the Yogācāra context, a kāyasākṣin is described as a learner (śaikṣa), who has experienced the eight methods of salvation (vimokṣa) (also the nirodhasamāpatti) ‘with the body’ (in person, directly). Strictly speaking, the nirodhasamāpatti can indeed only be experienced physically, since the conscious mental factors are eliminated; at the same time, this experience is a nirvāṇa or nirvāṇa-like experience (cf. ASBh 125, 13f: mokṣasadrśo vihārāḥ; AKBh 363,17: nirvāṇasadrśi).
\textsuperscript{28} The first component of this compound, ‘ṣaṭ-’, is unclear for several reasons. First of all, if it does mean the sixth level, ‘ṣaṣṭhi-‘ instead of ‘ṣat’ would be expected in the compound. Also a text passage that ensures that a bodhisattva can only enter the norodhasamāpatti from the sixth stage has not yet been detected in any related sources, at least according to my limited research so far. Schmithausen has carefully suggested the following alternate reading: “a bodhisattva who dwells on one of the levels [from the first] to the seventh (*ā-saptamī-bhūmisthita?y? [including].)” (whereby only one who also has not yet reached the first level and is therefore not yet an ārya would be excluded), but also admits that this is probably not how the text should be read.
consideration (*vicāra*) is regarding the accompaniment (*samanvāgama*) in the sense of the actual occurrence (*samudācāra*) [of the respective *vijñāna*],\(^{29}\) because “[one who is accompanied] by the store mind and not [accompanied] by actual perception (*ālayavijñānena na pravṛttivijñānena*)”\(^{30}\) is mentioned [in the VinSg]. As long as the store mind (*ālayavijñāna*) exists, one is inevitably (*avaśyaṃ*) \(^{(r3)}\) accompanied by [*pravṛttivijñāna*](s) as well, but only in the sense that the person is accompanied by its seed(s) (*bīja*) [and not necessarily with occurring *pravṛttivijñānas*].

“Non-retrogressing bodhisattva (*avaivartiko bodhisattva*)”\(^{31}\) is mentioned because, in the eighth level [of a *bodhisattva*], an actual outburst [of *kleśa*] (*parvavasthāna*) has absolutely (*atyaṃ*) no actual occurrence (*asamudācārāt*). ‘[It is called *ālayavijñāna* because] all the defiled factors (*saṃkleśadharmāḥ*), as long as they [actually] arise (*utpatti–mantah*), cling to (*ālīyante*), it [i.e., *ālayavijñāna*] as their cause.’\(^{32}\) And this is the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of it [i.e., *ālayavijñāna*] [as we read in the MSg I.3].\(^{33}\) But (ca) from [the eighth level] onwards [tataḥ prabhṛti], the [actually] arising [defiled elements] no longer cling to [the *ālayavijñāna*]. Since the meaning of ‘*ālaya*’ is removed, [it is said in the VinSg that] it (*tat = *ālayavijñāna*) is removed.\(^{34}\) The afflicted notion [of ‘I’], however, (r4) is already removed at the fourth [level]. Thus (tathā *hi*), the [subtle] innate (*sahaja*) wrong view of a substantial ego (*satkāyadṛṣti*)\(^{35}\) is stated as its hindrance (*tadvipakṣatva*) by the Teacher\(^{36}\) in the commentary.

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\(^{30}\) Tib. ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dang ldan la | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang mi ldan pa (Hakamaya 2001: 409 [§II.2.(b)])

\(^{31}\) Tib. phyir mi ldog pa’i byang chub sans dpa’ (Hakamaya 2001: 409 [§II.2.(b)])

\(^{32}\) For a more detailed discussion of this term, see Schmithausen 2014: 61ff.

\(^{33}\) MSg I.3: It is [called] *ālayavijñāna* because all dharmas that are subject to origination and are polluotional (*sāṁkleśika*) stick (*ālīyante*, i.e., are related) to it as [its] effects (*phalabhāvena*), or because it sticks (*ālīyate*, i.e., is related) to them as [their] cause (*hetubhāvena*). ... (Schmithausen 2014: 143).

\(^{34}\) The source in the VinSg is yet to be identified.


\(^{36}\) It seems that “teacher” refers to Vasubandhu, for a corresponding statement is found in the Daśabhūmikasūtra-vyākhyāna (D ngi 111b6ff): ‘jig tshogs la lta ba la sogs pas bsdus pa lhan cig skyes pa’i nyon mongs pa phra mo kun du ’byung ba.
to it (*tadvākhyāne, *tad = the fourth level). Moreover, it is stated as such in regard to the very level (i.e., the fourth level): “All the [states that are] innately (*sahaja*) cared for (*kelāyita*),

37

cherished as one’s own (*mamayita*),

38

are eradicated. Also, the fetter of wrong views has already disappeared from him previously [namely, by entering the first *bhūmi*].”

How, then, is it stated that the afflicted notion [of ‘I’] (*kliṣṭamanas*) is removed by means of vajra-like concentration (*vajropamena samādhinā*)”? (r5)

It is because there are two kinds of *vajropama*; the vajra-like [concentration] of a bodhisattva as well as the supreme vajra-like [concentration at the moment of entering] the buddhabhūmi. Thus, there is no mistake [in the statement of the present text that *ālayavijñāna* (which here comprises the kliṣṭamanas) is no longer existent in non-retrogressing bodhisattvas, i.e., on the eighth *bhūmi*]. Again, the store mind is not removed in terms of own-being (*svabhāva*) [as such as the eighth *vijñāna*]. How then? For [it refers to] the eradication of the reason for the designation “*ālayavijñāna*” (*ālayavyapadeśanimittaprahāṇāt*).

Otherwise where would the actual perception (*pravṛttivijñāna*) [as far as they still cling to anything as I or mine] of an arhat arise from? Its basis is the latent imprint of conceptual proliferation (*prapañcavāsanā*). (r6) The latent imprint (*vāsanā*) of the sticking (*abhiniviṣṭa*) actual perceptions (*pravṛttivijñāna*) is called “the latent imprint of conceptual proliferation (*prapañcavāsanā*)”. That is exactly why it is said [in the previous section of VinSg]: “[the arhat] gives up the appropriation of the base of pollution (*samkleśāśrayopādāna*).”

4.2. **Section 2 r6–v4 corresponding to §III in Hakamaya’s edition**

The second section of the root text deals with the question why only the six realms of perception (*rnam par shes pa’i khams drug po*), out of the eighteen realms (*khams bco brgyad po dag la*), are established from the

37 BHSD s.v. *kelāyati*: (1) cleans up, puts in order; (2) tends, keeps up, looks after (fields); (3) *tends, cares for (persons)*; (4) cares for, cultivates, devotes oneself to (states of existence); (5) attends to, prepares (by cooking).

38 BHSD s.v. *mamāyati*.

39 Tib. *kun nas nyon mongs pa’i gnas ngan len* (read *len pa*) *thams cad spong ba* (Hakamaya 2001: 407 [§I.5.(b).C.3]). In his comments on an earlier version of the present edition, Schmithausen suggested understanding *samkleśāśraya* as *ālayavijñāna*: the *ālayavijñāna*, insofar as it is the basis of the defilement, or the corresponding *prapañcavāsanā* in the *ālayavijñāna*. He also pointed out that the expression *samkleśāśrayopādāna* in this part of the VinSg may be understood somewhat differently from other occasions in the same text; cf. Schmithausen 2014 §237.1, fn. 1295 and 1296.
aspect of their own-beings, with the other realms being established from the aspects of their basis (\textit{gnas}, \textit{āśraya*}), their objective support (\textit{dmigs pa}, \textit{ālambana*}), and their associated mental factors (\textit{grogs}, \textit{sahāya*}). The commentary begins with its explanation of the propositional phrase \textit{(gang gi phyir, yataś ca)} and, again, comments on eight phrases of the root text in total. It is noteworthy here that the two phrases \textit{`[all the factors,] each having particular own-being'} (\textit{ngo bo nyid so sor nges pa, pratiniyatasvabhāva}) and \textit{“through the characteristic of each of their own”} (\textit{rang rang gi mtshan nyid, svakasvakena lakṣanena}) are expounded as different relations between the two philosophical terms \textit{‘what is being defined (lakṣya)’} and \textit{‘defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa)’}.

4.2.1. Root text (Hakamaya 2001: 410–412 §III)

VinSg \textit{D zhi} 9a3–b3; P \textit{zi} 10b6–11a8

1. \textit{gang gi phyir} nang dang phyi rol gyi chos thams cad \textit{ngo bo nyid so sor nges pa ni} | so so \textit{rang rang gi mtshan nyid} la rnam par gnas pa yin na | 'o na c'i phyir khaps bco brgyad po dag las rnam par shes pa'i kham drug po dag ni ngo bo nyid las rnam par gzhag la | de las gzhans pa'i khams rnam ni \textit{gnas dang | dmigs pa dang | grogs las} rnam par gzhag ce na |

2. \textit{(a)} rnam par shes pa'i kham drug po gang yin pa 'di dag ni nyin mo dang mtshan mo de \textit{dang de dag} 'das pa dang | skad cig de \textit{dang de dag} 'das pa dang | thang cig dang | yud tsam de \textit{dang de dag} 'das nas | rgyu de dag dang rkyen de dag la brten te | mig la sogs pa gnas rnam dang | gzugs la sogs pa dmigs pa rnam dang | sems las byung ba grogs rnam\textit{s kyis rnam pa du ma} rnam pa mang po sna tshogs dag 'byung zhing | gnas gang dang gang nas 'byung ba de \textit{dang de'i ming 'thob po} |

\textit{(b)} 'di lta ste | dper na me ni rgyu gang dang gang kho na la brten te 'bar ba de dang de'i grangs su 'gro ste | rtswa dag dang shing dag dang | lci ba dag dang | phub ma dag dang | sbur ma dag la brten te 'bar ba'i me ni rtswa'i me zhes bya ba nas | rgyas par sbur ma'i me zhes bya ba'i bar gyi grangs su 'gro ba de bzhin du mig dang gzugs rnam las brten te | rnam par shes pa 'byung ba ni mig gi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba'i grangs su 'gro ste | de bzhin du rgyas par yid dang chos kyi bar la brten pa ni | yid kyi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba'i bar gyi grangs su 'gro bar rig par bya'o |
1. 問。内外諸法、自性各別、各住自相、何因縁故、十八界中、唯六識界、自性建立、所餘諸界、為彼所依所縁助伴、而建立耶。

2. 答。
   (a) 由六識界、於彼彼念瞬息須臾日夜等位、速疾轉變、託彼彼緣、依眼等根、緣色等境、用諸心所、以爲助伴、非一衆多、種種生起、由彼彼依之所生故、得彼彼名。
   (b) 如、火依附彼彼緣故、而得燒然、爾時便得彼彼名數、由諸草木牛糞糠札等爲緣故、火方得然、爾時便數、名爲草火乃至札火、如是、眼色以爲緣故、眼識得生、數名眼識、如是乃至、數名意識、廣説應知。
   (c) 餘眼等界、若彼自性、從初生已、即彼自性、相似生起、展轉相續、究竟隨轉。
   (d) 又一識類、藉彼彼緣、種種差別、自性生起、是故、識界自性建立、所餘諸界、爲彼所依所縁助伴、而得建立。

VinSg_xt T 30 582a13–28
1. 一切内外法各有定性。於相不動。何故從十八界唯説六識。有定性故。所餘諸界是根是塵是伴侶故。

2. (a) 此諸識等且日夜持息羅繭時過故。種種因緣眼等諸根色等諸塵。心數爲伴種種緣生。隨所生處得名不同。
   (b) 如、火燒物、隨所燒處、得種種名、謂草火木火糞火、因眼因色、隨識得生、皆名眼識、乃至心識、亦復如是。
   (c) 眼等諸界、從始至終、皆是果報無記有異相。
   (d) 識則不爾。是故、分别識界、不明餘界。
4.2.2. Translation of the root text

1. Since, moreover, all the internal and external (nang dang phyi rol gyi) factors, each having a particular own-being (ngo bo nyid so sor nges pa), are established (rnam par gnas pa) in each of their own characteristics (rang rang gi mtshan nyid), then why are [only] the six realms of perception (rnam par shes pa’i khams drug po) out of the eighteen realms (khams bco brgyad po dag la) established from the aspect of their own-beings and the other realms are established from the aspects of their basis (gnas), their objective support (dmigs pa), and their associated mental factors (grols)?

2. (a) Those that are the realms of sixfold perception, having passed beyond each of those night and day (nyin mo dang mtshan mo), passed beyond each of those moments (skad cig), and having passed beyond each of those minutes (thang cig), and having passed beyond each of those instants (yud tsam), based on all the aspects of causes (rgyu) and conditions (rkyen), by means of the bases such as eyes, etc., objective support such as matter, etc., and by means of the accompaniment of mental factors, having arisen in many forms and in many ways (rnam pa du ma rnam pa mang po sna tshogs dag, anekavidhābhunānā-prakārāḥ), each obtains its name (ming, nāman).

(b) For example, when fire (me, agni) burns, based on its corresponding cause, it is counted with its respective name (grangs su ’gro ste). When it comes to fire, based on grasses (rtswa), woods (shing), cow dung (lci ba), husks (phub ma), chaffs (sbur ma), it is counted as grass-fire (rtswa’i me) and so on up to chaff-fire (sbur ma’i me). Likewise, it has to be known that when it comes to perception arisen based on the eye and matters, it is counted as the perception of the eye and so on up to when it comes to [the perception] arisen based on the mind and phenomenon, it is counted as the perception of the mind.\[338\]


\[42\] In the later part of the VinSg, where the five skandhas are explained in detail, this metaphor is mentioned in regard to the differentiation of the basis of perception (vijñāna). The Sanskrit text is partly preserved in the fragments from the St. Petersburg Collection that are currently being edited by the author (corresponding to VinSg D 42b1–2; P 44b6–8; VinSgXa 595a07–09; VinSgPs 1030b25–27):

VinSgms 18v8–19r1: tatrāśrayaprabhedaḥ saṃ ime āśrayā vijñānasvāṃpravṛttaye tadāthā cakṣurādīni śaṣāyanāti āśrītiṣya sadvijñānakāyāḥ pravarttante tussakaśṭhagomayaśākalīkāśrītāṅguṇasṛṣṭiḥ vijñānasvāṃpravṛttayeḥ śaṣāyanāt
dvīpadaḥ āśrayā vijñānasvāṃpravṛttayeḥ śaṣāyanāt
(c) The realms of the others such as the eye and so on, from the beginning, which arise based on the own-being, arise similarly (’dra bar) to the very same own-being, transmit from one to another (gcig nas gcig tu brgyud pas), and will always continue to function (rjes su ’jug par ’gyur).

(d) The perception of an identical type (rnam par shes pa rigs gcig pa), based on causes and conditions, arises as various manifold own-beings (rnam pa tha dad pa’i ngo bo nyid). Therefore, the realms of perception are established from the aspect of the very same own-being. The other realms are established from the aspect of [their] base, objective support, and associated mental factor.

4.2.3. Critical edition of the commentary

yataś cetyādi • anantarād evaśtādaśadadhātunirdesāt* saṁbāmdhāḥ vijnānavinīscayo vā [ ] prastuta iti [ ]

pratini(na)yatasvabhāvā43 iti | lakṣyasya lakṣaṇe niyatarūpatvāt* [ ]

svakasvakena lakṣaṇeneti lakṣaṇas(ya) (v1) lakṣaṇiyatarūpatvāt*44 [ ]

ṣaḍ eveti | manohdhātor agrahaṇaṃ tasyāvyaṭiriktatvād iti | caksurādayas tu [ ] jātito vyavasthāpitāḥ [ ] tathā hi yad aneka<m> caksuḥ ksāna<m> samānādibhedena tad ekataḥ kṛtvā caksurdhātur eva vyava-sthāpitāḥ [ ] vijnānajātyā<m>45 ca ṣaḍ api vijnānakāyā [ ] ekam vijnānam bhavatīti | tad apy eko dhātur vyaktavya āsīt* [ ]

āśrayā(v2)lambana[ ]sahāyata iti | tad eva jātisādṛśyam darśayati | caksurviṣṇunāśrayatvena hi sarvacaksur aviṣiṣṭam ityādi | dharmadhātur dvidhā sahāyasya cā<va> lambanam ca [ ] caittānāṃ svabhāvabhede saty api noktaḥ [ ] vijnānavihedēva eva tatpratītēḥ [ ]

prakarṣayuktam apakarṣayuktam madhyam ca kālam darśayati | tešām tešām iti |
anekavidhā iti (v3) āśrayālāṃbanākārabhedena sū{kṣaṃ}palakṣaṇa-bhedatvāt ta eva prabhedato nirdiṣṭāḥ | caksurāḍīnāṃ tu || duravadhāro bheda iti | jātita evoktāḥ ◊

bhedaṃ darśayati | tat ta<n> nāma labhata iti | api ca vijñānānāṃ* vivakṣitatvāt* tadupakaraṇabhāvena caksurāḍīnāṃ nir{d}eṣa iti || na teṣāṃ bheda 'ṅgikriyate | (v4) yathāgnyarthitvād indhanabhedam anādṛtya tasyaiva bhedaṃ prati{prati}padyate |

ekā{ṃ}ntā vijñānajātir ityādi | jātyabhede 'pi tasya bhedaṃ darśayati |

4.2.4. Translation of the commentary

“Since, moreover (yataś ca),”46 etc., is, due to the explanation of the eighteen elements47 (aṣṭādaśadhātunirdeśa) following immediately after (anantara) [the sentence beginning with yataś ca], introduced (prastuta) as the connection (saṃbandha) or as the clarification of the perception (vijñānaviniścaya).

“[All the elements,] each having a particular own-being (pratini-yataśvabhāva)”48 is stated because what is being defined (lakṣya) has a particular nature (niyata-rūpa) regarding its defining characteristic (lakṣaṇa).

“Through each of their own characteristics (svakasvakena lakṣaṇanena)”49 is stated (v1) because the defining characteristic has a particular nature regarding what is being defined (lakṣyaniyata-rūpatvāt).50

“Only six [realms of perception] (ṣaḍ eva)”51 is stated because the realm of the mental factor (manodhātu, in the traditional sense of the

46 Tib. gang gi phyir (Hakamaya 2001: 410 [§III.1]).
47 Hakamaya 2001: 404 [§I.5.b.B.1]. kun gzhi rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa ‘di la dgongs nas mig gi khams dang | gzugs kyi khams dang | mig gi rnam par shes pa’i khams dang | yid kyi khams dang chos kyi khams dang | yid kyi rnam par shes pa’i khams kyi bar du gsungs te |
48 Tib. ngo bo nyid so sor nges pa (Hakamaya 2001: 410 [§III.1]).
49 Tib. rang rang gi mi shan nyid la (Hakamaya 2001: 410 [§III.1]). Note that the Tibetans translated this instrumental phrase with the locative.
50 Note the slight variation in the basically same syntax of these two sentences. It is not clear if the compound lakṣyaniyata-rūpatvāt is a mere scribal mistake for lakṣye niyata-rūpatvāt, which would match the case in the previous sentence (lakṣaṇe niyata-rūpatvāt).
51 Tib. drug po (Hakamaya 2001: 410 [§III.1]). There is no word corresponding to eva in the Tibetan rendering, whereas both of the Chinese versions clearly render it with the character 唯 wéi (VinSE Xu T 30 582a14; VinSE Pa T 30 1020c14).
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immediately preceding moments of the six vijñānas) is not explicitly mentioned (agrahāna) due to its lack of distinction (avyatiriktatvāt) [from the realms of the sixfold perceptions]. However, the eye [faculty] and so forth are established from the aspect of a type (jāti). In other words, considering many [moments] of the eye [faculty], momentarily by the division of continuity and so on (samāntānādibhedena), from the aspect of oneness (ekataḥ), only the realm of eye [faculty] is established. Again, in regards to the type of perception, the groups of [sixfold] perceptions (vijñānakāyāḥ) also become one and the same perception. Therefore, that (= the one and the same perception) was also supposed to be clarified as the same realm.

With the words “[the other twelve realms besides those of the sixfold perceptions, i.e., sixfold sense faculties and sixfold objects are established] from the aspects of basis (āśraya), (v2) objective support (ālambana), and accompanying [mental] factors (sahāya),”52 [the author of the VinSg] shows just this similarity regarding type (jātisādṛśyaṃ). [As is well known,] “since (hi), as the basis of the eye perception (cakṣurvijñānāśrayatvena), all [moments of] the eye [faculty] are not distinguished,”53 and so forth. The realm of factors (dharmaṁdātātu) is twofold: [it may function] both [as] an accompanying [mental] factor (sahāya) and [as] objective support (ālambana). Although the [accompanying] mental factors each have their own distinct nature (caittānāṃ svabhāvabhede saty api), [the difference] has not been stated, for it is [easily] recognized (pratīti) from the difference of perceptions (vijñānabheda).

[The author of the VinSg] shows long (prakārṣayukta), short (apakārṣayukta), and medium [length] of time with the words “of these und those (teṣāṃ teṣāṃ)”54 [days and nights, etc.].

[The phrase “the realms of perceptions are] of many forms (anekavidha)”55 [indicates that] (v3) only those (= the realms of the sixfold perception) are specified (nirdiṣṭa) from the aspect of [sub]-division (prabhedaṁtātu), because their difference is easy to perceive (sūpalakṣaṇabhedatvāt) by the distinction according to the basis (āśraya), objective support (ālambana), and appearance (ākāra). However, the distinction of the eye [faculty], etc., [among the remaining twelve dhātu]s, is difficult to accurately determine

52 Tib. gnas dang | dmigs pa dang | grogs las (Hakamaya 2001: 410 §§III.1).
53 This might be a quotation or paraphrase from the root text, but the source has not yet been located.
54 Tib. de dang de dag (Hakamaya 2001: 410 §§III.2.(a)).
55 Tib. rnam pa du ma (Hakamaya 2001: 410 §§III.2.(a)).
(duravadhāra), therefore (iti), [they, i.e., the eye faculty and so forth] are stated only from the aspect of type (jāti, i.e., as eye faculty and so forth without further differentiation).

[The author of the VinSg] shows the distinction [of vijñāna among manifold vijñānadhatus] with the words “[it] obtains this or that name (rat tan nāma labhate).”\(^{56}\) In addition, the eye [faculty], etc., (i.e., the other twelve of the eighteen realms) is taught (nirdeśa) as aids for it [i.e., for vijñāna] (tadupakaraṇabhāvena) because it is intended (vivakṣitatva) [to teach] the perceptions (vijñāna).\(^{57}\) Thus, the [sub-]distinction among them (i.e., the eye faculty, etc.) is not accepted (anīkriyate). (v4) For example, when one is interested in fire (agnyarthavat), without being careful of (anādṛtya) the distinction of kindling (indhana), one takes into one’s consideration (pratipadyate) only the distinction of it (i.e., fire).

“The perception of identical type (ekāntā vijñānajātī),”\(^{58}\) etc., indicates that [the author of the VinSg] teaches the distinction of it (i.e., the sixfold perceptions) even when there is no distinction in regard to types.

4.3. **Section 3**

The last section corresponds to the root text right after Hakamaya’s edition ends. This section discusses the three kinds of states of mind that should be known by a monk who has obtained purification of the mind. The commentary begins with a sūtra quotation, which is provided as a source text explained by the VinSg, and analyses the question according to three points: (1) basis (adhiṣṭhāna), (2) purpose (prayojana), and (3) own-being (svabhāva). The commentary fragment ends with an explanation of the relation between the sūtra and the VinSg, introducing three different sources, which are rather hard to identify, except for one in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (Saṃdhi).

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\(^{56}\) Tib. de dang de’i ming ’thob po (Hakamaya 2001: 410 [§III.2.(a)]).

\(^{57}\) Cf. PSkV 15.2f: ... varṇaḥ satśiṣṭāniṣṭaṃ ca caksurviśeṣyatven ca vivakṣiṣṭaḥ; Tib. ... dbyibz kyi khyad par dang bcas pa’i kha dog mig gi yul du ’dod de (“...color having a particular shape is accepted as the object of the eye”); PSkV 29.5f: iha sankṣepasya vivakṣiṣṭatvāḥ ... āśrayābhedena nōka iti |; Tib. ’dir ni mdor bsdu bar bzhed ... pa’i phyir | ’dir gnas la sogs pa’i bya brag ma bshad do (“As [Vasubandhu’s text] is intended to be an abbreviated [explanation] ..., [differentiation of feeling] according to the different kinds of support is not taught [here]”).

\(^{58}\) Tib. rnam par shes pa rigs gcig pa (Hakamaya 2001: 411 [§III.2.(d)]).
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4.3.1. Root text (VinSg, D *zhī* 9b3–5; P *zi* 11a8–1)

\[\text{rnam par shes pa'}i tshogs yongs su shes par bya ba las brtssams te} \text{ dge slong sems rnam par dag par bya ba la zhugs pas rnam pa dus} \text{sems yongs su shes par bya zhe na} \text{ mdo brsdu na rnam pa gsum gyis te} \text{ kun nas nyon mong pa las kun tu dga' ba dang} \text{ kun nas nyon mong pa can gyi nyes dmigs dang} \text{ kun nas nyon mong pa rnam par bzlog pa'}i thabs kyis so} \]

VinSg\text{\textsubscript{Xu}} T 30 582a29–c15

復次當辯識身遍知。問心清净行苾芻。由幾種相遍知其心。答若略說由三種相。一雜染愛樂相。二雜染過患相。三雜染還滅方便善巧相。

VinSg\text{\textsubscript{Pa}} T 30 1020c22–24

若有比丘欲知識聚修習此行令心清净多種相貌能了心者。略說有三。樂著煩惱故。染心為過故。斷惑方便故。

4.3.2. Translation of the root text

**With reference to the thorough understanding of the group of perceptions,** by how many kinds [of states] should the mind be thoroughly known to the monk who has obtained purification of the mind? In brief, there are three kinds: by means of (1) joy (kun tu dga' ba) from affliction (kun nas nyon mons pa), (2) fault (nyes dmigs) of that which is thoroughly afflicted, and (3) reversing/turning away from (rnam par bzlog pa) the affliction.

4.3.3. Critical edition of the commentary (v4–6)

\[\text{nāhaṃ bhikṣava ekadhammapi samanupaśyāmi} \text{ laghuparivarttānam yathedaṃ cittaṃ} \text{ hi bhikṣavao laghuparivartti tasmā(t ta)rhi bhikṣavaś cittakūśalāś ca bhaviṣyāmaḥ ceto(v5) vivarttakūśalāś cety} \text{ asya sūtrasyā vyākhyaṇāḥ vijñānakāyaparijñānam ārabhyeti} \text{ adhiśṭhānataḥ prayaṇanataḥ svabhāvataś ca sūtravyākhyaṇāṃ} \text{ cetovīṣuddhipratiṇāṇaḥ bhikṣur adhiśṭhānaḥ} \text{ vijñānakāyaparijñānaṃ} \text{ prayaṇanāṃ} \text{ ttribhir ākārair iti svabhāvaḥ} \text{ samkleśavinvṛttivavyavasthāne} \]

Cf. AN I 10. 1–4

“nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, aññāṃ ekadhammampi samanupassāmi yam evam lahuparivāttaṃ yathayidam cittaṃ. Yāvaṃcidāṃ, bhikkhave, upamāpi na sukarā yāva lahuparivāttaṃ cittaṃ”ti.
4.3.4. Translation of the commentary

“I do not perceive, monks, even one dharma that is changing as quickly as this mind is. Certainly, monks, the mind changes quickly. Therefore, monks, we should be experts in the mind (v5) and experts in the transformation of the mind.” The explanation of this sūtra [passage] (i.e., the VinSg) reads “with reference to the thorough understanding of the group of perceptions (vijñānakāyaparijñānam ārabhya).”

The explanation of the sūtra [interprets the passage from] (1) the aspect of the basis (adhiṣṭhāna), (2) the aspect of the purpose (prayojana), and (3) the aspect of its own-being (svabhāva). The basis is “the monk who has obtained the purification of the mind (cetovīśuddhi)”. The purpose is “thorough understanding of the group of perceptions (vijñānakāyaparijñānam).” The own-being is “by three kinds (tribhir ākārair).”

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60 Cf. Samdhī V.3: rnam par shes pa de ni len pa’i rnam par shes pa shes kyang bya ste | ‘di ltar des lus ‘di bzung shing blangs pa’i phyir ro | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa shes kyang bya ste | ‘di ltar de lus ‘di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa’i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa’i phyir ro | sems zhes kyang bya ste | ‘di ltar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dang cho [rnam kyis] kun tu bsags pa dang nye bar bsags pa yin pa’i phyir ro |; VinSg, D zhi 182a5; P zi 189b4 rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dngos su na sens yin te | ‘di ltar de ni sa bon thams cad kyis kun tu bsags shing nye bar bsags pa yin no |; also implied in Hakamaya 2001: 480 [§1.6]: de tar na ‘di ni sens dang yid dang rnam par shes pa rnam par gzhag pa’i tshul yang dag pa yin te | de ltar khamgs gsum pa’i sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa thams cad ji skad bstan pa’i tshul ‘dis kun nas yon mongs pa’i tshul dang | rnam par byang ba’i thams cad khong du chub par bya’o | sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa’i tshul gzhan yongs su bstan pa gang yin pa de ni gdul ba’i rim pa nyid kyi phyir te .

61 Tib. rnam par shes pa’i tshogs yongs su shes par bya ba la brtsams te (D zhi 9b3; P zi 11a8).

62 Tib. dge slong sens rnam par dag par bya ba la zhugs pa (D zhi 9b3-4; P zi 11a8).

63 Tib. rnam par shes pa’i tshogs yongs su shes par bya ba (D zhi 9b3; P zi 11a8).

64 Tib. rnam pa gsum gyis Tib (D zhi 9b4; P zi 11a8). Three kinds are listed in the VinSg: (1) kun nas yon mongs pa las kun tu dga’ ba, (2) kun nas yon mongs pa can gyi nyes dmigs, and (3) kun nas yon mongs pa rnam par bzog pa’i thabs.
Again, what is the relation (saṃbandha) of this in regard to this (i.e., the relation between the sūtra and the VinSg)? (v6) It is stated [in the VinSg], in regard to the establishment of the cessation of pollution (samklesavinivrtilyavasthāna), “by attention that takes the actual perception as its object (pravṛttivijñānālamābanena manasikāreṇa), [one] exerts oneself (prayujyate) in the abandonment of pollution (samklesaprahāne).”

Some say, “for the sake of differentiation (vibhāgārtham), this [explanation of the VinSg] has been composed.” Others say, “it is mentioned that ‘only the store mind (ālayavijñāna) is the mind (citta)’ in order to explain (pratipādanāya) that the designation (vyapadeśa) of the mind (citta) exists in regards to the actual perception as well.” Some also say, “because the mind is the topic (adhikāra) [of this part of the VinSg], the explanation of the sūtra that [likewise] has the [mind] as its topic [has been included].”

5. Concluding remarks

As briefly mentioned above and also confirmed in the edition, this is not a word-by-word commentary like other well-known Abhidharma texts, such as the AKBh or ASBh. A few selected keywords are explained, but the majority of the root text remains unmentioned.

Schmithausen has commented that, although it is hard to judge based on a single folio of a text, there could be other possibilities, such as it having been written as explanatory notes as a part of a training tool for the VinSg (or other materials, including the VinSg or a part of the VinSg).

Discussing certain “digressions” or “appendices” in Bhāviveka’s PP, Krasser claims that these digressions were later additions which seem to have been written down by students who were being trained to debate against Yogācāra opponents. Without a doubt, the present commentary text displays great differences in regard to its style and contents. However,

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65 Tib. kun nas nyon mongs pa ldog pa rnam par gzhag pa gang zhe na ... (Hakamaya 2001: 402 [§1.5.(a)ff.]).

66 Tib. ’jug pa’i rnam par shes pa la dmigs pa’i yid la byed pas brtson par byed pa (Hakamaya 2001: 405 [§1.5.(b).B.2]); samklesaprahāne is not reflected in the Tibetan.

67 Related sources are found in Samdhi V3 and other parts of the VinSg. For quotations of these texts, see fn. 60 above. About the discussion regarding this passage, see Schmithausen 2014: 157–170 for his criticism of Matsumoto and Matsumoto’s counter-response in Matsumoto 2016.

68 From a personal conversation between Hartmann and Schmithausen (19 Feb. 2018).

69 Krasser 2011: 49.
we can still imagine a similar situation, i.e., a student taking notes during a lecture, also in the classroom of the Yogācāra school.

Moreover, there are a few elements that might suggest that this commentary on the core idea of Yogācāra doctrine is a similar kind of text, i.e., a training book for the Yogācāra school, written down by students. First of all, the commentary points out an unconventional usage (upacāra) of the term ‘the store mind (ālayavijñāna)’ as including ‘the afflicted notion [of ‘I’] (kliṣṭamanas)’ and explains the reason behind it (r1). This might suggest that it was an additional explanation for students who were familiar with basic terms, but not with their unconventional usage in different contexts. It is also noteworthy that the definition (laksana) of one of the most important terms in the Yogācāra school, ālayavijñāna, is highlighted in the text (r3). One of the most interesting features is that it adopts basic philosophical terms to clarify certain phrases. For example, the terms ‘what is being defined (lakṣya)’ and ‘defining characteristic (laksana)’ are employed to explain the two related phrases “[all the elements,] each having particular own-being (ngo bo nyid so sor nges pa, pratiniyatasvabhāva)” and “through the characteristic of each of their own (rang gi mtshan nyid, svakasvakena laksanena)” in r6–v1; three points, (1) basis (adhiṣṭhāna), (2) purpose (prayojana), and (3) own-being (svabhāva), are utilized to analyse a question presented in the root text in v5. The TJ (TJ D 316a–3; P 361a6-b1), a very similar type of analysis of a root text, in this case the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, is also pointed out by Krasser. Here an opponent’s argument is divided into (1) property possessor (chos can, dharmin), (2) reasons (gtan tshigs, hetu), and (3) examples (dpe, drṣṭānta). Krasser utilizes this instance as one of the key pieces of supporting evidence for his claim that these are notes taken by a beginner student listening to Bhāviveka.70 The TJ and the commentary of our interest are clearly very different from each other. However, the type of textual analytical technique found in both texts seems designed to assist students to understand the texts better.

One should also not rule out the possibility, as Schmithausen assumes, that this text might have been some sort of lecture notes written down by a lecturer, not a student, before giving a lecture. However, there are numerous instances of significant mistakes in the manuscript that can be interpreted as misunderstandings or a lack of understanding the text. For example, the peculiar wording ʻatsaptamibhūmisthitasya makes little sense in the context (r2),71 and the confusion of the key term bīja- with jīva- (r3) might suggest the situation of a student mishearing the intended

70 Krasser 2011: 64–69.
71 See fn. 17 above.
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Furthermore, there are also some minor mistakes: ālayavijñāneḥyaḥ satya avasyāḥ (r2), ālayārthasya prahāṇat prahīṇaṃ tatṛ̣ṣṭaḥ, prativinayataśvabhāvāḥ pratiniyatavabhāvāḥ (r6), cālambanam (v2), saṃkalpanabhedatvāḥ (v3), pratiḥpratiḥpadaye (v4), as well as a number of unnecessarily inserted or missing anusvāras (nirādhasamāptisamāpanasyeṁ in r2, tatraivaṁ in r3, and kṣaṇaṁsaṃtāṇādibhedena in v1). It seems unlikely that a lecturer who had a good understanding of the text would have made such mistakes.

It has to be mentioned that based on a single folio of a Sanskrit manuscript that has no corresponding Tibetan or Chinese translation, it is hard to make any pronouncements about the precise characteristics of the text. Unlike the PP or the TJ, neither its authorship nor the entire length of the commentary is known to us. However, considering the fact that the corresponding root text comprises a doctrinally highly important part of the Yogācārabhūmi(-śāstra) (YoBh), discussing the school’s key notion ‘ālayavijñāna’ and reflecting on the various unusual elements mentioned above, one could argue that this manuscript folio might have been a student’s notes composed, if not during, then perhaps shortly after an intensive lecture on the Yogācāra tradition while the material was still fresh in his mind. It is also possible that some of the mistakes found in the manuscript were introduced later by a scribe during the process of copying. However, we cannot simply conclude this, because it is unknown whether this particular manuscript witness is the original exemplar or is the result of a copying tradition reflecting additions of an indeterminate number of hands over an unknown span of years. Therefore, the assessment of this argument should be postponed until or unless the rest of the manuscript is discovered.

References


72 See fn. 28 above.


D  J. Takasaki et al., sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka bsTan ḥgyur—preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tshad ma 1–21. Tokyo 1981ff.


PañcMBhVin  *Viniścaya of Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ + Manobhūmi* (combined: in the VinSg): YoBh₁ P zi 2a7-111b2; D zhi 1b3–107a4; YBh₁ 579a10–620c21.

PP  *Prajñāpradīpamūlamadhyamakavṛtti* (Bhāviveka).


VinSg  *Viniścayasaṃgrahāṇī* section of the YBh.

VinSg*ms*  Fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript of part of the PañcMBhVin from the St. Petersburg Collection (cf. Choi 2015).

VinSg*Pa*  Paramārtha’s partial translation of the VinSg section of the YoBh (決定蔵論): T 30 1584.

VinSg*t*  Tibetan translation of the VinSg section of the YoBh. D 4038, *zhi* 1–zi 127a4; P 5539, *zi* 1–‘i 142b8.

VinSg*Xu*  Xuanzang’s Chinese translation of the VinSg Section of the YoBh (瑜伽師地論): T 30 1579.


YoBh  *Yogācārabhūmi*-śāstra.

YoBh*₁*  Tibetan translation of the YoBh.
A Buddhist refutation of the existence of a creator God: Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgaṅkārikā

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Introduction: Śubhagupta’s dates and works

(Bhadanta) Śubhagupta (Tib. dGe [b]srung[s]) is generally regarded as the author of seven treatises, out of which two, the *Paralokasiddhi and the *Nairātmyasiddhi, now lost, are known to us only through the lHan kar ma catalogue—which, it is to be noted, does not ascribe them by name to Śubhagupta.¹ The remaining five works, which consisted in independent tracts (in mixed verse and prose?), have come down to us in Tibetan translation and a handful of Sanskrit fragments.² Their stanzas alone have been preserved:

¹ “Logic” section (Tarka’i phyogs), no. 715 (‘Jig rten pha rol grub pa) and 712 (bDag med pa grub pa); see Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 397–398 and 396, respectively. On the *Paralokasiddhi and its commentary (de’i ’grel pa, no. 716) as a work of Śubhagupta, see Steinkellner 1985: 216–218. The attribution of the lost—and anonymous—*Nairātmyasiddhi is very uncertain. Most of the works ascribed to Śubhagupta in the bsTan ’gyur are listed in the lHan kar ma catalogue (gZhan sel ba grub pa [710], Thams cad mkhyen pa grub pa [711], Phyi rol gyi yul grub pa [713], dBang phyug ’jig pa grub pa [714]), testifying to the fact that the Śubhagupta corpus had been rendered into Tibetan by ca. 800. Due to its length, no. 722 (Thos pa brtag pa) seems not to correspond to Śubhagupta’s Śrutiparīkṣākārikā (Frauwallner 1957: 99). Only texts 710, 711, 713, and 714 are explicitly attributed to Śubhagupta. On (Bhadanta) Śubhagupta’s life and works, see Saccone 2019.

² For an overview of the available editions and translations, see Steinkellner/Much 1995: 52–55. For the Sanskrit fragments, see Mikogami 1978 and Matsumoto 1980.
1. Sarvajñasiddhikārikā (D 4243, P 5741, ed. Watanabe 1987: 60–62);
2. Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (D 4244, P 5742, ed. Sastri 1967: 68–87, Mikogami 1986);
3. Śrutiparīkṣākārikā (D 4245, P 5743, partially ed. Eltschinger 1999);
4. Anyāpohavicārakārikā (D 4246, P 5744);

Frauwallner (1961: 147) assigns Śubhagupta’s lifetime to the period 720–780 on the grounds that Śāntarakṣita criticizes some of his views in the Tattvasaṅgraha (see below), a work that likely was already composed as the great Nālandā scholar left for Tibet around 763. The Tibetan polymath Bu ston (1290–1364) regards Dharmottara (740–800 or 750–810) as a pupil (slob ma, *śiṣya) of Dharmākaradatta (alias Arcaṭa, 730–790) and Śubhagupta. As shown by Helmut Krasser, the Ṭīkā Bu ston relied upon for this statement is none other than the Pramāṇaviniścayatīkā, in the colophon of which Dharmottara regards whatever merit his work may have as indebted to these two scholars, without, it is true, presenting them as his teachers. Dharmottara’s alleged authorship of a Bāhyārthasiddhi might strengthen Bu ston’s interpretation, but it should be kept in mind that Dharmottara also showed himself critical of Śubhagupta’s opinions, notably on perception. Finally, according to Tāranātha (1575–1634), the “great logician” (rtog ge ba chen po, *mahātārkika) Śubhagupta was active during the reign of Dharmapāla (last quarter of 8th cent.–early 9th cent.?). In short, the only indisputable fact concerning the chronology of Śubhagupta is that one of his works at least was received around 760. Even through late Tibetan legends, nothing is known of Bhadanta Śubhagupta’s biography, institutional affiliation, or ordination lineage (Sarvāstivāda?).

Śubhagupta’s fame as a heterodox epigone of Dharmakīrti is based on what appears to have been his magnum opus, the 188-verse Bāhyārthasiddhi, in which he attempted to demonstrate the reality of objects external to consciousness and therefore to undermine Dharmakīrti’s arguments in favor of vijñaptimātratā. As a consequence, Bhadanta

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8 See, e.g., Steinkellner 1985: 218.
Śubhagupta incurred sharp criticism from Śāntarakṣita (725–788) and his disciple Kamalaśīla (740–795) in chapter 23 (Bahirarthaparīkṣā) of the Tattvasaṅgraha (pañjikā). This, however, is but one part of the picture, for the rest of Śubhagupta’s extant treatises can be shown to follow an orthodox Dharmakīrtian line (and, for that matter, were apparently never criticized by his coreligionists, a fact that could also be explained by their widely compilatory character). Śubhagupta is in fact to be credited with (one of) the first attempt(s) to dedicate short individual digests to the most salient points of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy. Although their relative chronology remains unclear, these treatises are thematically connected, and indeed, several among them quite abruptly start with a de’i phyir, “Therefore.” They range from noetic/linguistic topics such as the apoha theory (Anyāpohavicāra) and the defence of the conventionality of language (Śrutiparīksā), mostly against the Mīmāṃsā and its doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda, to the question of scriptural authority with a demonstration of the possibility of supersensory perception (Sarvajñasiddhi) against the Mīmāṃsā, and the refutation of a creator God (Īśvara bhaṅga) against non-Buddhist theistic schools (see below). Thus whereas the Bāhyārthasiddhi mainly targets the Buddhist idealists’ ontology, Śubhagupta’s shorter treatises criticize non-Buddhist, mostly Brahmanical views of scriptural and religious authority. Judged from a purely Dharmakīrtian perspective, and notwithstanding the absence of a thorough assessment of the Anyāpohavicāra’s doctrinal stance, only the former can be said to be heterodox.

In spite of their frequent lack of doctrinal originality and the terse nature of the Tibetan stanzas, Śubhagupta’s treatises undoubtedly deserve more scholarly attention than they have received so far, at least in the West. They reflect a first tendency to make Dharmakīrti’s thought more widely accessible in a way that significantly differs from Śāntarakṣita’s saṅgraha method both in form (short independent treatises) and contents (note the absence of core logical and epistemological issues in Śubhagupta’s

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10 Sarvajñasiddhikārikā, D zhe 188b3; Śrutiparīksākārikā, D zhe 196b2; Anyāpohavicārakārikā, D zhe 197a5.

11 As noticed by Steinkellner (1985: 217 and 222, n. 13), an anonymous commentator of Prajñāsena’s Paralokasiddhi regards Śubhagupta, a preceptor of the past (sngon gyi mkhan po, *pūrvopādhyāya), an authority (isha ma, *pramāṇa) who refuted the allodox’s doctrinal systems (mu stegs can grub pa’i mtha’, *tīrthikasiddhānta), as the Indic source of inspiration for Prajñāsena’s work. See also Steinkellner 1988: II.13 and 29, n. 1.
extant works). These works may also reflect a period in which the overall interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s thought was not yet closed, or, at least, in which representatives of schools doctrinally as remote from Vasubandhu-Dignāga-Dharmakīrti as the Vaibhāṣikas—provided Śubhagupta was a Vaibhāṣika—were still attempting to recontextualize it according to their own specific dogmatic agendas. At the very least, Śubhagupta’s work testifies to a partly critical reception of Dharmakīrti’s ideas among his non-Mādhyamika Buddhist coreligionists.

What follows is a tentative translation and commentary of Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā as edited by Shigeaki Watanabe (1977). Interpreting the Tibetan rendering of the stanzas is a matter of constant adjustment between what appears to be their literal meaning (provided there is anything like that in this particular case) and the parallels that can be adduced in order to make sense of them. We have drawn upon Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṅgraha (pañjikā), the second chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with its commentaries, and earlier materials such as Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita, the Yogācārabhūmi, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā. We are only too conscious that much remains to be said about Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā, and that the present attempt to make sense of this work can be much improved: parts of our translation are little more than guesses. Needless to say, the present essay is dedicated to the loving memory of our irreplaceable friend Helmut, to whom our stays in Vienna owed so much, and who, in addition to being a remarkably insightful scholar, was an exquisitely generous and charming person. His magnum opus, Śaṅkaranandana’s Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṅkṣepa (2002), is undoubtedly the best monograph on the Buddhist critique of Hindu theism to date.13

12 According to Mikogami, Śubhagupta’s defence of atomism while criticizing the vijñaptimātratā (Mikogami 1983) as well as his polemics against the vāsanā theory (Mikogami 1982, 1989) are hints to the fact that he was a Vaibhāṣika. Considering the Vaibhāṣikas’ at least mitigated realism in both ontology and language theory, it remains to be seen how a Vaibhāṣika could possibly defend, as Śubhagupta obviously did in his Anyāpohavicāra and Śrutiparīkṣā, strictly nominalist and conventionalist ideas.

13 Isabelle Ratié adds the following: As a PhD student, having never met either Helmut Krasser or Vincent Eltschinger, I once submitted for publication an article that criticized Krasser’s thesis that Śaṅkaranandana had been a Śaiva, pointing out that the Śaiva sources seemed inconclusive. The anonymous reviewer agreed and let me know that he was aware of another forthcoming paper that also criticized the thesis (but did so by examining Śaṅkaranandana’s works), encouraging me to write to its author—a certain Vincent Eltschinger. Many months later, as I was participating for the first time in a World Sanskrit
Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā: A brief analysis

The proof of īśvara targeted by Śubhagupta

Śubhagupta’s avowed aim with this short treatise is, as pointed out in kā. 3, to provide a summary of arguments that may be used in a learned assembly (‘khor, pariṣad?’)—where Buddhists are expected to try to demonstrate the superiority of their doctrine over that of rival religious movements—so as to refute the thesis according to which the universe was created by an omniscient God. Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s remark to the effect that the numerous refutations of īśvara tend to be repetitive\textsuperscript{14} certainly holds good in many respects, and as can be seen below, Śubhagupta does not seem to have striven for originality—most of his arguments can be found in earlier literature—but merely for a dense synthesis of the Buddhist criticisms levelled at Hindu theists.

Śubhagupta does not go to the trouble of expounding first his opponents’ arguments for asserting that God is the creator of the universe; he immediately proceeds to give the gist of the Buddhist response to be given to “the fool who holds that everything is created by īśvara.” As will become clear below, the opponent he has in mind could be a representative of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, but also of a Śaiva tradition, and the God (īśvara, lit. Lord) that Śubhagupta has in mind is clearly first and foremost Śiva,\textsuperscript{15} as can be seen from the conclusion, according to which “Viṣṇu and Brahmā too” can be refuted through this set of arguments.\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{flushright}
Conference at the University of Kyoto and chain-smoking in the designated area, a small man with a mischievous smile and a cigarette on his lips rushed to offer a handshake upon spotting the name on my badge. “Hi, I’m Helmut Krasser. I’m the guy who reviewed your paper about Śaṅkaranandana.” He was of course a far more accomplished scholar than I will ever be; and he did not mind giving others (anonymously!) ammunition against his own ideas. This wonderful elegance of his, the friendship that was sealed with that handshake, the nights of smoking-drinking-talking with Vincent and Helmut on several continents, and the many ways in which Helmut helped me over the years (including by inviting me twice to the IKGA as a guest researcher)—none of this can ever be forgotten.
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\textsuperscript{14} La Vallée Poussin 1928: 30: “Les sources bouddhiques sur īśvara sont nombreuses, mais ont le tort de se répéter.”

\textsuperscript{15} A few Śaiva sources of which Śubhagupta may have been aware are mentioned below; note also that according to the YD, the doctrine of īśvara was introduced in the Vaiśeṣika by a/some Pāśupatas: see Chemparathy 1965 and Bronkhorst 1996.

\textsuperscript{16} Cf. for instance the end of the refutation of īśvara in MHK 9.113cd: \textit{etena sṛṣṭikartṛtvam pratyuktaṃ brahmakṛṣṇayoh} || “The [contention] that Brahmā and Kṛṣṇa are the agents of [cosmic] creation must be refuted in the [manner just stated above].” This half-stanza apparently has no metrical equivalent in the TJ, but a
The main justification invoked by the upholders of a creator God, and apparently alluded to in *kā. 5*, consists in inferring His existence from the universe as an effect (*kārya*) that requires an intelligent agent (*buddhimatkārtrṛ*) as its cause. Thus the Naiyāyikas show that natural entities, whether alive (such as bodies and their parts) or inanimate (such as earth or mountains), possess a peculiar structure or a specific arrangement (*sanniveśaviśeṣa*) that cannot be explained away on the mere basis of their material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) and must therefore have an efficient cause (*nimittakāraṇa*), which, although imperceptible in the case of a creator God, must be inferred.

Aviddhakarna is apparently to be credited with the first formulation of this line of argument in a lost work of his; thus Kamalaśīla quotes the following reasoning as "put forward by Aviddhakarna" (*aviddhakarnopanyasta*):

That which is either apprehended through two sense-organs or not apprehended [by any sense-organ,\(^{17}\) and] which is the object of the debate,\(^{18}\) presupposes an intelligent cause (*buddhimatkāraṇa*), because it is particularized by an arrangement (*sanniveśaviśiṣṭa*) of the parts that cling together [so as to constitute this entity] itself, just as a pot; the atoms [stand] as a dissimilar example.\(^{19}\)

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\(^{17}\) According to Kamalaśīla (TSP\(_{k}\) 41,20-26/TSP\(_{s}\) 52,19-53,4), the first category encompasses the material elements that are earth (*pṛthivī*), water (*udaka*) and fire (*jvalana*), which can be apprehended by the senses of vision and touch (*darśanasparśa*), whereas the second concerns imperceptible entities such as air (*vāyu*) and atoms (*paramāṇu*).

\(^{18}\) The reason why Aviddhakarna mentions that "which is the object of the debate" is probably that both parties (i.e., the proponents of theism as well as its opponents) acknowledge that human artifacts are created by a conscious agent whereas uncomposed natural entities (such as atoms) are not, but they disagree on whether composite natural entities such as bodies are products of an intelligent agent. See, e.g., NVTT 563,10-13: *trayo hi khalu bhāvā jagati bhavanti. prasiddhaceta­nakartrkāś ca yathā prāṣādāṭṭālagopuratan­ādayah, prasiddhahatadvipa­ryayaś ca yathā paramāṇvākāsādayah, sandigdhaceta­nakartrkāś ca yathā ta­nutarumahīḥmahīḥdarādayah.* “For indeed, there are three [kinds of] entities in this world: [those] that are well known as having a conscious creator, such as palaces, watchtowers, gates, arches and so on; [those] that are well known as not [having such a conscious creator], such as atoms, space and so on; and [those] about which one doubts whether they have a conscious creator, such as trees, earth, mountains and so on.”

\(^{19}\) TSP\(_{k}\) 41,19-20/TSP\(_{s}\) 52,17-18: *dvīndriyagrāhyāgrāhyam vimatya­dhikaranaḥbhāvā-
Uddyotakara alludes to this inference of īśvara from the fact that some natural entities are effects\(^{20}\) and defends the thesis that natural entities endowed with specific arrangements (such as bodies) must have an efficient cause which, even though imperceptible, can be inferred on the grounds of their sharing similar features with human artifacts such as pots, since the latter display a specific arrangement (racanāviśeṣa, samsthānaviśeṣa)\(^{21}\) and have a perceptible efficient cause, i.e., the potter. Thus, faced with the objection according to which “just as a thorn’s sharpness for instance is devoid of efficient cause and [yet] endowed with a material cause, in the same way, in the case of the production of a body, etc., there is no such thing as an efficient cause,”\(^{22}\) Uddyotakara answers:

But what is the reasoning [in the objection] here? [Answer:] the body and so on have specific arrangements that are devoid of efficient cause, because, just as a thorn for instance [that has no efficient cause], they have a specific arrangement. [We answer the objection in the following

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

\(^{20}\) In his commentary on NS 4.1.21, Uddyotakara does not use the inferential reason “because it is an effect” (kāryatvāt) to prove that the universe has īśvara as its efficient cause: rather, he has recourse to the inferential reason “because it is unconscious” (acetanatvāt) that he applies to matter, atoms and actions leading to karmic retribution. Nonetheless, at the end of his lengthy commentary on this sūtra, he mentions Aviddhakarṇa’s argument while trying to show that in fact the kāryatvāt argument formulated by his predecessor amounts to the one resting on the acetanatvāt inferential reason. See NV 441,8–19 ad NS 4.1.21: evam kāryatvāt tṛṇādīni pakṣīkṛtya darśanasparśanavisayavatvād iti vaktavyam. evam yatra yatra vipratipattiḥ kāryatvaṁ ca tat tad\(^{1}\) anenaiva nyāyenānena drṣṭānena vāsyādinā pakṣayitvā sādhayitavyam iti. \(^{1}\)ca tat tad NV, p. 957: ca yat, tad NV. “In the same way, when one takes grass and so on as the subject of the inference since [they] are effects [and] objects of vision and touch, one can say [that they are controlled by an intelligent agent. That is to say,] in the same way, when one takes as the subject of the inference whatever is the object of the debate and involves [the property of] being an effect, one can establish [that this object has the property of being controlled by an intelligent agent] through the same reasoning [i.e., because of its being unconscious, by having recourse] to the example of the axe and so on,[which are unconscious entities requiring the control of an intelligent agent].”

\(^{21}\) As noted by Helmut Krasser, in his refutation of this proof, Dharmakīrti uses the compound samsthānaviśeṣa found in the NV rather than sannivesāviśeṣa/viśiṣṭa, which appears in Aviddhakarṇa’s fragment (see Krasser 1999: 216, n. 7, and Krasser 2002: 36, n. 39).

\(^{22}\) NV 441,20–442,1 ad NS 4.1.22: yathā kaṇṭakasya taikṣṇyādi nirmimittam copādānava ca, tathā śarīrādisargēpi. The example of the thorn’s sharpness is systematically ascribed to the so-called svabhāvavādins. See, e.g., BC 9.62, Bhattacharya 2002 and 2006.
way:] This is not [true], because the efficient cause of things whose efficient cause is not [directly] perceived can [still] be apprehended through inference: that whose efficient cause is not directly perceived has an efficient cause that can be acknowledged through inference. How? Because of its sharing a common feature (sāmānya) with [perceptible] substances that possess an efficient cause. Indeed, the substances that have a [perceptible] efficient cause possess a specific arrangement, pots for instance; and a body possesses a specific arrangement, and [so do] thorns and so on. Therefore they too have an efficient cause.

Similar ideas were elaborated by Naiyāyika authors who may have been contemporaries of Šubhagupta, such as Śaṅkarasvāmin, as well as later than him (this is notably the case of Jayantabhaṭṭa, Trilocana, Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāsarvajña, Vittoka, Udayana and Gaṅgeśa). They are also found in scriptures of the Śaivasiddhāṇa that belong to the last phase of its early scriptural development (i.e., around the 8th and 9th centuries CE), as well as in an important non-scriptural source belonging to the Śaiva dualistic tradition, namely, the NP by Sadyojyotis (fl. c. 675–725), of which Šubhagupta may have been aware. Among Śaiva sources that postdate Šubhagupta, the ĪP, in which the nondualist Utpaladeva

23 NV 442,1-6 ad NS 4.1.22: kah punar atra nyāyah, animittaracanāviśeṣāḥ šarīrādyaḥ samsthānaviśeṣavattvāt kaṇṭakādivad iti. na, anupalabhyamānanimittānām anumānato nimittopalabdhēḥ, yasya nimittam pratyakṣato nopalabhyate, tasyānumānato nimittam pratyetavyam. kutah – nimittavaddravyasāmānyāt, yāni khalu nimittavanti dravyāni samsthānaviśeṣavanti tāni ghaṭādīni. samsthānaviśeṣavac ca šarīram kaṇṭakādayaś ca. tasmāt te’pi nimittavanta iti.

24 The Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda (who seems to have been the first Vaiśeṣika author to introduce īśvara in the system; see Chemparathy 1965, Chemparathy 1968 and Bronkhorst 1996) does not use this line of argument in his PDhŚ or in the preserved fragments of his Ṭīkā on the Vaiśeṣikasūtra; the proof that he adduces in one of these fragments (preserved in TSP K 43,1-3/TSP Ś 54,18-20; see Chemparathy 1968: 68), to the effect that humans must be taught the meaning of words at the beginning of creation, is never mentioned by Šubhagupta. However, as shown in Chemparathy 1968: 69–70, from Kamalaśīla’s passing remarks it is clear that Praśastapāda had also formulated proofs of īśvara based on the necessity of assuming that the universe is the effect of an intelligent agent.


26 On the presentation of the inference of īśvara by these authors, see in particular Krasser 2002: 56–126.


29 See Ratié 2016: 309–311, particularly on the KT and PT.

endeavours to prove the existence of God from a dualistic perspective,\footnote{See Taber 1986, Krasser 2002: 149–158, and Ratić 2016.} also exploits these arguments in favour of the existence of a creator God.

**The Buddhist reply: Natural entities are not established to be effects of an intelligent cause because they are not seen to be so (kā. 4–5)**

Śubhagupta’s first criticism of the īśvaravāda consists in pointing out that the reasoning is defective inasmuch as there is a fundamental difference between the cognition of a natural entity such as a body and that of an effect brought about by an intelligent agent—so that the former cannot be merely identified with the latter as the Īśvaravādin does—because we see that a pot for instance arises thanks to the potter, whereas we cannot witness īśvara’s creation of the universe.

Admittedly, as seen above, Uddyotakara for instance argues that although the universe is not actually seen to be the creation of God, it must be inferred to be so precisely on the grounds that, just as entities seen to be produced by an intelligent agent, it possesses a specific arrangement, i.e., a peculiar structure that cannot be explained otherwise: it is the fact that it shares this common feature (sāmānya) with all artifacts that legitimates the inference of God. Dharmakīrti,\footnote{On Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the inference of īśvara, see, e.g., Oberhammer 1965: 10–22, Vattanky 1984: 33–39, Jackson 1986, Krasser 1999 and Krasser 2002: 19 ff.} however, points out that one can only infer a particular agent from a particular arrangement that has previously been observed to be causally dependent on this particular agent—otherwise one could infer that an anthill is the product of a potter from the mere fact that an anthill is also made of clay! According to the Buddhist philosopher, the theist’s inferential reason is too broad since it rests on the notion of “arrangement” in general, a sāmānya which, far from being “specific” as the Īśvaravādin claims,\footnote{Cf. Kamalaśīla’s concluding remark in his commentary on TS 65 which summarizes Dharmakīrti’s argument (TSP ₄₈,₄–₅/TSP ₆₁,₁₁–₁₂): *tad evam sanniveśaviśeṣasyaśiddhiḥ, sanniveśāmātrasya tv anaikāṇṭikatvam iti pratipāditam bhavati.* “Therefore it is thus demonstrated that [the Īśvaravādin’s contention regarding] a specific arrangement (sanniveśaviśeṣa) is not established; as for an arrangement in general (sanniveśamātra), it is inconclusive.”} amounts to a mere “verbal similarity” (śabdasāmya), and that, in fact, does not allow him to claim that the universe—which is quite different from a pot—has to
be deemed the product of an intelligent agent. Śāntarakṣita, for his part, sums up the argument in the following way:

The established rule is that one [can] ascertain [the existence] of [A] when one sees [B] if [B] has been ascertained as the effect of [A] through co-presence and co-absence (anvayavyatireka); but the specific arrangement in these different [things] that are bodies, trees and so on is not in the least of this kind; on the contrary, it is a mere word! When a [reason] of this kind is invoked, it establishes [nothing but] the doubtfulness or absence [of the property to be proven in the subject of the inference], as in the case of [the property of] being produced by a potter with respect to an anthill.

Īśvara cannot be both eternal and the intelligent creator of the universe (kā. 6-7)

In kā. 6, the Īśvaravādin is accused of holding an inconsistent position when he claims that God is both eternal and an agent, and the reason

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34 See PV 2.11-13: siddham yādṛg adhiṣṭhūrthbhāvābhāvānvṛttimat | sanniveśādi tad yuktam tasmād yad anumāya | vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdāsāṁyād abhedinah | na yuktānunmithī pāṇḍudravvīd iva hūtāśane | anyathā kumbhakāreṇa mrdvīkārasya kasyacit | ghatādeḥ karanāt sidhyed valmikāsāpyāt tatkṛtāḥ | “[A controlling agent] is correctly inferred if it is inferred from e.g. a [specific] arrangement that is such that it is established to [exist or not] according to whether a [specific] controlling agent exists or not. The inference of [something] that is well known [to occur] when there is one real entity (vastubhede) is not correct [if this inference is made] on the basis of [something] that [seems] not to be different [from that real entity] due to a [sheer] verbal similarity (śabdāsāmya)—for instance, [the inference] of fire from [the presence of something described as] a white substance [is not correct, because smoke and snow, although they are both said to be ‘white substances,’ are different]. Otherwise, an anthill too would be established to be the [potter’s] creation on the grounds that a specific modification of clay such as a pot is produced by the potter.” On these verses see Krasser 1999: 217 and Krasser 2002: 23 ff.

35 Note TSP K 47,27-48,1/TSP s 60,22-24: yat kāryam iti dhūmādi, yasyety analādeḥ, niścayasya tasvety analādēva, taddṛṣṭāv iti dhūmādkāryadṛṣṭau satyām. “One [can] only ascertain [the existence] of [A, i.e., a cause] such as fire, when one sees [B, i.e.,] when one sees [its] effect such as smoke, if [B, i.e.,] for instance smoke, has been ascertained as the effect of [A, i.e.,] for instance fire.”

36 Note TSP K 48,3/TSP s 61,10: tādṛṣṭāḥ – śabdāmātrenābhidhī. “Of this kind [i.e.,] which [appears] not to have differences due to a mere word.”

37 TS 63-65: anvayavyatirekābhīyāṃ yat kāryantī yasya niścitam | niścayasya tasvya taddṛṣṭāv iti nyāyo vyavasthitāḥ | sanniveśavīśeṣas tu naivāmīṣu tathāvidhah | tanuravādibhedeṣu śabda eva tu kevalah | tādṛṣṭāḥ procyamānas tu sandīgduvyatirekatām | āśādayati valmike kumbhakārakṛṭāv iva | 1kumbhakārakṛṭāv iva corr.: kumbhakārakṛṭādiṣu TS K, TS s. In other words, a reason of that kind is inconclusive (anaikāntika).
invoked for this claim is that an agent must proceed successively, just as this supposedly intelligent agent’s thought, which is contradictory with God’s alleged immutability. The verse concludes that for this reason, neither the Self (ātman) nor God can be the creator of the universe.

The idea that no permanent entity can be an agent because agency entails succession and therefore change is a *topos* of Buddhist philosophical literature that—as pointed out by Śubhagupta himself—has been applied to both the Self and God, since both are defined as agents (*kartṛ*) at least by some Brahmanical authors. Thus Vasubandhu argues in the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* that the Self cannot be the agent responsible for the arising of the six kinds of consciousness, because the latter arise successively (*krameṇa*) whereas the Self is supposedly permanent; and in the AKBh, he explains that if īśvara were the unique cause of the universe, the entire universe would have to occur simultaneously, all at once, which is absurd since we see that things occur in succession (*krama*).

A rather similar argument is already found for instance in Aśvaghoso’s BC and in the YBh:

Do you consider that the [cosmic] creation has God as its cause, or that its cause is a material cause other than Him? If [you consider that] it only has God as its cause, then when[ever] īśvara exists, the

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38 See Yoshimizu 1999, for instance p. 232, about the Abhidharma and Yogācāra traditions: “In these early traditions, a permanent existent such as an omniscient God (*īśvara*) or Self (*ātman*) was negated as being a cause of other phenomena on account of its inability to produce an effect.” See also Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 174–175.


40 AKBh 101,25-26 (commenting on AK 2.64d: *neśvarādeḥ kramādibhiḥ*, “[These dharmas] do not [arise] from [a single cause] such as īśvara, because of succession, etc.): *yadi hy ekam eva kāraṇam īśvarāḥ syād anyad vā yugapat sarvena jagatā bhavitavyam syāt, drśyate ca bhāvānāṁ kramasambhavah*. “To explain: if there were only one cause [i.e.,] īśvara or another [permanent entity], the entire universe should [come to] exist all at once; and we see that entities arise in succession.”

41 For other early Buddhist sources see Yoshimizu 1999: 242–243, n. 23 (which also mentions the YBh passage).

42 See BC 18.20, D ge 65a3-4/P nge 79a7-8: *gal te dbang phyug gis ni ’gro ba skyed gyur na || ’gro ba rim gyis rab tu ’jug pa ma yin la || skye dgu rnams kyi ’khor ba’i ’khor lo ma yin zhi ngag du gang zhih bskyed nas de dang de nyid ’gyur* ||

“If a Creator (*’īśvara*) produced the world (*’jagat*), there would be no ordered (*’krameṇa*) process of activity (*’pravṛtti*) in it, and men (*’prajā?*) would not revolve in the cycle of existence (*’samsārācakra*); in whatever state of existence anyone was born, there would he remain.” Translation Johnston 1937: 32 (Sanskrit equivalents in brackets ours).
[cosmic] creation exists; and when[ever] the [cosmic] creation exists, God exists—so the [cosmic] creation cannot have God as its cause.\(^{43}\)

It is also found, e.g., in Śāntideva’s BCA:

If there is no beginning for the cause [that is the creator God], how could there be a beginning for its effect? [And] how is it that [God] does not always create [this effect]?\(^{44}\)

Since Śubhagupta mentions both the agent and his thought as being of all necessity successive, it is also likely that here he has in mind the opening verses of Dharmakīrti’s refutation of īśvara in the PV:

There is no permanent means of valid cognition at all [such as God],\(^{45}\) because epistemic validity belongs to the cognition of an existing real entity, [and] because this [cognition of an existing entity] has no permanence due to the impermanence of its object; [and this impermanent cognition cannot belong to a permanent knower]\(^{46}\) because [something] that arises in succession cannot arise from [something] permanent, since it cannot require [other auxiliary causes to produce], because it cannot be helped [by them] in any way...\(^{47}\)

God cannot be considered a permanent means of valid cognition by those who claim that he is an eternal consciousness because a valid cognition occurs with respect to a real entity, but a real entity is necessarily impermanent (since in order to be real it must have a causal efficacy, which entails its impermanence), so that God’s cognition, if valid, must be as impermanent as its object; and God cannot even be said to be the permanent knower (jñātṛ) to which such an impermanent thought would belong, because if God is permanent it cannot produce anything successive (given that such a production would have to occur both at once and forever, which is absurd).

\(^{43}\) YBh 145.9-11: kaccid icchasi śvarahetukaḥ sargas tadanyopādānaha hetuko veti. saced śvarahetuka eva, tena yadesvaras tadā sargah, yadā sargas tadesvara itiśvarahetukah sarga iti na yujyate. See Chemparathy 1968: 96.

\(^{44}\) BCA 9.123cd-124a: hetor ādir na ced asti phalasyādiḥ kuto bhavet || kasmāt sadā na kurute...

\(^{45}\) That īśvara is the target of these verses is not explicitly stated by Dharmakīrti but the point is made clear by Devendrabuddhi (see Krasser 2002: 237).

\(^{46}\) Note PVV 10,14-16: syād etad anityaviṣayam anityam eva jñānaṁ kevalaṁ yasya taj jñānaṁ sa jñātaṁ nityo bhaviṣyatīty āha kramajanmanām... “This might be objected: ‘Indeed, the cognition is impermanent [since it] has an impermanent object; only, the knower to whom this cognition belongs must be permanent.’ He answers [this objection with the words] kramajanmanām.”

\(^{47}\) PV 2.8-9ac: nityam pramāṇaṁ vaivāsti prāmāṇyaṁ va vastusadgateḥ jñeyāṇityatayā tasyā adhriyvat kramajanmanah || niryād utpattivīśeṣād apekṣāyā ayogataḥ | kathaṇcin nopakāryatvat...
Here Dharmakīrti is applying to God’s cognition, and to God understood as a knowing subject, the more general criticism used in many earlier Buddhist sources, to the effect that no permanent entity can be an agent because agency entails succession. Śubhagupta uses the argument to show that īśvara cannot be permanent on the one hand and an agent and an intelligent being on the other hand, because both his action and thought must be successive and therefore require impermanent causes. Śāntarakṣita adopts the same strategy in the TS:

Permanent [entities] do not produce effects, because of the contradiction between succession and its absence; and if objects are successive, there must be succession in their cognitions too. God’s cognition must occur in succession, because it is connected to objects of knowledge that are successive; just as the cognition of Devadatta and [any other conscious individual] regarding such [impermanent things] as a flame.\(^{48}\)

Śubhagupta then adds in kā. 7 that if the universe is produced by this eternal cause that is īśvara, then there is no point whatsoever in striving to free ourselves from erroneous knowledge by writing treatises, since the cause of error—as the cause of the whole universe’s arrangement—must be eternally present and therefore impossible to remove. With its “quietist” overtones, the idea is somewhat reminiscent of Aśvaghoṣa’s remark in the BC to the effect that human endeavours are pointless if the universe has God as its cause:

Others contend that the [cosmic] creation is due to īśvara; in that [case] what is the point of man’s effort[s]? The same [entity] that is the cause of the universe’s activity is bound to be also the cause of its ceasing to be active.\(^{49}\)

The MHK for instance also explains that if an eternal God is the cause of the universe, one can never put an end to suffering:

And since the cause of suffering is permanent, where could the cessation of suffering come from? One does not see any cessation of heat as long as a fire is burning.\(^{50}\)

\(^{48}\) TS 76-77: kramākramavirodhena nityā no kāryakāriṇāḥ | viṣayānāṃ kramitvena tajjñānāy apī ca kramaḥ || kramabhāvānīśvarajñānaṃ kramivijñeyasaṅgatēḥ | devadattādīvijñānaṃ yathā jvalādīgacaram ||


\(^{50}\) MHK 9.104: duḥkhahetoṣ ca nityatvā tadduḥkhopāsāmaḥ kutah | noṣṇavyupaśamam drṣṭo jvalatī eva vibhāvasau ||
The question of the possibility of eliminating suffering lies at the very heart of Dharmakīrti’s description of the Bodhisattva as a śāstr, “a teacher” (where the result—being in a position to teach in a reliable manner—is taken to describe the cause—learning what is necessary to be in such a position).\textsuperscript{51} The future Buddha has every feature of a rationalist philosopher in quest of the means to bring about salvation:

Reflecting [upon the salvific means and its end] by means of reason(ing) and scriptures, [the Compassionate One] examines the cause of suffering, and, on account of the [very] characteristics of suffering itself, the nature of this [cause, which, he concludes, must necessarily be] impermanent, etc.\textsuperscript{52}

Here are the contents and the sequence of the Bodhisattva’s reflections according to Devendrabuddhi:

[The Bodhisattva examines the cause of suffering in the following way:] ‘What is the cause of the [type of] suffering consisting in (re)birth, [a cause] by the elimination of which [suffering] is it to be eliminated?’ By thus examining causality in general (hetumātra), he understands that [suffering] cannot be without a cause and concludes that by eliminating the cause, it is possible to destroy its effect. For otherwise [i.e., if suffering were without a cause,] how to eliminate [something] independent that is without a cause? After this, he examines whether [this cause] is permanent or not. If it is permanent, [suffering will in fact be] without a cause inasmuch as [something] permanent has no agency (nityasyaiva na kartṛtvam?); therefore, it will not be possible to cut off suffering. And even if [this cause] is a permanent agent ([an agent [acting] permanently), it does not cease to exist (avaikalya?) [and hence] its effect cannot be interrupted; thus it is not possible to get rid of it. […] On account of what does he analyze the [nature of the cause of suffering]? On account of the characteristics of suffering itself, i.e., on account of properties (dharma) of suffering such as occasionality (kādācitkatva)[, and this in the following way:] Since, according to the nature of [its] cause, a certain pain (duḥkha) occurs on a certain occasion, it is not without a cause, for [otherwise, i.e., if it were without a cause,] it would either constantly exist or never exist [at all]. And he understands that since it is occasional, [its] cause must be occasional[, too].\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} See Eltschinger 2005.

\textsuperscript{52} PV 2.132cd-133ab: yuktyāgamābhyaṁ vimṛṣan duḥkhaḥetum parikṣate | tasyānityādīrūpaṇ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ ||

\textsuperscript{53} PVP D55a4-b2/P62b6-63a5: skye ba’i mtshan nying can gyi sdu bsngal ’di’i rgyu ni gang yin | gang nye bar bcom pa las ’di bsal bar bya ba yin zhe na | de de ltar na rgyu tsam yongs su dpyad pa las ’di rgyu med pa can du mi ’gyur bar mkhyen
So far we have not been successful in identifying the source of Śubhagupta’s argument about treatises, but it can certainly be analyzed with the help of some parallels. In PV 2.5b, Dharmakīrti states that “a treatise [has for its purpose] to remove delusion” (śāstraṃ mohanivartanam). Here is Devendrabuddhi’s commentary:

[Composing a treatise] is not useless, because a treatise [has for its purpose to] remove delusion. If one were to act without knowing the characteristics (laksana) of the means of valid cognition that prompt to action (pravartakapramāna?), deception (visamvāda?) would [always] be possible (sambhava). Therefore, (s)he who wishes to act (pravṛttikāma) should know the [respective] characteristics of a means of valid cognition and a pseudo-means of valid cognition (pramānatadābha?) before acting. And [a person] who does not know them by him/(her) self will somehow [be able to] act after learning [what] reliability [is] from the characteristics as they are taught in a treatise that consists in teaching the distinguishing features of correct cognition (samyagjñāna). Therefore one composes a treatise. Indeed, inasmuch as [a treatise] removes the knowing/acting subject’s (pratipattṛ) ignorance as regards what a means of valid cognition is and is not (pramāṇetara?), it is not useless.
But as Manorathanandin makes clear, treatises, far from dealing just with valid cognition, also remove misconceptions pertaining to eschatology and soteriology: “Because a treatise teaches the characteristics [of things], the error bearing on them can be removed, so that [things] such as the other world and the *summum bonum* [of liberation], which are not well known through [empirical] practice, can be established.”\(^{56}\) And although his remark remains somewhat obscure, Vibhūticandra also suggests the soteriological value of epistemological treatises dealing with correct cognition (*samyagjñāna*): “It is due to correct knowledge that [practically relevant things such as] the existence of Dharma and the other world are ascertained, and from this [ascertainment], one obtains liberation.”\(^{57}\)

Now what would be a treatise’s soteriological relevance if the world together with error were created by a permanent God? This is the question raised by Śubhagupta, which the texts examined above do not formulate. However, the TS(P) at least twice reflects symmetric arguments dealing, not with *śāstra*, but with *sādhana*, “demonstration.” The first occurs in the framework of Šāntaraksita’s and Kamalaśila’s critique of the Śaṅkhya’s permanent Nature (*prakṛti*):

> And every demonstration that operates [both] removes an error and generates an ascertainment; [but] this does not stand to reason in the manner [you describe, i.e., if the effect pre-exists in the cause]. The word ‘error’ also includes doubt, because the latter superimposes [something erroneous] relying on two alternatives. For every demonstration does two things when it operates with regard to its own object: It removes the doubt and the error that pertain to the object to be cognized, and it produces an ascertainment bearing on this [object to be cognized]. [But] none of this agrees with reason in the doctrine [according to which] the effect preexists [in the cause]. How so? In order to [answer this question, Śāntaraksita] says the following: Since [both] permanently exist, neither can doubt and error be removed [by any demonstration], nor is, for that very reason, [any] ascertainment [ever] produced. To explain: in your system, doubt and

\(^{56}\) PVV 7.20-21: *śāstreṇa lakṣaṇopadarśanāt tadvisayoḥ sammoho nivartantiyo yena paralokaniḥśreyasādṛ vyavahārāprasiddhasya siddhir bhavati* | The *paraloka* is also the example resorted to by Prajñākaragupta in PVA 77.11-12.

\(^{57}\) According to Vibh. 7, n. 4: *samyagjñānād dharmāstivaparalokaniścayasya tato mokṣādhigamāt…*
error could consist either in consciousness (caitanya, Tib. sems can) or in the intellect and the mind. [But] these two[, doubt and error,] can be removed in neither of the two hypotheses, because, inasmuch as consciousness, the intellect, and the mind are permanent, these two are permanent, too. Nor can, for the very reason that they are permanent, ascertainment [ever] be produced by a demonstration.\textsuperscript{58}

As we can see, error and doubt cannot be removed by any demonstration—and, for this reason, by any treatise—if they are created by a permanent principle such as consciousness or, analogously, God.

A somewhat parallel argument occurs in Śāntarakṣita’s critique of the Īśvaravādin:

Or the [things] that arise successively do not have God as their cause, just as the cognitions of fools, which arise from demonstrations [of God] as they have been described here! [And] if [according to you, these cognitions] too arise from [God], stating demonstrations [in order to distinguish right and wrong cognitions] is useless: [stating demonstrations] cannot be an auxiliary cause for [Him,] who cannot be cured since [He] is permanent.\textsuperscript{59}

Kamalaśīla explains in the following way why stating demonstrations is useless if God is the creator of the universe, including cognitions:

[The Īśvaravādin:] “But God must be the producer of these [i.e., cognitions,] not on his own, [but rather,] while relying on the statement of demonstrations as an auxiliary cause; therefore this [statement of demonstrations] must not be vain.” It is in order [to respond to this objection] that [Śāntarakṣita] says “since [He] is permanent,” etc. If the statement of demonstrations provided God with the power [to produce right cognitions] after removing [his] powerless nature, then

\textsuperscript{58} TS 23-24ad., together with TSP\textsubscript{e} 27,16-26/TSP\textsubscript{s} 35,13-21: sarvam ca sādhanaṃ vyṛttam viparyāsanivartakam | niścayotpādakam cedaṃ na tathā yuktisaṅgatam || [...]viparyāsagrahamena samśayo’pi grhyate | tasyobhayāṁśaśvalambitvenā ṛopa-katvasambhavāt | sarvam eva hi sādhanaṃ svaviṣaye pravṛttam dvayaṃ karoti | prameyārthaviṣaye pravṛttau samśayavigā ipaśrayati | niścayaṃ ca tadviṣayam\textsuperscript{2} utpādayati | tad etat satkāryavāde yukṛṇa | pandati ity āha – na sandehetyādi | saṃśayo’pi gṛhyate ||

\textsuperscript{59} TS 88-89: ye vā krameṇa jāyante te naiveśvarahetukāḥ | yathoktasādhanodbhūtā jadānāṃ prayataya īva | īsām api tadubhūtau viphalā sādhanābhidhīḥ | niyatyād acikitsyasya naiva sā sahakārinī || naiveśvarahetukāḥ TS\textsubscript{s}: naiśvarahetukāḥ TS\textsubscript{K}: Note TSP\textsubscript{Tib} P’ e 189a8 yul de la.
it could be an auxiliary cause for him; [but] inasmuch as [God’s] nature cannot arise or be destroyed due to [His] permanence, He can be led to no [change] by anything, therefore the statement of demonstrations cannot be an auxiliary cause for him.\(^{60}\)

**The Īśvaravādin cannot prove that the universe is produced by an intelligent cause endowed with īśvara’s specific properties (kā. 8-10)**

Śubhagupta then proceeds to show that the Īśvaravādin is caught in a dilemma: either what he claims to prove is that the universe, as a peculiar complex structure, must be produced by an intelligent cause that happens to have the specific properties (*dharma*viśeṣa) that he ascribes to īśvara—i.e., permanence and unity—, or he merely wants to demonstrate that the universe is caused by something endowed with intelligence in general, without assuming that this thing possesses any specific property. The first member of the dilemma is examined in kā. 8-9; the second, in kā. 10.

According to kā. 8, if what the Īśvaravādin wants to establish with this inference is that the universe is produced by an intelligent cause that is particularized by eternality and oneness, then his inference actually proves the contrary of what it is meant to prove; for as explained in kā. 9, the fact that the universe is a complex structure rather leads us to infer that it results from the activity of an impermanent and multiple set of causes, since we see that a house for instance is not built by a single agent, but rather, by a team of different men whose bodies and minds are subjected to constant transformations.

Here again, Śāntarakṣita’s strategy in the TS is very close to Śubhagupta’s. Thus Śāntarakṣita remarks:

However, [God, which you regard as] permanent, one, [and] the substratum of a cognition that is omniscient and permanent,\(^{61}\) cannot be proved, because there is no invariable concomitance, since the property to be proven [i.e., being produced by such a cause] is lacking [in the example].\(^{62}\)

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\(^{60}\) TSP\(_K\) 56,11-15/TSP\(_S\) 71,13-17: *nanu sādhanābhidhāṃ sahakārinīṃ apekṣya teṣām īśvaro janako bhaviṣyati, na kevalah, tenāsau viphalā na bhaviṣyaḥ ity āta āha nityatvād ityādi. yady asau sādhanābhidhā taśyeśvarasyāsamartham svabhāvam apanīya samartham ādadhīta, tadā syāt sā tasya sahakārinī, yāvatā nityatvād īśvaro ’nutpādayanivartyasvabhāvavatayā na kenacit kiṇcit sa nīyata iti na sādhanābhidhā taśyasau sahakārinī yuktā.*

\(^{61}\) On this understanding of the compound, see Kamalaśīla’s explanation below.

\(^{62}\) TS 72: *kintu nityaikasarvajñanityabuddhisamāśrayaḥ | sādhyaivaikalyato’vyāpter na siddhim upāgacchati ‖*
Kamalaśīla explains:

For you are not trying to demonstrate merely the fact that [the universe] presupposes an intelligent [cause], but rather, the fact that it presupposes that thing called īśvara, which is permanent, one, a substratum of an omniscient and permanent cognition, the cause of all worlds, [and] intelligent—because this is precisely what is the object of this debate. And such a [thing] cannot be proved; why? Because ‘there is no invariable concomitance, since the property to be proven is lacking.’ [That is to say:] since the property to be proven, as it has [just] been described [i.e., being produced by such a single, permanent, etc., entity,] is lacking in the positive example, such as a pot; because [for this reason,] the invariable concomitance of the reason [i.e., possessing a specific arrangement,] with the property to be proven is not established; the implicit idea [here] is that there is no relation of the reason with the property to be proven as it has [just] been described in any example [of specific arrangement that might be adduced].

No pot has ever been seen to be created by a single, omniscient and eternal creator; on the contrary, experience shows that the complex structures found in artifacts are produced by causes that happen to be devoid of all these properties, as Śāntarakṣita points out in the sequel:

To explain: we know with certainty that [things] such as mansions, staircases, gates or watchtowers presuppose [causes] that are many, impermanent and have cognitions that are many and impermanent. For this very reason, this [reason] is also considered to be contradictory with what you want [to prove], since [it rather] establishes that [a specific arrangement] presupposes [a cause that is] many, impermanent and has cognitions that are many and impermanent.

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63 TSP$_\text{K}$ 49,21-26/TSP$_\text{S}$ 63,9-15: na hi bhavatāṃ buddhimatpūrvakatvamātram sādhayātum istāṃ kintu nitya ekaḥ sarvajñāyā buddher nityāyāḥ samāśrayah$^1$ saka-labhuvanahetur buddhimān īśvarābhidhāno yaḥ padārthaḥ, tatpūrvakatvam asya sādhayātum istāṃ tasyaiva vivādāsīpadībhūtavāt. sa ca tathābhūto na siddhim upagacchati. kasmāt. sādhyaśākalyāto vyāpteḥ. ghaṭadeḥ sādharmyadṛṣṭāntasya yathoktasādhayadharme$^2$vaikalyāt tathābhūtānaḥ sādhayadharmena hetory vyāptyasi-ddeḥ, na hi yathoktasādhayadharmena kvacic drṣṭānte hetoḥ pratibandhośtīti yāvat. $^1$samāśrayaḥ TSP$_\text{S}$: āśrayaḥ TSP$_\text{K}$; $^2$sādhayadharme$^\circ$ TSP$_\text{S}$: $^\circ$sādharmya$^\circ$ TSP$_\text{K}$.

64 TS 73-74: tathā hi saudhasopānagopurāttālakādayaḥ | anekānityavijñānapūrvakatvena niścitāḥ || ata evāyaṃ istasya vighātakrd apīṣyate | anekānityavijñānapūrvak- tvaprasādhanāt || See also TS 81: nityaikabuddhipūrvatvasādhane sādhyasūnyatā | vyabhicāraś ca saudhāder bahubhiḥ karanekṣanāt || “If [your] demonstration is about [showing that a specific arrangement] presupposes a permanent, single cognition, the property to be proven is lacking [in the example], and there is a deviation (vyabhicāra), since we see that [things] such as a mansion are produced by many.”
On the other hand, says kā. 10, if the Īśvaravādin replies that he is merely attempting to infer the existence of an intelligent cause in general, then what he has proven is merely that the universe as we experience it is the result of karmic retribution. Here again, the reasoning is very similar to that found in Śaṅtarakṣita’s TS:

And if you want [to demonstrate that the universe] presupposes an intelligent [cause] in general (sāmānyena), there is no dispute whatsoever in this regard, for according to us, the universe’s diversity arises from actions (karman).65

As pointed out by Helmut Krasser,66 this dilemma is in fact strikingly similar to the one in which the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila locks his theist opponent in the ŚV,67 and it is probable that Dharmakīrti, who seems

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65 TS 80: buddhimatpūrvakatvam ca sāmānyena yadīsyate | tatra naiva vivādo no vaiśvarūpyaṃ hi karmajam ||

66 Krasser 1999.

67 The only major difference appears to be that the members of the dilemma are presented in reverse order, as Kumārila first examines the possibility that the Īśvaravādin’s inference is only meant to establish a cause in general (hetumātra). See ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 74-75: sanniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattim yo gṛhādīvat | sādhayec cetanādhiṣṭhām dehānām tasya cottaram | kasyacid dhetumātratvam yady adhiṣṭhārītyesya | karmabhī sarvajīvānāṃ tatsiddheh siddhasādhanam || “And [we make this] answer to someone who strives to establish that the arising of bodies that are particularized by an arrangement is governed by a conscious [agent], as in the [case of the arising] of such [things] as a house: if [you] consider that governing [such an arising means nothing but] being a cause in general, [then] you [only] establish something that [in fact] is [already] established, because this [property of being a cause in general] is established for the actions of all living beings.” (For a slightly different translation see Krasser 1999: 219.) Kumārila then proceeds to show that if the inference is meant to infer a cause particularized by God’s peculiar attributes (such as creating out of mere will, without instruments or a body), then the inference’s example of the pot lacks the property to be proven, and the reason invoked rather demonstrates the validity of a thesis contrary to that held by the Īśvaravādin, since the universe, if produced as a pot is by a potter, must result from a finite and transient cause as the potter. See ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 76 and 79-80: icchāpūrvvakapakse’pi tatpūrvatvena karmanām | icchānantarasiddhis tu drṣṭānte’pi na vidyate | [...] kumbhakārādyadhiṣṭhānām ghaṭādau yadi ceṣyate | neśvarādhiṣṭhitatvam syād asti cet sādhyāhīnāta | yathāsiddhe ca drṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhātā | antiśvaravināśyādikarthattvam prasajyate || “Even if [you] claim that [the arisal of these bodies is governed in the sense that] it presupposes a will, [you prove what is in fact already established,] since actions presuppose the [will of their agents]. But if [the governing of the bodies’ arising means] their coming into being immediately after that will, this is not found in any example. [...] And if [you] consider that as regards [something] such as a pot, the governing agency is that of [an agent] such as a potter, [then] there can be no governing agency of God [with respect to that pot]; if, [on the other hand, you claim that] there is [such a
to allude to Kumārila’s version of it, had incorporated it into his own refutation of īśvara—a borrowing that was made possible by the fact that the Buddhists, just as the Mīmāṃsakas, consider that the universe’s variety is the result of the various actions standing in need of karmic retribution. And according to Vasubandhu, “the world’s variety arises from action, and this [action] is volition (cetanā) [i.e., mental action,] and what is produced by this [volition, i.e., physical and verbal actions],”70 and the AKBh adds “and it is not [the case that this variety,] which presupposes intelligence, was created by some single [agent].”71

The notion of “arrangement” cannot be legitimately applied to the universe (kā. II-12)

In kā.11 and 12, Śubhagupta argues that there is a fundamental difference between natural entities such as the visual organ and human artifacts such as houses, so that the Īśvaravādin cannot rightly state that natural entities must have a creator because we see that they are “arranged” or “fashioned” in a specific way. The reasoning behind this terse assertion might be somewhat similar to the one found in TS 61-62, which reformulates Dharmakīrti’s anthill argument72:

governing agency, then the example] lacks the property to be proven. And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood [i.e., with the potter and not God as the agent,] the reason must be contradictory: there would ensue that [the subject of the inference] would have an agent who is not God, perishable, etc.”  

68 See Krasser 1999, particularly the conclusion p. 222.

69 Note that MHK 3.220-221 already states this dilemma: sakartrkam athābhīṣṭam rācitavād ghaṭādivat | anirdīṣṭaviśeṣena kartā cet siddhasādhanam || aṭha ni-tyaikasākṣmādviśeṣena na te ’nvayaḥ | anityamūrtajātatvadosāpattiś ca tasya vah || “[Objection:] We accept that [things such as the eye] have an agent, because they are fashioned [by causes and conditions], like a pot[], and contrary to the self, etc.). [Answer:] If it is an agent of unspecified characteristics (MHK TJ/Tib gal te khyad par ma bstan pa’i byed po yin na), you [only] prove what is [already] established. But if it is [an agent] with characteristics such as [being] permanent, one, and subtle, [then] you have no positive concomitance/[co-presence] [for want of an example] (note that MHK TJ/Tib renders na te ’nvayaḥ as khyod dpe med, “you have no example”), and defects such as being impermanent, corporeal and arisen [ensue] for this [God] of yours.” Nonetheless, see Krasser 2012, which endeavours to show that Bhāviveka must have been posterior to Dharmakīrti.

70 AK 4.1ab: karmajām lokavacitryāṃ cetanā tatkrāṃ ca tat | On this passage, see also Krasser 1999: 221.

71 AKBh 192,3-4: na khalu kena cid buddhipūrvakam kṛtam.

72 On the latter see above, n. 33. AKVy 237,28 explains sa as kramabhedaḥ, “specific succession.”
In the case of [things] such as temples, one understands [that there must have been] an intelligent [cause], even when this agent is not perceived, when one sees that [these things] are particularized by an arrangement; if one could see such a [property of being particularized] in [the Īśvarāvādin’s] subjects of inference, such as bodies and mountains, one could correctly establish [this intelligent cause] as it is understood [by the Īśvarāvādin] on the basis of this establishment [through perception] of this [arrangement].

Kamalaśīla explains that a temple for instance has been established through co-presence and co-absence (anvayavyatireka) to be the product of the activity of intelligent individuals, so that upon seeing one it is legitimate to infer the existence of such a cause even if it is not currently visible;

but such a specific arrangement is not well known in [things] such as bodies, trees or mountains; what is well known [in that case] is the mere flatus vocis (pralāpamātra) “arrangement.”

The fundamental difference between a bodily organ such as the eye and an artifact is that in the second case, our use of such words as “fashioned,” “arranged,” etc., are warranted by previous perceptions through which we have ascertained the invariable concomitance of some intelligent agents with these entities’ arising; but in the former case, the Īśvarāvādin’s statement that the eye is “fashioned” is an empty word that is not grounded in any actual experience.

God’s will cannot solve the contradiction between His eternity and the universe’s succession (kā. 13)

Kā. 13 seems to presuppose that the Īśvarāvādin, in order to avoid the criticism that an eternal cause cannot produce a universe endowed with succession, has argued that although God is eternal, his will to create is not, which is the reason why creation can take place successively. The Buddhist’s response is that given that such a will must itself be a quality (guṇa) of an eternal substratum, it must itself be just as eternal and all-pervasive as this substratum (otherwise the substratum would change with the appearance or disappearance of this quality, and therefore could not be eternal)—and so it cannot be invoked so as to solve the

73 TS 61–62: sanniveśaviśiṣṭatvam yādṛg devakulādiśu | kartary anupalabdhe’pi yaddṛṣṭau buddhimadgatiḥ || tādṛg eva yadākṣyeta tadvagādiśu dharmiṣu | yuktam tatsādhanād asmād yathābhīṣṭasya sādhanām ||

74 TSP, 47,11-12/TSP, 60,11-12: na ca tathābhūtasanniveśaviśeṣas tanutarugiriprabhṛtiṣu prasiddhaḥ, kevalam sanniveśa iti pralāpamātraṃ prasiddham.
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contradiction between God’s eternity and the universe’s succession. The argument seems to be reminiscent of the discussion that takes place in the AKBh immediately after Vasubandhu has pointed out that if the universe were produced by an eternal God, it would not be successive:

[The Īśvaravādin:] Then this [arising of entities in succession] must be due to the force of īśvara’s will (chanda), [which takes such forms as] “May this arise now!”, “May that perish [now]!”, “[May this arise] later!” [The Buddhist]: Then because of these various wills (chandabheda), the cause [of the universe] would be established to be multiple; and these various wills too would occur simultaneously, because their cause, īśvara, is not distinct [from them].

A causeless entity cannot produce effects (kā. 14)

Śubhagupta then argues that only entities endowed with a cause can in turn participate in the production of something else, whereas a hare’s horn, which is never caused to come into being (the hare’s horn is one of the famous examples of non-existent things adduced by Indian philosophers), cannot in turn cause anything to exist.

The argument—which sounds like a variant of the Buddhist’s favourite point that an eternal entity can have no agency—is already found for instance in the MHK:

God is not the cause of the universe, because it is causeless, or because it does not arise—just as a sky-flower is not admitted to be the cause of the universe.

Śāntarakṣita also mentions it:

God is not the cause of [things] that arise, because He does not arise, just as a lotus in the sky; otherwise, everything would exist simultaneously.

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75 See above, n. 39.

76 AKBh 101,26-102,1 on AK 2.64d: sa tarhi cchandavaśād īśvarasya syād ayam idānim updayatām ayam nirudhyatām ayam paścād iti cchandabhedāt tarhi siddham anekam kāraṇam syāt, sa cāpi cchandabheda yugapat syāt taddhetor īśvarasyābhinnatvāt. Our understanding of abhinnatvāt diverges slightly from that of the AKVy (237,34, glossing abhinnatvāt as ekatvāt), AKBh_Tib. (D ku 102a4, de’i rgyu’i dbang phyug la tha dad pa med pa’i phyir—unless la is to be emended to las), and La Vallée Poussin (1923: 311, “puisque Dieu… n’est pas multiple”). In the final analysis, both interpretations amount to the same.

77 MHK 3.216: ahetutvād ajāter vā neṣo viśvasya kāraṇam | yathākāśasasya kusumam neṣṭam viśvasya kāraṇam ||

78 TS 87: neṣvaro janmināṃ het utpattivikalatvah | gaganāmbhojavat sarvam anyathā yugapad bhavet ||
The dilemma of God’s purpose (kā. 15)

The next verse formulates a dilemma according to which God either has or does not have a purpose in creating the universe. If he has one, then he is pursuing a goal that betrays his need of something he has not achieved yet, and therefore his imperfection, or the fact that he is not an īśvara (the word literally means “a lord,” someone who has power, and God supposedly has power over everything). But if he has no purpose, then he must be acting irrationally, as a madman.

A similar dilemma is already found in the BC⁷⁹ as well as in the YBh:

Do you mean that [God] creates with or without a purpose? If [He creates] with a purpose, then he is not a lord (anīśvara) with respect to that purpose, [so] one cannot [call Him] “the Lord of the universe.” If [He creates] without a purpose, then one cannot [hold] both that [He] has no purpose and that He creates.⁸⁰

Some earlier sources seem to take for granted that God, as any agent, must have some kind of purpose in creating, so that they only examine the part of the dilemma dealing with īśvara’s purpose. Thus Vasubandhu:

And to begin with, what is God’s goal with such a [tremendous] effort [put] in the [cosmic] creation? If it is [his] satisfaction (prīti), since then he is not capable of producing this [satisfaction] without a means, he cannot be a lord (īśvara) with respect to this [satisfaction, and] in the same way [he cannot be a lord] with respect to [anything] else.⁸¹

The Buddhist dilemma seems to have been appropriated by the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila against his theist opponents:

And thus, if [God] requires [something] in order to create, his freedom (svātantrya) is reduced to naught; and what is it that He desires [and] that would not be accomplished if He did not create the world? Even

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⁷⁹ See BC 18.23-24 (D ge 65b6-7/P nge 79b2-4) and Johnston 1937: 32.
⁸⁰ YBh 145,6-8: kaccid icchasi saprayojanaṁ vā srjaty aprayojanaṁ veti. sacet saprayojanaṁ tena tasān prāyojanatītānīśvaro jagadiśvara iti na yujyate. sacen nisaprayojanaṁ tena ṇāstī ca prāyojanaṁ srājāti ca na yujyate. See Chemparathy 1968: 96, and n. 44 (“The principle that underlines this argument is that no one will ever betake himself to any activity whatsoever, unless he has some purpose [prayojanam] in view”).
⁸¹ AKBh 102,6-8: kaś ca tāvad īśvarasyeyatā sargapravāsenārthaḥ, yadi prītis tāṁ tarhi nāntarenoṣayāṁ śaktah kartum iti na tasyām īśvaram syāt tathaiva cānyasmin. See La Vallée Poussin 1923: 312. Note also MHK 3.215: kasya cit prīthīnetvatvā loko neśavarakartṛkāḥ | vidadhāno yathā prītīm neśatīśvarī kartṛkāḥ || īśvarī- conj.: īśvara- Ed. “The universe does not have God for its Creator [simply] because it is the cause of his satisfaction, just as the husband (īśa) does not have [his] wife/(mistress) for his creator [simply because he] provides [her] with [sexual] satisfaction.” The meaning of this verse remains obscure to us.
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The problem with God’s auxiliary causes (kā. 16)
The next verse examines the possibility that there might be auxiliary causes contributing to God’s creation, such as actions (insofar as they require a karmic retribution). For the Naiyāyikas for instance maintain that there are other causes besides God, such as merit and demerit (dharmādharma), which play an auxiliary but crucial role in the production of the world, and they could use this to explain why īśvara, although eternal, does not create everything all at once (the sequence seen in the universe could be the result of these auxiliary causes); not to mention that this could enable the theist to maintain that although God is ultimately the cause of the universe, the seed is still in some sense the cause of the sprout. Śubhagupta points out, however, that if īśvara must depend on such causes in his creation, then he can only be grasped “by [an act of] faith”—an elliptical assertion that might be an allusion to Vasubandhu’s formulation of this argument:

Surely, for [the Īśvaravādin] who asserts that there is a single cause of the universe, the causal activity (puruṣakāra) of [all] other things must be denied, [however] obvious (pratyakṣa). And [if] he imagines that God is a factor of action along with [other] auxiliary causes, this can [only] be a mere expression of [his blind] faith (bhaktivāda), because we do not see any activity of [something] other than [these so-called auxiliary] causes in the production of the [effect]! And God (īśvara) cannot be the Lord (īśvara) if there are other, auxiliary causes.

ŚV, Sambhāṣēpaparihāra 54-55: tathā cāpekaṃmānasya svātantryam pratihanyate | jagac cāsṛjatas tasya kim nāmeṣṭaṃ na sidhyati || prayojanam anuddiśya na mando'pi pravartate | evam eva pravṛttiś cec caitanyenāsya kim bhavet ||

The expression also brings to mind TS 85, although the context is different, since there Sāntarakṣita attacks the idea that God can impart knowledge by teaching whereas he has no body (and therefore no mouth) by stating that “[the fact] that [someone] who has no mouth may be a teacher can only be grasped through [an act of] faith” (vimukhasyopadeṣṭṛtvaṃ śraddhāgamyaṃ param). The word seems to refer here to any causal activity besides God’s (cf. La Vallée Poussin 1923: 312: “Le partisan de Dieu, cause unique du monde, nie les causes visibles – causes et conditions – l’efficace [puruṣakāra] de la graine à l’égard de la pousse, etc.”). See, e.g., AKBh 76,15 and especially 95,3, where puruṣakāra is glossed kāritra.

AKBh 102,12-15: ekaṃ khalv api jagataḥ kāraṇaṃ parīghṛṇatāścāṃ arthā-
Śāntideva offers a similar criticism:

How is it that [God] does not always create? For He does not require anything else: there is nothing else that would not be created by Him. Therefore what could He require? If He requires a complex of conditions (sāmagrī), God can no longer be the cause [of the universe as you claim]; He is not free (iśa) not to act when the complex of conditions [is present], nor [is He free] to act if the [complex] is absent.  

The problem with God’s body (kā. 17-18)

The next reasoning is based, it seems, on a new dilemma that is not explicitly stated in Śubhagupta’s verses: either God has a body (a hypothesis examined in kā. 17-18), or he does not and creates by mere will (an idea criticized from kā. 19 onwards).

According to kā. 17-18, if īśvara has a “body, etc.” (lus sośs, śarīrādi?)—or, as spelt out in kā. 17, a body and sense organs (dbang po, indriya)—he cannot be omnipotent as the Īśvaravādin claims (since he cannot have created his own body and sense organs) and he must be subjected to birth and death (as any incarnated being). The reasoning in kā. 17 is reminiscent of Kumārila’s criticism of the theistic position in the ŚV, according to which God cannot have produced his own body, and—according to the Īśvaravādin’s own reasoning—this body, being a specific arrangement, requires an intelligent creator, so that one must assume another cause for it, and God cannot be omnipotent (since he owes his body to that other creator):

But if [you admit that] this [God] must have a body and [sense organs] (śarīrādi), [then] the coming into being of this [body can]not have been produced by [God] Him[self], so there must ensue that in turn, another [intelligent creator endowed with a body must be assumed] in the same way [in order to explain His body and sense organs].  

nāṁ pratyakṣaḥ puruṣaḥ kāraṇaḥ kārakaṁ īśvaraṁ kalpayata kevalo bhaktivādaḥ syāt, kāraṇebhyo’nyasya tadviparādaṁtyaḥ. sahakāriṣu cānyeṣu kāraṇeṣv īśvaro neśvaraḥ syāt.

86 BCA 9.124-125: kasmāt sadā na kurute na hi so’nyam apekṣate | tenāKRTO’nyo nāsty eva tenāsau kim apekṣatāṁ || apekṣate cet sāmagrīṃ hetur na punar īśvarah | nākartaṁ īśah sāmagryām na kariṁ tadabhāvataḥ ||

ŚV, Sambandhāksamaparīhāra 48ac: śarīrādy atha tasya syāt tasyotpattir na tatkrītā | tadvad anyaprasaṅgo’pi... Note that according to Pārthasārathimīśra, Kumārila is implicitly pointing out an infinite regress (NR 462,7: taduptyartham ca śarīrāntarābhhyapagame’navasthā. “And if, for the sake of [explaining] the
The point made in kā. 19, that God’s body must be subjected to birth and death, is also mentioned by Kumārila:

And your reason [—namely, that the universe must have been created by an intelligent being because it has a specific arrangement[88]—must be inconclusive because of His body and [sense organs] (śarīrādi[, which also have a specific arrangement and yet are supposedly eternal]; besides, [God]’s body must have come into being [and therefore cannot be eternal], because it is a body, just as our [body] for instance.89

The problem with God’s will (kā. 19-21)

The Īśvarāvādin could retort, however, that God, contrary to human beings, does not need a body in order to create, because he acts by mere will (icchāmātra).90 Kā. 19 reminds the reader of a point already established in kā. 13, namely, that the main problem with God’s agency (how can he create successively if he is eternal?) must also affect his will, which, inasmuch as it belongs to him, should also be eternal: how can the Īśvarāvādin explain that God’s will to create the universe does not occur at every moment? Śubhagupta’s opponent answers that this will only occurs once God has “examined the qualities and defects”—i.e., presumably, once he has pondered over the pros and contras of creating a particular aspect of the universe; unless here, the qualities and defects refer more specifically to the merit and demerit of those who are to experience this or that aspect of the universe.

88 Cf. NR 468,16, which defines this reason as utpattimattve sati sannivesāviśiṣṭatvāt, “since it must have come into being, because it is particularized by an arrangement.”

89 ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 77: anekāntaś ca hetus te taccharīrādinā bhavet | utpattimāṃś ca taddeho dehatvād asmadādāvat ||

90 Thus according to Praśastapāda (PDhS 49,7-11), God creates the universe by putting atoms together so as to form a cosmic egg, and this conjunction of atoms results “from the Great Lord’s mere will” (maheśvarasyābhidhyānamātrāt; cf. Vyomavatī 301,5, which glosses abhidhyāna with the word icchā); see Chemparathy 1968: 72 and pp. 81–83, and Bronkhorst 1996: 286–287. Kumārila attacks this conception in ŚV, Sambandhākṣepaparihāra 81-82ab: kulālavac ca naitasya vyāpāro yadi kalpyate | acetanah katham bhāvas tadicchām anurudhyate | ātsmān na paramāntvādē rāmbhah syāt tadicchayā | “And if you do not conceive the activity of this [Lord] as [that of] the potter, how can an unconscious entity conform to his will? Therefore the atoms and so on do not cling together by virtue of his will.” (See Krasser 1999: 220–221.) The idea that īśvara creates by mere will is also found in the Naiyāyika and Śaiva nondualistic sources (see Ratié 2016: 326, n. 157).
Thus Uddyotakara, when faced with the Buddhist objection that God, if He creates the universe because his eternal nature prompts him to do so, should create all at once and eternally, answers that it is not so, because although God is eternal, he is characterized by intelligence, and an intelligent entity always requires (sāpekaṣa) something besides itself—i.e., that on which this entity exerts its intelligence. In God’s case, being intelligent, he only creates when he has ascertained that a number of conditions are present (including the merit and demerit of those who are to experience this or that aspect of the universe):

If [our Buddhist opponent says that] since [according to us God creates] because it is His nature [to create, He must] always be active; we [ask him:] do you mean that if [God]’s nature consists in activity, He cannot have both activity and rest, for if a nature consists in activity, rest is not possible, and therefore no arising [of the universe] in succession is possible, because a nature [only] has one form, so that this [will:] ‘may this exist now,’ [and] ‘may this no [longer] exist,’ is not possible, for we do not see various effects arise from a cause that has a single nature? [If you mean this, we answer the following:] this is not a fault [in our system], because [according to us, God] is particularized by intelligence (buddhimattva); we have [already] demonstrated [His] intelligence, and what is particularized by intelligence requires [other things on which its intelligence is exerted]; and that which requires [other things] does not undertake [to create] everything, and it does not produce everything at once. [It is only] that whose causes are present that [comes to exist, whereas] that whose causes are absent does not [come to] exist. And it is not the case that the causes of everything can be present at the same time, therefore the arising of everything at the same time does not ensue: surely, this [God], when endeavouring to act, requires the time when merit and demerit come to maturation; the arising of [auxiliary] causes; the proximity of the beings which [must] experience that [which is to be created]; the maturation of the merit and demerit of these beings which [must] experience that [which is to be created]; and the absence of any obstacle to these [various auxiliary causes].91

91 NV 438,3-13: tattvābhāvyāt satatam pravrṭtir iti cet, atha manyase yadi pravrṭtisvabhāvakam tatttvaṃ pravrṭtinivrītī na prāpnutaḥ, na hi pravrṭtisvabhāvake tattve niḥvrīt yujyata iti krāmeṇa cotpattir na prāpnoti, tattvasyaikaraṇāpatvāt, idam idānāṃ bhavatv idam mā bhūd ity etan na yuktan, na hy ekarūpāt kāraṇāt kāryabhedam paśyāma iti, naiśa doṣāḥ, buddhimattvaviśeṣanāt, buddhimattavatvam ity etat pratipāditaṃ, buddhimattaya ca viśeṣyamāṇaṃ sāpekaṃ, sāpekaṃ ca na sarvam pravartate, na ca sarvam ekasmin kāla utpādayati, yasya kāraṇasāṃśiḥyam tad bhavati. yad asannhihakāraṇān tan na bhavatīti, na ca sarvasya yugapat kāraṇasāṃśiḥyham astiṇy ataḥ sarvasya yugapad utpādo na prasaktāḥ, sa khalu pravrtaṃāno
Śubhagupta’s answer in kā. 20 and 21 is apparently that if the arising of the qualities and defects on which īśvara has to ponder before wishing to create presuppose īśvara (and they must if īśvara is indeed the creator of everything, including these qualities and defects), then īśvara should know them from all eternity anyway, so that the Īśvaravādin remains incapable of explaining why God’s will occurs at certain points in time and not all at once and eternally.

A somewhat similar reasoning is found in the YBh:

If [the cosmic creation] has as its cause [God’s] will (icchā), this will in turn, does it have God as its cause, or does it have as its cause a material cause that is other [than Him]? If [this will] is caused by God alone, when[ever] God exists, the will exists; [and] since whenever the will [exists], God exists, the [cosmic] creation must eternally exist. If [this will] is caused by a material cause that is other [than Him], one does not see [such a cause]; and [even if it existed, God could] not [be] the lord (īśvara) with respect to that [cause, so] it would not be right [anyway to say that God is] the lord of the universe.92

In the same way, Vasubandhu attacks the idea that God’s will(s) may solve the contradiction between God’s eternality and his agency.93 and adds:

Or if [the Īśvaravādin explains that God’s wishes are not simultaneous because they] require various other causes, the cause [of the universe] cannot be God. […] If [the Īśvaravādin had rather say] that although God’s wishes are simultaneous, the universe is not simultaneous because it arises according to God’s wishes, [we answer that this is] not [the case], because [these wishes] do not become different later.94

**The problem with God’s knowledge (kā. 22-23)**

The next kārikās present a new dilemma: either God has knowledge as his nature (kā. 22) or he does not (kā. 23).

Śubhagupta first examines the thesis that God does have knowledge as its nature. This is of course the thesis held by his opponents: not only

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92 YBh 145,12-16: saced tadicchāhetukaḥ, sāpīcchā kim īśvarahetukaiva tadanyopādānahetukā vā. saced īśvarahetukaiva, yadesvāras tadecchā yadeccchā tadesvāra iti nityam sargeṇa bhavitavyam. saced anyopādānahetukā, tac ca nopalabhyate, tatra ca neśvaro jagadīśvārāna iti na yujyate. See Chemparathy 1968: 96.

93 See above, n. 75.

94 AKBh 102,1-6 ad AK 2.64d: kāraṇāntarabhedāpekṣaṇe vā neśvara eva kāraṇām syāt. […] yaugapadye’piśvaracchandānām jaṅgata na yaugapadyam, yathācchandam utpādanād iti cet, na, teṣām paścād viśeṣābhāvāt.
is God supposed to have a buddhimattattva, in Uddyotakara’s words, he is also held to be omniscient (sarvajña) on the grounds that a creator must know not only what (s)he creates but also all the various factors involved in this act of creation. Śubhagupta points out that this, however, must lead to a contradiction within the Īśvaravādin’s system. Thus the Naiyāyikas believe that knowledge must involve not only a knower (pramāṭṛ, jñāṭṛ) who is the agent of knowing, but also an instrument that is a sense organ (indriya) and an object on which the action of knowing is exerted (prameya, jñeya). But if God has no body, then he must know without sense organs; and if he starts creating the world at some specific point in time, how can he have knowledge as its nature before he has begun creating, when there is no object to be known yet?

If, however, the Īśvaravādin unwillingly concedes that knowledge cannot be God’s nature in order to avoid these absurd consequences, then he must admit that God has no will either, and therefore that God is not God—i.e., he is not a lord who is free (svatantra) to act as he pleases.

95 See above, n. 91.
96 See e.g. TSP₇ 43,22-44,2/TSP₆ 55,19-56,8: tathā cāhuḥ praśastamatiśrat-prabhātayah – sakalabhuvaḥhetuvād evāṣya sarvajñatvam Siddham, karuḥ kāryopādānatāpakaṇānaprayojanasaṃpradānaparijñāṇa. iha hi yo yasya karuḥ bhavati sa tasyopādānādi jānīte. yathā kulālaḥ kumbhādānāmi kartā taduṇādānam mṛṭpīṇḍam, upakaranāni ca cakrādīni, prayojanam udākaharaṇādi, kutuminam ca sampradānam jānita ity etat prasiddham; tathēvaḥ sakalabhuvaḥnām kartā, sa taduṇādānī paramānvādilakaṇāni, tadupakaranāni dharmadharmandikkaṇādi, vyavahāropakaranāni sāmāṇyavīśesa-samāvayalakaṇāni, prayojanam upabhogam sampradānasaṃjñakāṃś ca puruṣān jānīta ity anāt saṃdham asya sarvajñatvam iti. “And thus, Praśastamati [= Praśastapāda] and [others] have said the following: ‘Because the [Lord] is the cause of all worlds, his omniscience is established, because an agent has the full knowledge of the effect, the material cause, the instrumental causes, the purpose and the recipients [of the created object]. For in this [world], the agent of [something] knows this [thing]’s material cause and so on. Just as it is well known that a potter, who is the agent of e.g. pots, knows their material cause [i.e.,] the lump of clay, [their] instrumental causes [i.e.,] the wheel and so on, [their] purpose [i.e.,] containing water and so on, and [their] recipient [i.e.,] someone in charge of the household; in the same way, the Lord, who is the agent of all worlds, knows their material causes, which consist of the atoms and so on, their instrumental causes [i.e.,] merit and demerit, space, time and so on, the instrumental causes of usage (vyavahāra) that consist of generality, particularity and inherence, the purpose [i.e.,] the experience [of pleasure and pain], and humans, who are designated as the recipients. Therefore the [Lord]’s omniscience is established.” This fragment probably comes from Praśastapāda’s lost Ṭīkā (see Chemparathy 1968: 78 ff, and Bronkhorst 1996: 285).

97 On the acknowledgement of this point at least by later Naiyāyikas, who consider that īśvara’s cognition is only a pratyakṣa in a figurative sense because īśvara has no indriyas, see Chemparathy 1972: 175.
Or, to put it as Śāntideva, “if God (īśa) acts while not wishing [so], as a consequence he must be dependent on others,”\(^98\) which is contradictory with the Īśvaravādin’s very definition of God.

**Conclusion (kā. 24-25)**

The end of Śubhagupta’s short treatise reminds the reader of the main strategy that has been used throughout: God, if he is permanent and one, cannot produce a universe that involves sequence (*krama*).

**Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā: Text and translation**

Our edition of the ĪBhK is based on D no. 4247, *zhe* 200a2-201a2, C *zhe* 192b3-193b3, and P no. 5745, *ze* 212a2-213a3; except for a few emendations, it agrees almost entirely with Watanabe’s (1977: 581–583) [“W”], some of whose emendations we have followed (or at least discuss). As for our translation of the stanzas, it relies for the most part on the philosophical explanations provided above, i.e., on parallel passages and arguments. None of us read Japanese, so we could not make use of Watanabe’s Japanese translation (1977: 584–587). Fortunately, Chizuko Yoshimizu was so kind as to go through our translation and compare it with Watanabe’s. Needless to say, we are responsible for any mistakes or misunderstandings.

1. **Text**

| rgya gar skad du | īśva ra bhaṃ* ga kā ri kā | bod skad du | D³dbang phyug ’jig pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa |
| thams cad mkhyen pa la C⁴phyag ’tshal lo |
| gang gis P³yang dag mkhyen gyur cing | sems can rnams la ston byed pa |
| ’gro mgon* de la phyag ’tshal te | yang dag gtan la dbab par bya | 1 |

\(^{*CD(W)} mgon : P dgon.\)

| las dang nyon mongs las skyes shing | D⁴skad cig ma dang de bdag med |
| P⁴thams cad mkhyen dang ’dod C⁵chags bral | bsdus te ’dir ni brjod par bya | 2 |
| glen blo gang zhig ’di dag kun | dbang phyug gis ni byas so zhes |
| smra ba de yang mi šes pa* | gzhom phyir ’khor du gsal** bar brjod | 3 |

\(^{*CDP pa : W em. pas; on pas, see below, n. 100. **On gsal ↔ bsal, see below, n. 100.}\)

\(^98\) BCA 9.126ab: *karoty anicchann īśaś cet parāyattaḥ prasajyate* |
lus dang dbang po sa la sosgs | thams cad dbang phyug gis ma byas | 4
| de yang dbang phyug bskyed bya na | blo ldan skye las grub gyur te | 5

byed pa la sosgs rtags pa yi* | rgyu las skyes pa ma yin te | 6
| rim jug phyir na dper** blo bzhin | dbag dang dbang phyug sel bar blta | 6

byed pa la sosgs rtags pa yi* | rgyu las skyes pa ma yin te | 6

byed pa la sosgs rtags pa yi* | rgyu las skyes pa ma yin te | 6

byed pa la sosgs rtags pa yi* | rgyu las skyes pa ma yin te | 6

byed pa la sosgs rtags pa yi* | rgyu las skyes pa ma yin te | 6
A Buddhist refutation of the existence of a creator God

The text appears to be in Tibetan script with some English words. It contains a religious debate or argument, possibly around the concept of a creator God, as suggested by the context. The text seems to be discussing philosophical or theological points in a structured dialogue format.
2. Translation

In Sanskrit (the Indian language): Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā; in Tibetan: dBang phyug 'jig pa'i tshig le’ur byas pa.

Homage to the Omniscient!

1. Homage to this Protector of the world (jagannātha) who, knowing correctly, teaches (√śās?) the sentient beings (sattva), one must correctly ascertain [here who he is].

2. Here we should say briefly (samāsatas?) that he is the one who knows everything (sarvajña?) as resulting from actions and defilements (karmakleśaja?) and as momentary (kṣanika) and selfless (nirātmaka?), and who is free of attachment (vītarāga).

3. The fool who holds that everything is created by īśvara is [to be] clearly answered [what follows] in an assembly in order to dispel [his and other people’s] ignorance.

4. Nothing [in the universe,] such as bodies, organs and earth, is produced by īśvara, because there is a difference between the cognition of a body [and that] of an effect [brought about by an agent]: for example, [in the case of an effect such as a pot,] we see that [a pot] arises from the cause [that is the potter, whereas we do not see the universe being produced by īśvara].

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99 The exact meaning of Tib. yang dag gtan la dbab par bya remains somewhat obscure to us, as does its function.

100 The connection between, on the one hand, thams cad mkhyen dang 'dod chags bral and, on the other, las dang nyon mongs las skyes shing skad cig ma dang de bdag med, is unclear. Watanabe apparently interpreted the two segments as the two objects of Śubhagupta’s explanation in the present treatise. This interpretation is a bit problematic inasmuch as the present treatise contains no account of Buddhist ontology.

101 ĪBhK 3 is liable to several interpretations according to whether one reads gsal bar (“in a clear manner”) or bsal bar (“in order] to refute,” nīrākartum LCh 2512a), and whether one emends mi shes pa to mi shes pas (“because he is beset with ignorance,” with gzhom in a “passive”/intransitive meaning, e.g., [prati]hata LCh 2047b) or not (“in order to dispel ignorance,” with gzhom in an “active”/transitive meaning, e.g., nihanmi LCh 2047b; note PV Tib 2.132ab and 134cd, where [sdug bsgal]rgyu] gzhom pa'i phyir translates Skt. [duhkha-lhetor] hānārtham, “in order to eliminate [suffering/the cause]”). Reading bsal bar, de can be construed as an accusative (Skt. tam): “[the following is (to be?)] said to refute the fool who holds/[would hold] that everything is created by īśvara”; reading gsal bar, de is rather to be interpreted as a nominative (Skt. sā), with utkha in the sense “is [to be] answered”: “the fool who holds that everything is created by īśvara is [to be] answered [what follows] in a clear manner.” We take ’khor in the sense of par(i)-ṣad/sabhā (see, e.g., Negi 1993: 431ab).
5. If those [bodies, organs, earth and so on] were produced by īśvara, they too could be established [to be so] from the fact that they arise from an intelligent cause [only if one could first witness this production,] just as a pot [can only be established to arise from an intelligent cause once one has seen the potter in action]. And it cannot be argued that this is a different [situation, as the Īśvaravādin relies precisely on this analogy with the pot].

6. [The Buddhist: The universe] does not arise from an eternal cause that would be an agent and [an intelligent being as you claim], because [an agent] proceeds successively, just as the thought [of an intelligent being]; one [therefore] considers that the Self (ātman) and īśvara[, both of whom you hold to be eternal,] are refuted [as creators of the universe].

7. And if this [universe is produced] by īśvara, [then] it is vain to compose treatises so as to set aside erroneous knowledge, because this [erroneous knowledge in the world] comes from a cause that is [eternally] present [and therefore impossible to eliminate].

8. Moreover, proving that entities endowed with an arrangement (sanniveśa) are produced by an intelligent [being] (buddhimat) proves the contrary (viparyaya?) of the specific properties (dharmaviśeṣa) [that the Īśvaravādin ascribes to īśvara].

9. From the [mere] fact that the body, etc., has a [specific] arrangement, one understands that it must be produced by [something] impermanent (anitya) [and] multiple (aneka?), because one sees that it is so for instance in the case of a house.

10. But if (atha) [the upholder of God’s existence] proves in general (sāmānyena?) [that the things endowed with a specific arrangement] possess an intelligent cause (buddhimatkāraṇatvena?), [then] he [merely] demonstrates what is [already] established (siddhasādhana), since it is admitted that everything comes from karman.

11. And the reason invoked [by the Īśvaravādin], namely: “things are fashioned (alaṅkṛta?),” is not established (asiddha), because all entities are not born with this nature (tadrūpeṇa).

12. Because a difference is established: [when you say] that things are fashioned [i.e.,] arranged, this does not appear in [something] like an eye as [it does] in the case of a house.

13. God is not endowed with qualities (guṇa) such as will over the things

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102 ĪBhK 5 remains quite obscure to us; this is merely a tentative interpretation.
that he desires, because, just as they would never arise nor perish, they would be omnipresent, as the nature of space.

14. It is because [something] has a cause that it [can in turn] produce [something] else, like a pot, etc.; [but] a hare’s horn (śaśaviṣāṇa?), which does not arise, has no causality (hetutva?).

15. An agent [that would create] purposelessly (niṣprayojanam?) would be similar to madmen; but if it is with a purpose [in mind] [that He creates], he cannot be [the universe’s] lord (na tasyeśvaratvam bhavet?).

16. If īśvara must depend on the actions (karman) and other [auxiliary causes], since He depends on them, He is only perceived (upāvābh?) [as the universe’s lord] by [an act of] faith (śraddhā!)

17. If [īśvara] has a body and [sense organs] (śarīrādi?) for His nature (rūpa), he is not the agent of everything, since it is thanks to his possessing a body and sense organs that He produces [the universe], just as [an agent] different from Him.

18. And because of the [logical] reason [just] mentioned, it follows (prasaṅga) anyway that īśvara must be pervaded by birth and death.104

19. If īśvara is an agent thanks to his will (icchā?), why [does this will arise] at a certain [point in time] and not always? [The Īśvaravādin:] His will proceeds at a certain [point in time] after [God] has examined (vicārya?) the qualities and defects (guṇadoṣa) [of the things He wishes to create].

20. If the arising of [these] qualities and defects presupposes (°pūrvaka) īśvara, then these [qualities and defects] should arise in all [circumstances].

21. [But if you think that God’s will does not depend on the examination of qualities and defects, then] since it arises from Him alone, [His] will should arise all at once (sakṛt?); how could that which has not arisen before arise later?

103 Watanabe apparently interprets ĪBhK 14 as follows: “[If the opponent says that īśvara also] has [its] cause, [then īśvara] would be produced by something else, like a pot. A hare’s horn does not arise and [its] cause does not exist.” This interpretation does not require the admittedly rather unnatural emendation of gzhan gyis to gzhan gyi; in our opinion, however, what is at stake is īśvara both as an effect and as a cause, and not just as an effect. See our explanation and the parallel texts adduced above.

104 Or should one understand: “[the contradiction] follows anyway that īśvara has birth, perishes, and [nevertheless is] omnipresent”?
22. Or again, if, [as you claim, God] has knowledge as his nature (jñānarūpa?), how does he know without sense organs? [And how did he know] without any cognoscible [object] (jñeya) in the past, when [objects] were not created (nirmita?) [yet]?

23. But if [you had rather claim that God] has as his nature an absence of knowledge (asamprakhyānarūpa?), just as [an insentient entity] such as water, how [can he be, as you claimed] before, the only cause of [his] desire inasmuch as he is free (svatantra)?

24. Even if [God] were the cause [of the universe,] since he must exist (vyavasthiti?) as [something] permanent and of a unitary nature (ekarūpa?), [all] entities should [necessarily] arise everywhere (sarvatra?) and at all times (nityam?).

25. [Such is] the method (naya?) of the scholars who follow (anusārin) the path (mārga) of reasoning (yukti, nyāya?); one must know that through this same [method], Viṣṇu and Brahmā too are refuted.

[Thus] is completed this Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā composed by the master (ācārya) Śubhagupta.

References


BCA Bodhicaryāvatāra. See La Vallée Poussin 1898.


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<td>L. de La Vallée Poussin</td>
<td>L’Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, traduit et annoté. Premier et deuxième chapitres. Paris 1923.</td>
<td>1923</td>
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<td>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi. La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang traduite et annotée. Paris 1928.</td>
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NR Nyāyaratnākara. See ŚV.

NS Nyāyasūtra. See NV.


PVP Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā, D no. 4217, che 1-326b4, P no. 5717b, che 1-390a8.

PV_Tib Tibetan translation of the PV. See PV.


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TJ  *(Madhyamakahṛdaya)tarkajvālā* on MHK, D no. 3856, dza 40b7-329b4.


Vibh.  *Vibhūticandra’s* marginal notes on PVV. See PVV.
Vyomavatī


Watanabe 1977


Watanabe 1987


YBh


YD


Yoshimizu 1999

Reconsidering the phrase \textit{na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam} in the \textit{Vajracchedikā}, with special reference to the Chinese translations*

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The Mahayana sutra \textit{Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā}, popularly known as \textit{Diamond Sutra}, contains the renowned phrase \textit{na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam}, which appears in paragraph 10c of Edward Conze’s edition.\textsuperscript{1} The phrase represents the early Mahayana idea that the bodhisattva’s mind is “non-attached” or “disengaged.” Another side of the phrase’s significance is found in its Chinese translation by the Kuchean monk Kumārajīva (ca. 350–409) as \textit{ying wu suozhu er sheng qi xin} 應無所住而生其心. This phrase was widely known in East Asia, especially among Chan/Zen Buddhists, who evaluated the phrase on the basis of the Chinese philosophical dichotomy of “substance” (\textit{ti 體}) and “function” (\textit{yong 用}).\textsuperscript{2} Moreover, it deserves special attention that nearly all studies and translations of the passages to date implicitly or explicitly suppose that the meaning of the original Sanskrit passage is more or less simple and clear, while Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation is a sort of over-interpretation of the original sense or a free rendering. In the present essay, I will take up this passage and reconsider variant readings in Sanskrit as well as in Tibetan translation. In short, I will attempt to explore the relevant passages and variants to suggest that Kumārajīva’s Chinese translation is not a mistranslation but represents a significant aspect of the original passage in Sanskrit.

* I would like to thank Mr. Kevin Buckelew (Columbia University) for smoothing my English. Needless to say, however, all errors in this paper remain my own responsibility.

\textsuperscript{1} Conze 1974: 35–36.

\textsuperscript{2} It is well known that, leaving aside whether or not it is a historical fact, Huineng 慧能 (638–713; the sixth patriarch of Chinese Chan/Zen) in his youth made the resolution to become a monk when he heard someone chanting the phrase \textit{ying wu suozhu er sheng qi xin} (Nakamura/Kino 1960/2001: 199; Nakamura 1988: 165, Andō 1999: 593).

1. Paragraph 10c in Sanskrit

First of all, let me quote the passage in question of paragraph 10c by using Conze’s edition:

\[
\text{tasmāt tarhi Subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena \textit{apratiṣṭhitam} cittam utpādayitavyam\textsuperscript{<1>}} \text{ yan } \text{ \textit{na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam\textsuperscript{<2>}}, } \text{ \textit{na rūpa-pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam, na Šabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavya-dharma-pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam\textsuperscript{<3>}},}\n\]

Here the main purport is expressed by the repetition of similar, yet slightly different wording: \textit{<1> apratiṣṭhitam [negative] cittam utpādayitavyam} [positive sentence]; \textit{<2> na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam}; and \textit{<3> na ...pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam} [negative sentence]. Conze himself translates the paragraph as follows:

Therefore then, Subhuti, the Bodhisattva, the great being, should thus produce an unsupported thought, i.e. he should produce a thought which is nowhere supported, he should produce a thought which is not supported by form, he should produce a thought which is not supported by sounds, smells, tastes, touchables, or mind-objects. (Conze 1974: 73)

It is clear that Conze is aware of the multi-faceted senses of the negative word \textit{apratiṣṭhitam}, as he made a long note regarding twenty-one possible interpretations (listed in Conze 1974: 95–96). Except for this point, his understanding is basically the same as the preceding translators, such as Müller (1894) and Walleser (1914).\textsuperscript{4} Furthermore, later translators like Nakamura/Kino (1960/2001) and Nagao (1980) adopted basically the same interpretation.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{3} Conze 1974: 35–36. Numbers \textit{<1> <2> <3>} are my addition. Paragraph 10c is longer. The quotation is only a part of it.

\textsuperscript{4} Müller (1894: 122–123): “Therefore, O Subhûti, a noble-minded Bodhisattva \textit{<1> should in this wise frame an independent mind\textsuperscript{1}}, which is “\textit{to be framed as a mind not believing in anything\textsuperscript{2}}, \textit{<2> not believing in form, not believing in sound, smell, taste, and anything that can be touched\textsuperscript{3}.}”

Walleser (1914: 145–146): “Deshalb denn, Subhûti, ist durch einen Bodhisattva Mahâsattva \textit{<1> ein nichtgestützter (d. h. unabhängiger) Gedanke zu erwecken\textsuperscript{1},} der \textit{<2> ein nicht irgendworauf beruhendes Denken ist\textsuperscript{2}}, \textit{<3> nicht auf Erscheinung (rûpa) beruhendes Denken ist zu erzeugen, nicht auf Tönen, Gerüchen, Geschmäcken, Tastbaren, gedanklichen Zuständen (dharma) beruhendes Denken ist zu erzeugen\textsuperscript{3}.}”

\textsuperscript{5} Nakamura/Kino (1960/2001: 69–71): “それだから、スブーティよ、求道者・すぐれた人々は、\textit{<1> とらわれない心をおこさなければならない\textsuperscript{1}}, \textit{<2> 何ものかにとらわれた心をおこしてはならない\textsuperscript{2}}, \textit{<3> 形にとらわれた心をおこしてはならない\textsuperscript{3}}。声や、香りや、味や、触れられるものや、心の対象、にとらわれた心をおこしてはならない\textsuperscript{3}。” Nagao (1980: 29): “それゆえに、スブーティよ、偉大な菩薩は、\textit{<1> 執着のない心を生じるべきである\textsuperscript{1}}。”
Yet another, older version is kept in what is called the “Schøyen collection.” Paragraph 10c runs as follows:

Schøyen collection, a part of paragraph 10c (Harrison/Watanabe 2006: 120):

tasmāt tarhi Subhūte bodhisattvena evaṃ <⁵cittam utpādayitavyaṃ apratiṣṭhitam⁶>, <⁴na rūpapratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam, na sābda-gandharasāpraṣṭavyadharmanapratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam⁷>. <⁴na kvacitpratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam⁸>.

It is remarkable that the position of <⁵> and <⁶> are reversed in the same contents.

2. **Paragraph 10c in Chinese translations and Tibetan translation**

The above-cited Sanskrit passage <⁵> in 10c appears significantly different in Chinese translations. In what follows I will make a list of Chinese translations in the order of their historical appearance and offer brief comments on syntactical differences from other versions.

It was Kumārajīva who translated the *Diamond Sutra* into Chinese for the first time. In his translation, entitled *Jingang bore boluomi jing*, the passage in question runs as follows:

For that reason, Subhūti, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas <⁶>should in this way produce a pure and clean mind. <⁶>[They] should not produce the mind which sits on¹ forms (objects of eye-cognition), sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects. <⁷> [Without sitting on anything, [they] should produce their mind.]

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6 Harrison’s translation (2006: 147): “For that reason, then, Subhūti, a bodhisattva should conceive an aspiration in such a way that it is unfixed. He should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed in form, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed in sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or dharmas, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed in anything at all.”

7 In what follows, I attempt to translate the Chinese sentences in such a way that my translations reflect the nuances of the Chinese wording; in other words, my translations may deviate from the assumed Sanskrit words.

8 I intentionally use “sit on” as a translation of *zhu* 坐, which is usually translated as “abide in.” This is because I want to give a negative nuance to *zhu* in this context.
It is noteworthy that Skt. *apratiṣṭhitaṃ cittaṃ* (lit. “the non-stuck mind”)\(^9\) is replaced by Ch. *qingjing xin* (lit. “pure and clean mind”) and that the passages <2> and <3> are shown in reverse order, of which the passage <2> means “Without sitting on anything, [a bodhisattva] should produce his/her mind.”

The second oldest translation is Bodhiruci’s 菩提流支 (d. 529) *Jingang bore boluomi jing*. It says,

> is故須菩提, 諸菩薩摩訶薩<1>應如是生清淨心，而無所住<1>。<3>不住色生心，不住聲、香、味、觸、法生心<3>，<2>應無所住而生其心<2>。

(T8,754a) = (T25,786a)

For that reason, Subhūti, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas “<1>should in this way produce a pure and clean mind without sitting on any object.”<1>

<3>*Produce a mind, not sitting on forms, [and] not sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects.*<3> <2>*Without sitting on any object, [they] should produce their mind.*<2>

Bodhiruci certainly consulted Kumārajīva’s translation. However, he adds “without sitting on anything” after “pure and clean mind.”

Paramārtha’s 真諦 (499–568) translation is similar to the above two translations, yet slightly different.

> 須菩提, 是故菩薩<1>應生如是是無住著心<1>。<3>不住色生心，不住聲、香、味、觸、法生心<3>，<2>應無所住而生其心<2>。

(T8,763b)

Subhūti, therefore bodhisattva-mahāsattvas “<1>should in this way produce the mind which does not sit on attachment.”<1>

<3>*[They] should not produce the mind which sits on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects.*<3> <2>*Without sitting on anything, [they] should produce their mind.*<2>

In the Sui 隋 dynasty, Dharmagupta 達磨笈多 (d. 619) translated the *Diamond Sutra* in two ways: one in the normal way, and the other in the form of word-for-word translation in the original Sanskrit word order.\(^10\) His “normal” translation is included in his translation of Asaṅga’s commentary on the *Diamond Sutra*, entitled *Jingang bore lun* 金剛般若論:

> 是故須菩提，諸菩薩摩訶薩<1>應如是生清淨心，而無所住<1>。<3>不住色生心，不住聲、香、味、觸、法生心<3>，<2>應無所住而生其心<2>。

(T25,772a)

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\(^9\) In this paper I use the word “(be) stuck (on)” for Skt. *pratisthita*. For Conze’s twenty-one possible interpretations of the term, see Conze 1974: 95–96.

\(^10\) See Zacchetti 1996 and Watanabe 2009: 233–326. Note that the incomprehensible Chinese *fasheng-ying* 發生-應 is a mechanical translation of Sanskrit *utpāda-yitavyam*. As convincingly indicated, this strange wording reveals the incompleteness of the translation.
Reconsidering the phrase \textit{na kvacit pratiṣṭhitaṃ cittam utpādayitavyam}

For that reason, Subhūti, bodhisattva-mahāsattvas should in this way produce a pure and clean mind \textit{without sitting on any object}.

Produce a mind, not sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects. Without sitting on anything, [they] should produce their mind.

It is undoubtedly clear that Dharmagupta follows Dharmaruci in this translation. On the other hand, Dharmagupta’s unique translation in the Sanskrit word order is found in Gupta’s \textit{Jingang neng duan bore boluomi jing} 金剛能斷般若波羅蜜經, in which the passage in question is shown in the following incomprehensible sequence of Chinese characters:

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This suggests the following Sanskrit as the base of Gupta’s translation:

Comparing all these translations, we can say for certain that \textit{ying wu suožhu, er sheng qi xin 應無所住, 而生其心}, which originated in Kumārajīva’s translation, is a translation of \textit{na kvacit-pratiṣṭhitaṃ cittam utpādayitavyam} in Sanskrit. At the same time, however, each slight difference of wording and transposability between \textit{2} and \textit{3} probably suggests the possibility of various Sanskrit versions that are different from Conze’s edition.

As for the succeeding translators of the \textit{Diamond Sutra} in the Tang dynasty, we can pay attention to two major translators: Xuanzang 玄奘 (600/2–664) and Yijing 義淨 (635–713). Xuanzang’s translation of the \textit{Diamond Sutra} is included in his translation of the \textit{Mahāprajñāpāramitā} (\textit{Da bore boluomiduo jing} 大般若波羅蜜多經 in six hundred fascicles). The passage in question runs as follows:

For that reason, Subhūti, \textit{in this way without sitting on anything \textit{at all}}, bodhisattvas should produce their mind; not sitting on forms, [they] should produce their mind. Not sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should produce their mind; not sitting on non-sounds, non-smells, non-tastes, non-touch-objects,
or non-mind-objects, [they] should produce their mind.\(^{3}\) Without sitting on anything \textit{at all}, [they] should produce their mind.\(^{2}\)

This passage is identical with that of the preceding, independent translation \textit{Neng duan jingang bore boluomido jing} 能斷金剛般若波羅蜜多經 (extant in the \textit{Shuku zō} 縮藏 [月九] and so forth), which is not included in the Taisho Canon.

As a general tendency, Xuanzang is consistently critical of Kumārajīva’s rendering when the latter shows discordancy from the original Sanskrit passage. However, in the above translation, Xuanzang employs the Chinese translation \textit{dou wu suozhu ying sheng qi xin} 都無所住應生其心, which supports Kumārajīva’s translation \textit{ying wu suozhu er sheng qi xin} 應無所住而生其心; in other words, both Xuanzang and Kumārajīva take the original Sanskrit \textit{na kvacit-pratīṣṭhatam cittam upādayitavyam} as an affirmative rather than negative sentence.

Yijing’s translation of the same passage runs as follows:

\[\text{是故妙生、菩薩}^{1}\text{不住於事, 不住隨處}^{1}, ^{3}\text{不住色、聲、香、味、觸、法, 應生其心}^{3}. ^{3}\text{應生不住事心。應生不住隨處}^{3}\text{心}.^{2}\text{應生不住色、聲、香、味、觸、法心.}^{3}\text{.}^{(T8,773a)}\]

For that reason, Subhūti, bodhisattvas \<1\>do not sit on things(/substances) and do not sit on anything.\(^{1}\) \<3\>Not sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should produce their mind.\(^{3}\) \<2\>They should produce a mind which does not sit on things. [They] should produce the mind which does not sit on any place.\(^{2}\) \<3\>They should produce a mind without sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects.\(^{3}\)

Here again, we observe that all of the above-mentioned translators—Kumārajīva, Dharmaruci, Dharmagupta, Xuanzang, and Yijing—unanimously translate the passage corresponding to Skt. \textit{na kvacit pratīṣṭhatam cittam upādayitavyam} as affirmative sentence. Exactly the same is true of the Tibetan translation of the sutra. The following quotation is based on the Derge edition:

\[\text{rab ‘byor de lta bas na byang chub sems dpa’ sems dpa’ chen pos \<1\>’di ltar mi gnas par sems bskyed par zhes bya’o}^{1}\] \<2\>\text{ci la’ang mi gnas par}\]

\(1\) Note that \textit{dou} 都 in this phrase has an emphatic function, meaning “completely” or “utterly.”

\(12\) In my opinion the word \textit{suichu} 隨處 here is used in the sense of “anyplace” or “anything.” In the Taisho Canon, the four-character phrase \textit{bu zhu suichu} 不住隨處 appears three times in Yijing’s translation of the \textit{Diamond Sutra} and once in Yijing’s translation of Asaṅga’s commentary thereon. It thus seems that Yijing uses this phrase as his translation of \textit{na kvacit pratīṣṭhatam}.
Reconsidering the phrase na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam

Subhūti, therefore bodhisattva-mahāsattvas <1>should produce in this way a mind without being stuck on anything. <2>Without being stuck on any object, [they] should produce a mind. <3>And without being stuck on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should produce a mind. <5>

The passage <2> ci la yang mi gnas par sems bskyed par bya’o is evidently a Tibetan equivalent of Skt. na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam. It is critical that na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam is translated into Tibetan as ci la yang mi gnas par adverbially. Further, the Tibetan translation uses the adverbial words mi gnas par twice: once as a translation of apratiṣṭhitam in <1>, and the other time as a translation of na ... pratiṣṭhitam in <2>. This strongly indicates that the Tibetan translators Śilendrabodhi and Ye shes sde interpret na ... pratiṣṭhitam as a word group in the adverbial sense; that is, negative na does not correlate with the predicate of the sentence utpādayitavyam, but rather modifies pratiṣṭhitam.

3. Paragraphs 4 and 14e

In addition to paragraph 10c, the Diamond Sutra contains two other notable passages in paragraphs 4 and 14e. The following passage of paragraph 4 shows the quite similar wording na kvacit pratiṣṭhitena:

Conze edition (1974: 29), a part of paragraph 4:

\[ api tu khalu punah Subhūte \text{ na bodhisattvena vastupratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam}\, \text{<4>}, \text{ na kvacit pratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam}\, \text{<5>}, \text{ na rūpa-pratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam}, \text{ na śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavya-dharmeṣu pratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam}\, \text{<6>.}\]

Schøyen 4 (Harrison/Watanabe: 114):

\[ api tu khalu punah subhūte \text{<4>na bodhisattve<na va>stupratiṣṭhitena dānam dātavyam}, \text{<5>na kvacit pratiṣṭhitena dānam <dā>tavyam}\, \text{<6>}.}\]

Numbers <4>, <5>, and <6> are my addition. The quotation is only a part of paragraph 4. Conze (1974: 67) translates: “And again, Subhuti, not by a Bodhisattva who is supported by a thing should a gift be given, nor by one who is supported anywhere should a gift be given. Not by one who is supported by form should a gift be given, nor by one who is supported by sounds, smells, tastes, touchables, or mind-objects.” Müller (1894: 114) translates: “And again, O Subhūti, a gift should not be given by a Bodhisattva, while he believes in objects; a gift should not be given by him, while he believes in form; a gift should not be given by him, while he believes in the special qualities of sound, smell, taste, and touch.”

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13 Numbers <4>, <5>, and <6> are my addition.
This passage also shows a similarity to the Tibetan and Chinese translations. The following is a list of the Chinese translations taken up in the preceding section of the present paper:

Kumārajīva’s translation:

復次須菩提，菩薩於法應無所住行於布施。所謂不住色布施，不住聲、香、味、觸、法布施。(T8,749a)

Further Subhūti, without sitting on anything, bodhisattvas should practice giving; that is, they give a gift without sitting on forms; they give a gift without sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects.

Bodhiruci’s translation:

復次須菩提，菩薩不著於事，行於布施。不住色布施，不住聲、香、味、觸、法布施。(T8,753a)

Further Subhūti, not sitting on things, bodhisattvas practice giving; not sitting on anything, they practice giving. Not sitting on forms, they give a gift; not sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, they give a gift.

Paramārtha’s translation:

復次須菩提，菩薩不著己類，而行布施。不著所餘，行於布施。(T8,762b)

Further Subhūti, not adhering to their own possession, bodhisattvas practice giving; not adhering to anything else, they practice giving. Not adhering to forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, they give a gift.

[Dharma-]Gupta’s translation:

雖然復次時善實，不菩薩摩訶薩事住施與應。不色住施與應。不聲、香、味、觸、法中住施與應。(T8,767a)

14 Harrison (2006: 143) translates: “However, a bodhisattva should not give a gift while fixing on an object, Subhūti. He should not give a gift while fixing on anything. He should not give a gift while fixing on physical forms. He should not give a gift while fixing on sounds, smells, tastes or objects of touch, or on dharmas.”

15 The text reads yilei 己類 (no variant), but I understand it should be emended to jilei 己類 which probably means one’s own possession. The sinographs yi and ji are often confused in manuscripts and woodblock prints.
Cf. Watanabe’s Skt. reconstruction:

api tu khalu punaḥ subhūte नै bodhisattvena mahāsattvena vastupratiṣṭhitena dānām dātavyam,
na kvacit pratiṣṭhitena dānām dātavyam, na rūpa-pratiṣṭhitena dānām dātavyam, na śabda-gandha-rasa-spraṣṭavya-dharmesu pratiṣṭhitena dānām dātavyam.

(Watanabe 2009: 276)

Dharmagupta’s translation included in his translation of Asaṅga’s commentary:

復次須菩提 नै not sitting on things, bodhisattvas practice giving;

無所住行於布施 नै not sitting on [anything, they] practice giving.

不 住 於 色 布 施 नै not sitting on forms, [they] give a gift; not sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] give a gift.

Xuanzang’s translation:

復次善現, नै not sitting on things, bodhisattvas should practice giving;

都無所住 譬 行布施 नै not sitting on any place, [they] should practice giving.

不住於色, 應 行布施 नै not sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should practice giving.

Yijing’s translation:

復次妙生, नै not sitting on things, bodhisattvas should practice giving;

不 住 隨 處, 應 行 布 施 नै not sitting on any place, [they] should practice giving.

不住於色, 應 行布施 नै not sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should practice giving.

In all of the above cases—the translations by Kumārajīva, Bodhiruci, Paramārtha, Dharmagupta, Xuanzang, and Yijing—the Skt. passage नै kvacit pratiṣṭhitena dānām dātavyam is translated as an affirmative sentence. Chinese translations of this passage compatibly support my observation on paragraph 10c.

Further, paragraph 14e, too, includes the sentence नै kvacit-pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam. The following is a list of Conze’s Skt. edition and Chinese translations of 14e:
Conze edition (1974: 41–42), a part of paragraph 14e:

tasmāt taryāḥ Subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarva-saṃjñā-vivarjayitvā-anuttarāśāmy samyaksambodha cittaṃ utpādayitavyam. <7na rūpa-pratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na śabda-gandharasaspraṣṭavya-dharma-pratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na dharmapratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na adharmapratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam8>. 16

Schøyen 14e (Harrison/Watanabe 2006: 127):

tasmāt taryāḥ Subhūte bodhisattvena mahāsattvena sarva-saṃjñā-vivarjayitvā-anuttarāśāmy samyaksambodha cittaṃ utpādayitavyam. <7na rūpa-pratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na śabda-gandharasaspraṣṭavya-dharma-pratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na dharmapratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam, na adharmapratiṣṭhitam cittaṃ utpādayitavyam8>. 17

Kumārajīva’s translation:

是故須菩提, 菩薩應離一切相, 發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。<7不應住色生心。不應住聲、香、味、觸、法生心>。<8應生無所住心。<T8,750b>

For that reason, Subhuti, bodhisattvas should be free from all conception/appearance)18 to arouse the mind of the sublime, correct and perfect awakening. <7[They] should not produce a mind, sitting on forms; and [they] should not produce a mind, sitting on sounds, smells,

16 Conze 1974: 41–42. He translates the passage as follows (1974: 77–78): “Therefore then, Subhuti, the Bodhi-being [sic!], the great being, after he has got rid of all perceptions, should produce a thought of utmost, right and perfect enlightenment. Unsupported by form should a thought be produced, unsupported by sounds, smells, tastes, touchables or mind-objects should a thought be produced, unsupported by dharma should a thought be produced, unsupported by anything should a thought be produced.” Müller (1894: 128) translates: “Therefore then, O Subhūti, a noble-minded Bodhisattva, after putting aside all ideas, should raise his mind to the highest perfect knowledge. He should frame his mind so as not to believe (depend) in form, sound, smell, taste, or anything that can be touched, in something (dharma), in nothing or anything.”

17 Cf. Harrison 2006: 150: “For that reason, then, Subhūti, a bodhisattva and mahāsattva should conceive the aspiration for supreme and perfect awakening after eliminating all ideas, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed on forms, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed on sounds, smells, tastes, or objects of touch, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed on dharmas, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed on non-dharmas, he should not conceive an aspiration which is fixed on anything.”

18 The word xiang 相, which usually means “appearance” or “characteristic,” is used in the sense of xiang 想 (see the translations by Paramārtha and Xuanzang below).
Reconsidering the phrase *na kvacit pratiṣṭhitaṃ cittam utpādayitavyam*

Bodhiruci’s translation:

是故須菩提，菩薩摩訶薩應離一切相，發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。 何以故。若心有住，則為非住。 8> [They] should not produce the mind which does not sit on anything.

Paramārtha’s translation:

是故須菩提，菩薩摩訶薩應離一切相，發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。 何以故。若心有住，則為非住。 8> [They] should not produce the mind which does not sit on anything.

[Dharma-]Gupta’s translation:

彼故此善實，菩薩摩訶薩一切想捨離，無上正遍知心發生應。 8> [They] should not produce the mind which does not sit on anything.
For that reason, Subhuti, bodhisattvas should be free from all conception (appearance) to arouse the mind of the sublime, correct and perfect awakening. Why? If the mind has anything to sit on, it is not that which sits thereon. <7> [Bodhisattvas] should not produce a mind, sitting on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects. <7> <8> [They] should produce the mind which does not sit on anything. <8>

Xuanzang’s translation:

是故善現，菩薩摩诃薩遠離一切想，應發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心。<7>不住於色，應生其心。不住非色，應生其心。不住聲、香、味、觸、法，應生其心。不住非聲、香、味、觸、法，應生其心。<7> <8> 都無所住，應生其心。<8>. (T7,982c)

For that reason, Subhuti, bodhisattvas should set aside all conception and should arouse the mind of the sublime, correct and perfect awakening. <7> Not sitting on forms, [bodhisattvas] should produce their mind. Not sitting on non-forms, [they] should produce their mind. Not sitting on sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, or mental objects, [they] should produce their mind. <7> <8> Not sitting on anything at all, [they] should produce their mind. <8>

Yijing’s translation:

是故應離諸想，發趣無上菩提之心。<7>不應住色、聲、香、味、觸、法，都無所住而生其心。<7> <8> 不應住法，不應住非法，應生其心。<8>. (T8,773bc)

For that reason, Subhuti, [bodhisattvas] should be free from conceptions to arouse the mind of the sublime awakening. <7> [They] should not sit on forms, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch, mental objects. Not sitting on anything at all, [they] produce their mind. <7> <8> [They] should not sit on beings. [They] should not sit on non-beings, [either. In this way they] should produce their mind. <8>

Paragraph 14e has similar contents to paragraph 10c. Especially Kumārajīva and Xuanzang use exactly the same wording for paragraphs 10c and 14e. Dharmagupta follows Kumārajīva’s translation, whereas Dharmaruci and Paramārtha take the passage as a negative sentence. On the other hand, the Tibetan translation of the passage runs ci la’ang mi gnas par sms bskyed par bya’o ||, which is identical with the above-quoted passage in paragraph 10c.
4. Conclusion

Considering the above-stated observations all together, I propose that the Skt. *na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam utpādayitavyam* means “[Bodhisattvas] should produce a mind that is stuck on nothing.”

My intention is to understand it in the affirmative. It is probably the case that the original Sanskrit was also an affirmative sentence. I take *na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam* as modifying *cittam*. To put it another way, *na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam cittam* works as a synonym or paraphrase of *apratiṣṭhitam cittam*. Judging from the Chinese and Tibetan translations, which were produced independently and unanimously support this idea, the same exegesis must have originated in India.

The possibility of this interpretation has been overlooked by scholars to date. I hope that my humble research captivates a reader’s attention to reevaluate the significance of the *Diamond Sutra*.  

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19 I claim the possibility that *na* is connected with *kvacit*, therefore, *utpādayitavyam* is not connected with *na* in the passage in question in the *Diamond Sutra*. For a syntactical explanation of *na kvacit*, see Speijer (1886/1973: 217, #288 Rem 3) which says, “A negation added to the indefinites *kvacit, kutaścit kadācit, kathaṅcit* and their synonyms, serves to express ‘nowhere, from no place, never, in no ways.’” Further, Böhtlingk/Roth (1855–75: vol. 2, 521) gives the meanings of “niemals, in keinen Falle, durchaus nicht” for *na kvacit*. Based on them, I understand that *na kvacit pratiṣṭhitam* emphasizes the negative sense of its synonym *apratiṣṭhitam*.  

20 A typical case is found in Hajime Nakamura’s study. He explicitly and repeatedly states that Kumārajīva’s translation of paragraph 10c <2> “Without sitting on anything, [they] should produce their mind” as an affirmative sentence is the opposite of the meaning of the original Skt. sentence “[Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas] should not produce that mind which is clung to anything,” which is a negative sentence. See Nakamura 1988: 165–66 and Nakamura/Kino 1960/2001: 69–71). Andō (1999: 597) also expresses the same view that Kumārajīva’s translation is the opposite of the original Sanskrit.
### References

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Anthologizing the Great Way: Remarks on the Sūtrasamuccaya attributed to Nāgārjuna and its congeners

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1. Preamble

The untimely death of an esteemed colleague is a sobering opportunity to reflect on the passage of time, on one's own mortality, and on the precariousness of projects begun yet still unfinished even after many years have gone by. My work on Mahāyāna sūtra anthologies, set in motion by an interest in Śāntideva's Śikṣāsamuccaya, is one such project, and this paper, begun over a decade ago, was a first attempt to think more generally about the genre, and about what it meant to anthologize the Mahāyāna, the Great Way or the Great Vehicle. Now, prompted by the approach of another vehicle, time's wingèd chariot, I offer these preliminary thoughts on the subject in memory of my dear friend and respected colleague Helmut Krasser.

My interest in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (henceforth: Śikṣ) crystallized early on into a plan to retranslate the entire work into English. Although this has made little progress, it has spun off several papers on the text which have opened my eyes to issues of which I was previously unaware (see Harrison 2007, 2009, 2018a, 2019). One of those issues is the complicated relationship between the Śikṣ and other works, beginning with Śāntideva's other, more famous work, the Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra, then the

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1 Earlier versions of this paper were presented in Tokyo on May 19, 2006 at the 51st Symposium of the ICES (Tōhō gakkai), at Smith College in April 2007, and at Princeton University in the Princeton Buddhist Studies Workshop in March 2015. I thank my audiences on those occasions for their feedback, and my colleagues Akira Saitō, Paul Williams, Peter Skilling, Shayne Clarke, Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Jonathan Silk for their comments and for assistance with obtaining sources. For any errors of fact or wildness of surmise I alone remain responsible.
Sūtrasamuccaya attributed to Nāgārjuna, and then other commentaries of the same type, that is to say, what we would call anthologies. It was originally not my intention to take on all these other works as well, but I was simply drawn into the field, as often happens, while passing by—one looks over the fence, as it were, sees something that takes one's eye, and leaps across to take a closer look. Before one knows it, one is harvesting—or, worse luck, ploughing—ground which one had no intention of ever venturing upon.

Anthologies I take to be works which consist primarily of collections of passages cited from other works, and sometimes even of works quoted in their entirety, for which the usual Sanskrit term, at least in Mahāyāna Buddhist sources, is samuccaya. These have to be distinguished in the first place from commentaries of the more usual type, which often contain a substantial number of such quotations. Generally, however, these quotations are short, and the author's own words are centre-stage. These commentaries put forward arguments, for which the quotations appear in a supporting role rather than playing the lead. I will return to some of them later. Anthologies are also distinct from works at the other end of the spectrum, collections of individual texts which are put together while yet retaining their discrete identity, i.e. without being merged into a single work. In a sense the major canonical collections of the Buddhist tradition (the Nikāyas and Āgamas) are conceived on this model, as are ancient compilations like the Sutta-nipāta, and the later Tibetan mDo mangs collections, where texts were copied together for reasons which sometimes elude us. The latter are another example of what we often call, using the German term, Sammelhandschriften, manuscripts containing two or more texts, like the Mahāyāna sūtra MS in the Schøyen Collection or similar examples in the Gilgit collection, still imperfectly understood but often indicating that certain texts kept company for ritual or other reasons. But the key difference is that all the constituent works appear whole. Notable examples on the grand scale are the Mahāsammipāta and the Ratnakūṭa. Certain cases, however, do not allow themselves to be so easily classified. Where would we assign Śamathadeva’s Upāyikā to Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, which takes every sūtra he cites and gives it in full? What category does the Dharmapada/Udānavarga tradition fall into? Where do we situate the Buddhāvatamsaka? The

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2 Jens-Uwe Hartmann (personal communication) observes that the Pāli term is sangaha (Sanskrit samgraha). For examples of this usage, and for an extensive overview of the genre of sūtra anthologies as a whole, see Mochizuki 2015.

3 An especially interesting example is edited in Vinītā 2010.
field is obviously wide and its internal boundaries are not always clearly demarcated. That said, we can define an anthology of the samuccaya type as a work which consists primarily of sections of other works, i.e. not generally presented in their entirety, arranged according to certain principles, and with their titles given. Looking just at Indian works which fall into this category, I want to discuss four:

Sūtrasamuccaya (hereafter SūS) attributed to Nāgārjuna
extant in Chinese and Tibetan
Dasheng xiuxing pusa xingmen zhujing yaoji 大乘修行菩薩行門諸經要集 (T 847)
extant in Chinese; translated 721 by Zhiyan 智嚴
Śikṣāsamuccaya (Śikṣ) by Śāntideva (eighth century)
extant in Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan
Mahāsūtrasamuccaya by Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (i.e. Atiśa, 982–1054)
extant in Tibetan

Other anthologies exist, but there is no evidence that they were composed in India. One case in point is the Bhāvanākramasūtrasamuccaya, extant only in Tibetan. Working independently, both Jens-Uwe Hartmann and Jonathan Silk have arrived at the firm conclusion that this must be a Tibetan compilation. The Bhāvanākramasūtrasamuccaya and several similar works indicate that the practice of making anthologies was taken up by the Tibetans, along with the composition of commentaries of the more usual style, often packed with quotations, to be sure, but not counting as anthologies in terms of our definition. A particularly celebrated example is the Jewel Ornament of Liberation (Dam chos yid bzhin gyi nor bu thar pa rin po che’i rgyan) by Gampopa (1079–1153).

But let us restrict ourselves to the Indian works. If the SūS was composed by Nāgārjuna (i.e. the author of the Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā), then this would make it the earliest anthology, dating to the late second

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4 The list may not be exhaustive. These are simply the Mahāyāna Buddhist works of this class known to me at present. Further details of texts and translations are supplied below.

5 There is disagreement as to Śāntideva’s dates, with some putting him in the late 7th–early 8th centuries. Here I assume, with Ruegg (1981: 82), that his floruit probably fell in the first half of the 8th.

6 My knowledge of this work is indebted to a very thorough analysis prepared by Peter Skilling, as yet unpublished. Hartmann and Silk have shared their findings with me in personal communications.

7 One example is the gSung rab rin po che’i gtam rgyud of sKa’ ba dPal brtsegs. I thank Jens-Uwe Hartmann for drawing my attention to this compilation.
or early third century. Thus the first order of business is to address the question of its authorship.

As far as the ascription of the SūS to Nāgārjuna is concerned, the majority opinion among Western scholars of Buddhism is, to put it in a nutshell, to have no opinion, or at least not a definite one. The attribution is, to be sure, upheld quite strongly by some, especially by Bhikkhu Pāsādika and Christian Lindtner, and rejected by others, but it is neither accepted nor rejected by the rest, and this significantly large third category—perhaps the majority—includes, for example, such authorities as Ruegg (1981: 29), Williams (1984), who notes elsewhere (1989: 42) that the attribution to Nāgārjuna has not yet been disproved, and Schopen (2005: 141), who describes the authorship and history of the SūS as “still unresolved,” or, more recently (2007: 94, and n. 56), notes that “it might be by Nāgārjuna.” If one can generalize, Japanese scholars (such as Ichishima, Sasaki and Asano cited in this paper) seem to have fewer qualms about rejecting the ascription outright, and evidently this reflects the general view among Japanese scholars of Buddhism. There is thus a noticeable divide here between Western and Japanese Buddhology.

The issue of the authorship of the SūS is not a trivial one, for various reasons. It has an obvious intrinsic importance (as enabling us to know more about what Nāgārjuna was reading) but its extrinsic significance is even weightier. That is to say, a great deal hangs on the authorship of this work, since if it is from the hand of the composer of the Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikās, then it establishes the existence around the end of the second century of a large body of Mahāyāna sūtras, many of which are thought to be late, and this would have major implications for our understanding of the history of Buddhism, especially with regard to the vexed problem of periodization of Mahāyāna literature. What is early? What is late? How can we tell a late Mahāyāna sūtra from an early one? Here I am reminded of John McRae’s third rule of Chan Studies: precision implies inaccuracy (McRae 2003: xix). The use by various scholars, myself included, of such terms as “Early Mahāyāna” or “Early Middle Mahāyāna” masks the fact that we still have only the faintest idea of the relative chronology of the texts, still less of their absolute chronology, and the location in history of the movement or movements

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8 See, e.g., Lindtner 1982 and Pāsādika 1982 (where a slightly more cautious note is struck). The attribution is also accepted without qualification, e.g., by Murti (1955: 90–91), Lopez (1996: 26) and—apparently—Mabbett (1998: 334).

9 Cf. Williams 2009: 48, n. 9, written in response to an earlier version of this paper.
they reflect, even though these feeble attempts at greater precision are a quite understandable reaction to a tendency in the past to claim that every sūtra—the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, etc.—is “early.” After all, what is to be gained by pushing everything back into the first and second century CE? These half-hearted attempts at periodization also reflect a sense of frustration with what Peter Skilling once referred to as the “tyranny” of the date of the first translation into Chinese. We know that such dates may not give us a precise fix on the date of composition of any particular text, in absolute terms, although at least they furnish us with a terminus ante quem, which is better than nothing. (As will be seen, I will make liberal use of these dates in this paper.) Locating the SūS as a work of Nāgārjuna in the second century, or even the early third, would therefore make a big difference.

The date of the SūS is important for other reasons as well, because of its particular character as an anthology of sūtras. Here it may be helpful to consider the genre of sūtra anthology in the more general context of Mahāyāna śāstras. One of the things which distinguishes śāstras from sūtras is the emergence of the author, usually a named historical human being. In commentaries there is no hiding behind the voice of Ānanda, no evañ mayā śrutam ekasmin samaye (however punctuated) establishing a historical framework outside of which one cannot step. We see the author, at last. So we might ask, what brings the author of Mahāyāna śāstras out from behind the curtain? And when do the first such authors emerge? I.e., when do followers of the Mahāyāna begin to write commentary rather than scripture? And when—and this is perhaps a more interesting question—did Mahāyānists start writing commentaries which quote Mahāyāna sūtras as proof texts? For this must mark a critical stage in the development of the movement, in this respect: that it had progressed to the point where its adherents felt confident enough to cite its own scriptures explicitly as authorities. The SūS is obviously the earliest possible example of this kind of commentary, that is, if we accept the attribution to Nāgārjuna, since it can then be dated to the second or early third century, depending on what date we assign to him. But it is also important as one of the few surviving examples of the Mahāyāna sūtra anthology, and it is therefore appropriate to consider its overall character and its way of going about things in relation to its three extant congener

10 For a comprehensive review of the literature on the date of Nāgārjuna, see Mabbett 1998.
in our list, viz., the Zhujing yaoji, the Śikṣā and the Mahāsūtrasamuccaya. We will find that the links between these four works are sometimes more than a matter of family resemblances.

2. Four sūtra anthologies

To get down to details, the SūS cites approximately 70 texts, mostly Mahāyāna sūtras, with three citations from a Saṃyuktāgama, one from an Ekottarakāgama, and two from as yet unplaced avadānas. A closer study of the sources would be required to establish the precise number, not to mention the identity, of all the texts used. At this stage, due to limitations of space, we can only note that the list provided by Lindtner (1982: 175–178) is not an entirely reliable guide. Lindtner’s list contains a total of 68 titles, but at least two texts are cited under more than one title, while others are cited by non-standard titles which occasionally obscure their identity, not an uncommon occurrence in commentaries. There are also problems with how to count citations of the Buddhāvatamsaka, and of its component texts like the Lokottara-parivarta (given separately as No. 27)

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11 In this paper references to the SūS are to the critical edition of the Tibetan text established by Bhikkhu Pāsādika (1989). I have also made use of his annotated draft English translation, published serially in LSPEB (Pāsādika 1978–1982). There is a more recent French translation of the Tibetan by Driessens (2003), which appears to be reliable, although it is devoid of any scholarly apparatus. The work is also extant in one Tibetan fragment from Dunhuang (see Pāsādika 1997b), and in a late Chinese translation, T. 1635, the Dasheng baoyaoyi lun 大乘寶要義論, made by Fahu 法護 (Dharmapāla?), Weijing 惟淨 et al. in the first half of the 11th century. For the fragments of the Sanskrit which have survived, see Ichishima 1972, which deals with the citations in Kamalaśīla’s Bhāvanākrama III, and Karashima 2009. A commentary on the SūS exists, the Sūtrasamuccayabhāṣya-ratnālokālamkāra of Ratnākaraśānti (c. 1000 CE), on which see Ruegg 1981: 124 and Mochizuki 2015: 292, but this has not been consulted for this paper. Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna) also composed a short summary of the SūS entitled Sūtrasamuccayaśaṅcayārtha.

12 Not over 140, as misleadingly stated in Ichishima 1967: 49, 1968: 370 and 1986b: 8. This figure presumably refers to the number of citations. It is corrected in Ichishima 1990.

13 This is, according to Lindtner (1982: 173, n. 172), a “critical revision” of an earlier list by Banerjee. Banerjee’s list is even less reliable.

14 The Māñjuśrīvīrūvāṇa-parivarta (Lindtner’s No. 32) is also listed separately as the Māradamana-parivarta (No. 33), an alternative title for the same work, while the Brahma-pariprccchā (No. 13) and the Viṣeṣacintibrahma-pariprccchā (No. 68) are the same text. The so-called *Viniścayārāja (No. 66) may also refer to a version of the Arthavisvāyaścaya (No. 7).

15 E.g., the Bodhisattvagocaropāyaśvāvikurvānāirdeśa-sūtra appears as the Satyaka-parivarta (No. 51), the Samādhirāja as the Candraśraddhā, and so on.
and the *Gaṇḍavyūha* (No. 22), which is itself once cited in the SūS under the title of one of its own chapters. Should we reckon these as one sūtra or many?\(^\text{16}\) A similar difficulty pertains to Prajñāpāramitā citations, where it is only occasionally made clear which particular text is being quoted. Other Sanskrit titles in Lindtner’s list are reconstructions, but some of these conjectures are impossible.\(^\text{17}\) A careful study is therefore required to identify all the source texts, and even then it is possible that some of them will never be found, having left no trace apart from their citations in the SūS.\(^\text{18}\)

Structurally the SūS is organised around a series of 11 topics or “themes,” as Pāsādika terms them, 11 situations—or types of living beings—which are very rare (Tib. *shin tu rnyed par dka’ ba* = Skt. *sudurlabha*).\(^\text{19}\) They are:

1) the appearance of a Buddha;
2) obtaining a human rebirth;
3) obtaining rebirth at the right moment (the 8 *ksaṇas*);
4) engendering faith in the Tathāgata’s teachings;
5) generating the aspiration to awakening (*bodhicitta*) (or, more accurately, beings generating this aspiration);
6) great compassion for living beings;
7) (beings) eliminating obstructive factors;
8) (beings) putting the dharma into practice as a householder;
9) (beings) having faith in the *parinirvāṇa* of the Tathāgatas as it

\(^\text{16}\) The problem is not trivial, since it would be useful to know whether the author was familiar with the *Buddhāvatamsaka* as the major compendium that we now have, or drew on separate works which had not yet been gathered together to form it. His use of the title (*’Phags pa*) *Sangs rgyas phal po che’i mdo* = *(Ārya-)* *Buddhāvatamsaka-sūtra,* however, suggests that he was aware of the concept of the larger compendium, even while citing individual texts under their own titles (see SūS 154, 202). However, we cannot rule out interference by the Tibetan translators here, especially since in both cases the references in the Chinese version are to the *Daśabhūmika*.

\(^\text{17}\) E.g. No. 41, the *Ratnadārikādatta-sūtra* (for *Khye’u rin po ches byin pa’i mdo*), which scrambles the elements and gets the gender wrong as well. *

\(^\text{18}\) Ichishima (1986b: 4–8) also provides a list of texts cited, arranged by chapter in the order of appearance. It suffers from similar problems. The best study of the sources I have seen so far is Asano 1995.

\(^\text{19}\) Lindtner (1982: 173–175) lists 13 “main headings,” but his §§11 and 12 are really subsections of Theme 10. The 11 themes are the basis of Ratnākaraśānti’s analysis of the text.
really is (i.e. knowing that in reality the Tathāgatas do not cease to exist, that their passing away is a show);
10)(beings) having faith in the one way or one vehicle (ekayāna);
11) beings taking on the greatness and magnificence of Buddhas and bodhisattvas (note that the greatness of bodhisattvas is dealt with first, that of Buddhas comes last).

The SūS is thus ostensibly about the rarity, but in fact more about the value, of the pursuit of the bodhisattva path, and the 11 themes form a systematic and logical progression, leading readers up a kind of pyramid of “rarities” or values—each one rarer and thus more valuable than the one preceding it—at the apex of which stands the full magnificence of Buddhahood. The structure is fairly neat, although in the later sections the author departs from the basic plan to expound a number of other interesting themes, such as the connection between insight (prajñā) and skill in the use of creative stratagems (upāyakauśalya), and other issues which will be touched on below.

However, the author refrains for the most part from inserting himself into the discussion. For example, after the opening salutation, he dives right in to address the first theme, without any preamble (p. 1): “The appearance of a Buddha is very rare. How is it evident that the appearance of a Buddha is very rare? It is known from many authoritative sūtras.”

Then follows the first of a series of quotations. We note here that the author thus begins by explicitly addressing the problem of authority, reinforced by the use of the term tshad mar gyur pa (= pramāṇabhūta), and signals the fact that the whole purpose of the work is to provide its claims with scriptural backing, preferably drawn from more than one scripture. Similar statements, using ci mngon zhe na (“How is it evident?”) or ji ltar shes she na (“How does one know this?”), introduce other themes, also accompanied by the claim that many sūtras provide the necessary authority, e.g. at pp. 6 (Theme 3), 15 (Theme 5), 27 (Theme 6), and 100 (ad Theme 8). With some themes we encounter even simpler wording, like “How?” (ji ltar zhe na; e.g. for Theme 2, p. 4), “What is it?” (gang zhe na, as for Theme 11, pp. 188, 199) or “What is it like?” (ji lta bu zhe na / ci ’dra zhe na / ji lta ba bzhin ci ’dra zhe na; e.g. for Theme 4, p. 9, Theme 8, p. 51, or Theme 9, p. 113), or simply a series of passages describing what the relevant term means (as

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20 sangs rgyas ’byung ba shin tu rnyed par dka’ ste | sangs rgyas ’byung ba de shin tu rnyed par dka’ bar ci mngon zhe na | mdo sde du ma tshad mar gyur pa las shes te…

21 On this term, see Ruegg 1994 and Krasser 2001. I owe these references to Jens-Uwe Hartmann.
in the description of obstructive factors in Theme 7), but even in these
cases the teaching of many sūtras can be invoked (as with Themes 9 and
10). Apart from this there are sometimes cursory remarks summarizing
particular points, e.g., at pp. 25, 103, 104, 132, 174–175, 182, 198, 206. As
interesting as these may be, they are extremely brief, often no more than
one sentence. There are no extended discussions, no statement of purpose
for the work as a whole, no concluding remarks.

So we have an author, but we see very little of him, only enough to
say that he has marshalled his citations according to a definite plan. The
same is true of the Zhujing yaoji.\textsuperscript{22} Since this work is less well known, at
least to Western scholarship, it merits a more detailed treatment here.\textsuperscript{23}
The Dasheng xiuxing pusa xingmen zhujing yaoji \textsuperscript{24} in three \textit{juan}\textsuperscript{25} (T 847), was translated into Chinese by Zhiyan 智嚴 in 721 (according to Asano), so at this point all we can say about its
date is that it was composed before the eighth century.\textsuperscript{26} It must be a text
of Indian origin (taking “India” in the broadest sense): it cannot have
been composed in China, since it cites at least one sūtra not translated
into Chinese (no. 4, the \textit{[Niṣṭhāgata]bhagavajjñānavaipulya-sūtra}), and
the citations even of those that had been translated match no existing
Chinese versions. If it could be demonstrated conclusively that Śāntideva
knew it and used it, that would be an even stronger argument for Indian
composition (but on this see below). The Zhujing yaoji consists of groups
of citations from a total of 41\textsuperscript{27} sūtras presented in sequence with the
briefest of introductory comments indicating the topic addressed; they

\textsuperscript{22} I am indebted to my colleague Akira Saitō for first calling my attention to this
work, and to the pioneering work of Asano (Asano 1998), which provided a
convenient springboard for diving into its complexities. Note that this Zhujing
yaoji is not to be confused with the encyclopedic compilation of that name put
together by Daoshi in the 7th century (T 2123).

\textsuperscript{23} My work on this text is ongoing, so what follows is in the nature of an interim report.

\textsuperscript{24} The Chinese rendition of the title suggests something in Sanskrit like *Mahāyānabodhisattvacaryā-sūtrasamuccaya*, but this would be a purely
speculative reconstruction. Zhujing yaoji, however, is certainly a good fit for
Sūtrasamuccaya.

\textsuperscript{25} There is something odd about the division into three \textit{juan} that we find in the
Taishō, since the table of contents seems to be arranged in terms of two \textit{juan} only,
with 21 sections in each. See T 847, 17: 935c26 and 936b25.

\textsuperscript{26} Asano puts its composition at the beginning of the 7th century, following Okamoto
1988: 277–278 (but with a reference to the wrong publication). Ōkamoto’s
argument for this date, however, is not compelling.

\textsuperscript{27} Not 42 sūtras as Asano 1998: 329 (182) maintains; see also Asano 2003: 115. Two
texts are cited twice, and one of the 42 sections contains quotations from two works.
are in fact little more than headings. These headings are collected in a kind of table of contents (TOC) at the beginning of the work, possibly of Chinese composition, since assignment tojuan is also given. This TOC lists the 42 sections of the work (each one containing material from a separate sūtra) with the titles of the sūtras quoted and the 66 bodhisattva “practices” (菩薩行門六十六條) which are dealt with in the quotations (with 1–8 practices in each section). The concept of 66 practices makes no appearance in the body of the text—i.e. as a total, separate from the individual listings—so it may be the invention of the compiler of the TOC. Even if this TOC is a Chinese addition to the work, it does not do much more than repeat the 42 headings in the body of the commentary (sometimes with changes to the wording). We see hardly anything of the author of the commentary, then, apart from these headings.

Turning to the sūtras cited, in his 1998 paper Asano Morinobu was able to identify 19 titles with known sūtras and with specific passages in them. A close examination of the text has enabled me to identify more; the work of identification is ongoing. It is far from easy, because the titles can vary wildly from those used in the Dazangjing. Several texts are cited more than once: Gaṇḍavyūha at 7 and 27 (under different titles), Sarvapunyasamuccayasamādhi-sūtra at 30 and 31 (also under two different titles, even though one citation follows the other!). In one case (No. 6), two separate texts are cited under the same title, Mahāprajñāpāramitā. At least half of the texts cited also show up in the Śikṣ (at current count, 22), and a slightly smaller number (currently 16) appear in the SūS, but these anthologies do not necessarily cite the same passages. At present the list (in English alphabetical order) stands as follows:

28 It is not clear what Indic term xingmen行門stands for here. In any case, the number of practices in each section does not always match the number of passages cited from each sūtra.

29 There are in fact 67 practices in the initial TOC in the Taishō, but this is possibly accounted for by several variants in the numbers given in the body of the text (see 17:942b24, c28; 957b14).

30 Four texts are still unidentified, and may well remain so.

31 No. 6, not further identified by Asano (1998: 185), undoubtedly constitutes the most interesting discovery. The citation is in three sections: the first two are passages from the Pañcapāramitā-nirdeśa, while the third is a series of prose translations of verses (13 in all) from the Ratnaūnasamucayagāthā, interspersed with what appear to be commentarial elaborations. If 721 CE is the date of the translation of the Zhujing yaoji, then this predates the complete Chinese translation of the Ratnaūna by Faxian法賢 in 991 CE by almost three centuries, and is thus one of the oldest attestations of the text (along with the citations by Candrakīrti in hisPrasannapadā, early 7th century). Cf. Yuyama 1976: xlix.
Acintyabuddhaviśaya-nirdeśa (No. 23)
Ajātaśatrukaukarṇyavinodanā-sūtra (No. 24); also cited in ŚūS
Ākṣayamatirinirdeśa-sūtra (part of the Mahāsaṃnipāta) (No. 36); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Anantamukhanirhāra-dhāraṇī (No. 42); also cited in Śīkṣ
*Bodhicittotpāda-sūtra? (No. 28)
*Bodhisattvabuddhānusmṛtisamādhi-sūtra? (No. 34)
Dharmasaṃgīti-sūtra (No. 35); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Gaganagañja-sūtra (part of the Mahāsaṃnipāta) (No. 22); also cited in Śīkṣ
Gandavyūha (part of the Buddhāvataṃsaka) (Nos. 7, 27); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Ghanavyūha-sūtra (No. 32)
Guṇālaṃkṛtasaṃkusumitādārikāpariprcchā-sūtra (No. 2)
Hastikakṣya-sūtra (No. 1); also cited in Śīkṣ
Kṣitigarbha-sūtra? (No. 37); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Lokottara-parivarta (part of the Buddhāvataṃsaka) (No. 5); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Mahāyānopadeśa (No. 20)
Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūhālaṃkāra-sūtra (No. 26); also cited in Śīkṣ
Mañjuśrīvrikṣita-sūtra (No. 17); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Mañjuśrīvrikṣutvāna-parivarta / *Māradama-parivarta / Māradama- na-sūtra (No. 18); also cited in ŚūS
(Niṣṭhāgata-)bhagavajjñānavaipulya-sūtra (No. 4); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Pañcapāramitā-nirdeśa (No. 6a)
*Paramārthasamvṛtisayānirdeśa-sūtra (No. 11)
*Pūrṇa-pariprcchā (No. 19)
Ratnacūḍa-pariprcchā (No. 8); also cited in Śīkṣ
Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā (No. 6b)
Ratnakūṭa (= Kāśyapa-parivarta) (No. 21); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
*Ratnarāśi 2 (i.e. a different text by that name) (No. 29); also cited in ŚūS? Śīkṣ?
Sāgaramati-pariprcchā (No. 12); also cited in ŚūS, Śīkṣ
Sandhinirmocana? (No. 40)

On the problem of citations of the Ratnarāśi in the Śīkṣ and the ŚūS which cannot be located in the text of that name that we know, see Silk 1994: 691–703. The single brief citation of *Ratnarāśi 2 in the Zhujing yaoji is consistent in theme and tone with the passages dealt with by Silk, but not identical with any of them.
Sarvapuṇyasamuccayasamādhi-sūtra (Nos. 30, 31); also cited in Śiksā
Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda-sūtra (No. 41); also cited in ŚūS, Śiksā
Strīvivarta-vyākaraṇa 1 (No. 13)
Strīvivarta-vyākaraṇa 2 (No. 25)
Tathāgata(guhya)kośa-sūtra (No. 16); also cited in ŚūS, Śiksā
Ugra(datta)-paripṛcchā (No. 38); also cited in ŚūS, Śiksā
Unidentified (Nos. 9, 15, 33, 39)
Upāyakauśalya-sūtra (14); also cited in ŚūS, Śiksā
Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa (No. 3); also cited in ŚūS, Śiksā
Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā (No. 10); also cited in Śiksā

The current total is, as stated previously, 41 texts, but this may change as identifications are firmed up.

The manner of citation is also interesting. Sometimes the citation is a single passage, sometimes a sequence of discrete passages from the same text, but with absolutely no indication of breaks or elision markers such as we find frequently in the Śiksā. A more unusual feature is that texts seem to be cited in continuous stretches, including narrative framing, quite unlike the Śiksā, which reflects more editorial shaping and cutting on the part of its author, with the removal of much (but not all) of the narrative frame, as well as the addition of the compiler’s own commentary (hence I disagree with Asano (1998: 183), who sees the two works as similarly devoid of the author’s own thinking). Sometimes Śāntideva removes the narrative framing that we find in the same passage in T 847 (e.g. No. 14). We could say that the Zhujing yaoji cuts and pastes without trimming. In one case (No. 2) the complete text of the sūtra is cited. As for the overall structure of the Zhujing yaoji, there is no well-organized sequence of topics of the kind we see in the ŚūS. Instead we find a loosely arranged succession of passages which treat the following themes (in descending order of frequency): (1) the greatness of the Mahāyāna and the superiority of the bodhisattva path to the śrāvaka path, hence the need for bodhisattvas to avoid the practices of the śrāvakas; (2) the bodhisattva’s practice of the six perfections; (3) the ethics of the bodhisattva; and (4) the challenges to the bodhisattva posed by Māra. There is no particular logic to the order in which these themes are (repeatedly) addressed.

In the case of the Zhujing yaoji, then, we also see very little of the author. In this regard both the ŚūS and the Zhujing yaoji are very different from the Śiksā, an anthology of Mahāyāna sūtras the attribution of which to Śāntideva (eighth century) is well established. Śāntideva and his own opinions are much in evidence, not least in the clear linkages between
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the Śīkṣa and his master-work, the *Bodhisattvacaryāvatāra* (BsCA), or, in its later, revised form, the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (BCA).\(^{33}\) Whereas the authors of our first two anthologies say very little, Śāntideva says a great deal, not only in the verses with which his work is interspersed,\(^{34}\) but in the frequent and often quite substantial prose passages which link his citations from scripture. Determining the full extent of these passages will demand detailed research into Śāntideva’s source texts, to work out where the citations actually start and stop. This research has yet to be done. In the Śīkṣa Śāntideva cites over 110 works, and it is arguably the case that not only in the prose passages just mentioned, but also in the way he selects certain passages from certain sūtras and not others (from what by his day must have been a vast corpus), cuts material out of the selected passages as it suits him (often without ellipsis markers), and arranges the resulting pieces in particular configurations, Śāntideva is exercising a fair degree of authorial control over the material. His originality has, as I have said elsewhere, been underestimated, but so has his indebtedness to his predecessors, as we shall see. Structurally the work is organized around 27 Kārikās—and these are far from constituting the full extent of its verse part—which lay out a template for the bodhisattva’s spiritual discipline, the essential points of which are the giving, preserving, purifying and increasing of a bodhisattva’s person, possessions and merit. As with the SūS, however, this plan is often departed from, as the author expands upon topics of special interest to him which do not fit the plan’s neat three-by-four matrix. But unlike the other two anthologies (SūS and *Zhujing yaoji*), here we have a much clearer impression of the author’s personality.

However, we should not conclude from this that the absence of authorial voice is *ipso facto* proof of early date, and its presence indication of a later one, since the fourth great Mahāyāna sūtra anthology, the *Mahāsūtrasamuccaya* (MSūS) of Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna (Atiśa; 982–1054), outdoes even the SūS in the elision of the author.\(^{35}\) The MSūS cites 83 sūtras or śāstras, and in including śāstras it differs from the three other works of this class (Mochizuki 2002: 5). What is even more distinctive, however, is the absence of any comment by the author himself: a quick perusal of the text (see Mochizuki 2004) indicates that he adds almost no

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33 For an exploration of the relationship between the two works, see Saitō 2013 and Harrison 2019.

34 On these, more numerous than has been generally acknowledged, see Harrison 2007 and 2009.

35 Our knowledge of this commentary is greatly indebted to the work of Mochizuki Kaie (2002, 2004).
words of his own: apart from the chapter headings, which are recapitulated in a list at the end of the work (ibid., p. 376), the text is simply a series of quotations, each one preceded by the relevant text title (e.g., *Tshangs pas byin pas zhus pa'i mdo las kyang* [here follows the quotation] *zhes gsungs so ||*). This pattern is unvarying. Furthermore, while the 37 chapters of the work deal each with a particular topic, there seems to be no principle of organisation (cf. Mochizuki 2002: 5–6). The elision of the author is so complete that he has not even imposed any structure on his material.

These four anthologies are thus different in several important respects, although they often draw their material from the same sūtras. Since the SūS appears to have been the first to be composed, its position is of special importance.

3. The authorship of the *Sūtra-samuccaya*

Let us turn back to the SūS, then, and to the question of its authorship. There can be little doubt that the ascription to Nāgārjuna, i.e. to the founder of the Madhyamaka school, was firmly accepted by the later Indian tradition. Thus we find Candrakīrti (early seventh century) including the SūS in a list of eight works by Nāgārjuna which he gives in his *Madhyamakaśāstrastuti*, and referring to its exposition of the “One Vehicle” (*ekayāna*) doctrine in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*.36 Śāntideva mentions Nāgārjuna’s SūS in his BsCA/BCA, in a set of much-discussed verses,37 and his work provides ample evidence that he was talking about the text we have today, and that he was familiar with its contents (see below). Kamalaśīla (late eighth century) quotes several passages from it, one of them with explicit attribution to the great Mādhyamika, in his third *Bhāvanākrama* (see Tucci 1971: 22, 25, 27). And both early eleventh-century commentaries by Ratnākaraśānti and Atiśa ascribe the work on which they comment to Nāgārjuna as well. From India the attribution passed into Tibet where it was, as far as I know, universally upheld. Thus Nāgārjuna is given as author of the text in the Tibetan translation in the bsTan ’gyur. All this proves, however, is that the ascription of the SūS to Nāgārjuna dates back at least to the seventh century, not that it is correct, but it does give us a *terminus ante quem* for the work (the Chinese translation in this case being very late). With the commentator being practically invisible, as we have seen, there would seem to be very slim internal grounds for

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36 See La Vallée Poussin 1907–1912: 402.

37 For a discussion of these verses, see Harrison 2007. Cf. Saitō 2004, which also provides a useful review of previous interpretations.
affirming or denying Nāgārjuna's authorship, *pace* Lindtnner. Indeed, when it comes to the content of the work, reservations are usually expressed on the basis of the assumed lateness of a few of the sūtras quoted, particularly the *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, which reflect Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha doctrines held to be later developments in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.38 One response to this objection is to hypothesize that these passages could well be later interpolations in the Sūs, it being very easy to add citations to an anthology. This defence seems plausible enough, but it is unsatisfactory. Equally unsatisfactory is the rejoinder that ostensibly later elements in the parts of the relevant problem texts not quoted by the author of the Sūs are later interpolations in those texts, given that we know that sūtras changed over time.39 Both these scenarios are perfectly possible in principle, yet any argument which rests on the notion of interpolation can potentially be applied whenever one runs into trouble, and is therefore arbitrary and of little practical use.40 We have to take the Sūs as a whole. When we do, I believe, we can find several grounds for questioning the attribution, quite apart from the use of sources which are demonstrably late, and even this last argument, perhaps the only one with any real force, can be strengthened by extending it beyond the usual suspects.

Many of these grounds relate to the issue of consistency with other works in the Nāgārjuna corpus, in terms of style and procedure as well as content. The first question to ask is this: does Nāgārjuna cite Mahāyāna sūtras as proof texts in any other commentary? The question here is not whether Nāgārjuna is a Mahāyānist,41 or whether his work betrays evidence of the influence of Mahāyāna sūtras like the Prajñāpāramitā texts, but whether he is in the habit of using quotations from them. Lindtnner 1982: 260 makes this claim for two texts apart from the Sūs, the *Catuḥstava* (CS) and the *Bodhisaṃbhāra* (BS). The former collection includes many echoes of verses found in Mahāyāna sūtras, but being what it is—a set of versified eulogies, not an attempt to establish anything by arguments—it

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38 To these two sūtras Ichishima 1968 adds the *Daśabhūmika* and the *Gaṇḍavyūha* as problematic.
39 This is the implication of the careful discussion in Williams 1984: 89–93, which leaves open the possibility that Nāgārjuna knew a *Lankāvatāra*, i.e. the sūtra in an earlier recension, not the *Lankāvatāra* we have today.
40 It can only be applied with confidence if the passages at issue are clearly intrusive, if they are stylistically or thematically inconsistent with the rest of the work, or if there is other evidence for suspecting their integrity.
41 As denied by Warder 1973, and, in a somewhat less straightforward way, by Kalupahana 1986.
does not name its sources, so we cannot locate a single citation as such. One could equally well conclude that the sūtras not known to predate the third century are echoing the CS rather than the other way around.\textsuperscript{42} As for the BS, while there are many echoes of concepts and phrases found in the sūtras, there is only one actual reference to a text by its title: in v. 95 the \textit{Daśadharmaka-sūtra} (later Text No. 9 in the Ratnakūṭa) is referred to by name. However, a whole sequence of verses (vv. 132–145) appears to reflect the influence of the \textit{Kāśyapa-parivarta} (first translated into Chinese in the late second century, and archaic, so presenting no problem), while others are taken by Lindtner to reflect the \textit{Vimalakīrthi-nirdeśa} or \textit{Ratnamegha}.\textsuperscript{43} So, when Lindtner says (p. 260) that “CS and BS contain numerous allusions to, or even quotations from, these texts,” the use of the word “quotation” is misleading: there is not a single citation of the sort that we find in the SūS. The situation with Āgama quotations is the same: throughout his corpus Nāgārjuna is obviously drawing on the Āgamas, but he does not name his sources. This is especially pronounced in the \textit{Suhṛlleka}, with its many clear echoes of an Ekottarikāgama,\textsuperscript{44} also of a Samyuktāgama, and of the \textit{Udānavarga/Dharmapada} tradition. In this work echoes of Mahāyāna sūtras are less common. But not once does Nāgārjuna name his source, except to say things like “the Buddha has said,” and so on (cf. Dietz 1984: 28, 30). Even though we can be quite sure he drew on material from the \textit{Kāśyapa-parivarta}, the \textit{Daśabhūmika-sūtra}, and many other texts, outside the SūS the reference to the \textit{Daśadharmaka}

\textsuperscript{42} That this is a perfectly feasible possibility can be seen in the fate of the famous \textit{namaskāra} with which the MMK opens (the two \textit{gāthās} beginning \textit{anirodham anutpādam}), which eventually found their way into various Mahāyāna sūtras, including later versions of the Prajñāpāramitā, where some of their wording appears in a modified prose form. This rather undercuts Walser's treatment of their significance (2004: 170–171), since he assumes—almost certainly incorrectly—that the flow of influence is in reverse. The two \textit{gāthās} have even turned up on a copper plate inscription from Afghanistan in the Schøyen Collection probably dated 492/493: see Melzer 2006: 275, which includes useful bibliographical references to previous studies.

\textsuperscript{43} Here Lindtner's references, although useful, have to be read with some caution. It is hard to know in many cases whether Nāgārjuna is referring to Mahāyāna sūtras or to the Āgamas from which those sūtras have drawn their material. Lindtner may be jumping to conclusions at times.

\textsuperscript{44} Lindtner's notes (1982: 219–224), for example, cite “references” and “allusions” to the Anguttara-nikāya (as also to the Samyutta-nikāya, Dhammapada, and so on), but this is regrettable imprecision. These titles are not generic, but denote specific Pāli texts or textual corpora, to which Nāgārjuna is almost certainly not referring. It would be a useful exercise to try to track down and analyse the parallel passages in surviving versions of the Ekottarikāgama, some recension of which is clearly Nāgārjuna's most important source for this work.
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stands as one of two explicit title references, alongside the celebrated reference to the Kātyāyanāvatāda, presumably from a Samyuktāgama collection, in Milamadhyamaka-kārikā XV.7. This means that the extensive and explicit citation of Mahāyāna sūtras as proof texts in the SūS is anomalous. Indeed it is unlikely that Nāgārjuna would cite Mahāyāna sūtras in this way, since an appeal to their authority would only work if it was widely accepted that they had any. Such citations would be inconsistent with what Gregory Schopen (2000/2005) and Joseph Walser (2004) have said about Nāgārjuna and the basic defensiveness concerning the Mahāyāna which he demonstrates so clearly in the Ratnāvalī.

In the Nāgārjuna corpus the SūS is decidedly anomalous for other reasons, since, apart from the svavṛtti to the Vighrahavyāvartanī (VV), and the Vaidalya-sūtras and -prakaraṇa (VP), every other work whose attribution to Nāgārjuna rests on reasonably firm grounds, at least according to Lindtner’s criteria, is in verse. We find too that most of these other works have elements conspicuously absent in the SūS, such as a statement of intent (prayojana) at the beginning—so the Ratnāvalī (RĀ) v. I.2, Suhṛllekha (SH) vv. 1–3, Bodhisambhāra (BS) v. I, Vaidalya-prakaraṇa (VP) v. I—or a dedication of merit (puṇyapariniṣṭham) or similar wish at the end—see Lokātītastava v. 28, Acintyastava v. 59, BV v. 112, Yuktisaṣṭikā v. 60—or a closing salutation to the Buddha—Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā XXVII.30, VV v. 71. Only the Śūnyatā-saptati lacks all these elements (unless the final verb in its v. 73 is construed as an imperative). The presence or absence of these formal elements is something that was taken seriously by the later tradition, as the discussion by Paul Williams in his extensive review of Lindtner 1982 shows (Williams 1984: 78–83).

45 The Pāli equivalent, the Kaccāyanagotta-sutta, is found in the Samyutta-nikāya (S ii 16–17), the Chinese—with some interesting variants—in the Za ahan jing, T 99, No. 301 (II.85c17–86a3).

46 One possible rejoinder to this is to postulate that Nāgārjuna might freely cite Mahāyāna sūtras when writing for fellow-Mahāyānists, but refrain from doing so when addressing a general Buddhist or even lay audience.

47 I remove the Bodhicittavivaraṇa (BV) from Lindtner’s list of 13 texts which must be considered genuine, since Williams 1984 argues compellingly against its attribution to Nāgārjuna I. The BV, however, is also a verse work, so even if we included it, it would make no difference to the argument. As for the VP, Tola and Dragonetti 1995: 15 consider its attribution to Nāgārjuna to rest on very weak grounds, and are inclined to doubt it. As Shōryū Katsura has reminded me (personal communication), the VP is written in prose, but the 73 sūtras or aphorisms which form the core of the work reflect the same lapidary style typical of Nāgārjuna’s verse compositions.
Although none of them is very compelling on its own, these three considerations taken together—disinclination to cite Mahāyāna sūtras, preference for verse, use of formal elements—should be enough to cast doubt on the ascription of the SūS to Nāgārjuna, even before we turn to the more usual argument about the presumed late date of composition of some of the sūtras it cites, especially the Lankāvatāra-sūtra (4 citations) and the Śrīmālādevīśimhanāda-sūtra (2 citations). With the former work the problem is especially acute, since, besides bristling with later doctrinal developments and allusions to other sūtras, including indeed the Śrīmālā, it contains (in vv. 163–166 of the Sagāthakam section) what is apparently a “prophecy” of the advent of Nāgārjuna himself, referred to as Nāgāhvaya. The Lankāvatāra was first translated into Chinese by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 433, but that translation is lost. The oldest translation extant is that made by Guṇabhadra in 443 (T 670/K 159, Lengqie abaduolu bao jing 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經). According to Nakamura 1980: 231, the scholarly consensus is that the Lankāvatāra was composed in the late fourth century, but Schmithausen 1992 rather suggests the early fifth. Guṇabhadra—or rather the team that he led, consisting of Baoyun 寶雲 and others—also produced the first Chinese translation of the Śrīmālā in 436 (T 353/K 54, Shengman shizihou yisheng dafangbian fangguang jing 勝鬘師子吼一乗大方便方廣經). Wayman and

48 And cast doubt is perhaps all they can do, given that the charge of circular argumentation is inevitable with problems of corpus determination like this. Only the application of stylometric analysis might allow us to escape this trap, but it would be complicated by the fact that not all works attributed to Nāgārjuna survive in Sanskrit. It could not in any case work for the SūS, even if we had the Sanskrit text, since it consists largely of quotations from other authors.

49 Cf. Ruegg 1981: 56–57 and Lopez 1996: 26, who is forced by his acceptance of Nāgārjuna’s authorship of the SūS to regard this prophecy as an apparent interpolation in the Lankāvatāra. The Sagāthakam section does not appear in the first Chinese translation, but does appear in the second and third (513 and 700–704 respectively). More compelling, however, is the work of Schmithausen (1992), who shows rather conclusively that parts of the Lankāvatāra found already in the oldest Chinese translation drew upon the Trimsikā, regarded as one of Vasubandhu’s later works.

50 T = number in the Taishō; K = number in The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue (Lancaster and Park 1979).

51 It is to be noted that the Lankāvatāra was not known at all to the compilers of the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV), the later parts of which were produced in the early 5th century according to Takasaki. See Takasaki 1966: 61–62, 53, and 32–33 for comments on the sūtras quoted or alluded to in the RGV, some of which are also cited in the SūS, and evince later Tathāgatagarbha doctrines. See also Takasaki 1982. If the compilers of the RGV did not know or use the Lankāvatāra, it is all the more unlikely that Nāgārjuna would have known it, even in an early recension.
Wayman 1974 date that text to the third century, although their arguments with regard to the text’s date and provenance are open to question. Yet these two sūtras are not alone in causing difficulties for an attribution to a second- or perhaps early third-century figure like Nāgārjuna, since there are others with late Chinese translation dates. Of course, one or two sūtras with late translation dates prove nothing, since there are well-known cases of obviously very early texts which were not translated into Chinese until around the end of the first millennium, but a large number of late translations constitutes a pattern which cannot be ignored. That number includes:

1) the Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarīka-sūtra (2 citations in the SūS), first translated into Chinese by Narendrayaśas in 558 (T 380/K 110, Dabei jing 大悲經);
2) the Tathāgatabimba-parivarta (1 citation), of which the Chinese translation was made by Tiyunboruo (*Devendraprajña? *Devaprajña?) in 691 (T 694/K 419, Dasheng zao xiang gongde jing 大乘造像功德經);
3) the Śraddhābalādhānāvatāramudrā-sūtra (5 citations), first translated into Chinese by Dharmaruci in 504 or 508–534 (T 305/K 81, Xinli ruin famen jing 信力入印法門經);
4) the related Niyatāniyatāvāramudrā-sūtra (2 citations), translated into Chinese by Gautama Prajñāruci in 542 (T 645/K 138, Bubiding ruding ruin jing 不必定入定入印經);
5) the Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra (2 citations), also translated by Gautama Prajñāruci in the period 538–541 (T 721/K 801, Zhengfa nianchu jing 正法念處經);
6) the Dharmasaṅgīti-sūtra (2 citations), translated by Bodhiruci I in 515 (T 761/K 404, Faji jing 法集經);
7) the Praśāntavinīścayaprātiḥāryasamādhi-sūtra (3 citations), translated by Xuanzang in 663 or 664 (T 648/K 482, Jizhao shenbian sanmodi jing jing 寂照神變三摩地經);
8) the Bodhisattvagocaropāyaviṣayavikurvāṇanirdeśa-sūtra, also known as the Satyaka-parivarta (2 citations), first translated

52 The details in the list which follows are taken from the Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais (Fascicule annexe du Hōbōgirin) and from Lancaster and Park 1979. The dates are mostly based on the latter catalogue. They need to be checked carefully against other sources, especially to determine whether any lost first translations alter the picture.
53 To be distinguished from the Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka-sūtra, for which see Yamada 1968.
54 Lindtner’s list gives only one citation.
by Guṇabhadra in the period 435–443 (T 271/K 162, *Pusa xing fangbian jingjie shentong bianhua jing* 菩薩行方便境界神通變化經);

9) the *Dārakaratnadatta-sūtra = *Bodhisattvacaryā-nirdeśa (1 citation), translated by Faxian/Tianxizai, in the period 989–999 (T 488/K 1227, *Baoshou pusa putixing jing* 寶授菩薩菩提行經).

10) the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā-sūtra* (4 citations), first translated by Dharmakṣema in the period 414–426 (T 397.5/K 56.5, *Dafangdeng daji jing haiyi pusa pin* 大方等大集經海慧菩薩品).

As I suggested above, we must reject any attempt to salvage the situation by postulating the later interpolation into the SūS of the citations from these sūtras, since, even if such a hypothesis were admissible in the case of one or two texts, one would be hard pressed to maintain it when so many sūtras with first translation dates in the fifth and sixth centuries and even later are seen to be involved.\(^{55}\) One can go further than this, however, and add greater force to the argument by considering the content of another set of texts cited in the SūS. These are texts that form part of or are connected with the Mahāsaṃnipāta, most of them reaching China in the early fifth century:\(^{56}\)

1) the *Candragarbha-parivarta* (7 citations), first translated by Narendrayaśas in 566 (T 397.15/K 56.15, *Dafangdeng daji jing yuezang fen* 大方等大集經月藏分);

2) the *Sūryagarbha-parivarta* (1 citation), first (?)\(^{57}\) translated by Narendrayaśas in the period 584–585 (T 397.14/K 56.14, *Dafangdeng daji jing rizang fen* 大方等大集經日藏分);

3) the *Ākāśagarbha-sūtra* (1 citation), first translated by Buddhayaśas 408–413 (T 405/K 62, *Xukongzang pusa jing* 虚空藏菩薩經);

4) the *(Daśacakra-)Kṣitigarbha-sūtra* (3 citations), first translated during the period 397–439, translator’s name lost (T 410/K 58, *Dafangguang shilun jing* 大方廣十輪經).

\(^{55}\) So far I have focussed primarily on translation dates, but a careful perusal of the relevant sūtras would be required to strengthen the argument, by ascertaining whether the contents of any or all of them reflect demonstrably later doctrinal developments and historical circumstances. Some of the texts in this list have already been the focus of detailed studies, which among other things look into their dating, not always with convincing results. For reasons of space these studies are not reviewed here.

\(^{56}\) I review the same list in Harrison 2018b, but offer only the briefest summary of the argument built around it.

\(^{57}\) The similarly titled text translated by Dharmakṣema 414–426 (T 397.13) is apparently not a parallel to the text cited in the SūS (cf. Nattier 1991: 172, n. 61). Further work is needed to clarify the situation.
In a long string of citations in the SūS (79–93) we find many revealing passages from these texts levelling threats against people—kings and ministers of state in particular—who despoil wealthy monasteries of their considerable property—including land, buildings, servants and cattle—and otherwise interfere in the affairs of the Saṅgha. The same or similar material from the Ākāśagarbha and the Kṣitigarbha is also cited at length in the Śikṣ, and would repay careful study, suggesting as it does a historical situation in which the Buddhist Saṅgha found itself in serious conflict with the civil authorities. The Candragarbha passage cited in the SūS goes so far as to warn those in power of the karmic consequences of inflicting punishment on members of the Saṅgha, even if they are guilty of serious offences. These striking themes are pursued both negatively and positively. This lengthy section falls in the middle of a discussion about wrong practice on the part of householders, but serves a polemical end which goes beyond the ostensible purpose of the text.

To return to our subject, even leaving aside the relatively late date of this set of texts, united by the themes they address, by the element garbha in their titles, and by their connection with the Mahā-saṃnipāta, one has to ask if the author of the Ratnāvali and the Suhṛllekha, which are attempts to appeal to monarchs for support for the Saṅgha and/or provide them with spiritual guidance, could or would have compiled a series of quotations threatening kings and their ministers with hellfire and damnation for depriving the same Saṅgha of its abundant wealth and inflicting punishments on immoral monks. The Ratnāvalī is, at least in part, what we would call a “begging letter,” concerned with institutional fundraising of the sort with which modern academics are becoming, alas, ever more familiar.

If we ask about the context in which Nāgārjuna worked, we would have to say that one aspect of it was his position in an organisation seeking to increase its endowments. He was thus intent on cultivating the goodwill of potential donors, and representing the Saṅgha as a worthy recipient of their benefactions. The material included in the SūS hardly sits well with such a

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58 On the problems involved in deducing which historical situation this was, see Nattier 1991: 110–117, with special reference to the “Hephthalite hypothesis” advanced by Yamada Ryūjō, which bears directly on the Śūryagarbha- and Candragarbha-sūtras.

59 Note that the author of the SūS also cites a number of other texts which were incorporated in the Mahāsaṃnipāta, such as the Aksayamati-nirdeśā, the Sāgaramati-paripṛcchā and the Dhāraṇīśvararāja-paripṛcchā (Tathāgatamahā-karunā-nirdeśā).

60 The Suhṛllekha is more concerned with spiritual guidance, and only touches on the desirability of making donations to bhikṣus, brāhmaṇas and others in passing (v. 6).
public relations exercise, and would in fact have doomed it to failure. For this reason alone we would have to conclude that even if this anthology was compiled by a Nāgārjuna, he is unlikely to have been the same Nāgārjuna who wrote the MMK and the Ratnāvalī.

As for determining a date of composition, that is hardly possible at this point. This could have been as early as the fourth or as late as the fifth century, or even the sixth.61 One important piece of evidence now to be taken into account is the recent identification by Seishi Karashima of two Sanskrit fragments of a single folio found in Khadalik, on the Southern Route of the Silk Road.62 Karashima identifies this folio as coming from a manuscript of the SūS, although at one point in his paper (p. 263) he qualifies this with the word “probably.”63 Although dating on paleographical grounds is rather inexact, the South Turkestani Brāhmī in which this fragment is written suggests fifth–sixth centuries (I would say sixth, given the stylized calligraphic nature of the script). At any rate it gives us a terminus ante quem for the composition of the SūS that we didn’t have before, i.e. before the sixth century, and possibly even before the fifth. Whenever the SūS was composed, its ascription to Nāgārjuna, the founder of Madhyamaka, must have become widely accepted by the early seventh century, when Candrakīrti mentions it, followed by Śāntideva in the eighth century. For all that, we ought to regard it as unsustainable.

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61 Ichishima 1968, who comes to the same conclusion that the SūS is the work of another author—another Nāgārjuna, according to him—puts him at around the same time as Asaṅga. In his 1986b and 1990 articles, however, Ichishima places this Nāgārjuna after Vasubandhu (whom he dates to 400–480 in the first article and 320–400 in the second). I remain unconvincing of the wisdom of hypothesizing a Nāgārjuna II (or III?).

62 See Karashima 2009.

63 “In fact, except for the words on recto 5, namely [vi]citrasukhāvāptir bhavavyava, which do not have parallels in the Tibetan or Chinese translation of the Sūtrasamuccaya, the other parts agree quite well with these translations of the text ...” I would correct the reading to [vi]citrasukhāvāptir bhavaty ava, and, with Karashima (2009: 265), regard these words as part of the author's own commentary (or a gloss which has been added to the same), falling between the Ratnarāṣi citation and that from the Puṣpaketā-sūtra. The wording of that commentary in the Tibetan and Chinese translations of the SūS (see Karashima 2009: 267 and 270) is, however, different, albeit thematically related, so we must leave open the possibility that this fragment belongs to another work which has either borrowed material from the SūS or been its source.
4. The relationship between the SūS and the Śikṣ

Of course, we have only a slender basis for knowing that Candrakīrti was referring to the SūS which we have today (see above), but with Śāntideva we are on firmer ground. To begin with, Śāntideva’s brief characterisation of the work is on target. The implication of his reference to the SūS in BsCA IV.90 is that the rules of training of the bodhisattva (śikṣāḥ) are to be found in it, while in a revised version of the same verses in BCA VI.104–106 he asserts that it propounds good conduct, or the conduct of good people (sadācāra). Such a claim is certainly consistent with the content of parts of the SūS. But more convincing evidence than this can be found: we can tell that the work Śāntideva was referring to was the SūS we have now because of its obvious influence on his own anthology, the Śikṣ. That influence is shown most clearly by identical sequences of citations from the same works. For example, the citations from the Rājāvadāka-sūtra

Text according to BCA-P 159–164: śikṣāḥ sūtreṣu drṣṭyante tasmāt sūtrāṇi vācayet | ākāśagarbhāsūtre ca mūlāpattīr nirūpayet || [V.104] śikṣāsamuccayayāśyāṃ draṣṭavyaś ca punah punah | vistareṇa sadācāro yasmāt tatra pradarśitaḥ || [V.105] saṃkṣepeṇātha vā tāvat paśyet sūtrasamuccayaṃ | āryanāgarjunābaddhaṃ dvitīyaṃ ca prayatnataḥ || [V.106]. For detailed discussions of the import of these verses and previous research on them, see Saitō 2004 and Harrison 2007: 224–226; see also Saitō 2013: 2–3. My translation of the three verses in the BCA runs as follows:

The rules of training are to be found in the sūtras.
Therefore one should recite the sūtras,
And one should consider the cardinal transgressions
In the Ākāśagarbhā-sūtra. [V.104]
The Śikṣāsamuccaya should by all means
Be looked at again and again
Since good conduct is propounded
At length in it. [V.105]
Alternatively, [for the same thing] in brief,
One should just look carefully
At the Sūtrasamuccaya,
The companion work [of this type], composed by the Noble Nāgārjuna. [V.106]

However, it must be admitted that alternative interpretations of the last two pādas are possible, as we will see below.

A full list of correspondences is provided in Asano 1995, which adds to the findings of an earlier study by Sasaki Kōken (1965). Sasaki identified 17 citations in common, which Asano expanded to 28 citations (not 28 sūtras, as on p. 57 of his article) from the SūS corresponding to 34 passages in the Śikṣ. Asano laid out all the citations shared by the SūS and the Śikṣ in charts and tables with impressive care and precision, although I did not become aware of his paper until I had done all the same work myself. Thus there is scarcely anything new in this section, or, as Śāntideva himself would put it, na ca kiñcid apūrvam atra vācyam.
and the *Ratnamegha-sūtra* at Śikṣ 206–210\(^\text{66}\) mirror the same sequence of citations, with the text cut at slightly different points, in SūS 61–69.\(^\text{67}\) In fact Śāntideva’s citation of the *Rājāvādāaka* is greatly abbreviated, but it seems to be taken directly from the sūtra, rather than being a cut-down version of the SūS, since it contains sentences here and there which do not occur in the SūS, and the order of paragraphs is occasionally different.\(^\text{68}\) There are a number of other cases where the Śikṣ citation, even though taken from the same portion of the relevant text, far exceeds the scope of the SūS (e.g., the lengthy *Pitāputrasamāgama* quotation at Śikṣ 244–262, as compared with a fraction of the same material at SūS 144–146), so we can see that Śāntideva has consulted the source texts himself. But there are also cases where the Śikṣ contains less than what is cited in the SūS, and no wording which is not found in the older work, which suggests the possibility that Śāntideva is simply borrowing his predecessor’s material without reference to the original source. Such cases include the sequence of citations from the same sections of the *Mahākaruṇāpuṇḍarīka-sūtra* and the *Sāgaranāgarāja-paripṛcchā* at Śikṣ 309, which follows that of SūS 104–107. In the Śikṣ (at 311–312) these are followed shortly after—citations from two other texts intervening—by an identical set of quotations taken ostensibly from the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra* (these come directly after the *Sāgaranāgarāja-paripṛcchā* quotation in the SūS, at 107–108).\(^\text{69}\) Both commentaries cite the same section of the *Tathāgatabimba-parivarta* which comes next in the SūS (SūS 108–109: Śikṣ 173), with the Śikṣ giving much less of the text, and the same is true of the citation of the *Tathāgatakośa* (SūS 178–180: Śikṣ 171–172).\(^\text{70}\) Most revealing, finally, is the sequence of identical citations from the Ratnarāśi, the *Anupūrvasamudgata-parivarta* and the *Sāgaramati-paripṛcchā* (SūS 109–112: Śikṣ 312–313) where even the brief comment linking the last two citations has apparently been lifted *verbatim* by Śāntideva from the SūS.\(^\text{71}\) Identical portions taken from three sūtras in a row lie well beyond

\(^{66}\) All references to the Śikṣ are to the pages of Bendall’s edition (Bendall 1897–1902).


\(^{68}\) It also uses a different title. The work is cited in the SūS as *gSal rgyal gyis zhus pa* (= *Prasenajit-paripṛcchā*).

\(^{69}\) Kazunobu Matsuda has recently identified these passages as coming not from the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra*, but from the *Kuśalamūlasamparigraha-sūtra*. See T 657, 207a26–29 and b11–15, and Braarvig/Pagel 2006: 21, n. 10.


\(^{71}\) SūS 111: ‘di yang de bzhin gshegs pa la mchod pa dang rim gro bya ba bla na med
the bounds of coincidence, to say nothing of repeating another author’s words. Indeed, it can be seen from the page references given above that Śāntideva has borrowed an entire sequence of citations from the SūS (SūS 104–112), leaving some of them together but dispersing the rest to other parts of his own commentary. This survey of borrowings and influences is not exhaustive, but is sufficient to show that Śāntideva drew on the SūS for at least some of his material when he composed his own more extensive sūtra-anthology. Our interest, of course, lies not in accusing him of plagiarism or failure to acknowledge his sources properly—as many have pointed out, Indian notions of authorship are quite different from ours—but in deducing from this degree of indebtedness that the SūS which Śāntideva ascribed to Nāgārjuna and used himself is indeed the same work which we have today. Of broader significance is the general effect of anthologies which we can see in operation here: they tend to become determinative of how a tradition is received. It is well known that the Śikṣ has had a strong impact on the later Tibetan tradition, to the extent that knowledge of the sūtras it cites seems often to be derived from Śāntideva’s citations rather than from direct acquaintance. What we see here is that Śāntideva himself was also subject to this process. For all we know, the author of the SūS, whoever he was, may have been similarly indebted to his predecessors.

5. The relationship between the Śikṣ and the Zhujing yaoji

As we continue to explore the topic of connections between our commentaries, we take up the question of the relationship between the Śikṣ and the Zhujing yaoji. Asano Morinobu’s contention in his 1998

\[ \text{pa ste} = \text{Śikṣ 313.6: idam ca niruttaram tathāgatapūjopasthānam. This was not noted by Asano.} \]

An alternative explanation is to ascribe the SūS to Śāntideva as well, given the later tradition that he also composed a work of that name (see, e.g., Pezzali 1968: 80ff.). However, given the many differences in style and content between the works, and Candrakīrti’s references to the SūS (implying its existence before the time of Śāntideva), such a hypothesis seems implausible. It is considered and tentatively rejected by Sasaki Kōken (1965), who reviews the correspondences discussed above (his list of them being more extensive than mine, but not as comprehensive as Asano’s), but comes to no firm conclusions about the close relationship between the two works which his article establishes. Ichishima (1968, 1986a) advances the different hypothesis that Śāntideva compiled another SūS of his own (now lost), using the earlier work ascribed to Nāgārjuna as a source book, but as far as I can see there is no solid evidence for this. It is based largely on a particular reading of BCA V.106 and Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā, as well as the testimony of Bu ston.
article is that the Zhujing yaoji is likely to be the SūS referred to by Śāntideva in the much-discussed BCA verse V.106, which he interprets as follows (Asano 1998: 182), “Alternatively, in brief, first look at the Sūtrasamuccaya / And then, in the second place, read with care the work of the Noble Nāgārjuna.” That is to say, it is quite plausible that the words Zhujing yaoji are a translation of Sūtrasamuccaya, and thus that it is the text referred to here, since it is indeed shorter and more condensed than the Śikṣ—about the same length, in fact, as the SūS—and it does present bodhisattva conduct in terms of Śāntideva’s brief characterization of it.

To support his contention that Śāntideva knew this work, Asano lists seven sūtras where Śikṣ and Zhujing yaoji quote the same passages (11 in all) from the same texts, in all cases with the Śikṣ citation being shorter, he asserts, than that found in the Zhujing yaoji. However, as can be seen from the following table, while it is true that the Śikṣ does quote some of the same passages, in all cases it has additional citations from the same text (Asano fails to mention this), so coincidence cannot be ruled out.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sūtra Name</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Zhujing Yaoji</th>
<th>Śikṣ quotes same passage or less</th>
<th>Śikṣ quotes other passages?</th>
<th>Zhujing Yaoji passage found in Sūs?</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa</td>
<td>No. 3</td>
<td>Yes (1 sentence at 6.10–11 from 3a)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Śikṣ does not cite 3b (VKn §3.38–41).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upāli-paripṛcchā</td>
<td>No. 10</td>
<td>Yes (passages at 164.8–165.1, 178.9–16)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sāgaramati-paripṛcchā</td>
<td>No. 12</td>
<td>Yes (long citation at 50.3–51.6, 151.3–12 from 12c; 184.9–188.4 from 12b, with many omissions)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes, part of 12c (12th hook of Māra; this part not in Śikṣ)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upāyakauśalyasūtra</td>
<td>No. 14</td>
<td>Yes (just a little less than No. 14, at 66.9–14)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaganagañja-sūtra</td>
<td>No. 22</td>
<td>Yes (only 1 brief sentence at 51.14)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dharma- saṃgīti-sūtra</td>
<td>No. 35</td>
<td>Yes (35a = 12.8–12.12)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ugra-paripṛcchā</td>
<td>No. 38</td>
<td>Yes (part of 38b = 271.9–11)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Match between Śikṣ &amp; 38b so inexact that 38b cannot be source</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Further, it tends to cut the passages up, abbreviate them and so on. At any rate, it is abundantly clear that Śāntideva is not relying exclusively on the Zhujing yaoji for his knowledge of these texts. Asano also lists 13 cases where the Śikṣ and the Zhujing yaoji quote the same sūtras, but separate passages (as we have seen, the two anthologies draw citations from the same 22 works). Asano’s conclusion (p. 186) that it is highly probable that Śāntideva referred directly to the Zhujing yaoji when composing his commentary and selected sūtras cited by it cannot be sustained: the most one can say is that it is possible he knew it. Asano is right to conclude cautiously that we can’t be certain that this is the SūS he speaks of, even if it is certainly the case that the three works are all part of the same tradition. In sum, a more fine-grained analysis of the citations in both works is required before one can draw a firm conclusion on this issue.

6. Concluding Remarks

The four sūtra anthologies that have been our focus so far sit within a fairly extensive body of Mahāyāna Buddhist commentarial literature, which includes sūtra commentaries proper, i.e. works devoted to clarifying the content of specific Mahāyāna sūtras, such as the Vajracchedikā-vyākhyā and the like, as well as texts which sit between the genres of scripture and commentary, what Cabezón calls “second order” works, like the Sandhinirmocana. Considering this diverse literature takes us back to the question: when did the first commentaries appear with citations of Mahāyāna sūtras as proof texts? Which is to say, when did proponents of the Mahāyāna feel sufficiently confident about the status of their tradition to cite their own scriptures as authorities? If we accept that the ascription of the SūS to Nāgārjuna must now be rejected, we can no longer date this development to the second century on the basis of that text.

The question is not when Mahāyānists began producing commentaries. Let us assume that they did so at a very early date, perhaps even before the second century. This would hardly be surprising, given the antiquity of the commentarial impulse in Buddhism. Even in the Vinayas, for example, one finds the Vibhaṅga sections, and these are not late additions.

73 I note, incidentally, that Asano 1998 has a fair number of mistakes, especially as regards references given for parallel passages in Chinese, and must be used with caution. Even so, I found his preliminary survey with its identifications extremely helpful.

74 Proof positive would be some anomaly in a Zhujing yaoji citation not found in the root text in any of its surviving versions but replicated by the Śikṣ.
to that corpus. Such commentarial supplements are perhaps inevitable and natural in an orally transmitted textual tradition, since students learning the texts will inevitably ask their teachers what the words they have memorized mean, and the explanations will be given in this style. As far as the Mahāyāna is concerned, we may suppose that as soon as a sufficient body of scripture existed, and a community sufficiently large which accepted that scripture and yet felt the need to engage with the problems it generated, then the stage was set for the writing—or the oral production—of commentaries, works devoted to systematic formulation of pre-existing material which was not necessarily systematically formulated itself. Abhidharma speaks to the same need. In the case of the Mahāyāna it may have had something to do with the development of large monastic communities with significant proportions of their members committed to the Mahāyāna way of being Buddhist. In other words, it is a matter of critical mass. We can imagine an earlier Mahāyāna with scattered communities of believers preserving and transmitting one or two texts, in which case there may have been a limited need for exegesis, for authoritative resolution of problems arising from the transmitted material. A later Mahāyāna of large monastic communities, with large libraries, or with many people holding many different texts in their heads, if not on the shelves in their cells, would have given rise to a different sort of need. This also entails critical mass in a second sense, the mass of texts with which not everyone will be conversant or to which not everyone will have easy access. Then the need would have arisen for anthologies of the type we have been considering.

However, our question bears on the more specific problem of when followers of the Mahāyāna became sufficiently self-assured to cite their own scriptures in defence of their positions. This had certainly happened by the fourth century, since in works ascribed to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu we see such citations. For example, in Vasubandhu’s commentary (Bhāṣya) to Maitreyaṇaṭha’s/Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the first chapter of which is devoted to a defence of the authenticity of Mahāyāna, we find a small number of Mahāyāna sūtras quoted or referred to by name, along with texts from the (or a) Saṃyuktāgama and Ekottarikāgama. These include the Akṣayamatinirdeśa-sūtra, Kāśyapa-parivarta (referred to as Ratnakūṭa), Tathāgataguhya-sūtra (referred to as Guhyakādhipati-nirdeśa), Daśabhūmika-sūtra, Brahmaparipṛcchā (= Brahmaviśeṣacinti-

75 A list is given in Jamspal et al. 2004: xxxvii–xxxviii.
paripṛcchā), and Śrīmālā-sūtra.\(^{76}\) Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasamgraha also contains a small number of citations, among them references to Mahāyāna sūtras, including the Śatasāhasrikā, Sandhinirmocana, Kāśyapa-parivarta, Daśabhūmika-sūtra, and Brahmaparipṛcchā (= Brahmaprīṣeṣacintiparipṛcchā).\(^ {77}\) Vasubandhu’s Vākyāyukti also contains a celebrated and influential defense of the Mahāyāna (see Cabezón 1992). Although drawing mainly on the Āgamas, it cites just over a dozen Mahāyāna sūtras, among them (again) the Tathāgataguhya, Sandhinirmocana, and Śatasāhasrikā, as well as the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa, Upāyakauśalya-sūtra, Sarvāpnuṣasamuccayasamādhi-sūtra, and others.\(^ {78}\) In all these works the numbers of Mahāyāna sūtras cited are comparatively modest. They are more numerous in several other commentaries from around the same period which survive only in Chinese, most notably the Da zhidu lun (T 1509/K 549), also ascribed to Nāgārjuna, and translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva 402–406. The attribution of this voluminous work to Nāgārjuna is problematic, but at least we know it was composed by the end of the fourth century. It quotes some 33 Mahāyāna sūtras, which are conveniently listed by Lamotte in the introduction to Vol. III of his Traité (Lamotte 1970: xxxiv–xxxvii).\(^ {79}\) Revealingly, not one of the 16 texts with late translation dates cited in the SūS mentioned above in Part 3 of this paper, including the Laṅkāvatāra and the Śrīmālā, is quoted in it. In fact, nearly all of the sūtras cited were translated into Chinese by the time of Kumārajīva or (in very few cases) shortly after, at the beginning of the fifth century. The sole exception is the Ratnamaya-sūtra. This is significant, for two reasons. First, if the SūS was composed by a Nāgārjuna, it is most unlikely that the same person also composed the Dazhidu lun. Second, it provides confirmation of a kind for the method we have used to query that ascription in the first place, since in this case we see a clear correlation between the date of the commentary’s appearance in the historical record and the date of the first translation into Chinese of nearly every one of its sources. Also worthy of note in this connection is the *Daśabhūmi(ka)vibhaśā, the Shizhu piposha lun 十住毘婆沙論 (T 1521/K 584), whose attribution to Nāgārjuna is equally suspect.

\(^{76}\) The apparent citation from the Śrīmālā cannot be located in any existing version of the text. Cf. Wayman/Wayman 1974: 26. In addition to the explicit references, there are a number of citations of unnamed sūtras and āgamas which merit further study.

\(^{77}\) See Nagao 1994: II, 144–145, 148–149 for a complete list.

\(^{78}\) A complete list is given as Appendix 6 of Skilling 2000.

\(^{79}\) Very useful lists are also given in Saigusa 1969: 15–44.
The first Chinese translation of this work is supposed to have been made by Dharmarakṣa in the period 265–313, i.e. the late third century, but it is not clear how reliable this tradition is. The existing translation (T 1521) we owe once again to Kumārajīva, made in the period 402–412, so the commentary must date to the late fourth century at the latest. It also quotes a small number of Mahāyāna sūtras, citing some of the same titles as the Da zhidu lun, but not nearly as many. Once again, as far as I can tell, not one of the 16 texts listed above in Part 3 features in this commentary, just as, with the doubtful exception of the Śrīmālā, not one of them is cited in the aforementioned works by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Thus we can be certain that by the fourth century Mahāyānists were writing both commentaries on sūtras and commentaries which cited their own sūtras as proof texts, at the same time as they continued to write śāstras, like the abovementioned Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra or the Vyākhya-yukti, in which they defended the authenticity of their scriptures against their detractors. What this seems to indicate is ongoing difficulty with criticism from non-Mahāyānists, which is apparently consistent with a perennial theme found both in the sūtras and in the śāstras which anthologised them, that of marginality, of being on the receiving end of contempt, ridicule, doubt and rejection, the theme of the despised outsider. We see it already in the Ratnāvalī, and in sūtras translated into Chinese in the late second century (e.g., the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and the Pratyutpanna-sūtra), when we might imagine that the movement was not yet well-established, and therefore, not surprisingly, on the defensive. But what is interesting is how long this marginal rhetoric is maintained. We see it amply developed in the SūS, especially in Theme 7, which deals with the rarity of living beings who get rid of obstructive conditions (antarāyika-dharma). These conditions are defined as causing injury to bodhisattvas, the machinations of Māras, contempt, and rejection of the True Dharma.

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80 A complete list of these quotations also appears in Saigusa 1969: 44–49. Many of his identifications are tentative or conjectural, however, so the text clearly needs further study.

81 It would, incidentally, be a difficult and demanding undertaking to chart all such explicit citations of and allusions to Mahāyāna sūtras in commentaries and sūtras alike, but it would at least yield a basis for a comprehensive internal chronology of Mahāyāna sūtra literature. To the best of my knowledge this has not yet been attempted.

82 At this point it is not clear to me when the first Indian śāstras quoting Mahāyāna sūtras (as distinct from Chinese commentaries doing this) were translated into Chinese. As far as I can tell, the great 3rd-century translators like Zhi Qian and Dharmarakṣa have no such commentaries to their credit.
These all come down to rejection of the Mahāyāna and disrespect of bodhisattvas. “Injury”, for example, is variously defined as contempt, anger, ridicule or defamation of a bodhisattva, use of harsh language to one, or dissuading a bodhisattva from following the Mahāyāna: actual injury is not at issue, except to make the extraordinary claim—one of several—that it is far worse to be angry at one bodhisattva than to kill countless galaxies full of arhats.\textsuperscript{83} Positive illustrations of the converse, of the meritoriousness of looking up to bodhisattvas, are also given, in similarly hyperbolic terms (SūS 37ff.). Even if the sūtras from which these passages are excerpted were composed long before the date of the compiler of the SūS, which may have been the fifth century, that he saw fit to cite them might suggest that the kind of defensiveness to which they attest had not yet ceased to be a live issue.\textsuperscript{84}

But is this a plausible scenario? For it does not stop there: we find similar material anthologized in the Śikṣ, in the late seventh or early eighth century. What does this mean? We could infer from it that followers of the Mahāyāna went on being despised and mocked for hundreds and hundreds of years.\textsuperscript{85} But we should at least consider the possibility that such passages reflect a fossilized attitude, a classical scriptural trope which may once have corresponded to actual social circumstances, but is now repeated even when it no longer reflects reality. If this is the case, it would mean that the presence of such passages in sūtras and commentaries may have no value as evidence of the historical background against which they were composed, and that they are as unreliable an indicator of the actual circumstances of their authors as are the references to the last days of the Dharma, also a fossilized trope. After all, although we would expect such statements from a despised and marginalised newly emergent subgroup, is it likely that a group can remain despised and marginalised—and still survive—for so many centuries? It may well be, however, that even a

\textsuperscript{83} The point is overstated, to say the least. If one still ascribed the SūS to Nāgārjuna, one would have to ask how a philosopher of his calibre could subscribe to such intemperate rhetoric, let alone propagate it in his own work. However, the Ratnāvali suggests that Nāgārjuna did in fact believe that contempt for the Mahāyāna was karmically dangerous (see RĀ 4.88–89). This is even clearer in Śāntideva, but at least he puts the onus on bodhisattvas always to put their best foot forward so as to ensure that others do not burn in hell for despising them (see esp. Śikṣ, Kārikās 10–12).

\textsuperscript{84} In fact, they are taken from the Śraddhābalādhānāvatāramudrā-sūtra and the related Niyatāniyatāvatāramudrā-sūtra, both first translated into Chinese in the early 6th century.

\textsuperscript{85} This appears to be the position of Schopen 2000/2005, who also notes the staying power of this theme.
successfully established community might still have had recourse to this kind of rhetoric for its own purposes, and we might ask ourselves what those purposes might have been. It is conceivable, then, that followers of the Great Vehicle liked to think that the Dharma was always in its last days, and the Mahāyāna was always despised, even when the contrary was clearly the case, when the monasteries in which Mahāyānists were well represented were populous and wealthy institutions, when commentators confidently cited Mahāyāna scriptures as authorities, and, for all we know, rulers with pretensions to bodhisattvahood sat upon the throne.

Be that as it may, the commentaries addressed in this paper remain documents of great importance, and not simply because they preserve substantial sections of Mahāyāna sūtras which we do not have in Sanskrit (in the case of the Śikṣ) or might otherwise have been lost altogether. They also tell us something about how Mahāyāna sūtras were used. That is to say, they give us an idea of the popularity or historical importance of particular texts, helping us to make some sense of this large and unwieldy literary corpus. For example, there are 351 Mahāyāna sūtras in the Derge Kanjur, plus 748 titles in the Tantra (rGyud and gZungs ’ dus) sections. Even allowing for double counting, over a thousand works survive from the literary creativity associated with the developments Buddhism underwent during the first millennium. How do we know which of these texts were important, and which were not? Or which texts kept being used, and which fell immediately into obscurity? Even allowing for the dangers of arguments from silence, and the tendency of later anthologies to follow the lead of their predecessors, it is interesting to note the titles that occur only rarely or not at all in our four anthologies. We see, for example, the comparatively low profile in them of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka (not in the Zhujing yaoji; cited four times briefly in the ŚūS and three times, with different and somewhat longer passages, in the Śikṣ; and cited once in the MSūS) or the total absence of the two Ṣūkhāvatīvyūhas (not once in any of our four); also Prajñāpāramitā texts are poorly represented, in relation to their bulk. If we think of our anthologies as the religious and literary equivalent of mix tapes, as personal compilations of the Mahāyāna’s greatest hits, then we would have to conclude that in India these texts barely made the charts, and did not have the impact that they had in East Asia. On the other hand, if we look at the Śikṣ, while we find that some

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I leave this for another occasion. It is less difficult to see how the trope of the Last Days might continue to be useful to Buddhist teachers, century after century.

On the importance in India of this work cf. Silk 2001, which addresses the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka citations in the Śikṣ in detail.
texts we know quite well were frequently cited by Śāntideva (e.g., *Ugraparipṛcchā, Akṣayamati-nirdeśa*), other texts virtually unknown to us were particular favorites of his, quoted at great length (e.g., *Sāgaramati-paripṛcchā, Dharmasamgiti-sūtra, Ratnamegha-sūtra*). We clearly have a lot to learn, and more work to do, before these anthologies yield up all their secrets.

**Postscript**

While this paper was in press, it came to the author’s attention that a partial Sanskrit manuscript of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* had surfaced in the People’s Republic of China. See Junqi WANG, Meifang ZHANG, Xiaofang LÜ, Xing SONG, Kawa Sherab SANGPO, and DAZHEN, A Preliminary Study on a Newly Discovered Sanskrit Manuscript of Nāgārjuna’s *Sūtrasamuccaya*. *Journal of Buddhist Studies* 17 (2020) 59–88. This valuable paper, which does not question the attribution to Nāgārjuna, presents a diplomatic edition of the folios of the manuscript which can be read at this time (90b–97a); the rest—around 30 folios—await restoration. Having even partial access to a Sanskrit text of the *Sūtrasamuccaya* is a most welcome thing, but it does not change the overall conclusions reached in the present article.

**References**


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Harrison 2018b  

Harrison 2019  

Ichishima 1967  

Ichishima 1968  

Ichishima 1972  

Ichishima 1986a  

Ichishima 1986b  

Ichishima 1990  

Jamspal 2004  
L. Jamspal \textit{et al.}, \textit{The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkāra) by Maitreyanātha/Āryāsaṅga Together with its Commentary (Bhāṣya) by Vasubandhu}. New York 2004.

Kalupahana 1986  


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One or many?
The commentaries on the Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna*

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The relation between a text and its alleged author is a notoriously difficult one in ancient India, and it is very different from what we, from our perspective of historicity, would like it to be. Once the fame of a scholar is established, it appears to exert an almost magnetic force and attracts texts that will be tied to his name, and thereby imbued with his fame, or connect the text with a certain tradition of literature, doctrine, or philosophy. Śāstric texts are no exception, and Helmut Krasser succeeded in explaining a very specific variant of that phenomenon.1 Certain problems in the texts he studied made it difficult to wholeheartedly accept the authorship of the scholar who was named as the author. One example that Krasser based his study on is the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, and we are indebted to him for the important observation that “[m]any of the problems are solved and new perspectives opened if one considers the possibility that the two translations may have been made from two different versions of class notes.”2 The text thus does not really contain what its attribution promises. It is obvious that śāstric texts are not my field of expertise, but, in the following, I will draw attention to a somewhat related phenomenon. In this case, various prominent names are attached to apparently the same work, one of which is Dignāga.

The section Mdo ’grel of the Tibetan Tanjur preserves altogether five commentaries on the Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna or Samantabhadra-

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1 Krasser 2011 and 2014.
2 Krasser 2014: 308.

caryāprāṇidhāna, a poem of about sixty-two verses\(^3\) held in highest esteem in the Mahāyāna traditions.\(^4\) At one point in its history, it became incorporated into the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, where it forms the end of the text, but for ritual and devotional purposes, it also continued to be transmitted separately. Versions are known in Sanskrit—or, rather, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit—as well as in Chinese, Khotanese, Mongolian, Tangut, Tibetan and Uigur. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that already in India the poem was deemed worthy of being commented upon. As far as I am aware, no Indian original of the aforementioned five commentaries is preserved, but they can be studied through their Tibetan translations included in the Tanjur. Three of them are attributed to illustrious figures in the history of Indian Buddhist erudition and philosophy:

1) Nāgārjuna’s *Ārya-bhadracaryāprāṇidhānamahārāja-nibandhana*\(^5\)
   translated by Thig-le bum-pa and Blo-ladan shes-rab (D 4011, nyi 163b4–182a1; P 5512, nyi 189b7–211a2);

2) Dignāga’s *Samantabhadracaryāprāṇidhānārthasaṃgraha*
   translators unknown (D 1412, nyi 182a2–201a4; P 5513, nyi 211a2–231a5);

3) Śākyamitra’s *Bhadracaryāprāṇidhānarāja-ṭīkā*
   translated by Śākyasimha and dPal-brtsegs (D 4013, nyi 201a4–234a4; P 5514, nyi 231a6–267a7);

4) rGyan bzang-po’s *Ārya-bhadracaryāprāṇidhānarāja-ṭīkā*
   translated by Jñānagarbha and dPal-brtsegs rakṣita (D 4014, nyi 234a4–252b4; P 5515, nyi 267a7–288a3);\(^6\)

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3 The number of verses varies; the earliest translation into Chinese has only 44, cf. Nakamikado 2005: 5 and Osto 2010: 2.


5 In the Peking edition *-mahāprāṇidhānarāja*.

6 Three manuscripts of it were found at Dunhuang, one complete and two fragmentary, see La Vallée Poussin 1962: 56 and 57 (IOL 146 and 148) and Lalou 1939–61: 49 (no. 150). IOL 146 and no. 150 in Lalou preserve the names of the author, rGyan bzang-po, and the two translators (Gnya’-na gar-ba and dPal-brtsegs). The remarkable number of manuscripts containing (parts of) the *Bhadracaryāprāṇidhāna* found in the Dunhuang cave attests to its importance and popularity among Tibetans in
5) Vasubandhu’s Ārya-bhadracaryāpraṇidhānarāja-ṭīkā
translated by Ānanda and Bhadrapāla (D 4015, nyi 252b5–269a7; P 5516, nyi 288a3–308a8).

When scrutinizing these translations, it becomes obvious that four of the five commentaries are extremely similar. In reality, the exemplars of commentaries 1, 2, 4 and 5 ascribed respectively to Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, rGyan bzang po, and Vasubandhu must have been derived from the same Indian text. This was noticed already many years ago by a Japanese scholar. Unaware of his paper, I came across a quotation from Mātṛceta’s Varnārhavarṇa in one of the commentaries (see below), and when I searched the others, I found the same quotation in an additional three.

A thorough inspection of the four texts, and especially of the various quotations they contain, leaves no doubt that they go back to a common source. In itself, this is not a sensational finding; as mentioned above, it is a rather common phenomenon within the Indian tradition to ascribe a text to a famous figure, and therefore it is hardly worth speculating who the original author may have been, at least in the absence of corroborative evidence. Nor is it unusual to see the same text ascribed to different authors in different traditions, as often happens when we compare the author’s name given in a Tibetan translation with that preserved in the corresponding Chinese translation. It is less common, if not decidedly rare, however, for an interesting but otherwise rather unspectacular text to be credited to altogether four authors, and we may be justified in giving this situation some additional consideration.

In fact, the situation is even more complicated, and a closer look may also reveal something about the way the early Tibetan translators dealt with such problems. The Tanjur contains yet another commentary on the Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna, this time not by an Indian, but by a Tibetan; it therefore came to be included in another section (sNa tshogs in Derge and Ngo tshar bstan bcos in Peking):

6) Ye-shes sde’s bZang spyod kyi ’grel pa bzhi’i don bsdus nas brjed byang du byas pa bzhugs
(D 4359, jo 184a1–213b1; P 5846, cho 217a2–252a5).

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7 Central Asia; cf. the indices in Lalou 1939–61 and La Vallée Poussin 1962.
8 In Peking -praṇidhānaṭīkā.
9 Tsukinowa 1952, cf. Nakamikado 2005. My thanks are due to Kazunobu Matsuda for drawing my attention to these important papers.
9 Hartmann 2009: 231.
Ye-shes sde was one of the most prolific translators during the early spread of Buddhism in the imperial period, and three works apparently written by him were included in the Tanjur. As the title of his commentary on the *Bhadracaryāprāṇidhāna* indicates, it contains notes (*brjed byang*) on a summary of four other works, and very conveniently Ye-shes sde lists the names of these four works, or rather their authors, in Sanskrit, in his introduction, and in Tibetan translation in his colophon:

Introduction

(C 189a6–7, D 184a1–2, N 212v3–4, P 217a3–4, GT 265b1–2): 'phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam | ā tsārya (tsaryan P NPGT) tig (di ka CD) nā (na CD) gas mdzad pa dang | shākya mi tra (ta N) dang | buddha kī rītī dang | bha dra ba nyi ti kās (bha dra pa hi ti kās C, bha dra pa ha sti kas NPGT) mdzad pa rnam pa bzhi’i don dang | 'phral (dphral D) du mkhan po dag las thos pa dang | mdo sde las ‘byung ba dang sbyar te bshad pa brda phrad sla ba brjed byang du byas pa |

Colophon

(D 213a7–b1, P 252a3–5): 'phags pa bzang po spyod pa’i smon lam la slob dpon phyogs kyi glang pos ’grel pa mdzad pa dang | slob dpon shā kya bshes gnyen gyis ’grel pa mdzad pa dang | sangs rgyas grags pas ’grel pa mdzad pa dang | rgyan bzang pos tika mdzad pa dang (deest P) rnam pa bzhi’i don dang | ’phral du mkhan po dag las (la P) thos pa dang | mdo sde nas ‘byung ba dang yang sbyar te bshad pa brda phrad sla bar brjed byang du byas ba rdzogs so

He tells us here that he used the commentaries of Ācārya Dignāga (in the colophon: slob-dpon Phyogs kyi glang-po), Śākyamitra (slob-dpon Śākya bshes-gnyen), Buddhakīrti (Sangs-rgyas grags-pa) and Bha dra pa nyi/hi ti kā / Bha dra pa ha sti ka (rGyan bzang-po); that he combined their meaning with instructions from his teachers and passages culled from the Sūtras; and that he noted them down for an easy explanation. Three of these texts are preserved: those by Dignāga (above, no. 2), Śākyamitra (no. 3), and rGyan bzang-po (no. 4). With regard to the overall structure, and especially the quotations from other sources, Śākyamitra’s commentary

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11 In this context, translated as a “mnemonic” by Schaik/Downey 2009: 185, n. 18.

12 For the introduction, all five available Tanjur editions were consulted in order to establish the reading of the Indian names, especially that of rGyan bzang-po. Digital images of Cone, Narthang and the Golden Tanjur are accessible at the Buddhist Digital Resource Center (https://www.tbrc.org/): Cone Tanjur, vol. 206, sna tshogs jo; Narthang Tanjur, vol. 214, mdo cho; Golden Tanjur (bsTan ’gyur gser bris ma), vol. 214, mdo cho (for a survey of this Tanjur cf. Skilling 1991).
is quite different from the other two, which are practically identical. To illustrate this with the quotations: Śākyamitra cites other texts only three times, while the two commentaries ascribed to Dignāga and rGyan bzang-po contain the same twenty citations in the same order, a pattern shared by the commentaries ascribed to Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu. This could hardly have happened by chance, and it raises various questions. It is difficult to imagine that an excellent scholar like Ye-shes sde did not immediately realize this state of affairs. But, if he noticed it, why did he avoid commenting on it? And did he see only the Tibetan translations of the two commentaries, or did he also have access to one or more Sanskrit manuscripts? This is not easy to answer. He shares fourteen of the twenty quotations in Dignāga (D 4012) and rGyan bzang-po (D 4014). In two cases (quotations 1 and 2), his version agrees with that in D 4014 (rGyan bzang-po) and, in one (10), it is similar. In another case (18), it is very close to D 4012 (Dignāga). But, in the remaining ten cases (4, 5, 8, 11–15, 17, 19), it differs from the others. Here, he either drew his translations from the lost commentary of Buddhakīrti/Sangs-rgyas grags-pa, from already existing canonical translations of the quoted texts, or from his own translation of a Sanskrit original.

While Nāgārjuna, Dignāga and Vasubandhu are illustrious figures, Śākyamitra and rGyan bzang-po appear to be less so. The Indian name of Śākyamitra is easy to establish, but rGyan bzang-po’s name leaves ample room for speculation. Watanabe (1912: 23) reconstructed (Vi)bhūṣaṇabhadra or Alaṃkārabhadra, but Suzuki (1961), Yuyama (1967: 47) and Tatz (1977: passim), followed by Herrmann-Pfandt (2008: 319, no. 562) and Osto (2010: 3), gave it as Bhadrāpaṇa, while La Vallée
Poussin (1962: 56, no. 146) and Schaik/Downey (2009: 185, note 18) have Bhadrāpaṇa. Ye-shes sde’s Tibetan transliteration is frustratingly unhelpful and aggravates the problem, because the versions disagree: bha dra ba n y i ti kā of the Derge edition and bha dra pa hi ti kā in Cone are difficult to reconcile with bha dra pa ha sti ka in the prints of Narthang and Peking and in the manuscript of the Golden Tanjur, and none of them suggests a plausible Sanskrit word. The second element of the Tibetan name, bzang po, is well-established as a translation of bhadra, but the first defies a reconstruction. As far as I could see, none of the above-mentioned scholars justifies his or her choice of Bhadrāpaṇa or Bhadrāpaṇa, even though the equation of paṇa or āpaṇa with rgyan is anything but self-explanatory. The Bhadracaryāpraṇidhānarāja-ṭīkā seems to be his only work, and he is not mentioned in the Tibetan histories of Buddhism in India.

Recall that among the four commentaries used by Ye-shes sde, only three are preserved; the one written by Buddhakīrti/Sangs-rgyas grags-pa is apparently lost. Surprisingly, it was also unknown to the compilers of the Lhan kar ma catalogue, although they do list Dignāga’s work (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 318, no. 561), Śākyamitra’s (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 317, no. 559), rGyan bzang-po’s (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 319, no. 562), and even Ye-shes sde’s commentary itself15 (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 319, no. 563). Beyond these four, they list another commentary by a certain Yon-tan ’od,16 most likely corresponding to Guṇaprabha, that was already lost in the time of Bu-ston (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 318, no. 560). The texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna and Vasubandhu were translated at a later time and thus could not be included in either the Lhan kar ma or Ye-shes sde’s work. Taking all the information together, there are traces of another four commentaries:

7) A lost work by Buddhakīrti/Sangs-rgyas grags-pa, used by Ye-shes sde for his commentary;
8) A lost work by *Guṇaprabha/Yon-tan ’od, listed in the Lhan kar ma;
9) A work of an unknown author partly preserved in a manuscript from Dunhuang, see La Vallée Poussin 1962: 56 (IOL 147).17 The passage presented by La Vallée Poussin already clarifies that it is not a copy of one of the extant commentaries, and yet it is closely related to

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14 The Dunhuang manuscript contains only the Tibetan translation of the name.
15 The title is slightly different: bZang po spyod pa’i grel pa rnam pa bzhi ka las btus te brjed byang du bgyis pa.
16 The bZang po spyod pa’i bshad sbyar by slob-dpon Yon-tan ’od in 500 ślokas.
17 Facsimiles are available on the homepage of the International Dunhuang Project (http://idp.bl.uk/, shelf mark IOL Tib J 147).
the four texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, rGyan bzang-po, and Vasubandhu. Further reading confirms this impression, but the exact status of the text remains to be established. Some sentences seem culled from the translations of Dignāga’s and rGyan bzang-po’s texts, but verse quotations generally appear as prose. Could it be a Tibetan compilation from various sources for personal use?

10) Another work of an unknown author partly preserved in a manuscript from Dunhuang, see Lalou 1939–61: 49 (no. 151). Its beginning is lost, and the colophon does not mention the author. The short extract presented by Lalou corresponds to a passage in the four related commentaries and in Ye-shes sde’s work (Nāgārjuna, 169b6–7; Dignāga 189b5–6; rGyan bzang-po, 240b2–3, Vasubandhu, 258a7–b1; Ye-shes sde 195a7): the wording is very close, but not identical to any of the five. At this moment, the most likely explanation is that Pelliot tibétain 151 preserves a part of either Buddhakīrti’s or *Guṇaprabha’s lost work.

This brings us back to the question of the authorship of the commentary represented by the four texts ascribed to Nāgārjuna, Dignāga, rGyan bzang-po, and Vasubandhu. The possibility that they represent different examples of “class notes”, as Helmut Krasser surmised for the two Tibetan translations of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti, is ruled out by the congruency of the four texts. Conspicuously, three of the four names belong to towering figures in three different traditions of Indian Buddhist thought and philosophy: Nāgārjuna as a representative of the Madhyamaka, Dignāga of the Pramāṇa, and Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra tradition. The Bhadracaryāpraṇidhāna must have been a rather important ritual text in later Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. One is tempted to think that the commentary became something like a standard teaching tool in monastic education and that each “faculty” appropriated it to its own curriculum by association with the founding father of its tradition. If this makes sense, it is tempting to take another step and speculate that Guṇaprabha, author of the lost commentary mentioned in the Lhan kar ma, is meant to be the Guṇaprabha famous in Vinaya studies. This would leave rGyan bzang-po as the only unknown figure, and thus as the most likely among the candidates to be the real author—if Indian Buddhist tradition was ever interested in such a concept as “real authorship”.

18 A facsimile of the manuscript is found at http://gallica.bnf.fr/ when searching for Pelliot tibétain 151.

All six of the fully preserved commentaries adopt, with only minor variants, the canonical translation of the *Bhadracaryāpranidhāna* for their quotes from the root text. In Ye-shes sde’s case, this is not surprising since he ranks among the translators of the *Buddhāvatamsakasūtra*. For the other five versions, it illustrates either the working method of the translators themselves or that of unknown later revisers. This attempt at standardization by drawing on an accepted—or even authoritative?—translation of the root text does not extend to the quotations from other sources: the four closely linked commentaries 1, 2, 4 and 5 share the sources, but not their translations. This leads to the singular phenomenon of having at least five different translations of the same Indian text, when the canonical translation of the source is also taken into account, and even six, when Ye-shes sde uses the same quotation—a circumstance which provides an invaluable mine of information for everybody interested in Tibetan language and translation techniques.\(^{20}\)

In the following, a list of the quotations and references in the four commentaries will be presented in order to illustrate their intimate relationship. Whenever Ye-shes sde’s commentary shares the quotation, it is also listed. A presentation of all the quotations would be highly instructive, but far exceeds the limits of this paper; it will have to be published elsewhere, and probably in a digital form, since only this medium offers the means for viewing the different versions of a lengthy quotation side by side with its canonical translation and, if available, its Sanskrit original, or with quotations of the same passage in other works.\(^{21}\) As an example, however, all texts are presented *in toto* for the first quotation. From the second quotation onwards, only the introductory

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\(^{20}\) I am not aware of any systematic study of multiple translations into Tibetan. As one among few, Michael Hahn was highly interested in this phenomenon and edited several *stotra* texts from such a comparative perspective, the last being his work on Carpaṭi’s *Avalokiteśvarastotra* published posthumously (Hahn 2012 [2017]).

\(^{21}\) Recently Péter-Dániel Szántó drew my attention to a lengthy passage in the *Ādikarmāvatāra* of Mañjukīrti (section 1.13 in Szántó’s unpublished edition), and it turned out that about a sixth of the Sanskrit text underlying the commentaries 1, 2, 4, and 5 is preserved in this source. There can hardly be a doubt from where the author of the *Ādikarmāvatāra* took the passage, since he quotes from the *Bhadracaryāpranidhāna* and then connects it to Vasubandhu’s commentary: *tad uktam: karmabalam pariśodhayamānaḥ. ity asya vyākhyāne Vasubandhupādaiḥ, “it is said: ‘purifying the power of karma’ (verse 38a of the *Bhadracaryāpranidhāna*). In the commentary on this the venerable Vasubandhu (explains)…”* The passage that follows therefore must be derived from commentary no. 5. The text begins with quotation no. 10 in the list below and ends with no. 19. In the Tibetan translation, it corresponds to folios 263a3–265a2. I am extremely grateful to Péter-Dániel for bringing this important discovery to my knowledge.
sentence in each commentary is listed. It demonstrates very well both the basic congruity and the diversity in details and shows if and how the source of a quotation is mentioned. Unidentified quotations are cited in a footnote, using their version in the first commentary (D 4011). It is followed by a list of the additional quotations in Ye-shes sde’s commentary. All references are to the Derge edition of the Tibetan canon.

1. A single verse, no title: *Udānavarga* 21.5cd

Sanskrit (Bernhard 1965–68: 280):

\[ jītā me pāpakā dharmās tato ‘ham upagā jīnāḥ \];

canonical translation (Zongtse 1990: 208):

\[ sdig pa’i chos las nga rgyal bas || de bas nye ’gro nga rgyal ba || \]

with the variant nyer.

D 4011: *ji skad du bcom ldan ‘das kyis |

sdig pa’i chos las nga rgyal te || des na nyer ’gro nga rgyal ba ||

zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa bzhiṅ no (164b1);

D 4012: *sangs rgyas bcom ldan ‘das kyis ‘di skad du |

sdig pa’i chos nnams las rgyal bas || nyer ’gro nga ni rgyal ba yin ||

zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa’o (185a1);

D 4014: *ji skad du bcom ldan ‘das kyis |

sdig pa mi dge’i chos las nga rgyal te || de bas nyer ’gro nga ni rgyal ba yin ||

zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa ste (234b7–235a1);

D 4015: *ji skad gsungs pa |

sdig pa mi dge’i chos las nga rgyal te || de bas nyer ’gro nga ni rgyal ba yin ||

zhes bya ba la sogs pa ste (253b3);

D 4359: ‘di skad ces bcom ldan ‘das kyis bka’ stsal pa |

sdig pa mi dge’i chos las nga rgyal te || de’i phyir nyer ’gro nga ni rgyal ba yin ||

zhes gsungs pa la sogs pa ste (185b5–6)

2. Two verses related to the *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa*\(^\text{22}\)

\(^{22}\) In various regards, this is rather complex. The second verse (the only one quoted by Ye-shes sde) lists four inconceivables (*acintya*) taught by the Buddha, namely meditation (*bsam gtan* [pa], probably *dhyāna*), deed (*las*, *karman*), snake gods (*klu*, *nāga*) and the exalted state of a Buddha (D 4011 and 4014: *sangs rgyas bdag nyid che*, D 4012 *sangs rgyas nnams kyi che ba nyid*, D 4015 *sangs rgyas mthu yi bdag nyid che*, D 4359 *sangs rgyas bdag nyid che nnams*, all of which most likely translate *buddhamāhātmya*). The reference must be to the *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* (D 47 *De bzhin gshegs pa’i gsang ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan pa*, T 310.3 密迹金剛力士會 and T 312 如來不思議祕密大乘經); however, these verses occur in none of the three translations. The corresponding passages are in prose; they list the four *acintya* in a different order (*karman*, *nāga*, *dhyāna*, *buddha*: D 47, 104a3–4 *las, klu, bsam gtan pa, sangs rgyas*; T 310.3, vol. 11, 43c14–22 所造立業，志如龍王，禪思一心，諸佛所行; T 312, vol. 11, 706b1–9 業，龍，定，佛) and they have no equivalent for *māhātmya*. In his
D 4011: *bsam gyis mi khyab pa nyid kyang* (171b2–3);
D 4012: *bsam gyis mi khyab par lung las kyang bshad pa* (191b1–2);
D 4014: *bsam gyi mi khyab pa nyid las kyang* (242a6–7);
D 4015: *bsam gyis mi khyab pa yang gang gsungs pa* (259b7–260a1);
D 4359: *bcom ldan 'das kyis bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan pa'i mdo las one verse only* (197b3–4).

3. A single verse, no title: *Bodhisattvavyogācāracatuḥśataka-ṭīkā* 5.280 of Candrakīrti

D 4011: no reference to the source (171b4–5);
D 4012: ∅
D 4014: no reference to the source (242b1);
D 4015: no reference to the source (260a2);
D 4359: ∅

4. A single verse, source unknown

D 4011: *de nyid kyi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis* (171b5–6);
D 4012: *de ltar yang bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pa* (191b3–4);
D 4014: *bcom ldan 'das kyis* (242b2–3);
D 4015: *bcom ldan 'das kyis gsungs pa* (260a3);
D 4359: apparently only a prose sentence (197b6).

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5. Two verses, no title: Varnāharvarṇastotra 5.21–22 of Mātṛceṭa
D 4011: de skad du yang (172a5–6);
D 4012: lung las kyang ’di skad du gsungs te (192a1–2);
D 4014: de skad du (242b7–243a1);
D 4015: de bzhin du yang gsungs pa (260b1–2);
D 4359: sangs rgyas la bstod pa las (198a7–b1).

6. Gaṇḍavyūha, chapter Maitreya(vimokṣa), verse 54.20
D 4011: ’phags pa sdong po bkod pa’i mdo’i ’phags pa byams pa’i rnam par thar pa las kyang (172a6–7);
D 4012: sdong pos brgyan pa’i mdo sde ’phags pa byams pa’i rnam par thar pa las bshad pa (192a2–4);
D 4014: de bzhin du ’phags pa sdong po bkod pa’i mdo ’phags pa byams pa’i rnam par thar pa las kyang (243a1–3);
D 4015: de bzhin du sdong po bkod pa’i mdo byams pa’i rnam par thar pa las kyang gsungs te (260b2–3);
D 4359: ∅

7. A single verse, source unknown
D 4011: de skad du yang (174a2);
D 4012: ∅
D 4014: de skad du (244b5–6);
D 4015: de bzhin du yang gsungs pa (262a3–4);
D 4359: ∅

8. Reference without citation, most probably to the Gocarapariśuddha-parivarta, chapter 16 in the Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra
D 4011: ’di thams cad spyod yul yongs su dag pa’i mdo blta bar bya’o (174a7–b1);
D 4012: de ni ’phags pa spyod yul yongs su dag pa’i mdo la ltos shig (194a1);
D 4014: ’di thams cad ni ’phags pa spyod yul yongs su dag pa’i mdo la blta bar bya’o (245a3);
D 4015: de yang ’phags pa spyod yul yongs su dag pa’i mdo la blta bar bya’o (262b4);
D 4359: ’phags pa spyod yul yongs su dag pa’i mdo las gsungs pa lta bu’o (201b3).

25 Hartmann 1987: 182–184; see also Hartmann 2024.
26 For the Sanskrit, see Vaidya 1960: 374.
27 D 4011 gang phyir sems can gzhal med rnams || so sor ’jig rten khams rnams su || skad cig skad cig ’tshang rgya des || zhum pa dang du blang mi bya ||.
9. A single verse, no title: *Vīradattagṛhapatiparipṛcchā* (D 72, 202b6)
D 4011: *ji skad du* (174b3–4);
D 4012: *‘di skad du* (194a3–4);
D 4014: *ji skad du* (245b2);
D 4015: *ji skad du gsungs pa* (262b4);
D 4359: ∅

10. A single verse, no title: *Karmavibhaṅga* (D 338, 282b7–283a1)
D 4011: no reference (175a3–4);
D 4012: *‘di skad du* (194b3–4);
D 4014: *ji skad du* (246a2–3);
D 4015: *ji skad du gsungs pa* (263a3–4);
D 4359: *lung las* (202b4–5).

11. *Sukārikāvadāna* (D 345); a summary of the story, not a verbal quotation
D 4011: *dper na phag mo’i rtogs pa brjod pa las* (175a7–b1);
D 4012: *ji ltar ched du brjod pa’i sde las* (194b7–195a1);
D 4014: *dper na phag mo’i rtogs pa brjod pa las* (246a6–7);
D 4015: *ji lta bar phag mo’i rtogs pa brjod pa las* (263a7–b1);
D 4359: *phag mo’i rtogs par brjod pa’i mdo las* (202b5–6).

12. A prose citation apparently from a version of the *Karmāvaraṇaviśuddhisūtra*
D 4011: *ji skad du las kyi sgrīb pa rnam par sbyong ba’i mdo las* (175b2–5);
D 4012: *‘di skad du las kyi sgrīb pa so sor sbyong ba’i mdo las kyang ‘di lta ste* (195a1–5);
D 4014: *ji skad du las kyi sgrīb pa rgyun gcod pa’i mdo las ‘di lta ste* (246b1–4);

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28 D 338 *de skad du |

*shin tu mi bzad las rnam byas pa ni || bdag la smod dang rab tu bshags pa dang ||

*sdom par byed pa de dag sras’ gyur gyis || shin tu rtsa nas phyin ces mi smra’o ||

*zhes gsungs pa lta bu ste*; the original source is unknown.

29 For a Sanskrit text of the story, see Cowell/Neil 1886: 193–196 and for a translation, Rotman 2008: 325–328. D 4012 does not refer to the *Sūkarikāvadāna*, but to *ched du brjod pa’i sde*, apparently the *Udāna*.

30 This is rather complex: none of the two *Karmāvaraṇa-sūtras* (D 218–219) agrees fully with the quotations. In the first, however, there is a corresponding passage containing the phrase *gtsug lag khang nas gtsug lag khang du* (D 218, 294a5), and in Ye-shes sde’s text there is a monk named Pas-byin who corresponds to dPas-byin in D 218 (294b1). However, Ye-shes sde’s quotation knows of two monks, a *dge slong* Dri-ma med-pa’i ‘od and a *dge slong* Pas-byin. The first four versions are closely related, but it is difficult to align them with Ye-shes sde’s version. For a Central Asian Sanskrit fragment of the *Karmāvaranaviśuddhisūtra* preserved in St. Petersburg with a *bhikṣu* Śūradatta (evidently the *dge-slong* (d)Pas-byin), see Hori 2011: 8 (SI P/67.4 line v4).
13. A lengthy prose quotation from the Tathāgatakośa-sūtra

D 4011: ji skad du 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i mzdod kyi mdo las (175b5–176a7);
D 4012: ji itar 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i mzdod kyi mdo las kyang (195a5–b7);
D 4014: ji skad du 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i mzdod las (246b4–247a6);
D 4015: ji skad du 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i mzdod las rgyas par gsungs te (263b5–264a5);
D 4359: ji skad du 'phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa'i mzdod kyi mdo las (203a5–b5).

14. A short prose quotation from the Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā (D 68)

D 4011: ji skad du 'phags pa nye ba 'khor gyis zhus pa'i mdo las (176b1–2);
D 4012: ji skad du 'phags pa au pā lis dris pa'i mdo las gsungs pa de ste (196a1–2);
D 4014: ji skad du 'phags pa nye ba 'khor gyis zhus pa'i mdo las (247a7–b3);
D 4015: ji skad du 'phags pa au pā lis zhus pa'i mdo las (2664a6–b1);
D 4359: nye ba 'khor gyis zhus pa las (203b5–7).

15. A prose sentence from the Gaṇḍavyūha

D 4011: de skad du 'phags pa sdong po bkod pa'i mdo las kyang (176b2–3);
D 4012: de las yang gsungs pa (196a2–3);
D 4014: de bzhin du (247b1–2);
D 4015: ji skad du 'sdong po bkod pa'i mdo las kyang gsungs te (264b1);
D 4359: yang na mdo sde las (203b7).

31 T 821 大方廣如來祕密藏經 Dafangguang rulei bimizang jing; a Tibetan translation is listed in the Lhan kar ma (Herrmann-Pfandt 2008: 68–69, no. 123), but was lost already at the time of Bu-ston. The same quotation is found in the Sūtrasamuccaya (Pāsādika 1989: 178–180) and in the Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall 1897–1902: 171–172; cf. also Harrison 2018a: 232).

32 Cf. Python 1973: 44f. for the Tibetan text of the canonical version and the corresponding Sanskrit quotation in the Śikṣāsamuccaya. It is interesting to note that Upāli’s name in the title is transliterated in D 4012 and 4015.

16. A prose passage from the Vajracchedikā\(^{34}\)
D 4011: sum bṛgya pa las kyang (176b3–5);
D 4012: sum bṛgya pa las gsungs pa (196a3–5);
D 4014: sum bṛgya pa las kyang (247b2–3);
D 4015: sum bṛgya ba las kyang gsungs pa (264b1–3);
D 4359: ∅

17. A prose passage from an unknown source, but perhaps related to the Ajātaśatrukaukrtyavinodanāsūtra (D 216)
D 4011: kha cig ‘di skad ces ... zhes gsungs pa yin no (176b6–177a1);
D 4012: kha cig ‘di skad du ... zhes gsungs na (196a5–7);
D 4014: kha cig ‘di skad du ... zhes ’byung na (247b4–6);
D 4015: kha cig ‘di skad du smra ste ... zhes so (264b3–6);
D 4359: kha cig ‘di skad du ... ’phags pa ma skyes dgra’i ’gyod pa bsal ba’i mdo las ’byung ba yin no (203b7–204a4).

18. A well-known verse from the karma-related narrative literature\(^{35}\)
D 4011: no reference (177a3);
D 4012: gang gsungs pa (196b1–2);
D 4014: no reference (248a1);
D 4015: gang ‘di skad du gsungs pa (264b7–265a1);
D 4359: lung las (204a4).

19. A single verse, no title: Caturdharmikasūtra, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya\(^{36}\)
D 4011: de skad du yang (177a4–5);
D 4012: de ltar yang gsungs pa (196b2–3);
D 4014: de skad du (248a2–3);
D 4015: de bzhin du yang gsungs pa (265a1–2);
D 4359: gzhung las, only the second half of the verse (204a5–6).

__Footnotes__

\(^{34}\) Triśatikā is a usual variant of the title, cf., e.g., Tucci 1956: 5; for the Sanskrit text cf. Schopen 1989b: 101 (fol. 7a3–5).

\(^{35}\) For the Sanskrit text cf. Avadānaśataka or Divyāvadāna passim:

| na praṇaśyanti karmāṇi api kalpaśatair api |
| sāmagrīṃ prāpya kālāṃ ca phalanti khalu dehinām ||

often with the improved variant reading kalpakotiśatair api in päda b.

\(^{36}\) Only the Sanskrit text of the Caturdharmikasūtra contains the verse, cf. Vinītā 2010: 404–405; for the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya see Pradhan 1975: 357 and D 4090, khu 21a2–3. It is also quoted in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣyaṭīkā Tattvārthā (D 4421, 204a5–6) and in the Nyāyānusāriṇī (T 1562, vol. 29, 694b3–4; this reference I owe to Kazunobu Matsuda). The verse consists of a general statement and its illustration with an example from everyday life, characteristic of gnomic literature.
20. A verse from the *Mañjuśrībuddhaksetra*guṇavyūha,* translated as prose in D 4012 and 4014

D 4011: *ji skad du ’phags pa ’jam dpal rgyal po nam mkhar gyur pas* (179a1–2);
D 4012: *gzhung las* (198a6);
D 4014: no reference (249b4–5);
D 4015: *’phags pa ’jam dpal chos kyi rgyal por gyur pa na gsungs pa* (266b3–4);
D 4359: ∅

*Additional quotations in Ye-shes sde’s commentary*

Ye-shes sde cites considerably more texts. Since Buddhakīrti’s commentary, one of the four texts Ye-shes sde based his own work on, is not available, the possibility that he derived the additional citations from that source cannot be excluded. It is conspicuous, however, that he is listed among the translators of most of the additional texts. This may point to a certain predilection for sources with which he was thoroughly familiar. The fact that in most cases the canonical translation appears to have been made use of underlines the probability that this was an intentional choice made by Ye-shes sde himself.

1. = no. 1 in the list above.

2. *Daśabhūmikasūtra?*

   186a4: *’phags pa sa bcu pa’i mdo las sa dang po thob pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ rnam ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i rigs su skyes pa yin no zhes gsungs pa lta bu ste,* but apparently without a parallel; perhaps a summary? A similar idea is expressed in the *Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra* (D 106, 364b3–4).

3. *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa (D 47)?*

   186a7–186b1: *bcom ldan ’das kyis bsam gyis mi khyab pa bzhi bka’ stsal pa las | rnal ’byor pa’i mthu bsam gyis mi khyab ces gsungs pa lta bu’o.* Cf. quotation no. 2 in the list above. No such statement seems to exist in the *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* or in another text.

4. *Triskandhasūtra (D 284)*

   186b7–187a2: *phung po gsum pa’i mdo las;* cf. no. 38 below; the quotation corresponds to the canonical version (60a6–b1) translated by Ye-shes sde.

For the canonical translation cf. D 59, 279a7; D 4011 corresponds to the canonical text.
5. *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* (D 47)  
188b4–7: ‘*phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa’i gsang ba bstan pa’i mdo las ‘byung ba ‘di lta bu la yang bya ste*; very close (with one omission) to the canonical version translated by Jinamitra, Dāṇaśīla, Munivarman and Ye-shes sde (201b1–4).

6. *Maitreyamahāsīṁhanādasūtra* (D 67)  
189b2–3: ‘*phags pa byams pa seng ge sgra chen po’i mdo las*; it corresponds to the canonical version (60a6–b1) translated by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, Prajñāvarman and Ye-shes sde (82b5–6).

7. *Triskandhakasūtra* (D 284) and *Karmāvaraṇapratiprasrabdhi* (D 219), reference without citation  
189b4: *phung po gsum pa’i mdo sde dang las kyi sgrib pa rgyun gcod pa la sogs pa’i mdo bklag go.*

8. *Akṣayamatinirdeśa* (D 175)  
192b2ff: ‘*phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa’i mdo las*; a summary of a lengthy passage on the Tathāgata *Samantabhadra and his Buddha field Mi ’dzums pa* (84b5ff., cf. Braarvig 1993, vol. I, 10ff., and vol. II, 39ff.). The sūtra is translated by Dharmatāśīla.

9. *Akṣobhyavyūha-sūtra* (D 50) and *Amitābhavyūha-sūtra* (D 49), reference without citation  
192b7: *mi ’khrugs pa bkod pa’i mdo dang | ’od dpag tu med pa’i zhing gi bkod pa’i mdo las ji skad gsungs pa lta bu’o*, both translated by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde.

10. = no. 2 in the list above (*Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa*? D 47, translated by Jinamitra, Dāṇaśīla, Munivarman and Ye-shes sde).

11. = no 5 in the list above (*Varṇārḥavarṇastotra*, D 1138, translated by Sarvajñādeva and dPal-brtsegs rakṣita).

12. *Akṣayamatinirdeśa* (D 175)  

13. *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (D 176)  
14. **Vimalakīrtinirdeśa** (D 176)
   

15. **Lalitavistara-sūtra** (D 95), reference without citation
   
   200b7: 'phags pa rgya cher rol pa’i mdo las zhib tu gsungs pa yin no; translated by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Munivarman and Ye-shes sde.

16. **Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra**, reference without citation
   
   200b7–201a1: 'phags pa mya ngan las 'das pa’i mdo las gsungs pa yin no, probably referring to the āgama text, which, however, was never independently translated into Tibetan.

17. = no. 8 in the list above (**Gocarapariśuddhaparivarta**).

18. **Caturdharmikasūtra** (D 249)
   

19. = no. 10 in the list above (**Karmavibhaṅga**).
   
   The Karmavibhaṅga is translated by Jinamitra, Dānaśīla, Munivarman and Ye-shes sde, but the two translations of the verse do not agree, and it is questionable whether the Karmavibhaṅga is the original source.

20. = no. 11 in the list above (**Sukārikāvadāna**, D 345, translated by Jinamitra and Ye-shes sde).


22. = no. 13 in the list above (**Tathāgatakośasūtra**; Tibetan translation lost).


25. = no. 17 in the list above (a prose passage from an unknown source, but perhaps related to the Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinodanāsūtra).

26. = no. 18 in the list above (ubiquitous verse in karma-related narratives).
27. = no. 19 in the list above (Caturdharmikasūtra, Abhidharmakośabhāṣya [D 4090, translated by Jinamitra and dPal-brtsegs råṣīṭa], etc.).

28. Kāśyapaparivarta (D 87)  
204b5–7: 'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen por ‘od srungs kyi le’u las ‘byung ba; the verse in the sūtra is omitted, but otherwise it mostly agrees with the canonical translation of Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (130a2–5; for the Sanskrit cf. Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002: 23, §§ 48–49).

29. Mahāyānasamgraha of Asaṅga (D 4048)  
205a2: theg pa chen po bsdus pa las kyang; it corresponds to the canonical version translated by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (40b1); cf. Lamotte 1973: 312–313 (10.28,11).

30. Akṣayamatinirdeśa (D 175)  

31. Prajñāpāramitā  
205bl–2: 'phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las; unspecific, cf., e.g., Śatasāhasrikā, D 8, nga 305a3–4.

32. Daśabhūmika (D 44)  

33. Ratnaketu (D 138), reference without citation  
205b6: rin po che tog gi mdo las gsungs pa bzhiṅ to; translated by Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde.

34. “sūtrānteṣu”, reference without citation  
207a2: mdo sde dag las | sangs rgyas gcig gi drung nas kyang ma gyos la | sangs rgyas thams cad kyi drung du yang phyin te | mchod cing rim gro byed do zhes gsungs pa lta bu’o; unspecific. Not identical, but at least similar is a passage in the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa (D 176, 206b1), cf. Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature 2004: 238, 5.14.

35. Daśabhūmika (D 44)  
206b5–7: 'phags pa sa bcu pa’i mdo las; two passages, the second of which appears earlier in the sūtra, cf. Buddhāvataṃsakasūtra, kha, 245a7–b1 and 185b2–4.
36. *Tathāgata(mahā)karuṇānirdeśasūtra* (D 147)

208b1–2: \textquoteleft phags pa de bzhin gshegs pa\'i thugs rje bstan pa\'i mdo las; close to the canonical text translated by Śīlendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde (199a2–3).

37. *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (D 115) and reference to the *Amitābhavyūha* (D 49)

209b1–2: bde ba can gyi bkod pa\'i mdo las | shā ri\'i bu de bzhin gshegs pa \textquoteleft od dpag med de\'i \textquoteleft od ni sangs rgyas kyi zhing thams cad du thogs pa med de | de\'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pa \textquoteleft od dpag med ces bya\'o zhes bya ba la sogs pa \textquoteleft od dpag med kyi bkod pa\'i mdo las rgya cher gsungs so; the quotation from the Sukhāvatīvyūha corresponds to the canonical version translated by Jinamitra, Dānasīla and Ye-shes sde (197b2).

38. *Triskandhakasūtra* (D 284)

211b7–212a2: \textquoteleft phags pa phung po gsum pa\'i mdo las kyang; cf. no. 4 above in this list; again the quotation corresponds fairly well to the canonical version (76a3–7) translated by Ye-shes sde.

39. *Karmāvaraṇapratiprasrabdhisūtra* (? D 219) and *Vajradhvajasūtra* (chapter 30 of the *Avataṃsakasūtra*, D 44), reference without citation

212a3: \textquoteleft phags pa \textquoteleft jam dpal gyi sgrib pa rgyun gcod pa\'i mdo las yongs su bsngo ba \'byung ba dang | sangs rgyas phal po che\'i mdo las kyang rdo rje rgyal mtsan gyi mdo rgya cher \textquoteleft byung ba ste; the first title suggests partly the Karmāvaranapratiprasrabdhisūtra (D 219) and partly the Karmāvarāṇaviśuddhisūtra (D 218). The expression sgrib pa rgyun gcod pa translates pratiprasrabdi, but Mañjuśrī serves as the interlocutor in D 218; in D 219 it is Śāriputra. The term yongs su bsngo ba, however, occurs only in D 219 and therefore this must be the intended source. For the *Vajradhvajasūtra* and its function as a pariṇāmanā cf. Harrison 2018b; it is interesting to note that the version in the Bathang manuscript Kanjur mentions Surendrabodhi and Ye-shes sde as the translators (Harrison 2018b: 172).

References


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Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge in the sNying po?

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Introduction
The Madhyamaka works composed by the Tibetan scholar Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) testify to his affiliation to a line of interpretation which came to be associated with the Svātantrika orientation of Madhyamaka.1 Among his recovered works, one finds commentaries on the Madhyamakālāṅkāra of Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788), the Madhyamakāloka of Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), and the Satyadvayavibhaṅga of Jñānagarbha (eighth cent.). A fourth work, which stands at the core of the present paper, is a Summary of Madhyamaka structured around the two-truth theory. The colophon gives the title “Madhyamaka– The Essence of Reality”2 (dBu ma de kho na nyid snying po), while the cover-page of the manuscript edited by Helmut Tauscher (Tauscher 1999a) speaks of a “quintessential elucidation of the three Eastern Mādhyamikas” (dbu ma shar gsum gyi stong thun), an expression that refers to the three above-mentioned Indian teachers or to their main works.3


2 One could alternatively understand the title as “The Heart of the Essence (or: of the Essentials) of Madhyamaka.” However, it seems that in a number of cases the initial mention of “dbu ma” in the title of Madhyamaka works, respectively of “tshad ma” in the title of epistemological works, functions as an indicator of the subject of discussion rather than as part of the title properly speaking.

3 These four works of Phya pa appeared in the bKa’ gdams gsung ‘bum. See rGyan ’grel, sNang ’grel, bDen gnyis rnam bshad and sNying po in the bibliography for

Following Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, Phya pa defends the idea that the central concept of Madhyamaka philosophy, “emptiness”—the being void of an essence, of inherent existence, of all phenomena—can be established by reasoning, through an inference that follows the rules set by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660). It thus qualifies as an argument that functions by the force of facts (Skt. vastubalapravṛtta, Tib. dngos po stobs zhugs) and as an autonomous reasoning (Skt. svatantra, Tib. rang rgyud). Phya pa deals in particular (if not exclusively) with the proof of emptiness based on the logical reason “being neither one nor many” (Skt. ekānekaviyoga, Tib. gcig dang du bral). This argument is mentioned by Śāntarakṣita in the first verse of his Madhyamakālaṅkāra, while technical issues linked with this proof are discussed by Kamalaśīla in his Madhyamakāloka (see Keira 2004). Phya pa describes it as an argument that “negates a negandum” (dgag bya dgag pa)—i.e., it “negates ultimate entities” (yang dag pa’i dngos po dgag pa) or “negates proliferations” (spros pa dgag pa)—but also as an argument that “proves pervasive emptiness” (khyab pa’i stong nyid sgrub byed). Phya pa discusses this inference in detail in two places: in an excursus appended to his commentary on the first verse of the Madhyamakālaṅkāra in his rGyan ’grel, and in a parallel discussion (in a somewhat longer version) in his Summary of Madhyamaka (sNying po) (see Hugon 2015). The identification of the elements in this argument (the subject, the logical reason, the thesis) and their relation are also recurring issues in Phya pa’s epistemological works.

Phya pa’s endeavor to show that such an argument for proving emptiness is possible and correct, which builds on Kamalaśīla’s discussion, is thus common to several of his works. But it is solely in the sNying po that Phya pa extensively addresses the adverse position according to which this inference is not proper—more generally, that no autonomous inference is acceptable for Mādhyamikas—and that the negation of the negandum (i.e., of “ultimate entity” or “proliferation”) is to be carried out
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

exclusively by a “consequence” (Tib. thal ’gyur, Skt. prasaṅga).⁶ A very brief mention and criticism of the same position is otherwise found in Phya pa’s doxography, without its proponent being identified by name.⁷

In the sNying po Phya pa identifies the proponent of this view as “Candrakīrti, etc.” (zla ba grags pa la sogs pa). Note that Phya pa does not label his opponent “thal ’gyur pa” (see Vose 2009: 304, n. 27). The terms thal ’gyur pa and its correlate rang rgyud pa do not appear in the sNying po (Tauscher 2003: 212). Phya pa does not mention the thal ’gyur pa/rang rgyud pa division either when discussing the sub-schools of Madhyamaka in his doxography (gZhung rnam ’byed 29a5ff.) and does not use these expressions in his other Madhyamaka works. Whether he was acquainted with these expressions or not is debatable. The use of these terms in Tibet largely predates Phya pa. The term thal ’gyur ba is indeed already found to qualify Candrakīrti’s position in a work reporting the teaching of Hasumati, a work which was presumably written by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (cf. Dreyfus/Tsering 2009: 393–395). The latter had already returned to Tibet around the year 1100 (Vose 2009: 48), before Phya pa was even born. However, Apple (2016: 630–631, n. 18) notes that, while there is evidence that some scholars contemporaneous with Phya pa knew the classification “thal ’gyur ba” (namely, Bya ’Chad kha ba Ye shes rdo rje [1101–1175] applies it in his doxography), it was not used by Pa tshab’s own disciple Zhang Thang sag pa or by Pa tshab’s bKa’ gdams pa supporter Shar ba pa Yon tan grags (1070–1141). It is thus maybe not so surprising that it would not be widespread in the works of scholars related to the gSang phu tradition, even if these scholars did distinguish the logical notions of autonomous arguments and arguments by consequence.⁸

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⁶ sNying po §125.11 (T 55–77; bKa’ 24a6–31a4). See Section 1 below for an outline of this passage.
⁷ gZhung rnam ’byed 32a4–32b2: cir yang ma grub pa’ang pha rol pos ’gal zla ’am blangs pa de’i ’gal ’gog pa’i thal bas grub la ’gog gyi phyogs kyi chos dang tshad ma nges pa la brten pa’i rjes dpag gis ’gog pa ma yin te de dag mthun snang du grub pa’i tshad ma med pa’i phyir ro zhes brjod par mi bya ste | … khas blangs kho na la thal ba sbyor bas the tshom dang srid pa bkag par ’gyur la | khas blangs pa bden na de’i dor ba mi ’thad la mi bden na des ’gal la ’gog mi nus pa’i phyir yang thal tsam ma yin te | sang rjod pa’i rjes dpag nyid kyis yin no |
⁸ Notably, Phya pa’s teacher of Madhyamaka rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags contrasts the use of autonomous arguments (rang rgyud) and that of consequences (thal ’gyur). Gro lung pa (who had been Phya pa’s teacher towards the end of his live, see Cabezón 2010) similarly opposes thal ’gyur and tshad ma dngos rang rgyud pa in his bsTan rim chen mo (Vose 2009: 53). Neither of them name the partisans of the respective arguments rang rgyud pa and thal ’gyur ba.
Phya pa’s refutation of Candrakīrti is mentioned in the Deb sngon by ’Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481). gSer mdog paṅ chen Śākya mchog Idan (1428–1507) summarizes in his dBu ma rgya mtsho the arguments of Phya pa. Śākya mchog Idan does not identify his source as the sNying po, but presents these arguments as “a series of refutations by Phya pa, having identified the opponent by name as Candrakīrti.” A number of passages from Phya pa’s account of the views of Candrakīrti find a literal equivalent, and others are adapted, in the doxography of the rNying ma pa master Klong chen Rab ’byams pa Dri med ’od zer (1308–1364), the Grub mtha’ mdzod. The corresponding position is dealt with last in Klong chen pa’s presentation of the various Buddhist and non-Buddhist systems in the third chapter of this work. Klong chen pa, like Phya pa, ascribes the position he presents to “Candrakīrti and others,” but further identifies it in terms of “Prāsaṅgika” (thal ’gyur ba’i lugs). Unlike Phya pa, Klong chen pa does not include a criticism of this position, which he himself recognizes as the highest philosophical system (Butters 2006: 157–164). Klong chen pa probably became acquainted with the sNying po and other works of Phya pa during his studies in gSang phu as a young man (see Butters 2006: 26).

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Section 4.1. for more information on these two scholars.

9 Deb sngon 406,11–12: slob dpon phywa bas slob dpon zla ba grags pa la dgag pa mang du mdzad pa la…

10 dBu ma rgya mtsho, chap. 2, vol. 14, 53b5 (p. 518): phya pas zla ba’i zhabs kyi mtshan nas bos te dgag pa byas pa’i rim pa rnams…This passage is located in the section discussing the Prāsaṅgika movement (starting at fol. 53a2 [p. 517]: gnyis pa thal ’gyur du smra ba’i gzhung la log par rtog pa bsal ba). The account of Phya pa’s arguments is found on fol. 53b5–55b6 (p. 518–522). Śākya mchog Idan also writes in his dBu ma byung tshul that “Phya pa composed a treatise in which one finds numerous refutations of both the content and the words of Candrakīrti’s treatise.” (dBu ma byung tshul 13b6: phya pas…zla ba’i bstan bcos kyi tshig don gnyis ka la dgag pa’i rnam grangs shin tu mang po yod pa’i bstan bcos mdzad ).

11 The presentation of Prāsaṅgika (Grub mtha’ mdzod 100–113) is found in the section 1.2.2.2.1.2.2.2.2 (see the outline of the work in Butters 2006: Appendix B). The Prāsaṅgika-section in the Grub mtha’ mdzod is subdivided into the same subsections as sNying po §125.111, but the refutation of autonomous argumentative statements (found in sNying po §125.111.3) is omitted (Grub mtha’ mdzod 100,20–101,2). Conversely, Klong chen pa adds a number of paragraphs that are absent in the sNying po, notably, sections on the definitional bases (mtshan gzhi) and the definitions (mtshan nyid) of the two truths according to the Prāsaṅgikas (Grub mtha’ mdzod 102–104). The closest literal parallels with the sNying po are found in the third subsection (thal ’gyur gyis spros pa gcod pa’i tshul), which repeats to a large extent sNying po §125.111.4.

12 Grub mtha’ mdzod 101,2–4; slob dpon klu sgrub kyi nges pa don gyi lta ba’i dzin pa’i slob ma’i mchog zla ba grags pa la sogs pa rnams ni ’di ltar ’dod de…

13 Werner (2014: 37–40) has brought to the fore ample evidence that in the Grub
This remarkable passage of the *sNying po* did not escape the attention of modern scholars. It was previously discussed in broad lines by Tauscher in his inquiry of Phya pa’s views on arguments by consequence (Tauscher 1999b). Vose fully translated it in his book *Resurrecting Candrakīrti* (Vose 2009: 139–169), and identifies it as “perhaps our most important document for understanding the formation of Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika schools of Tibetan Madhyamaka” (ibid. 139). In spite of the pioneering insight both scholars provide into this passage, their contributions left a number of interpretative and terminological questions open. Tauscher expressed his perplexity at the apparent absence in this text of elements of the theory of argumentation by consequence as it is ascribed to Phya pa in later sources, and at the possibility that Phya pa might even be rejecting argumentation by consequence completely in the *sNying po* in view of the title of §125.11. Vose appears to have been puzzled by some expressions used by Phya pa when discussing argumentation methods. This owes to the fact that Phya pa did not include in the *sNying po* a full-fledged exposition of his own theory of argumentation by consequence, although it stands in the background of the whole discussion. One has to turn to his epistemological works for an extensive presentation of his own views, which he spells out in the fifth chapter of his Summary of epistemology (*Mun sel*) and in a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*’Od zer*). It is entirely clear in these works that Phya pa does not have anything against argumentation by consequence *per se*. In particular, the neither one nor many argument itself can be presented in the form of a consequence statement. Phya pa is objecting in the *sNying po* to a specific model of consequence that finds no legitimate place in his own theory. In brief, Phya pa does not accept a model of consequence that claims to achieve the *negation* of the opponent’s tenets without involving, at some stage, *establishment* by a means of valid cognition. According to Phya pa’s theory, given a consequence of the form “it follows that S is
Q, because P,” if there is no establishment, by a valid cognition, of the pervasion (P entails Q) or of the opposite of the derived conclusion of a consequence (i.e., of the opposite of ‘S is Q’), the consequence may be genuine, but it only qualifies as a “refuting consequence,” which does not prove or negate any thesis. Proving or negating a thesis requires that these features are established by a valid cognition. In such a case (provided additional features are also satisfied), the consequence is a “proving consequence” which has the same capacity as its reverse form, the autonomous argument (i.e., proving nonP, negating P).\footnote{17}

Knowledge of Phya pa’s theory of argumentation (which was undoubtedly expected from Phya pa’s readers at the time) sheds much light on the discussion in \textit{sNying po} §125.11, helping us to better understand Phya pa’s arguments against the opponent’s model of argumentation. Nevertheless, one can observe that Phya pa’s portrayal of the opponent’s position includes notions that are not part of Phya pa’s own theory of argumentation, and which he does not discuss elsewhere. In this paper I examine Phya pa’s account of the views regarding argumentation methods that he ascribes to “Candrakīrti, etc.” (\textit{sNying po} §125.111.3 and §125.111.4)\footnote{18} and attempt to identify Phya pa’s source(s). Two features of Phya pa’s portrayal are particularly relevant in this regard: the version of the translation of verses from Candrakīrti’s works cited in the \textit{sNying po} (Section 2) and the logical notions and technical terms that are part of the opponent’s position (Section 3).

\section{Outline of \textit{sNying po} §125.11}

The structure of the relevant passage of the \textit{sNying po} makes clear which were the main points of contention in the debate about the argumentative method to be followed. “Candrakīrti and others” vouch for a complete rejection of autonomous inference (\textit{sNying po} §125.111.3) and propose an alternative method for negating proliferations (§125.111.4).

The Candrakīrtian arguments against autonomous inference can be divided into two sets. In the first set of arguments, the opponent invokes

\footnote{17}{“Proving consequences” only differ from autonomous inferences in terms of the verbalization of the argument: the latter present the triply characterized reason directly, proving consequences do so indirectly. See Hugon 2013: 678.}

\footnote{18}{The other aspects of the opponent’s position, \textit{sNying po} §125.111.1 (“the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken awareness”) and 5.2 (“the distinction between the two truths”), as well as the third part of Phya pa’s objections against the opponent’s position in §125.112.3 (“it is incorrect that mind and mental factors are cut off in Buddhahood”) are thoroughly discussed in Vose 2009.}
the lack of a commonly appearing subject (i); the lack of a thesis to be proven (ii); the absence of a valid cognition able to establish the three characteristics of the logical reason (iii)—perception and inference are just worldly cognitions (jig rten pa’i blo); they are not properly speaking valid cognitions (tshad ma). The closing statement of §125.111.3 reads:

Mādhyamikas do not have any thesis whatsoever. Therefore a logical reason proving it and an autonomous argument indicating that (logical reason) are incorrect. And for this reason also, there is no elimination of proliferations by an autonomous argument.19

The second set of arguments against autonomous inference contains three claims: autonomous inference is not necessary to negate proliferations (iv), incapable of doing so (v), and is incorrect (vi).

The method of argumentation prescribed by “Candrakīrti and others” (on which more will be said below in Section 3) is used in sNying po §125.111.4 in the presentation of the arguments adduced to refute all the possible options of “arising,” building on the refutation of arising by Nāgārjuna in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK) I.1. The opponent’s method purports to negate (‘gegs pal dgag pa’/gog) the respective options of arising—[a] arising from self, [b] arising from something else, [c] arising from both, [d] arising without a cause20—eventually leading to “the substantialist being countered” (dngos por smra ba ’gog pa) and “proliferations being negated” or “eliminated” (spros pa’/gog pa; spros pa gcod pa) without anything being established for the proponent.

Phya pa rebutts the first set of arguments against autonomous inference (i, ii, iii) in sNying po §125.112.1 (“it is incorrect not to accept an autonomous argument”). He addresses the claims in the second set (iv, v, vi) when rejecting controversies with regard to his own position (§125.114). He refutes the opponent’s specific arguments [a], [b] and [d] for negating arising in §125.112.21 (“it is incorrect/impossible to negate the substantialist view via a consequence”). There he points out that a consequence, in the opponent’s model, is unable to negate the negandum at all, is unable to negate all proliferations, and is unable to eliminate the doubt that there are proliferations.

19 sNying po T 62,13–14; bKa’ 25b4: dbu ma pa la cir yang (T cir yang; bKa’ ci’ang) dam bcar med pas de’i sgrub byed kyi rtags dang de ston pa’i rang rgyud (T dang de ston pa’i rang rgyud; bKa’ dang de ston pa’i rtags dang rang rgyud) mi ’thad pa’i phyir yang rang rgyud kyi spros pa gcod pa ma yin no ||. A similar statement is found in T 61,15–18.

20 Cf. sNying po, T 63,1–14 [a], T 63,15–64,5 [b], T 64,6 [c], T 64,7–15 [d]. These subdivisions of §125.111.4 are not marked in Tauscher’s edition.
2. Citations from Candrakīrti’s works in the sNyin po
The view that Phya pa ascribes to “Candrakīrti and others” is supported by a number of citations from Candrakīrti’s Madhyamakāvatāra (MA):

- MA XII.4 on the distinction between mistaken and non-mistaken cognition (cited in sNyin po §125.111.1)
- MA VI.23–26 and VI.28–29 on the distinction between the two truths (§125.111.2)
- MA VI.30 in connection with the rejection of autonomous arguments (§125.111.3)
- MA VI.8cd, VI.14ab and VI.100 when presenting, respectively, arguments [a], [b] and [d] against arising (§125.111.4).

Also relevant is the citation, in sNyin po §125.111.3, of verses from Nāgārjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī (VV 29) and Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (CŚ XVI.25) in support of the claim that Mādhyamikas do not have a thesis.

The MA citations might not all come from the MA/MABh directly. Those in §125.111.4 might be cited through Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā (PsP). Indeed, in PsP on MMK I.1, Candrakīrti incorporates MA VI.8cd, VI.14 and VI.100ab (MacDonald 2015: §21, §61 and §65), as well as Nāgārjuna’s VV 29 and Āryadeva’s CŚ XVI.25 (MacDonald 2015: §26). The verse of the CŚ is also cited in MABh (D311b5–6), but that of the VV is not. The sNyin po does not elaborate on the Buddhapālita/Bhāviveka debate, with which Candrakīrti deals at length in the PsP. But elements of the arguments for negating arising reported in the sNyin po are in part traceable to Candrakīrti’s discussion in the PsP rather than the MABh (see for instance below Section 3 (1), n. 40).

21 No verse is cited in connection with the refutation of “arising from both” [c], which follows from the refutation of “arising from self” and “arising from other.” When dealing with the third option in the MABh, Candrakīrti repeats the half-verses MA VI.8cd and VI.14ab between VI.98ab and VI.98cd.

22 In the sNang ’grel (which post-dates the sNyin po, see Hugon 2015: 59, n. 9), Phya pa mentions the name Buddhapālita (slob dpon sangs rgyas skyangs) in the section on the refutation of arising from self entitled sngon gyi slob dpon kyi tshig la klan ka spang ba (sNang ’grel 48a3, when commenting on “mchas pa rnams” in MĀ D190b2). He mentions the name Bhāviveka (slob dpon legs ldan ’byed) in sNang ’grel 55a8 (commenting on MĀ D198a6) in connection with the refutation of arising from other, where his objections against “previous teachers” (sngon gyi slob dpon) are rejected. The name Bhāviveka appears also in connection with the refutation of arising from other in sNang ’grel 9b4 (commenting on MĀ D137a7). Both are named side by side in sNang ’grel 2a3–4. Phya pa does not mention the name Candrakīrti in these passages.
Tauscher (2003: 245, n. 22) observed that the sNyeling po version of the verses of the MA significantly diverges from Pa tshab’s translation of the MA (the work was originally translated by Pa tshab and Tilakakalaśa; the translation was subsequently revised by Pa tshab and Kanakavarman) as well as from the earlier translation of the MA by Nag tsho Tshul khrims rgyal ba (a student of Atiśa, born in 1011), a translation which was revised by Pa tshab and Tilakakalaśa.23 (The revised version of Nag tsho’s translation is preserved in the Peking bsTan ’gyur. For the sake of convenience, I will refer to it below as “Nag tsho’s translation.”) The translation of the MA verses in the sNyeling po also differs from the version found in Jayānanda’s MA-ṭīkā, a work that was composed in Minyag (after Jayānanda’s stay in Tibet) and translated by the author himself and Kun dga’ grags (see van der Kuijp 1993). In Jayānanda’s MA-ṭīkā these verses appear in a version that resembles Pa tshab’s translation of the MA. The issue is made more complicated by the fact that there are numerous differences in the two manuscripts of the sNyeling po between the readings of the cited verses. Most of them are minor differences, but there are also important variations in structure (see below MA VI.23a) and in the number of syllables per line (MA VI.14a, MA VI.100c).

In the comparative tables below, the relevant differences between the various versions are marked with bold characters. Orthographic differences that are not relevant to the comparison are not reported. Minor differences (including those interpreted as a scribal error) between the two versions of the sNyeling po, and between Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations, are reported in parentheses rather than in distinct columns.24

For verses MA VI.23–26, 28–30 and XII.4, Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations mostly concord. When they differ, the version in the sNyeling po offers in three cases (MA VI.23a, VI.28b, XII.4b) a still different reading, but sides with Pa tshab’s translation in two cases (MA VI.23d and IV.24a). Interestingly, in MA VI.23a, the sNyeling po has the alternative reading log pa where Nag tsho’s translation reads ’khrul ba and Pa tshab’s reads

23 The difference between the two translations of the MA is discussed in Tauscher 1983.

24 The reading of MA in Nag tsho’s translation is the one from P5261. Tauscher’s verse-index (1989) provides alternative readings for these verses based on citations by later Tibetan scholars (such as Tsong kha pa), but no relevant variant was found for the verses under consideration. The reading of Pa tshab’s translation of the MA is that from Louis de La Vallée Poussin’s edition cited in the notes of Tauscher 1999a. I did not indicate here the variations of MA verses in D and P (all minor), nor the few variants in the reading of these verses in the MABh as they were not relevant for the comparison with sNyeling po (except in VI.23 and XII.4).
brdzun pa (for the Sanskrit mrṣā). But in VI.23d and IV.24a, where one also finds the same divergence—’khrul ba in Nag tsho’s translation and brdzun pa in Pa tshab’s—the sNyin po reads brdzun pa, like in Pa tshab’s translation. In MA XII.4, both Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations have 15-syllable lines. The corresponding verse in the sNyin po has 15 syllables for lines a and b (different from Nag tsho and Pa tshab, but with common elements), and 13 syllables for lines c and d.

MA VI.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( sNyin po )</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 24b6</td>
<td>T59,16–17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>dngos tshogs yang dag log pa’i mthong pa yis</td>
<td>dngos kun yang dag mthong ba’i ’khrul pa yis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>dngos rnyed ngo bo gnyis ni ’dzin par ’gyur</td>
<td>dngos rnyed (/snyed Nag tsho) ngo bo gnyis ni ’dzin par ’gyur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>yang dag mthong yul gang yin de nyid de</td>
<td>yang dag mthong yul gang yin de nyid de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par ’dod</td>
<td>mthong ba brdzun pa kun rdzob bden par gsungs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25 This divergence is noted in Vose 2009: 234, n. 7, where the Sanskrit version of the stanza is cited: *samyaṃ mrṣādarśanalabdhabhāvam rūpadvayam bibhrati sarvabhāvāḥ | samyaṃdrśāṃ yo viṣayaḥ sa tattvam mrṣādrśāṃ saṃvṛtisatyām utkam ||*
### MA VI.24

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 24b4–5; T59,8–9</td>
<td>mthong ba brdzun pa rnam pa gnyis yin te</td>
<td>mthong ba brdzun pa’ang rnam pa gnyis ’dod de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>mthong ba ’khrul pa’ang rnam pa gnyis ’dod de</td>
<td>mthong ba brdzun pa’ang rnam pa gnyis ’dod de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>dbang po gsal dang dbang po skyon ldan no</td>
<td>dbang po gsal dang dbang po skyon ldan no</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>skyon ldan dbang po rnam kyi shes pa ni</td>
<td>skyon ldan dbang can rnam kyi (/kyis Nag tsho) shes pa ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>dbang po legs gyur (’gyur bKa’) la ltos log par ’dod</td>
<td>dbang po legs gyur shes pa log par ’dod</td>
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### MA VI.25

<table>
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<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 25a1</td>
<td>gnod pa myed pa dbang po drug po’i</td>
<td>gnod pa med pa’i dbang po drug rnam kyi (/kyis Pa tshab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>gnod pa myed pa dbang po drug po’i</td>
<td>gnod pa med pa’i dbang po drug rnam kyi (/kyis Pa tshab)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>yul gyur gang yin ’jig rten la ltos nas</td>
<td>bzung ba gang zhig ’jig rten gyis rtogs te</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>’jig rten nyid las bden yin lhag ma ni</td>
<td>’jig rten nyid las bden yin lhag ma ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>’jig rten la’ang log pa nyid du gzhag</td>
<td>’jig rten nyid las log par rnam par bzhag</td>
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### MA VI.26

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 25a1–2; T60,9–10</td>
<td>mi shes gnyid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can</td>
<td>mi shes gnyid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>mi shes gnyid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can</td>
<td>mi shes gnyid kyis rab bskyod mu stegs can</td>
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### MA VI.28

<table>
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<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste</td>
<td>gti mug rang bzhin sgrib phyir kun rdzob ste</td>
<td>des gang bcos ma bden par snang de ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>des (jde bKa’) ‘dir dngos rnams bden par gang brtags pa</td>
<td>des gang bden par mthong ba’i bcos ma de</td>
<td>des gang bcos ma bden par snang de ni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>kun rdzob bden par thub pa des gsungs te</td>
<td>kun rdzob bden zhes thub pa des gsungs te</td>
<td>kun rdzob bden zhes thub pa des (jde Nag tsho) gsung te</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>bcos mar gyur pa’i bden pa kun rdzob du</td>
<td>bcos mar gyur pa’i bden pa kun rdzob du’o</td>
<td>bcos mar gyur pa’i dngos ni kun rdzob tu’o</td>
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### MA VI.29

<table>
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<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>rab rib mthu yis skra shad lasogs pa</td>
<td>rab rib mthu yis skra shad (jbshad Nag tsho) la sog pa’i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>dngos po log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pas</td>
<td>dngos po log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pa</td>
<td>ngo bo log pa gang zhig rnam brtags pa</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>de nyid bdag nyid gang gis myig dag pa</td>
<td>de'i bdag nyid gang gis myig dag pa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>mthong ba gang yin de bzhin 'dir shes bya</td>
<td>mthong de de nyid de bzhin 'dir shes kyis</td>
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**MA VI.30**

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<tr>
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<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>gal te 'jig rten tshad ma nyid yin na</td>
<td>gal te 'jig rten tshad ma yin na ni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>'jig rten de nyid mthong yin 'phags gzhan gyis</td>
<td>'jig rten de nyid mthong bas 'phags gzhan gyis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>ci dgos 'phags p'a'i lam gyis ci byar yod</td>
<td>ci dgos 'phags p'a'i lam gyis ci zhig bya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>blun po tshad mar gyur pa ga la yod</td>
<td>blun po tshad mar rigs pa'ang ma yin no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**MA XII.4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>gang phyir chos nyid skye myed yin zhing blo'ang skye ba dang bral ba</td>
<td>gang phyir chos nyid skye myed yin zhing blo la skye ba dang bral ba</td>
<td>gang tshe skye med de nyid yin zhing blo yang skye ba dang bral ba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>de phyir de rnam sten la de'i is de nyid rig pa lta bu ste</td>
<td>de phyir de rnam rten la de yis de nyid rig pa lta bu ste</td>
<td>de tshe de rnam rten (// rnam bsten MABh D) las de yis de nyid rtogs par brjod bya ste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>gang phyir sems ni yul gyi rnam par byung pas de'i yul</td>
<td>ji ltar sems ni gang gi rnam pa can du 'gyur ba de yis yul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Note: The text is in Tibetan, and the translations are provided as best as possible.*
The situation is different for the verses of the MA that are also cited in the PsP (MA VI.8cd, 14ab, 100). There Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations are significantly different in structure: the former has verses with 11 syllables per line (12 in MA VI.100b), the latter has verses with 13 syllables per line.

- For VI.8cd, the version cited in the sNying po also has 13 syllables per line and matches Pa tshab’s translation of the MA with a minor difference in line d.27

### MA VI.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>PsP (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 25b5–6; T63,5–6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</td>
<td>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang med</td>
<td>de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</td>
<td>de las de ni 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa ma yin nyid</td>
<td>skye zin slar yang skye bar rigs pa'ang ma yin nyid</td>
<td>skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa'ang ma yin nyid</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- For MA VI.14ab, line b in the sNying po matches Pa tshab’s translation in 13 syllables. So does line a in sNying po T. But line a in sNying po bKa’ has 11 syllables, but is different from Nag tsho’s 11-syllable translation.

---

26 The two-syllable expression *nye* *bar* is omitted in MA (P and D), but present in MABh. The two syllables are needed to arrive at 15 syllables like in the previous three lines.

27 Pa tshab’s translation of the same verses in the PsP is slightly different for line c. The translation of the PsP was made in Kashmir by Mahāsumati and Pa tshab, then revised by Pa tshab and Kanakavarman in Tibet (MacDonald 2015, vol. I: 15–17, Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 45).
### MA VI.14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td><strong>gzhan la brten pas gzan zhig 'byung par 'gyur na ni</strong></td>
<td><strong>gzhan la brten nas gal te gzan zhig 'byung bar 'gyur na ni</strong></td>
<td><strong>gzhan la brten nas gal te gzan zhig 'byung bar 'gyur na ni</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>bKa’ 26a2</strong></td>
<td><strong>T63,17–18</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>'o na me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhi ng</td>
<td><strong>me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhi ng</strong></td>
<td>'o na me lce las kyang mun pa 'thug po 'byung 'gyur zhi ng</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>bKa’ 26a4–5</strong></td>
<td><strong>T64,7–8</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- For MA VI.100, lines a and b in the sNying po version match exactly Pa tshab’s translation of the MA. Pa tshab’s translation of the same verses in the PsP is completely different, but also has 13 syllables per line. Line c in sNying po bKa’ has 13 syllables and resembles Pa tshab’s translation, but line c in T counts 11 syllables (different from Nag tsho’s translation in 11 syllables). For line d, both T and bKa’ have a line of 11 syllables, which is different from Nag tsho’s translation.

### MA VI.100

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>MA (Nag tsho)</th>
<th>MA (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>PsP (Pa tshab)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td><strong>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong bar gyur na nam mkha’ yi (/mkha’i T)</strong></td>
<td><strong>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong na nam mkha’ yi</strong></td>
<td><strong>gal te 'gro ba rgyu yis stong par gyur na nam mkha’ yi</strong></td>
<td><strong>gal te rgyu yis stong na 'gro ba 'di dag gzung bya min</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>bKa’ 26a4–5</strong></td>
<td><strong>T64,7–8</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td><strong>ud pa la’i dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du myed nyid na</strong></td>
<td><strong>utpala dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du med 'gyur na</strong></td>
<td><strong>ut pa la yi dri mdog ji bzhin gzung du med nyid na</strong></td>
<td><strong>ji ltar nam mkha’i utpala yi dri dang kha dog bzhin</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When it comes to the verses of the VV and the CS (also cited in the PsP), the version in the sNying po differs from both the translation of these verses in the PsP and the respective revised translations that found their way into the bsTan 'gyur.

- For the VV, the translation found in the bsTan 'gyur was made in 842 by Jñānagarbha and later revised by Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar, probably around 1120–1140 (Vose 2009: 48 and 54; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 43). The translation in the PsP matches that of the VV in the bsTan 'gyur. However, a quite different Tibetan version of the verse is found in Jayānanda’s MA-tīkā—Jayānanda obviously did not rely on his revised translation of the VV when translating this verse in the MA-tīkā as part of the quotation from PsP. The revised version is found in the works of rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, a student of Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde 'bar (see below Section 3 (1)), with a minor difference in line d, in which rMa bya’s works read nga ni, like in sNying po T (De nyid snang ba 13a2, ‘Thad rgyan 21a6–b1).

### VV 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>sNying po</th>
<th>VV bsTan 'gyur (Jayānanda, Khu) =PsP (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>MA-tīkā (D121b2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bKa’ 25b3</td>
<td>T62,8–9</td>
<td>gal te nga la dam bca’ ‘ga’ yod</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a gang tshe nga la dam bca’ yod</td>
<td>gal te ngas dam bca’ ‘ga’ yod</td>
<td>yod par gyr na skyon ‘di ‘byung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b nga la skyon de yod pa yin</td>
<td>des nga la skyon de yod</td>
<td>bdag la dam bca’ med pas na</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c nga la dam bca’ myed pas na</td>
<td>nga la dam bca’ med pas na</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As for the ČŚ, the canonical Tibetan version of the *Catuhśataka* is the translation made by Pa tshab and Śukṣmajana in Kashmir (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 45). The Tibetan of the verse in the PsP differs from it in line b. That in Pa tshab’s translation of the MABh has a small difference in line c. Again, the verse in Jayānanda’s MA-ṭīkā is different from all the other versions. Interestingly the translation cited by Phya pa is identical to the version of the verse in the Tibetan translation of Śāntarakṣita’s *Madhyamakālamkāra* 68 (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 122–123), except in line c (line c in the sNying po is similar to Pa tshab’s translation). The translation of the *Madhyamakālamkāra* was carried out by Ye shes sde and Śilendrabodhi at the time of the first diffusion of Buddhism in Tibet.

**ČŚ XVI.25**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>sNying po bKa’ 25b4; T62,11–12</th>
<th>Madhyamakālamkāra 68 (Ye shes sde)</th>
<th>ČŚ bsTan ‘gyur (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>MABh D311b5–6 (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>PsP (Pa tshab)</th>
<th>MA-ṭīkā (D121bl)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>yod dang myed dang yod myed ces</td>
<td>yod dang med dang yod med ces</td>
<td>yod dang med yod zhes</td>
<td>yod dang med yod med ces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>khas mi len pa gang yin pa</td>
<td>khas mi len pa gang yin pa</td>
<td>gang la phyogs ni yod min pa</td>
<td>phyogs ni gang la’ang yod min pa</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>phyogs gang la ni yod min la</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>de la yun ni ring por yang</td>
<td>de la nan tan ldan pas kyang</td>
<td>de la yun ni ring po na’ang</td>
<td>de la yun ni ring po la’ang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>yun ni ring por yang de’i skyon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>cir yang klan ka bya mi nus</td>
<td>cir yang lkan ka bya mi nus</td>
<td>klan ka brjod par (jpa ČŚ) nus ma yin</td>
<td>brjod par nus pa ma yin no</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

28 I report here the reading of the verses as cited in Tauscher 1999a: 62.
What can we conclude from this comparison? The translation of the VV and ČŚ in the *sNying po* appears to reflect an ancient translation, before the revision by Jayānanda and Pa tshab, respectively. As for the MA verse, the kind of differences that are observable between the *sNying po* version and Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations of the MA verses are notably differences in the choice of translation for specific terms, differences in sentence structure, and differences in the number of syllables per line (as in MA XII.4cd). But there is still a common basis, namely, whole verses or lines for which the *sNying po* concords with these translations or with one of them. This excludes that the *sNying po* reflects a translation completely independent from these two. The cases where the translation in the *sNying po* includes portions that differ from both Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations (while still involving portions that are identical to those two) could suggest that the version that Phya pa is citing corresponds to Nag tsho’s translation before it was revised by Pa tshab. Verses (respectively, lines) that count 11 syllables in the *sNying po*, 11 syllables in Nag tsho’s translation revised by Pa tshab, and 13 syllables in Pa tshab’s new translation, strongly speak in favor of such a hypothesis. On the other hand, verses MA VI.8cd, 14ab and 100ab reflect Pa tshab’s new translation, at least in one or the other version of the *sNying po*.

The differences in versions T and bKa’ of the *sNying po* seem to indicate that modifications took place in the course of the transmission of the *sNying po*, by way of “updating” the translation of the verses originally present in the *sNying po*. Thus, for verses MA VI.23a and VI.100c, the reading in T is closer to Nag tsho’s translation, the reading in bKa’ closer to Pa tshab’s translation. But for MA VI.14a it is the opposite. Should such an “update” be postulated as well for the other cases where both T and bKa’ side with Pa tshab’s translation? While this is possible, one might, under such a hypothesis, expect a higher proportion of verses matching Pa tshab’s translation. A more likely option would be that Pa tshab’s new translation was already in circulation at the time Phya pa was writing (respectively, at the time the author of Phya pa’s mediating source was writing), but had not yet replaced the previous translation(s) on a broad scale. Phya pa would thus be quoting these verses in a mixture of the older and the newer translation.\(^{29}\)

\(^{29}\) Phya pa’s acquaintance with the MA is also reported in the colophon of Phya pa’s doxography, but no verses from the work are cited. The MA is mentioned along with the other works on which the author relied for his presentation of philosophical systems (*gZhung rnam ’byed* 33b1–3: …slob dpon zla ba grags pa’i
At this point, I was able to identify only one other work that cites these verses in the same translation as the *sNying po*, the doxography of Klong chen pa (*Grub mtha’ mdzod*), which, as mentioned earlier, re­uses a lot of material from Phya pa’s works. Tracing in other Tibetan works the occurrence of the verses in the form attested in each of the two manuscripts of the *sNying po* might help shed more light on this issue of textual history.

3. The opponent’s method of argumentation—Logical notions and terminology

In the *sNying po* (§125.111.3), the method prescribed by “Candrakīrti and others” for negating proliferations is termed *khas blangs nang ’gal ba* (in *T*) or *khas blangs na ’gal ba* (in *bKa’*). The variation might be due to a

dbu ma la ’jug pa’i gzhung rnams las bsdus ste). The relative chronology of the *sNying po* and the *gZhung rnam ’byed* is as yet unclear.

Klong chen pa indeed cites the same verses as Phya pa (at the exception of MA VI.26 and MA VI.30, and the fourth quarter of MA VI.28). They are found on the following pages in the Beijing edition of the *Grub mtha’ mdzod*: p. 111 (VV 29, CŚ XVI.25), p. 108 (MA VI.8cd), p. 109 (VI.14ab), p. 106 (VI.23), p. 102 (VI.24), p. 104 (VI.25), p. 103 (VI.28), p. 105 (VI.29), p. 110 (VI.100), p. 101 (XII.4). In many cases the verses or lines of the verses appear in a version identical to the *sNying po*, against Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations (see in particular MA VI.8d, VI.24a, c and d, VI.29a, b and d, VI.100d, and XII.4). In the first citation of MA VI.23a and d and VI.100c, the *Grub mtha’ mdzod* more specifically concord with *sNying po* bKa’ against *sNying po* T. This is, however, not the only scenario one meets in the Tibetan translation of these verses in the *Grub mtha’ mdzod* (of which I only consulted the Beijing edition). There are also cases of a verse or a line identical to *sNying po* and Pa tshab’s translation (which is, in some cases, identical to Nag tsho’s, in other cases not), cases where the *Grub mtha’ mdzod* version matches Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translation (the two being almost identical) against the *sNying po* version, and cases where it differs from all other versions. This mixture of scenarios is found also for the citation of VV 29. That of CŚ, on the other hand, clearly sides with Pa tshab’s translation against *sNying po*. 

Apart from Klong chen pa’s works, the only correspondence that I found through a search of the e­texts available via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center (www.tbrc.org at the time of writing) is for MA VI.30, which is cited in the same version as in the *sNying po* in volume Cha of the *Sa skya bka’ bum* among the works of the Sa skya hierarch Grags pa rgyal mtshan (1147–1216). The correspondence to the exact folio is unknown. On the issue of variation in quotations, see Roesler 2015, which examines, among other cases, variant quotations of MA II.5 and MA VI.226 in a work of Po to ba, noting that these may be interpreted as representing Nag tsho’s unrevised translation (499–501). Besides variations indicative of earlier or alternative translations, Roesler highlights the possibility that discrepancies in quotations might be due to inexact memory, or to an author drawing from a secondary source.
scribal mistake. Indeed, final “-ng” and tsheg are very similar in cursive script. It is difficult to assess which was the reading intended by Phya pa. The occurrence of the related expression khas len na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur (see below) with the same reading in the two manuscripts might be an argument—although not a conclusive one—in favor of reading khas blangs na 'gal ba. The two expressions, however, do not imply a significant difference in meaning. Khas blangs na 'gal ba can be translated as “incompatibility with regard to what is accepted,” khas blangs nang 'gal ba as “internal contradiction [pertaining to] what is accepted.” This method is also referred to simply in terms of 'gal ba (“incompatibility”) in the next subsection (§125.111.3, v).

The first mention of this method in terms of khas blangs na(nang) 'gal is illustrated by an example:

If [something] is already existent (ye nas yod pa), it is contradictory that [its] arising would be meaningful (skye ba don yod pa). If the arising [of something] is meaningful (skye ba don yod na), it is contradictory that [it] would be already existent (ye nas yod pa), etc. The statement points out the incompatibility ('gal ba) between two items A and B, which are accepted by the addressee of the argument. Their incompatibility itself is, as subsequent discussions mention, a matter of the addressee’s acceptance. In the illustration, the argument targets a proponent of Sāṃkhya philosophy who accepts both:

(A) that something is already existent (ye nas yod pa) (this is equivalent to the Sāṃkhya claim that effects already exist in the cause [rgyu la 'bras bu yod pa]);

(B) that its arising is meaningful (skye ba don yod pa).

The above argument is a short version of the refutation of “arising from self,” which is further discussed in §125.111.4 [a]. In the introduction to the section illustrating the application of this method for refuting arising

32 The works of rMa bya also present the alternance of na 'gal and nang 'gal in this expression, with the addition of the expression with na nang 'gal (see below Section 4.2.1., n. 53). The passage of Klong chen pa’s doxography in which he is re-using Phya pa’s account (see fn. 11) has the reading nang 'gal. Later authors such as Go rams pa (1429–1489) favor the phrasing nang 'gal. See Cabezón/Dargyay 2006: 178 (khas blangs nang 'gal bstan pa) and 192 (khas blang nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur 'ba' zhig brjod).

33 sNying po §124.111.3 (iv) (T 62,5–6, bKa’ 25b2–3): ye nas yod na skye ba don yod par 'gal la skye ba don yod na ye nas yod par 'gal zhes pa la sogs pa.
(§125.111.4), the method for negating proliferations is more specifically called \textit{khas len na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur}, i.e., “a consequence (\textit{thal 'gyur}) involving/relying on the incompatibility with regard to what is accepted.” In each of the sections [a], [b] and [d], in which arising from self, from something else, and arising without a cause are negated, the argumentative method actually involves three arguments, the technical terms for which are:

(1) \textit{'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur}
(2) \textit{'go snyom pa}
(3) \textit{bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa}.

In what follows, I consider these three notions with a focus on their use in the refutation of “arising from self” [a].

\textbf{Text of sNying po §125.111.4 [a] (T 63,1–14; bKa’ 25b5–26a1)}\(^{34}\)

\begin{verbatim}
| des na khas blangs na 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur kho nas spros pa geod de |
| [a] |
| (i) grangs can pa dag |
| [p1] mgon par gsal ba (m) lasogs pa\(^a\) ye nas yod pa (A) la skye ba don myed pas (nonB) kyang\(^b\) khyab par yang 'dod la |
| [p2] dngos po rnam gsri dus na 'bras bu'i ngo bo'ang? ye nas yod par (A) yang\(^b\) 'dod pas |
| de ni de las 'byung na yon tan 'ga' yang yod ma yin ||
| skyes par gyur pa slar yang skye bar rigs pa ma yin nyid || |
| (MA VI.8cd) |
| ces |
| [p3] nang gi skye mched lasogs pa (S) mi gsal ba rgyu'i dus na'ang (n) ye nas yod par (A) yang 'dod cing |
| [p4] da gdod skye dgos par (B) 'dod pa na |

(ii) rgyu'i dus na (n) nang gi skye mched (S) ye nas yod pa'i (A) phyir skye ba don myed par (nonB) thal zhes 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur |
| brjod la |
\end{verbatim}

\(^{34}\) Differences between the two versions pertaining to punctuation and to orthography (in particular, the consistent spelling \textit{myi} in bKa’ against \textit{mi} in T, the alternance ‘\textit{ga’}/'\textit{ga}, '\textit{pal/ha}) have not been recorded. Titles, numbers and letters in parentheses and marking in bold characters are editorial. A re-use of this section by Klong chen Rab 'byams pa is found in Grub mtha’ mdzod 108,11–109,6.
(iii) de khyab pa ma grub par rtog na mi gsal ba’i dus na (n) ye nas yod (A) kyang skye tshod du (B) mngon par gsal ba’i dus na’ang (m) ye nas yod (A) kyang skye dgos par ’gyur (B) la | de (m) skye mi dgos pa’i tshod du (nonB) mi gsal ba’i dus na’ang (n) ye nas yod pa (A) la skye mi dgos pas (nonB) khyab ces ’go snyom pa dang |
(iv) mngon par gsal ba’i (m) yod pa (A) la skye mi dgos (nonB) pas khyab kyang mi gsal ba’i (n) yod pa (A) la skye^ mi dgos (nonB) pas ma khyab po zhes ’byed na khyad par de bsgrub bya dang mtshungs yod pa de (A) kho bo cag la ma grub pa ltar khyad par de yang ma grub po zhes pas
(v) rang las skye ba ’gegs pa dang |

\[\text{Given that } \text{mngon par gsal ba} \text{ is later opposed to } \text{mi gsal ba}, \text{ the mention lasogs pa is not intended to cover mi gsal ba}. \text{ I suspect that la sogs pa followed the mention of an example that got lost.} \]

\[\text{bK}a’ \text{ pas kyang : T pas} \]

\[\text{T ngo bo’ang : bK}a’ \text{ ngo bo} \]

\[\text{bK}a’ \text{ yod par yang : T yod par} \]

\[\text{T(em.), bK}a’ \text{ skye : T(ms) skyi} \]

(1) ’gal ba sdud pa’i thal ’gyur

The first type of argument, which one can translate as “a consequence in which incompatible items are brought together,”^35 is none other than “a consequence involving/relying on the incompatibility with regard to what is accepted” (khas len na ’gal ba’i thal ’gyur). It takes the characteristic form of an argument by consequence, in which the incompatibility between A and B has become the basis for the entailment (i.e., A entails nonB):

^35 In Phya pa’s epistemological works the expression ’gal ba sdud pa is used to refer to two incompatible properties being applied together to the same basis (gzhi gcig la ’gal ba sdud pa). See Mun sel 92b7–93a1, ’Od zer 195b3. It might be considered a synonym to the almost homophonic expression ’gal ba ’du ba, which Phya pa frequently uses in these works (e.g., Mun sel 6b3, 6b4, 16a2, 22a2, 32b3; ’Od zer 7a3, 63b5–6, 131b6), and which is often found also in the sNang ’grel (for instance 9a5, 12b4, 60a2) and the rGyan ’grel (for instance 21a3, 25b8, 26a2), and occurs a couple times in the bDen gnys nmam bshad (21a5, 23b7) and the sNying po itself (T 47,5 and 116,21). See also n. 49, and the alternative use of the expressions khas blangs ’gal ba ’dus pa and khas blangs la ’gal ba sdud pa in the bDen gnys ’chad pa mentioned at the end of Section 4.2.3.
Because \textit{(phyir)} $S$ is $A$, it follows \textit{(thal)} that it is non$B$ (for arguments [a] and [d])

or

\textbf{It follows that $S$ is non$B$ (thal) because it is $A$ (phyir)} (for argument [b]).

The refutation of “arising from self” accordingly has the form (see Text §(ii) above for the Tibetan):

Because the inner sense-field at the time of the cause ($S$) is already existent ($A$), it follows that its arising is meaningless (non$B$).

A and B represent here the same items that were pointed out to be incompatible in the previous illustration of the opponent’s method (see above n. 33).

The statement of the argument by consequence identified as a ‘\textit{gal ba} sdud pa’i \textit{thal} ’gyur’ is preceded by a list of claims that the addressee of the argument is said to accept. In the case of the refutation of arising from self [a], the Sāṃkhya is said to accept the following (see Text, §(i)):

\begin{itemize}
  \item [p1] For what is manifest, etc., “already existent” ($A$) entails “arising is meaningless” (non$B$)
  \item [p2] For entities, the nature of the effect is already existent at the time of the cause ($A$)
  \item [p3] Non-manifest (entities) such as the inner sense-field, etc., are already existent at the time of the cause ($A$)
  \item [p4] (For non-manifest entities) arising is necessary ($B$)
\end{itemize}

That the addressee subscribes to these tenets ensures that the consequence is pertinent. Here the proponent should make sure that the addressee

\begin{itemize}
  \item [(a)] accepts the premise ‘$S$ is $A$’
  \item [(b)] accepts the premise ‘$A$ entails non$B$’
  \item [(c)] does not accept the conclusion that follows from the premises, namely, that ‘$S$ is non$B$’
\end{itemize}

\footnote{It is not obvious whether this is supposed to represent the actual statement—what the proponent would state in the debate—or is a metalinguistic reference to the statement, which reveals the form of the argument. Typically, the metalinguistic statement expresses the conclusion derived from the first premise, which might be considered a fault for an actual statement. On this difference, see Hugon 2013: 675–676.}

\footnote{In \textit{sNying po} §125.112.21 (T 70,5) the consequence is characterized as “genuine” (\textit{rnal ma}). In Phya pa’s own system, this amounts to a consequence to which the addressee cannot retort that he does not accept the premises or that he accepts the}
Requirement (a) is satisfied, because ‘S is A’ corresponds to [p3], which is a particular case of [p2], the Sāṃkhya tenet that effects already exist at the time of the cause. Requirement (c) is satisfied because the Sāṃkhya holds that ‘S is B’ (=[p4]). The entailment (b) is here a key issue. According to [p1], the Sāṃkhya readily concedes that “being already existent” (A) entails “arising not being necessary” (nonB) in the case of what is manifest (mngon par gsal ba, Skt. abhivyakti). For instance, the Sāṃkhya would accept that a pot in the form of a pot present in front of one does not require arising. The Sāṃkhya wouldn’t object in this case to the argument stated in MA VI.8cd, namely, that “the origination once again of what has [already] originated is simply not reasonable.” But they would not accept this when it comes to a pot at the stage of a lump of clay, i.e., at the stage it is non-manifest. At such a stage, the pot is already existent (A) (=[p3]), but does require arising (B) (=[p4]).

The question of the entailment is taken up in two follow-up arguments marked with the terms ‘go snyom pa (“equality”) and bsgrub bya dang mtshungs (pa) (“similarity to what is to be proven”).

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38 See Text, note α on my interpretation of la sogs pa in this sentence.
39 Trans. MacDonald 2015: 51–52. In the MA this verse represents the argument against arising from self. The place of the citation of MA VI.8cd in the sNying po misleadingly suggests that it supports [p3], whereas it is more logical that it is cited to support [p1]. In the parallel passage in Klong chen pa’s Grub mtha’ mdzod (108,11–109,6), verse MA VI.8cd is presented as stating a consequence, namely, the Sāṃkhya has to accept that A entails nonB (irrespectively of the subject).
40 In the PsP, the Sāṃkhya’s acceptance that a pot situated in front of one does not require re-arising enables the case of the “pot situated in front” to be used as an example when establishing, through an other-acknowledged inference, “not requiring re-arising” (punarutpādānapekṣa) from the logical reason “[already] existent by own nature” (svātmanā vidyamānam) for a pot at the stage of a lump of clay and other “things disposed to arise” (utpitsupadārtha). See PsP §29–30, and MacDonald 2015: 80–82, n. 173–175. Note that Phya pa’s portrayal does not mention explicitly the example of the “pot in front of one” or of the “pot as a lump of clay,” but only the “inner sense-field” as an instance of something that is non-manifest. (Also, Phya pa does not speak of “re-arising” but only of “arising.”) The “inner sense-field” figures as the subject in Bhāviveka’s inference criticized by Candrākīrti in the PsP (§27), as well as in the other-acknowledged inference that Candrākīrti proposes, based on Buddhapālita’s statement (§29–30).
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

(2) ‘go snyom pa

In the refutation of arising from self [a] the first follow-up argument in answer to the qualm that the entailment “A entails nonB” might not be established draws out the “equality” (‘go snyom pa) between the case of an entity at the time it is non-manifest (n) and the case of an entity at the time it is manifest (m) (like for instance a pot as a lump of clay and a pot in front of one). The argument is that if B necessarily follows from A in one case, it must also follow from A in the other; but if nonB follows from A in one case, it must also follow from A in the other. This amounts to an argument by parity of reasoning: what is entailed must be the same because the same reason applies. As stated in the sNyīng po (Text, §[iii]):

Assuming that (an entity) at the time it is non-manifest (must) arise even though it is already existent, then also at the time something is manifest, arising is necessary even though (the entity) is already existent. But assuming that arising is not necessary (at the time an entity is manifest), also at the time (an entity) is non-manifest, being already existent entails that arising is not necessary. This is the (argument of) equality.

The goal of this argument is to force the Śaṃkhya to accept that A entails nonB in every case, and in particular in the case of an entity that is non-manifest at the time of its cause, of which the subject (S) is an instance.

(3) bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa

The second follow-up argument provides an answer to a potential objection to the argument by parity of reasoning. The Śaṃkhya might argue that there is no “equality” precisely because there is a “difference” (khyad par) between the case of entities that are manifest (m) and those that are non-manifest (n): A entails nonB for the former (=p1), but not for the latter (=p4). The argument is stated as follows (see Text, §(iv)):

Should one object, making a distinction as follows:

The existence of what is manifest (A[m]) entails that arising is not necessary (nonB), but the existence of what is non-manifest (A[n]) does not entail that arising is not necessary (nonB).

[We answer:] This distinction is similar to what is to be proven. Just like the existence of the effect in the cause (=A)41 is not established for us, this distinction itself is not established.

41 One should understand that the “existence of the effect in the cause” is equivalent to “being already existent” (A). In arguments [b] and [d], the answer includes the literal expression of A in this sentence.
Invoking the “similarity to what is to be proven” (bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa) is akin to appealing to petitio principii, the fault of presenting as a reason something which is to be proven. The objection against the establishment of the entailment by way of “equality” indeed relies on a distinction that amounts to saying that nonB is found in some cases qualified by A but not in other cases qualified by A. The retort points out that A itself is not established for the Buddhist at all—this is something that would have to be proven. Thus invoking a difference between cases where A applies is not a legitimate reason, as A itself would first need to be established.

The outcome of the three-part argument is, in each case, that item A is negated. How each argument purports to negate each option of arising is actually a moot point. It can be understood as an application of the principle that premises that lead to an unwanted conclusion should be rejected (or negated). The addressee is here expected to reject the premise ‘S is A’. But in practice he could also reject ‘A entails nonB’ (the follow-up arguments seem to be there to ensure that this does not happen), or reject both premises, or accept the derived conclusion nonB and reject B, or just remain puzzled as to what part of the set of tenets he holds is problematic. Phya pa’s standpoint is that unless establishment of specific features by a valid cognition is involved, such arguments do refute the opponent (insofar as the opponent is unable to retort), but do not negate any tenet held by the latter.

4. Mediating source(s) for Phya pa’s account

Although Phya pa does refer to Candrakīrti as the proponent of the views he criticizes, his portrayal of the opponent’s views illustrates specific logical concepts and technical terms that are not found in Candrakīrti’s works.

Against the option that the formatting was Phya pa’s creation, one can remark that the types of arguments (1) and (3) discussed above are not part of Phya pa’s own theory of argumentation and are not discussed

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42 The option being negated corresponds exactly to item A in [b] and [d]. But in [a], the outcome of the argument is that “arising from self is negated” (rang las skye ba ’gLegs pa), whereas item A is “being already existent” (ye nas yod pa). The two are to be understood to be equivalent. Śākya mchog ldan’s rephrasing of argument [a] (which he calls ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur) has bdag la(s) skye ba for A (dBu ma rgya mtsho, chap. 2, vol. 14, 54b1–2 [p. 520]). Klong chen pa also equates the two notions (Grub mtsha’ mdzod 108,12–13: rgyu la yod pa skye bas rang las skye ba ’dod).
or even mentioned elsewhere in his works. This is not surprising for 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur (1) and khas lang na/(nang) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur, since these terms precisely refer to a method of argumentation by consequence that Phya pa rejects, and only discusses in this particular section of the sNying po.

The argument called 'go snyom pa (2) finds an echo in Phya pa’s profuse use of arguments by parallels (on which see Hugon 2008). The 'go snyom pa argument considered above would amount to a one-step argument by parallels (those usually have more than one step) invoking the parallel between the domain involving the elements (n, A, B) and the domain involving the elements (m, A, B). And it would thus be a special case, for in most instances of arguments by parallel, the elements of the source domain are not preserved in the target domain (as is here the case with A and B). Phya pa does not use the term 'go snyom pa to refer to arguments by parallels. He calls them on one occurrence mgo’ bsgres, and uses the verb (b)sgre to mark parallel statements. Not counting the account of the three arguments by consequence [a], [b] and [d] in the sNying po, Phya pa uses the expression 'go snyom (spelled mgo snyom) on a single occasion elsewhere in the sNang 'grel (43b3). However, we will see in Section 4.2.2 that mgo’ bsgres appears as an alternative expression for what is, in sNying po, called 'go snyom pa.

It is likely that these technical notions are those used by his opponent, and that Phya pa is drawing from the works of Tibetan followers of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka or repeating (maybe adapting) an earlier portrayal-cum-criticism of their position. Tracing the occurrence of the arguments termed 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur, khas lang na/(nang) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur, 'go snyom pa and bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa can help us zoom in on the source for Phya pa’s account.

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43 The expression bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa is not used elsewhere in Phya pa’s works in the sense it has in this passage of the sNying po. For instance, in Mun sel 22a4 the expression is used to indicate the similarity between what is to be proven and what is to be defined.

44 The expression mgo snyom is used in sNang 'grel 43b3 (rnam pa du ma yin yang ngo bo gcig yin na ha cang thal ba ni yon tan la sogs pa zhes pa ste mgo snyom pa'o ||) to gloss on MĀ D182b4: yon tan la sogs pa'i chos 'gal ba dang Idan pa yang gcig pa nyid yin na ni sna tshogs kyang gcig pa nyid du thal la “If what has contradictory properties such as qualities, etc. is one, it would follow that what is manifold also is one.” Phya pa uses elsewhere in the sNang 'grel the expressions mgo mtshungs pa (45b4, 59a2, 70a5), mtshungs par bsgre ba (60a4), and bsgre (70a5) in the same sense.
4.1. *Previous refutations of pro-Candrakīrtian scholars*

Phya pa is certainly not the first to express disagreement with the view that Mādhyamikas have no thesis and do not resort to autonomous arguments. Gompa reports that Klimes Tshul khrims shes rab (10th cent.) and others already criticized such a view.\(^{45}\) Closer to Phya pa’s time, relevant first-hand evidence of arguments against this view can be found in the works of two scholars linked with the tradition stemming from rNgog Blo Idan shes rab (1059–1109) in gSang phu: Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas (ca. 1040s–1120s) and rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags.

The first, who studied under rNgog Blo Idan shes rab, but also under Atiśa (982–1054) and ’Brom ston rGyal ba’i ’byung gnas (1004/1005–1064), refutes in his bsTan rim chen mo “some previous teachers” (sngon gyi slob dpon kha cig) who advocate the use of consequences exclusively and do not accept autonomous means of valid cognition (see Cabezón 2010: 49). Apart from the shared core thematic under discussion, there is no remarkable similarity between this passage and the sNyings po.

rGya dmar ba, who had been Phya pa’s teacher for Madhyamaka and epistemology in sTod lung, refutes this position in one of his Madhyamaka works.\(^{46}\) The set of views that rGya dmar ba rebuts corresponds to the first set of arguments against autonomous inference in Phya pa’s portrayal (sNyings po §125.111.3, i, ii, iii): the absence of a thesis of one’s own, there being no autonomous means of valid cognition, the non-establishment of the subject.\(^{47}\) Speaking against the rejection of autonomous arguments, rGya dmar ba also provides arguments that find some echo in Phya pa’s sNyings po §125.112.\(^{48}\) rGya dmar ba does not spell out the details of the opponent’s method of argumentation by consequence and its application, and his account does not include any citation from Candrakīrti’s works. One also does not find in his dBu ma de kho na nyid the key terms that appear in Phya pa’s portrayal of the opponent’s views: khas lang


\(^{46}\) dBu ma de kho na nyid 27b5–28a8. A critical edition and translation of the text (in progress) by Kevin Vose and I can be found at: https://www.oeaw.ac.at/ikga/forchung/tibetologie/materialien/the-dbu-ma-de-kho-na-nyid-of-rgya-dmar-ba-byang-chub-grags-12th-c/.

\(^{47}\) dBu ma de kho na nyid 27b6–8 (de ‘gog pa mi ‘thad pa sun dbyung ba).

\(^{48}\) rGya dmar ba questions the possibility, for those who do not accept autonomous arguments, of claiming that they have no thesis, to negate the views of others, and to deductively draw the conclusion in a consequence. See dBu ma de kho na nyid 27b8–28a1 (rang rgyud med na dam bca’ khas len med pa nyid mi ‘thad pa), 28a1–2 (gzhon gyi ‘dod pa mi khegs pa), 28a2–3 (thal ’gyur nyid ‘thad par mi rung ba).
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

na(snan) 'gal ba'i thal 'gyur, 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur, bsgrub bya dang mtshung pa and 'go(lmo) snyom. While rGya dmar ba’s work was obviously, generally speaking, influential on the composition of the sNying po, for what concerns the rebuttal of supporters of Candrakīrti, it does not provide enough elements that would suggest a re-use by Phya pa in the sNying po.

4.2. Tibetan supporters of Candrakīrti

Phya pa was in an ideal position to be directly acquainted with the views of Candrakīrti’s Tibetan supporters. The world of pro-Candrakīrti scholars was indeed blooming in Phya pa’s time. According to Śākya mchog ldan’s dBu ma rgya mtsho, Phya pa’s arguments against their views, which found their way into the sNying po, were triggered by a series of events including: Pa tshab’s return to Tibet and his gathering numerous disciples, including former students of Phya pa (rMa bya, gTsang nag pa); the arrival in Tibet of Jayānanda, who also taught a Candrakīrti-oriented Madhyamaka and attracted many disciples (Khu mDo sde ’bar, etc.)

and possibly a live debate between Phya pa and Jayānanda, in which Khu mDo sde ’bar may have acted as an intermediate.

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49 rGya dmar ba however uses elsewhere the expressions 'gal ba 'dus pa and 'gal ba sdud pa ("bringing together incompatible items"). For the first see dBu ma de kho na nyid 5a2. For the second see dBu ma de kho na nyid 3a8, where rGya dmar ba speaks of 'gal ba sdud pa la that ba byed pa ("drawing the consequence that two incompatible items are being brought together"). The consequence, in the case under discussion, is that the two truths, which are accepted to be ultimately one, would have distinct natures. See n. 35 on Phya pa’s use of the related expression 'gal ba ’du ba.

50 Pa tshab returned to Tibet around the year 1100. Jayānanda is estimated to have been active in Central Tibet between 1120 and 1140 (Vose 2009: 48 and 54).

51 dBu ma rgya mtsho, chap. 2, vol. 14, 53a6–b6 (p. 517–518). Śākya mchog ldan offers a more succinct account in his dBu ma byung tshul 13b5–7. On the debate, Śākya mchog ldan writes (dBu ma rgya mtsho 53b4): de’i tshes slob dpon phya pa dang | kha che ananda gnyis khu lo tshsa ba bar du brgyud pa’i rtsod pa byas pas phya pa rgyal lo zhes bya ba’i gtam du bya ba dag kyang snang la |. Note that Śākya mchog ldan specifies in the dBu ma rgya mtsho that he is reporting a hearsay ("there are some who report that...") [gdam du bya ba dag kyang snang!], and continues, saying “ji ltar yin yang rung ste,” which one can translate “whether or not this was indeed the case.” In the dBu ma byung tshul he omits this specification and just states that Phya pa debated with Jayānanda at the time the latter came to Tibet (13b6: de’i dus su phya pas dngos su brtsod...). Note that Śākya mchog ldan does not imply in either text that the portion of sNying po refuting Candrakīrti and others represents an account of the debate. Phya pa’s written arguments in treatises are rather presented in the dBu ma byung tshul as an “indirect” (rgyud nas) refutation and the debate as the occasion for a “direct” (dngos su) refutation.
4.2.1. rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus—The fourfold typology of arguments by consequence

Phya pa’s student rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus (d. 1185), although he had become a student of Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde ’bar and Jayānanda, nevertheless agrees with Phya pa in refuting scholars who hold the view that Mādhyamikas have no thesis at all and no means of valid cognition at all and who prescribe the exclusive use of arguments by consequences which rMa bya refers to as khas len na 'gal gyi thal 'gyur, khas len na 'gal gyi thal 'gyur or khas len nang 'gal gyi thal 'gyur to refute the views of others. rMa bya refuses this “extreme” view. He holds the absence of thesis and means of valid cognition to be true on the ultimate level, but on the conventional level, the Mādhyamikas can hold negative theses (in the context of a debate with an opponent) and even affirmative theses (e.g., dependent arising). The establishment of these theses, however, only relies on means of valid cognition that are acknowledged in the world, or by an opponent (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 163–168).

Another feature of rMa bya’s works relevant to our inquiry is that rMa bya subscribes to a fourfold typology of arguments, three of which are found among the types of arguments that Phya pa mentioned in his account of the refutation of arising by Candrakīrti and his followers. rMa bya thus lists in both the 'Thad rgyan (22a6–b3) and the De nyid snang ba (15a4–b3):

(i) gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag
(ii) ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur

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52 Previous studies on rMa bya are found in Williams 1985, Vose 2009 and Doctor 2014. rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus is probably identical with the rMa bya rTsod pa’i seng ge listed as one of Phya pa’s foremost students of epistemology, one of the “Eight Great Lions” (seng chen brgyad). He must be distinguished, however, from rMa bya Byang chub yes shes, Pa tshab’s “spiritual son.” (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: Section I §4.2)

53 Khas len na nang ’gal is found in De nyid snang ba 13a2 (’on kyang gzhan gyi phyogs ni khas len na nang ’gal gyi thal ’gyur tsam gyis ’gog pa yin te), khas len na ’gal in De nyid snang ba 14a7 (gal te tshad ma med kyang gzhan phyogs khas len na ’gal gyi thal ’gyur gyis ’gog go zhes kyang brjod par mi nus te). Khas len nang ’gal is found in a single occurrence of the expression in ‘Thad rgyan 21a6–b2: yang kha cig ... (VV 29) ces pa’i tshul gyis dbu ma pa la rang phyogs khas blang rgyu’i lta ba ci yang med pas de sgrub byed kyi tshad ma’ang med la’ gzhan gyi britags pa’i mtha’ thams cad khas len nang ’gal gyi thal ’gyur gyi ’gog pa yin no zhes zer ro ||
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

(iii) rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa’i ’go snyoms pa (/mgo snyom)\(^{54}\)
(iv) bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i ma grub pa

Although the expression “thal ’gyur” only occurs in the term for the second, all four are grouped under the heading “arguments by consequence” (thal ’gyur gyi rtags/thal ’gyur gyi gtan tshigs).\(^{55}\)

rMa bya also provides an explanation for each of the four types (in a slightly different wording in the respective texts):

♦ Type (i), gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag (“other-acknowledged inference”), eliminates the opponent’s view (A) by directly establishing the opposite thesis (nonA) for the opponent based on a logical reason (B) the three characteristics of which are accepted by the opponent. In other words, when the opponent accepts ‘S is B’ and ‘B entails nonA’, he is logically forced to accept nonA, which is opposite to his own view A.\(^{56}\)

♦ Type (ii), ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur (“consequence that expresses an incompatibility”) is defined as:

Bringing out the opposite (i.e., nonA) in the mind of the opponent, through an argument such that qualification of the subject (S is A), entailment (A entails nonB) and the elimination [of the derived conclusion (S is nonB)] are established for the opponent.\(^{57}\)

Such an argument draws from ‘A’ the consequence ‘nonB’ that the opponent does not accept, leading the opponent to reject ‘A’. This type can tentatively be equated with what Phya pa referred to as ’gal ba sdud pa’i thal ’gyur. That the difference is only terminological would be supported by the fact that Śākya mchog ldan, when paraphrasing Phya pa’s presentation in the dBu ma rgya

\(^{54}\) In the verse that presents the “four great consequences” (thal ’gyur chen po rnam bzhi) this type of consequence is referred to as ’go snyoms (De nyid snang ba 15a5)/mgo snyom (De nyid snang ba rtsa 2a3).

\(^{55}\) Anne MacDonald drew my attention to the fact that rMa bya hence considers here “other-acknowledged inference” (i) as a type of consequence, whereas Candrakīrti clearly distinguishes the two (see PsP §56–§60). I come back to this point below in Sections 4.2.2. and 4.2.3.

\(^{56}\) De nyid snang ba 15a7: tshul gsum pha rol po’i khas blangs kyi pha rol po’i blo ngor mtha’ gcig tu bsgrub pa. ’Thad rgyan 22a6–22b1: phyogs chos khyab pa pha rol la grub pa’i rtags kyi pha rol gyi ngor mtha’ gcig tu nges pa’i dam bca’ bsgrubs nas gzhan phyogs sel ba.

\(^{57}\) De nyid snang ba 15a7: phyogs chos khyab pa bsal ba pha rol po la grub pa’i rtags kyi pha rol gyi blo ngor bzlog pa’ phen pa. A similar definition is given in ’Thad rgyan 22b1–2: phyogs chos khyab pa bsal ba gsum pha rol la grub pas pha rol gyi ngor bzlog pa’ phangs pa’i sgo nas gzhan phyogs sel ba.
mtsho, rephrases ‘gal ba sdud pa’i thal ‘gyur as ‘gal ba brjod pa’i thal ‘gyur (see fn. 42 for the reference).

♦ rMa bya explains that type (iii) is an argument that “draws the parallel, by way of the reason being the same, that what it is a reason for also is the same.” He resorts to it on several occasion to establish entailment. rMa bya’s ‘go snyoms thus corresponds to ‘go snyom pa in Phya pa’s account.

♦ bsGrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i ma grub pa (iv) has two subtypes, the first of which—dngos por smra ba’i sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs par ma grub pa “a probans of the substantialists that is unestablished insofar as it is like something to be proven”—clearly corresponds to bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa in Phya pa’s portrayal.

In the De nyid snang ba, rMa bya states that the fourfold list of arguments by consequence is “of traditional origin” (15a6: rgyun lugs su ‘byung). He illustrates the use of each type in works by Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. For (i) he cites a verse from the MA which may correspond to MA VI.104 (the Tibetan is quite different from both Nag tsho’s and Pa tshab’s translations). For (ii) he cites a verse from MMK that corresponds to MMK IV.2 (also with a translation that differs from the canonical one). For (iii) he cites MMK XX.20cd, and for (iv) he cites MMK IV.8 (in which the expression bsgrub par bya dang mtshungs pa occurs in Tibetan for the Sanskrit samam sādhyena).

The fourfold typology found in rMa bya’s works is reported by several later Tibetan scholars. To mention a few: it is found for instance in the early fourteenth century doxography of dBus pa Blo gsal Byang chub ye shes as part of the Prāsaṅgika position linked with the name of Buddhapālita (Mimaki 1982: 176, 4–7 “rtags bzhi”), in Tsong kha pa’s (1357–1419) account of an opponent’s view and in the notes on this passage by ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721) (Mimaki 1982: 176, n. 475; see also below 4.2.3), in Śākya mchog ldan’s fifteenth-century dBu ma rgya mtsho, and in the sixteenth century gZhung lugs legs par bshad pa that was falsely ascribed to Sa skya pandita (Mimaki 1982: 176, n. 475). The fourfold typology is also mentioned by bCom ldan rig pa’i ral gri (1227–1305) in his doxography, by Rong ston Shes bya kun rig

58 Thad rgyan 22b2: rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa’i sgo nas rgyu mtshan can yang mtshungs par bsgr ba. Thad rgyan 15a7: rgyu mtshungs pa la rgyu mtshan can mi mtshungs par ’dod pa la mtshungs par smra ba ste.

59 dBu ma rgya mtsho, chap. 10, vol. 15, 11a5 (p. 547). Śākya mchog ldan cites the verse introducing these four in rMa bya’s De snyid snang ba 15a5.
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(1367–1449) in his commentaries on Candrakīrti’s works, as well as in Go rams pa’s commentary on the MA and in the works of Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507–1554). But what is its origin and the history of its transmission up to rMa bya?

Part of the terminology may actually be traced in Candrakīrti’s works. The PsP seems to be the source for the expression gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag. It might also be the source for the expression ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur. On the other hand, I am unaware of a technical term in Sanskrit that would correspond to the notion of ’go(mgo) snyom(s) or mgo bsgre. As noted, rMa bya quotes a verse from the MMK with the expression samam sādhyena in relation to the type of argument called sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa, which is known in Indian logic, including in some Madhyamaka texts, as the sādhyasama (see Mimaki 1982: 177–178, n. 479 for references). To the best of my knowledge, the fourfold typology itself is not found as such in any Indian work.

One can here exclude that rMa bya learned these types of arguments from Phya pa. Conversely, it is improbable that Phya pa would have been made aware of the equivalent arguments he ascribes to his Candrakīrtian opponent through his former students (I surmise, rather, that Phya pa’s Madhyamaka compositions were the works he taught his students at gSang phu). One must also keep in mind the terminological difference in the sNying po regarding rMa bya’s second type (ii) and the absence of the mention of “other-acknowledged inference” (i) in the sNying po.

rMa bya’s knowledge of the fourfold typology is more likely to come from one of his subsequent teachers, Pa tshab, Khu mDo sde ’bar or Jayānanda, or someone in their circle. However, rMa bya’s teachers Pa tshab and Jayānanda do not, as far as I know, mention this fourfold

60 Go rams pa’s discussion is dealt with in some details in Jackson 1987: 434–435, n. 156. Go rams pa also mentions a subdivision of mgo snyoms by gTsang nag pa (see Jackson 1987: 457, n. 216). The other references were found via a search of the e-texts available via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center. Unfortunately the correspondence to page numbers is unknown.

61 Mimaki (1982: 176, n. 476) points out PsP §57 and §58 as possible sources. Anne MacDonald also pointed out to me the discussion in PsP §28, §29 and §59–§60.

62 Mimaki (1982: 176, n. 477) mentions PsP ad MMK II.12 as a possible source for the term ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur. Note also Candrakīrti’s mention of virodhacodanā (Tib. ’gal ba brjod pa) in PsP §28, where this notion is, however, associated with that of “inference from [the opponent’s] own [point of view]” (svata evānumāna, Tib. rang gi rjes su dpag pa).

63 According to ’Gos lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal (1392–1481) Phya pa composed these treatises before occupying the chair of gSang phu ne’u thog (Deb sngon 405).
typology as a set, and neither discuss nor use the last two types (’go/mgo snyom(s) and bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa).

Two recently recovered works bring evidence for this fourfold typology before rMa bya.

4.2.2. The fourfold typology in a report of Atiśa’s teaching

The fourfold typology adopted by rMa bya is attested in an eleventh-century work said to report the teaching of Atiśa, the General Explanation of, and Framework for Understanding, the Two Realities (bden gnyis spyi bshad dang / bden gnyis ’jog tshul, hereafter: bDen gnyis spyi bshad). This work surfaced within the bKa’ gdamgs gsung ’bum collection and has been studied and translated by James Apple (Apple 2016 and Apple 2018a: 171–266). It provides us with evidence of a precedent for the view portrayed by Phya pa, before Candrakīrti’s works were translated into Tibetan and spread in Tibet. Apple draws out the following points in his summary of the contents of the work (Apple 2016: 634):

– Atiśa was a partisan of the view that Mādhyamikas hold no thesis.
– Reasoning refutes the erroneous views of the opponent, but does not invalidate the Mādhyamika proponent’s absence of acceptance.
– Mādhyamikas do not posit proofs, but arguments by consequence and other-acknowledged inferences.
– Means of valid cognition are only conventional.

On argumentative method, the bDen gnyis spyi bshad says:

\[
\text{slob_dpon kl}u \text{ sgrub kyi bzhung las} \mid '\text{gal ba rjod pa’i thal ’gyur : ltas snang yang sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa : mgo bsгре ba stе} \mid \text{khyed ’di ltar ’dod na rgyu mtshan khyad_par med pa’i phyir : ’di yang khas len dgos zha}s pha rol po dang sbral} \mid \text{g}zhan la gрагs pa’i rjes_dpаг } \mid \text{rang rgyud khas len pa ltar na yang khyed rang gi rig pa ’di dang ’gal zhes brjod pa stе } \mid \text{phyogs_chos dang khyab pa pha rol po dang ’brel te khas blangs (em. khas blangs Ms khas blangs kyi blangs) kyis grub pa’o } \mid \text{64}
\]

\[bDen \text{ gnyis spyi bshad 21b3[p.64]–22a2[p.65] (trans. in Apple 2016: 653, [706.16–20], see also Apple 2018a: 204). The notation } x_y \text{ indicates that the two syllables are written in an abbreviated form in the manuscript; “:” indicates a punctuation mark consisting of two vertically aligned dots. I am not sure how to make sense of the expression “ltas snang yang” before sgrub bya dang mtshungs pa. In view of rMa bya’s formulation of this type as bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i ma grub pa (“unestablished insofar as it is similar to what is to be proven”) and of later formulations in terms of sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa (“a probans}
The expressions that I marked in bold characters correspond to the four types of arguments in rMa bya’s list. They are here introduced in a different order, and the argument of “equality” is called mgo bsgr ba rather than ’go/(mgo) snyom(s) pa. A short explanation is only provided for mgo bsgr ba—explained with the phrase “If you accept this, you must also accept that, because the reason is not different”—and for gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag. While rMa bya tags the four arguments “arguments by consequence” (see fn. 55), this is not explicit in the bDen gnyis spyi bshad.

Nāgārjuna is named as the source of the various types, but no specific passages are cited in this regard. Like in the case of rMa bya (who links the fourfold typology with Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, see 4.2.1), the reference to Nāgārjuna appears to be an attempt to legitimize this typology, but the existence of an Indian textual source for the typology as such is questionable. Now, since the bDen gnyis spyi bshad claims to report Atiśa’s teaching, it would be possible that the fourfold typology was part of his teaching, in which case there would be an Indic origin for the four expressions. These expressions do not seem to appear in other works of Atiśa. They are not mentioned either in the early bKa’ gdam pa commentary on Atiśa’s Sayadvayāvatāra studied by Apple (Apple 2013 and 2018a: 123–170). Another possibility is that the fourfold typology mentioned in the bDen gnyis spyi bshad is a Tibetan addition supplemented in the course of the transmission of the record of Atiśa’s teaching.

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65 The explanation of other-acknowledged inference presents some difficulties. I understand it as follows: “One states: ‘In accordance to what is accepted [in] your own continuum (i.e., the triply characterized reason ‘B’), your own awareness (A) is incompatible with that (i.e., the thesis established by the other-acknowledged inference, ‘nonA’).’”

66 If “pha rol po dang sbrel” (“bound to the opponent”) is read with the first three arguments, this suggests that they are grouped in one category, while other-acknowledged inference stands apart. But this distinct status is just about its being qualified by the notion that “qualification of the subject and entailment are established via acceptance, in connection with the opponent” (phyogs chos dang khyab pa pha rol po dang ’brel te khas blangs kyis grub pa). The explanation of other-acknowledged inference (see the preceding note) might be understood as indicating that such an argument points out an incompatibility to the opponent, just like ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur.

67 A search in the e-text of Atiśa’s collected works (Beijing 2006) via the Buddhist Digital Resource Center did not yield any result for the four terms of the typology (not counting their occurrence in the bDen gnyis spyi bshad, which has been included in this publication by the editor of the collected works).
teaching up to the compilation of this text in the second half of the eleventh century.68

4.2.3 The fourfold typology in a work by Khun Mo sde ’bar (?)

Another interesting source is a short Madhyamaka work also published in the bKa’ gdamgs gsung ‘bum, the Slob dpon gyi lugs kyi bden pa gnyis ’chad pa, “Explanation of the two truths according to the system of the Teacher” (hereafter: bDen gnyis ’chad pa). An introduction to this work with an English translation was published by Apple (2018b). The work states that it reports the teaching of the two truths according to Candrakīrti based on Nag tsho Lo tsā ba (Atiśa’s student and first translator of Candrakīrti’s MA).69 On a few occasions, the view of Nag tsho is contrasted to that of the “Teacher,” who could possibly be an Indian teacher of the person writing the text. Also mentioned by name in the text are Pa tshab (1055–1145?) and the king of Guge bTsad po rTse ldan (reigned from 1057–1088), setting the late eleventh century as a terminus a quo for the composition of the text.

Discussing argumentative methods in the fourth section of the work, the author of the bDen gnyis ’chad pa distinguishes “proving consequences” (bsgrub pa’i thal ’gyur) and “refuting consequences” (sun ’byin pa’i thal ’gyur) (9.6–7)70 and claims that only the latter should be applied by Mādhyamikas to eliminate the opponent’s mistaken views (10.2). A refuting consequence performs two actions: directly, it “brings together incompatible items in the other’s mind” (gzhan gyi blo la ’gal ba bsdus/’gal ba sdud) and indirectly, it brings about the rejection of a philosophical system (7.2; 10.3–4).

Four varieties of consequences are listed (10.6), which correspond to the four types of arguments in rMa bya’s works (see 4.2.1) and in the eleventh-century work reporting Atiśa’s teaching (4.2.2):

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68 Apple assesses the work to have been compiled by a colleague or disciple of rGya lCags ri ba, who was a teacher of sGam po pa bSod nams rin chen (1079–1153). See Apple 2016: 623–627 and 2018a: 172–174.
69 Apple previously described this work as follows (Apple 2016: 622): “An outline to the system of the two realities of the Ācārya [Nāgārjuna]. The text discusses six points of difference between so-called “Consequentialists” (thal ’gyur ba, prāsaṅgika) and “Autonomists” (rang rgyud pa, svātṛantika) based on the views of Atiśa, and Tibetan scholars such Nag-tsho lo-tsa-ba Tshul-khrims rGyal-ba, rNgog lo-tsa-ba bLo-Ildan shes-rab, and Pa-tshab nyi-ma grags.”
70 These numbers refer to the Arabic numbers written on the folios, and to the line number. Note that this (modern) numbering of the folio does not reflect the actual order of the folio (nos. 11 and 12 are to be read between the pages numbered 4 and 5).
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

The terminology in the bDen gnyis 'chad pa is identical with rMa bya’s list, but the order is again different. This enumeration is followed by an explanation pertaining to each variety, except for the first, for which the author refers to a previous passage dealing with the refutation of the Sāṃkhya views on arising. The refutation of “arising from self” (7.2–9) includes a list of the tenets the Sāṃkhya opponent subscribes to (7.3–6); the statement of the “genuine consequence” (rnal ma’i thal ’gyur) (7.6–7); the rebuttal of an objection regarding entailment (7.7–8). The author does not indicate a source for the fourfold typology, but one can note that, when explaining the third (bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa), he cites MMK IV.8, the same verse that rMa bya cites to illustrate the use of this argument by Nāgārjuna.

Apple (2018b: 945–950) identifies the bDen gnyis 'chad pa as being a work by Khu mDo sde ’bar (ca. 1060–1140). The latter not only was a pupil of Pa tshab, a disciple and collaborator of Jayānanda, and a teacher of rMa bya (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 42–43), but was also reportedly involved as an intermediate in the debate between Phya pa and Jayānanda (see fn. 51). Khu mDo sde ’bar would thus be, from a circumstantial perspective, both an ideal source for rMa bya’s fourfold typology of arguments and an ideal candidate for Phya pa’s portrayal of the opponent’s view in the sNying po.

Apple bases his ascription of the bDen gnyis 'chad pa to Khu mDo sde ’bar in great part on the similarity of the contents of the text with the second view discussed by Tsong kha pa in his Lam rim chen mo (dated to 1402) and the identification of the proponent provided by 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa (1648–1721). The first view addressed by Tsong kha pa is that of Jayānanda; it includes a citation from the latter’s MA-ṭīkā (Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 156–159). Tsong kha pa introduces the second view as that of “the Lo tsā bas who are disciples of this paṇḍit [i.e., of Jayānanda]” (paṇḍi ta de’i slob ma lo tshsha ba dag). 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa identifies the proponent of the second view as “the translator Khu mDo sde ’bar and others” (khu lo la sogs). The view in question indeed

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72 On this passage of the Lam rim chen mo (675,5–676,19) see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 161–162 and Yoshimizu 1993. The beginning of the passage (up to the beginning of Tsong kha pa’s mention of the definition of each type), with ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s notes, is cited in Apple 2018b: 246 and n. 41.
matches the position of the author of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* regarding the claim of the Mādhyamikas holding no thesis of their own (at least when investigating ultimate reality).\(^{73}\) the rejection of autonomous arguments, and the exclusive use of arguments by consequence that refute the opponent but do not induce a proof (the distinction is drawn between “refuting consequences” [sun ’byin gyi thal ba] and “proving consequences” [(b)sgrub pa’i thal ‘gyur]). In particular, Tsong kha pa includes in the presentation of this view the four arguments: ‘gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur, gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag, sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa and rgyu mshan mtshungs pa’i mgo snyoms. (See Lam rim chen mo 675,15–676,7). The explanation of the four is far from being literally identical with that of the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* but presents relevant similarities, such as the mention, in the case of ‘gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur, that this “statement of incompatible items being brought together” (gal ’du brjod pa) leads the opponent to reject his philosophical system (grub mtha’ ’dor ba). In the *bDen gnyis 'chad pa*, the list of the four arguments is given when distinguishing the types of consequences. All four are thus considered to be instances of “consequences” like in rMa bya’s writings (see fn. 55).\(^{74}\)

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\(^{73}\) On this specific point, see the end of the account of the second position in Lam rim chen mo, translated in Yoshimizu 1993: 210, in which the proponent of this position defends the idea that not all assertions (’dod pa) amount to a thesis (dam bca’). See in this regard the discussion in *bDen gnyis 'chad pa* 13.8–10, in the more general context of the question whether prāsaṅgikas may hold negative theses. The author first concedes this possibility (13.8: rnam dpyad {for bcad} dgag pa’i dam bca de mod), highlighting the idea that such theses are established by a consequence expressing a contradiction (unlike positive theses that require an autonomous argument). He then point out that a negative assertion of the kind (rnam dpyad dgag par ’dod pa) does not amount to a thesis of one’s own (rang dam bca). The author’s mention of the statement that prāsaṅgikas have neither a positive nor a negative thesis (14.1: dbu ma thal ’gyur ba la yongs cod sgrub pa’i dam bca myed par ma zad | rnam bcad dgag pa’i dam bca yang myed do zhes bya ba) occurs in answer to the question whether asserting the refutation of others amounts to a thesis pertaining to the ultimate. One can thus understand the author to support the view that there is no thesis whatsoever with regard to the ultimate, but that negative theses are acceptable with regard to the conventional, provided they are established by consequence only.

\(^{74}\) ’Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s gloss on Tsong kha pa’s mention of “four [arguments]” (bzhi) splits the four into “three consequences and one logical reason” (thal ‘gyur gsum dang gtan tshigs gcig ste). The following gloss specifies that the “logical reason” is other-acknowledged inference and reformulates the other three types with the addition of the expression thal ‘gyur. Cited in Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 163, n. 73: de yang ’gal brjod kyi thal ’gyur dang gzhan la grags pa’i rjes dpag gam gzhan grags kyi gtan tshigs dang | sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i thal ’gyur dang rgyu mshan mtshungs pa’i mgo snyoms kyi thal ’gyur dang bzhi’o |
That Tsong kha pa had in mind Khu mDo sde 'bar when referring to “the translator, student of Jayānanda,” as 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa affirms, is a likely option, especially considering that Khu mDo sde 'bar’s name was famous in Madhyamaka circles at that time (see Apple 2018b: 949), and that an equivalent position is also ascribed to him by Go rams pa (Yoshimizu 1993: 211). It remains in question, however, whether Tsong kha ba based his account of this view on a written source or on orally transmitted information. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa’s mention of “others” indicates that Khu mDo sde 'bar’s position was shared by several scholars, thus opening further possibilities for the authorship of the bDen gnyis 'chad pa, although it is likely that its author, if he is not Khu mDo sde 'bar himself, is to be found within the circle of Khu mDo sde 'bar.

Regarding the possible relationship between Phya pa’s portrayal of the opponent in the sNying po and the bDen gnyis 'chad pa, in addition to the mention of the four types of arguments, an interesting feature is that the bDen gnyis 'chad pa contains the second set of three arguments against autonomous arguments that Phya pa mentions in the sNying po (iv, v and vi in §125.111.3). It is said that consequences are to be applied to eliminate the mistaken cognitions of others and superimpositions, because autonomous arguments are unnecessary (dgos pa myed), powerless (nus pa myed), and incorrect (mi rigs pa) in the Madhyamaka context (7.1–2ff.).

Especially noteworthy is also the connection made in the bDen gnyis 'chad pa between ’gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur and the idea of “bringing together incompatible items in the other’s mind” (gzhan gyi blo la ’gal ba bsdus/'gal ba sdud) (10.3–4), which is also expressed in terms of khas blangs ’gal ba ’dus pa and gzhan gyi khas blangs la ’gal ba sdud (pa) (7.2). The idea of “bringing together incompatible items” finds a precedent in the discussion of arguments by consequence in a Madhyamaka commentary included in the manuscript bundle published in the bKa’ gDams gsung ’bum (vol. 11) and ascribed to Pa tshab; more precisely, in the first of the three texts in this manuscript, which the colophon identifies as the teaching of Hasumati (= Mahāsumati, Pa tshab’s teacher in Kashmir). The author uses in this regard the expression ’gal ba bsum (pa). The term ’gal ba bsdus/sdud in the bDen gnyis 'chad pa is terminologically closer to Phya pa’s reference to this type of consequence in terms of ’gal ba sdud

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75 Go rams pa, however, does not include the fourfold typology of consequences in his account of Khu mDo sde 'bar’s view.

76 See Dreyfus/Tsering 2009 for a preliminary investigation of this material.

77 gSal byed 12a.1,3–4 (p. 51): gzhan gyi ’gal ba khyab pa’i chos khas blangs pa la thal ba’i sgo nas phyir rgol ba la ’gal ba bsum nas bzhag pa’i sgo nas ’gal ba khas len par byed pa’i sgo ’dogs khegs so
This expression is a specific feature of Phya pa’s portrayal in the *sNying po*, and so far I have not been able to find any evidence of a fourfold typology of arguments mentioning it in place of ‘gal ba brjod pa’i thal ’gyur, at the exception of Klong chen pa’s doxography, in which, as I argue earlier, the author is re-using Phya pa’s text.

While there are thus a number of remarkable features of the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* that would make it a potential candidate for being Phya pa’s source, there are also important differences. Just mentioned was the absence in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* of the specific expression ‘gal ba sdud pa’i thal ’gyur. Significantly also, in the refutation of arising from self, the author of the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* does not use the specific formulation ye nas yod pa for tenet A, an expression that Phya pa uses in the *sNying po* (and in the *sNang ’grel*, see 48a3ff.), but which other Tibetan scholars (at the exception, again, of Klong chen pa) do not typically use when discussing this argument. The initial argument addressed to the Sāṃkhya to refute arising from self (the “genuine consequence”) is phrased quite differently in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* than in the *sNying po*, and does not solve the issue of the entailment by appealing to follow-up arguments termed ‘go snyom and bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa’i ma grub pa. The counter-argument is formulated in the form of a classical consequence (7.8: thal ’gyur ‘god pa). The explanation of ‘go snyom (13.5–7) itself is illustrated by the “equality” between contrapositive statements. In addition, the short *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* does not discuss the other options of arising.

Another element that deserves consideration is the Tibetan translation of the verses cited in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa*. Several of the verses of the MA cited in *sNying po* §125.111 are also cited in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa*, namely, MA IV. 23, 24 (twice), 25 (twice), 28 (twice) and 29 (not cited are MA XII.4, MA IV.26, IV.30, and the three verses cited in the refutation of arising [a], [b] and [d]), as well as VV 29 and CŚ XVI.25. Apple’s analysis of the citations in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* showed that the translation corresponds to that of Patshab (to that of Jayānanda and Khu mDo sde ’bar in the case of VV) (Apple 2018b: 941, n. 22). There are a few minor variants with the canonical versions, and other variants which may have resulted from scribal mistakes. In contrast, as discussed in Section 2, the verses in the *sNying po* only side partially with the revised trans-

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78 The elements of the argument in the *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* are: skye ba (S), yod pa skye ba (A), don myed cing thug pa myed (nonB). *bDen gnyis ’chad pa* 7.6–7: grangs can gyi skye ba chos can | khyod skye ba don dang bcas shing thug pa dang bcas par ’dod kyang don myed cing thug pa myed par thal | bya ba dam bca | he du ni yod pa skye ba yin pa’i phyir dper na rgyu yod yod pa de yang skye na don myed par ’dod pa bzhin no | de ni rnal ma’i thal ’gyur yin no |
lation by Pa tshab, and would appear to precede Pa tshab’s revision of Nag tsho’s translation of the MA, and, for CŚ and VV, to reflect ancient translations prior the revisions by Pa tshab and by Jayānanda and KhumDo sde ’bar. Whether one should, on the basis of the verse citations, conclude that Phya pa portrays a follower of Candrakīrti who was active prior to the time the author of the bDen gnyis ’chad pa was writing is a disputable question. While the bDen gnyis ’chad pa attests the adoption of Pa tshab’s translations, it might be the case that other contemporaneous authors in the same circle were still using the earlier translations. It is also conceivable that Phya pa is drawing from earlier translations of the Indian works cited, which were known to him, although the scholars he portrays had actually already adopted the new translations.

It is also debatable what weight should be ascribed, for dating the sNying po and the position it portrays, to Phya pa not using the terms rang rgyud pa and thal ’gyur ba (see the Introduction), whereas these are profusely used in the bDen gnyis ’chad pa.

The differences pointed out above exclude that Phya pa’s portrayal is a re-use of the bDen gnyis ’chad pa, or even that it would be based on this work. Still, the similarities hint to Phya pa’s mediating source being part of the same intellectual circle as the author of this work, if not a precursor.

As noted before, Pa tshab and Jayānanda do not, as far as I know, mention the fourfold typology as a set, and neither discuss nor use ’go/ mgo snyom(s) and bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pa in their works. One can add to this the lack of terminological correspondence with the sNying po in their discussion on the refutation of arising. As such, they do not appear to be likely candidates for being the source of Phya pa’s portrayal. While the works of their pupils that are available show more similarities with the portrayal in the sNying po, they do not, on the other hand, account for the use of pre-Pa tshab translations of verses from the MA and for the expression ’gal ba sdud pa’i thal ’gyur. They highlight the prāsaṅgika/svātantrika division and adopt a fourfold typology of

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79 Vose (2009) discusses evidence that Jayānanda and Phya pa knew each other’s positions, especially regarding the understanding of Buddhahood and of the two truths (Vose 2009: 54 and 197, n. 90, and the detailed discussion in chap. 4). On the other hand, the excursus on argumentation in Jayānanda’s MA-ṭīkā, which is followed by the citation of an important portion of the PsP (on this excursus see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 157 and Vose 2010: 558), which includes the same verses of the MA, VV and CŚ as those cited in Phya pa’s account, does not provide evidence of Jayānanda engaging Phya pa’s arguments. There is also no literal correspondence between this passage and the sNying po that could suggest a re-use, by Phya pa, of a something like a preliminary version of the MA-ṭīkā.
arguments including “other-acknowledged inference.” whereas such elements are absent in the sNyin po, and do not combine 'gal ba sdud pa'i thal 'gyur, 'go/mgo snyom(s) and bsgrub bya dang mtshung pa in the refutation of arising. One should here keep in mind, as attested in the bDen gnyis sphyi bshad, that this fourfold typology is already attested in the late eleventh century, in the teaching lineage stemming from Atiśa’s oral teachings on Madhyamaka, a text which also does not mention the prāsaṅgika/svātantrika division. This speaks in favor of the fourfold typology being an element of Madhyamaka teaching that preceded Pa tshab’s return to Tibet and being passed on to Pa tshab’s students via another channel than the teachings of Pa tshab or Jayānanda.

It may seem too much of a platitude to conclude with the wish that further investigations of early Tibetan works will shed more light on the question of Phya pa’s source(s)—although I do hope this will be the case. The above discussion demonstrates, however, the remarkable steps forward that the newly available texts from the bKa’ gams gsung ’bum collection allow us to take in tracing the history of ideas in the early Tibetan tradition and in gaining a better sense of their dissemination among scholars of various lineages.

Acknowledgments

The work on this paper was generously supported by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) in the context of the project P23422–G15 “Early bKa’ gams pa scholasticism – Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge’s contribution.” A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the workshop “Candrakīrti and Beyond” (Austrian Academy of Sciences, IKGA, June 26, 2017). I wish to thank the participants for their useful feedback. The revised version benefitted from recent new studies by James Apple of Madhyamaka works in the bKa’ gams gsung ’bum, in particular his study of the bDen gnyid ’chad pa. I am grateful to him for sharing information on this topic and for his observations and questions, which helped me better determine a number of points. I am very thankful also to Anne MacDonald for her insightful comments and for helping to improve my English.

Another student of Pa tshab, Zhang Thang sag pa (ca. 1080–1150), uses arguments termed 'gal ba brjod pa'i thal ba, 'go snyom gyi thal ba and 'go snyom, and sgrub bya dang mtshung pa'i thal ba but does not define these notions or enumerate them as part of a fixed fourfold set. See Tshig gsal ti ka 64, 8–9; 65, 12–13; 74, 1–2 and 14. See Jackson (1987: 435, n. 156) for the reference to Śākya mchog ldan’s mention of scholars reporting a discussion of these reasonings by Zhang.
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

References

<table>
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<th>Year</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Khu mDo sde ’bar (?)</td>
<td>Slob dpon gyi lugs kyis bden pa gnyis ‘chad pa. bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum. Chengdu 2009, vol. 6,</td>
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<td>bDen gnyis ‘chad pa</td>
<td>Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, dBu ma bden pa gnyis rnam par bshad pa yi ge nyung ngus gzhung gsal bar byed pa. bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum, Chengdu 2006, vol. 6,</td>
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<td>bDen gnyis rnam bshad</td>
<td>Atiśa, bDen gnyis spyi bshad dang / bden gnyis ‘jog tshul. bKa’ gdams gsung ’bum. Chengdu 2009, vol. 64,</td>
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<tr>
<td>ČŚ</td>
<td>Āryadeva, Catuḥṣataka. Tib. in D3846.</td>
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dBu ma de kho na nyid


dBu ma byung tshul

gSer mdog pan chen Śākya mchog Idan, dBu ma'i byung tshul rnam par bshad pa'i gtam yid bzhin lhun po. The Complete Works (gSung 'bum) of gSer mdog pan chen Śākya mchog Idan, ed. K. Tobgey. Timphu 1975 [Reprint: Delhi 1988]), vol. 4, 209–248.

dBu ma rgya mtsho

gSer mdog pan chen Śākya mchog Idan, Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa'i mdzod lung dang rigs pa'i rgya mtsho. The Complete Works (gSung 'bum) of gSer mdog pan chen Śākya mchog Idan (see dBu ma byung tshul). Timphu 1975, vol. 14 (pha), 341–647 and vol. 15 (ba), 1–695.

De nyid snang ba

rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi rgyan de kho na nyid snang ba. bKa’ gdams gsung 'bum. Chengdu 2006, vol. 13, 753–820.

De nyid snang ba rtsa

rMa bya Byang chub brtson 'grus, dBu ma rigs pa'i tshogs kyi rgyan de kho na nyid snang ba'i rtsa ba/ dBu ma de kho na nyid snang ba'i rtsa ba. bKa’ gdams gsung 'bum. Chengdu 2006, vol. 13, 745–748.

Deb sngon

‘Gos lo tsä ba gZhon nu dpal, Bod gangs can yul du chos dang chos smra ji ltar byung ba'i rim pa bstan pa'i deb ther sngon po. Chengdu 1984.

Doctor 2014


Dreyfus/McClintock 2003


Dreyfus/Tsering 2009


Grub mtha’ mdzod

Klong chen rab 'byams pa Dri med 'od zer, Theg pa mtha’ dag gi don gsal bar byed pa grub pa'i mtha’ rin po che'i mdzod. Kun mkhyen Klong chen rab 'byams kyi gsung 'bum. Beijing 2009, vol. 15, 25–360
Who is the proponent of Candrakīrti portrayed by Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge?

**gSal byed**  

**gZhung rnam 'byed**  

**Hugon 2008**  

**Hugon 2012**  

**Hugon 2013**  

**Hugon 2015**  

**Jackson 1987**  

**Keira 2004**  

**Lam rim chen mo**  

**MA/MABh**  

**MA-ṭīkā**  
Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā (dbu ma la ’jug pa ’grel pa).* Tib. in D3871.

**MĀ**  
Kamalaśīla, *Madhyamakāloka.* Tib. in D3887.


PsP  Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*. References are to the edition and translation in MacDonald 2015.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge</td>
<td>Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, <em>dBu ma de kho na nyid kyi snying po</em>. T=Reference to the page and line numbers in Tauscher 1999a. bKa'=Reference to the folio and line number of the manuscript published in <em>bKa’ gdamgs gsung ‘bum</em>, Chengdu 2006, vol. 7, 15–129. The indications of sections ($) refer to the edition in Tauscher 1999a.</td>
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<td>'Thad rgyan</td>
<td>rMa bya Byang chub brtson ’grus, <em>dBu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ‘grel pa ’thad pa’i rgyan</em>. Rumteg 1975.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Reference</td>
<td>Citation</td>
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A further folio from Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* ad II.119–135, Göttingen Collection Xc 14/57*

Kazuo Kano
Komazawa University

While a complete text of Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* is preserved in the form of a Tibetan translation, its Sanskrit original has been known only in part. Fragments (in total 24 folios) of the Svārthānumāna chapter (= PV I) of this work were identified by Kazunobu Matsuda in the Sanskrit manuscript collection of Nepal’s National Archives in Kathmandu, and a transliteration of them was published by Inami, Matsuda, and Tani in collaboration. The present article reports on a further Sanskrit fragment of a different chapter of this work, namely, the Pramāṇasiddhi chapter (= PV II), found among another Sanskrit manuscript collection that was at one time preserved at Ngor monastery in Tibet. Unfortunately, only one folio has been identified so far; any remaining folios from the same chapter await to be found (though there is a report that refers to the existence of other folios of the chapter). It was the late Helmut Krasser

* I am very grateful to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson and all other participants of the reading sessions with him, both at Hamburg University and at Mahidol University, to Prof. Vincent Eltschinger and Prof. Chizuko Yoshimizu for reading my draft and making many valuable remarks, to Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for correcting my English, and to the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen for permitting me to use the plates of Xc14/57. This research was financially supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.

1 We have about 90% of the Sanskrit of the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* on the PVSV thanks to Karnakagomin’s *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā*, which often is little more than an update of Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā*.

2 According to Inami et al. 1992: vi, the 24 folios correspond to the Tibetan version: Derge Tōhoku no. 4220, Je, 101b7–103a4, 179a5–226a7, 230a5–235a7.

3 Textual reuses from the *Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā* in other Sanskrit works have been reported by Frauwallner, Steinkellner, and Iwata. See Inami et al. 1992: v.

4 See Steinkellner 1981: 287–288 n. 24 “The chapter in question is probably the second (*pramāṇasiddhi*). Prof. Tucci has confirmed the existence of these pages, but due to a reorganisation of the ISMEO-library they are not available at the moment.”

who encouraged me to study this fragment and supported me in doing so.

In the present paper, I shall first review the textual material and clarify the context of the work, and then provide a preliminary edition of the Sanskrit fragment of Śākyabuddhi’s text together with the corresponding part of Devendrabuddhi’s text glossed by Śākyabuddhi. A photographic reproduction of the fragment and detailed studies will be presented on another occasion.

Photographic plates Xc14/57

It was Gokhale (1968) who first studied photographic plates that include the folio in question. The plates (4 plates developed from exposures taken by Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana) are preserved at the K. P. Jayaswar Research Institute in Patna.⁵ Gokhale reports that the plates have the labels “Ṅ-Darśana 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B” (signifying Ngor monastery, Darśanagrantha [unidentified] philosophical work[s]), which were placed by Sāṅkṛtyāyana below the palm-leaf folios when they were photographed. As Gokhale reports, “these 36 pages contain apparently three different texts, including fragments of Mahāyānasūtrālāṃkārabhāṣya (abbr. MSABh) and Cakrasaṃvaravivṛti besides the present fragments of the Trīṃśikāvijñāntābhāṣya.”

The 36 pages of the 18 folios are distributed among the 4 plates as follows: plate 1 = Ṅ-Darśana 1A (recto sides of 9 folios); plate 2 = Ṅ-Darśana 1B (verso sides of 9 folios); plate 3 = Ṅ-Darśana 2A (recto sides of 2 folios) and Ṅ-Cakrasaṃvaravāri. 1A (recto sides of 7 folios); plate 4 = Ṅ-Darśana 2B (verso sides of 2 folios) and Ṅ-Cakrasaṃvaravāri. 1B (verso sides of 7 folios). Positive exposures of the same material were also made, and a corresponding set of plates is now preserved under shelf marks Xc14/56 and 14/57 at the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek in Göttingen: plate 1 = Xc14/57 plate 1; plate 2 = Xc14/57 plate 2; plate 3 = Xc14/57 plate 3 and Xc14/56 plate 1; plate 4 = Xc14/57 plate 4 and Xc14/56 plate 2.⁶ Copies of the plates are available through the reproduction service (i.e. digitized/ scanned copies) in Göttingen.

Gokhale identified the 11 folios of “Ṅ-Darśana” as Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s catalogue entry No. 66 “Darśanagrantha,” but the latter consists of only 4 folios.⁷ In fact, Gokhale deciphered only 2 folios from the

⁵ The negatives are probably also preserved at the institute.

⁶ See Bandurski 1996: 93 n. 271. Xc14/56 corresponds to Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 33, No. 71 “Cakrasaṃvaravivṛti.”

⁷ Gokhale 1968: 175 “The photographs in question seem to correspond to what has been described as No. 66 in the VIII. bundle, found in the Ngor
A further folio from Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikāṭīkā

Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya, leaving 9 folios aside. He simply mentioned the existence of the folios featuring the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya. Their precise contents were first clarified in Kano 2004 as follows.

Leaves contained in the photographic image Xc14/57

Xc 14/57, Plate 1 = Ṅ-Darśana 1A
- Leaf 1 = TrBh, fol. 10r, Lévi 1925: 24.4–25.10
- Leaf 2 = TrBh, fol. 12r, Lévi 1925: 27.29–28.25
- Leaf 3 = MSABh, fol. 23r, Lévi 1907: 52.8–53.19
- Leaf 4 = MSABh, fol. 32r, Lévi 1907: 72.22–73.22
- Leaf 5 = Pramāṇavārttikāṭi, fol. 27r: D4220, Nye 115b7–116b5
- Leaf 6 = MSABh, fol. 41r, Lévi 1907: 93.20–94.19
- Leaf 7 = MSABh, fol. 42r, Lévi 1907: 95.21–96.23
- Leaf 8 = MSABh, fol. *27r, Lévi 1907: 58.24–60.7
- Leaf 9 = MSABh, fol. 47r, Lévi 1907: 106.24–107.25

Xc 14/57, Plate 2 = Ṅ-Darśana 1B
- Leaf 1 = TrBh, fol. 12v, Lévi 1925: 28.25–29.17
- Leaf 2 = MSABh, fol. 23v, Lévi 1907: 53.20–54.22
- Leaf 3 = Pramāṇavārttikāṭi, fol. 27v: D4220, Nye 116b5–117b3
- Leaf 4 = MSABh, fol. 32v, Lévi 1907: 73.22–74.17
- Leaf 5 = MSABh, fol. 41v, Lévi 1907: 94.19–95.21
- Leaf 6 = MSABh, fol. 42v, Lévi 1907: 96.23–98.1
- Leaf 7 = MSABh, fol. *27v, Lévi 1907: 60.7–61.15
- Leaf 8 = MSABh, fol. 47v, Lévi 1907: 107.25–109.5
- Leaf 9 = MSABh, fol. 54v, Lévi 1907: 124.26–126.6

Xc 14/57, Plate 3 = Ṅ-Darśana 2A
- Leaf 1 = MSABh, fol. 58r, Lévi 1907: 133.18–135.10
- Leaf 2 = MSABh, fol. 54r, Lévi 1907: 123.20–124.26

Xc 14/57, Plate 4 = Ṅ-Darśana 2B
- Leaf 1 = MSABh, fol. 58v, Lévi 1907: 135.10–136.10
- Leaf 2 = MSABh, fol. 54v, Lévi 1907: 124.26–126.6

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monastery of Tibet...” See Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 33 (No. 66) “Ṅor, Vol. VIII.4; (Darśanagrantha); Kutilā; 21⅓ x 2 inches; 4 leaves, 6 lines; incomplete.” There is another “Darśanagrantha” (3 leaves) in the same bundle preserved at Ngor, but it has 8 lines per folio, whereas our folios usually contain 6 lines. See Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1935: 33 (No. 69) “Ṅor, Vol. VIII.4; (Darśanagrantha); Kuṭilā; 21⅓ x 2 inches; 3 leaves, 8 lines; incomplete.”
The plates “ṑ-Darśana” 1A and 2B display eleven folios containing text fragments of three works, namely, the Trīṃśikābhasya (2 folios), the Mahāyānasūtraśāstra (8 folios), and Śākyabuddhi’s Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (1 folio). The eight folios of the MSABh correspond to 23, *27, 32, 41, 42, 47, 54, and 58 (see Table 2; the folio number of fol. 27 cannot be clearly seen on the photograph). A folio from the Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā hidden among these leaves was not reported by Gokhale.

**Concordance of MSABh folios in Xc14/57**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>pp. 52.8–54.22</td>
<td>= ad X.9–ad XI.3</td>
<td>Kano 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>*27</td>
<td>pp. 58.25–61.15</td>
<td>= XI.14–ad XI.27</td>
<td>Kano et al. 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41–42</td>
<td>pp. 93.20–98.1</td>
<td>= ad XIV.25–ad XV.2</td>
<td>in preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>pp. 106.24–109.5</td>
<td>= ad XVI.27–XVI.40</td>
<td>in preparation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>pp. 123.20–126.5</td>
<td>= ad XVII 26–XVII.39</td>
<td>Kano 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>pp. 133.18–136.10</td>
<td>= XVIII.8–XVIII.24</td>
<td>in preparation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**A description of the manuscript**

The size of the folios is unknown. In the case that our manuscript corresponds to Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s catalogue No. 66, as Gokhale asserts, it would be 21⅓ x 2 inches. The script is the type commonly seen in Nepalese Sanskrit manuscripts of around the twelfth or thirteenth century. Most parts of the leaves are legible on the photographic plates, any damage being minimal.

**Context**

Our fragment starts from Śākyabuddhi’s sub-commentary (ṭīkā) on Devendrabuddhi’s commentary (pañjikā) ad PV II.119. According to Eltschinger (2011: 44), “at PV II.34b–119, Dharmakīrti presents his arguments in favor of rebirth.” Eltschinger (2011: 45) summarizes PV II.120–131ab as asserting that “as a result of a constant practice over a myriad of successive lifetimes, the mental quality of compassion gradually

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8. *Trimśikābhaśya*, fol. 12r was not photographed, while MSABh, fol. 54v was photographed twice.
forms the very essence of the mental continuum, to the detriment of opposing mental events (dharma)." PV II.131cd–135 further discusses compassion and issues relevant to it (moving from the commentary on ājñaddhiṣṭita to the commentary on śāstṛtva, both of which are qualities of the Buddha taught in the opening verse of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya). The following table is a concordance of the basic verses of the Pramāṇavārttika, the corresponding commentary on them in Devendrabuddhi’s paññikā (preserved only in Tibetan) and sub-commentarial passages from Śākyabuddhi’s tīkā (Tibetan text and the Sanskrit fragment preserved in Xc14/57).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PV</th>
<th>Devendrabuddhi (D4217, P5717)</th>
<th>Śākyabuddhi (D4220(^{11}); Ms = Xc14/57)</th>
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<tr>
<td>II.119</td>
<td>D51r4–v4; P57v6–58v8</td>
<td>D115r6–116r4; Ms 27r1–3 (= from D115v6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.120–123</td>
<td>D51v4–52v5; P58v8–59v5</td>
<td>D116r4–7; Ms 27r3–4</td>
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<td>D52v5–53r2; P59v5–60r2</td>
<td>D116r7–v2; Ms 27r4–5</td>
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<td>II.125</td>
<td>D53r2–5; P60r2–7</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.126</td>
<td>D53r5–v2; P60r7–v6</td>
<td>D116v2–3; Ms 27r5–6</td>
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<td>II.127</td>
<td>D53v2–4; P60v6–61r1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.128</td>
<td>D53v4–7; P61r1–4</td>
<td>D116v4; Ms 27r6</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.129</td>
<td>D53v7–54r2; P61r4–7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.130</td>
<td>D54r2–6; P61r7–v4</td>
<td>D116v4–7; Ms 27r6–v1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.131</td>
<td>D54r6–v2; P61v4–62r1</td>
<td>D116v7–117r2; Ms 27v1–2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.132</td>
<td>D54v2–55r2; P62r1–v3</td>
<td>D117v2–v2; Ms 27v6</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.133</td>
<td>D55r2–v4; P62v3–63r7</td>
<td>D117r2–v2; Ms 27v2–6</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.134</td>
<td>D55v4–56r4; P63r7–v8</td>
<td>D117v2; Ms 27v6</td>
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<tr>
<td>II.135</td>
<td>D56r4–v1; P63v8–64r6</td>
<td>D117v2–6; Ms 27v6 (= up to D117v3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 For other relevant studies, see Eltschinger 2011: 43 n. 1.
10 Devendrabuddhi, D54v2: brtse ldan (PV II.132a) zhes bya ba la sog pa ston pa nyid (*śāstṛtva) ’chad par byed de brtse ldan te.
11 This part corresponds to bsTan ’gyur: dPe bsdur ma (Beijing, 2002), vol. 99, 284.13–291.4.
Devendrabuddhi on PV II.119

Since, for a precise understanding of our text, it is necessary to identify the passages in Devendrabuddhi’s commentary that are the target of Śākyabuddhi’s glosses, I shall briefly review such passages.

PV II.119 is located at the end of a series of refutations of the position of a Lokāyata who asserts that a mind in this life (existing in a body) does not take rebirth in the next life.12

tasmān na hetuvāikalyāt sarveṣām anyacetasām
asandhir īdṛṣaṃ tena sēsavat sādhanāṃ matam || PV II.119 ||

It is therefore13 not the case that due to the absence of a cause14 there is no connection [to the next life] for any kind of mind at the final moment [of this life]. Such reasoning (īdṛṣaṃ sādhanāṃ, i.e., anyacittavādi) is therefore considered to be sēsavat (“admissive of exceptions,” or, according to PVV, anaikāntikam “inconclusive”).15

12 Namai 1996 is very helpful for understanding the background. Namai (1996: 312) provides materials relevant to the Lokāyata’s disproof of rebirth—that is, the argument rejected in PV II.119: Kamalaśīla, TSP on v. 1938: ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnvatāt tagatayor api cittayor naikah santānah. “Because the bodies of this life and the next life are separate, there is no single continuum for the two [separate] minds that accompany them (i.e. the bodies of this and the next life).” See also PVA 105.21 (see below), cited below in fn. 17.

13 The word tasmād is glossed by Devendrabuddhi (D51r4) as “Since it is established that the body is not the material cause (*upādāna) of the mind” (gang gi phyir lus sens kyi nye bar len par gyur pa ma yin par bsgrubs pa de’i phyir). Cf. also Manorathanandin’s PVV cited below in n.16.

14 The word hetuvāikalyāt is glossed by Devendrabuddhi (D51r4) as: lus kyi ’byung ba’i rgyu dang bral ba’i phyir, which in turn is explained by Śākyabuddhi (D115r5) as: lus kyi ’byung ba’i rgyu dang bral ba’i phyir zhes bya ba la | lus kyi bdag nyid can gyi ’byung ba gang yin pa de nyid rgyu yin la | de dang bral ba’i phyir zhes bya ni ngag gi don to. According to these commentators, the word hetuvāikalyāt means “due to the absence of a cause of the arising of [a mind] which has the body as its nature.”

15 Cf. PVV 53 on PV II.119 (words from the verse are bold-faced): yataś cittam eva cittasya hetuh, tryñākarmasahāyāṃ ca pañcāyatanaś, tasmān na vaikalyāt sarveṣām antyacetasām asandhiḥ cittasya pañcāyaś, ca hetuvāikalyāt, kāryot-pādasyāvaśyāmbhāvitvā | tenedṛṣam antyacittavādi sēsavad anaikāntikam sādhanām matam [ ].

For the sādhana mentioned here, see PVV 26 on PV II.45–46: maranacittatvāc cittāntarāpratisandhānam arhaccaramacittavad. “[A Devadatta’s mind at its final moment] does not continue over to the mind in [his] next life because, like an Arhat’s mind at the final [moment before nirvāṇa], it is a mind at death” and TSP on v. 1863: sarāgasya maranacittam cittāntaram na pratisandhatte maranacittavād arhaccaramacittavad. Cf. also PVA, v. 420: yad yan maranavijñānam na taj jāmnāntarāṅgum | tac cittavād yathā vātadosyasya mṛtivedanam [ ].

For sēsavat in this particular context in PV II, see Kataoka 2003: 169–172. See also Franco 1996: 127 n. 87.
Devendrabuddhi’s precise statement of the Lokāyata’s position is found as a *prayoga* in his commentary on PV II.119:

\[
\text{lus tha dad pa la gnas pa nyid kyi phyir | 'jig rten gzhan du mngon par 'dod pa'i lus la gnas pa can gyi sems ni sems gzhan dang nying mtshams sbyor ba ma yin te | skyes bu gzhan gyi sems bzhin no |}
\]

(Devendrabuddhi, D51r6)

Since [the mind in this life and the mind in the next life] exist in separate bodies (*bhinnadehavṛttitvāt*), therefore in the next life (*paraloke*) the mind, which, as admitted [by you] (*abhyupagatam*), exists in a body (*dehavṛttam cītītān*) is not connected to a mind in the next [life] (*cītītānāṃ na pratisandhitē*), just as the mind of another person [in this life is not connected to the mind of someone else] (*puruṣāntaracittavāt*).\(^\text{16}\)

Devendrabuddhi then demonstrates that this *hetu* (i.e. *bhinnadehavṛttitvāt*) in the Lokāyata’s statement is not valid when it comes to proving the discontinuity of the mind after death. Criticizing the expression *bhinnadeha*, Devendrabuddhi states that the mind of two different bodies (i.e. one in this life and another in the next life) has a continuity of its own, just like the continuity between a seed and its sprout, and admits of a linear continuation of a particular set of five āyatana throughout all existences as a basis for a certain single sattva (which is, of course, just nominally existent).\(^\text{17}\) In this regard, one’s bodies in this and the next lives are just different states of such a single continuity.\(^\text{18}\)

Devendrabuddhi goes on to criticize the same *hetu* (i.e. *bhinnadehavṛttitvāt*) in the Lokāyata’s statement is not valid when it comes to proving the discontinuity of the mind after death. Criticizing the expression *bhinnadeha*, Devendrabuddhi states that the mind of two different bodies (i.e. one in this life and another in the next life) has a continuity of its own, just like the continuity between a seed and its sprout, and admits of a linear continuation of a particular set of five āyatana throughout all existences as a basis for a certain single sattva (which is, of course, just nominally existent).\(^\text{17}\) In this regard, one’s bodies in this and the next lives are just different states of such a single continuity.\(^\text{18}\)

\(^{16}\) The Sanskrit words supplied in brackets are taken from PVA 105.21: *ihalokacittān cītītānāṃ na pratisandhitē, bhinnadehavṛttitvāt, devadattacittavāt.* “The mind in this life is not connected to the mind in the next life, for they exist (*vṛtti*) in separate bodies, just like the mind of Devadatta (which is not connected to the mind of someone else).” Cf. also Śākyabuddhi, Skt. fragment in X14/57, fol. 27r1: *puruṣāntaretyādi,* and Devendrabuddhi, 51v3 (*skyes bu gzhan*).

\(^{17}\) See Devendrabuddhi, 51r7–v1: *lus dag ni rang bzhin tha dad pa tsam gyis nying mtshams sbyor ma yin te | sa bon dang myu gu dag rang bzhin tha dad kyang mtshams sbyor ba'i phyir ro |.* (Translation) “It is not the case that there is no connection/continuity [between the mind in this life and the mind in the next life] merely because the two bodies [of one person] (i.e. one in this life and the other in the next life) have their own different natures. This is because[,] for instance[,] although a seed and its sprout have their own different natures, there is a continuity [between the two].” See also ibid. 57v1: *de bas na rgyud tha dad pa'i lus la gnas pa can nying mtshams sbyor bar mi 'gyur ba de yang grub pa ma yin te | skye ba thams cad la skye mched lnga'i khyad par nrams ni sems can du btags pa geig gi rien nyid yin pas du ma la ma mi 'jug pa'i phyir ro |.* The expression “linear continuation” has been supplied by the present author.

\(^{18}\) See Devendrabuddhi, 51v1–2.
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haṃśrītivāt), now focusing on the word vṛtti (i.e. *dehe cittasya vṛttih*), rejecting the “existence” (vṛtti) of the mind in the body. He discusses *indriyavigñānas*’ dependency on their corresponding *indriyas*, stating: “There is no fault even if there is the ‘arising’ (*utpatti*) of an *indriyavigñāna* with the help of its base (*tadāśrayena*, i.e., *indriya*, implying the body).”

He then states: “Likewise (i.e. even as *indriyavigñānas* arise with the help of *indriyas*), the mind is not a state being supported [by an external base] (*ādheyabhāva*), inasmuch as the mind (lit. *citta* and *caitta*s) does not exist (*vṛtti*) in an external/cognitive object (*viṣaya*, that is, a base for the cognition); [rather, the mind arises (*utpatti*) with the help of a base of its own].”

He thus denies the mind’s existence (*vṛtti*) in the body but accepts the mind’s arising (*utpatti*) with the help of a base of its own (i.e. the *indriya/body or its viṣaya*).

Our Sanskrit fragment of Xc14/57 numbered fol. 27r starts from Śākyabuddhi’s gloss on this same statement of Devendrabuddhi’s, but there are some textual problems at its beginning. The fragment starts with the following passage: [... ...] (the first three *akṣaras* are yet to be deciphered)33 *tarādheyabhāvenāvasthānaṃ dehe cittasya vṛttih, kim tu tadāśrayenotpattir eva*. Its corresponding passage in the Tibetan translation runs: 'gyur ba ni 'dod na brten pa nyid kyi sgo nas lus la sems

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19 See Devendrabuddhi, 51v2: lus la gnas pa bkag pa'i phyir ma grub pa yin no.
20 Devendrabuddhi, D51v2 (see also, below, edition §119.1): *dbang po'i rnam par shes pa de'i rten gyis bskyed pa yang skyon yod pa ma yin no*. The corresponding Sanskrit of the words *de'i rten gyis bskyed pa* is probably *tadāśrayenotpattiḥ*, as attested in our fragment, fol. 27r1.
21 Cf. Śākyabuddhi, Skt. fragment in Xc14/57, fol. 27r1: -ādheyabhāvena.
22 Devendrabuddhi, D51b2–3: *'di ltar de dag ni rten pa'i ngo bo ma yin te|sens dang sens las 'bying ba dag ni yul la mi gnas pa'i phyir ro||*. This suggests the following undesirable consequence: if the mind were something spatially supported, then it would exist upon an (external) base, namely a base for the cognition, that is, an external object of cognition.
As a preamble to this statement of Devendrabuddhi’s, Śākyabuddhi introduces the Lokāyata’s position, namely, insofar as *indriyavigñānas* arise (*utpatti*) in dependence on *indriyas*, one should also accept the mind’s existence depending on the body. Śākyabuddhi, D115v5–6: *dbang po la brten nas skye na ni lus la brten nas skyes par khas blangs pa nyid yin te*.
23 The first three *akṣaras* look like syā da bhya, but are difficult to reconstruct into a meaningful phrase.
Both the Tibetan rendering *ma yin* and the conjunctive *kim tu* (which implies the syntax: *na ... kim tu ... “it is not the case ..., but rather ...”) in our fragment suggest the existence of a negative particle *na* in the first half of the passage. This cannot be made out in our fragment (and may have been written on the previous folio, which is yet to be discovered). As a conjecture, I thus supply *na* at the beginning and read the passage as follows:

\[*na ...* .. .. .. *tarādheyabhāvenāvasthānam dehe cittasya vr̥ttiḥ, kim tu tadāśrayenotpattir eva*

It is not the case (*na, ma yin*) that the mind’s “existing” (*vr̥ttiḥ*) in the body means [its] abiding/resting (*avasthānam*) by virtue of its state of being supported [by an external base] (...)*25*, but rather (*kim tu*), it means just [the mind’s] “arising” (*utpattiḥ*) with the help of its own basis.*26*

Śākyabuddhi then notes that Devendrabuddhi makes a further point:

\*[tathā ca nāsiddho hetur ity ata āha — *tadutpattau ca vr̥ttāv iti.*

And [the Lokāyata may] say: “In such a case (i.e. if the mind arises with help of its base), [our] *hetu* is not *asiddha*.” [To refute this, Devendrabuddhi] therefore says: *tadutpattau ca vr̥ttau.*

This is a preamble to the following passage of Devendrabuddhi (D51v3) (bold-faced words are attested in Śākyabuddhi’s Sanskrit text, and non-bold Sanskrit words are my reconstruction based on the Tibetan text):

(Tibetan text) *de las skye ba yang gnas pa yin na skyes bu gzhān* gyi *lus yul du ‘gyur ba las kyang skye ba’i phyir | de la gnas pa’i sems ni gzhān la mṭshams sbyor ba’i phyir ma nges pa yin no | | (See edition §119.1, below.)

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*24* Unfortunately, the first three *akṣaras* in the manuscript are unclear, and also the corresponding words in Tibetan, *‘gyur ba ni ’dod na (“if the transformation (*vikāra*) [of indriyas] is admitted [by Lokāyata as the meaning of the word *vr̥tti*]”)*, are unclear to me.

*25* We may expect something like *itara or anyatra* in the undeciphered *akṣaras* (*.. .. .. tarā*), “by virtue of its state being supported by something else” (*anyatatādheyabhāvena*).

*26* As the texts of our fragment and the Tibetan text obviously belong to two different recensions, as shown by some cases below, in the passage in question these two versions probably do not correspond with each other exactly.

*27* Śākyabuddhi, D115b7–116r1: *de ltar gtan tshigs ma grub pa ma yin no zhe na | de’i phyir de las skyes pa yang gnas pa yin no zhes bya ba smos te...*. 
(Reconstruction) *
tadutpattau ca vṛttau satyām, puruṣāntaradehād
viṣayabhūtād apy utpatteh, tatra vṛttaśya cittasyānyatra pratisandhā-
nād anekāntah syāt.

(Translation) And if the expression “[the mind] arises from this (tadutpattau)” meant “when [the mind] exists (vṛtti),” then [the mind] would [be able to] arise (utpatteh) even from someone else’s body serving as an external object; therefore, the mind that exists in it (i.e. in its own body) would be connected to [the mind] in someone else’s [body]; therefore, [the hetu of the Lokāyata’s statement, namely, *bhinnadehavṛttitvāt] should be uncertain.29

Devendrabuddhi continues (D51v3–4):

gal te dbang po 'gyur pa na 'gyur ba'i phyir dbang po dang 'dra bar
lus la gnas pa yin30 no zhes na ma yin te | yul gyi 'gyur bas kyang snang
ba tha dad pa'i phyir 'di gtan tshigs ma yin no sgrub par byed pa yang
lus rten yin pa la bsal31 ba la sogs pas bshad zin pa (...)(See edition
§119.1, below.)

One may say: “When an indriya is transformed (indriyavikāre), [its corresponding indriyavijñāna] is [also] transformed; therefore, just as [the indriyavijñāna exists] in [its corresponding] indriya, [the mind ought to] exist in the body.” [But] this is not the case; [for] manifestations [as they appear to the indriyavijñāna] vary due to the transformation of external objects, too (*viṣayavikāreṇāpi), [and not only due to the transformation of an indriya alone]. This (i.e. *bhinnadehavṛttitvāt) is therefore not a [valid] hetu. And its sādhana has already been declared (*vihitaṃ) [in PV II.39] with the rejection of a body as a base, etc. (āśrayanirāśadinā)

In this way, Devendrabuddhi establishes the invalidity of the Lokāyata’s argument and thereby refutes a position that negates the next life. The

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28 This corresponds to Śākyabuddhi’s paraphrasing atā āha — tadutpattau ca vṛttāv iti (fol. 27r1). Devendrabuddhi points out an undesired consequence if one takes the word vṛtti in the sense of tadutpatti. Śākyabuddhi glosses this as: dehād utpattir eva yadi tatra cittasya vṛttir iṣyate tadaivapraṅkārā vṛttir viṣayabhūte ’pi dehe vidyate. “If one admits that the very arising (utpatteh) [of the mind] from the body means the existence (vṛtti) of the mind in it (i.e. in the body), there would be [the possibility of] a kind of existence (vṛtti) even in a body that is an external/cognitive object (i.e. someone else’s body).”

29 Uncertain, that is, with regard to the sādhya, namely, *cittāntaram na pratisandhatte.

30 yin ] em.; ma yin DP (Peking = no. 5717, Che, 58r7). This emendation is based on the understanding that the opponent (the Lokāyata) takes the position that the mind exists in the body (i.e. lus la gnas pa yin).

31 bsal ] em. (acc. to -nirāsa- in our fragment); gsal DP (Peking = no. 5717, Che, 58r8).
existence of a foundation (i.e. *saṃsāra*) for the constant practice of compassion over a myriad of successive lifetimes (PV II.120ff.) is thus established.

**Devendrabuddhi on PV II.120–123**

Since Eltschinger (2011: 44ff.) has extensively studied PV II.120–128, I need not repeat this passage here. In his gloss on verses II.120–123, Devendrabuddhi states two *prayogas* of Dharmaṅkīrti’s position, and glossing these two *prayogas*, Śākyabuddhi states (fol. 27r3):

\[
\text{prathame prayoge } \text{manoguṇatvam hetuḥ, dvitīye } \text{bhīyāse sati viśiṣyamāṇatvam iti viśesāḥ.}
\]

In the first *prayoga*, the *hetu* is “being a mental quality,” while in the second [it] is “being enhanced when practised continuously.” This is the difference [between the *hetus* of the two *prayogas*].

**Devendrabuddhi on PV II.124**

PV II.124 is translated by Eltschinger as follows:

\[
kāṣṭhapāradahemāder agnyāder iva cetasi | 
abhyāsajāḥ pravartante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ ||
\]

[Mental qualities] of the likes of compassion[, joy and equanimity], which arise as a result of constant practice, proceed spontaneously in the mind, just as wood, mercury or gold [change spontaneously] due to fire[, to alchemical processes] or to [heat in an isolation chamber].

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32 For a translation, see Eltschinger 2011: 46, 48.

33 For the two *prayogas*, see Devendrabuddhi §120ff.1 in my edition, below. These two *prayogas* are summarized by Eltschinger (2011: 44–45): “Then follow two formal arguments (*prayoga*) using a *svabhāvahetu* as evidence and taking great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) as their subject. In the first case, the evidence, ‘being a mental quality’ (*manoguṇa*), is said to imply the property to be proven, namely, ‘to become the entire essence of man if its practice is extreme[ly intense]’. In the second case, the property of ‘being a mental quality that [always] improves with constant practice’ is said to imply the property of ‘gradually becoming the essence of man as a result of an extreme[ly intense] practice.’”


34 See Eltschinger 2011: 49.
Devendrabuddhi, glossing the word kṛpādayaḥ (II.124d), states: “the word ādi includes [the remaining members of the four brahmavihāras, namely,] muditā, upeksā, etc.”

Śākyabuddhi, in turn, goes into the definitions of muditā and upeksā individually. Then he moves on to an explanation of the examples (wood, mercury, gold, etc., heated by fire, etc.) proffered in verse II.124ab. Devendrabuddhi explains the chemical operation involving mercury (pārada or pārata) as follows:

In the same way, with regard to mercury, there is [the chemical operation starting with] “preparing/combining” (sbyor ba, *yoga), going on to “actualizing [of the medicine]” (spyod pa, cāraṇa), etc., and ending with “binding” (*dzin pa, *bandha).

In his gloss, Śākyabuddhi explains this on the basis of the rasāyana terms cāraṇa, jāraṇa, māraṇa, and bandha as follows (fol. 27r5):

\[
\text{cāraṇam} \text{ tasmin bandhanīye pārade ausadhānāṃ prakṣepaḥ |}
\text{prakṣiptānāṃ tatraiva kṣapaṇāṃ matam jāraṇam | kataman māraṇam}
\text{ ity ata.ucyate — dṛḍhatāpattir bandhaḥ}
\]

[The word] cāraṇa “actualizing” is [defined as] introducing medicinal herbs into the mercury to be bound (bandhanīya). [The word] jāraṇa “digesting” is understood as the dissolving (kṣapaṇa) of the [medicinal herbs] introduced in that same [mercury]. What is the “killing” (māraṇa) of the [mercury]? [Reply: It is] the binding (bandha) [of it], that is, making [the mercury] firm.

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35 Devendrabuddhi, D52v5: sogs pa smos pas ni dga’ ba dang btang snyoms la sogs pa bzung ngo

36 Fol. 27r4: pareṣām anavadyasaumanasyābhidhyānapravṛttā cittasumanaskatā muditā | anunayapratighaḥhetau viṣaye rāgapratighavivṛttaḥ cittasumanaskatāupeksā |

37 Fol. 27r4–5: kāṣṭhapāratahemāder īti āṣṭhī | agnyāder īti paṅcamāti, agnyādeḥ sakāśāti | yathā kāṣṭhādeḥ sambhūtā bhamādayaḥ svarasena pravarttante tadvac cetasi kṛpādaya īti |.

38 Or “processing [the mercury],” or “making it move.”

39 Devendrabuddhi, D53r1: de bzhin du dngul chu’i yang sbyor ba dang spyd pa la sogs pa’i bar du ‘dzin pa zhes bya ba ni mthar phyin pa’o | |. See edition §124.2, below.

40 See Meulenbeld 2008: 2A.

41 The Tibetan translation does not seem to have precisely equivalent words. See Śākyabuddhi, D116v2: dngul chu’i yang sbyor pa ni dngul chu mi ‘thor bar bya ba de la sman blugs pa zad pa gang yin pa de spyd pa zhes bya ba brjod do | |. The words cāraṇam and bandhaḥ probably correspond to spyd pa and ‘dzin pa, respectively, in Devendrabuddhi’s text (D53r1, see above). For these terms relating to the rasāyana operational procedure, see Hellwig 2009: cāraṇa (ibid. 97–98), jāraṇa (ibid. 169–176), māraṇa (ibid. 234–236), bandhana (64–67). I owe these references to Prof. Somdev Vasudev.
Devendrabuddhi on PV II.126

Devendrabuddhi repeats verse II.126cd in words of his own:

How (kutah, gang las) could those kinds (tāsām īdṛśīnāṃ) of a mind of compassion, etc., stagnate (sthiīh) when they practise continuously (saty abhyāse) in accordance with [repetitional practice] (yathābhīyāsam, cf. Tib. ji ltar)?

Śākyabuddhi (fol. 27r5) glosses this verse: “[‘Those kinds of a mind’ refers to those] who reach a form of increase (i.e. maturity) which accords with repetitional practice” (abhīyāsānurūpāṃ vrddhiṃ gacchantīnām). Still concerning the same verse, Devendrabuddhi states that “with regard to the second [instance of] sādhya, there is an observation of what contradicts the pervader” (i.e. something that stands in contradiction to the pervader is observed) (dvitiyāsādhyāpekṣayā vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ). “The second [instance of] sādhya” means here the “stagnation (sthiīh)” of a mind of compassion, which is an undesirable consequence (the verse rules out stagnation in the development of a true mind of compassion). Śākyabuddhi explains that the compound vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi refers to “the mind’s increase/development growing out of a previous seed of the same type” (fol. 27r5–6: tulyajātīyapūrvabījapravṛddhitvam).

Devendrabuddhi on PV II.131

In his gloss on PV II.131, Devendrabuddhi explains that verses II.34 up to 131ab are Dharmakīrti’s commentary on Dignāga’s word jagaddhitaiṣin in the opening verse of the Prāmaṇasamuccaya:

The nature of striving for the good of the world (jagaddhitaiṣitvam) has already been explained (vyākhyātāṃ) in the verses starting from

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Prof. Madhu Parameswaran suggests that the word svarasa (cf. PV II 124d: svarasena) is a special kind of medicine used for the māraṇa process, and may well have a double meaning in the verse. For the word svarasa in the Āyuvedic context, see, for instance, Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasamhitā by Vāgbhaṭa, 5.6.9–10ab: sadyah samuddhṛtāt kṣuṇṇād yaḥ sravet paṭapīḍitāt svarasaḥ sa samuddiṣṭah ... “What flows from the pressed cloth [bundle] containing crushed [herbs] that are freshly plucked is well indicated as the ‘own juice’(svarasaḥ)” (I owe this source and its translation to Prof. Parameswaran in a personal communication on 1 June 2019.)

42 For PV II.126, see Eltschinger 2011: 50.
43 Devendrabuddhi, D53r7: ji ltar de ’dra ba’i brtse ba la sogs pa’i blo de dag ni goms yod yin na gnas gang las. See edition §126.1, below.
44 See the last part of Devendrabuddhi, §126.1 in my edition, below.
Śākyabuddhi has a preamble introducing this statement of Devendrabuddhi’s, but it is unfortunately unclear both in our Sanskrit fragment and in the Tibetan rendering. The fragment reads: *doṣaprahāṇaṃ siddha bhuddha bu[ddhyā] .. .. .. nn āha — *jagaddhitaśītvaṃ vyākhyātam iti.* The Tibetan version suggests a different reading: *nyes pa spangs pa ’og nas bsgrub par ’gyur ba blo la grub par mdzad nas ’dir smos pa yin no* (Śākyabuddhi, D117r1). I have not come up with a conclusive solution for emending this preamble.

### Devendrabuddhi on PV II.133

Glossing PV II.133ab: *yuktyāgamābhyaṃ vīṃśaṃ duḥkkahetum* “investigating the cause of suffering with the help of reasoning and scriptures,” Devendrabuddhi states (D55r3–4 = edition §133.1; the boldfaced words are paraphrased by Śākyabuddhi in our fragment):

(Tibetan text) *re zhog lung* *mang po de la dmigs nas des bstan pa’am sgrub pa rnam par dpyod pa yin gyi (= vīṃṣaṃ, 133a) rigs pa nyid kyis ’ga’ zhog gi tshe ’jug par ’gyur ba (...)*

(Reconstruction) *bahavas* (or: *bahūn*) *tāvad āgamān upalabhya*

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45 Devendrabuddhi, D54v1–2: sgrub byed thugs rje goms pa zhes bya ba nas brtsams te | chags bracl chags dang mi gtsang bzhin zhes bya ba’i bar ’dis ni ’gro la phan par bzhed pa nyid bshad pa yin no |. See edition §131.2, below.

46 The following is an excerpt of the image (beginning from *ṣaprahāṇaṃ* up to āha) of the manuscript, fol. 27v2, the middle column.

47 One might reconstruct this Tibetan sentence as, for instance, *doṣaprajñānordhvaṃ sādhyāṃ buddhuḥ (blo la) sādhyānāṃ āha.*

48 We might, with the help of Prof. Isaacson’s suggestion, tentatively conjecture: *doṣaprahāṇaṃ siddham buddhasyeyi (or buddha iti) sādhyānāṃ āha— *jagaddhitaśītvaṃ vyākhyātam iti* (“In order to establish that the abandonment of faults is completed for/in the Buddha, [Devendrabuddhi] says: *jagaddhitaśītvaṃ vyākhyātam.*”). Since the *jagaddhitaśītva* is a quality of the Buddha, this conjecture is not impossible in this context. The word *blo la* (*buddhaḥ*) in the Tibetan translation might be a confused rendering of *buddhe/buddhaya*.

49 l*n* P (P5717, Che, 62v4); *lus* D.

50 Although the Tibetan version seems to have *bahūn* instead of *bahavas*, I follow Śākyabuddhi’s Sanskrit paraphrasing. But the present context, especially the verbs *vīṃṣaṃ* (or *vīṃṣati*) and *pravartate*, suggests a single grammatical subject
tadupadarśitam vānuṣṭheyam vā vimṛṣati (or: vimṛṣan, cf. 133a), yuktyaiva kadācit pravartate.

(Translation) He (i.e. bodhisattva) after studying many (bahavas = bhāhūṇ) scriptures first investigates (vimṛṣati) [the means of overcoming the cause of suffering] (upāyaṃ, acc. to Śākyabuddhi) that was taught in the [scriptures] (tadupadarśitam) or that is to be practised (anuṣṭheyaṃ), [and then he examines its characteristics, that is, impermanence, etc., on the basis of the particular features of that same suffering (parīkṣate tasyāṇītīdirūpam ca duḥkhasyāva viśeṣaṇaih = 133bcd)]; but in some cases (kadācit), he proceeds (pravartate) only through reasoning (yukti).

Conventions

boldface words of Devendrabuddhi’s pañjikā paraphrased in Śākyabuddhi’s ūṭīkā
( ) restorations
[ ] damaged akṣara(s)
. missing portion (consonantal or diacritic vowel sign) of a partially legible syllable
.. akṣara yet to be deciphered
* reconstruction of Sanskrit text

(i.e. the bodhisattva) and not a plural (“many people,” bahavas), and accordingly, the reading bahīṇ with āgamān is more natural. If we keep Śākyabuddhi’s Sanskrit paraphrasing (i.e. bahavas), we can interpret bahavas as accusative instead of nominative, which is quite rare but not unattested, as mentioned by Renou (Grammaire Sanscrite, §247, 3, p. 354). For a study on this and relevant passages, see Eltschinger 2005: 398–399.


Preliminary Edition\(^{51}\)

[II.119]

tasmān na hetuvaikalyāt sarveśām antyacetasām

| asandhir īdṛṣaṃ tena śeṣavat sādhanaṃ matam|

(Devendrabuddhi) (...)\(^{52}\)

§119.1\(^{53}\) **dbang po’i rnam par shes pa de’i rten gyis bskyed pa** yang skyon yod pa ma yin no || ’di ltar de dag ni rten pa’i ngo bo ma yin te | sems dang sems las ’byung ba dag ni **yul la mi gnas pa’i phyir ro** ||

§119.2\(^{54}\) **de las skye ba yang gnas pa yin na skyes bu gzhän gyi lus yul du ’gyur ba las kyang skye ba’i phyir | de la gnas pa’i sems ni gzhän la mthams sbyor ba’i phyir ma nges pa yin no ||** gal te dbang po ’gyur pa na ’gyur ba’i phyir dbang po dang ’dra bar lus la gnas pa yin\(^{56}\) no zhe na ma yin te | yul gyi ’gyur bas kyang snang ba tha dad pa’i phyir ’di gtan tshigs ma yin no || **sgrub par byed pa yang lus rten yin pa la bsal\(^{57}\) ba la sogs pas bshad zin pa** de ltar na skye ba dang ’chi ba’i rgyun grub pa de ltar na snying rje la sogs pa’i yid kyi yon tan rnam goms pa yod pa dang | shin tu goms pa yod pa na de’i bdag nyid du gyur pa ’gal ba yod pa ma yin no ||

(Śākyabuddhi) (...)

§119.1\(^{58}\) **de ltar na lus la gnas pa nyid yin no zhe na | dbang po’i rnam par shes pa** zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | gzhän ni brten pa nyid kyi sgo nas lus la sems gnas par ’dod de | de ltu bur gyur pa’i gnas pa yang

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\(^{51}\) For the reader’s convenience, I provide three additional texts in my edition: (1) corresponding verses of the *Pramāṇavārttika*, (2) words of Devendrabuddhi’s *pañjikā* glossed by Śākyabuddhi, and (3) Śākyabuddhi’s text preserved in our fragment Xc14/57, in that order. To clarify their correspondences, I add section numbers (with “§” section marks) to Devendrabuddhi’s and Śākyabuddhi’s texts. I omit Devendrabuddhi’s text when it is not glossed by Śākyabuddhi. For Tibetan texts, I consulted the Derge Tanjur as the main standard; when there were textual problems, I collated the portion in question with the Peking Tanjur. As for the translation of PV II.120–131b, I basically follow Eltschinger 2011.

\(^{52}\) The sign (...) here and elsewhere indicates the omission of text from (in this case) Devendrabuddhi’s commentary by the present editor (here, for instance, the omitted part is D51r4–v1).

\(^{53}\) Devendrabuddhi, D51v2–3.

\(^{54}\) Devendrabuddhi, D51v3–5.

\(^{55}\) For a Sanskrit reconstruction of this passage, see the introduction.

\(^{56}\) *yin* ] *ma yin* DP.

\(^{57}\) *bsal* ] *gsal* DP. See the introduction.

\(^{58}\) Śākyabuddhi, D115v6–7.
A further folio from Śākyabuddhi’s *Pramāṇavārttikāṭīkā*

§119.2 
\[59\] The first three *aṅgaras* are not clear in the Ms. As for the interpretation of this passage, see the introduction.

\[60\] Śākyabuddhi, D115v7: ’gyur ba ni ’dod na brten pa nyid kyi sgo nas lus la gns pa ni ma yin gyi ’on kyang de la brten nas skye ba nyid yin no [ ].

\[61\] Here, the *hetu* is *bhinnadehavṛttitvāt*. See Devendrabuddhi, D51r6: lus tha dad pa la gns pa nyid kyi phyir (*bhinnadehavṛttitvāt*) ’jig rten gzhan du mngon par ’dod pa’i lus la gns pa can gyi sens ni sens gzhan dang nying mtshams sbyor ba ma yin te ’skyes bu gzhan gyi sens bzhin no [ ].

\[62\] The Tibetan translation does not have corresponding words for *ānekāntadarśana*: rang gi rgyud la nying mtshams sbyor ba’i phyir ma nges par ’gyur ro, which could be reconstructed as *svasāntāne pratisandhānād anekāntaḥ syāt*. The phrase *ānekāntaḥ syāt* is from Devendrabuddhi, D51v3: ma nges pa yin no [ ].

\[63\] The word *bhāva* corresponds to the suffix -*tvā*; that is, Śākyabuddhi understands *āśraya-nirāsāḥ* in the sense of *āśrayatvā-nirāsāḥ*.

\[64\] PV II.39: pratyekeṃ upaghāte ’pi nendriyāṇāṃ manomateḥ | upaghāto ’sti bhangे *syās tesaṃ bhangaś ca drṣyate* [ ]. “Even when sense faculties are individually damaged, manomati (i.e. manovijñāna) will not be damaged. If, however, there is destruction of it (i.e. manomati), the destruction of them (i.e. the sense faculties) will be observed.” This verse shows that the body, for all its sense faculties, is not a base for the mind. For a Japanese translation, see Inami 1997: 14.
II.120–123

abhāṣena viśeṣe ’pi laṅghanadakatāpavat
svabhāvātikramo mā bhūd iti āhitaḥ sa cet
punaryatnam apekṣeta yadi syād asthirāśrayaḥ
viśeṣo naiva vardheta svabhāvaś ca na tādṛśaḥ
tatropayuktaśaktīnām viśeṣān uttarān prati
śādhanānām asāmarthyān nityaṃ cānāśrayasthīteḥ
viśeṣasyāsvabhāvatvād vrddhāv apy āhito yadā
nāpekṣeta punaryatnam yatno ‘nyaḥ syād viśeṣakṛt

(Devendrabuddhi) (...) §120ff.1

§120ff.2

dper na shin tu legs par goms par byas pa can gyi skyes bu mchongs pa na 
| yul cung zad cig gnor par byed kyi | dpag tshad dam rgyang 
grags phyed dam | rgyang grags sam lhag pa ma yin pa lta bu’o | (...)

§120ff.3

gang rang gi ngang gis ’jug pa ma yin te | dper na ’dod chags 
la sogs pa lta bu’o | gang zhig yang bya ba’i phyir ’bad rtsol la ltos pa ji 
ltar du bshad pa’i phul du ’byung ba 
rcnams kyi snying rje chen po yang 
goms pa las khyad par can du ’gyur ro 
zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so | (...)

(Sākyabuddhi) §120ff.1

śrotriya eva kramaṇa nairghṛṇyābhāyasāj 
jottiṅgaḥ kāpāliko bhavati | prathame prayoge manoguṇatvāṃ hetuḥ,
dvitiye 68 bhāyāse sati viśisyaṃaṇāt
vavam iti viśeṣah 69

§120ff.2

ūrdhvam ceti yojanāt pareṇa dvitriyojanādikam | tathā cāha

65 Devendrabuddhi, D51v5–7. The prayoga no. 1 is attested in PST, chapter 1, p. 9.7–9: ye manogunāḥ, te ‘tyantābhāyāsasambhave sati sātmībhavanti, śrotriya-
joṭiṅganairghṛṇyavat

66 Devendrabuddhi, D52r2.

67 Devendrabuddhi, D52r6–7.

68 dvitiye ] em.; dvitiye Ms.

69 viśeṣah ] em.; śeṣah Ms. Tib. reads: khyad par ro. For the two prayogas, see
Devendrabuddhi, §120ff.1. Here Śākyabuddhi clarifies the difference (viśeṣah) 
between the hetus in these two prayogas.
kumārilah —

dasaḥastāntaram vyomno yo nāmotplutya gacchati |
nāsaṃ kraśasaṭaṃ gantuṃ śaktō ’bhyaśaśatair \[27r4\] api \[70\]
iti |
§120ff.3 yathā rāgādaya iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ | te hy abhyāsavaśāt
svarasapravṛtttayo na bhavanti\[71\] | yathokte ’tiśaya iti laṅghanādilakṣaṇe |

[II.124]

cāṣṭhapatradahemāder agnyāder iva cetasi
abhyāsajāhi pravartante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ

(Devendrabuddhi) (...) §124.1\[72\] sogs pa smos pas ni dga’ ba dang btang
snyoms la sogs pa bzung ngo || ci dang ’dra bar zhe na |
me la sogs pa shing dag dang ||
dngul chu dang ni gser sogs bzhin || (II.124ab) (...)
§124.2\[73\] de bzhin du dngul chu’i yang sbyor ba dang spyod pa la sogs pa’i
bar du ‘dzin pa zhes bya ba ni mthar phyin pa’o || sogs pa smos pas ni de lta
bu’i rigs can zangs ma la sogs pa gzhan dag la yang rtogs par bya’o || (...)

(Śākyabuddhi) §124.1 pareṣām\[74\] anavadyasaumanasyābhidhyānapravṛttā\[75\]
cittasumanaskātā muditā | anunayapratīghatetā viṣaye rāgapratīghaviviktacittasamatopekṣā\[76\] | kāṣṭhapatradahemāder\[77\] iti śaṣṭhī |
agnyāder iti pañcamī, agnyādeḥ \[27r5\] sakāśataḥ | yathā kāṣṭhādeḥ sambhūtā

70 This is a quotation from Kumārilas’s Brhaṭṭīkā, which is cited also several times
in other works.
71 na bhavanti | em.; bhavati Ms. Tib. reads *na bhavanti (D16r6–7: ’dod chags la
sogs pa goms pa can gyi de dag rang gi ngang gis ’jug par mi ’gyur ba lta bu’o), and
Devendrabuddhi also reads *na bhavanti (D52r6: gang rang gi ngang gis ’jug pa
ma yin te).
72 Devendrabuddhi, D52v5–6.
73 Devendrabuddhi, D53r1.
74 pareṣām | em.; pareṣāmm Ms.
75 °saumanasyābhidhyānapravṛttā Ms. The word abhidhyāna means either
“thinking about” or “desiring.” Both meanings are possible here. Cf. Tib.:
gzhan dag gi (D gis) kha na ma tho ba med pa’i yid bde ba nyid ni dga
ba’o ||, °pareṣām anavadya-cittasumanaskatā muditā for pareṣām anavadya-
asumanasyābhidhyānapravṛttā cittasumanaskatā muditā (Ms); a phrase
corresponding to °saumanasyābhidhyānapravṛttā is not found in the Tibetan
version (possibly because the Tibetan translator confused saumanasya for
sumanaskatā, such as due to eyeskip).
76 °samatopekṣā | em.; °samatāpekṣā Ms.
77 PV II.124. (pārata = pārada).
bhasmādayaḥ svarasena pravarttante tadvac cetasi kṛpādaya iti |
§124.2 cāraṇam⁷⁸ tasmin bandhanīye pārate ausadhānāṃ prakṣepaḥ |
praksiptānāṃ tatraiva ksapanāṃ matam⁷⁹ jāraṇam | kataman⁸⁰ māraṇam⁸¹ |
ity ata ucyate — dṛḍhatāpattir bandhāḥ⁸²

[II.126]

yasmāc ca tulyajātiyapūrvabījapravṛddhayah
kṛpādibuddhayas tāsāṃ saty abhyāse kutah sthitiḥ

(Devendrabuddhi) (...) §126.¹³ jī ltar de 'dra ba’i brtse ba la sogs pa’i blo
de dag ni |
goms yod yin na gnas gang las || (II.126d)

(The word ’dzin pa (= bandha) is Devendrabuddhi’s word, while the word
dṛḍhatāpatti seems to be Śākyabuddhi’s own explanation. Note that the Tibetan
translation of Śākyabuddhi’s text is slightly different from the Sanskrit. See
Śākyabuddhi, D116v2: dngul chu'i yang sbyor pa ni dngul chu mi 'thor bar bya
da la sman blugs pa zad pa gang yin pa de spyod pa zhes bya bar brjod do ||.

(Śākyabuddhi) §126. tāsāṃ īdṛśināṁ yathābhyaśam iti|
abhyāsānurūpāṃ vrddhiṃ gacchantināṃ ity arthaḥ |
sthitivṛtikasya tulyajātiyapūrva, bījapravṛddhirahitatvam vyāpakam, tadviruddhaṁ |
ca tulyajātiyapūrvabījapravṛddhivatvam iti dvitīyasādhyaṃ pekṣayā |
cyāpakaviruddhopalabdhīḥ |

⁷⁸ cāraṇam ] em.; kāraṇam Ms |
⁷⁹ matam ] Msac; matam ra Msac. |
⁸⁰ kataman ] conj., satat Ms. Tib. gang. |
⁸¹ māraṇam ] em.; maraṇam Ms. |
⁸² The word ’dzin pa (= bandha) is Devendrabuddhi’s word, while the word
dṛḍhatāpatti seems to be Śākyabuddhi’s own explanation. Note that the Tibetan
translation of Śākyabuddhi’s text is slightly different from the Sanskrit. See
Śākyabuddhi, D116v2: dngul chu'i yang sbyor pa ni dngul chu mi 'thor bar bya
da la sman blugs pa zad pa gang yin pa de spyod pa zhes bya bar brjod do ||.

⁸³ Devendrabuddhi, D53r7–v2. |
⁸⁴ īdṛśinām ] em. īdṛśanām Ms. |
⁸⁵ Devendrabuddhi, D53r7: jī ltar de 'dra ba’i brtse ba la sogs pa’i blo de dag ni....
Here the word yathābhhyāsam corresponds to ji ltar (yathā). The Tibetan version
of Śākyabuddhi’s text (D116v2), too, reads: jī ltar de 'dra ba’i brtse ba la sogs pa’i
blo de dag. See also the introduction.
[II.128]

tasyādaun dehavaiguṇyāt paścādvad avilaṅghanam sanair yatnena vaigunye niraste svabale sthitih

(Devendrabuddhi) §128.1 gal te stobs dang ’bad rtsol dag las mchongs pa yin gyi | rang gi rigs las ’jug pa can ni ma yin te | ’di ltar goms pa’i dus phyis skyes bu’i sa ji tsam chod pa can gyi mchongs pa yin pa de ltar sngar yang ci’i phyir mi ’gyur zhe na | de ni skyes bu’o | | (...)  

(Śākyabuddhi) §128.1 paścādvad iti sūtrapadām tadyathābhyāsād ūrdhvaṃ ity anena miśrikṛtya vyācaṣṭe | svabale sthitir ity anena vyavasthitotkarṣatvam āha |

[II.130]

tathā hi mūlam abhyāsāḥ pūrvaḥ pūrvah parasya tu kṛpāvairāgyabodhādeś cīttadharmasya pāṭave

(Devendrabuddhi) (...) §130.1 sogs pa smos pas ni yid kyi yon tan gzhan yang bzungngo | brtse ba la sogs pa ci ’dra ba zhig gi zhe na | semschos kyi’o | | (...)  

§130.2 sbyor ba yang sngar thob pa’i khyad par ’bad rtsol med par ’jug pa yod pa de’i gnas skabs can gyi yid kyi chos goms pa gang yin pa de yang de las khyad par lhag par byed pa can yin te | dper na sngar byas pa’i yid kyi chos kyi khyad par goms pa lta bu’o | | (...)  

(Śākyabuddhi) §130.1 ādigrahaṇād anyasyāpi mānasasyeti mudito-pekṣādeḥ | kṛpāvairā[27v1]gyabodhāder ity uktam | tad eva pṛcchati —
§130.2 tasyāhitasya manodharmasya viśeṣādhānād abhyāsas tanmanodharmābhyāsah [98] yathā pūrvam āhitaviśeṣasya manodharma-syābhyāsa [99] iti śāstraśilpakarmādiśy āhitaviśeṣasyety arthaḥ [100]

[II.131]

kṛpātmakatvam abhyāsād ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat nispannah karuṇotkarṣaḥ paraduḥkhākṣameritaḥ

(Devendrabuddhi) §131.1[101] ci dang 'dra bar zhe na | chags bral chags dang mi gtsang bzhin (= II.131b: ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat) | dper na grol ba rnams kyi bde ba dang sdug bsngal dag la skyo ba dang skyo ba med pa'i mtshan nyid can gyi chags pa dang bral ba'i bdag nyid thob pa lta bu'o ||

§131.2[102] sgrub byed thugs rje goms pa (= II.34a: sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsāt) zhes bya ba nas brtsams te | chags bral chags dang mi gtsang bzhin (= II.131b: ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat) zhes bya ba'i bar 'dis ni 'gro la phan par bzhet pa nyid (cf. Pramāṇasamuccaya, opening verse: jagaddhitaiṣिन) bshad pa yin no ||

(Śākyabuddhi) §131.1 sukhaduḥkhayor udvegānudvega, [27v2] laksanam iti sukha udvego 'saktatā, duḥkhe 'nudvego 'pratighātaḥ,

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95 kidṛśasya] em.; kidṛśasya Ms.
96 oāder] em.; oāde Ms.
97 manodharma] em.; manodharma° Ms.
98 Devendrabuddhi’s word tanmanodharmābhyāsah corresponds to the rendering of the pañjikā: de'i gnas skabs can gyi yid kyi chos goms pa (but our Sanskrit fragment does not have anything corresponding to gnas skabs can gyi). The Tibetan version of Śākyabuddhi’s text is different from our Sanskrit fragment (D116v6: yid kyi chos byas pa de khyad par du bya ba'i phyir | goms pa ni yid kyi chos goms pa gang yin pa de ni'o ||).
99 manodharmābhyāsa] conj.; manodharmābhyāsa Ms. This is a dṛṣṭānta in the prayoga formulated by Devendrabuddhi (D54r4–6).
100 Concerning śilpakarmādi, see, for instance, pañcavidyāsthāna (e.g. MSABh on XI.60: pañcavidham vidyāsthānam — adhyātmavidyā hetuvidyā śabdavidhyā cikitśavidyā śilpakarmasthānavidyā ca).
101 Devendrabuddhi, D54r6–7.
102 Devendrabuddhi, D54v1–2.
103 (Translation) “The [Buddha’s] nature of striving for the good of the world (jagaddhitaiṣिन) has already been explained in the verses starting from sādhanaṃ karuṇābhyāsār [PV II.34a] up to ghṛṇāvairāgyarāgavat [PV II.131b].”
vāsīcandanaikalpatvam iti yāvat

§131.2 dosaprahaṇam siddham buddha iti sādhyann āha — jagaddhitaisītvam vyākhyātam iti | pramāṇasamuccayanamaskāraśloke jagaddhitaisīṇa āha ity etad padam vyākhyātam ity arthaḥ |

[II.133]
yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimrśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate
tasyāṇityādirūpam ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣanaiḥ

(Devendrabuddhi) §133.10 brtse ba dang ldan pa de’i sdug bṣngal bcom pa’i phyir sbyor ba bang yin zhe na | lung dang rigs pas (yuktyāgamābhyāṃ = II.133a) zhes bya ba la sogs pa smos te | re zhiṅ lung108 mang po de la dmigs nas des bstan pa’am sgrub pa rnam par dpyod pa yin gyi riṅs pa nyid kyis ’ga’ zhiṅ gi iṣhe ’jug par ’gyur ba de ltar na lung smos pa yin no |

§133.2108 skye ba’am mtshan nyid can gyi sdug bṣngal ’di’i rgyu ni gang yin | gang nye bar bcom pa las ’di bsal bar bya ba yin zhe na | de de ltar na rgyu tsam yongs su dpyod pa las ’di rgyu med pa can du mi ’gyur bar mḵhyen nas rgyu bkag pas de’i ’bras bu bcom par nus so zhes bya bar thugs su chud pa yin no |

104 Eltschinger has correctly reconstructed this phrase of Devendrabuddhi’s as su-kha duḥkhayor udvegānudvegalakṣaṇam, which is attested in our fragment. For details, see Eltschinger 2011: 51, n. 40. The word vāsīcandanakalpa is a wide spread term referring to an Arhat’s indifferent attitude toward anything and anyone, expressed here as his having an indifferent attitude toward someone torturing him with an axe (vāṣi), on the one hand, and toward someone else smearing him with sandalwood paste (candana), on the other. See, for instance, Tanigawa 1994 (and a series of his study of this term) as well as Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 269–271.

105 dosaprahaṇam siddham buddha iti (or buddhasyeti) sādhyann āha] conj., dosaprahaṇam siddha ba[ddhyā] ... ... nn āha Ms. This is a tentative conjecture (for its translation, see the introduction). The Tibetan version of Śākyabuddhi’s text reads: D117r1: nyes pa spangs pa ’og nas bṣgrub par ’gyur ba blo la grub par mḍad nas ’dir smos pa yin no.

106 Pramāṇasamuccaya, opening verse.

107 Devendrabuddhi, D55r2–4. For a Sanskrit reconstruction of part of this passage, see the introduction.

108 lung ] P; lus D. See the introduction.

109 Devendrabuddhi, D55r5.

110 (Translation) “What is the cause of this suffering which has (re)birth as its characteristic (janmalakṣaṇa)? By the elimination of what can this [suffering] (’di) be removed? [Reply:] Given that [suffering] is such, being aware—through the investigation of cause in general (rgyu tsam, *hetumātra, i.e., causality in general)—that it cannot be without a cause, he understands that by eliminating (bkag pas) the cause, one can remove its effect (tatkāryam parihantum).”
§133.3¹¹¹ de ni rtag sosgs ngo bo yang de las dus phyis ci ’di rtag pa yin nam ’on te ma yin rtag pa nyid yin na rtag pa nyid la byed pa po nyid med pa de ltar na | rgyu med pa can nyid yin pa’i phyir sdug bsngal gcad par mi nus pa can nyid du ’gyur ro || (...)

§133.4¹¹² sosgs pa smos pas (cf. anityādirūpaṃ = II.133c) ni rgyu de’i mtshan nyid dang ’phel ba’i rgyu brtags pa mdzad pa yin te | de yang ’gal ba bsgrub pas de bsal ba’i phyir ro || (...)

§133.5¹¹³ res ’ga’ bar ’gyur ba de’i phyir | rgyu res ’ga’ ba yin no zhes rtag par mdzad do || sbyor ba ni gang zhig res ’ga’ ba yin pa de ni rgyu res ’ga’ ba can yin te | dper na myu gu la sosgs pa lta bu’o || sdug bsngal gyi khyad par ’di yang res ’ga’ ba yin no zhes bya ba ni rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs so || rtag pa nyid kyang ’di’i rgyur mi ’gyur ro zhes bya ba’i sbyor ba ’di brjod par bya ste | rgyu rtag pa nyid la yang res ’ga’ nyid ’byung ba ni mdzad la sosgs pa mi rung ba’i phyir ro || (...)

§133.6¹¹⁴ de bzhin du rnam pa gzhan dag gis kyang rgyu yod pa dang | de’i rang bzhin yongs su brtags pa mdzad do ||¹¹⁵

(Śākyabuddhi) §133.1 yukti anumānam¹¹⁶ | tayā vimarśo yukto ’numānasya vicārakṣamatvāt | āgamasya tu vicāre ’nava [²⁷v3] sthā |¹¹⁷ sa hi vicārottarakālabhāvity atā āha — bahavas¹¹⁸ tāvad āgamān upalabhhyetādi | tadupadarśitam vety āgamopadarśitam upāyam ity adhyāharaḥ | anuṣṭheyam vety samuccayārtho vāśabdaḥ | āgamopadarśitam¹¹⁹ upāyam anuṣṭheyam¹²⁰ ca vimṛśann ity arthāḥ¹²¹ —

¹¹¹ Devendrabuddhi, D55r6.
¹¹² Devendrabuddhi, D55r7–v1.
¹¹³ Devendrabuddhi, D55v2–4.
¹¹⁴ Devendrabuddhi, D55v5.
¹¹⁵ *evam anyair apy ākārair hetor bhāvam tatsvabhāvam ca parīkṣate. (Translation) “In this way, he investigates the existence of the cause [of suffering] and the intrinsic nature [of the cause] on the basis of other aspects (i.e. other than anityatā), too.” This is a gloss on PV II.133d: duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ. In PVV, Manorathanandin explains: duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ kādācitkatvādibhiḥ.

¹¹⁶ anumānam | em.; anupamānaṃ Ms.
¹¹⁷ ’navasthā ] conj.; vasthā yah Ms.
¹¹⁸ For the interpretation of bahavas, see n. 51 in introduction above.
¹¹⁹ āgamo° ] em.; agamo° Ms.
¹²⁰ nu is added in the top margin. The Tibetan rendering of upāyam is thabs las byung ba, suggesting upeyam, which also fits the context.
¹²¹ Cf. Tib. lung gis bstan pa’i thabs dang thabs las byung ba rnam par dpyod pa yin gyi zhes bya ba’i don to ||
kim etad ghaṭate na vetī || tathā ca vicāre pūrvam eva pravṛtte yuktyaiva kadācit pravartate | tad anenaitat katha[27v4] yati — yuktīr eveyam dvimukhī kathītā, kācid yathābhhyāsam eva niścitā kācid āgamanusārenāvatīrṇeti |

§133.2 tatkāryam[123] pratihantum iti janmalakṣaṇam |
§133.3 tata ūrdham iti hetutvanīscayād ūrdhvaṃ[124] |
§133.4 laksanaṃ vṛddhihetutvam ceti kimlakṣaṇo ’yaṃ hetuś ca ko[125] duḥkhavṛddhe[126] |

§133.5 kadācitkahetur iti kadācitkam kāraṇam yasyeti vigrahah, anityakāraṇam ity arthah[27v5] | ayam eva nityo ’py asya hetur na bhavatī ti prayogya vaktavya iti yat kadācitkam tan nityakāraṇam na bhavati, tadyathāṅkūrīdātiyādīnā vāpakaviruddhopabhiprayogyo vaktavya ity arthah |

§133.6 evam anyair apy ākārair iti duḥkhasya kadācitkatvākārād anyair apy anātmādyākāriḥ | hetor bhāvam iti sattāmātram | tatsvabhāvam iti viśeṣah[127] | tathā[27v6] nātmakam duḥkham, yac cānātmakam tan na svatantravṛtti,| tato ’yaḥ hetuṇā[128] bhāvyam, sa ca hetu anātmaka eva svatantrasya hetutvāyogād[130] ityādinā parīkṣate[131] |

[II.134]
yatas tathā sthite hetau nivṛttir neti paśyati
phalasya hetor hānārtham tadvipakṣam parīkṣate

122 na vetī ] conj.; neti Ms.
123 tatkāryam ] em.; tatkāryam tatkāryam Ms (ditto).
124 The phrase “after that” (tata ūrdhvaṃ) means after ascertaining that impermanence, etc., is the cause of suffering. Cf. PV II.133: duḥkhahetuṃ ... anityādirūpaṃ.
125 ko ] conj. (or kim); yā (unclear) Ms.
126 (Translation) “As for the phrase laksanaṃ vṛddhihetutvam ca, what characteristic does this (i.e. suffering) have? And what is the cause of the increase of suffering?” Devendrabuddhi, D55r7: sogsa pa smos pas (cf. anityādirūpaṃ 133c) ni rgyu de'i mtshan nyid dang 'phel ba'i rgyu brtags pa mdzad pa yin te.
127 viśeṣaḥ ] em.; viśeṣa Ms.
128 svatantravṛtti ] em., svatantravṛttī Ms.
129 hetunā ] conj.; hetur iti Ms. See Śākyabuddhi Tib. 117v1: ’di ni rgyus ’gyur ba yin no. Syntactically, hetunā goes with bhāvyam, yielding the meaning “it should be a hetu.”
130 -āyogād ] em., -āyogyād Ms.
131 parīkṣate ] em.; parīkṣyate Ms. See PV II.133b: parīkṣate.
(Devendrabuddhi) §134.1 ci'i phyir rgyu dang de'i rang bzhin la brtag pa mdzad ce na | gang phyir de ltar sdug bsngal gyi rgyu gnas pa | 'bras ldog gzigs pa med phyir ro || (= II.134ab] sdug bsngal bzlog par mdzad par bzhed pas so || (...)  

(Śākyabuddhi) §134.1 tathā sthite duḥkhahetāv iti vināśitānāpatter133 iti |

[II.135]  
sādhyate tadvipakṣo 'pi heto rūpāvabodhatah  
ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ  

(Devendrabuddhi) (...) §135.134 gang gi tshe 'di'i dmigs pa dang rnam pa de 'dra ba can yin no zhes sdug bsngal gyi rgyu'i rang bzhin shes par 'gyur pa de'i tshe | de dang 'gal ba'i rnam par gnas pa'i ngang tshul can gang yin pa de ni de'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs yin no zhes bde blag du rtogs par 'gyur ro || (...)  

§135.2135 chags pa ste sred pa ni rgyu yin par sngar bshad zin to || (...)  

(Śākyabuddhi) §135.1 viśaya ālambanam tasya grahaṇam | prakāra ākāraḥ  

§135.2 uktaṃ prāg ityādinā136 janmahetum tāvad āha |  
duḥkhe viparyāsamatis tṛṣṇā cābandha [end of the Ms]"kāraṇam (PV II.81ab)137  

132 Devendrabuddhi, D55v4–5.  
133 vināśitānāpatter] conj.; vikalpamatāpāted Ms. The conjecture is very tentative on the basis of the Tibetan version of Śākyabuddhi’s text (D117v2): ‘jig pa ma thob pa’o.  
134 Devendrabuddhi, D56r5–6.  
135 Devendrabuddhi, D56r7.  
136 oādinā ] em.; oādina Ms. The Tibetan version of Śākyabuddhi’s text (D117v2–3) has the phrase "ātmātmīyagrahakṛta (= II.135c) ityādinā instead of uktaṃ prāg ityādinā. See the next footnote.  
137 Devendrabuddhi, D56r7: chags pa (= snehaḥ, II.135d) ste sred pa ni rgyu yin par sngar bshad zin to ||. The Tibetan version of Śākyabuddhi’s text reads (D117v2–3): bdag dang bdag gir ’dzin byas pa’i (= II.135c) zhes bya ba la sogs pas re zhig skye ba’i rgyu ni | sdug bsngal phyin ci log blo dang || sred pa kun nas ’ching ba’i rgyu || (= PV II.81ab) zhes bya bas bshad zin pa nyid kyi phyir ro ||. PV II.81ab: duḥkhe viparyāsamatis tṛṣṇā cābandhakāraṇam (“The cause of bondage is craving and the mistaken view regarding suffering.”).
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Three controversies concerning aggregation
(saṃghāta/samūha) in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya

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Introduction
Recent studies on the Sanskrit manuscripts of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and its Vṛtti have clarified the relationship of Dignāga’s epistemological theories with those of early Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, and also with those of Vasubandhu. Concerning the development of a logical and epistemological system in Buddhism, in its early stages in particular, this literature is providing us precious material for determining the relationship between Buddhist ideas and those of non-Buddhists, as well as the relationship between Dignāga and Vasubandhu. When viewed from the perspective of the development of ontological ideas or thinking, however, the relationship between Buddhists and non-Buddhists in this period, viz., in the time of Vasubandhu and Dignāga, has not yet been sufficiently clarified.

With reference to ontological thinking, the controversy regarding permanent existence was a prominent topic in various philosophical trends at the time. As ultimate existence in the material world, both non-Buddhists and Buddhists postulated “the minutest” (paramāṇu), which the non-Buddhists saw as permanent. In addition to paramāṇu, the non-Buddhists supposed that there is an imperceptible permanent existence of all living beings, such as puruṣa or ātman. These ideas evoked radical discussions between the non-Buddhists and Buddhists, because for Buddhists, nairātmyavādin, these ideas had to do with their essential doctrines and were inacceptable.

Moreover, the discussions show that non-Buddhists developed a proof formulation for these permanent existences. Against them, Buddhists

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1 It is not certain whether pudgala, which the pudgalavādin assumes as a subject of person and is often referred to in Abhidharma literature, is supposed to be permanent or not.

strongly argued their non-existence, claiming the theory of nairātmya by defending the ontological position that in the world there is “aggregation (saṃghāta/samūha) only.” Some Buddhist groups postulated the existence of pudgala as a subject of a person, the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika tried to prove the existence of ātman, while the early Sāmkhya philosophers theorized a system in which puruṣa, the permanent individual “soul/self;”\(^2\) is one of two essential principles, along with prakṛti, “primordial matter,” as a material principle. As has been discussed by the present author as well as other scholars,\(^3\) the proof of the existence of puruṣa in early Sāmkhya is closely related to that of ātman or Īśvara in the early stages of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions. Accordingly, proof of the existence of puruṣa or ātman presumably played an essential role in the ontology of early Sāmkhya, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Simultaneously, for Buddhists, the criticism thereof of Vasubandhu and Dignāga was of essential significance for their nairātmya theory.

In order to clarify the basic differences between the ontological positions of the Buddhists and the Brahmanical schools, where a permanent “soul/self” such as ātman or puruṣa is postulated, we must go back, at least, to the discussions recorded in Abhidharma literature such as that represented by Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (hereinafter AKBh). Here we find various discussions between Abhidharma thinkers and their opponents or interlocutors, not only Buddhists such as Sarvāstivādins, Vātsīputrīyas, and Sautrāntikas, but also non-Buddhists such as Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas, and Sāṃkhyas. The AKBh contains a precious record of these polemic exchanges.

The most distinctive ontological characteristic of the Abhidharma philosophy at that time is that it enumerates various phenomena in the world, material and mental, inside and outside of mind, and classifies these into factors or elements called dharma. As an effect of this enumeration and classification, the Abhidharma thinkers construct the ontological idea that only aggregations (saṃghāta/samūha) of factors or elements exist, and that there is no permanent subject or controller of this aggregation. Against this idea, the opponents claim that there is something other than these elements, which they call dravya,\(^4\) dharmin, pudgala, puruṣa, or ātman.

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\(^3\) See Kano 1989 and Ishitobi 1986.

\(^4\) Regarding the term dravya, we must keep in mind that in Abhidharma literature the term is often used in its adverbial form of dravyataḥ or dravyasat, whereas the Vaiśeṣika usually use it as a substantive, namely, as a category of “substance.”
Supposing that “aggregation” (saṃghāta/samūha) is a process of action, viz., the gathering of some elements or factors, there arise at least three questions. First, what are the ontological states of the elements themselves? With what material cause does the agent create this aggregation, if there is such an agent? Second, for what purpose does the agent or controller make them come together, or do the elements aggregate of their own accord? Third, who makes these elements come together? In other words, who is their controller (kartṛ, adhiṣṭhātṛ)? Is there an agent who controls the aggregation, or do the factors or elements come together by themselves? If we regard the “aggregation” as a process and apply the kāraka theory to the verb “aggregate” as grammarians, these questions, namely, the question of the constituents of aggregation, its purpose, and its agent or controller, correspond to the instrumental case, the dative case, and to the nominative case, respectively.

In answer to the first question, Abhidharma thinkers present the theory of skandha and the concept of “the minutest” (paramāṇu), a concept that may have been borrowed from the ideas of non-Buddhists, along with bhūta or mahābhūta. Concerning material units in the outer world, although Buddhists borrowed the idea from non-Buddhists, both developed an atomic theory according to which minute particles, paramāṇu, are postulated as the ultimate element; non-Buddhists such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika regard paramāṇu as permanent, whereas the Buddhists regard them as impermanent, momentary existence. The AKBh and other Abhidharma literature before and after the AKBh record various discussions on atomic theory, in which Buddhists, including Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, and Vaiśeṣikas, share basic ideas, although they sometimes characterize paramāṇu or āṇu differently.

The second question, the teleological question, developed into a theistic inquiry. On the basis of this question, Sāṃkhya thinkers established a proof of the existence of the permanent “soul/self” puruṣa. We can find this idea in the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (hereinafter SK), where saṃghātaparārthatvāt is used as one of the five well-known reasons for the proof of the existence of a permanent puruṣa. Based on the commentary Māṭharavṛtti on SK 17, the proof formulation can be reconstructed as follows:

<proposition> cakṣurādiśarīram parārtham [The body such as the eyes, etc., is for someone else.]
<reason> saṃghātatvāt [because it is aggregated.]
<example> rathagrthroparyāṅkādivat 6 [just like a cart, house, sofa, etc.].

Apparently, this argument can be regarded as a teleological argument, something we often find in theistic arguments. 7

On the other hand, Abhidharma discussions on dravya as dharmin, or pudgala and ātman, are closely related to the third question on the subject of daily human actions, such as activities (karman), remembrance (smṛti), cognition (vijñāna), or that of transmigration (samsāra). This was a highly controversial topic at that time, and many thinkers from various philosophical positions participated in its discussion. Abhidharma thinkers and Vaiśeṣikas also discussed the āśraya of psychological phenomena such as sukhā or duḥkhā, and the object of ahamkāra. These discussions are closely connected to the Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsaka arguments for the existence of ātman.

In what follows, I examine several passages from Abhidharma literature, mainly the AKBh, a representative Abhidharma work, 8 in which these controversies are animatedly described. Since the answer to the first question, atomic theory, in particular, has already been extensively discussed by many Japanese scholars, in this paper, I will first examine the basic construction of atomic theory and then concentrate on the second and third controversial questions.

1. Aggregated existence (skandha, saṃghāta, samūha, rāśi) in the AKBh

In the third chapter of the AKBh, against the opponent who claims the existence of ātman as a subject of transmigration, Vāsūbandhu declares that there is no ātman, but only skandha (nātmāsti skandhamātram tu). 9 As is clearly stated in this passage, the ontological principle of Abhidharma philosophy against ātmavāda is that that which exists is only skandha, viz., aggregation.

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6 Cf. for instance, SKM 22.6ff. and 22.13–15: evam amī mahādayaś caṣkṣurādayo na svārthā na ca parāparārthāḥ, kim tu parārthāḥ. yaś cāsaū parah sa cātmā. tasmād anumāmahe asti puruṣāḥ, yasyārthe caṣkṣurāditiṣaṅghātaḥ śarīram utpannam iti. Regarding this proof, see Watanabe 2007.
8 While the AKBh is seemingly a systematic work, it in fact rather records the effect of discussions provoked by Abhidharma philosophers. It sometimes includes the actual process of certain discussions.
9 AKk 3.18 ab.
At the beginning of the first chapter of the AKBh, Vasubandhu states that there are five skandhas.

And, these conditioned (samskrta) dharmas are five skandhas such as rūpa (-skandha) etc. (AK 1.7ab)\(^\text{10}\)

These conditioned dharmas are rūpa-skandha, vedanā-skandha, saṃjñā-skadha, saṃskāra-skandha, and vijñāna-skandha. The “conditioned” means that gathering and forming together, [they are] created by conditioning causes (pratyaya).\(^\text{11}\)

After analyzing each category of the five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, and eighteen dhātus, Vasubandhu presents the definition of these three categories:

[The words] skandha, āyatana, and dhātu have the meaning of heap/aggregation (rāśi),\(^\text{12}\) gate of arrival (āyadvāra), [and] race/family (gotra), [respectively].\(^\text{13}\)

He then introduces a detailed discussion of the definition of skandha as follows:\(^\text{14}\):

<Proponent> (hereafter [P]): If the meaning of [the word] skandha is “heap/aggregation” (rāśi), then these skandhas would attain to be existent as designations (prajñaptisat). [In fact, they are only] collections (samūha) of many substances (anekadravya), like pudgala as a heap/aggregation.

\(^\text{10}\) AKk 1.7ab (AKBh(P) 4,25 = AKBh(E) 6,1: te punah samskrta dharmā rūpādī-skandhapañcakam ).

\(^\text{11}\) AKBh(P) 4,26–27 ad AKK 1.7ab = AKBh(E) 6.2–4: rūpaskandhovedanāskandhaḥ saṃjñāskadandho saṃskāraskandho vijñānaskandhaḥ cety ete saṃskṛt dharmāḥ. sametya saṃbhūya prayayaiḥ 〈kṛṭa iti saṃskṛtāḥ〉. \([\text{1}]\) AKBh(P) 4,27: kṛṭāḥ.

\(^\text{12}\) On the various meanings of the term skandha, the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra (AMVŚ) <A-p’i-ta-mo Ta p’i-p’o-sha Lun> (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論) states that it means 聚 (samūha/saṃghāta?), 合 (samūha/saṃghāta?), 积 (rāśi?), or 略 (?) (AMVŚ 74, 383c). Cox translates them as “a heap, a bundle, an assemblage, or a collection.” (Cox 2004: 564, n. 99). However, the correspondence of the translations with these terms is not clear.

\(^\text{13}\) AKK 1.20ab (AKBh(P) 13,4 = AKBh(E) 20,3): rāśyāyadvāragotrārthāḥ skandhāyatanadhatāvah ā.

\(^\text{14}\) First, it will be useful to keep in mind that the AKBh was composed as a result of disputes concerning doctrinal issues and that accordingly, various processes in these disputes are reflected in the text. In other words, it is not a text in which a systematic doctrine is stated in order. See Willemen et al. 1998:10. See fn. 8.
<Opponent> (hereafter [O]): No. [It does not mean heap/aggregation (rāśī)]. This is because even one atom as a substance (dravyaparamāṇu) is also skandha. In such a case, it should not be stated that the meaning of skandha is heap/aggregation (rāśī), since there is no character of heap/aggregation in one thing.

On the question of whose positions are represented in the above passage, two interpretations are possible. First, it may be that P represents Vasubandhu’s position and O’s position is that of a Sarvāstivādin, for whom the word skandha does not necessarily mean heap/aggregation. Second, it may be that the position of both P and O belong to opponents of Vasubandhu, with P’s position being accepted by Vasubandhu.

In this passage, the basic idea of Buddhism shared by the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika is stated, namely, whatever is conditioned is aggregated. In the ontological system of Abhidharma philosophy, the five skandhas are the most basic category, and accordingly we can say that this theory of aggregation is a predominant and consistent characteristic of their ontology. In fact, the Abhidharma philosophers’ basic ontological idea of “aggregation” (samūha, saṃghāta, etc.) is found in various contexts and the term itself is frequently used. Moreover, in the passage cited above, there is a two-way interpretation of the ontological state of skandha, i.e., as real entities (dravya) and as designations (prajñāpti). Vasubandhu’s conclusion is as follows:

Therefore, skandhas are existent as designations (prajñāptisat), just like heap/aggregation (rāśi).

The opponent then raises an objection, to which Vasubandhu responds:

<O>: If so (= skandhas are existent as designations), the sense spheres (lit. the place of arrival) where forms appear (rūpīṇy āyatanāni) also would be designations, because many atoms of the eye, etc., become a gate of arrival (= sense spheres).

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15 The term dravyaparamāṇu must be a karmadhāraya compound. Yaśomitra refers to the term saṃghātaparamāṇu in contrast to dravyaparamāṇu (AKVy 123,16–19). See chapter 3, fn. 37.

16 AKBh(P) 13,24–27 = AKBh(E) 21,13–16: yadi rāśyatatha skandhārthaḥ prajñāptisataḥ skandhāḥ prāpnuvanti. anekadravyasamūhatvāt rāśypudgalavat. na. ekasyāpyi dravyaparamāṇoḥ skandhatvāt. na tarhi rāśyatathā skandhārthaḥ iti vaktavyam. na hy ekasyāsti rāśitvam iti.

17 Among the four noble truths, the second is “the aggregated cause of suffering,” but it is simply expressed as “the aggregate” (samudaya) (集).

18 AKBh(P) 14,2 = AKBh(E) 21,25: tasmād rāśivad eva skandhāḥ prajñāptisantaḥ.
<P>: No, each of the entire [atoms] becomes the cause [of cognition], and [the senses] are the co-operators of their objects. [Accordingly,] the senses alone would not be sense spheres [which include the six places of arrival, viz., the six senses and six objects].

2. *prajñaptisat* and *dravyasat*

As is well known, the three basic categories of dharmas, viz., *skandha*, *āyatana*, and *dhātu*, are mentioned and summed up in the *Chü-she Lun Chi* (俱舎論記) by P’u-kuang (普光). According to his understanding, the Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣika regard *skandha* as *dravyasat*, whereas the Sautrāntikas and Vasubandhu regard it as *prajñaptisat*. The reason for their different views of these categories is closely related to their respective definitions of *dharma* and atomic theories.

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19 AKBh(P) 14,2–5 = AKBh(E) 21,6–22,3: rūpīṇy api tarhy āyatanāni prajñā-pitsanti prāpnuvantī. bahūnam caṣārīdiparamāṇānāṁ āyadvārabhāvāt. na. ekaśāḥ samagrāṇāṁ kāraṇabhāvād viśayasaḥakahāritvād vā nendriyaṁ prthag āyatanam syāt.

20 T 1821, Vol.41. On P’u­kuang (普光, 7th cent.), who was a disciple of Hsūan-tsang (玄奘) and well-versed in both Abhidharma and Mahāyāna literature, see Kamata 1999 Vol. 6: 320–321.

21 P’u-kuang’s interpretation can be arranged as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><em>skandha</em> (蘊)</th>
<th><em>āyatana</em> (処) (place of arrival, sense spheres)</th>
<th><em>dhātu</em> (界) (elements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sarvāstivādin Vaibhāṣika</td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em>&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em></td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasubandhu</td>
<td><em>prajñaptisat</em>&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em>&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em>&lt;sup&gt;c&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sautrāntika</td>
<td><em>prajñaptisat</em></td>
<td><em>prajñaptisat</em>&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td><em>dravyasat</em>&lt;sup&gt;d&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<sup>a</sup> See p. 236, fn. 16.

<sup>b</sup> AKBh(P) 301,8: katham ca sūtre sarvam astīty uktam. sarvam astīti brāhmaṇa yāvad eva dvādaśāyatanānti. [In Āgama, how is it stated that all exist? It is stated as that “all exist” means “O Brahman! So far as the twelve sense spheres are concerned [all exist].”]

<sup>c</sup> Commenting upon the above passage(b), Katō says, “Vasubandhu states that only twelve āyatana are dravyasat.” (Katō (J) 1989: 181, n. 5). However, this passage does not necessarily mean that only the twelve āyatana are dravyasat, but it possibly means “at least, so far as the twelve āyatana are concerned, [they are all dravyasat].” And it does not deny that all dhatus are dravyasat.

<sup>d</sup> ANAŚ T1562 Vol. 29, 350ff. See Katō(J) 1989: 175.

See Cox 2004: 564–574 in particular.

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Regardless of whether the skandhas and āyatanas are designations (prajñaptisat) or real entities (dravyasat), this kind of discussion about aggregation is naturally connected to the investigation of paramāṇu, because with regard to an aggregation, we can easily postulate questions about the elements of an aggregation, such as whether these elements are permanent or impermanent, and how we can cognize the aggregation. Accordingly, in the following section, I will discuss the theory of paramāṇu and its relation to other categories such as skandha, dravya and rūpa. For instance, as seen above, an opponent argues that even one atom as a real entity (dravyaparamāṇu)\textsuperscript{23} is nothing but a skandha.

3. Atomic theory

As has been pointed out by many scholars,\textsuperscript{24} the source of and the way of thinking about atomic theory, with its materialistic and mechanistic character, was originally different from that of the categorical system of Abhidharma philosophy, which enumerates and analyzes mental and epistemic facts and related elements. When the atomic theory was first introduced, these two ideas, namely, atomic theory and a categorical system, were unrelated. The amalgamation of the Abhidharma categorical system of philosophy with atomic theory can thus be followed in the discussions in Abhidharma literature after its middle stage.\textsuperscript{25} Moreover, the ontological ideas of not only the Buddhist Sarvāstivādins, but also in early Brahmanical schools have two different, and perhaps independent, origins with regard to the ultimate existence of objects. One is the atomic theory as an idea of the goal of ultimate quantity, and the other is an elemental theory (bhūta, bhautika) that is the effect of the idea of essential quality. As has already been pointed out by Sakurabe,\textsuperscript{26} the Sarvāstivādin’s ontological concept consists of these two theories within another categorical system, namely, the dharma system. In the Sarvāstivādin arguments, even in those of Vasubandhu, these three ideas are sometimes contaminated by each other, a contamination that sometimes causes difficulties in our systematic understanding.

\textsuperscript{23} See fn. 15.

\textsuperscript{24} See, for instance, Sakurabe 1969: 101, and Isshiki 2015: 957.

\textsuperscript{25} See fn. 32.

\textsuperscript{26} Sakurabe 1969: 76–103, 93–96 and 101–103 in particular.
The discrepancies caused by the different ontological and categorical ideas even caused some difficulties for Abhidharma philosophers themselves in the early stages. It is thus important to keep in mind that the difficulties found in the discussions we are going to treat are a result of the different original ideas.

As far as the atomic theory of early Indian Buddhism is concerned, many scholars have hitherto taken up various aspects of this theory in their research. These discussions have been conducted mainly from ontological and epistemological points of view. This is because, with reference to atomic theory, whatever ontological standpoint Abhidharma philosophers may have taken, the point of each theory is to explain how one can cognize an aggregation of atoms, since it is unanimously accepted that individual atoms are beyond perception. The main points of discussion to be clarified are the following:

A) The definition of *paramāṇu*;

B) The relationship between *paramāṇu* and categories such as *skandha*, *rūpa*, *dravya*, etc., and the ontological state of *paramāṇu* (*dravyasat* or *prajñaptisat*);

C) The form of an aggregation—with contact or without contact, with space or without space—and how an aggregation can be cognized;

D) The relationship between atomic theory and the idea of *mahābhūta*.

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28 This kind of discussion is already found in AMVŚ. For instance, AMVŚ Vol. 73, T Vol. 27, 380a: 尊者世友作如是説。極微展轉互相觸不。答互不相觸。若相觸者即應住至第二剎那。大徳説曰。一切極微實不相觸。但由無間假立觸名。 “The venerable Vasumitra produces the following idea: [Opponent] ‘Do the accumulated/developed atoms make contact with each other?’ [Answer] ‘They are not in contact with each other. If they make contact with each other, they need to stay until the second moment, after they have originated.’ The reverend (大德) claims that all atoms in fact do not make contact with each other, but since there is no space between them, we say conventionally that they are in contact [with each other].” Recent research by Japanese scholars discusses this kind of issue, as for instance Mimaki 1988: 236–240. This issue is closely related to the epistemic ideas of the Sarvāstivādins and Sautrāntikas concerning atoms.

29 According to Sakurabe, in the early stage of Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature, we find two different ideas coexisting with each other: first, the four *mahābhūtas* are material things; second, *mahābhūtas* are their characters of tangibility. (Sakurabe 1969: 95–96)
including quality, such as forms and colors, and quantity\textsuperscript{30}: Is the quality of the aggregation of atoms based on the quality of a single atom or on its quantity or special arrangement?\textsuperscript{31}

Although they are closely related, these different points of view are convenient for arranging the discussion. In the following, I will examine the descriptions in Abhidharma literature, including literature before and after Vasubandhu, by focusing on A and B.

In the undertaking to amalgamate Abhidharma categories with the atomic theory, a focus was on the relation of the minutest (\textit{paramāṇu}) with the category or the concept of \textit{rūpa}, \textit{dravya}, and perceptibility.

Before Vasubandhu,\textsuperscript{32} the Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra (AMVŚ) \textit{<A-p’i-ta- mo ta p’i-p’o- sha Lun>} states:

The \textit{paramāṇu} is the finest (\textit{sarvasūkṣma}?) material existence (\textit{rūpa}), which one cannot cut, destroy, pierce (penetrate), and cannot adopt nor reject, ride nor put on, grasp nor pull. It is neither long nor short, neither round nor square, neither equal nor unequal,\textsuperscript{33} neither high nor low. It cannot be subdivided. One can neither analyze it nor cognize it by sense perceptions, nor hear, nor smell, nor lick, nor touch it. Therefore, we call it the minutest (\textit{paramāṇu}).\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item AMVŚ Vol. 131, T Vol. 27, 682c–683a.
\item For instance, the idea of the Sarvāstivādin is stated in AMVŚ Vol. 13, T Vol. 27, 64a:

\begin{quote}
Is there one blue atom or not? There is, but it cannot be grasped by visual cognition. If one atom is not blue when many atoms are aggregated, the aggregated one would not be blue. [...] Is there an atom that has a long form or not? There is, but it cannot be grasped by visual cognition. If one atom is not long, when many atoms are aggregated, the aggregated one would not be long [...].
\end{quote}

\item Sakurabe supposes three stages in the development of Abhidharma philosophy before Vasubandhu’s AKBh. According to his classification, the AMVŚ belongs to the second stage, and the SAHŚ belongs to the third stage. (Sakurabe 1969: 41–60)
\item 正: \textit{sātaṃ}? 不正: \textit{visātaṃ}?; cf. ANAŚ Vol.1, T Vol.29 334a: 形色八者。謂長短方圓正不正。此中正者，謂平等形。不平等形為不正。AKBh(P) 6,14: \textit{tatra sātaṁ samasthānām. visātaṁ viṣamasthānam}.
\item AMVŚ T Vol.27, 702a: 極微是最細色、不可斷裁破壊貫穿、不可取捨乗履搏掣。非長非短、非方非圓、非正不正、非高非下。無有細分、不可分析、不可観見、不可聴聞、不可嗅嘗、不可摩觸。故説極微。For the Sarvāstivādin, there are two kinds of \textit{rūpa} (色), \textit{rūpa} as a color and \textit{rūpa} as a form (\textit{saṃsthāna}). Of these, the former consists of twelve kinds and the latter consists of eight kinds, viz., long, short, round, square, equal, unequal, high, and low (長短方圆正不正高下). Therefore, it is said here
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Here, the author declares that *paramāṇu* is the finest *rūpa*: it cannot be subdivided nor analyzed, and is beyond perception. That is, it refers to a single atom in the sense that it is the minutest matter that cannot be subdivided.

In contrast, the *Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra* (SAHŚ) *<Tsa A-p’i-t’an Hsin Lun>* states:

The minutest (*極微*, *paramāṇu*) is of two kinds, that is, the minutest as a real entity (*事極微*, *dravyaparamāṇu*) and the minutest as an aggregate (*聚極微*, *saṃghātaparamāṇu*). [...] The latter consists of many real entities (*衆多事*, *anekadravya(ka)*?).

From the above descriptions, we see that with relation to the category of material existence (*rūpa*), *paramāṇu* is defined as the finest *rūpa*, and many Abhidharma texts, including the AKBh, unanimously support this. In relation to the concept of *dravya*, on the other hand, *paramāṇu* is defined as of two kinds: the *paramāṇu* consisting of one *dravya*, and that consisting of several *dravyas*. This description reveals that the idea of two kinds of *paramāṇu* was already known or advocated in the middle stage of Abhidharma literature, before Vasubandhu’s AKBh. However, we cannot attest who first advocated the theory of two kinds of *paramāṇu*, or when.

In the following stage, in the AKBh Vasubandhu states the following with regard to the origination of conditioned existence (*saṃskṛtadharma*) (*有為法*):

Then, concerning the *dharmas* that have *rūpa* (= *rūpin*), there is the following rule.

In *kāmadhātu*, the minutest (*paramāṇu*) without sound and senses [arises] as being constituted of eight *dravyas*. (AK 2.22ab)

In fact, the finest (*sarvasūkṣma*) thing that is an aggregate of material existence (*rūpasamāṇghāta*) is called “the minutest” (*paramāṇu*) that the *paramāṇu* has no *rūpa* as a form (*samsthāna*). ANAŚ Vol.1, T Vol.29, 333c–334a; 色二或二十 … 論曰。言色二者、是二種義。謂顕與形。此中顕色有十二種形色有八。故或二十。


According to Sakurabe’s classification, the SAHŚ belongs to the third stage in the development of Abhidharma philosophy. (Sakurabe 1969: 41–60). See also fn. 32 above.

The term *rūpasamāṇghāta* can be construed in at least two ways: first, “*rūpa* as an aggregated,” and second, “the aggregated of *rūpa*.” If one imperceptible atom is
[here in the verse], because the other one (= a single atom?) cannot be
cognized. The [minutest] arises as one that has no sound, no senses,
that is constituted of eight dravyas, and is lacking none of them
(= the eight dravyas). The eight dravyas comprise four main elements
(mahābhūtānī) and the four objects of the senses depending on [the
elements] (upādāyarūpānī), namely, color and form, odor, taste, and
the state of being palpable (spraṣṭavyā), while the minutest that has
no sound but has senses arises as comprising nine dravyas or ten
dravyas. Among them, first, [the aggregate of material existence that
is] constituted of nine dravyas has body and senses.°

Yaśomitra comments on this passage as follows:

[The paramāṇu here is] the paramāṇu as an aggregate (samghā-
taparamāṇu) and not the paramāṇu as [one] real entity (dravya-
paramāṇu). It is because in the state where the thing has no
distinction of front or back and all colors and forms are diminished
(sarvarūpāpacitam), the thing in such a state is accepted as
dravyaparamāṇu. The samghātaḥ paramāṇur is different from it.

According to Yaśomitra, there are two levels of paramāṇu, viz.,
(a) dravyaparamāṇu, and (b) samghātaparamāṇu. Here, samghāta-
paramāṇu refers to the paramāṇu consisting of eight, nine, or ten
dravyas, in other words, the rūpa as an aggregate (rūpasamghāta). It does
not mean a single atom, but the minutest particle.

The point to observe here is the statement in the AKBh “because
the other one cannot be cognized.” This implies that rūpa(dravya)-
samghātaparamāṇu is a minute unit or particle that can be cognized. In
other words, there are two levels of paramāṇu or particle: one defined
as an dravyaparamāṇu (imperceptible paramāṇu), and the other as a
samghātaparamāṇu (perceptible particle?).

This reflects the idea that there are two kinds of paramāṇu as found

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38 AKBh(P) 52,22–53,3: rūpiṇāṃ tu dharmāṇām ayaṃ niyamaḥ. kāme ṣṭadravyako
śabdaḥ paramāṇur anindriyāḥ | (2.22ab) sarvasūkṣmo hi rūpasamghātaḥ
paramāṇur ity ucyate. yato nānyatara viññāyeta. sa kāmadhātāv aśabdako
‘nindriyaś cāṣṭadravyaka utpadyate nānyatamena hīnāḥ. aṣṭau dravyāṇi catvāri
mahābhūtāti catvāri copādāyarūpāṇī rūpaganḍharasprasṭavyāṇī. sendriyas
tu paramāṇur aśabdako navadravyaka utpadyate daśadravyako vā. tatra tāvat
kāyendriyī navadravyaḥ.

39 AKVy 123,16–19: sarvasūkṣmo rūpasamghātaḥ paramāṇur iti. samghāta-
paramāṇur na dravyaparamānuḥ. yatra hi pūrvaparabhāgo nāṣī (,) tat sarva-
rūpapacitam dravyaṃ dravyaparamāṇur itiṣyate. tasmād viñṇaśti samghātaḥ
paramāṇur iti.
Three controversies concerning aggregation in the SAHŚ. The description in the AMVŚ is supposedly corresponds to the former.\footnote{In the third chapter of the AKBh, Vasubandhu states “The final stage of diminishing (apacīyamānasya) rūpa is paramāṇu. (AKBh(P) 176.11 ad AKk 3.85: rūpasyāpacīyamānasya paryantah paramāṇuḥ.) The word paramāṇu in this sentence perhaps means dravyaparamāṇu, a single atom.

\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,383c: 有對色中最後細分，更不可析，名曰極微。}

\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,521b: 分析諸色，至一極微，故一極微，為色極少，不可析故。522a: 以一極微可名為色。}

\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,337c: 變礙故名為色。若爾極微云何變礙。無一極微現在獨住，積集住故變礙義成有説。}

\footnote{AMVŚ Vol. 136, T Vol. 27,702a: 此七極微成一微塵。 (Katō (T) 1987: 80[581]). saptaparamāṇavo anuḥ. (em.) (AKBh(P)176,18: sapta paramāṇavo anuḥ); ANAŚ Vol. 32, T Vol. 29,521c: 故毘奈耶但作是説，七極微集名一微等。… 謂七極微為一微量。522a: 謂毘奈耶作如是説。七極微集名一微等。}}

After Vasubandhu, Saṃghabadra 衆賢, a conservative Sarvāstivādin, states in his \textit{Abhidharmanyāyānusārāstra} (ANAŚ) (阿毘達磨順正理論) the following:

Among spacious matters (mūrtarūpa?), the minutest one that cannot be analyzed anymore is called \textit{paramāṇu}.\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,383c: 有對色中最後細分、更不可析、名曰極微。}

The single \textit{paramāṇu} is the minutest \textit{rūpa}, since it cannot be analyzed.\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,521b: 分析諸色，至一極微。 故一極微、為色極少、不可析故。522a: 以一極微可名為色。}

Saṃghabadra’s idea is not different from the traditional idea that \textit{paramāṇu} is the minutest \textit{rūpa} that cannot be analyzed any further. However, it is not clear whether the single \textit{paramāṇu} is \textit{saṃghātaparamāṇu} or \textit{dravyaparamāṇu}. Here, \textit{paramāṇu} supposedly corresponds to \textit{dravyaparamāṇu}. Further, he says that the reason we call the material world \textit{rūpa} is because it changes and can be destroyed, and it does not exist alone but exists only as an aggregate. Accordingly, it changes.\footnote{ANAŚ T Vol. 29,337c: 變礙故名為色。若爾極微云何變礙。無一極微現在獨住，積集住故變礙義成有説。}

On the basis of these concepts of \textit{paramāṇu}, Abhidharma philosophers suppose the minute particle \textit{anu} to be a combination of seven \textit{paramāṇus}. We find this idea in AMVŚ, AKBh, and ANAŚ.\footnote{AMVŚ Vol. 136, T Vol. 27,702a: 此七極微成一微塵。 (Katō (T) 1987: 80[581]). saptaparamāṇavo anuḥ. (em.) (AKBh(P)176,18: sapta paramāṇavo anuḥ); ANAŚ Vol. 32, T Vol. 29,521c: 故毘奈耶但作是説，七極微集名一微等。… 謂七極微為一微量。522a: 謂毘奈耶作如是説。七極微集名一微等。} It therefore follows that Vasubandhu supposes at least three stages of minute things: the single atom (\textit{dravyaparamāṇu}), the atom as an aggregate (\textit{saṃghātaparamāṇu}), and the minute particle (\textit{anu}).

In addition to these Abhidharma texts, as already pointed out by Hayashima, the \textit{Yogācārabhūmi} (YBhū) also reports and criticizes the ideas of those claiming the existence of permanent atoms.

And, furthermore, depending upon common thinking, those who understand that the minutest is permanent think as such. [That is,] they who do not understand “the depending origination”
(pratītyasamutpāda) in accordance with facts (yathābhūtam) [think that] being presupposed by existences, effects of existences arise by accumulation (pracaya). And they suppose that perishing presupposes decay (apacaya). Therefore, things are as follows: A gross thing arises from minute things, and, being divided, the gross thing arrives at the state of minuteness. Accordingly, the gross thing is impermanent. The minutest things (paramāṇava), [however,] are permanent.45

Here, YBhū criticizes a typical idea of realists, perhaps the Vaiśeṣika, who advocate the theory of accumulation or that of formation (ārambhavāda) based on permanent atoms (anunityatvavādin). According to the Vaiśeṣika theory, dvyanuka, which consists of two atoms, and tryaṇuka, which consists of three dvyanukas,46 are characterized as effects (kāryalaksana) and impermanent.47 The Nyāyakandalī, a commentary on the Praśastapādabhāṣya, states the proof of the existence of the permanent atom by inference as follows:

What is the means of valid cognition of the existence of the earth, which has the [quantity of] minutest as its essential property? [It is the following] inference. The gradual stage of the quantity of minuteness must have somewhere its final [stage], because it is the gradual stage of a quantity, just like [the property of] largeness. [The thing] where there is the final stage [of minuteness] and there is no further minute thing is the minutest. For this very reason, [it is] permanent, because it is a substance and has no parts like ether. Or, if it had [some] parts, then it would not be the minutest. It is because we understand in the world that the quantity of its part is smaller than that of the effect. And [if it has (some) parts] its part would be the minutest. [Objection] It (= it’s part) would not be so, because there are further parts [of the part]. In this way, in such a case, there would be infinite regress.48

46 The Brahmasūtrabhāṣya (BSBh) records caturaṇuka, which consists of two dvyanukas. BSBh ad BS2.2.11.
47 Cf. PBh 5–6, NK 78,10–80,12. According to the Vaiśeṣika theory, paramāṇu and dvyanuka are imperceptible, whereas tryaṇuka is perceptible. (NK 317,5–320,3)
48 NK 78,10–79,6: paramāṇusvabhāvāyāḥ prthvyāḥ sattve kim pramāṇaṃ. anumāṇaṃ,anuparimāṇatāratanāmyāṃkvacidviśrāntamparimāṇaṃsthātaramyātvaṃ. mahatparimāṇaṃsthātaramyāvavat, yatredam viśrāntaṃ yataḥ paramaṇur nāsti sa paramāṇuv. atah eva nityo dravyatyagatre सत्व anavasthāv tad ākāśavat[.] atahāyaṃ sāvayavo na tarhi paramaṇuv, kāryaparimāṇamīpeksayā tadavavaparimāṇāsyā iti. atah so 'pi na bhavati, avayavāntarasadbhāvāt. evam tarhy anavasthā. [...]


Here, Śrīdhara applies the logical device “anavasthāprasāṅga” (the unwanted result of infinite regress) to the stage of the quantity of minuteness. For Vaiśeṣikas, as realists, it was easier to reconcile atomic theory with their categorical system than for those following the Abhidharma philosophical system. Indeed, it is highly possible that atomic theory itself was an original Vaiśeṣika idea and was introduced into Abhidharma philosophy in its middle stage. So far, we have seen how Abhidharma philosophers tried to harmonize traditional Abhidharma categories or concepts (rūpa and dravya) with the atomic theory by focusing on the definition of paramāṇu and its relation to rūpa, dravya, and aggregation. In this amalgamation process, setting aside the various interpretations based on different ontological positions, as a whole Abhidharma philosophers suppose two or three kinds of atomic elements, namely, an atom as a substance (dravyaparamāṇu), an atom as an aggregate (samghātaparamāṇu), and minute particles (aṇu) consisting of seven atoms, for instance, although the relationship between the second and third is not clear. Almost all Abhidharma thinkers, even Vaiśeṣikas, are unanimous with regard to the idea that the first, the single atom, is imperceptible.

These descriptions, however, leave two issues for the remaining enquiry: first, how many kinds of atoms they supposed, and second, the relation of atoms with form and color, or mahābhūta. For these issues, a further investigation is necessary.

4. Two types of proof of the existence of pudgala or ātman

It is characteristic of Abhidharma philosophy for all phenomena to be enumerated and divided into factors or elements. The philosophical tendency of enumerating various factors or elements, which consist of the phenomenal and psychological world and epistemic or empirical processes, in Buddhistic terms, the vedanā that brings us suffering (duḥkha), was also common in other Brahmanical schools at that time, such as the Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, although their final goal and means toward that goal were different from those of Buddhism. With regard to the idea of ātman, since the Abhidharma thinkers’ position is anātmavāda, this enumeration can be seen as a preliminary step for their negation of ātman. The logic therein is “elimination” (pariśeṣa): while there is factor A, it is not ātman. We find factor B, but it is also not ātman, and so forth.

Thus, the possibility of each element as a permanent subject is eliminated. In this regard, it is understandable why the chapter known as a critique of the existence of the permanent subject of the person (pudgala, 補特伽羅) comes last in the AKBh.\textsuperscript{50} In this sense, the AKBh as a whole can be regarded as an enumeration system designed to deny the existence of ātman.

The theory criticized in the last chapter of AKBh, i.e., pudgalavāda, is already found in earlier literature, in particular the AMVŚ and AVPŚ (*Abhidharmavijñānakāyapādasāstra 阿毘達磨識身足論). These works report various discussions on pudga\textit{ta} that are significant for the history of ātmavāda, because they undoubtedly represent the first philosophical discussions in Buddhism regarding the existence of a permanent “soul/self.”

At the beginning of the ninth and last chapter of the AKBh,\textsuperscript{51} Vasubandhu states the following:

In fact, is there no liberation somewhere other than it (= not doing negligence)? No, there is not. Why? It is because they (= adherents of other Brahmanical theories) stick to the incorrect view of the ātman (vitathātmadṛṣṭi). In fact, they do not consider the continuity (saṃtāna) of skandhā as the designation of ātman (ātmaprajñapti).

What then [do they suppose to be ātman]? They suppose nothing but another substance (dravyāntara) [than the substances we enumerated] to be ātman […].\textsuperscript{52}

Hereafter begins the discussion about pudgala. Vasubandhu’s statement, “They suppose another substance (dravyāntara) [than the substances we enumerate] to be ātman…,”\textsuperscript{53} strongly suggests that enumerating the factors or elements helps to eliminate the substance called ātman. A similar way of thinking, elimination (pariśeṣa), is also found in the

\textsuperscript{50} This chapter was known, according to Sakurabe (1960:36–37), as pudgalaviniścaya, pudgalanirdeśa, pudgalavāda, ātmavādapiṣedha, or pudgalapiṣedhanirdeśa.

\textsuperscript{51} For ninth chapter of the AKBh, we have at least two Japanese translations: Sakurabe 1960, and Murakami 1993a and 1993b. The former is a pioneering study of the chapter, a translation from the Tibetan; the latter is a translation from the Sanskrit.

\textsuperscript{52} AKBh(P) 461,1–4 = AKBh(L) 34,2–36,3: \textit{kiṃ khalv ato ’nyatra mokṣo nāsti. nāsti. kiṃ kāraṇam. vitathātmadṛṣṭinīvīṣṭatvāt. na hi te skandhasaṃtāna evātmapiṣedhaṃ vyavasyanti. kiṃ tarhi. dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti. ātmagrāhaprabhavāś ca sarvakleśā iti. katham punar idam ganyate. skandhasaṃtāna evēdhām ātmābhidhānām vartate nānyaśmin abhidheya iti.}

\textsuperscript{53} Cf. AKBh(P) 472,14–15 = AKBh(L) 120,4–5: ye ’pi ca dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ manyante tīrthakarāś tesām eva mokṣābhāvadoṣo niskampaḥ.
categorical system of the Vaiśeṣika. The logical method of elimination developed in philosophical systems such as the Vaiśeṣika and in Abhidharma philosophy because it is particularly effective for arguing in categorical systems that have limited numbers of categories. It is quite interesting in this sense that, on one hand, Abhidharma thinkers deny the existence of ātman by enumerating the factors or elements they suppose and then eliminating each factor that cannot be ātman or pudgala. On the other hand, Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya thinkers tried to prove the existence of ātman using the same logic of elimination in their categorical systems, seeing ātman as a dravya bearing the guṇas of sukha, dukha, icchā, dveṣa, and prayatna, as is discussed in various texts.54

4.1. Argument against a Vātsīputrīya

In the same chapter, against a Vātsīputrīya who claims the existence of pudgala, Vasubandhu states the following:

In such a case, first, it is to be considered that the Vātsīputrīyas claim that there is pudgala.55

(P): Do they (= Vātsīputrīya) suppose [pudgala] as a real existence (dravya) or as a designation (prajñapti)? In such a case, what does “as a real existence” (dravyataḥ) mean? Or what does “as a designation” (prajñaptitāḥ) mean? If it is another existence like rūpa, etc., [it exists] as a real existence (dravya). If[, however,] it is an aggregation (samudāya) such as milk or the like, [it exists] as a designation. What comes from that?

First, [if it exists] as a real existence, it follows that it (pudgala) must be stated as being different from other skandhas because it has its own characteristics that are completely different from those of other skandhas, just as other skandhas [differ from] each other. Then, the cause of the difference must be stated. […]

Or [if it is supposed to be] unconditioned (asamskṛta), then it would follow that your idea would be that of the adherent of any other Brahmanical school. And, [the supposition of pudgala] would be purposeless. If [on the other hand, you claim that it exists] as a designation, then we also say this as such.

54 See Kano 1996 and 2010.
55 The Sarvāstivādin claims that there is no other existence like pudgala other than saṃskṛtadharma and asaṃskṛtadharma. They say that saṃskṛtadharma and asaṃskṛtadharma have been discussed in order to deny the existence of pudgala. (AMVŚ Vol. 76, T Vol. 27, 392c: 復有二法。謂有為無為法。問何故作此論。答為欲遮遺補特伽羅。)
(O): It exists in fact neither as a real existence nor as a designation. How then [does it exist]? Pudgala is designated in dependence on (upādāya) [various] skandhas [as the causes] that are on the inner side (ādhyātmika) and are functioning as dependent (upāttān vartamānān) [upon skandhas].

Here, Vasubandhu clarifies at least three positions: that pudgala exists only as a designation, as he describes it; that it exists as a real entity (dravya) other than skandhas, which is the same as that of the Brahmanical school; and a third position by the opponent, that it exists neither as a real entity nor as a mere designation and is designated in dependence on skandhas. Moreover, Vasubandhu criticizes that no one can understand the idea of “skandhān upādāya,” and presents two interpretations of the meaning of upādāya, viz., ālambya and pratītya. The former means that pudgala is supposed as a designation by making skandhas the object of cognition, and the latter means that skandhas are the cause of that designation. Vasubandhu criticizes that if it means the former, this idea is the same as his own, and if it means the latter, it follows the same defect, namely, that pudgala is different from skandhas. He concludes that pudgala exists only conceptually as a designation (prajñaptitah). Furthermore, the opponent compares the relationship between skandha and pudgala to that of fuel (indhana) and fire (agni). In both cases the latter (i.e., pudgala and fire) arises in dependence on (upādāya) the former (i.e., skandha and fuel). Then, Vasubandhu discusses the meaning of upādāya again and provides the criticism that even if it means āśraya or sabhāva, pudgala would be different from the skandhas.

56 Sakurabe interprets “ādhyātmikān upāttān vartamānān” generally as skandhas that build up the body and mind of real living beings (Sakurabe 1960: 56, n.1).

57 AKBh(P) 461,13–20 = AKBh(L) 38,1–40,3: yat tarhi vātsīputrīyāḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti. vicāryaṃ tāvad etat. kiṃ te dravyata icchanty āhosvit prajñaptitah. kiṃ cedaṃ dravyata iti kiṃ vā prajñaptitah. rūpādivat bhāvāntaram cet dravyataḥ. kṣirādivat samudāyaś cet prajñaptitah. kim cātaḥ. yadi tāvat dravyataḥ, sa bhinnasabhāyatvāt(1) skandhebhīyo 'anyo vaktya itaretaraskandhāvat. kāraṇam cāśya vaktavyam. asaṃskṛto vā. atas śūrthikāryaprasanām nispravojanatvām ca. atha prajñaptitāh. vayam eva evam brūmah. naiva hi sa(2) dravyato 'sti nāpi prajñaptitāh. kim tarhi. ādhyātmikān upāttān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñaptiye. [1]AKBh(P): sāmhinna- ; (2)AKBh(P) lacks sa.]

58 AKBh(P) 461,21–23, = AKBh(L) 40,5–8: kim idam upādāyeti. yady ayam arthaḥ skandhānāṃ ālambyetā(1) teṣv eva pudgalaprajñaptih prāpnoti. yathā rūpādin ālambya teṣv eva kṣīraprajñaptih. athāyam arthaḥ skandhān prātiye. skandhānāṃ pudgalaprajñaptikāraṇatvāt sa eva doṣaḥ. [1]See AKBh(L) 40, n. 25.]
In this argument, we find Vasubandhu’s basic and firm position that there is nothing other than the aggregated, namely, skandhas, and that pudgala exists merely as a designation.

4.2. Teleological arguments

4.2.1. The subject and the purpose of birth

Now, some difficulties occur if we do not accept pudgala. Among them, regarding “the birth of self-produced living being” (sattvā upapādukā yoniḥ),59 which is one of the four kinds of birth (catasro yonayaḥ),60 the question arises, “what is born?” Vasubandhu answers that skandhas are born. The opponent, a pudgalavādin, however, cites the āgama “ekāḥ pudgalo loka utpadyamāna utpadyate”61 in support of his claim that pudgala is not identical to skandhas, but is different from them. What does this puzzling and reduplicative expression mean?

A similar expression is found in the Abhidharmadīpa (AD):

A Sāṃkhya scholar thinks, “nothing other than what is [already] existent is born (vidyamānam eva jāyate), just like yoghurt that already exists in milk [is born].” This is because cause and effect are one and the same. This kind of thought is refuted. A second birth is impossible for an existence that is already born.62

Taking the above description from the AD into consideration, the āgama presumably intends that one and the same pudgala that has already arisen (in a previous world) arises in this world. This expression can be interpreted as presenting the pariṇāmavāda of Sāṃkhya.

59 The “sattvā upapādukā” means “the living being who is born by himself without dependence upon a womb, an egg, water, etc.,” that is, Gods, living beings in hell, and living beings in the intermediate state (antarābhāva). The AKBh explains: “living beings who are without deficiencies/imperfections, without a lack of senses, and endowed with all limbs and sub-limbs, are born at once. For this very reason, they are called upapādukā because they act well in their appearing (upapādane).” AKBh(P) 118,29–119,2: upapādukā yoniḥ katamā. ye sattvā avikalā ahīnendriyāḥ sarvāṅgapratyangopetāḥ sakṛd upajāyante. ata eva upapādane sādukāritvād upapādukā ity ucyante. tad yathā devanārākāntarābhavikādayaḥ. [1]AKVy 265.13: upapādane upapattau ; [2]AKBh(P) 119, n. 1.]

60 Cf. AKBh(P) 118,24: anḍajā yonir jarāyujā saṁsvedajā upapādukā yonih. yonir nāma jātiḥ.

61 AKBh(P) 468,16 = AKBh(L) 90,9.

On this āgama, the Abhidharmakośopāyikā, a Tibetan commentary on the AKBh, states the following:

O monks! For the benefit (phan pa, upakāra) of many living beings, for the happiness (bde ba, sukha) of many living beings, for compassion (thugs brtse ba, anukampā) for the world, and for the benefit and happiness of gods and people, a pudgala who is coming forth appears in the world.\(^{63}\)

In this commentary, a pudgala, which for Vasubandhu is nothing but an aggregate of skandhas, is said to appear for the benefit of others. Such ideas are the source of the proof of the existence of a permanent puruṣa and these ideas are almost the same as that in the Śāṃkhya proof that the aggregated is for the other (saṃghātaparārthatvāt), as cited and discussed at the beginning of this paper.

4.2.2. The purpose of karman

After criticizing the Vaiyākaraṇa and Vaiśeṣika, Vasubandhu takes up the issue of karman, in which he questions not only its subject but also its purpose. First, he says the following:

(O): If there is no ātman, for what purpose does one undertake karman?

(P): The purpose is that I wish to be happy (sukhī) and not to be suffering (duḥkhī).\(^{64}\)

Here, the opponent first raises a question about the purpose of karman. Similar to the āgama cited above, the opponent argues for a purpose, but Vasubandhu insists that it is for the benefit of oneself. One may say that this is a teleological argument that must be distinguished from the argument on the subject of action, which the Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika mainly use.

In the two descriptions cited above, two factors are taken up, namely, “pudgala appears” in the context of transmigration, and “one undertakes karman.” As the purpose of these, two possibilities are discussed: they are for oneself or for others. The proponent, Vasubandhu, takes the first position, and the opponent, perhaps a Śāṃkhya, takes the second one.

\(^{63}\) AKUp 133a 5–6: dge slong dag skye bo mang po la phan pa dang. skye ba mang po la bde ba dang. 'jig rten la thugs brtse ba'i phyir dang. lha dang mi rnams la phan ba dan bde ba'i phyir 'jig rten du gang zag gcig skye ba na skye ste. Honjo does not identify the passage with canonical sources, but lists some possibilities (Honjo 2014: 906).

\(^{64}\) AKBh(P) 476,4–5 = AKBh(L) 150,1–2: ātmany asati kimarthah karmārambhaḥ. aham sukhi syām aham duḥkhī na syām ity evamarthaḥ.
The idea that *pudgala*, even though it is just an aggregation, appears for the benefit of others, can be regarded as a source of or at least connected to the Sāṃkhya’s proof of the existence of the *puruṣa*: that an aggregation is for someone else (*saṃghātaparārthatva*) as is mentioned above. This Sāṃkhya proof is formed from a teleological point of view, namely, taking a phenomenon as an activity (*kriyā*) and seeking its purpose. The opponent in the AKBh expresses an idea similar to this Sāṃkhya position.

**4.3. The object of *ahaṃkāra*, and the āśraya of *sukha* and *duḥkha***

After the above question, the opponent continues:

(O): Whoever on the earth is that I whom the *ahamkāra* has as its object? What is that which the *ahamkāra* has as its object?

(P): *[Ahaṃkāra]* has *skandha* as its object.

(O): How is it known?

(P): Because of the affection (*sneha*) for them (the *skandhas*), and because the understandings (*buddhibhiḥ*) of white, etc., have the same locus [with *ahamkāra*] (*sāmānyādhikaranyāt*). In other words: “I am white.” “I am black.” “I am fat.” “I am thin.” “I am old.” “I am young.” Thus, we experience that the understandings of white, etc., have the same locus with *ahamkāra*. With reference to the ātman, however, we do not experience such [various] states (*prakārā*). […]  

(O): If there is no ātman, who/what is in fact afflicted or delighted, in which as the recipient delight or affliction arise, just like a flowered tree or woods bearing fruits? What is then the recipient upon which these two (delight and affliction) rest?

(P): The six sense spheres (*āyatana*).  

In this argument, we find two controversies, namely, the object of *ahamkāra* and the āśraya of *duḥkha* and *sukha*. Regarding the object of the concept “I” (*aham*) or that which is an āśraya of *duḥkha* and *sukha*, the Buddhist position is opposed to that of the Naiyāyikas or Vaiśeṣikas, who regard *duḥkha*, *sukha*, and *ahamkāra* as reasons or marks (*liṅga*)

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65 AKBh(P) 476,5–8 = AKBh(L) 150,3–11: *ko 'sāv aham nāma yadvīṣayo 'yam ahamkārah. kimvīṣayo 'yam ahamkārah.*[*] skandhavisayah. katham jnāyate. teṣu snehāt. gaurādibuddhibhiḥ sāmānādhikaranyāc ca.[*] gauro 'ham aham svāmāh. sthālo 'ham aham kṛśah. jirno 'ham aham yuveti. gaurādibuddhibhiḥ sāmānādhikarano 'yam ahamkāro drśyate, na cātmāna ete prakāra drśyante[*].

[*] AKBh(P): lacks *kimvīṣayo 'yam ahamkārah* ; [*] AKBh(P): -karanyāt tu ; [*] AKBh(L): -avyante, 150, n. 743.]

66 AKBh(P) 476,16–18 = AKBh(L) 152,12–16: *asaty ātmanī ka esa sukhitov duḥkkhitov vā, yasminn āśraye sukham utpannaṃ duḥkhāṃ vā, yathā puṣpito vṛksah phalitaṃ vanam iti. kāḥ punar anayor āśrayaḥ. sādāyatanam.*
for proving the existence of ātman. The point of the difference is that, for the first question, Buddhists suppose that the skandhas are the object of ahamkāra, whereas the Vaiśeṣikas or Naiyāyikas suppose ātman as its object. For the second question, the Buddhists suppose the six sense spheres (āyatanas) as the recipient (āśraya) of sukhā and duḥkha, whereas the Vaiśeṣikas or Naiyāyikas suppose another substance (dravya), namely, ātman as their āśraya.

4.4. The subject of sāṃśāra, smṛti, vijñāna, and karman

4.4.1. The subject of sāṃśāra

Concerning the subject of sāṃśāra, smṛti, and vijñāna, the opponent says the following:

(O): Such being the case, if there is no pudgala, what actually transmigrates, because it is inappropriate that transmigration itself transmigrates? The following is said by the Buddha: “The living beings who are covered by ignorance and wandering in rebirth (samdhāvatām) transmigrate.”

(P): How then does pudgala transmigrate?

(O): [They transmigrate by] abandoning [their] other [previous] aggregate and taking [new ones].

(P): With reference to the position, the answer is [already] stated. And, as it is said that just like momentary fire wanders as continuity (samtāna), so it is said that aggregations (samudāya) of skandhas called “living beings” (sattvānāṃ) who have attachments caused by eager desire transmigrate.

(O): If this [living being] is mere skandhas, why did the Buddha say, “He was nobody but I who was a teacher named Snetra at that time and on that occasion”?

(P): […] Accordingly, [the statement] “he is nobody but I” shows that [a living being] has the characteristic of being a single continuity (ekasaṃtānatā).

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67 See Kano 1996: 223. PBh 16,3ff.
68 SĀ Vol.6 No.133–138 (T Vol 2, 41c–42c), etc. See Murakami 1993b: 113,5 and 137,5 n. 89; Honjo 2014: 925.
69 AKBh(P) 471,24–472,7 = AKBh(L) 116,1–118,2: yadi tarhi pudgalo nāsti ka eṣa sāṃsāra eva(s) samsaratīti yuktam. uktaṃ ca bhagavatā “avidyāni varamānām sattvānām samdhāvatām samsaratām” iti. atha pudgalaḥ katham samsaratī. skandhāntaratayāgopādānāt. uktottara eṣa pakṣah. yathā tu kṣaṇiko ‘gnte samtatayā samacaratītyā ucye tathā sattvākhyāḥ skandhā- sāṃuddhāyās trṣnopādānāḥ samsaratiḥ ucye. yadi skandhamātṛam idam kasmād āha bhagavāh “aham eva sa tena kālena tena samayena sunetro nāma śāstā ‘bhūvam’ iti. … tasmād aham eva sa ity ekasamātānitām darśayati.
The opponent tries to prove the existence of *pudgala* as the subject of transmigration, and against this, the proponent claims that an aggregation (*samudāya*) of *skandhas* called *sattva* transmigrates. Here, for the opponent, an existence of continuity, *pudgala*, is requested as the subject of phenomena, in this case, transmigration. In the above citation, the passage makes clear that with reference to transmigration, Vasubandhu’s counter-concept of *pudgala* is *saṃtāna/saṃtati*, and the subject of *saṃtāna/saṃtati* is *samudāya* of *skandhas*.

This kind of argument is, on one hand, already found in other Abhidharma literature before the AKBh. In the second book of the AVPŚ, for instance, *pudgala* is discussed in the context of *saṃsāra* and five *gatis*, *vedanā*, seeing, hearing, cognition, the object of *maitra/mettā* (*慈*), and so on. We do not, however, find the idea of *saṃtāna/saṃtati* there. On the other hand, Brahmanical texts, for instance, the *Manusmṛti*, discuss *ātman*, *kṣetrajña* and *jīva* as a subject of transmigration.71

### 4.4.2. The subject of *smṛti/smarana* and *vijñāna*

The opponent then raises a question:

(O): Such being the case, if there is not *ātman* at all, how does the remembrance (*smaraṇa*) of a fact or a thing that is experienced for a long time in the momentary heart arise, and also the recognition (*pratyabhijñāna*)?72

The proponent answers as follows:

(P): [It arises] from the specific mind (*cittaviśeṣāt*) accompanied by the conception of the object of recollection (*smṛtiṣayasyasamjñā*).73 […]

(O): Now, how does one mind (*cetas*) recollect what is experienced by the other mind, because if this were the case, Yajñadatta’s mind would remember what Devadatta experienced.

(P): No, [such a thing does not happen], because there is no relation [between the two facts]. Between them, there is in fact no relation like that between two [facts] which belong to one and the same continuity.
(ekasamūnīkayoḥ). This is because [in the case you present] there is no causal relation (akāryakāraṇabhave), and we do not mean that one mind remembers what is experienced by the other, but rather that the mind of recollection arises as different from the mind of experience. [It happens] as is stated above because of the transformation of continuity (samatatiparinayā). In such a case, what is wrong with it? And, the recognition arises only because of the remembrance.  

The following discussion then ensues:

(O): In the case in which there is no ātman, who on earth remembers?  
(P): What is the meaning of “remember”?  
(O): One grasps an object by remembrance.  
(P): Is grasping it (= the object) different from [its] remembrance?  
(O): If so (i.e., if they are different from each other), who makes the remembrance?  
(P): It is already stated that one who does it is a specific mind as a cause of recollection (smṛtiḥetuḥ cittaviśeṣaḥ). In such a case, it is said[ for instance,] that Caitra remembers. Therefore, in fact, after the observation of it (=remembrance) arising from the continuities called Caitra (caitrākhyāt saṃtānāt), it is said that Caitra remembers (smarati).

(O): If there is no ātman, to whom (kasya) does the remembrance (smṛti) belong?  
(P): What is the meaning of the sixth case (i.e., genitive) [in this case]?  
(O): It means “owner” (svāmin).  
(P): For instance, who is the owner of what?

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75 AKBh(L) evam, see n. 567. If we read evam, the sentence means “who remembers in this way?” However, in this context, what “evam” indicates is unclear.

76 In the following, I translate smṛti as “recollection” and smarana as “remembrance” only to distinguish the difference in the original, except some passages where the relationship with the verb “remember” (smarati) is significant.

77 The term tadgraṇahaṇam can be interpreted in two ways: “the grasp” or “grasp of it (= the object).” I take the latter interpretation.

78 AKBh(P) reads “smṛtim tarhi kah karoti,” whereas AKBh(L) reads “smṛtim tarhi karoti,” based on the Ms. The latter, however, does not make sense in this context. I follow Pradan’s reading, even though it is his emendation as a supplement. See AKBh(L) 124, n. 568.
(O): It is just like Caitra [is the owner] of a cow.

(P): How is he its owner?

(O): In fact, depending upon it, he employs it as a means of conveyance [for something] or for milking and the like.

(P): Furthermore, for what [object] is the remembrance to be employed, when its owner is sought with reference to it (= the remembrance)?

(O) [It is to be employed] for things or facts to be remembered.

(P): For what purpose is [the remembrance] to be employed?

(O): For remembrance.

(P): O! It is well stated by those who have grown up in happy circumstances, because [they say that] the same one (= remembrance) is to be employed for itself.

(O): Such being the case, the cause indeed attains the state of owner (svāmin), and the effects are really its property (svam), because the cause has supremacy (ādhipatya) over effects, and by effects, the cause comes to own them. In fact, it (i.e., remembrance) is really related only with the cause of remembrance.

(P): And, when whoever called Caitra is grasped as one existence in the continuities of the aggregation of latent faculties (samskārasamāhasamṭāṇa), he is said to be the owner of what is called a cow. Further, if some changes of going to another place are brought about for it (= his cow), he is called “owner” by regarding his mind as being the cause [of the change]. However, there is in fact not even one Caitra at all, nor is there any cow.
In this discussion, we find that the proponent presents two concepts for the subject of remembrance or the owner of memory instead of *pudgala*, namely, *cittaviśeṣa* and *saṃskārasamūhasantāna*. The latter is almost the same as the concept Vasubandhu employs in the previous argument. The AKBh defines *citta* as being synonymous with *manas*, or *vijñāna*, by saying “[it is called] *citta* because one accumulates [something therein].”

Accordingly, *cittaviśeṣa* can be replaced by *vijñānaviśeṣa*.

Moreover, it is noteworthy here that the idea of *santāna*, which the Buddhists present as a counter concept to that of lasting existence such as *puruṣa* or *ātman*, is not described as a simple continuity but as the continuity of causal relations. To the question why Devadatta does not remember what is experienced by Yajñadatta, Vasubandhu answers that there is no causal relation between them. The simple concept of “continuity” (*santāna*) is seemingly contradictory with momentary perishing (*kṣaṇabhaṅga*). However, by introducing the idea of causality, that is, not simple continuity, but that of causal relations, Vasubandhu tries to reconcile the two concepts *kṣaṇabhaṅga* and *santāna* with each other.

The counterargument against the theory of *saṃskārasamūhasantāna* is found in the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. There, the Naiyāyika claims that *ātman* is different from the body, senses, or *manas*, because one recognizes what is perceived by the left eye by the right eye as well. Or, as the reason for the existence of *ātman*, they present the fact that when one perceives a specific color or the fragrance of a fruit, one salivates and thus stimulates a different sense. These two facts are used as evidence of the existence of *ātman*. According to the Naiyāyika, in the former case, *ātman* has the function of simultaneously integrating (*pratisannidhi/pratysandhāna*) two perceptions or experiences; in the latter case, it has the function of remembrance (*smṛti/smarana*) or recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) in different times. Against these claims, the Buddhist answers: “No, it is because remembrance has what is to be remembered as its object.”

The Naiyāyika then states the following:

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81 AK k.2.34: *cittam mano ’tha vijñānam ekārtham cittacaitasāḥ || AKBh(P) 61,23: cinotīti cittam.*

82 NS 3.1.7: *savyadṛṣṭasyetareṇa pratyabhijñānānāt.*


85 NS 3.1.13: *na, smṛteḥ smartavyaviśayatvāt.*
If a living being is a mere saṃskārasamātati, then many saṃskāras would repeatedly perish after arising. There is not such a latent faculty at all, even one that would be able to experience (anubhavet) the [acquiring of] knowledge pertaining to the three times or having remembrance. Further, without such an experience, there would be no identification (pratysandhāna) of knowledge or remembrance such as “I” [that perceives an object I previously perceived] or “my” [remembrance], just as [in the case of] the different bodies.

In this passage, we find two key terms: saṃskārasamātati/saṃskāra-samāhasantāna as presented by the Buddhists, and pratysandhāna as presented by the Naiyāyikas, on the basis of which they suppose its subject. This discussion corresponds to that in the AKBh cited above, and thus both can be regarded as recording the same debate. Other Brahmanical texts such as the SS, CS, and YS enumerate smṛti as a liṅga of ātman.

In the same way, in the AKBh, the proponent refers to indriya, artha, and manaskāra as the cause of cognition (vijñāna). The Vaiyākaraṇa then raises the following question:

[There are] also [those] who argue [thusly]:

(O) In fact, since a state (bhāva) depends on [its] agent (bhavitṛ), all states depend on [their] agents. For instance, just as [in the case] “Devadatta goes.” In such a case, the state (bhāva) of “going” depends on Devadatta as the one who goes. [In the same way,] cognition is a state. Hence, there must be someone who cognizes [as the agent].

(P) He (= the opponent who argues in this way) must be asked who is this Devadatta. If [he means it is] ātman, this must really be proven. Or [if he means it is] a person in our daily verbal expression (vyavahārapuruṣa), then there is not such [a person] at all, because those who have such a name are [in fact, nothing but] the saṃskāras. In this case, just as Devadatta goes, he (= the saṃskāra named Devadatta) cognizes.

(O) Then, how does Devadatta go? In fact, unintelligent people are attached to [the existence of the agent] by grasping uninterrupted continuity of momentary saṃskāras as a lump of living beings. When their continuity arises in another place, [these saṃskāras become] its (=arising’s) cause, and [they in such a situation are] called “Devadatta

86 On pratysandhāna, see fn. 84.
87 NBh 143.22–144.2 (ad NS 3.1.14): saṃskārasantatimātre tu sattve upadyotpadya saṃskārās tirobhavanti. sa nästy eko ’pi saṃskāro yas trikālaviśiṣṭam jñānam smṛtim cānubhavit. na cānubhavam antareṇa jñānasya smṛteś ca pratīsandhānam ahaṃ mameti cotapadyate dehāntaravat.
89 AKV 712.26: yo ’pi āha. bhāvasya bhavitrapekṣād iti Vaiyākaraṇaḥ. Murakami 1993b 137, n. 100.
goes.” And, the arising [of the continuity] in another place is [denoted by] “going.” It is just as we express the continuity of a flame or a sound as “it goes” or its “going.” […]

(O) Then, in the sūtra, it is stated that the cognition cognizes. In this case, what does the cognition do?

(P) It does nothing. It is stated, however, that [it is] just as the effect follows its cause, because it gets its essence by the similarity [with the cause], even though it does nothing at all. [And,] it is stated that, in the same way, cognition is also said to cognize the object, because it gets its essence by similarity (sādṛṣṭeṣyamānātmalabhāt), even though [the cognition itself] does nothing at all. What then is in fact its similarity (sādṛṣṭeṣyam)? The fact that [the cognition] has its (object’s) form (tadākāratā). For this very reason, it is stated that [cognition] also cognizes an object that appears through the senses and does not [cognize] the senses [themselves]. Rather, in the same way, in this case too, since there is a statement [in āgama] that “cognition cognizes” because the continuity of cognition becomes the cause of [the next] cognition (vijnānasamātānya vijnāne kāranabhāvād), [the expression has] no fallacy, because the term “agent” indicates the cause.

91 Cf. ŚBh 54, 17. See fn. 98.
92 The “tad” of “tadākāratā” can be construed in two ways. On one hand, it can mean “viṣaya.” On the other, it can mean “ākāra” in the previous cognition. In the first interpretation, however, “viṣaya” means “previous cognition.” Therefore, these two interpretations are nearly the same in content.
93 The “tad” in “tadindriyād” is unclear. I take it as “the sense in the present cognition,” because otherwise “api” would be meaningless.
94 AKBh(P) 473,15–474,3 = AKBh(L) 130,1–134,9: yo ‘py āha. bhāvasya bhavitāram apekṣate. yathā devadatto gacchāti atra gatir bhāvo gantīram devadattam apekṣate. tadā vijñānam bhāvah. tasmād yo vijñānti tena bhavitavyam iti. sa vaktavyah. ko ‘yam devadatta iti. yady ātmā sa eva sādhyah. atha vyavahārapuruṣah. so ‘pi na kaścid ekaḥ(,) samskārā hi ta evaṃmāmānah. tatra yathā devadatto gacchati tathā(1) vijñāti. kathām ca devadatto gacchati. kshanikā hi samskārā abhinmasaṃtāna devadatta iti bālaiv ekasaitavapindagrāhenādhimuktiḥ svasya samātānya deśāntarotpattau(2) kāraṇam bhavanta ucyante gacchati devadatta iti. sā ca deśāntarotpattir gatir iti. jvālaśabdasamaṃtānyor gacchātigamanābhidhānavat. […] yat tarhi “vijñānam vijñānti”ti sātra uktam kim tatra vijñānam karoti. na kincit karoti. yathā tu kāryam kāraṇam anuvidhiyata ity ucyate. sādṛṣṭeṣyātmalabhād akuruvad api kincit. evaṃ vijñānam api viṣayaṃ(3) vijñātītya ucyate. sādṛṣṭeṣyātmalabhād akuruvad api kincit. kim punar asya sādṛṣṭyam. tadākārāt. ati eva tadindriyād api utpānam viṣayaṃ vijñāṇātya ucyate nendriyaṃ. atha vā tathā ‘trāpi vijñānasamaṃtānya vijñāne kāranabhāvād vijñānam vijñāṇātya vacanam(4) nirdoṣam kāraṇe kartāśabdanirdeśāt. [1]AKBh(P) yathā; [2]AKBh(P) deśāntare; [3]AKBh(P) lacks viṣayaṃ ; [4]AKBh(P) vacanān.]
In the above discussion, the first point to observe is that the opponent tries to prove ātman as bhavitṛ by regarding cognition as bhāva. Vasubandhu replies to the opponent that the cognition as the cause (kāraṇa) cognizes, because it is the cause of the next cognition. In other words, he sees the relation between kāraṇa and kārya within the series of causal nexus in the continuity of cognition. By ātmavādins such as the Naiyāyika and the Mīmāṃsaka, the causal relation between ātman and bhāva is seen vertically as an agent and its effects, whereas Vasubandhu sees the causal relation within the continuity of cognition horizontally, namely, as part of a stream of cognition.

This kind of dispute is clearly reflected in the Mīmāṃsāśabarabhāṣya (ŚBh). In its Tarkapāda, ad MS 1.1.5, Śabaravāmin (Ś) reports the following:

(Ś) If there is no cognizer (vijñātṛ) other than cognition [itself], then [the question would be presented:] by whom is “he cognizes” stated? By the term [“cognize,”] the designation (abhidhānam) of the subject of cognition occurs. Therefore, since the term [“cognize”] must be made to have sense, we will have to suppose ātman that is different from cognition. [...].

Then Śabaravāmin presents “desire” (icchā) as evidence of the existence of ātman, stating the following:

(Ś) We cognize [the existence of] ātman by [that of] “desire” (icchā). How? Desire in fact arises when we intend [to get] something we cognized before, not something we have not cognized before. [...] Even for some object some person has cognized before, desire does not really arise in another person who has not cognized [it]. And, for something he has cognized one day, desire arises on another day [...]. If the cognizer (upalambhaka) is a mere cognition, when it perishes, in whom would desire arise on another day? [...].

The same discussion is applied to “recollection” and “cognition” itself.

Śabaravāmin continues:

(Ś) It is really impossible for those who do not recollect [something] to have desire [for it]. And, recollection does not arise concerning what has

95 ŚBh 52,8–11: yadi vijñānād anyo vijñātā nāsti, kas tarhi “jānāti” iti ucyate? jānāsya kartur abhidhānam anena śabdenopapadyate. tad eṣa sābo ētvān kartavya iti jānād vyatiriktam ātmānam kalpayiṣyāma iti [...].

96 ŚBh 52,17–54,1: icchāyā ātmānam upalabhāmahe. katham? upalabdhabhūre hi abhiprete bhavati icchā, nānupalabdhabhūre. [...] na khāv anyena puruṣena upalabdhe 'pi viśaye 'nyasyānupalabdhur icchā bhavati. bhavati cānyedur upalabdhe 'paredyur icchā. [...] yadi vijñānāmātṛm evadām upalabhakam abhaviṣyat, pradhvaste tasmin kasyāparedyur icchā 'bhaviṣyat.
not been experienced before. Accordingly, recollection is impossible if there is merely an aggregate of cognition (vijñānaskandhamātre) that perishes in every moment.

(O) <Buddhist> On this point [a Buddhist] says [the following]: [What we have said about] desire is [applicable to] recollection as well. A cognition (vijñānam) that is similar to the previous cognition (pūrvavijñānasadṛṣṭam) or that has the previous cognition as its object (pūrvavijñānaviṣayaṃ) is called “recollection” (smṛti).\(^97\) […]

The knowledge of the collection of skandha caused by other collections of skandha is cognized by another [collection of skandha], which is born from its (= the knowledge’s) continuity (tatsantatijena), and not from some continuity other than it (= the knowledge’s continuity). Accordingly, the collections of skandhas are essence-less (śūnyāḥ). Then, with reference to the content, there is a Brāhmaṇa: after arising out of these elements, the collection of cognition (vijñānaghana) indeed perishes into nothing but them (i.e., these elements). There is no consciousness (saṃjñā) after death.\(^98\)

(Ś): [Śabara] answers on this point: This is not the case. Of [the object] that one saw on a certain day, the understanding “I saw it” arises on another day. Such [an understanding] arises in the individual self (pratyagātman), not in another.\(^99\)

We find here the same critical point concerning the connection between experiences or cognition in different times and the connection between experiences in different persons. In Naiyāyika’s discussion, two different senses of the same person are taken up, instead of the example of the latter. That is, the non-Buddhist, namely, the Mīmāṃsaka here, points out the problem of integration (pratisannidhi/pratyasandhāna) of two experiences in different times, and of two experiences in different persons. Comparing the characterization of smṛti in the AKBh with that by the opponent in the ŚBh cited above, we find a certain similarity of the point in question.

The idea of the proponent in the last chapter of the AKBh is almost the same critical point concerning the connection between experiences or cognition in different times and the connection between experiences in different persons. In Naiyāyika’s discussion, two different senses of the same person are taken up, instead of the example of the latter. That is, the non-Buddhist, namely, the Mīmāṃsaka here, points out the problem of integration (pratisannidhi/pratr̥ysandhāna) of two experiences in different times, and of two experiences in different persons. Comparing the characterization of smṛti in the AKBh with that by the opponent in the ŚBh cited above, we find a certain similarity of the point in question.

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\(^{97}\) ŚBh 54,14–18: na hy “asmartāra icchanti” ity upapadyate. na cāḍṛṣṭapūrve smṛtir bhavati. tasmāt kṣaṇike vijñānaskandhamātre smṛtir anupapanneti. atrāha. smṛtir api icchanti. pūrvavijñānasadṛṣṭaṃ vijñānaṃ pūrvavijñānaviṣayaṃ vā smṛtir ity ucyate.

\(^{98}\) Cf. BĀU 2.4.12: evaṃ vā ara idaṃ mahād bhūtaḥ anantaṃ apāraṃ viṇānaghana eva. etebhyah bhūtebhyah samutthāya tāṇy evāvāvā vinaśyati. na pretya saṃjñā ’stīty are bravāmi. Frauwallner 1968: 54 n. 1.

same as that of the opponent in the ŚBh. These texts may have been produced from common discussions.

So far, we have examined Vasubandhu’s idea, or that asserted by the Buddhist in the NBh and ŚBh, on the subject of *smṛti/smaraṇa* and *vijñāna*, and the non-Buddhist’s objection against this idea.

Vasubandhu’s idea can be summarized as follows:

1) A living being is mere *saṃskārasaṃtati/saṃskārasamūhasaṃtāna*.
2) A cognition (*vijñānam*) that is similar to a previous cognition (*pūrvavijñānasadṛśaṅ* or that has a previous cognition as its object (*pūrvavijñānāviṣayaṃ*) is called “recollection” (*smṛti*).
3) There is a causal relation (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) between a previous cognition and the present cognition.

These ideas are criticized by the Grammarians, the Mīmāṃsakas, and the Naiyāyikas. They are also nearly the same as those cited as the opponent’s claim in the *Mīmāṃsāśabarabhāṣya* as well as in the *Nyāyabhaṣya*.

In the AKBh, a dispute with the Vaiśeṣikas is recorded at the end of the discussion:

(O): Ātman must necessarily be accepted, because recollection and the like belong to the category of property (*guna*), and it (= property) must depend on a substance (*dravya*).\(^{100}\) This is because it is not proper for them to depend on other substances [than ātman, such as earth, water, *manas*, etc.].\(^{101}\)

(P): No, it is because [the fact that they are *gunas* is] not established.\(^{102}\)

This discussion is the typical proof of ātman by means of the inference of *sāmānyatodṛśta* with *pariśeṣa*,\(^{103}\) according to which a property (*guna*) must belong to a substance (*dravya*) and must have a substance as its recipient (*āśraya*). This inference is the *sāmānyatodṛśta*, which is backed by the categorical system of Vaiśeṣika. The last sentence cited above expresses the logic of elimination (*pariśeṣa*), by which all possibilities other than what is to be proven, ātman, are negated. This is particularly effective in a system of enumeration, like that of the Vaiśeṣika or the

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\(^{100}\) VS 1.1.15: *dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam.*

\(^{101}\) In PBh, *smṛti* is included in *buddhi* as ātman’s *guna*. PBh 57.

\(^{102}\) AKBh(P) 475,22–23 = AKBh(L) 148,11–13: *avaśyam ātmābhyupagantavyah. smṛtyādīnāṃ guṇapadārthatvāt. tasya cāvaśyam(1) dravyāśritatvāt. teṣām cānyāśrayāyogād iti cet. na asiddheḥ(2) [1] AKBh(P) cārthād avaśyam ; (2) AKBh(P) lacks asiddheḥ].

\(^{103}\) See Kano 2001.
Abhidharma. As is stated, the Abhidharmic enumeration system of dharmas can be construed as a basis for the logic of elimination, because elimination functions effectively in a limited categorical system, even if the categories being supposed are numerous.

4.4.3. The subject of karman

The discussion of smīti and vijñāna is followed by a question about the kartṛ and bhokṛ of karman. The opponent says:

(O): If there is no ātman, who is the agent of these karmans? And who becomes the enjoyer (bhokṛ) of the effects [of these karmans]?

(P): What is the meaning of the sentence “[who is] the agent [of these karmans]” or “[who becomes] the enjoyer?”

(O): The agent means one who makes [something,] and the enjoyer means one who enjoys [something].

(P): You mentioned [only their] synonyms, and not their meanings.

(O): The scholars who give definitions (lākṣaṇika) (i.e., possibly the grammarians) provide the following definition of an agent: “an agent [denotes kāraka which] depends only upon itself (svatantra).”

Moreover, in the world we experience that there is an independency of someone with reference to only some effects. This is just as Devadatta [depends only upon himself] with regard to [his] bathing, eating, or going.

(P): Furthermore, whom/what then do you call Devadatta? If you call ātman [Devadatta], it is nothing but what is to be proven. Or, if you call what consists of five skandhas [Devadatta], it is really the agent. […] thus, there is nothing/nobody at all that/who has independence, because all existences, in fact, function depending on some other conditioning causes (pratya), […]

(O) If there is no ātman, how is the arising of the effect from the vanished karman possible in the future?

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104 Pāṇini 1.4.54. This sūtra is often cited in Īśvara discussions.

(P) Even if there were ātman, how is the arising of the effect from the vanished karman possible in the future?

(O) [It is possible] from the dharmādharma [caused by the karman] that rests upon it (ātman).

(P) [...] However, we never insist that effect arises from the vanished karman in the future. How then? [The effect of karman arises] from the specific evolution of its (karman’s) continuity (tatsantatiparīṇāṁmaviśeṣāt), just like seeds and fruits [...].

(O) What then is “continuity” (santati), what is “evolution” (pariṇāma), and what is “specific” (viśeṣa)? The successive birth (prasava) of a mind after [a previous mind] preceded by karman is the continuity. Its (the continuity’s) rise in a succession of a different way is evolution. Furthermore, the evolution that is able to produce an effect immediately thereafter is a specific evolution, because it is specified by the last [phase of the] evolution.

In this discussion, it is apparent that for the opponent, with reference to the relation with karman, the existence of ātman is evidenced by the continuity between karman and its effect. In other words, ātman must combine karman and its phala. However, the Buddhists explain this continuity by introducing the idea of the specific pariṇāma of karman’s continuity (karmasantatiparīṇāṁmaviśeṣa). At the beginning of this passage, the question about the agent (kartr) and the enjoyer (bhoktr) of karman are raised. Regarding karman, as has already been pointed out, an inquiry into its subject and purpose must be undertaken. The enjoyer (bhoktr) of karman is the subject of action, but it can also be understood in the context of a teleological argument. In the Sāmkhya theory, puruṣa is characterized as “enjoyer” (bhoktr). SK 17 states the following:

Puruṣa exists. [This is proven by the following five reasons.] First, it is because the aggregation [exists not for the elements that constitute it, but] for the other.

106 According to PBh 16,7ff., dharmādharma are guṇas of ātman.

107 AKBh(P) 477,7–11 = AKBh(L) 158,1–8: katham asaty ātmani vinaśṭāt karmanā āyatvāṃ phalotpattih. ātmany api sati kathāṃ vinaśṭāt karmanā āyatvāṃ phalotpattih. tadāśṛṣṭid dharmādharma. … naiva tu vayaṃ vinaśṭāt karmanā āyatvāṃ phalotpattim brūmah. kathāṃ tarhi. tatsaṃtatiparīṇāṁmaviśeṣād bijaphalavat.


109 See section 4.2 above.
Second, because [it is stated in the Kārikā 11 that the evolved (vyakta) consists of] three constituents, etc. [and the puruṣa is] its opposite.

Third, because [the evolved needs] control [by the other for its activity].

Fourth, because [for the evolved that consists of three constituents], there must be its “enjoyer” (bhokty).

And fifth, because [everybody] engages in activities for the isolation [of puruṣa].

Here, we find five reasons stated in ablative form for the existence of a permanent puruṣa, two of which concern our discussion: the fourth suggests the subject of karman, and the first suggests the purpose of aggregation. These have been seen in the SKM cited above.

The AK Bh seems to reflect heated and lively discussions between Vasubandhu, other Buddhists, and various Brahmanical schools, such as the Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Vaiyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsaka, and the Sāṃkhya, regarding the existence of ātman, pudgala, and puruṣa. The ninth chapter of the AK Bh, the Takrapāda of the Mīmāṃsāśabarabhāṣya, and the Nyāyabhaṣya share these discussions.

5. Concluding remarks

Abhidharma thinkers enumerate the various factors of phenomena in our empirical world principally as the cause of suffering, and correlate them with each other. As an effect of this, they negate the existence of a permanent ātman or pudgala and conclude that there is not a permanent existence such as ātman or pudgala, as supposed by their opponents, but that there are only the skandhas or aggregates of elements. In Vasubandhu’s AK Bh, we find the philosophy of “aggregation only” based on an analysis of each factor. However, as presented at the beginning of this paper, by regarding “aggregation” as a process and applying the kāraka theory to the verb “aggregate” as grammarians, we find three themes about aggregates in the controversies between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, or between the various groups of Buddhists themselves. First, what is the ontological state of the elements themselves as the material cause of their aggregation? Second, for what purpose does the controller make them come together, or for what purpose do the elements aggregate by themselves? Third, who makes these elements come together, in other

110 SK 17: saṃghātaparārthatvāt trigunādiparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt | puruṣo ’sti bhoktybhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravr̥tteś ca ||.

111 See fn. 6.
words, who is their controller (*kartr, adhiṣṭhātr*)? Is there an agent who controls the aggregation, or do the factors or elements come together by themselves?

In response to the first question, these groups developed the *paramāṇu* theory and tried to combine it with their original concepts or categorical theories—*rūpa, skandha*, etc. for the Buddhists, and *dravya, guna*, etc. for the Vaiśeṣikas. This situation was common to Buddhists, namely, the Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, or other Buddhists, as well as to non-Buddhists, namely, the Nyaiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. In the first question, the Nyaiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas tried to prove the existence of *paramāṇu* as a permanent substance (*nityadravya*).\(^{112}\)

The second question, the inquiry into the purpose of aggregation, can be construed as a teleological argument. The Sāṃkhyas use this kind of argument to establish the permanent existence of *puruṣa*, an individual “soul/self.”

The third question evoked lively discussions about whether there is permanent existence as a subject or not. This was discussed among Buddhist *pudgalavādins*, Sarvāstivādins, Sautrāntikas, and non-Buddhist *ātmavādins*, such as Nyaiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Śāmkhyas, and Mīmāṃsakas, concerning the subject of *saṃsāra, smṛti, vijnāna*, and *karman*, the āśraya of *sukha* and *duḥkha*, and the object of *ahaṃkāra*. Vaiśeṣikas and Nyaiyāyikas, in particular, established and developed the proof of the existence of *ātman* by regarding these phenomena as its inferential marks (*liṅgas*).\(^{113}\) The polemics between these philosophical groups and the original theories each of them developed are recorded in the AKBh, particularly in the ninth chapter, as well as in the NBh, and the ŚBh. These descriptions reflect a primitive stage of the controversy between those who supposed some sort of permanent existence and many Buddhists, who claimed “aggregation only,” the characteristic of the philosophical system of Abhidharma Buddhism.

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112 Cf. PBh 5.8–9: *sā tu dvividhā. nityā cānityā ca. paramāṇulakṣaṇā nityā. kāryalakṣaṇā tv anityā.*

113 See Kano 1996 and 2010.
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AKUp  Abhidharmakośopāyikā nāma Ṭīkā. Tohoku 4094, Otani 5595.


AMVŚ  *Abhidharmamahāvibhāṣāśāstra <A-p’i-ta-mo Ta p’i-p’o-sha Lun> (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), T 1545, Vol. 27.


BĀU  Bṛhadāranyakopaniṣat


Three controversies concerning aggregation

Frauwallner 1968 See ŚBh.


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Sakurabe 1969


SAHŚ


SĀ

Saṃyuktāgama <Tsa A-han Ching> (雑阿含経).

ŚBh


SK

Sāṃkhyaśāstra, see SKM.

SKM


SS


T


Watanabe 2007


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YS

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Is God just like a potter?
The logical fallacy *viśeṣaviruddhatva* in a proof for the existence of God

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Introduction

*Viśeṣaviruddhatva*, the incompatibility of a reason property (*sādhana*/heṭu) with a particular aspect of a target property, is a logical fallacy that Kumārila identifies in connection with a proof of God’s existence. In the following, the present author tries to trace, though partially, the history of this fallacy in the works of Kumārila, Jayanta, Śucarita, and Śālikanātha.

1. The basic structure of inference

Kumārila regards the following three steps as prerequisites for an inference (*anumāna*):

1) Repeated experiences (*bhūyodarśana*) of the coexistence of the probandum (*sādhya*) and the probans (*sādhana/heṭu*) in a familiar setting, e.g., fire and smoke in a kitchen hearth.

2) Grasping invariable concomitance (*vyāptigraha*) between the two related universals, e.g., “fire” and “smoke”;

3) Witnessing the probans in the subject (*pakṣa*) of the thesis, e.g., seeing smoke on a mountain.

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1 ŚV *anumāna* 12abc: *bhūyodarśanagamyā ca vyāptiḥ sāmānyadharmayoḥ | jñāyate bhedahānena.* “And invariable concomitance, which is apprehended through repeated experiences, is known between two general properties (i.e., universals) without particularity.” Cf. Yamakami *et al.* 1983: 9–10.

2 One grasps the probans’ pervadedness (*vyāptatva*) by the probandum.

3 In exceptional cases, the relationship is grasped between two individuals, for example, Rohiṇī and Kṛttikā. From the rising of Kṛttikā one infers the rising of Rohiṇī. ŚV *anumāna* 12d–13ab: *kvacic cāpi viśeṣayoḥ | kṛttikodayam ālakṣya rohiṇ yāsattikḷptivat.* “And in some [exceptional] cases [invariable concomitance is] also [known] between two individuals. For example, one infers that Rohiṇī is proximate after one observes that Kṛttikā has risen.” Cf. Yamakami *et al.* 1983: 10.

4 According to Jayanta, Ācāryas hold the view that *liṅgaparāmarśa* (synthesizing

2. Two Proofs of God

There are two well-known types of proofs for the existence of God (Īśvara), i.e., the creator of the universe. If we disregard, for the time being, minor differences of expression that reveal subtle differences in the two proofs and point to ways in which different authors understood them, they can be formulated as follows:

1) The earth and so on must have a creator (kartṛ), because they are effects (kāryatvāt), just like a pot.

2) Mountains and so on must have a creator, because they are qualified by a configuration (saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt), just like a pot.

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5. This smoke with that smoke is required in addition to these three steps. See NM I 179, 3–4: prathamam lingajāñānam, tato vyāptismařanam, tato dhūmaparāmarśāh, tato vahniñānam. “First, a cognition of an inferential mark; then a recollection of invariable concomitance; then a synthesis of smoke; then a cognition of a fire.”

6. Īśvara also takes the role of saṁhartṛ, i.e., the destroyer of the universe. See NM īśvara §2.2.10. Cf. Kataoka 2009a: 59 for a Japanese translation of the section.

7. For example, I do not go into details regarding the distinction between sentient beings (cetana, ajaḍa) and insentient entities (acetana, jaḍa) that Kumārila takes into consideration in his ŚV sāpa 75.

7. Jayanta presupposes the following syllogism: prthivyādi tadutpattiprakārapāravojanādyabhijñakartṛpūrvvakam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭādivat. See NM īśvara §3: prthivyādi kāryam dharmi, tadutpattiprakārapāravojanādyabhijñakartṛpūrvvakam iti sādhyo dharmah, kāryatvād ghaṭādivat. “An effect such as the earth is the thesis-locus; that [the earth] is preceded by a creator who knows the manner, purpose, etc., of its production is the target property; because it is an effect, just like a pot, etc.” See also Krasser 2002: II 105 for a German translation and Kataoka 2010 for a Japanese translation. In Jayanta’s probandum, i.e., tadutpattiprakārapāravojanādyabhijñakartṛpūrvvakam, the qualification part of kartṛ, namely, tadutpattiprakārapāravojanādyabhijñā is the viśeṣa part over which the Mīmāṁsakas dispute in connection with viśeṣaviruddha. Cf. RNĀ 32, 16–20: vivādādhyāsitam buddhimaddhetukam. kāryatvāt. yat kāryam tad buddhimaddhetukam, yathā ghaṭaḥ. kāryam cedam. tasmād buddhimaddhetukam iti. NKus 547,6: kṣityādi kartṛpūrvvakam kāryatvād iti. ŚD 115, 14–15: kṣityādikam buddhimatkartrkam kāryatvād ghaṭādivat.

8. Similarly, Jayanta presupposes the following syllogism: śailādi buddhimatkartrkam, saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, ghaṭādivat. NM īśvara §3.1.2: aha vā saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvam eva hetum abhidadhmahe. “Alternatively, we claim that being qualified by a configuration is the reason.” See also Krasser 2002: II 105 and Kataoka 2010: 26. NM īśvara §3.2.4.1: yad yat saṁniveśaviśiṣṭan tat tad buddhimatkartrkam. “Whatever is qualified by a configuration has a sentient creator.” Cf. also the pūrvapakṣa at §2.2.2.1.2: śailādisaṁnīvešo ‘pi naisa kartranumāpakāḥ. “Nor is this configuration of a mountain, etc., the cause for inference.”
2.1. **Kāryatva**

The reason property of the first proof, i.e., *kāryatva*, should be explained in accordance with the three steps of inference mentioned above.

1) A person has repeatedly witnessed a potter make a pot. In other words, they have experienced the coexistence of the pot’s property “having a maker” (*kartṛmatva*) and its property “being an effect” (*kāryatva*).

2) Through this process a person then establishes invariant concomitance between the two properties, i.e., having a maker and being an effect. That is to say, they establish that everything that is an effect must have a maker (*yad yat kāryaṁ tat tat kartṛmat*).

3) Now, natural things such as the earth, mountains, and so on, of which an obvious maker is not seen, are effects just like a pot.

4) Therefore, they must have a creator, i.e., God.

2.2. **Saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatva**

The reason property of the second proof, “being qualified by a configuration” (*saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatva*), is ascribed by Kamalaśīla to Aviddhakāraṇa. Kumāryla presupposes this reason when he discusses God in verse 74 of the *Saṁbandhākṣepaparihāra* chapter of the Ślokavārttika (= ŚV *sāp* 74). The syllogism presupposed by Kumāryla can be reconstructed as follows:

*deepādayaś cetanādhiṣṭhānotpattayaḥ, saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, grhādivat.*

The bodies and so on [of creatures] are produced under the governance of a sentient being, because they are qualified by a configuration, just like a house and so on.

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For the relevant passage of TSP 52, 16–18, see Krasser 1999: 216 and Krasser 2002: 35, n. 39. Aviddhakāraṇa’s own expression of the reason is “because of being qualified by a configuration of its constitutive parts” (*svārambhakāvayavasaṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt*).

ŚV *sāp* 74: *saṁniveśaviśiṣṭānām utpattiṁ yo grhādivat | sādhayec cetanādhiṣṭhāṁ dehānāṁ tasya cottaram ||*. For a translation, see Krasser 1999: 219: “Now (ca), the [following is our] answer to the one who wishes to establish that the creation (*utpatti*) of bodies specific in configuration must be governed by a conscious being (*cetanādhiṣṭhā*), like [the creation of] houses, etc.”

Cf. Nyāyaratnākara *ad* *sāp* 74, NRĀ 467,23-24: *bhūdharadehadūrvāṅkurādayo ye ’pi vipratipannacetanakartrākāś te sarve cetanādhiṣṭhānotpattayaḥ, saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatvāt, sāvayavatvād ity arthah, ghaṭādivat.*
In the ŚV sāp, in particular in verses 42cd–114ab, Kumārila denies the existence of a creator (sraṣṭṛ) who fixed the relationships between words and meanings at the beginning of creation (sargādau).\(^{12}\) In ŚV sāp 79 and following, Kumārila denies the existence of God (Īśvara) posited as the governor (adhiśṭhātṛ) of the production of creatures’ bodies. Kumārila’s framing of God as the creator of linguistic convention accords well with and seems to be a response to Praśastamati’s view. According to Śāntarakṣita, Praśastamati holds the view that people’s linguistic activity at the beginning of creation must have been based on the teaching by another kind of being, namely, God.\(^{13}\)

2.3. **The reason property and the subject**

In the following, for the sake of brevity, the reason property of the first proof, kāryatva, is mainly used. Because both reason properties, kāryatva and saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatva, have the same logical function, the discussion applies to both. As for the subject, it can be anything of which an obvious maker is not known. Jayanta mentions natural things such as the earth (kṣiti, bhū, prthivī, vasuṇdharā), a mountain (śaila, naga, kṣitidhara, parvata), and wild plants (akṛṣṭajātāḥ sthāvarāḥ) such as trees (vanaspati) and grasses (tṛṇa).

3. **A pseudo-reason called višeṣaviruddha**

Kumārila does not accept the existence of God, the creator (sraṣṭṛ) of the universe. One of his arguments against the existence of God is that the reason given for his existence is a pseudo-reason (hetvābhāsa), classified as višeṣaviruddha.\(^{14}\)

3.1. **Vируdda**

First, hetvābhāsa and viruddha in general should be explained. There are only three kinds of pseudo-reasons in Kumārila’s system:

1) An unestablished reason (asiddha-hetu): the reason in question is not established with respect to the subject.\(^{15}\)

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\(^{12}\) ŚV sāp 42cd: sargādau ca kriyā nāsti, tādṛk kālo hi neṣyate ||. “And it is not the case that the making [of the relationships between words and meanings] takes place at the beginning of creation, because such a time is not accepted.”

\(^{13}\) TS 51ab: sargādau vyavahāraś ca puṁsām anyopadeśajāḥ ||.

\(^{14}\) Kumārila also points out other fallacies of the proof. See Krasser 1999: 219ff.

\(^{15}\) For subcategories of asiddha, see ŚV anumāna 75cd–83ab.
2) An inconclusive reason (anaikāntika-hetu): the reason in question is inconclusive, i.e., it implies both the intended probandum (sādhya) and its opposite; thus, it may deviate from the target.\footnote{For subcategories of anaikāntika, see ŚV anumāna 83cd–96ab.}

3) An incompatible reason (viruddha-hetu): the reason in question would prove the opposite and thus refute (ṝbadh) the probandum\footnote{For subcategories of viruddha, see ŚV anumāna 96cd–107ab.}; for example, being a product (kṛtakatva), when used by a Grammarian or a Mīmāṃsaka with regard to a sound (śabda), would prove impermanence (anītyatva) and not its opposite, permanence (nītyatva).\footnote{ŚV anumāna 97cd: nityatve kṛtakatvasya dharmabādhāḥ viruddhatā ||. “Producedness is an incompatible [reason] when applied to [prove] eternity, because it refutes the property [i.e., eternity].” Cf. Yamakami et al. 1984: 38.}

A synopsis of the hetvābhāsa section of ŚV anumāna is given in Yamakami et al. 1984: 13–14 as follows (slightly modified by the present author):

I. asiddha 75cd–83ab
   1. svarūpāsiddha 76cd–79ab
      1.1. ubhayaviparyayāsiddha 76cd–77ab
      1.2. anyataraviparyayāsiddha 77cd–78ab
      1.3. saṁdigdhāsiddha 78cd–79ab
   2. āśrayāsiddha 79cd–81ab
   3. Supplementary explanation: anyatarāsiddhi and dūṣaṇa 81cd–83ab

II. anaikāntika=samśayahetu 83cd–96ab
   1. sādhāraṇāanaikāntika 85cd–86ab
   2. asādhāraṇāanaikāntika 86cd–91ab
   3. viruddhāvyabhicārin 91cd–96ab

III. viruddha 96cd–107ab\footnote{As pointed out by Yamakami et al. 1984: 23, Kumārila’s classification of viruddha is based on Dignāga’s PSV ad PS 2bcd. See Kitagawa 1965: 131.}
   1. dharmasvarūpaviruddha 97cd
   2. dharmaviśeṣaviruddha 98–100ab
   3. dharmisvarūpaviruddha 100cd–102ab
   4. dharmiviśeṣaviruddha 102cd–103ab\footnote{Kumārila presupposes the following syllogism as an example of dharmiviśeṣaviruddha, i.e., a reason property’s incompatibility with a particular}
5. dharmadharmisvarūpaviruddha 103cd–104ab
6. dharmadharmiviśeṣaviruddha 104cd–107ab

The relevant part is ŚV anumāṇa 98–100ab, where Kumārila explains dharmaviśeṣaviruddha.

3.2. Viśeṣaviruddha

Viśeṣaviruddha (III.2: dharmaviśeṣaviruddha in the above synopsis\(^{21}\)) is a particular kind of viruddha-hetu. The usual viruddha (III.1: dharmasvarūpaviruddha) can be analyzed as sādhyena viruddho hetuh, i.e., the reason in question is incompatible with, that is to say, would refute the intended target property itself.\(^{22}\) For example, being a product (kṛtakatva) would prove the opposite of permanence (nityatva) and would thus refute permanence.

On the other hand, viśeṣaviruddha (i.e., dharmaviśeṣaviruddha) can be analyzed as sādhyadharmaviśeṣena viruddho hetuh. That is, the reason in question would refute a particular aspect of the intended target property. In other words, the reason implies a particular quality that is contradictory to a quality of the intended probandum. Kumārila presupposes the

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\(^{21}\) Yāmuna, who “seems to be acquainted with Sucaritamiśra” according to Mesquita 1980: 201, (mistakenly) explains kāryatva as dharmaviśeṣaviruddha in ĀP 32, 3–7: api ca dharmaviśeṣaviruddhaś cāyaṁ hetuḥ “kāryatvāt” iti. ... katham iva tatpratyayikabhūtāśāryānityatpratapasvarvajñātvādyabhimataviśeṣān sādhyadharmin avagamayati. Kumārila’s example of dharmaviśeṣaviruddha at ŚV anumāṇa 102cd–103ab, however, does not support Yāmuna’s classification. The reason should be classified as dharmaviśeṣaviruddha and not dharmaviśeṣaviruddha if one follows Kumārila’s system.

\(^{22}\) Considering the contrast with sādhyaviśeṣa (i.e., sādhyadharmaviśeṣa), the commentators of the Ślokavārttika add svarūpa to sādhyā. In other words, usual viruddha is designated as sādhyadharmasvarūpaviruddha, which can be analyzed as follows: sādhyadharmasvarūpaṇa viruddho hetuh, i.e., the reason in question is incompatible with, i.e., would refute, the target property itself. Kumārila himself uses the term viśeṣaviruddha when describing dharmaviśeṣaviruddha at ŚV anumāṇa 102cd–103ab. Cf. Yamakami et al. 1984: 41.
following syllogism as an example of dharmaviśeṣaviruddha in ŚV anumāṇa 98cd–99ab:

*śabdarūpam prāk sanbandhāvadhāraṇād (svarūpa-)arthavat, vibhaktimattvāt, paścādvat.

Because it has a case-ending, a linguistic unit has [its own form as its] meaning even before the ascertainment of the [semantic] relationship, just as [it does] after [the ascertainment of the relationship].

The fallacy of this syllogism is as follows: the reason (vibhaktimattvāt, “because it has a case-ending”) would prove “having something else as its meaning” (asvarūpa-arthavat) rather than the intended target property, “having its own form as its meaning” (svarūpa-arthavat). Kumarila demonstrates here that the intended probandum, e.g., “having a meaning” (arthavat) has an implicit qualification, e.g., “its own form” (svarūpa). This is what is called dharmaviśeṣa, i.e., a particular aspect of the target property. The first speaker implicitly intends to prove “having its own form as its meaning” (svarūpa-arthavat) when he simply states “having a meaning” (arthavat). However, his reason “because of having a case-ending” (vibhaktimattvāt) would rather prove the opposite, i.e., “having something else as its meaning” (asvarūpa-arthavat). Thus, the reason becomes dharmaviśeṣaviruddha, i.e., a pseudo-reason incompatible with a particular aspect of the target property. Here the particular aspect (viśeṣa) substantially functions as an implicit qualification of the target property.

Similarly, in the case of the proof of God, the intended target property,

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23 The entire verses of ŚV sāp 98–100ab are as follows: bādho dharmaviśeṣasya yadā tv evam prayujyate | arthavac chabdasya dṛśyate tena prāg api | vibhaktimattvāt paścādvat svarūpeṇeti caśātrie | asvarūpārthayogas tu paścāc chabdasya drṣyate | arthavac mahābhūtārthata bhavet |. “On the other hand, a particular aspect [of the intended target property] is refuted when [a syllogism] is applied in the following manner—"A linguistic unit has a meaning even before the ascertainment of the [semantic] relationship, because it has a case-ending, just as [it does] after [the ascertainment of the semantic relationship].”— and if [having] its own form [as its meaning] is intended. However, it is experienced that a linguistic unit has something else as its meaning after [the ascertainment of the semantic relationship]. Therefore, it would undesirably follow that it has something else as its meaning even before [the ascertainment of] the [semantic] relationship.”

24 Yamakami et al. 1984: 39–40 err when they interpret the term svarūpa as meaning “its own, original meaning (i.e., non-figurative, primary meaning).” Here svarūpa means śabdāsvarūpa, namely, a word-form. According to the propounder of this syllogism, a word gauḥ has its own form /gauḥ/ as its direct meaning and not an object, cow. Having this in mind, the propounder claims that a word can refer to a meaning (which in fact is a word-form) even before one ascertains the relationship between the two relata.
“being preceded by a creator” (kartrpūrvaka), has an implicit qualification, namely “being preceded by a creator who is omniscient and so on.” The given reason “because of being an effect” (kāryatvā), however, would prove the opposite, i.e., it would prove the universe was preceded by a maker who was not omniscient, etc. (asarvajñaḍikartrpūrvaka). It would not demonstrate that the universe is preceded by a creator who is omniscient and so on. (sarvajñaḍikartrpūrvaka).

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For more details of the proof of God, we should look more closely at Kumārila’s argument against the existence of God.25

4. Kumārila’s argument against the existence of God

4.1. Particular features of the target

A mountain’s property “being an effect (kāryatva)” would prove the existence of its maker (kartr). This maker, however, is not yet qualified by any other specific attributes of God, i.e., all-powerful (īśvara), eternal (nitya, avināśin), omniscient (sarvajña), most compassionate (parakāruṇika), bodiless (āśarīra), and so on.26 In other words, this reason would prove the existence of a mere creator of a mountain, but it would not provide any further information about this creator. Rather, the example, i.e., a pot, indicates features opposite to those of the intended creator.27 A potter, who is a maker of a pot, has characteristics opposite to those of God, such as being relatively weak (anīśvara), mortal (vināśin),

25 That the reason in question can be classified as dharmaviśeṣaviruddha is supported by the parallel structure between the proof of God and the syllogism given by Kumārila as an example of dharmaviśeṣaviruddha. See ŚV anumāṇa 98–100ab (cf. Yamakami et al. 1984: 39) for the example of dharmaviśeṣaviruddha.

26 Cf. NM īśvara §1: sa devaḥ paramo jñātā nityānandāḥ kṛpānvitaḥ | kleśakarma-vipākādi-parāmarśāvivarjitaḥ ‖. “God is the best knower, eternally blissful, compassionate, and untouched by affliction, karma, and its ripening, etc.”

27 ŚV sāp 80ab: yathāsiddhe ca drṣṭānte bhaved dhetor viruddhatā ‖. For a translation, see Krasser 1999: 220: “And if [you understand] the example as it is normally understood (yathāsiddha), then the reason would be contradictory.” Cf. NM
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and so on. These features of the potter, if transferred to the target, would refute the proof of God, because God would be proved to be similarly weak and so on, just like a potter.\textsuperscript{28} It is true that one can argue that a mountain has a creator just as a pot has a maker, i.e., a potter. But, one would be arguing that the mountain has a creator who, just like a potter, is relatively weak, and so on. In this way, the example of the pot implies features or qualifications that are contrary to those of the intended target due to the parallelism between the example and the subject.\textsuperscript{29} Thus, the reason property “being an effect (\textit{kāryatva})” when applied to the proof of God is called \textit{viśeṣaviruddha}, a pseudo-reason that refutes a particular aspect (\textit{višeṣa}) of the target property (\textit{sādhyā[dharma]}).\textsuperscript{30}
4.2. Dissimilarity of the example

This type of rebuttal is very effective because it denies the first speaker’s proof by using the same example, in this case a pot. In the inference, when the speaker says, “just like a pot,” the subject in question, i.e., a mountain, is regarded as similar to the example, i.e., a pot. With regard to the target property itself (sādhyasvarūpa), the proof seems to hold in that a mountain may seem to have a creator just as a pot does. With regard to its particular aspects (viśeṣa), however, the example does not support what the speaker intended. Rather, it entails qualifications opposite to those of the target and thus refutes the target’s particular features. The maker would be weak, mortal, not omniscient, and so on, just like a potter.31 There is a contradiction (virodha) with respect to particular aspects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>pot</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>mountain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sādhyadharma</td>
<td>has a maker</td>
<td>=</td>
<td>has a maker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viśeṣa</td>
<td>who is not eternal, etc.</td>
<td>⊥</td>
<td>who is eternal, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.3. Targets of Kumārila’s criticism

Kumārila’s main opponent must be Aviddhakarṇa, because Kumārila refers to the same reason, saṁniveśaviśiṣṭatva, that Aviddhakarṇa used. At the same time, Kumārila’s attack probably also aims at the view of Praśastamati. Praśastamati states that the maker of something always knows its material cause and so on.32 In other words, the maker of a product knows everything about it. Just as a potter knows the material cause and so on of a pot, God, who is the creator of all worlds, knows their material cause and so on. That is to say, Praśastamati tries to show that God’s omniscience is proven precisely because he is the creator of all worlds.33 In this way, Praśastamati emphasizes the parallelism between the example and the target.

31 Cf. NM īśvara §2.2.2.3: vyāpāravān asarvajñāḥ śarīrī kleśasaṁkulaḥ ||. “[The maker of a pot] has movement, is not omniscient, has a body, and is troubled by afflictions.” The strength of the second speaker’s rebuttal which points out that the first speaker’s reason is viśesaviruddha is well understood if it is compared with sādharmyasamā jātiḥ, a kind of false, analogous rejoinder (jāti), in which the second speaker newly introduces a counterexample (e.g., sky) against the first speaker’s example (e.g., a pot).

32 TSP 55, 20–21: yo yasya kartā bhavati sa tasyopādānādīni jāntiḥ.

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Kumārila intends to show the failure of the example by demonstrating its dissimilarity. Whereas his opponent emphasizes similarity and the parallel structure of the example, Kumārila emphasizes the opposite, i.e., dissimilarity and the unparallel structure, in particular, the contradiction with respect to particular aspects.

5. Jayanta’s solution

Kumārila has pointed out that the reason given in the proof of God is incompatible with a particular aspect of the target property (viśeṣaviruddha, i.e., sādhyaviśeṣaṇa viruddho hetuḥ), i.e., it is a reason that refutes a particular aspect of the target property. Facing Kumārila’s criticism, Jayanta (a contemporary of King Śaṅkara Varman, r. 883–902 ce), being a Naiyāyika, has to search for a way to prove the existence of God that overcomes Kumārila’s criticism.

5.1. Rejection of viśeṣaviruddha as a pseudo-reason

First of all, Jayanta does not accept the existence of the pseudo-reason called viśeṣaviruddha. Jayanta states that the acceptance of such a pseudo-reason as a logical fallacy would destroy the very idea of a proper inference. “It would destroy all inferences” (sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt) is the key phrase in Jayanta’s criticism. The essence of Kumārila’s critique lies

<table>
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<tr>
<th>potters</th>
<th>≃</th>
<th>God</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sādhyadharma</td>
<td>is a maker</td>
<td>=</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>viśeṣa</td>
<td>who knows its cause, etc.</td>
<td>=</td>
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</tbody>
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37 See NM iśvara §3.3: abhyupagame vā sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgāt. “For, if [viśeṣaviruddha] is accepted [as a kind of pseudo-reason], all inferences would be destroyed.” Cf. Kataoka 2010: 35. See also Vācaspati’s mention of sarvanumānocchedaprasaṅgāt in a similar context. Krasser 2002: II 93,4.

38 Commenting on NS 1.2.6, which defines viruddha, i.e., one of the pseudo-reasons (hetvābhāsa), Jayanta makes it explicit that viśeṣaviruddha is not acceptable. NM II 611, 12: viśeṣaviruddhānāṁ hi hetvābhāsatsvābhāyupagame
in the argument that the subject has to be parallel to the example, even with regard to certain additional characteristics. Therefore, qualities such as being non-eternal and so on, present in the example should be congruous with the subject. In other words, the creator of a mountain should be compared to the maker of a pot with regard to both his general aspect as well as certain particular aspects. Against Kumārila, Jayanta argues that when the speaker says, “just like in a kitchen,” what would be proved by smoke would be a fire that is small and so on, just like a small fire in the kitchen hearth. This is absurd, states Jayanta, because what is proved by smoke with regard to a mountain is fire without any further qualification. Minor details of the example should be disregarded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>kitchen</th>
<th>mountain</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sādhyadharma</td>
<td>has a fire = has a fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>višeṣa</td>
<td>which is small, etc. ≠ which is big, etc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly, what is proved by the property “being an effect” with regard to a mountain is a mere creator without any further qualification. It is not the case that the example must parallel the subject even with respect to its minor details.

sarvānumānocchedaprasaṅgah.

39 NM īśvara §2.2.2.3: ghaṭasya yādṛśah kartā tādṛg eva bhaved bhuvaḥ ||. “The earth should have a creator exactly similar to that of a pot.” Cf. Kataoka 2009a: 55.

40 See NM īśvara §3.3: višeṣāṇāṁ tu na tal liṅgam asti yan na bādhakam. “anityaḥ śabdah kṛtakatvāt” ity ayam api śravaṇatvādi śabdasya višeṣajātaṁ bādhata eva. dhūmo ’pi parvatāgnivišeṣān kāṁścin mahānasāgnāv adṛṣṭān apahanty eva. “With respect to particular aspects, however, there is no inferential mark that does not refute them. The [proper reason used in the syllogism] “A sound is transient, because it is a product,” too, does refute particular features of sound such as being an object of the auditory organ. Smoke, too, does refute some of the particular features of a fire on a mountain that were not seen in the fire in the kitchen hearth.” See also NM īśvara §3.1.2.2, which begins with the passage “I do not understand [the meaning of your phrase] “similar” (yādṛg iti na buddhyāmahe).” There, Jayanta compares a small fire in a kitchen hearth with a big fire on a mountain in a poetic language. Cf. Kataoka 2010: 28.

41 NM īśvara §3.1.2.3: atha višeṣaraḥtaṁ dhūmamātram agnimātreṇa vyāptam avagatam iti tatas tadumānumānam, ihāpi saṁnivaśamātraṁ kartṛmātreṇa vyāptam iti tato ’pi tad anumāyatām. “If [you say] mere smoke without particularity is understood as pervaded by a mere fire and therefore the latter is inferred from the former, then [I answer] in the present case, too, a mere configuration is pervaded by a mere maker and therefore the latter should be inferred from the former, too.” Cf. Kataoka 2010: 28.
5.2. Three views of the Naiyāyikas regarding particular features

The next problem that Jayanta has to solve is how to obtain further information about the creator. He presents three solutions:

1) Minor information about the creator of the universe is provided by scripture (āgama).

2) Knowledge is attained through a particular type of inferential reason called kevalavyatireki, i.e., a reason in which there is only co-absence (vyatireka) of the probandum and the probans. If the creator had not been omniscient, he could not have created the universe. In other words, the creator must be omniscient because it would be impossible for a being who was not omniscient to create the entire universe.

3) Knowledge is attained by virtue of the presence of the reason in the subject (pakṣadharmatābalā). A special effect makes one infer a

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43 NM īśvara §3.9.5 (also quoted in Krasser 2002: II 112, n. 164): so ‘yam āgamād anumānāt pakṣadharmatāto vā viśeṣalābha iti sthitam. “Thus, it is established that particular aspects are obtained (i.e., known) either through scripture, an inference, or through [the reason’s] being a property of the subject.” Cf. Kataoka 2010: 42.


45 Kevalavyatireki-hetu for the Naiyāyikas corresponds to arthāpatī based on anyathānupatī for the Mīmāṁsakas. See Kataoka 2009b: 298–299.

46 NM īśvara §3.9.1.2. See Krasser 2002: II 111 and Kataoka 2010: 38–39. Strictly speaking, the present kevalavyatireki-hetu is qualified by the property “being based on anvaya vyatirekihetu” and is thus called by Jayanta anvaya vyatirekhemulakevalavyatirekin. I do not go into the details of this qualification here. See Kataoka 2009b: 294–298 for further explanation.

47 NM īśvara §3.9.1.2: prthivyādi kāryam asmadādīvilaśanasarvavajñaikakartṛkam, asmadādiṣu bādhakopapattau satyāṁ kāryatvāt. “The effects such as the earth, etc., have as their sole creator an omniscient being who is different from ordinary people like us, because they are effects when a refutation is justifiable with regard to ordinary people like us.” Cf. Kataoka 2010: 39. For Ratnakīrti’s discussion, see Patil 2009: 167ff.

special creator.\textsuperscript{49} The three worlds, which function as the means for creatures to experience pleasure and suffering, indicate that their creator is omniscient. The last argument fits well with the reason given in the other proof of God, \textit{saṁniveśa(viśeṣa)vattva}, having a (particular) configuration, because it is well known that a good design (a good configuration of parts) proves the existence of a good designer.

The last solution (3) is the simplest, because it does not require an additional means of knowledge (\textit{pramāṇa}), whereas the first (1) and the second (2) require scripture and another inference, respectively, in addition to the present inference based on \textit{kāryatva}.

6. Sucarita’s response

In his critique of \textit{viśeṣaviruddha}, Jayanta is right to point out that in a valid inference not all of the details need be transferred from the example to the subject. It is true that the inferential reason \textit{kāryatva} itself could prove the mere existence of a creator, just as smoke itself proves the existence of fire, without indicating any further properties of fire (although particular features of the fire in question, e.g., being big and so on, may be indicated from particular features of the smoke in a particular setting). But is it really the case that none of the particular features of the example needs to be transferred to the subject?

Sucarita, a commentator on Kumārila’s Ślokavārttika who was active in the first half of the tenth century,\textsuperscript{50} rejects the opponents’ criticism of \textit{viśeṣaviruddha}. One of the prerequisites of an inference, as we have seen, is repeated experiences of the coexistence of the probans and the probandum in a familiar locus. In the case of the pot, a person will have repeatedly experienced the coexistence of the two properties, i.e., having a creator and being an effect. At the same time, some other features are

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{49} NM \textit{iśvara} §3.9.1.3: \textit{vilakṣanāt kāryād vilakṣaṇa eva kartānumāsyate, stavarakebhya iva tatkusuśalah kuvindaḥ}. “From a special effect a similarly special creator will be inferred, just as from silk cloths a weaver skillful in [weaving] them [is inferred].” Utpaladeva puts more emphasis on the role of the locus (\textit{āśraya}) when he refers to the case in which one infers fire from smoke in a forest of Khadira trees and in which one knows that the fire comes out of Khadira trees. \textit{Vṛtti ad Īśvarasiddhikārikā} 7, ST 5,12–15: \textit{yathā dhūmamātreṇa dūrāt khadiravane ‘gnimātre ‘py anumīyatā kathāt kātyānto vāśayāpy aśrayaśāt prasidhyati}. “For example, although mere fire is inferred from mere smoke far off in a forest of Khadira trees, its particular aspect ‘coming out of Khadira trees’ is established through the locus (i.e., the Khadira forest) even without depending on the particular aspect of smoke.”
  \item \textsuperscript{50} For Sucarita’s chronology, see Kataoka 2014: 345(18)–341(22).
\end{itemize}
also experienced as coexistent. The potters that people have seen have always been relatively weak, not omniscient, mortal, and so on. In other words, these particular features are invariably concomitant inasmuch as they have never been seen to be absent in the maker.51 Sucarita states: “These particular features are not known to deviate. Therefore, they are necessarily made to enter (i.e., necessarily included in) the invariable concomitance (na te višeṣā viditavyabhicārā iti vyāptāv anupravesitā eva).” The maker who is coexistent with the property “being an effect” has always been not all-powerful (anīśvara), and so on.52 Therefore, these additional features that would be incongruous with the characteristics of an all-powerful God would also be inferred, because they are included in the invariable concomitance between the probandum and the probans. Thus, the all-powerful lord (īśvara) would be proved to be not all-powerful (anīśvara).

7. Śālikanātha’s argument
Śālikanātha, a well-known scholar of the Prābhākara school, who was probably active around 900 CE, i.e., before Sucarita and after Trilocana, also refers to the same argument “entering into the invariable concomitance” (vyāptyanupraveśin) in his criticism of the proof of God’s existence, although he does not mention the term višeṣaviruddha. He explicitly states that the target property to be proven (such as a fire on a mountain) should be parallel to that experienced in the example (such as a fire in a kitchen hearth).53 In the case of the proof of God, a qualification such as “having a body” and so on (vigrahavattvādi), too, should enter the invariable concomitance and therefore only a being who has a body

51 Vācaspati refers to a similar view. See Krasser 2002: II 92,6–8.

52 Kāśikā ad sāp 80cd, ms. 3002–3003: viruddhatām eva vivṛṇoti—anīśvaretī. anīśvaro kāra’ sarvavid vināśī ca kulalādir ghāṭādir kartā dṛṣṭah. na te višeṣā viditavyabhicārā iti vyāptāv anupravesitā eva. ato dṛṣṭāntaparidṛṣṭānīśvara- tvādirūpānumānāpattes cetanasya ya īśvaratvādayo višeṣās te bādhyerann iti. “[Kumārila] precisely explains the nature of the incompatible reason [and states]—‘not all-powerful.’ People have seen as the maker of a pot, etc., potters, etc. who are not all-powerful, not omniscient, and mortal. These particular features are never known to deviate. Therefore, they are necessarily made to enter (i.e., be included in) the invariable concomitance. Therefore, because features such as not being all-powerful that have been seen in the example would [also] be inferred, the particular features of the sentient being [to be proven], such as being all-powerful, would be refuted.”

53 PrP vimalāñjana, 309,4–5: yādṛśaṁ tu rūpaṁ vyāpakam upalabhyate tad eva- numātuṁ śakyate nānyat.
and so on (just like a potter) would be inferred. Thus, we can trace the argument of implied concomitance already to Śālikanātha.

8. Conclusion
The example “just like a pot” demands that the inferential target “a mountain” has parallel properties, not just in its general aspect but also in its particular aspects. Thus, the creator whose existence would be proved on the basis of the reason “being an effect” would be not all-powerful, not omniscient, not eternal, etc., just like a potter. Kumārila’s critique of the Naiyāyikas’ and Vaiśeṣikas’ proof of God is concerned with the lack of parallelism between the example and the targeted subject. It is, however, not the case that all minor details are transferred from an example to the subject under dispute. Jayanta reminds Kumārila of the existence of the second step in inference, i.e., grasping invariable concomitance (vyāptigraha), through which unnecessary, incidental elements are removed from invariable concomitance. According to Jayanta, only the main property “having a creator” (kartṛmattva) is invariably concomitant with the reason property “being an effect” (kāryatva), and not other minor aspects. Sucarita, however, points out, against the opponents, that some particular features, e.g., not being all-powerful, not being omniscient, being mortal, are included in the invariable concomitance, because they have never been seen to be absent in the familiar cases. In other words, these features are essential and not incidental. They enter (anu-pra-vīś) the invariable concomitance, according to Sucarita and Śālikanātha. If one’s system of inference stands on the empirical method of “repeated experiences,” it is difficult to reject the Mīmāṁsā criticism of viśeṣaviruddha, i.e., lack of parallelism with respect to some particular aspects of the target property.

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54 PrP vimalāñjana, 309,5–6: iha ca vigrahavattvādy api vyāptyanupraveṣīti tad anumātavyam.

55 For various theories of the establishment of invariable concomitance (vyāptigraha), see Kataoka 2003. Jayanta’s own model of vyāptigraha, which is influenced by Dharmakīrti’s model of a limited number of pratyakṣas and anupalambhas, does not include repeated experiences (bhūyodarśana) of Kumārila’s type and therefore can escape, theoretically speaking, from Sucarita’s criticism, whereas Trilocana’s model (and Vācaspati’s as well) includes repeated experiences and therefore cannot escape from Sucarita’s criticism. For Śālikanātha, the first experience, which occurs by means of perception and so on (pratyaksādi), is the real cause of establishing the invariable concomitance (PrP 204,12–13), whereas repeated experiences help to distinguish a genuine invariable concomitance from an apparent relation caused by an incidental factor, the latter of which is called aupādhika (PrP 205,2).
References


NRĀ  Pārthasārathī’s Nyāyaratnākara. See ŚV.


Is God just like a potter? The logical fallacy viśeṣaviruddhatva


The Dharmakīrtian path to liberation*  

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The seventh-century Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti is perhaps best known for his contributions towards the development of Buddhist logic and epistemology. However, it has been pointed out that in the Pramāṇa-siddhi chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika he deals with religious issues, such as the nature of the Buddha, non-existence of the creator God, the doctrine of saṃsāra and the four nobles’ truths.¹

It is well known that PV II is an extensive commentary on the maṅgala-śloka of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya, in which the Buddha is regarded as a means of valid cognition (pramāṇa), being characterized

* This paper was written in 2001 to be published in the second volume of “The Way to Liberation” (Japanese Studies on South Asia), ed. by Sengaku Mayeda. Although the first volume of the same title was published in 2000 in India, the second volume never appeared. Meanwhile, I lost track of my own file. Fortunately, Dr. Christina Pecchia in Vienna had kept a pdf file of my original paper in her computer and sent it to me. Mr. Daisei Michimoto put it into a Word file and at the same time made valuable editorial comments. I would like to thank them, for without their help I could not have presented this paper to this memorial volume for Helmut Krasser.


Finally I would like to thank Prof. Jonathan Silk for correcting my English and giving me many valuable suggestions when I wrote this paper in 2001. I would also like to thank Prof. Vincent Eltchinger for providing me with information on relevant works published since 2001.

¹ For a detailed synopsis of PV II, see Inami/Tillemans 1986. For the sake of convenience, I shall follow the verse numbers given by Miyasaka 1971/72, though I adopt the chapter order of PV proposed by Frauwallner 1954. As to the actual readings of the verses, I sometimes correct Miyasaka’s, by consulting the other editions by Vetter 1990 and Franco 1994.
as (1) one who seeks the benefit of all living beings (*jagadhitaiśin*), (2) a true teacher (*śāstr*), (3) *Sugata* who is praiseworthy, beyond return and complete, and (4) a protector (*tāyin*). The main purpose of PV II is to establish that the Buddha is a *pramāṇa* or a trustworthy being of authority, by examining his teachings.

With reference to the fourth characteristic of the Buddha, ‘being a protector’, Dharmakīrti gives two definitions of ‘protecting’ (*tāya*): (1) ‘stating the path to liberation which has been experienced by the Buddha himself’ (*svadrṣṭamārgokti*) and (2) ‘elucidating the four nobles’ truths’ (*catuḥsatyaprakāśana*). For Dharmakīrti and his followers, the Buddha is omniscient (*sarvajña*) not because he knows everything, but because he knows the four nobles’ truths.

1. Dharmakīrti identifies suffering (*duḥkha*) with the ‘five transmigrating *skandhas*’ (*samsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*); in other words, a sentient being who is subject to the continuous series of births and deaths or *saṃsāra* is suffering. Just as do the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas, Dharmakīrti meditates upon the truth of suffering from four points of view or aspects (*ākāra*), namely, (1) ‘impermanence’ (*anityatā*), (2) ‘suffering’ (*duḥkhatā*), (3) ‘emptiness’ (*śūnyatā*) and (4) ‘Selflessness’ (*anātmatā*).

2 See Steinkellner 1982: 14, Appendix II.
3 See PV II 145c and 146d.
5 See PV II 147a.
7 See PVV, p. 62: *duḥkhasatyaiḥ cānityataḥ, duḥkhataḥ, śūnayataḥ, anātmataś ceti caturākāram ākhyātum āha*
It (i.e. suffering in the form of transmigrating *skandhas*) is not eternal because it is observed sporadically. It is suffering because it is conditioned by the [three] defilements [such as desire] and because it is subject to its cause. It is neither Self nor controlled [by Self].

He later mentions the sixteen false aspects, such as ‘permanence’, ‘pleasure’, ‘Self / I’ and ‘Mine’, superimposed upon the four nobles’ truths, which cause one to desire, and the sixteen true aspects of the four nobles’ truths which are incompatible with the false ones. This seems to suggest that Dharmakīrti is presupposing the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika doctrine of the path to liberation according to which the four nobles’ truths are meditated upon from the sixteen aspects at the four stages of penetration (*nirvedhabhāgīya*), also known as the four virtuous roots (*kuśalamūla*), before entering into the path of vision (*darśanamārga*). However, the lack of further evidence forces us to abstain from making further assumptions. In any case, according to Dharmakīrti, when a bodhisattva realizes suffering, compassion (*dayā*) will arise from the residual impressions of his previous actions (*pūrvasaṃskāra*).

2.

Dharmakīrti identifies the cause of suffering as attachment to Self (*ātmasneha*), and desire or craving (*tṛṣṇā*) as the grounds for rebirth. He

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8 PV II 270cd–272ab: *sthiram sukham mamāham cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye || abhūtān sōdasākārān āropya parītṛṣyat || tatraiva tadviruddhātmatattvākārānurodhinī || (Vetter reads tadviruddhārtha-.)

9 On the sixteen aspects in a soteriological perspective, see Eltschinger 2014.

10 PV II 194cd–195ab: *duḥkhajñāne 'viruddhasya pūrvasaṃskāravāhinī || vastudharmo dayotpattir na sā sattivānurodhini ||

On Dharmakīrti’s view of compassion, see Iwata 2011.

11 PV II 185cd–186ab: *sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetuvāt sampravartate || asukhe sukhasaṃjñāsya tasmāt tṛṣṇā bhavāśrayāḥ ||
further states that the attachment to Self, which is the cause of attachment to Mine (ātmīyasneha), is intensified by the belief in Self (ātmagraha).

The core of the Dharmakīrtian path to liberation lies in the elimination of the belief in Self, which he calls by several names, namely, ātma-graha, ātma-darśana/dṛṣṭi, sattva-graha, sattva-darśana/dṛṣṭi, and satkāya-darśana/dṛṣṭi. He concludes that one who aims at liberation should eliminate the belief in Self:

\[
\text{tasmād anādisantānatulyayātīyabījakām} \| \\
\text{utkhātamūlāṃ kurute sattvadṛṣṭiṃ mumukṣavaḥ} | \text{PV II 256cd–257ab}
\]

Therefore, one who wishes to be liberated should completely uproot the belief in Self, which is continuously caused by the same kind [of belief] from beginningless time.

Dharmakīrti identifies the belief in Self with one of the three main defilements (kleśa), i.e., ‘ignorance’ (moha), and regards it as the root cause of all defilements (doṣa/mala). He considers that the belief in Self produces the notion of Others (para) and that the distinction between Self and Others produces attachment and hatred (parigraha-dveṣa) which further cause all the other defilements.

In this connection, it is to be noted that the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas clearly distinguish the belief in Self from ignorance. They define the former as the false view of I or Mine (ātmadṛṣṭir ātmīyadṛṣṭir vā), which is one of the defilements called ‘the six views’ (dṛṣṭi), and classify it under the category of ‘knowledge’ (prajñā), one of the ten mahābhūmika-caittas. On the other hand, they identify the latter with avidyā, one of the six kleśamahābhūmika-caittas. Therefore, the belief in Self and ignorance, though they are both defilements, should be regarded as two different dharmas according to the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Theory of Dharma.

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12 PV II 235cd–236ab: sarvathātmagrahāḥ sneham ātmani draḍhayaty alam || ātmīyasnehabījaṃ tat tadavasthām vyavasthitam |

13 PV II 196cd: mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣānām sa ca sattvagraho ... || PV II 213ab: tan(=moha)mūlaś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam |

14 PV II 219cd–220ab: ātmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau || anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ praṇāyante |

15 AK Bh, p. 281.

Dharmakīrti seems to distinguish two kinds of belief in Self, i.e., the acquired (ābhisaṃskārika) and the innate (sahaja).\footnote{PVV, p. 70: \textit{dvidhā hi satkāyadrṣṭiḥ – ābhisaṃskārikī yā skandhavyati- riktātmādyavasāyini, sahajā ca i tatra prathamā dārśanāmārge hīyate, na dvītyā bhāvanāmārgaheyā | sā ca mohaḥ, trṣṇāyāś ca hetur iti bhavati janmaprabandhāḥ |}} Although he does not refer to the former by name, he gives the definition of the latter as follows:

\begin{quote}
\textit{sukhī bhaveyam duḥkhī vā mā bhūvam iti tṛṣyataḥ} ||
\textit{yaivaḥ iti dhīḥ saiva sahajam sattvadarśanam} | PV II 200cd–201ab
\end{quote}

The innate belief in Self is nothing but the awareness of ‘Self’ of someone who desires: “I wish to become happy” or “May I not become unhappy.”

Manorathanandin characterizes the acquired belief in Self as ‘reification (adhyavasāya) of Self distinct from the five skandhas.’\footnote{See the above note 18.} It may be interpreted as a kind of intellectual awareness or theoretical assumption of Self; hence, it can be abandoned at the stage of dārśanāmārga (the path of vision). The innate belief in Self, on the other hand, is a kind of instinctive awareness of Self; thus, it can only be eliminated at the stage of bhāvanāmārga (the path of cultivation/meditation).

The Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas do not accept such a distinction. They only admit the first type which they call a constructed or speculative (vikalpita) belief in Self and which can be abandoned in the path of vision. However, Vasubandhu refers to some former teachers (pūrvācārya) [of the Sautrāntika school?] who just like Dharmakīrti claim that there are two kinds of belief in Self.\footnote{AKBh, p. 290: \textit{sahajā satkāyadrṣṭir avyākṛtā yā mṛgapakṣinām api vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ |}} According to Lambert Schmithausen, the Yogācārabhūmi also refers to the same distinction.\footnote{Schmithausen 1987: 148.} Thus, we may be able to assume that Dharmakīrti has more affinity with the Sautrāntika-Yogācāra tradition than the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣikas regarding the doctrine of the path to liberation, which after all is not surprising in view of his affinity with the former tradition in other respects too.

Now let us see how Dharmakīrti describes the unavoidable consequences of the belief in Self.

\footnotesize

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} PVV, p. 70: \textit{dvidhā hi satkāyadrṣṭiḥ – ābhisaṃskārikī yā skandhavyati- riktātmādyavasāyini, sahajā ca i tatra prathamā dārśanāmārge hīyate, na dvītyā bhāvanāmārgaheyā | sā ca mohaḥ, trṣṇāyāś ca hetur iti bhavati janmaprabandhāḥ |}
\item \textsuperscript{18} See the above note 18.
\item \textsuperscript{19} AKBh, p. 290: \textit{sahajā satkāyadrṣṭir avyākṛtā yā mṛgapakṣinām api vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ |}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Schmithausen 1987: 148.
\end{itemize}
yaḥ paśyaty ātmānam tatrāsyāhamḥ
ti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ ||

snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā
doṣāms tiraskurute ||
gunadarśi paritṛṣyāna mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte ||
tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṁsāre  || PV II 217cd–219ab

One who sees Self has forever an attachment to it: “[This is] I.”
Because of the attachment [to Self] he desires pleasant things. The
desire covers up [their] faults.

He who sees merits [in them] desires for [them, saying] “This is mine”
and takes up the means [to attain] them.

So long as he has an attachment to Self because of that [belief in Self],
he will stay in saṁsāra.

The belief in Self (ātmagraha) results in an attachment to Self (ātmasneha),
which then results in a desire or craving (tṛṣṇā). The desire causes an
attachment to one’s possessions and promotes an action to attain them.
In other words, the belief in Self causes an attachment to Self which
causes a desire. The desire causes an action (karman) which results in
rebirth (bhava) or transmigration (saṁsāra). Thus, the belief in Self is the
ultimate cause of saṁsāra, i.e. suffering (duḥkha).

Dharmakīrti later states that one who is not free from desire but full
of craving is not free from karman and defilements (kleśa) and goes
through saṁsāra. Although both karman and ignorance (i.e., the belief
in Self) are regarded as the [indirect] causes of saṁsāra, only craving is
mentioned with reference to the four nobles’ truths because it is the direct
cause of saṁsāra. An action without craving will not result in rebirth.

3.

According to Dharmakīrti liberation or final release (mukti) occurs when
the residual impressions of previous actions cease to exist and there will
be no future life. Liberation is attained by the vision of Selflessness
(nairātmyaṁśrṣṭi), which Dharmakīrti also calls the vision of Emptiness
(sūnyatādṛṣṭi). The vision of Selflessness or Emptiness can be obtained
by the realization of suffering or painfulness of all conditioned dharma,
which he identifies with the most fundamental teaching of the Buddha,

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21 Miyasaka reads: tatrāham.
22 PV II 254cd–255ab: aviraktaś ca tṛṣṇāvān sarvārambhasamāśritah ||
saṁsāraṁ saṁsārāṁ nāma tādṛṣṭaḥ |
23 PV II 189b–190ab: kāraṇatve ‘pi noditam |
ajñānam uktā trṣṇāvān santānapraṇāṇā bhave ||
ānantaryān na karmāpi sati tasminn asaṁbhavāt  || Cf. PV II 194ab.
24 PV II 197cd: nāmuktiḥ pūrvasaṁskāraṁśaye 'nyāpratisandhitāḥ ||
i.e. dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). The painfulness of all conditioned dharmas is due to their impermanent nature. An underlying principle here is that whatever is causally conditioned or dependently originated is impermanent, hence painful.

Having in mind the suffering of [all] conditioned [dharmas] (saṃskāra-duḥkhhatā), [the Buddha] taught the meditation on suffering (duḥkhhabhāvanā). And for us [Buddhists] that (i.e., the suffering of all the conditioned dharmas) means dependent origination (pratyayotpatti), which is the basis for the vision of Selflessness (nairātmyadṛś).

Liberation, on the other hand, arises from the vision of Emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭi) (i.e., the vision of Selflessness) and all the other meditations aim at the [vision of emptiness]. Precisely for this [reason], [the Buddha] taught that suffering is due to impermanence and that Selflessness is due to suffering.26

From the above quotation it is quite clear that Dharmakīrti understands the three dharmamudrās namely, (1) “Whatever is causally conditioned is impermanent,” (2) “All dharmas are suffering,” and (3) “All dharmas are selfless,” in a logical order. All dharmas are selfless because they are suffering or painful. All are painful because they are causally conditioned, not independent.

The reasoning that something is selfless because it is painful may be understood from the following passage of the *Madhyamāgama, quoted by both Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin in this context:

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rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityam anityam vā
aniyaṃ bhadanta | yad anityam tad duḥkham sukham vā
duḥkham bhadanta
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aniyaṃ bhadanta | yad anityam tad duḥkham sukham vā
duḥkham bhadanta
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Miyasaka reads: yuktis.

26 See Franco 1997: 82.

27 PVABh, p. 157, and PVV, p. 87 (with some variants).

Cf. MN III, p. 19: tāṃ kim maññatha, bhikkhave? rūpaṃ niccam vā aniccam vā tā? aniccam, bhante, yaṃ panāniccam, dukkham vā tāṃ sukhaṃ vā ti? dukkham, bhante. yaṃ panāniccam dukkham vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallan nu tāṃ samanu-
“Oh monks, is color-form permanent or impermanent?”
“Impermanent, Sir.”
“Is whatever is impermanent painful or pleasant?”
“Painful, Sir.”
“Regarding whatever is impermanent, painful and of a changing nature, can one see as follows: This is mine. I am this. This is my Self?”
“Indeed not, Sir.”

4.
Finally regarding the path (mārga) to liberation, Dharmakīrti says:

\[\text{ukto mārgas tadabhyaśād āśrayaḥ parivartate} \] PV II 205cd

The path [to liberation] has been explained. Due to the repeated practice of the [path] the basis (āśraya) is transformed (parivartate).

Manorathanandin identifies the path as ‘vision of Selflessness’ (nairātmyadarśana) and refers to the preceding portion of PV II where the word ‘śāstr’ is explained.28 I take it to be PV II 132–138, which I shall translate below. It is most interesting that Dharmakīrti considers ‘transformation of the basis’ (āśrayaparivṛtti) to occur as a result of the repeated practice of the path, which suggests that he shares the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādin concept of liberation.29

Manorathanandin explains the transformation of the basis in the following manner:

\[\text{tasyābhyaśād āśrayaḥ kleśavāsanābhūtam ālayavijñānaṃ parivartate kliṣṭadaśānirodhāt kleśavisāmyuktacittaprabandhātmanā pariṇamati} \]30

Due to the repeated practice of the path, the basis, i.e. ālayavijñāna consisting of the residual impressions (vāsanā) of defilements (kleśa), is transformed or changed into a continuum of minds (cittaprabandha) dissociated from defilements because of cessation of the defiled state.

Prajñākaragupta, on the other hand, simply states that as a result of the transformation of the basis either a continuum of minds (cittasantāna)

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28 PVV, p. 71: śāstrpadavyākhyaśare.
29 As a matter of fact, he refers to ‘the transformation of the basis’ at least twice more in PVSV, p. 51, 3–5 and in SAS, p. 68, 9–13. See Lindtner1984: 157–158.
30 PVV, p. 71
or ālayavijñāna is purified (pariśuddha).\textsuperscript{31} Karṇakagomin, commenting upon a passage of the PVSV where the term āśrayaparāvṛtti occurs, says as follows:

\textit{āśrayo bhrāntibījam ālayavijñānan tasya parāvṛttir āvaraṇavigamaḥ} \textsuperscript{32}

The basis is ālayavijñāna which is the cause of Illusion; its transformation means the removal of obstructions.

Although Devendrabuddhi, the first interpreter of Dharmakīrti, does not identify what the ‘basis’ is in this context, it seems reasonable to assume that Dharmakīrti is following the traditional Yogācāra-Vijñānavādin doctrine of ālayavijñāna. As a matter of fact, he refers to ālaya(vijñāna) at least once in PV III 520, where it is considered to be capable of producing cognitions of different kinds simultaneously, but its capacity may be suppressed by an intensive cognition of the preceding moment; whether ālayavijñāna produces a certain cognition or not is subject to the preceding cognition.\textsuperscript{33}

Furthermore, in order to prove that the defilements cannot arise once the path is perfected, Dharmakīrti refers to another traditional doctrine of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādin, that the mind (citta) is by its own nature luminous (prabhāsvara) and that the defilements (mala) are only adventitious.\textsuperscript{34} It is well known that the idea goes back to the early sūtras, such as Aṅguttara-Nikāya, and Mahāyāna-sūtras, such as Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā, and that Ratnagotravibhāga refers to it in the context of āśraya-parivṛtti. Therefore, the idea is not unique in the Buddhist tradition; however, if we can assume that Dharmakīrti is presupposing the

\textsuperscript{31} PVABh, p. 142: tasyābhyāsād āśrayasya cittasantānasyālayasya vā pariśuddhatvam bhavati \textsuperscript{33} Franco 1997: 83 suggests that the particle vā is perhaps not used to express an alternative, but to rephrase. In that case, since a continuum of minds is identified with ālayavijñāna, there is no discrepancy between Manorathanandin's comments and Prajñākaragupta's. On the transformation of the basis in PV II, see also Eltschinger 2005 and 2016.

\textsuperscript{32} PVṬ, p. 211.

\textsuperscript{33} sakṛd vijātīyajātāv apy ekena paṭīyasā | cittenāhitavaiguṇyād ālayān nānya-sambhavah || Discussed by Franco 1994. Regarding the identity of ‘basis’ (āśraya) in this context, it is to be noted, Schmithausen 1967 did not consider that Dharmakīrti had assumed ālayavijñāna as the ‘basis’ despite the interpretation given by the majority of the commentators of Dharmakīrti. For the detailed discussion of this topic, see Eltschinger 2016: 45–49.

\textsuperscript{34} PV II 208cd: prabhāsvaram idam cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ ||

Cf. MAV I 22, p. 27: na kliṣṭā nāpi vākliṣṭā śuddhā ‘śuddhā na caiva sā | prabhā-svaratvāc cittasya kleśasyāgantukatvataḥ || “It (i.e., emptiness) is neither defiled nor undefiled, neither pure nor impure, for the mind is luminous [by its own nature] and the defilement is adventitious.”
doctrine of ālayavijñāna, which is unique to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, in PV II 205cd, it seems reasonable again to consider that he is relying on the same tradition in PV II 208cd.\(^\text{35}\)

4.1.
Let us now see how Dharmakīrti explains the path to liberation. As I mentioned above, he gives a brief description of the path when he discusses the connotation of the word śāstṛ (teacher) in the maṅgala-śloka of Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya. It runs as follows:

\[
\text{dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate} \quad \text{PV II 132}
\]

\[
\text{[A bodhisattva] full of compassion [for appeasing others’ suffering] is engaged in [applying every] means (upāya) in order to appease [his own] suffering. For it is difficult for one who has not experienced the goal (upeya) (i.e. the appeasement of suffering) and its cause (i.e. the path) to explain that [goal and its cause to others].}\(^\text{36}\)
\[
yuktyāgamābhīyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhahetum parīkṣate \quad \text{PV II 133}
\]

\[
tasyānityāadirūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣāṇaiḥ
\]

\(^\text{35}\) Franco 1997: 88ff. seems to opt for some affiliation with the Tathāgatagarbha doctrine in this portion of PV II.

\(^\text{36}\) Prajñākaragupta adds another line before PV II 132 in order to explain the state of a bodhisattva; namely, “[A bodhisattva] who has accomplished the excellence of compassion and who is urged [to act] because he cannot endure [to see] others suffer” (nippannakaruṇotkarṣaḥ paraduḥkhākṣameritaḥ).

\(^\text{37}\) Eltschinger has pointed out that Franco criticized Vetter’s understanding of this verse and PV II 136cd–137ab, especially with reference to the term ‘āgama’; Franco 1989: 84–90. When I originally wrote this paper, I was not aware of the problem and understood that the subject is a bodhisattva in general who applies the argument by means of reasoning and scripture (yukty-āgama) in order to prove something, just as Vasubandhu did when he tried to prove sarvāstivāda in his Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya. See Katsura 2003: 105–110. Now I realize that the subject could be the bodhisattva who later became the Buddha Śākyamuni; he might be the bodhisattva in the previous lives of the Buddha as Franco assumed, or he might be the bodhisattva before he was fully awakened as Prajñākaragupta seems to suggest. See Franco 1989: 88–89. In any case, I have no decisive opinion regarding what is meant by the term ‘āgama’ in PV II. 133. It could not be the one taught by the Buddha himself, because it did not exist before he was fully awake and started teaching; but it could not be the āgamas of the other religious tenets, because they would not have helped him prove the cause of suffering, etc. This leads me to my original position that the subject of the verse 133 is a bodhisattva in general. After all, Dharmakīrti, being a Mahāyānist, could have assumed that there existed many buddhas who provided bodhisattvas with their own āgamas, even when the future Buddha Śākyamuni was working towards his awakening in his previous as well as current lives.
Investigating by means of reasoning (yukti) and scripture (āgama), he [who wishes to be liberated] examines the cause of suffering and its nature, such as impermanence, etc., through the special characteristics (viśeṣaṇa) of suffering itself [, such as sporadicity (kādācitkatva)].

For he sees that there is no cessation of the result (i.e. suffering) as long as its cause continues to exist as it is.

In order to abandon the cause [of suffering] he examines its adversary (vipakṣa) and the adversary, in its turn, is established/determined (sādhyate) by the awareness of the nature of the cause [of suffering].

Attachment (sneha) produced by grasping of Self and what is possessed of Self (ātmātmīyagraha), which takes the residual impressions (saṃskāra) as its object, is the cause [of suffering].

Vision of Selflessness (nairātmyadarśana), which is incompatible [with the attachment to Self], is that which repels it (i.e. the attachment to Self).

[After having learned from scripture the cause of suffering as well as its adversary and determined them by reasoning,] if the [bodhisattva] repeatedly practices many kinds of means (upāya) in many ways and for a long time, the demerits (doṣa) of the [cause of suffering] and merits (guṇa) [of its adversary] will become clear.

Thus [due to repeated practice] his intelligence becomes sharpened and consequently the residual impressions (vāsanā) of the cause [of suffering] will become clear.

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38 PVV, p. 50: duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ kadācitkatvādibhiḥ

39 PVV, p. 51: etam duḥkhahe tum tadvipakṣaṁ cāgamād upaśrutya anumānān niścitaṁ ...

40 Miyasaka reads: khaṅgāder.
suffering, viz. the belief in Self and desire] are [completely] abandoned. This (i.e., the complete abandonment of the residual impressions) is the distinction of the Great Muni, who works for others, from a Rhinoceros (i.e., pratyekabuddha) and others.

The repeated practice of the means [to appease suffering] is what [the Master Dignāga] considered to be the [Buddha’s act of] ‘teaching’ (śāsana), for [such a practice] aims at that (i.e., ‘teaching’).

A bodhisattva, the future Buddha, realizes the suffering of others and becomes full of compassion to save them. First of all he devotes himself to practice every means (upāya) to appease his own suffering, for otherwise he would not be able to teach it to others. In order to appease suffering, he must abandon the cause of suffering. In order to abandon the cause of suffering, he must determine its adversary or counter-remedy (vipakṣa).

He learns from scripture (āgama) the cause of suffering and its adversary and determines them by reasoning (yukti). The ultimate cause of suffering is an attachment (sneha) produced by the belief in Self (ātmagraha); its adversary is the vision of Selflessness (nairātmyadarśana). Then he repeatedly practices many kinds of means to appease suffering for a long time. Consequently, his intelligence becomes sharpened and the residual impressions (vāsanā) of the belief in Self will be abandoned completely. As a result he will be fully liberated from suffering or saṃsāra.

There is nothing really special about Dharmakīrtian path to liberation described above. It is quite simple and can be accepted by any school of Buddhism. The only uniqueness may lie in the role of ‘reasoning’ (yukti) in determining the cause of suffering and its adversary. In this connection, it seems rather significant that a bodhisattva is said to examine the nature of the cause of suffering, such as ‘impermanence’ (anityatā), both by means of reasoning and the scripture. Now proof of impermanence or momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) is one of the recurring topics in Dharmakīrti’s works and the logical investigation of the nature of suffering and its cause might have served a Buddhist practitioner to attain the higher realization in his practice of meditation on suffering, as suggested by T. Vetter:

In order to accomplish this “transformation of the basis” contemplation must not only rely on “hearing” Buddhist teachings, but also on the logical reflection of the teachings. This reflection is, according to Dharmakīrti, part of Buddhist practice from the beginning. It does not need examination by logicians. This is only necessary when it
has been impeded by false theories. To refute false theories about inference and about perception may be considered a theoretical task independent of religious aims. This is not true of Dharmakīrti. One can point to clear utterances on this matter ..., but also to the fact that his investigations into inference focus on the nature of things as a reason (svabhāva-hetu) and that this svabhāva-hetu is mainly used to demonstrate impermanence or momentariness. This may be considered an indication that Dharmakīrti never lost sight of the aim of Buddhist teaching; and also that his examination of ordinary means of cognition was intended to serve the practice by means of which one achieves a cognition in the highest sense, i.e. a perception no longer subject to disturbance by concepts which cause misery.41

5. Conclusion
Dharmakīrti considers that the root cause of our suffering (duḥkha), i.e., transmigration (saṃsāra), is the belief in Self (ātma/-sattva-graha/-darśana, or satkāyadrṣṭī). Thus he thinks that the path (mārga) to liberation (mokṣa/muktī) from suffering consists in cultivating the vision of Selflessness (nairātmyadarśana), i.e., the vision of Emptiness (śūnyatādṛṣṭī). He seems to assign a certain role to reasoning (yukti) in the practice of meditation on suffering. Generally speaking, regarding the discussion of the path to liberation, he shows a certain affinity with the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins.42

References


42 It is to be noted that in PV II Dharmakīrti refers to and criticizes the doctrines of the path to liberation held by the Vaiśeṣikas, the Sāṃkhya and the Jainas.


The Dharmakīrtian path to liberation


Iwata 2011


Kajiyama 1998


Katsura 2003


Kimura 1981


Kimura 1998


Krasser 2001


Lindtner 1984

MAV  

Miyasaka  
1971–1972  
See PV II.

MN III  

Pecchia 2015  

PV II  

PV III  

PVABh  
Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra-bhāṣya, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya or Vārttikālaṃkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāraḥ). Patna 1953.

PVSV  

PVṬ  

PVV  

SAS  
Schmithausen 1967  L. Schmithausen, Sautrāntika-Voraussetzungen in Viṃ-
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Vetter 1992  T. Vetter, Pāramārthika-pramāṇa in Dhammakīrti’s
Pramāṇaviniścaya and in Gtsang-nag-pa’s Tshad-
ma rnam-par nges-pa’i Ṭi-ka legs-bshad bsdus-pa. In:
Tibetan Studies, Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the
International Association for Tibetan Studies Narita
A handful of Indian Buddhist texts contain long lists of *krimi* (or *kṛmi*), a word that can refer to insects, creatures such as earthworms, and parasitic worms that infest the body. *Krimi* is translated as *chong* 虫 (蟲) in the Chinese texts and as *srin bu* in Tibetan. Both these translations include the same range of meanings as the original Sanskrit. These worms appear most frequently in meditation texts that describe the impure nature of the body, which is said to be inhabited by varying numbers of worms, often 84,000, or 80,000, or 80. The worms are mentioned not for scientific or medical purposes but to evoke disillusionment with the body.

Several worms with the same names as those in Buddhist works also appear in the classical Indian medical literature. *Carakasaṃhitā* (second or third century), *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (third century) and *Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā* (around 600) generally mention twenty types of worms, which are classified according to the substances from which they arise (Meulenbeld 1974: 622–625). The Buddhist accounts of worms seem to share a common store of information with the medical literature, even though some of the Buddhist material may predate the currently available versions of the medical texts. In this, the accounts of worms in Buddhist texts are similar to the description of the thirty-eight weeks of gestation in *Garbhāvakrāntisūtra* (Kritzer 2014a: 10–11). More will be said later about the connection between worms in the Buddhist and in the medical texts.

In this paper, I focus on the longest account of worms in Indian Buddhist literature, a passage in the seventh and final chapter of *Saddharmasūtra*.
smṛtyupasthānasūtra, which was probably composed between the second and fifth centuries. In addition, I refer to three other worm passages in the same sūtra. But first I summarize the discussions of worms in several other Indian Buddhist texts.

Worms in the Pāli tradition

The two main texts that discuss worms in the Pāli tradition are *Vimuttimagga (Path of Liberation) and Visuddhimagga (Path of Purity). *Vimuttimagga, written sometime before the fifth century, is no longer extant in Pāli but is available in an early sixth-century Chinese translation, Jiētūdào lùn 解脫道論 (T1648). In a passage on meditating on worms as one of thirteen ways of meditating on the body, *Vimuttimagga states that 80,000 “families” of worms feed on the body. It then names the type or types of worms that inhabit a given part of the body, e.g., “The worms living in the hair are called Hair­iron” (T1648.433b21; Ehara et al. 1961: 174). Altogether 85 types of worm are named. Unfortunately, the Chinese translates only eight of the names; the other worm names are transliterated. For example, the worms that live in the throat are called apolihe 阿婆離呵 (T1648.433b29). It is not clear whether the original Pāli names can be reconstructed.

Visuddhimagga, which dates to the beginning of the fifth century, is available in Pāli. It draws heavily on *Vimuttimagga in many places, but not, it seems, in its two sections on worms, which both appear in a chapter on the subjects of meditation. In the first passage, the meditation subject is death, and one of the ways to approach the topic is to contemplate “the sharing of the body with many.” In this case, “the many” are worms, diseases, and external factors such as snakes. The worms receive the most emphasis. Worms are said to live in dependence on and feed on outer skin, inner skin, flesh, sinews, bones, and marrow. The worms are not named, and the list of body parts is much shorter than in *Vimuttimagga or the other texts I mention below. The text continues: “And there [the worms] are born, grow old and die, evacuate, and make water; and the body is their maternity home, their hospital, their charnel-ground, their privy and their urinal. The body can also be brought to death with the upsetting of these worms” (Ñāṇamoli 1975: 253; Visuddhimagga 193–194). This description of the body is striking, and the final statement is significant because it indicates a connection between the mood of the worms and the condition of the body.

In the second Visuddhimagga passage, the meditation subject is
the body. Thirty-two body parts and excretions are examined in detail and shown to be repulsive. Interestingly, here the worms reside only in the stomach. There are thirty-two worms in the stomach. Only six are named: roundworms, boil-producing worms, “palm-splinter” worms, needle-mouthed worms, tapeworms, and thread worms (Ñañamoli 1975: 277–278; Visuddhimagga 213). The body as maternity home, etc., is again mentioned, and the behavior of worms, including when they are upset, is described: “When there is no food and drink, etc., present, they leap up shrieking and pounce upon the heart’s flesh; and when food and drink, etc., are swallowed, they wait with uplifted mouths and scramble to snatch the first two or three lumps swallowed” (Ñañamoli 1975: 278; Visuddhimagga 213).

Worms in Saṃgharakṣa’s *Yogācārabhūmi

Three other texts discussing worms were all originally composed in Sanskrit, but, with a single partial exception, are now available only in Chinese and, in some cases, Tibetan translations. They all are earlier than Visuddhimagga and probably *Vimuttimagga. Saṃgharakṣa’s *Yogācārabhūmi is a meditation text translated into Chinese in 284 by Dharmarakṣa, with the title Xiuxingdao di jing (Sūtra on the Stages of the Path of Practice, T606). A partial second-century translation entitled Dao di jing (Sūtra on the Stages of the Path, T607) is attributed to An Shigao (Yamabe 2013: 596), thus more than a century earlier than Dharmarakṣa’s translation. In a passage describing the disgusting aspects of every stage of worldly existence, both translations include the enumeration of eighty worms that inhabit the body shortly after birth. The passage in Xiuxingdao di jing that includes the worm names is more than twice as long as the corresponding passage in Dao di jing, which mentions only the parts of the body the worms inhabit. For example, Dao di jing says, “Two types (of worms) arise in the roots of the hair” (T607.234c29–235a1), whereas Xiuxingdao di jing says, “Two types (of worms) are in the roots of the hair. The first is called Tongue Lick. The second is called Double Lick” (T606.188a29–b1).

Worms in Garbhāvakrāntisūtra

Garbhāvakrāntisūtra (Sūtra on Entering the Womb) is an account of conception, gestation, and birth, centering around the thirty-eight weeks
of gestation. The history of the text is complicated: there are three extant Tibetan translations and three Chinese translations, which transmit several different versions of the sūtra.¹ The oldest extant translation, Baotai jing (胞胎經, Sūtra on the Embryo in the Womb, T317), is, like Xiuxingdao di jing, the work of Dharmarakṣa. All versions of Garbhāvakrāntisūtra mention 80,000 worms that arise in the infant’s body shortly after birth, but there are many differences among the translations. The Tibetan translation of the longest version names seventy-eight worms. Dharmarakṣa’s translation gives an abbreviated list of only five worms, along with the statement that the rest of the worm names are found in Xiuxingdao di jing, where indeed the first five names agree with the five names in Baotai jing (Yamabe 2013: 599). However, all versions of Garbhāvakrāntisūtra, unlike Xiuxingdao di jing, state that each worm lives in a certain part of the body and eats that part. For example, “A type of worm called Eye-eater lives in the eyes and eats the eyes” (Kritzer 2014a: 75). In this sūtra, many body parts are said to be afflicted by more than one worm. For instance, the intestines are infested by worms named Mixed Water, Big Mixed Water, Needle Lips, and Big Needle Lips (Kritzer 2014a: 78).² Some of these names correspond to names in the medical texts, and some of the worms may correspond to actual parasites.

Worms in Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra

The most elaborate passages on worms in Indian Buddhist literature are found in Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra, an important and little studied text, probably completed by the beginning of the fifth century. Much of the text is presented as the observations of a meditating monk, a yogācāra, giving vast quantities of cosmological and doctrinal detail. A partial Sanskrit manuscript of the first six of seven chapters is extant. There is a complete sixth-century Chinese translation, Zheng fa nian chu jing (正法念處經, T721), by Gautama Prajñāruci and a Tibetan translation, Dam pa’i chos dran pa nye bar gzhag pa (Tohoku 287), attributed to Tshul khrims rgyal mtshan (twelfth century). The sūtra is very long, 417 pages in the Taishō edition of the Chinese translation.

The Sanskrit text of Chapter Two has been edited and translated (together with a critical edition of the Tibetan translation) by Daniel Stuart (2015). Chapter One is being edited by Vesna Wallace and Chapter Three by Mitsuyo Demoto. I am in the process of editing the Tibetan translation of Chapter Seven.

¹ For a study of the sūtra, including a critical edition and English translation of the longest Tibetan translation, see Kritzer 2014a.
² A discussion of worms in the sūtra, including a table of all the worm names, can be found in Kritzer 2014b.
There are four passages in this sūtra that concern worms. (For a comparative table of the worm names in these passages, see the Appendix.) One is in Chapter Three, which is a meditation on hells and the actions that cause one to be born in the hells. The other three passages appear in Chapter Seven. Below, I briefly outline the passage in Chapter Three. I go into greater depth regarding the first passage in Chapter Seven, about which, as far as I know, nothing has been written. I simply summarize the second and third passages.

In addition, eighty worms are briefly mentioned in Chapter Two (Stuart 2015: 332). As Daniel Stuart has pointed out (personal communication), this number is the same as the number given in both versions of Saṃghārakṣa’s *Yogācārabhūmi.*

In all three passages in Chapter Seven, the worms are arranged according to the part of the body they inhabit: head, throat, blood, flesh, bile, bones, feces, and marrow. In Chapter Three, the arrangement is rather haphazard, with the group of ten marrow worms first, followed by seven bone worms, ten feces worms, four flesh worms, eight bile worms, another three bone worms, nine head worms, eight throat worms, nine blood worms, and an additional four flesh worms.

The worms in all passages in the sūtra are generally consistent. However, some worms appear in some passages but not others. For example, a worm named Slippery is found only in the third passage in Chapter Seven and in Chapter Three. Furthermore, sometimes a worm’s name is translated into Tibetan or Chinese in two or three different ways. For example, we find skra za ba, skra za bar byed pa, and skra za as translations of keśāda, Hair Eating, and 脂, 脂內行, and 脂遍行 as translations of medontaścara, Coursing in the Fat.

Five worms in the sūtra clearly correspond to worms mentioned in *Carakasaṃhitā,* while two others perhaps correspond. Two worms correspond to worms in *Suśrutasaṃhitā* and seven to worms in *Aṣṭāṅgaḥṛdayasaṃhitā.* Like the sūtra, these three texts classify the worms into groups according to their origin. However, while the sūtra includes eight groups, *Carakasaṃhitā* and *Aṣṭāṅgaḥṛdayasaṃhitā* mention only four groups of worms and *Suśrutasaṃhitā,* three. The three medical texts list twenty worms, but the names are not all the same, and the groups into which they are assigned also sometimes differ, as does the order of worms within a group.
Worms in medical texts (adapted from Meulenbeld [625])

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>origin</th>
<th>Carakasamhitā (258 [3.7.9–13])</th>
<th>Suśrutasamhitā (773 [6.54.7–16])</th>
<th>Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya-samhitā (528–29 [3.14.43–56])</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>external excretion/impurity (bāhyamalaja/amṛja)</td>
<td>yūka pipilika</td>
<td></td>
<td>yūka likṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blood (śoṇitaja/raktaja)</td>
<td>keśāda lomāda lomadvīpa saurasa audumbara jantumātara</td>
<td>keśāda romāda nakhāda dantāda kikkiśa kuṣṭhaja parīśarpa</td>
<td>keśāda lomavidhvamsa lomadvīpa udumbara saurasa mātara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>phlegm (śleṣmaja/kaphaja)</td>
<td>antrāda udarāda hṛdayacara curu darbhapuṣpa saugandhika mahāgūḍa</td>
<td>darbhapuṣpa mahāpuṣpa pralūma cipita pipilaka dāruṇa</td>
<td>antrāda udarāveṣṭha hṛdayāda mahākuha kurava darbhakusuma sugandha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>feces (purīṣaja)</td>
<td>kakeruka makeruka leliha saṣulaka sausurāda</td>
<td>ajava vijava kipyā cipyā ganḍūpada curu dvimukha</td>
<td>kakeruka makeruka sausurāda sulūna leliha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra passage on worms in Chapter Seven describes in considerable detail the effects, both bad and good, of each worm. In contrast, Carakasaṃhitā and Suśrutasaṃhitā, with one exception in Suśrutasaṃhitā, do not describe the worms individually: the appearance and the exclusively ill effects are mentioned briefly for each group. The sūtra, like the other Buddhist texts discussed above, says nothing about how to get rid of the worms, whereas Carakasaṃhitā and Suśrutasaṃhitā provide detailed remedies.

Worms in Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra, Chapter Three

In Chapter Three, the causes for rebirth in each of the eight main hells are explained, and the various sufferings are described. In an explanation of the signs of death that appear to beings in the worst hell, Avīci, who are about to die, eighty types of worms that inhabit the body are said to be killed by eighty winds. For example: “The Needle Mouth worm is killed by the wind Ruined by Sweat.” This passage does not mention the part of the body each type of worm inhabits, and it gives no further description of the worms. However, it is significant because it is the only worm passage in the sūtra that is extant in Sanskrit. Demoto thinks this passage is related to the third passage in Chapter Seven (personal communication).

Worms in Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra, Chapter Seven

The seventh chapter, available only in Chinese and Tibetan, is centered on a Buddhist meditation on the body, in which the practitioner contemplates the various parts of his body to eliminate attachment to the material world. As Stuart points out, this chapter, unlike the first six, bears a separate title, Lus dran pa n ye bar gzhag par zhes bya ba’i chos kyi rnam grangs, which he translates back into Sanskrit as *Kāyasmṛtyupasthānam nāma dharmaparyāya and into English as “The Dharma Teaching on the Presence of Awareness of the Body” (Stuart 2015: 1, n. 106).

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3 For a summary of the chapter, see Stuart 2015: 1: 75-77.
4 sūcimukhakaḥ kṛmih svedasamdūṣanena vāyunā hanyate (provisionally edited by Demoto, personal communication); srin bu khab gdong la rlung rngul ’jig gis gnod par byed do (D ya 249b4-5); 鈎口虫。濕過風殺 (T721.7b1).
5 The corresponding passage in the Tibetan version is D ya 249a5-250b4, in the Chinese, T721.75a16-c8.
The chapter begins with a *nidāna*, a statement of subject-matter, in which the Buddha extols the benefits of meditation on the body. He explains how the practitioner will no longer be confused by afflictions after observing the true nature of the body. The practitioner thus recognizes the true nature of the sense organs and sense objects and therefore approaches nirvana. When he sees *rūpa* with his eye, but no false discrimination is produced, he no longer desires or takes pleasure in it. He realizes that the true nature of the body is that it is nothing more than a collection of body parts, fluids, discharges, etc., beginning with hair, body hair, and nails. As a result, he can fix his mind in accordance with this meditation and lose his attachment to external sense objects. He then observes his physical eye and thinks of it as merely a ball of flesh consisting of the four *mahābhūtas*. The same is true of the other material sense organs, and realization of this frees the practitioner from attachment to *rūpa*. Next, the practitioner is instructed to observe the transitory and unsatisfactory nature of the body. Finally, the body is said to be based on karma, which determines into which of the five destinies a person will be reborn.

This leads into descriptions of the body in each of the five destinies. First is a very long discussion of the body in the human realm. Distinctions are made among people in Jambudvīpa, Uttarakuru, Pūrvavideha, and Godānīya, birth into which, like birth into the destinies themselves, depends on karma. This is followed by a shorter description of the realm of gods with distinctions between the Caturmahārājakāyika gods and the Trayastriṃśa gods. Still shorter are explanations of the eight hells, mostly dwelling on the bad actions leading to rebirth in them, while even shorter is a description of suffering in the *preta* destiny. Finally, animals are said to live in the water, on land, and in the sky and to be womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born, and apparition-born. Examples are given in each case. After this, it is stated that life in all destinies consists of suffering, and that disillusion with birth and death can lead to liberation.

Then the *yogācāra* observes his body and contemplates it from head to foot. He observes groups of ten worms living in each of eight locations in his body: head, throat, liver and spleen, flesh, bile, bones and fat, feces, and marrow. Thus, there is a total of eighty worms.

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6 T721.379a10-18. This has been translated by Stuart from the Chinese (Stuart 2015: 1: 49–50, n. 42). The corresponding passage in the Tibetan is D sha 109b7–110b7.
7 The system of five destinies (*gati*), not including *asura*, predates the system of six destinies, common in Mahāyāna texts (see Nattier 2003: 256, n. 317, 297, n. 588).
8 T721.379a18–b18; D sha 110a4–111a5.
9 T721.379b19–381c13; D sha 111a.5–117b1.
Passage 1: Body Parts and the Worms that Inhabit Them

Below I summarize the descriptions of individual worms from the first passage in Chapter Seven. I use mainly the Tibetan translation, but where the Tibetan is difficult to understand, I rely on the Chinese. For these worms, I give the names in Tibetan and the Chinese from Chapter Seven as well as the corresponding Sanskrit, if any, from Chapter Three. The Sanskrit equivalents were kindly provided to me by Mitsuyo Demoto. Note that there are sometimes significant disagreements in the names among the three languages. Occasionally, there are also considerable differences between the Tibetan and the Chinese translations of the descriptions.

Worms in the head (D mdo sde sha 117b3–118a4; T721.381c14–382a1)

1) Worms called Moving in the Brain (klad phor la rgyu ba, 脳行, mastiṣkacarāḥ) move in the yogācāra’s brain to eat it.

2) The worms living in the yogācāra’s brain are Brain Eaters (klad pa za bar byed pa, 常食此腦, mastakaluṅgāhāra).

3) Worms called Going in the Skull (glad phor gyi rus pa'i gseb na 'gro ba, 住髑髏中。若行若食 [“dwelling in the skull, whether going or eating”], kapālikācara [thus Demoto]) live in the yogācāra’s skull and eat it.

4) Worms called Hair Eating (skra za ba, 髮 [Hair], keśāda) are on the outside of the yogācāra’s skull. If they eat too much, his hair falls out.

5) Worms called Coursing in the Ear (rna ba la spyod pa, 耳 [Ear], śravaṇacara) live inside the yogācāra’s ears, eat them, and, when they get angry, his ears suffer and become ill.

6) Worms called Entering the Nasal Mucus (snabs la 'jug pa, 鼻 [Nose], simhānāvartayītā [Turning in the Nasal Mucus?]), live in the yogācāra’s nostrils. When angry, they eat the food that the yogācāra has eaten, and they eat the brain membrane that flows from his nose. They cause the appetite to worsen.

7) Worms called Coursing in the Fat (tshil gyi nang na spyod pa, 脂 [Fat], medontaścara) live in the yogācāra’s head. When they eat the fat, they get angry and cause headaches.

8) Worms called Moving in the Joints (tshigs kyi gseb na rgyu ba, 練 [Joint]) live in the yogācāra’s body. They are born in the middle of the jaw, and they eat it. They wander around the middle spaces of the
external ear. If they eat it (the jaw? the ear?) after becoming angry, they pierce it as if with a needle.

9) Worms called Spittle Eater (*lud pa za ba*, 食涎, *lālābhyuṣaka* [Sprinkling Spittle]), live in the repository for fallen food residue and the root of the tongue. They eat it (the root of the tongue?), and if they get angry, they make the yogācāra’s tongue become dry.

10) Worms called Tooth Root Eater (*so’i rtsa ba za bar byed pa*, 牙根 [Tooth Root], *dantamūlakāhādaka*) live in the roots of the teeth, and if they become angry, the yogācāra’s teeth hurt.

This passage is followed by enumerations of bones and fleshy parts in the head, after which the focus moves down to the throat. Ten types of worms make the yogācāra’s throat swell.

In this section, the descriptions of the worms and their actions become more detailed. At the very beginning of the section, the yogācāra asks himself, “In what part of this body do my worms perform what actions that make me sick or make me healthy?” All of the accounts of individual worms describe how the worms make the yogācāra sick, while a few also say how they make him healthy. Strangely, the descriptions vary considerably in length and do not follow a strictly parallel structure.

**Worms in the throat** (*D sha* 118b1–121b6; *T721.382a12–383b8)

1) Worms that eat spittle (*kha chu za bar byed pa*, 食涎, *lālābhakṣaka*) make the yogācāra healthy by swallowing spittle, but when they are too fat, they make him cough up mucus.

2) Worms that produce saliva (*mchil ma ’byung bar byed pa*, 唾, *śleṣmakledayīt* [Phlegm Srinkler]) make the yogācāra healthy by preventing food from being regurgitated and causing nutritive liquid to flow properly, but if there is too much mucus, they belch mucus water or go into his heart.

3) Worms called Emetic (*skyug byed*, 吐 [Vomit], *pracchardaka*) produce wind-vomit, bile-vomit, phlegm-vomit, combination-vomit, and fly-vomit when they move upward, but when they are healthy and fall to the bottom of the yogācāra’s belly, his nourishment improves.

4) Mad for Sweetness (*mngar myos*, 醉味, *madhumatta*) worms are very fine, legless, and mixed (in color?). If the yogācāra eats food that he likes, the worms are happy, but if he eats food that he doesn’t like, they are weakened. Similarly, he likes the food that the worms like. If he doesn’t eat, the worms get sick.
5) Drunken (rab myos, 放逸) worms live at the top of the yogācāra’s eye sockets, but, if they move to the neck and throat, they make him angry or unhappy. If they stay in their own place, they do not cause illness.

6) The yogācāra likes the food liked by Worms that Desire the Six Flavors (ro drug la zhen cing sred pa, 貪嗜六味), and he doesn’t want the flavors that they don’t want. If he is stricken by heat disease, the worms will be overcome sooner than he, and his food will seem disgusting to him.

7) Worms called Gurgling (ghur ghu ra ka, 抒氣 [Letting Out Air?], ghurghuraka) are covered with spittle and have small faces and legs. They belong below the eye-sockets, but if they get angry, they can dwell anywhere in his head. If they go to his throat, it will become painfully cold. Gurgling worms and the worms in the neck do not get along with each other. When they quarrel, the yogācāra will get sick.

8) Worms called Hating Flavor (ro la rab tsdang ba, 憎味, rasapradveṣin) live at the base of the head and neck and in the two eye-sockets. They desire only a single flavor, for example, sweet or sour, and hate the other flavors.10 Whichever they do not desire, the yogācāra does not desire. When the worms go into the tip of the yogācāra’s tongue, it becomes dry, and if the worms get angry, his tongue hurts and becomes heavy. If the worms are not angry, these problems do not occur.

9) Worms called Fond of Sleep (nyal ba la dga’ ba, 嗜睡, svapnābhilāṣin) are the size of a speck of dust in a ray of sun. They live in many places all over the yogācāra’s head and neck. During the day, they become sick and tired. At night, they hide in the heart. When the worms get tired, the yogācāra also sleeps.11

10) Worms called Fat (sbom po, 有腫 [Swollen]), move in the blood of the head and neck and in the fat. When they become thin in certain places, they drink the yogācāra’s blood, and his body swells up in those places. However, if they stay in the sinews, these problems do not occur.

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10 The Chinese includes all six of the traditional flavors, while the Tibetan mentions only five, omitting kaṣāya, “astringent.”

11 I cannot understand much of this passage in the Tibetan, so I’ve based this summary in part on the Chinese.
The mutual influence between the person and the worms is a striking feature of this passage. To me, at least, it is reminiscent of *dohada*, the two-heartedness of the pregnant woman and the fetus in her womb, that is described in various Indian medical and religious texts but, perhaps surprisingly, not in *Garbhāvākrāntisūtra*.

At the end of this section, the benefits of meditation on worms are summarized. When the *yogācāra* correctly sees the worms, he becomes free from desire in this life and in future lives. He loses all attachments to people and pride in things. He realizes that lack of desire and living a virtuous life will lead to nirvana.

After the section on worms in the throat, the constituents of the trunk of the body, including bones, organs, muscles, and liquids, are enumerated, followed by more lists of worms.

The *yogācāra* is said to meditate on his body and investigate which of his worms live in which of his channels and produce a healthy or unhealthy state. He observes that ten worms born from the womb go to his spleen (lungs, in the Chinese translation) and produce illnesses. The worms are described as lacking legs, moving as they please, infinitesimally small, very subtle, lacking eyes, itching, and having the characteristic of disease. After the names of these worms are listed, they are briefly described, and the consequences of their getting angry are explained.

**Worms that live in the blood and cause diseases in the liver and spleen (D sha 124a1–b4; T721.384a4–29)**

1) Worms called Body-Hair Eating (*spu za ba*, 食毛, *romāda*), if they get angry, eat the *yogācāra*’s eyebrows, (the hair) of his two eyes, his beard, and his short hairs. They cause leprosy.

2) Worms called Piercing (*'bigs byed*, 孔行 [Hole Going], *sosura*), if they get angry, go into the *yogācāra*’s bloodstream and upset his whole body.

3) Worms called Worm Mother (*dzan tu mAn da ra*, 禪都摩羅, *jantumātara*) make the *yogācāra*’s bloodstream smell bad.

4) Worms called Fig-like (*au dum ba ra*, 赤 [Red], *audumbara*) in the mouth and nostrils, when they get angry in the blood, produce pustules and abscesses.

5) Worms called Thoroughly Grasping (*kun du 'dzim byed*, 食汁 [Eating Juice], *prasrāva* [Flowing]), if they get angry in the *yogācāra*’s bloodstream, produce spleen disease, blood, and bile.

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12 See Kritzer 2014a: 79 for four types of worms with *'bigs*, “pierce,” in their names.
6) Worms called Body Hair Island (spu’i gling, 毛燈 [Body Hair Lamp], lomadvīpa) go into the yogācāra’s bloodstream, and, when they become angry, they produce itching, jaundice, pustules, and modo dyA lang.

7) Worms called Angry at Blood (khrag la rab tu khro ba, 贓血) go into the yogācāra’s bloodstream, become angry, and produce leprosy and sexual disease (’dod chags kyi nad ?) and, in women, the condition of being reddened by blood and skin disease.

8) Worms called Blood Eating (khrag za ba, 食血, romabhakṣa) produce blood diseases such as dizziness, quivering of the neck, and inflammation of the anus.

9) Worms called Shaking (rab rab byed pa, 㿇㿇 [Numb Numb], simisimi [Quivering?]) go into the yogācāra’s bloodstream and produce fatigue, paralysis, fierce flow, and difficulty in enjoying meals.

10) Sour worms [am bya kas, 酢, amdhūka], if they get angry, also cause these types of diseases.

Next, ten types of worms living in the flesh are listed, after which their actions are described in more detail than those of the worms in the liver and spleen.

Worms in the flesh (D sha 124b4–127a2; T721.384a29–385a12)

1) Worms called Produced from Sores (rmas kun nas slong [bslang]) ba, 生瘡 [Producing Sores], vranasamuttha) become numerous wherever there are wounds, eat the wounds, and produce itching and further sores.

2) Tsun tsu ra ka (tsun tsu ra ka, 刺 [Stabbing or Thorn], cuñcuraka [meaning not found]) worms, if they become hungry, cause many
problems: they increase the yogācāra’s feces and cause diarrhea, weaken his digestive heat, dry out his mouth, wear out his body, cause pain, prevent sleep, and make him mute. They are very happy if he suffers.

3) Worms called Agitating the Sinews (rgyus pa sful ba, 閉筋 [Closing the Sinews], snāyughaṭṭaka) make the yogācāra’s sinews hurt if they get angry, but if they do not get hungry, the sinews will not hurt. If the yogācāra becomes hungry from lack of food, the worms drink the blood in his sinews. If the worms eat the yogācāra’s body, brown phlegm is produced.

4) Worms called Agitating the Channels (rtsa sful ba, 動脈, śirātudana) move in the channels without obstruction because they are very fine. If they live in the food channels, there is transmission of disease. As a result, the yogācāra’s body dries up, or he loses his appetite. If the worms harm the water-moving channels, his gums dry up. If they harm the sweat-moving channels, sweat comes out of his pores. If they damage the urethra, they stop the urine. If they damage the semen, it is very painful. And if they move into the feces-moving channels and get angry, they cause suffering equal to death.

5) Worms called Skin-shaking (pags pa skyod par byed pa, 食皮 [Skin Eating], carmakartr [Skin Maker]) live in the yogācāra’s skin, and when they get angry due to defects in his food, his complexion worsens. His skin becomes rough or itches and turns red, white, or blue, or becomes broken, or his nails, hair, body hair, short hairs, and the surface of his skin decay. He gets thick pox or leprosy, and the heat leaves his skin and flesh.

6) Worms called Agitating the Fat (tshil sful ba, 動脂, medotudana) live in the streams in which fat moves. If they get angry due to defects in the yogācāra’s sleep or food, they cause diarrhea with vomiting.

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17 This is not a mistake. The text reads “hungry” in the first clause, and “angry” in the second.
18 I have translated this sentence from the Chinese because I cannot make sense of the first part of the Tibetan (de gal te nga’i zas rnams kyi stobs kyi smosts rtst scons joms par byed do).
19 The Chinese is very different here: “the worms will make all of a person’s body hair pores lack sweat” (令人一切毛孔無汗 [accepting the reading from the Song, Yuan, and Old Song editions over the main Taishō reading, 污, “dirt”]).
20 The Tibetan name in the description in the first passage is “Skin Shaking,” but the Tibetan name in the list, the Chinese name (食皮) in all three passages, and the Tibetan names in the second and third passages (pags pa za ba, pags pa gtub pa) all mean “Skin Eating.” The corresponding worm in Chapter Three is called “Skin Maker” (carmakartr, lpags byed, 皮作).
pustules, a pale appearance, a “spot” disease, goiters, rotten sinews, exhaustion, emaciation, or constant sweating.

7) Worms called Increasing (‘phel byed, 和集 [Combining], aupacalika) eat the yogācāra’s body in two ways: they eat the sensate portions, consisting of blood, flesh, bones, marrow, bile, and semen, and the insensate portions, consisting of hair, small hairs, nails, whiskers and teeth. As a result, they increase, and if, due to a defect in the yogācāra’s food, they do not grow enough, the yogācāra lacks energy. Otherwise, he is happy and sleeps well. His strength increases, and his skin, blood, fat, marrow bones, semen, and strength grow.

8) Worms called Stink (dri ngan pa, 臭, durgandha) live in the yogācāra’s flesh, feces, and urine. If they get angry due to a defect in his food, his feces, urine, saliva, and nasal mucus stink, and his nose and eyes exude pus. Everything, including clothes, bedding, and food associated with the worms, stinks. If they go into his teeth, the teeth stink. And due to a defect in his sleep, the filth on his tongue smells bad and turns white, and his body starts to smell bad and be impure.

9) Worms called Moving in Sweat (rngul la rgyu ba, 汗 [Sweat]) move in the flesh of the yogācāra’s back. If his food is digested, they take the feces in the small hole of the sacrum (rus pa gsum) and place it at the junction of his buttocks. They moisten the small hole of three other bones (?) with his bad water (chu ngan). After they make large shapes of feces in the region of the cervical vertebrae, his urine flows.

10) The tenth worm on the list, Burning (sreg byed, 熱), is not included in the detailed descriptions in either Tibetan or Chinese.

Worms in the bile (D sha 127a2–129b4; T721.385a13–385c24)

1) Worms called Tsu ra ba (tsu ra ba, 瘡瘍 [Numb Numb], pañcabhir vāyubhiḥ sahacara [Accompanied by Five Winds]), if they get angry due to a defect in the food, eat the yogācāra’s eyelashes, resulting in his getting pustules and itching. If they eat other parts, his tears

Demoto suggests that this should be read aupacayika or aupacāyika (personal communication).

The meaning of the last sentence is not clear to me.

In the Chinese, these worms are said to move in the indriyas (根). No mention is made of bile.

The Chinese 臭獠 means “Numb, Numb.” A worm in medical texts such as Carakasaṃhitā is called curu, but aside from the similarity in sound, I can find no connection.
increase. If they move into his eyes, they cause serious illness, and his vision deteriorates. They turn the eye into a mere lump of flesh.

2) Worms called Agitating (sgul byed, 慳懺 [Sad Sad], todana) move in the yogācāra’s bile all over his body. They burn his bones, his limbs become hot, and his hands and feet are very burnt. If the worms go into his skin, he sweats.

3) Worms called Blossoming with Substance (rdzas kyis rgyas pa, 花 [Sprout Flower], garbhapuspaka [Embryo Flower]) have sharp lips and short legs and move in the yogācāra’s bile. He gets a belly of fire and great illness. If they dwell elsewhere in the body because they are hungry due to defects in the yogācāra’s food, they burn the body in those places. When they wander in his blood, the blood pours out, and his whole body burns as if on fire. His skin also is affected, and he gets pustular spots on his legs.

4) Worms called Great Cheat (rigs chen po [Great Family], mahākuhaka) live in the yogācāra’s bile. When they get angry, they produce pustules of blood and bile all over his body, making blood and bile flow from his ears and nose and creating a state like death. They also turn his body blue, make it jaundiced, and make the mouth bitter.

5) Worms called Black One (nags pa, 黑, kālaka) wander all over the body, pulling the damaged bile. If they get angry due to defects in the yogācāra’s food, they produce black spots like sesame seeds all over his body and make fleshy pustules, turn his body black or yellow, instigate winds, including a red, smelly wind, or destroy his anus or bile.

6) Worms called Big Meal (zas chen po, 大食, mahābhaksaka), if they get angry due to defects in the yogācāra’s food, live in his bile, eat his food, and thus produce heat. Because they become large, his body becomes wet, and all his limbs and minor parts, as well as his eye-, ear-, nose-, and tongue-faculties, are damaged. The sense-faculties lose the ability to perceive their objects.

7) Worms called Moving in Heat (dro ba la rgyu ba, 暖行 [Heat Moving], uṣṇacaraṇa [Heat Moving]) like hot food and hate cold

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25 It is fairly clear that rigs (“family”) is the result of a confusion of the Sanskrit kula, “family,” with kuha, “cheat.” In Chapter Three, the Sanskrit mahākuhaka is translated as ku ha ka chen po in the Tibetan and 大諂 in the Chinese.

26 In the description of the worm in this section, it is called Moving from Heat (dro ba las rgyu ba). However, in the list it is called Moving in Heat, and since this agrees with the name in all the other passages, I accept this version.
food. When the yogācāra eats cold food, they get angry and harm his whole body. They lick his mouth, heart, or throat, make his body wet or heavy, and make his phlegm red.

8) Worms call Burning (rtam par sreg byed, 作熱) live in the place in the yogācāra’s body where his bile is located. If he eats heavy food, they burn him with fire. They damage his strength and his neck veins, obstruct his throat, and make his feces become pale and like bad water. He comes not to like the cold, and he no longer wants sweet foods.

9) Worms called Digestive Heat Spoiling (sme drod nyams par byed, 火食 [Fire Eating]) are born together with bile. They are happy when it is cold and become frail when it is hot. Because they are happy when it is cold, the yogācāra desires food, but, when it is hot, his digestive heat is weakened. When it is cold, his bile is well established, but, when it is hot, it is rejected.

10) Worms called Great Fire (sme chen po, 大火) desire all the incompatible foods that the yogācāra has eaten. If they are hungry, they eat worms in his body, and, as a result, he has pain everywhere in his body.

Worms arising from bones and living in fat (D sha 129b4–132b7; T721.385c25–386c21)

1) Worms called Bone Licking (rus pad dpa byed pa, 舐骨, asthilelihāna) live in the marrow of the yogācāra’s shoulder and thigh bones and in the small of his back, and they move inside the vital spots of all his bones. If they get angry due to defects in the food, they cause pains in his bones and worsen his color and his (sense of) touch. They eat everything included in the bones, whether bone or flesh. If they do not get hungry, the above-mentioned sensations will not occur.

2) Worms called Excessively Rubbing (shin tu ’drud byed, 嚼骨 [Bone Gnawing]) live in all the yogācāra’s bones. If they rub his bones excessively, all his bones become dry. They cause fever, hoarseness, and diarrhea. If he did not have these worms, he would have illness in his sides and vomiting, and his appetite would deteriorate. If all the worms in his joints do not rub the bones, the above-mentioned illnesses will not occur.

3) Worms called Moving While Cutting the Joints (tshigs pa gcod cing rgyu ba, 割節, parvacchedana), if they are hungry due to defects in food, shrink the yogācāra’s arms. The limbs of his body fall off, or
he has illness of the heart, and even a city appears to be empty to the yogācāra. His nose is disturbed, he is always depressed, and his mind does not delight in touchable or visible things because his feelings are very strong.

4) When Worms called Stink (dri ngan pa, 臭, durgandha) get angry due to defects in food, the yogācāra is afflicted by inflammation, heaviness, delay in healing, skin disease, and white patches on his body. If none of this happens, he sleeps properly. He also gets leprosy, which spreads all over his body.

5) Worms called Bone Pus Family (rus pa'i rnag gi rigs, 瘡 [Pus], asthisuvijāta [Well-born in the Bones?]), if they are hungry due to defects in food, repeatedly arise in the yogācāra’s body, no matter how old he is, even if they have been previously eliminated. They produce bad-smelling spots, similar to the fruit of the plakṣa and udumbara trees, which turn into itching eruptions and produce much oozing. Hive bees and biting flies descend (onto the oozing eruptions?).

6) Worms called Red Mouth (kha dmar ba, 赤口, lohitamukhaka) live in the yogācāra’s bones. If they are hungry due to defects in food, he suffers daily from an illness like erysipelas, heavy blood flow, and increase in lymph and pus. They cause the disease called “Internal Sore.”

7) Worms called Tasting (myong bar byed pa, 頭頭摩 [All Rubbing?]) are active in the yogācāra’s bones. When they get hungry due to defects in food, they produce pustules in the yogācāra, wandering all over his body and causing paralysis wherever they go. His mind empties, his body becomes insensitive, his bladder and defecation are blocked, and he becomes sleepless. The worms turn his limbs and minor parts into sticks, like an ant’s. He becomes very thirsty. Blindness arises in him, and he gets a cold fever and swelling. If the worms do not get hungry, the above-mentioned conditions are eliminated.

8) Worms called Skin Eating (pags pa za ba, 食皮) live in the yogācāra’s bones. If they get hungry, many bad things can happen: his lips, mouth, or eyes swell; there is an eruption of pus; there is a sensation of sinews contracting; thirst increases; his throat is dry; his ears swell; his neck is stiff; his head is destroyed by gouging; white hair appears prematurely; his windpipe is crushed; he sleeps at the wrong time and takes pleasure in unsuitable food; he is not happy in a single spot; he enjoys empty dwellings and temples; his mind wanders; he babbles a lot about little; since he constantly scratches his limbs and
minor parts, his body becomes like a whirl of ashes. If the worms do not get hungry, he does not scratch (the itches caused by) the above-mentioned conditions.

9) Worms called Ant (grog ma pa, 風刀 [Wind Knife], pippalaka [Pin])

live in the yogācāra’s bones. When they get angry due to defects in food, they produce a terrifying feeling in his vital points. They go into the top of his head, his jaws, his heart, his lower intestines, his anus, the bottoms of his hands and feet, and his nails, and adhere like a needle. They shake his streams, eat the nasal mucus in his nose, and shake his eyes, mouth, and body. They make him hate food. If they get hungry, together with other worms, they immeasurably harm his body. Because of this experience, he cannot sleep. If they do not get hungry, the above-mentioned conditions do not occur.

10) Worms called Razor Mouth (spu gri’i kha, 刀口 [Knife Mouth], kṣuramukhaka) arise first when the yogācāra emerges from the opening of the vagina. Due to a special quality, they are born at the same time (as he). As for worms that arise within the womb, they always die, but due to the special quality of his mother’s breast and food, after he is born, the Razor Mouth worms arise.

The benefits of meditating on this group of worms that move in the bones are mentioned: the yogācāra’s eyes are free of darkness; he has passed beyond the state of being an ordinary person; he is free of afflictions, of the concept of “mine,” of doubt, and of suffering; he is completely pure.

Worms in the feces (D sha 132b7–135b4; T721. 386c22–387c6)

1) Worms called Slimy (be’u snabs pa, 生 [Alive]) move in the yogācāra’s feces. If the digestive heat of this body weakens, they make the digestive heat of his body even weaker. They produce flesh (sha), and since the feces are ruined, the color becomes pale. The yogācāra no longer grows, and his face also becomes pale.

27 The Tibetan name may be the result of a confusion between Sanskrit pippalaka, “pin,” and pipīla or pipīlaka, “ant.” This conjecture is supported by the inclusion in Carakasamhitā of a worm called pipiṅkā. The Chinese 風刀, “wind knife,” seems closer to pippalaka. The word grog ma pa, in the name of worms and of a wind, is found in several places in the Tibetan translation of Chapter Seven of the sūtra and nowhere else, as far as I can tell.

28 The Chinese is quite different here and I do not completely understand it.

29 The Chinese translation suggests that “this” here refers to the worms.

30 The meaning is not clear here. The Chinese does not mention flesh.
2) Worms called Needle Mouth (khab kyi kha, 針口, sūcīmukhaka) are active in the yogācāra’s feces. They are thick and long, move in his stomach and intestines, and are unstoppable. They turn upward (from) his stomach and intestines, come out of his mouth together with phlegm, and lick his heart. He becomes mute, or his digestive heat becomes weak. (They leave the body with the feces, and they die in an instant.)

3) Worms called Born from Sphisphi (phi spi skyes pa, 白節 [White Joint], sphisphija) move in the yogācāra’s feces. Their body is short, they have a large retinue, they always move in the filthy liquid, they smell bad, and they arise together with feces. Flies arise together with the feces the worms enjoy, and they cause a large amount of feces to come out, and the yogācāra’s food becomes repugnant to him.

4) Worms called Legless (rkang pa med pa, 無足, acaraṇa), if they get hungry due to defects in food, purge the yogācāra’s feces or urine stream by striking it with wind. When they go into his intestines, they purge the stream of his voice and the stream of his cough, and they cause the stream of hunger, the stream of the wind of his breath, and the stream of thirst to arise. The arising of those streams produces agitation of the various types of diseases in him.

5) Worms called Scattering Feces (bshang ba rnam par ’thor byed, 散汁 [Scattering Juice], purīsavikṣepaka) move throughout the yogācāra’s entire body together with the feces that has been dissolved from their food. When they are all over his body, it has a beautiful color thanks to the worms’ feces.

6) Worms called Tormented by Thirst (skom pas gdungs pa, 三燋 [Triple Burning], viṭakartṛ), when the yogācāra has a fever, annoy his feces, his stomach, and his fire. The worms become very hot and rush through his body. Tormented by the sweat and heat, they dry up the

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31 This sentence is translated from the Chinese because the Tibetan seems corrupt: “The ones that go outside his body live together with the flowers (?) for a brief moment.”

32 The meaning of sphisphi is unclear.

33 That this worm is called Legless might imply that other worms have legs and thus cast doubt on the translation of krini as “worm.” However, if this worm is indeed the same worm that appears in Chapter Three with the Sanskrit name acaranā, the Tibetan and Chinese translations in Chapter Seven may be mistaken. Acaranā can mean either “legless” or “actionless,” and perhaps this worm was originally Actionless. For more discussion, see the footnote in the chart.

34 The Chinese adds that without the feces, the yogācāra’s color would be bad.

35 The meaning of the Sanskrit is unclear to me.
storehouse from which his semen moves. Since they are angry, they also produce thirst and head illness.

7) Worms called Gut Splitting (rgyu ma 'byed par byed pa, 破腸, antrabhādaka) go inside whatever the yogācāra eats or drinks and are tormented. They open his guts and cut his stomach, or they make his stomach become a wind stomach or a bile stomach or a phlegm stomach. They also harm his feces.

8) Worms called Paralyzing (rnam par rengs byed, 閉塞 [Shutting Off], viṣṭambha [Obstruction]) move inside the yogācāra’s feces. They eat what he has eaten and are paralyzed due to their innate special nature. They remove the sheath of his life movement. Due to the fault of the fire that accompanies his food, he is paralyzed, and his intestines contract, or he becomes ill or gets heart pain or the pain of stomach disease.

9) Worms called Good Color (mdog bzangs, 善色, suvarṇa) turn foods that are not good for the yogācāra, or foods that he does not like, into foods good for his health. They produce bliss and strength, instigate the complete elimination of illness, and remove defects. If these worms are strong, the yogācāra will get a good color and strength due to their special nature. If they are not strong, his body will be thin.

10) Worms called Anal Inflammation (gzhang smin par byed pa, 糟門瘡 [Filth Door Sore], gudapāda36) produce in the yogācāra diseases that ripen the anus, namely, wet ones, dry ones, innate ones, ones arising in an earlier time, and ones arising from wind, bile, phlegm, or a combination of the three. They damage the tube through which his feces move and harm his digestive heat. Due to that damage to his digestive heat, the Anal Inflammation worms produce anger and inflame his anus in various ways.

Worms in the marrow (D sha 135b4–137a4; T721.387c7–388a22)

1) Worms called In the Body Hair (spu la yod pa, 毛 [Body Hair], romaśa [Body Hair]) live in the body hair all over the yogācāra’s body. They irritate the marrow of all his limbs and minor parts and eat them. As a result, the yogācāra gets a bad color, leprosy, and bone pain and becomes exhausted.

36 Demoto (personal communication) points out that the Sanskrit is clearly a mistake for gudapāka, “anal inflammation.” I cannot find the compound gzhang smin par byed pa in any Tibetan dictionary.
2) Worms called Black Mouth (kha nag pa, 黑口, krṣṇamukhaka) move within the yogācāra’s marrow and go into his limbs and minor parts unobstructed. If they become hungry, they dissolve his marrow and separate his bones. His complexion becomes bad, and he becomes hunchbacked and weak and (can only) travel to nearby places. He moves stooped over and deteriorates.

3) Worms called Indolent (spro ba med pa, 無力 [Powerless], nirutsāha) eat the yogācāra’s marrow. Satiated, they make the yogācāra indolent, and they become indolent, too. If other worms moving in the marrow inflict injury, they cause the yogācāra pain that is very unbearable.

4) Worms called Great Pain (zug gzer chen po, 大痛, mahāśālakara [Great Śalakara?]) move constantly in the yogācāra’s marrow. They torment all three dhātus, become the cause of all illnesses, and cause pus and inability to sleep.

5) Worms called Bewildering (rmongs par byed pa, 煩悶, vyāmohakartṛ) move into the conduit that goes to the yogācāra’s mind and become very subtle. They disturb his happy mental stream and produce heart illness in him. As a result, he faints and has a bad complexion, and his heart hurts. He becomes dispirited because his appetite deteriorates, fever arises, and the worms press on his heart, and he becomes dispirited when he sees worms outside.37

6) Worms called Flowing Down (‘og tu ’gro ba, 下流, adhovaha) move in the channel in which the yogācāra’s semen moves. If he eats and drinks something beneficial, his semen increases. Since the worms fall into his urine tube, they emerge together with his urine.

7) Worms called Fire Colored (me mdog can, 火色, agnivarṇakara [Making Fire Color]) are on the list of marrow worms in both the Chinese and the Tibetan, but they are described in neither.

8) Worms called Flying Up (au Thing gA, 起身根 [Arousing the Body Organ], uddīṅga)38 live in the yogācāra’s bladder. When his bladder is filled with urine, they are happy. Since they are happy, with the force of the urine, they coarsen the āyatanas that are the base for

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37 Here in the same sentence, we see the word srin bu (krimi) referring to both internal and external worms.

38 Demoto emends the Sanskrit manuscript of Chapter Three to uddīṅgaḥ from uḍḍīṃśah and says that the Chinese translator of this passage in Chapter Seven understood the word as ullaṅga. She tentatively translates uddīṅga as “going by flying up,” taking it as analogous to pataṅga, “flying.” I provisionally use her translation.
the movement of semen, due to a foolish ordinary person’s having improper thoughts about it.

9) Worms called Happy in Imagining (kun du rtog par dga’ ba, 憶念歡喜 [Happy and Mindful], ṣaṃkalpadṛṣṭi [False View of Discrimination]), if they get hungry, cause the yogācāra to have many good or bad dreams. His dreams are the result of the power of the worms that move in the tubes to his mind.

At the end of this section, the benefits of meditating on the body in general are mentioned: the yogācāra is not established in the presence of Māra, reaches the verge of nirvana, is unfettered by the craving that arises together with desire for pleasure, and is not harmed by the afflictions of one who is subject to rebirth.

Passage 2: The Wind that Makes Worms Proceed All Over
The next section of the sūtra is a very long passage on many winds and their effects on the body. This section has been summarized by Ishikawa (2002: 128–138), who counts 77 winds. One of these winds, called Making Worms Proceed All Over, can mix with, oppose, and shake worms from the head to the foot, beginning with ten types of worms in the head and continuing with lists of ten worms each in the throat, the blood, the flesh, the bile, the limbs, the feces, and the bloody marrow. These worms all spread throughout the body due to the Making Worms Proceed All Over wind. Most but not all of these worms correspond to the worms in the previous passage, and, in some cases, the order in which the worms are mentioned is different.

Passage 3: Worms and Winds at the Time of Death
After the section on the winds, the yogācāra contemplates death and how the winds and the worms will destroy the body. At the time of death, all the worms will first be destroyed by the winds, after which the yogācāra

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39 These are mentioned as separate worms on the lists in both the Tibetan and the Chinese translations, but, in the descriptions in both translations, they are included in the same paragraph. In the Tibetan, the description is clearly of a single worm. In the Chinese, it is not clear whether this is one kind of worm or two.

40 At least, the Chinese translation numbers each list from one to ten, while the Tibetan mentions ten worms at the beginning of each list but does not always give ten names.

41 D sha 147a1–147b7; T721.391a3–b12.
will die. Again, the worms are grouped in tens according to the body parts in which they live: head, throat, blood, flesh, bile, bones, feces, and bone marrow. Each worm is said to be destroyed by a specific wind, and Ishikawa (2002: 128–138) has matched the wind names in the previous section with the worms in this section.\textsuperscript{42}

In addition, in the case of the worms in the blood, there is a general description of these worms and a description of the pain experienced at the time of death and of the destruction of the worms. The worms in the blood have no legs, are short, are very thin, have no eyes, cause itching, and have the nature of an arrow. At the time of death, the worms are overcome by the winds and the person’s blood dries up. When people die, they are desiccated, with harsh and unbearable sensations. On the brink of death, severe fear of death produced by desire arises due to being bound to ignorance and confusion in people who are being separated from their own people, their friends, their relatives, their children, their wives, their valuables, and their means of subsistence. The dying person has physical and mental pain.

Similarly, in the case of the worms in the feces, there are descriptions of how the worms and winds affect the body and of the pain suffered at death. The winds and the worms cause the feces to dry up, and then the whole body dries up and becomes agitated, dilapidated, and rotten. On the brink of death, other people and we ourselves experience these and other terrible things.

\textbf{Some observations on worms in \textit{Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra}}

First, it must be stressed that most of the worms in the sūtra are not real. In the medical texts, too, only a handful of the worms correspond to actual parasites. G. Meulenbeld is skeptical about the reality of the worms in the medical texts and states: “their identification, in so far as they are no [sic] imaginary creatures, proves to be …difficult” (Meulenbeld 1974: 623). To account for the proliferation of names in those texts, some Indian scholars take the word \textit{krimi} to mean also germs or bacteria. For example, R. Kashyap states that “Veda was not unaware of the microscopic invisible Krimis revealed by modern scientific appliances” (Kashyap 1935–1936: 95). But we must remember that there were, in fact, no microscopes in ancient India, and it is unlikely that the Vedic authors somehow intuited the existence of microbes in any genuine way. Another

\textsuperscript{42} D\textit{sha} 165b6–169a3; T721.396c18–398a7.
scholar, C. Chakraberty, confidently provides scientific names for fecal worms in *Suśrutasaṃhitā* (Chakraberty 1923: 235–236). Meulenbeld criticizes him, saying that Chakraberty does not provide support for his identifications, which are unreliable in the case of parasites not visible to the naked eye (Meulenbeld 1974: 623). Nevertheless, certain parasites are large enough to be visible, and it is not far-fetched to conclude that the authors of both the medical texts and *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* imagined or inferred the existence of many other smaller worms, based on these visible parasites.

The sūtra appropriates medical and anatomical knowledge for soteriological purposes. Meditation on one’s own body is presented in the sūtra and in other texts as observation of the body “as it really is,” namely, as subject to change, illness, and death. We are attached to our bodies when they are healthy, intact, and covered with clothes, ornaments, and ointments. But, as the *nidāna* at the beginning of Chapter Seven says, when we think of the body as a collection of parts, we become disillusioned. In addition to the passages on worms and the illnesses they cause, *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, like the other meditation texts mentioned above, enumerates bones, organs, tendons, and other components of the body that are described in the medical literature. This accumulation of medical detail is crucial to the effectiveness of the meditation: the numbering and naming of parts strengthen the impression that the body is not an indissoluble entity. The meditation texts increase the number of worms over the number found in the medical literature in order to enhance the disillusioning effect. The sūtra goes even further than the other Buddhist texts by explaining at length the various illnesses that the worms cause.

One striking feature of the worm passages is that there is very little indication of what the worms look like. We might expect physical descriptions of every worm, but in fact we can find descriptions for only a handful of individual worms in the first passage and for one group of worms in the first passage (worms in the spleen) and one in the third (worms in the blood). Since the passages are part of a meditation on the body, and since worms are clearly meant to arouse disgust, gory visual details would serve the purpose of the text. Instead, the sūtra relies on evocative names, accounts of unpleasant effects, and sheer numbers to fulfill this function.

It is also surprising that the worms are not only malevolent creatures but also do some good things. In many cases, if the *yogācāra* does not do anything to offend the worms, the worms do not cause any problems. Some
Worms are harmless if they stay where they belong but cause problems if they move. Drunken worms live at the top of the eye-sockets and only upset the yogācāra if they move to his neck. Emetic worms cause vomiting when they move upward but help the yogācāra’s nourishment when they fall to the bottom of his belly. In other cases, the worms do positive things. Worms that eat spittle, if they do not get fat, keep the yogācāra healthy by swallowing spittle. Good Color worms help make food conducive to the yogācāra’s well-being. Some of these beneficial effects will remind us of current research on intestinal microbes, some of which are necessary for good health while others cause illness. Nevertheless, we must keep in mind that the authors had no actual knowledge of microscopic organisms, so almost all the worms are products of the imagination.

As we have seen, the worms mostly do harm. They are found all over the body and not confined to the gut. They are the cause of a multitude of conditions, from baldness to insomnia to heart pain to intestinal inflammation. They are depicted as angry creatures, eager to take revenge on their host. The Tsun tsu ra ka worms, for example, are happy when the yogācāra suffers.

There are clear similarities among all these Buddhist enumerations and descriptions of worms. They all focus on worms as evidence of the unsatisfactory nature of worldly existence and the disgusting nature of the human body. The passages I’ve discussed all have some basis in the Indian medical knowledge and theories of their time. But they extrapolate from the handful of parasitic worms visible to the naked eye and described in medical texts to a panoply of often exotically named creatures that inhabit every nook and cranny of the human body.

*Saddharmasmrtyupasthānasūtra* is noteworthy among Buddhist texts for having the most detailed and extensive passages on worms. Unlike the other works that I’ve mentioned, this sūtra includes not only numbers, names, and locations, but also detailed descriptions of the worms’ actions and effects. I hope that further study will shed light on the relationship among the Buddhist accounts, especially the directions of influence, if any, among them.
Appendix

Worms in the Third and Seventh Chapters of Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Worms in the Head</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>klad phor la rgyu ba</td>
<td>glad pa la rgyu bar byed pa de</td>
<td>klad pa la gnas rgyu ba</td>
<td>(43) mastiṣkacara (glad par rgyu, 腦)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving in the Brain</td>
<td>(頭內)</td>
<td>(頭內)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>klad pa za bar byed pa</td>
<td>mgo bo dang mgul pa</td>
<td></td>
<td>(44) mastakaluṅgāhāra (glad rgyas za, 頭內)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(常食此腦)</td>
<td>(腦內)</td>
<td>(腦內)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brain Eater</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>glad phor gyi rus pa'i gseb na 'gro ba</td>
<td>thod pa la rgyu bar byed cing gseb tu song</td>
<td>thod pa la rgyu ba</td>
<td>(45) kapālikācara (thod par rgyu, 頭骨行)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(住髑髏中。若行若食)</td>
<td>(骨行)</td>
<td>(骨行)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going in the Skull</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skra za ba (髮)</td>
<td>skra za bar byed pa</td>
<td>skra za ba</td>
<td>(46) keśāda (skra za, 煩惱與)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hair Eating CSA</td>
<td>(食髮)</td>
<td>(食髮)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I am indebted to Mitsuyo Demoto for a copy of her working chart of worms and winds in Chapters Three and Seven. All references to Demoto are to this chart or her provisional edition of Chapter Three. Names are given according to the order of the first passage. The order sometimes differs in the other passages.

The letter C, S, or A following the translation of a worm name indicates that a worm with the same or a similar name is found in Carakasamhitā, Suśrutasamhitā, or Aṣṭāṅgahrdayasamhitā. If the name is not identical, the corresponding Sanskrit is given in parentheses.

Demoto suggests that the Chinese is a translation of kleśāda.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coursing in the Ear</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ear</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ear</strong></td>
<td><strong>śravanacara</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rna ba la spyod pa</td>
<td>rna ba la rgyu ba</td>
<td>rna ba la rgyu ba</td>
<td>(rna rgyu, <strong>Ear</strong>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(耳)</td>
<td>(耳行)</td>
<td>(耳行)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entering the Snot</strong></td>
<td><strong>鼻内</strong></td>
<td><strong>流涕</strong></td>
<td><strong>snabsānāvartayitṛ</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>snabs la 'jug pa</td>
<td>snabs shin tu</td>
<td>snabs kyis g.yogs pa</td>
<td>(snabs ’khril, <strong>鼻内</strong>)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(鼻)</td>
<td>'phel bar byed pa</td>
<td>(流涕)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coursing in the Fat</strong></td>
<td><strong>脂内行</strong></td>
<td><strong>脂内行</strong></td>
<td><strong>medontacara</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tshil gyi nang na spyo</td>
<td>tshil la rgyu bar byed p</td>
<td>tshil gyi mtha’ na rgyu</td>
<td>(tshil nang rgyu, <strong>脂内行</strong>)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d pa (脂)</td>
<td>(脂內行)</td>
<td>ba (脂內行)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moving in the Joints</strong></td>
<td>tshigs pa rnams dang 'gram par gyur pa</td>
<td>tshigs pa rnams dang 'gram par gyur pa</td>
<td>(節行)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tshigs kyi gseb na rgyu</td>
<td>tshigs pa rnams dang 'gram par gyur pa</td>
<td>tshigs pa rnams dang 'gram par gyur pa</td>
<td>(節行)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ba (續, 身)</td>
<td>(節行)</td>
<td>(節行)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spittle Eater</strong></td>
<td>lud pa za ba</td>
<td>lud pa za ba</td>
<td><strong>lālābhyukṣaka</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(食涎)</td>
<td>(食涎)</td>
<td>(食涎)</td>
<td>(kha chu ’debs, <strong>涎灑</strong>)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tooth Root Eater</strong></td>
<td>so‘i rtsa ba za bar byed</td>
<td>so‘i rtsa ba nas za ba</td>
<td><strong>dantamūlakhādaka</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S (dantāda)</td>
<td>pa</td>
<td>(食齒根)</td>
<td>(so drung za, <strong>齧齒骨</strong>)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worms in the Throat</strong></td>
<td><strong>喰食</strong></td>
<td><strong>喰食</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(噉食)</td>
<td>emetic</td>
<td>(喰食)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Worms in Saddharmasūryapusthānasūtra

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kha chu za bar byed pa (食涎)⁴⁶</td>
<td>zas su ngar snabs za ba (食涎)</td>
<td>zas su ngar snabs za ba (食涎)</td>
<td>(52) lālābhākṣaka (kha chu za, 涎食)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mchil ma ’byung bar byed pa (唾)</td>
<td>mchil ma rnams shin tu ’grim (’grim?) par byed pa (消唾)</td>
<td>(53) ślesmakledayitṛ (bad kan rlan byed, 唾冷沫)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skyug byed (吐)</td>
<td>rab tu skyug byed (歯吐)</td>
<td>rab tu skyug par byed pa (吐)</td>
<td>(54) pracchardaka (rab tu skyug, 吐)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mngar myos (醉味)</td>
<td>mngar myos (甜醉)</td>
<td>mngar myos (甜醉)</td>
<td>(55) madhumatta (sbrang rtsi myos, 密醉)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In sections where a list of names is followed by descriptions of each worm, the form of the name given is the form that appears in the description.

⁴⁶ Here, the Chinese and the Tibetan agree that a worm moving in the ten channels for the flow of flavors (khu ba rgyu ba bcu’i rtsa rnams kyi nang na rgyu bar gyur pa (行十味脈⁴⁷)) is a separate worm from the worm that is mad for sweetness (mngar myos⁴⁹), and both omit the intoxicated worm.

⁴⁷ Demoto points out that this reading, from the Three Editions and the Old Song, is better than the main Taishō reading, 和.

⁴⁸ Here, the Tibetan seems to conflate the worm moving in the ten channels and the worm that is mad for sweetness.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rab myos (放逸) <strong>Drunken</strong></td>
<td>rab myos (甜醉)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(56) ṣaḍrasābhilāśin (ro drug sred, 六味 慾望)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ro drug la zhen cing sred pa (貪嗜六味) <strong>Desiring the Six Flavors</strong></td>
<td>ro drug la sred pa (嗜味)</td>
<td>ro drug la dga’ ba (嗜味)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ghur ghu ra ka (抒氣) <strong>Gurgling</strong></td>
<td>ghur ghu ra ba (抒氣)</td>
<td>ghur ghu ra ba (抒氣)</td>
<td>(57) ghurghuraka (bar bur, 抒氣)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ro la rab tu sdang ba (憎味) <strong>Hating Flavor</strong></td>
<td>ro la rab tu sdang ba (憎味)</td>
<td>ro la rab tu sdang ba (憎味)</td>
<td>(58) rasapradveśin (yid 'byung, 增50味)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nyal ba la dga’ ba (嗜睡) <strong>Fond of Sleep</strong></td>
<td>nyal ba la shin tu mngon par dga’ ba (嗜唾51)</td>
<td>nyal ba la shin tu mngon par dga’ ba (嗜唾52)</td>
<td>(59) svapnābhilāśin (rmi lam sred, 夢慾望)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sbom po (有腫) <strong>Fat</strong></td>
<td>sbom po</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spu za ba (食毛) <strong>Body Hair Eating</strong></td>
<td>spu za ba (食毛)</td>
<td>spu za ba (食毛)</td>
<td>(60) romāda (spu za, 毛生)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘bigs byed (孔穴) <strong>Piercing</strong></td>
<td>so su ra, (孔穴)</td>
<td>slubs (slu bas?) can (孔行)</td>
<td>(61) sosura (so sura, 善味) **Good Flavor?**53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

50 This seems to be a mistake for 慾.
51 This seems to be a mistake for 睡.
52 This seems to be a mistake for 睡.
53 Based on the Chinese translation in Chapter Three, Demoto suggests the possibility that the Sanskrit there is a mistake for surasa, hence “Good Flavor.” Carakasaṃhitā mentions a worm surasa living in the blood (3.7.11; Sharma 1981: v. 1, 342).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>(62) jantumātara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worm Mother C</td>
<td>Worm Mother C A</td>
<td>Worm Mother C A</td>
<td>(skye ba'i ma,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(jantumātṛ) A</td>
<td>(mātṛ)</td>
<td>(mātṛ)</td>
<td>虫母)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>au dum ba ra</td>
<td>au dum ba ra</td>
<td>au dum ba ra</td>
<td>(63) audumbara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fig-like CA</td>
<td>Fig-like CA</td>
<td>Fig-like CA</td>
<td>(u ma ba ra, 毛光)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>dzan tu mAn da ra</td>
<td>(64) prasrāva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoroughly Grasping</td>
<td>Thoroughly Grasping</td>
<td>Thoroughly Grasping</td>
<td>(rab zag)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spu'i gling</td>
<td>spu'i gling</td>
<td>spu'i gling</td>
<td>(65) lomadvīpa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body Hair Island CA</td>
<td>Body Hair Island CA</td>
<td>Body Hair Island CA</td>
<td>(spu gling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kun du 'dzim byed</td>
<td>kun du 'dzim pa</td>
<td>kun du 'dzag pa</td>
<td>(66) romabhakṣa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(食汁)</td>
<td>(食汁)</td>
<td>(蝨母)</td>
<td>(spu zan, 毛食)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khrag la rab tu khro ba</td>
<td>khrag la rab tu khro ba</td>
<td>(頑血)</td>
<td>(67) simisimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry at Blood Khrag</td>
<td>Angry at Blood Khrag</td>
<td>(頑血)</td>
<td>(si mi si ma, 習習)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khrag za ba</td>
<td>khrag za ba</td>
<td>khrag za ba</td>
<td>(68) aṃdhūka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blood Eating Khrag</td>
<td>Blood Eating Khrag</td>
<td>(食血)</td>
<td>(u ma bug a, 酎)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rab rab byed pa</td>
<td>rab rab byed pa</td>
<td>(瘤瘤)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaking</td>
<td>Shaking</td>
<td>(瘤瘤)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>am bya kas</td>
<td>skyur po</td>
<td>skyur po</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>Sour</td>
<td>(酢)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

54 蝨母 appears to be a translation of jantumātara, a mistaken repetition of the name of the previous worm, transliterated as禅都. The name of the wind that destroys it, 惡火風, corresponds to the name of the wind in Tibetan that destroys the worm named kun du 'dzag pa.

55 The reading of the Three Editions and the Old Song is 頑血.

56 In the Tibetan, this is included in the list but not in the worm-by-worm descriptions.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worms in the Flesh</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E7%94%9F%E7%98%A1%7D">\textit{rmas kun nas slong (bslang) ba} (生瘡)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E7%94%9F%E7%98%A1%7D">\textit{rmas kun nas slong ba} (瘡味)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E7%94%9F%E7%98%A1%7D">\textit{rma la kun du ’byung ba} (生瘡)</a></td>
<td>(69) \textit{vranasamuttha} (bu \textit{rmas bslang}, 瘡生)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Produced by Sores</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%88%BA%7D">\textit{tsun tsu ra ka} (刺)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%88%BA%7D">\textit{tsun tsu ka ba} (撫撫)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%88%BA%7D">\textit{tsun tsu ka} (刺)</a></td>
<td>(70) \textit{cuñcuraka} (tsun tsu sgra, 粥粥)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agitating the Sinews</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%96%89%E7%AD%8B%7D">\textit{rgyus pa sgul ba} (閉筋)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%96%89%E7%AD%8B%7D">\textit{rgyus pa sgul ba} (閉筋)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%96%89%E7%AD%8B%7D">\textit{rgyus pa sgul bar byed pa} (閉筋)</a></td>
<td>(71) \textit{snāyughaṭṭaka} (rgyus pa gcod, 筋閉)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agitating the Channels</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%88%7D">\textit{rtsa sgul ba} (動脈)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%88%7D">\textit{rtsa ’bigs pa} (動脈)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%88%7D">\textit{rtsa ’bigs par byed pa} (動脈)</a></td>
<td>(72) \textit{śirātudana} (rtsa gcod, 脈動)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skin Shaking</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%A3%9F%E7%9A%AE%7D">\textit{pags pa skyod par byed pa} (食皮)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%A3%9F%E7%9A%AE%7D">\textit{pags pa za ba} (食皮)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E9%A3%9F%E7%9A%AE%7D">\textit{pags pa gtub pa} (食\textsuperscript{57}皮)</a></td>
<td>(28) \textit{carmakarṭr} (lpags byed, 皮作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agitating the Fat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%82%7D">\textit{tshil sgul ba} (動脂)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%82%7D">\textit{tshil sgul ba} (動脂)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%8B%95%E8%84%82%7D">\textit{tshil sgul bar byed pa} (動脂)</a></td>
<td>(29) \textit{medotudana} (tshil gnod, 脂嘴)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Increasing</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%92%8C%E9%9B%86%7D">\textit{’phel byed} (和集)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%92%8C%E9%9B%86%7D">\textit{’phel byed} (和集)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E5%92%8C%E9%9B%86%7D">\textit{’phel byed} (和集)</a></td>
<td>(30) \textit{aupacalika}\textsuperscript{58} (bsags byung, 和集)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stink</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E8%87%AD%7D">\textit{dri ngan pa} (臭)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E8%87%AD%7D">\textit{dri ngan pa} (臭)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E8%87%AD%7D">\textit{dri ngan pa} (臭)</a></td>
<td>(31) \textit{durgandha} (dri mi zhim, 惡臭)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moving in Sweat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E6%B1%97%E8%A1%8C%7D">\textit{rngul la rgyu ba} (溼)</a></td>
<td><a href="%5Ctextit%7B%E6%B1%97%E8%A1%8C%7D">\textit{rngul la rgyu ba} (汗行)</a></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{57} Accepting the reading of the Three Editions and the Old Song.

\textsuperscript{58} Demoto suggests that this should be read \textit{aupacayika} or \textit{aupacāyika}. 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
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<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>rnam par sreg byed</strong> (熱)</td>
<td>sreg byed (熱)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burning</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Worms in the Bile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tsu ra ba (瘤瘤)</td>
<td>tsu ra ba tha (蘇毘羅)</td>
<td>tsu ra bakaH (瘤瘤)</td>
<td>(32) pañcabhir vāyubhiḥ sa hacaraḥ (sa ha tsu ra ba, 五風共未虫)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tsuraba</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sgul byed (惙惙)</td>
<td>sgul byed</td>
<td>sgul byed (惙惙)</td>
<td>(33) todana (gnod byed, 築築)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Agitating</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rdzas kyis rgyas pa (苗花)</td>
<td>rdzas kyis rgyas pa (苗花)</td>
<td>ku shi me tog (苗花)</td>
<td>(34) garbhapuspaka (snying po me tog skyed, 藏華)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Blossoming with Substance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rigs chen po (大諂)</td>
<td>chen po’i rigs (大諂)</td>
<td>chen po’i rigs (大諂)</td>
<td>(35) mahākuhaka (ku ha ka chen po, 大諂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Great Cheat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nags pa (黒)</td>
<td>nag pa pa (鳥), (黒)</td>
<td>nag pa pa (黒)</td>
<td>(37) kālaka (nag po, 黑)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Black One</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>zas chen po (大食)</td>
<td>zas chen po (大食)</td>
<td>zas chen po (大食)</td>
<td>(38) mahābhakṣaka (za chen, 大食)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Big Meal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dro ba las rgyu ba (暖行)</td>
<td>dro ba la rgyu ba (行熱)</td>
<td>dro ba la rgyu ba (行熱)</td>
<td>(39) uṣṇacarana (rkang dro, 暖行)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Moving in Heat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

59 Both the Tibetan and Chinese list this worm, but neither describes it.

60 It is fairly clear that the Tibetan rigs (family) is the result of confusing kuha (cheat) with kula (family).

61 In the second passage, the first worm on the list of ten in the bile is 黒, “black.” However, the fifth on the list is 鳥, also “black.” In the Tibetan nag pa pa, “black one,” is fifth on the list.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
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<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| rnam par sreg byed (作熱)  
**Burning** | rnam par sreg byed (大熱) | rnam par sreg byed (大熱) |  |
| me drod nyams par byed (火食)  
**Digestive Heat Spoiling** | me drod nyams byed | me drod nyams byed (火) |  |
| (食味)  
**Eating Flavor** | (食味) |  |  |
| me chen po (大火)  
**Great Fire** | me chen po (大火) | me chen po (大火) |  |
| rus pa ldag pa byed pa (舐骨)  
**Bone Licking C (lelihaḥ) A (lelihaḥ)** | rus pa ldag pa (舐骨) | rus pa la ldag pa (舐骨) | (40) asthilelihāna (rus pa 'jig byed, 舐骨) |
| shin tu 'drud byed (齧骨)  
**Excessively Rubbing** | shin tu 'drud byed (齧骨) | (齧骨) | (41) krṣnacaranā (rkang gnag, 黒足) |
| tshigs pa gcod cing rgyu ba (割節)  
**Moving While Cutting the Joints** | tshigs pa gcod cing rgyu ba (割節) | tshigs pa gcod cing rgyu ba (割節) | (42) parvacchedana (tshigs gcod, 密割) |
| dri ngan pa (臭)  
**Stink** | dri mi zḥim pa (臭) | dri mi zḥim pa (臭) | (11) durgandha (dri nga[n], 惡臭) |

\(^{62}\) In the list, this worm is called simply 火, “fire.”
<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rus pa’i rnag gi rigs (爛)</td>
<td>rus pa’i rnag gi rigs (爛)</td>
<td>rus pa’i rnag gi rigs (消骨)</td>
<td>(12) asthisuvijāta (rus pa legs skyes, 骨生)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bone Pus Family</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kha dmar ba (赤口)</td>
<td>kha dmar ba (赤口)</td>
<td>kha dmar ba (赤口)</td>
<td>(13) lohitamukhaka (kha dmar, 赤口)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Red Mouth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>myong bar byed pa (頭頭摩)</td>
<td>myong bar byed pa (頭頭摩)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(14) (brtson bcas, 針刺)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tasting</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pags pa za ba (食皮)</td>
<td>pags pa za ba (食皮)</td>
<td>pags pa la spyod cing za ba (食皮)</td>
<td>(15) marmacāraṇa-bhakṣaṇa (gnad rgyu za, 脈行食)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Skin Eating</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grog ma pa (風刀)</td>
<td>grog ma (風刀)</td>
<td>grog ma pa (風刀)</td>
<td>(16) pippalaka (mtshon cha kha, 必波羅)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ant</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spu gri'i kha (刀口)</td>
<td>spu gri'i kha (刀口)</td>
<td>spu gri'i kha (刀口)</td>
<td>(17) kṣuramukhaka (spu gri kha, 堅口)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Razor Mouth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be’u snabs pa (生)</td>
<td>dangs ma pa (生)</td>
<td>dangs ma pa (生)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slimy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>khab kyi kha (針口)</td>
<td>khab kyi kha (針口)</td>
<td>khab kyi kha (針口)</td>
<td>(19) sūcīmukhaka (khab gdong, 刺口)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Needle Mouth</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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63 Demoto points out that the Three Editions and the Old Song include this worm, which is found in neither the main Taishō text nor the Tibetan translation.

64 The Sanskrit manuscript is unclear here. Demoto says that all three syllables are indistinct, with the middle syllable being illegible. She tentatively reads the word as sā...mah, and she lists it in this position in her chart only because of the order in which it is found in the text. She cannot ascertain a correspondence with頭頭摩.

65 Demoto emends from the manuscript’s marmacāriṇā bhakṣaṇah and suggests that this may be a mistake for carmabhakṣaṇa, “skin-eating.”
At the beginning of the list in the third passage, the Chinese explicitly states that there are ten worms. However, eleven worms are listed. Eleven worms are also listed in the Tibetan. Kokuyaku Issaiyō (225 n. 28) points out that the Three Editions and the Old Song omit the second worm named 無足 and renumber the worms. However, eleven distinct worms appear in the Tibetan, with rkang med as the fourth worm and mi spyod pa as the fifth. Therefore, it seems as though the Chinese name for the fifth worm, 無足, incorrectly duplicates the name of the fourth worm. In the list of worm names in the Sanskrit manuscript of Chapter Three, which according to Demoto may be based on the current list in Chapter Seven, there is only one worm between spisphija (白節) and purīṣavikṣepaka (散糞), namely acaraṇaḥ. This word could mean either “legless” or “actionless.” The Chinese translation 不行 would indicate “actionless,” while the Tibetan translation, rkang med, suggests “legless.” However, in Chapter Three of the Tibetan, the name of the wind that destroys this worm is zas ldan, “possessing nourishment,” which corresponds to the Chinese 食和合 and the Sanskrit āhārayukta. In Chapter Seven, it is the fifth worm, mi spyod pa, that is destroyed by a wind called “possessing nourishment” (食相應). Therefore, it seems likely that the fourth worm in the third passage of Chapter Seven is “legless” (Sanskrit original unclear), while the fifth worm is “actionless” (Sanskrit acaraṇa).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First Passage</th>
<th>Second Passage</th>
<th>Third Passage</th>
<th>Sanskrit (Chapter Three)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>phi spi skyes pa (白節)</td>
<td>phi spi skyes pa (白節)</td>
<td>phi spi skyes pa (白節)</td>
<td>(20) spisphija (s+phi s+phi dza, 胃穿破)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born from Sphisphi</td>
<td>rkang pa med pa (無足)</td>
<td>rkang pa med pa (無足)</td>
<td>(21) acarana (rkang med, 不行)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legless</td>
<td></td>
<td>mi spyod pa (無足)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rkang pa med pa (無足)</td>
<td>bshang ba rnam par 'thor byed (散糞)</td>
<td>bshang ba rnam par 'thor byed (散糞)</td>
<td>(22) purīṣavikṣepaka (bshang ba g.yeng byed, 屎散)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feces Scattering</td>
<td></td>
<td>bshang ba 'byed pa (三燋)</td>
<td>(23) viṭakartṛ (gsum byed, 三節)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>skom pas gdungs pa (三燋)</td>
<td>skom pas gdungs pa (三燋)</td>
<td>bshang ba 'byed pa (三燋)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tormented by Thirst</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

66 At the beginning of the list in the third passage, the Chinese explicitly states that there are ten worms. However, eleven worms are listed. Eleven worms are also listed in the Tibetan. Kokuyaku Issaiyō (225 n. 28) points out that the Three Editions and the Old Song omit the second worm named 無足 and renumber the worms. However, eleven distinct worms appear in the Tibetan, with rkang med as the fourth worm and mi spyod pa as the fifth. Therefore, it seems as though the Chinese name for the fifth worm, 無足, incorrectly duplicates the name of the fourth worm. In the list of worm names in the Sanskrit manuscript of Chapter Three, which according to Demoto may be based on the current list in Chapter Seven, there is only one worm between spisphija (白節) and purīṣavikṣepaka (散糞), namely acaraṇaḥ. This word could mean either “legless” or “actionless.” The Chinese translation 不行 would indicate “actionless,” while the Tibetan translation, rkang med, suggests “legless.” However, in Chapter Three of the Tibetan, the name of the wind that destroys this worm is zas ldan, “possessing nourishment,” which corresponds to the Chinese 食和合 and the Sanskrit āhārayukta. In Chapter Seven, it is the fifth worm, mi spyod pa, that is destroyed by a wind called “possessing nourishment” (食相應). Therefore, it seems likely that the fourth worm in the third passage of Chapter Seven is “legless” (Sanskrit original unclear), while the fifth worm is “actionless” (Sanskrit acaraṇa).
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>rgyu ma 'byed par byed pa (破腸)</td>
<td>bshang ba 'byed pa (破腸)</td>
<td>rgyu ma 'byed pa (破腸)</td>
<td>(24) antrabheda (rgyu ma 'jig byed, 腸破)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gut Splitting</td>
<td>zas smin pa rnings so sor rengs par byed pa (閉食消)</td>
<td>(25) viśṭambha (dbos byed, 塵脹)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rnam par rengs byed (閉塞)</td>
<td>zas smin pa rnings so sor rengs par byed pa (閉食消)</td>
<td>(25) viśṭambha (dbos byed, 塵脹)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paralyzing</td>
<td>mdog bzangs (善色)</td>
<td>mdog bzangs (黃)</td>
<td>(26) suvarṇa (mdog bzang, 金)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mdog bzangs (善色)</td>
<td>mdog bzangs (善色)</td>
<td>mdog bzangs (黃)</td>
<td>(26) suvarṇa (mdog bzang, 金)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good Color</td>
<td>g Zhang smīn par byed (穢門瘡)</td>
<td>g Zhang smīn byed (消重食)</td>
<td>(27) gudapāda (g Zhang rkang, 糞門熟)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anal Inflammation</td>
<td>g Zhang smīn byed (穢門瘡)</td>
<td>g Zhang smīn byed (消重食)</td>
<td>(27) gudapāda (g Zhang rkang, 糞門熟)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worms in the Marrow</td>
<td>Worms in the Marrow</td>
<td>Worms in the Marrow</td>
<td>Worms in the Marrow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spu la yod pa (毛)</td>
<td>spu la gnas pa (毛)</td>
<td>spu la gnas pa (毛)</td>
<td>(1) romaśa (spu can, 毛)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the Body Hair</td>
<td>kha nag pa (黒口)</td>
<td>kha nag pa (黒口)</td>
<td>(2) krṣṇamukhaka (kha gnag, 黑口)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Mouth</td>
<td>kha nag (黒口)</td>
<td>kha nag pa (黒口)</td>
<td>(2) krṣṇamukhaka (kha gnag, 黑口)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>spro ba med pa (無力)</td>
<td>spro ba med pa (失力)</td>
<td>spro ba med pa (無力)</td>
<td>(3) nirutsāha (sbro [spro?] med, 無力)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indolent</td>
<td>gzer zug chen po (大痛)</td>
<td>gzer zug chen por byed pa (大痛)</td>
<td>(4) mahāśālakara (rab pHy byed, 大力作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Pain</td>
<td>gzer zug chen por byed pa (大痛)</td>
<td>gzer zug chen por byed pa (大痛)</td>
<td>(4) mahāśālakara (rab pHy byed, 大力作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zug gzer chen po (大痛)</td>
<td>Zug gzer chen po (大痛)</td>
<td>Zug gzer chen po (大痛)</td>
<td>(4) mahāśālakara (rab pHy byed, 大力作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bewilderment</td>
<td>rmongs par byed pa (煩悶)</td>
<td>rmongs par byed pa (煩悶)</td>
<td>(5) vyāmohakartr (rmongs par byed, 迷作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rmongs par byed pa (煩悶)</td>
<td>rmongs par byed pa (煩悶)</td>
<td>rmongs par byed pa (煩悶)</td>
<td>(5) vyāmohakartr (rmongs par byed, 迷作)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Demoto points out that the Sanskrit is clearly a mistake for gudapāka, “anal inflammation.”
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<tr>
<td>me mdoṅ can (火色)</td>
<td>me mdoṅ can (火色)</td>
<td>me’i mdoṅ can (火色)</td>
<td>(6) agnivārṇakara (med [me?] mdoṅ byed, 火色作)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fire Color</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>'gré pd (滑)</td>
<td>(7) picchilaka ('gré byed, 滑)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'og tu ’gro b (下流)</td>
<td>'og tu ’gro b (下流)</td>
<td>’og tu rgyu b (下流)</td>
<td>(8) adhovaha ('og ’gro, 河漂)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flowing Down</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>au Thing gA (起身根)</td>
<td>au Thing gA (起身根)</td>
<td>o’u Thing ka (起身根)</td>
<td>(9) uḍḍīṅga (ud ting g, 跳)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flying Up</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kun dū rtogs par dga’ ba (憶念歡喜)</td>
<td>kun dū rtogs pa (憶念)</td>
<td>kun dū rtogs pas dga’ ba (憶念歡喜)</td>
<td>(10) saṃkalpakadṛṣṭi (kun rtog mthong, 分別見)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Happy in Imagining</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dga’ ba pa (歡喜)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Happy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**References**

_Aṣṭāṅgahṛdaya-samaḥtī_, ed. A. M. Kunte et al.: _Aṣṭāṅgahṛdayasaṃhitā: A Compendium of the Ayurvedic System Composed by Vāgbhaṭa, With the Commentaries (Sarvāngasundārā) of Arunadatta and (Āyurvedarasāyana) of Hemādri_. Bombay 1939.

Chakraberty 1923  
C. Chakraberty, _An Interpretation of Ancient Hindu Medicine_. Calcutta 1923.

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68 In the first passage, this worm appears on the list in both the Chinese and the Tibetan, but it is described in neither.

69 In both the Tibetan and the Chinese, Happy and Imagining are considered as separate worms in the list, while in the description in the Tibetan translation, Happy in Imagining is clearly one worm. In the description in the Chinese, it is not clear whether they are one worm or two.
Worms in Saddharmaśṛtyupasthānasūtra


Dam pa’i chos dran pa nye bar gzhag pa Tibetan translation of Saddharmaśṛtyupasthānasūtra. D no. 287, ya 82a1–sha 229b7.

Dao di jing  Dao di jing 修行道地經. T 607 (XV).


Jietuodao lun  Jietuodao lun 解脫道論. T1648 (XXXII).


Mādhavanidāna  See: http://niimh.nic.in/ebooks/madhavanidana/?mod=read


Xiuxingdao di jing Xiuxingdao di jing 修行道地經. T606 (XV).


The Bhedābhedaparīkṣā (BAP) is the shortest treatise in the extant works ascribed to Jñānaśrīmitra that are included in the Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī (J). However, very little has so far been written on it, perhaps for the following reasons: first, no work relevant or connected to BAP can be found in the collection of the works of Jñānaśrīmitra’s disciple, Ratnakīrti, which would have made it much easier to get into the text and grasp its meaning. Second, BAP focuses exclusively on the contradictory character of bhedābhedapakṣa (the view of accepting both difference and nondifference), and the context of its content is unclear. This article aims to provide introductory remarks on BAP, propose an improved synopsis of its main claims, and present text-critical notes in advance of a critical edition under preparation on the topic based on key photographic material. It also expects to draw the attention of researchers to this enigmatic text.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Francesco Sferra for sharing with me the photo data of Sanskrit manuscripts of Jñānaśrīmitra’s works in Tucci’s collection and for allowing me to use them for preparing the present article.

Cf. Ratnakīrtinibandhāvalī (R), where there is no mention of BAP either. However, it is interesting to note that in his Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa, Ratnakīrti refutes bhedābhedapakṣa (the view of accepting both difference and nondifference) in terms of the relationship between ātman and cognition, as pointed out by Kyuma (2010: 108, n. 11). Cf. R 126,18–20: bhedābhedapakṣas tu dhikkāra eva, tasyaiva tadapeksāya bhedābhedaviruddhadharmādhyāsād ekatvānupapatteḥ. tataś ca yad bhinnam bhinnam evābhinnam cābhinnam iti naikasya bhedābhedau. In Mimaki (1976: 170–171), the passage is translated as follows: “L’opinion que [les connaissance sont] à la fois non-différentes et différentes [du Soi permanent] (bhedābheda-pakṣa), est une pure honte (dhik-kāra). Car du fait d’être le siège de natures incompatibles, différente et non-différente de “B”, il n’est pas possible que “A” soit unique. Donc, ce qui est différent est précisément différent, et ce qui n’est pas différent n’est pas différent; il n’y a pas deux [natures] différente et non-différente pour une [chose].”

1. Introductory remarks

Anantalal Thakur, the editor of J, summarizes the content of Bhedābhedarikṣā (BAP) succinctly as follows:

The Bhedābhedaparīkṣā is the shortest tract in this collection. It seems to deal with the relation subsisting between knowledge and its object. Some hold that each one of these is different from the other. While there are many to accept their fundamental identity. Now everyone of these positions has to face many objections. In order to avoid this, a third party presents the view of identity in difference with the hope that, in the mixed-view, identity will remove the objections against difference and vice-versa. But the author shows that instead of removing the objections, the mixed-view becomes the target of all the objections taken together.\(^2\)

Here Thakur assumes that the subject of BAP is “the relation subsisting between knowledge and its object.” However, such a relation is not explicitly mentioned in BAP although it may be related to bhedābheda-pakṣa. Kyuma (2004, 2010)\(^3\) has discussed the relationship between BAP and Jñānaśrīmitra’s other works, as well as the structure and content of BAP, offering different arguments, which are briefly outlined below:

(1) Thakur’s assumption that BAP is referred to in Jñānaśrīmitra’s Sākārasiddhi (SS) ought to be reconsidered (Kyuma 2004)

According to Thakur, a passage in SS’s sixth chapter refers to BAP; thus, BAP is older than SS. The colophon of SS explicitly mentions the name of its author, Jñānaśrīmitra; therefore, the authorship of BAP is also indirectly confirmed.\(^4\) However, the SS passage in question should be seen as part of SS’s own context, where difference and nondifference

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\(^3\) Cf. Kyuma 2004; 2010.
\(^4\) J Introduction: 10; 12, where Thakur draws attention to the underlined part of the following passage in the sixth chapter of SS (J 505,1–3) as the basis for his statement: tasmād avidyāśabdena vikalpa evābhīdhīyate, tayā nirmitam darśitam asad eva rūpaṃ bāhyam itty arthah. rūpaśūnyatayor hi bhedābhedanisedhaprastāvem uktam etad iti na dosah. (“Therefore, it is conceptual cognition that is denoted by the word avidyā (ignorance). It is meant that external matter, which is nothing but nonexistent, is constructed (and) shown by that (ignorance). Since this was said on the occasion of rejecting difference and nondifference between emptiness and matter, there is no fault.”). Cf. also Kyuma 2004: 111. Although Thakur regards SS as older than AP (cf. J Introduction: 12–13), the chronological order of SS, AP, and BAP is yet to be determined. For the methodological problems of Thakur’s chronology (including the possibility of the author’s rewriting), cf. Kyuma 2004: 121–122, n. 3; Kyuma 2005 (Einleitung): LXXII, fn. 57.
between emptiness (śūnyatā) and matter (rūpa) are being refuted, as stated in the previous paragraphs of the same sixth chapter.\(^5\)

(2) BAP is referred to in Jñānaśrīmitra’s *Apohaprakaraṇa* (AP) (Kyuma 2010)

It is reasonable to suppose that BAP is more closely related to AP, as suggested in the following sentence of AP (J 213,3): \textit{bhedābhedapakṣo 'pi kṣipto 'nyatra}.\(^6\) As Thakur rightly pointed out, the authorship of AP is well established. If we admit that BAP is mentioned in AP, the authorship of BAP will be endorsed as well.\(^7\) In addition, judging from the context of the passage to which the above sentence belongs, it is evident that \textit{bhedābhedapakṣa} here means “the view of accepting both difference and nondifference.”\(^8\) This leads to the assumption that the expression \textit{anyatra} refers to BAP and that the context of AP is tacitly presupposed in BAP.

Interestingly, this article reinterprets the meaning of \textit{bhedābhedapakṣa}, as will be shown in the synopsis, where terms such as “separate cognition” (prthagupalabdhi) and “application of another word” (śabdāntaravṛtti) are used. These terms are likely relevant to the Buddhist theory of meaning or semantics, *apohavāda*.

(3) Structural peculiarities of BAP (Kyuma 2004 and 2010)

Besides its length, the structure of BAP also gives the impression that this work is incomplete or unfinished. Two alternative meanings of the term \textit{bhedābhedapakṣa} are given at the beginning of the text: (i) “the gathering of both,” i.e., the view of accepting difference as well as nondifference (ubhayasamuccaya), and (ii) “the absence of both” (tadabhāva), which falls into several subalternatives. However, this second alternative meaning is not discussed in the text. Although it cannot be ruled out that, for some reason, a large lacuna may have been created in the process of

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\(^6\) For details of AP’s context to which this passage belongs, cf. Akamatsu 1983: 89; 220–221, n. 114; Ogawa 1981: 75–76; Kyuma 2010: 90–93; 107–108, n. 11. In McCrea/Patil 2010 too (not consulted by Kyuma 2010), this passage is interpreted as referring to BAP (ibid.: 157, n. 103) and translated as follows (ibid.: 68): “Likewise, the view of difference/nondifference is refuted elsewhere.” For the \textit{bhedābheda} relationship between the individual (vyakti) and the universal (sāmānya) advocated by the Bhāṭṭa school, cf. Takenaka 1972; 1980.

\(^7\) Cf. J Introduction: 10, where Thakur points out that Vādideva, the Jain author of the *Syādvādaratnākara*, and Ratnakīrti attribute their citations of AP to Jñānaśrīmitra.

\(^8\) Note that in this case, the relationship is between two universals, i.e., treeness (vṛkṣatva) and existence/nonexistence (sattva/asattva).
transmitting manuscripts, we should also consider the possibility that the gap was caused by Jñānaśrīmitra’s style of writing. In other words, BAP may have been composed as a brief essay rather than a complete and independent prakaraṇa.9

In this relation, we must draw attention to Prof. Birgit Kellner’s comment that Jñānaśrīmitra’s Anupalabdhirahasya and Sarvaśabdābhāvacarcā are both “unfinished works, as preparatory compositions” and “overlap to a considerable degree, to the extent that one wonders why they were not combined to form one uniform treatise.”10 The brevity and somewhat strange structure of BAP may also suggest that BAP was prepared as a supplementary work of AP.11

After reviewing the above observations, a final remark is worth mentioning regarding point (2). Prof. Kei Kataoka has mentioned the relationship between AP and Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā in his recent articles. He has shown that a quoted passage in AP, which Jñānaśrīmitra ascribes to kaumārīlas, is originally from Sucaritamiśra’s Kāśikā,12 indicating that, Jñānaśrīmitra refuted bhedābhedapakṣa in response to Sucaritamiśra, as shown above, in J 213,3. This will help justify the assumptions that BAP is related to the context of apohavāda and that AP and BAP are thus interrelated.

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9 One may assume that Jñānaśrīmitra did not find it necessary to deal with the second alternative, which could deviate from the subject of BAP itself (bhedābhedapakṣa).

10 Cf. Kellner 2007: 44. This issue is discussed in more detail in Kyuma 2010: 96; 110–111, n. 17.

11 Cf. J Introduction: 7, which runs as follows: “The Sarvaśabdābhāvacarcā may be held as an appendix to the Anupalabdhirahasya inasmuch as it discusses the scope of Kāryānupalabdhi (negation of an effect) to prove the non-existence of words in general.”

2. Synopsis of BAP

The following synopsis is an improved version of a previous one in Japanese.13

0.0. Purpose of the work: an examination of the view of accepting both difference and nondifference (bhedābhedapakṣa) (179,1–2)

0.1. Alternative meanings of this view (179,2–4):
<1> having the nature of the gathering of both (ubhayasamuccayasvabhāva)
<2> having the form of the absence of both (tadabhāvarūpa)14
<2-1> nothing but the negation of both (prasajyamātra)
<2-2> something else (bhāvāntara) suggested by force of exclusion (paryudāsavṛtti)
<2-2-1> the third thing opposed to the original subject (prakṛtapratyanīka)
<2-2-2> something irrelevant to the original subject (aprakṛta)

1. Examination of <1> (179,5–182,8)
1.1. Subalternatives for <1> (179,5–12)
<1-1> If each defect (doṣa) of difference and nondifference attaches to a certain thing (vastu), this view is useless because each defect cannot be rejected.
<1-2> If not, it is also useless because the thing will have no merit (guṇa).

1.2. Examination of <1-2> (179,13–180,10)
Hypothetical objection against <1-2> (179,13–15): both difference and nondifference have only their own merits, i.e., the negation of the nonapplication of another word (śabdāntarāvṛttinivṛtti) and the rejection of separate cognition (prthagupalabdhibādhā), respectively.

Answer to the objection (179,15–22): both difference and nondifference have their merits and their defects (i.e., the attribution of separate manifestation and the nonapplication of another word). The following alternatives can be offered to reject this objection:
<<1>> things can follow your intention.
<<2>> things can follow merits or refrain from defects by themselves.
<<3>> difference and nondifference, or their effects (i.e., merit and defect), exist at different points in time (in order/at random).

13 Cf. Kyuma 2004: 112–115. Several typographical errors of the page numbers in the original version are also corrected here.
14 Alternative <2> and its subalternatives are not discussed in the text.
1.2.1. Examination of <<1>>: things cannot follow your intention since they have no intelligence. (179,22–180,3)

1.2.2. Examination of <<2>>: this option is also impossible for the same reason given above. Even if things have intelligence, separate manifestation, application of another word, and other possible alternatives are neither merits nor defects of things themselves. (180,4–10)

1.2.3. Examination of <<3>> (180,11–27):

1.2.3.1. If difference and nondifference do not exist simultaneously, one cannot reject the other’s defect. (180,11–15)

1.2.3.2. If the merit and defect of difference occur successively, nondifference, the opposite of difference, will never come into existence. (180,15–27)

1.2.4. Conclusion of 1.2. (180,27–181,2)

1.2.5. Supplementary discussion on 1.2. (181,3–19)

1.2.5.1. The opponents’ view of accepting both difference and nondifference between the individual (vyakti) and the universal (sāmānya) is not tenable. (181,3–8)

1.2.5.2. It is meaningless to resort to both difference and nondifference. (181,8–12)

1.2.5.3. Even if the rejection of each defect is made alternately and successively (i.e., the defect of nondifference is rejected by difference and then the defect of difference by nondifference), it leads to the fact that both cannot function independently of each other. (181,12–19)

1.3. Conclusion of 1. (181,20–21)

1.4. Proof (prayoga) for establishing that the abovementioned fallacies are invariably attributed to the view of accepting both difference and nondifference. (181,22–182,8)

1.4.1. Presentation of the proof based on the essential property as a logical reason (svabhāvahetu): if X has only Y as its cause, X invariably exists when Y exists (= pervasion, vyāpti), just as cognition seems to require specific capacities such as the faculty of sight (= example, drṣṭānta). The abovementioned fallacies, in general, rest only on accepting both difference and nondifference as their cause, i.e., logical reason is a property of the subject, pakṣadharmatā. (181,22–23)

1.4.2. Establishment of pervasion through the cognition of what is
incompatible with a pervader (vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi) (181,24–26)

1.4.3. Rejection of the nonestablishment aspect (of a logical reason, asiddhatā) (181,26–182,8)

1.4.3.1. There is no nonestablishment understood as a logical fallacy because logical reason invariably exists in the subject of the thesis. (181,26–27)

1.4.3.2. Hypothetical objection (182,1–2): difference and nondifference are interdependent (as in the case of a burning iron ball and fire or milk and water). Answer to the objection (182,2–5): any cognition that does not discriminate between two different things is erroneous. However, this proof is also applicable to the case of a single effect that has two different causes.

1.4.3.3. Hypothetical objection (182,5–7): even if X is invariably dependent on Y, X does not always exist when Y exists. Answer to objection (182,7–8): there is no fault even in this case because X can be dependent not only on Y but also on other causes.

3. Text-critical notes on BAP

This article anticipates the preparation of a critical edition with an annotated translation based on the codex unicus, for which the following two sets of reproductions are available:

(1) film negatives of the Sāṅkṛtyāyana collection of the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitäts-bibliothek in Göttingen, No. Xc 14/25

(2) scans from film negatives of one of Giuseppe Tucci’s expeditions to Tibet

Possibly because of the conditions in which (2) was photographed, the left half of each page in (2) looks brighter and clearer than in (1), whereas the right half appears more blurred and obscure. Marginal corrections or additions visible in (1) are sometimes hidden under the edge of another page in (2). The following is a preliminary report of the ongoing editorial work, which is expected to help draw attention to this short yet perplexing piece of Jñānaśrīmitra.


16 Full details will be given in the text’s forthcoming edition.
**Editorial conventions**

[x] uncertain reading

{x} correction added in the margin or in the spaces between lines; sometimes additions are apparently made by a different hand

«x» deleted akṣara, struck out by the scribe

x deleted akṣara, marked by a small stroke found on the top of the akṣara

x⁰ akṣara without virāma

. partly illegible akṣara

* string hole

◊ space-filler

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| 180,1: guṇamātram arpayan dūṣaṇa- | 1b6: guṇamātram a«.pa»yan⁰ dūṣaṇa- | emended with J |
| 180,1: upaneṣyata | 1b6: upaleṣyata¹⁸ | emended with J |
| 180,2: kimātma- pramāṇānabhijñena | 1b6: same reading | kimātmapramāṇā- bhijñena (?)¹⁹ |
| 180,2: -parigrahaḥ kṛtaḥ | 1b6: -parigrahaḥ²⁰ kṛtaḥ | |
| 180,4: vaiṣamye 'nunayādiḥ | 1b6: vaiṣām anunayādiḥ | |
| 180,6: tadanuvṛtti- | 1b7: tvadanuvṛtti- | |
| 180,9: -parigraho 'graha eva | 2a1: -parigraho [yuka]{yukta} eva²¹ | -parigraho 'yukta eva |
| 180,12: tadā abhedaḥ | 2a1: tadā 'bhedaḥ tadbhedah | |
| 180,13: kāryāṇi na vihanyante | 2a1: kāryāṇi {na} vihanyante | |
| 180,15: tatkālakra- ryakālabhaḍaḥ | 2a2: tatkā{lakā} ryakālabhaḍaḥ | |
| 180,15: tatra bhedaḥ | 2a2: tatra bhedaḥ²² | |
| 180,16: -paniyatatā | 2a2: -paniyat«ā»atā | |

¹⁸ Under this word (at the bottom of the page), there is a marginal note, which looks like “no 7” in another script (perhaps Nepalese).

¹⁹ kimātmapramāṇānabhijñena seems to make sense (it would be better to analyze the compound into kimātma-pramāṇānabhijñena rather than kimātmapramāṇa- anabhijñena), but the wording kimātmapramāṇābhijñena (kimātmapramāṇābhijñena or kimātmapramāṇa-abhijñena) may have been originally used in a sarcastic sense.

²⁰ This visarga is inserted between ha and kr by adding one dot in the upper blank and another in the lower.

²¹ In the manuscript, this “graha” (in J) looks like “yuka (or yukta?)” without avagraha. The top margin is blurred and unclear but seems to have “yukta 1” written in it by a different hand.

²² This visarga is inserted in the lower blank between da and ša.
| 180,17: evaṃ nyāyavihasto hasta- | 2a2: same reading | evannyāyavihasto hasta-<sup>23</sup> |
| 180,18: [sa ca]<sup>24</sup> kasya | 2a2: ekasya |
| 180,19: bhavan tasyaiva | 2a3: bhavaṃs tasyaiva |
| 180,19: tatrāpi pratyekam | 2a3: tatrāpi kāryayoḥ pratyekam |
| 180,20: -pratibaddhatve | 2a3: -pratibaddhandhatve | emended with J |
| 180,21: prapātapatana- | 2a3: same reading | pratāpapatana- |
| 180,21: iṣṭakāmatā- | 2a3: istakāmatā- | emended with J |
| 180,22: upekṣām | 2a3-4: u◊(2a4) pekṣām |
| 180,22-23: yadā bhedasya | 2a4: same reading | yadābhedasya |
| 180,23: paścād | 2a4: pāaścād |
| 180,24: nivāryatām | 2a4: nivāryat[e]āṃ |
| 180,25: ity anavasthā (J<sub>1</sub>: itv anavasthā) | 2a4: ity anavasthā |
| 180,25: prāktanena | 2a4: prāktenena | emended with J |
| 180,25: etāvatī | 2a4-5: etā(2a5)tāvatī | emended with J |
| 181,1-2: prthak prati- | 2a5: prthak<sup>0</sup>prati- | prthakprati-<sup>25</sup> |

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<sup>23</sup> Although the wording *hastasamāracita* appears in J 376.8 (*hastasamāracita eva pratibhāti*), it is tempting to further emend *vihasto hastasamāracitam* to *vihastahastasamāracitam*.

<sup>24</sup> It is unclear what the square bracket refers to in “180,18: [sa ca] kasya” used in J.

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References


AP  Apohaprakaraṇa (Jñānaśrīmitra): see J 201–232.

BAP  Bhedābhedaparīkṣā (Jñānaśrīmitra): see J 179–182.


Kyuma 2010  T. Kyuma 久間泰賢, On the Bhedābhedaparīkṣā Ascribed to Jñānaśrīmitra (2) (Jñānaśrīmitra に帰せられる著作『不一不異の考察 (Bhedābhedaparīkṣā)』について(2)). Ronshū (論集) 14 (2010) 88–112.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SS</td>
<td><em>Sākārasiddhiśāstra</em> (Jñānaśrīmitra): see J 367–513.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Mandalas intertwined: Why minor goddesses in the Tabo Main Temple matter

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It has long been a desideratum of mine to identify the beautifully painted goddesses represented between the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala in the Assembly Hall of the Tabo Main Temple (Figure 1).¹ The life-size clay sculptures are distributed along all the walls of the Assembly Hall, and together with the four-fold Vairocana at the end of the hall—behind a more recently added altar—form the main subject of the temple, an assembly of the core deities of the Vajradhātumahāmāndala.² The painted goddesses take a prominent position between the halos of the clay sculptures. Often represented frontally and painted with considerable attention to detail, they are clearly different from—and more prominent than—usual groups of offering goddesses.³ However, there is no hint about these goddesses in either textual or visual sources on the Vajradhātu mandala and thus, their original meaning and function has long remained an enigma. This contribution can now resolve this enigma, offering a new interpretation for the iconographic programme of the Tabo Main Temple that can shed new light on how Buddhism was practised at the time.

I am pleased to dedicate this discovery to the memory of Helmut Krasser, who closely witnessed and at times edited, as a friend and with a sympathetic wink, my studies on the Tabo Main Temple through the 1990s and beyond.

¹ The main publications on the Tabo Main Temple referenced here are Klimburg-Salter, 1997, and van Ham, 2015, the latter contributing images only.
² The Vajradhātumahāmāndala, often referred to simply as the Vajradhātu mandala, is the main mandala of the Sarvatasthasattvasaṁgrahatantra (Compendium of Principles of all Tathāgatas Tantra), the principal source of the concept of five esoteric Buddhas.
³ As attractive paintings they feature in both publications: Klimburg-Salter, 1997, figs. 103, 104, and van Ham, 2015, 78–81, 84–85.

The Tabo Main Temple is the earliest Tibetan Buddhist monument which is largely preserved to this day. Much of its decoration was updated only forty-six years after its founding under the guidance of Jangchupö (byang chub 'od), most probably in the years before 1042. It was then that the clay sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala were added to the Assembly Hall and most of the murals in the Assembly Hall, Cella and Ambulatory were painted. Traces underneath this “renovation layer” indicate that what we have of the previous iconography was not substantially different, but we cannot be certain about this, in particular for the Assembly Hall. Only the Entry Hall remained unchanged, possibly because of the donor representations found there, which also show the renovators’ ancestors and the acting abbot at the time of the renovation. Further, the Hindu and pan-Indian deities also represented in this space still fitted the iconographic programme of the renovation.

That the sculptures and paintings of the renovation period are indeed a programme has already been shown in many ways, be it how the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala deities are distributed in the Assembly Hall in accordance with the two entrances, how the two narrative cycles below the sculptures visually reference each other and the main sculpture of Vairocana, or how the Buddhas of the Fortunate Aeon (bhadrakalpa)
are arranged in the Ambulatory.\textsuperscript{11} Clearly, a lot of reflection went into the arrangement of the sculptures and murals; one can read the entire temple as the progressive development towards buddhahood, with the Vajradhātu mandala in the Assembly Hall being its dynamic centre.\textsuperscript{12}

But there are also disjointed elements in this programme, such as the seemingly fragmentary Dharmadhātuvāgīśvara maṇḍala assembly represented on the west wall above the sculptures.\textsuperscript{13} Comprising only seventeen deities, the assembly represents a tiny fraction of the deities of this mandala, which usually has at least 125 deities inside three superimposed palaces, and this does not even include the outer circle of Hindu and pan-Indian deities, which brings the number of deities beyond 200. Until now, the question of why this mandala is so fragmentary has not been addressed.\textsuperscript{14} Of course, the main deity of a mandala can represent the entire assembly, but why is only a selection of deities from the central palace portrayed?

Since at Tabo, the mandalas are only represented in the form of their assembly of deities, the respective placement of these deities is flexible. Nonetheless, their interrelationship with regard to their placement needs to make sense. As the example I discuss below shows, it is not necessary for the deities of an assembly to be in direct spatial relation to each other. What is more, the same set of deities may even be shared between mandalas: they may be part of two different mandala assemblies that happen to include the same set of deities. The Dharmadhātu mandala of Tabo, it turns out, is actually spread throughout the monument and also shares deities with the Vajradhātu mandala, which is represented in sculpture. This reading not only enables most of the deities that have so far resisted identification to be identified, it also allows a re-evaluation of the temple’s programme as a whole.

\textsuperscript{11} See Luczanits, 1999, 163–177.

\textsuperscript{12} While this notion can be extracted from the above-cited publications, it is nowhere as fully demonstrated as in my public talks and teaching on the subject since 2004.

\textsuperscript{13} The Dharmadhātuvāgīśvara maṇḍala is referred to in the following as the Dharmadhātu mandala. The fragmented Dharmadhātu mandala assembly in Tabo is discussed in detail in Klimburg-Salter, 1999. For further images, see Klimburg-Salter, 1997, 113–119, figs. 113–115; van Ham, 2015, 146–148.

\textsuperscript{14} Klimburg-Salter, 1999, 305, simply refers to the Vajradhātu mandala as also being incomplete, but there, all deities of the central palace were represented in sculpture. The sixteen Bodhisattvas of the Fortunate Aeon that often are part of this mandala are found in the Ambulatory.
This reassessment is important, since the renovation phase in the Tabo Main Temple represents the earliest iconographic programme preserved in any Tibetan Buddhist monument. It thus offers a unique view of the adopting and adaptation of Buddhism in the mid-eleventh century, a view that is not reflected in such detail in the extant historical and religious texts. It also puts the ordinances of successive West Tibetan rulers who tried to regulate what type of Buddhism was to be practiced into a new perspective.\textsuperscript{15}

The goddesses

The clue for the new reading is provided by the goddesses portrayed between the mandala sculptures. An analysis of their iconography reveals that they actually belong to the assembly of the second palace of the Dharmadhātu mandala. This assembly is comprised of twelve goddesses personifying the accomplishments of a Bodhisattva in each cardinal direction. Their right hand attributes are those of the respective direction and the Buddha family; the left hand attributes identify the respective goddess. At Tabo, these goddesses are distributed all around the Assembly Hall. They are placed in their respective direction in alignment with the orientation of the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala assembly. In the following, I discuss some of the goddesses of each group individually, and list them with their iconographic details as far as they are today preserved at Tabo.

In the east are the personifications of the ten stages (bhūmi) in a Bodhisattva’s career complemented by an additional stage at the beginning and another at the end. The group begins with Adhimukticaryābhūmi (Figure 2), of red colour and holding a red lotus, represented to the right side of the protective goddesses above the entrance to the Assembly Hall. The eastern assembly thus begins at the entrance to the Assembly Hall and continues clockwise.\textsuperscript{16} The individual iconography of the goddesses conforms closely to the descriptions in the \textit{Dharmadhūtvāgīśvaramaṇjuśrīmaṇḍalavidhi}, which is used as the main textual source.\textsuperscript{17} For example, Acalābhūmi is described as white and

\textsuperscript{15} On the ordinances, see Karmay, 1980a; Karmay, 1980b.

\textsuperscript{16} The first seven deities of this group can be seen in van Ham, 2015, 69, the first and last one cut off at the sides.

\textsuperscript{17} The \textit{Dharmadhūtvāgīśvaramaṇjuśrīmaṇḍalavidhi} is contained in the Tengyur (bstan ‘gyur) of Beijing, Derge, Ganden, and Narthang. The same text is also titled \textit{Gaganāmalasupariśuddhadharmadhūtvājñānagarbha (nam mkha’ dri ma}
 Mandalas intertwined

holding a red five-pointed vajra on top of a white moon disk on a lotus, grasping the stalk of the lotus, and this is almost exactly the way she is depicted at Tabo (Figure 3). Most distinctive of the bhūmi goddesses are, however, the last two: Dharmameghābhūmi, whose book attribute is enveloped by a ‘dharma-cloud’ (Figure 4), and Buddhasamantaprabhā, whose attribute is an image of Buddha Amitābha on a lotus. The latter is no longer called a bhūmi and is possibly representing ultimate Buddhahood.

In the following table (Table 1) the bhūmi goddesses are listed in their succession in the text, which conforms to their positions in the Tabo Assembly Hall. The number provided indicates their occurrence in the descriptions of the mandala, and the iconographic details provided are those of the goddesses in the Tabo Assembly Hall. References to depictions of the goddesses are also included in this column.

Table 1: The twelve stage goddesses (bhūmi)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Goddess Name</th>
<th>Color/Attribute</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Adhimukticaryā-bhūmi</td>
<td>mos pas spyod pa’i sa</td>
<td>red; holding a red lotus (Figure 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Pramuditābhūmi</td>
<td>rab tu dga’ ba’i sa</td>
<td>red; holding a triple jewel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Vimalābhūmi</td>
<td>dri ma med pa’i sa</td>
<td>dark green with white shading; attribute not preserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Prabhākārībhūmi</td>
<td>‘od byed pa’i sa</td>
<td>red; holding multi-coloured lotus (van Ham, 2015, 78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Arciṣmatībhūmi</td>
<td>‘od ‘phro ba’i sa</td>
<td>green; with blue lily</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

med pa shin tu yongs su dag pa chos kyi dbyings kyi ve shes kyi snying po, a name also given to the mandala itself. I have used the ACIP edition of the Tengyur in comparison with the Beijing version. For the description in the Nispannayogāvalī, I used the edition of Chandra and Sharma, 2015, as a comparison, which is also the source for the Sanskrit names. It diverges occasionally from the Vidhi; Tabo usually sides with the latter. While the Vidhi likely predates the Tabo renovation, the Nispannayogāvalī is roughly contemporaneous with it.

18 The goddess is depicted in van Ham, 2015, 81.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Plane</th>
<th>Color/Feature</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Sudurjayābhūmi</td>
<td>yellow</td>
<td>holding a green jewel in the left hand resting on her lap (Figure 1; Klimburg-Salter, 1997, fig. 103; van Ham, 2015, 79 top)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Abhimukhībhūmi</td>
<td>orange</td>
<td>with red shading; book on a lotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Dūraṅgamābhūmi</td>
<td>blue</td>
<td>crossed vajra (viśvavajra) on a multicoloured lotus (van Ham, 2015, 80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Acalābhūmi</td>
<td>white</td>
<td>vajra in front of the moon disc on top of a white lotus (Figure 3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Sādhumatībhūmi</td>
<td>red</td>
<td>blue lily with sword (van Ham, 2015, 79 bottom)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Dharmameghābhūmi</td>
<td>light red</td>
<td>book enveloped by ‘dharma cloud’ (Figure 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Samantaprabhā</td>
<td>red</td>
<td>holding an image of Buddha on a lotus (van Ham, 2015, 81)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the southern quarter of the Dharmadhātu mandala are the personifications of a Bodhisattva’s perfections (pāramitā). Again the common list of ten perfections is expanded by two additional ones at both ends, the first being Ratnapadmapāramitā. At Tabo only a few of these goddesses are well preserved; the second half of the group, including Prajñāpāramitā, is lost entirely (Table 2). These were once located above the offering goddesses on the south side of the west wall. As an example for the pāramitā, I present an illustration of Vīryapāramitā, represented in the south-west corner; she is green and holds a blue lily (utpala) in her left hand (Figure 5). The last goddess of this group is Vajrakarmapāramitā, who signifies the perfection of esoteric practice.
### Table 2: Twelve perfection goddesses (*pāramitā*)

All of the *pāramitā* goddesses are two-armed, except for Prajñāpāramitā, who is described as four-armed but is not preserved at Tabo. They each hold a jewel in their right hands in different positions. Only their colour and distinguishing attribute in their left hand are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Goddess</th>
<th>Hand Position</th>
<th>Colour/Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Ratnapadmapāramitā</td>
<td>rin po che pad+ma’i pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>red; attribute not preserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Dānapāramitā</td>
<td>sbyin pa’i pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>bright red; attribute not recognisable from documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Śīlapāramitā</td>
<td>tshul khrims pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>white; hand held at side but attribute not recognisable from documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Kṣāntipāramitā</td>
<td>bzod pa’i pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>orange with red shading; holding a white lotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>54</td>
<td>Vīryapāramitā</td>
<td>brtson ‘grus kyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>green; with a blue lily (Figure 5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Dhyānapāramitā</td>
<td>bsam gtan gyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>blue; with a white lotus (van Ham, 2015, 85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Prajñāpāramitā</td>
<td>shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Upāyapāramitā</td>
<td>thabs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Praṇidhānapāramitā</td>
<td>smon lam gyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Balapāramitā</td>
<td>stobs kyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Jñānapāramitā</td>
<td>ye shes kyi pha rol tu phyin pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In the west are the personifications of the controls or powers (vaśitā) gained by a Bodhisattva. The first is Āyurvaśitā, who is red and holds an image of Buddha Amitābha on a lotus, which can faintly be recognised as having once been painted in front of a white disk (Figure 6). Together with the six following goddesses, she is represented immediately below the core deities of the Dharmadhātu mandala at the north end of the west wall. In the case of the vaśitā, the usual set of ten is expanded at the end by the goddesses Tathatā (suchness) and Buddhabodhi (Buddha’s awakening), both directly referencing Buddhahood (Table 3).

The beautifully preserved Jñānavaśitā, dark blue and holding a sword on top of a blue lily (Figure 7), is a good example of the stylistic differences between the goddesses on the south and north sides of the Assembly Hall. These differences suggest that two different groups of artists were at work. This is another indication that the Tabo programme was carefully preconceived and followed through. It also demonstrates that both styles were temporally very close to each other and belong to the renovation phase.

Table 3: Twelve control goddesses (vaśitā)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vaśitā</th>
<th>Left Hand Attribute</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Āyurvaśitā</td>
<td>tshe la dbang ba</td>
<td>red; only the outline of the Buddha can be recognised on a white disk, which is his halo, above a crude lotus (Figure 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Cittavaśitā</td>
<td>sems la dbang ba</td>
<td>white; hand in a vajra fist held in front of chest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>Parīśkaravaśitā</td>
<td>yo byad la dbang ba</td>
<td>red; holding a banner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19 These are the seven goddesses described in Klimburg-Salter, 1999, 303, as follows: “many are so crudely repainted that neither the original colour nor the original iconography can be distinguished”.
The north side is occupied by personifications of spells (dhāraṇī). Their iconographic details are surprisingly unrelated to other representations of these goddesses. A good example is Cundā, who is white and holds a red vase with a white garland hanging from it in her left hand (Figure 8). This is another good example of the Tabo depiction closely aligning with the text. Towards the end of the list below, the dhāraṇī goddesses personify increasingly abstract notions (Table 4). These stand for the esoteric accomplishments of the Bodhisattva and complement the other goddesses representing mainstream Mahāyāna concepts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Color/Attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Karmavaśitā</td>
<td>las la dbang ba green; attribute not preserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Upapattivaśitā</td>
<td>skye ba la dbang ba green; holding a twig</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Ŗddhivaśitā</td>
<td>rdzu ’phrul la dbang ba green; sun disk in front of the crescent of the moon disk on a white lotus (van Ham, 2015, 84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Adhimuktivaśitā</td>
<td>mos pa la dbang ba white; plant with large bud held by the stalk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Praṇidhānavaśitā</td>
<td>smon lam la dbang ba orange red; blue lily (utpala)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Jñānavaśitā</td>
<td>ye shes la dbang ba dark blue; sword standing on a blue lily (utpala) (Figure 7; Klimburg-Salter, 1997, fig. 104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>Dharmavaśitā</td>
<td>chos la dbang ba red; orange vase on lotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>Tathatā</td>
<td>de bzhin nyid ma lost (replaced by line drawing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Buddhabodhi</td>
<td>sans rgyas kyi byang chub ma lost (replaced by line drawing)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4: Twelve spell goddesses (*dhāraṇī*)

All of the *dhāraṇī* goddesses are two-armed and hold a crossed vajra (*viśvavajra*) in their right hands in different positions. Only their colour and distinguishing attributes in their left hands are listed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Spell Goddess</th>
<th>Colour and Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Sumatiḏhāraṇī</td>
<td>red; vajra fist at hip holding an ear of grain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Ratnolkinḏhāraṇī</td>
<td>red; with a banner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Uṣṇīṣavijayā-ṇaṁśvī ṛṇaṁśvī ṛṇaṁśvī ṛṇaṁśvī ṛṇaṁśvī</td>
<td>white; vase in the left hand on hip</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Mārīcīṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Parnāśabariṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>green; attribute not recognisable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Jāṅgulīṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>white; attribute not recognisable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Anantamukhīṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>green; vase on a lotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Cundāṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>white; red vase with a white garland hanging from it on one side held at the side of the hip (Figure 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Prajñāvardhanīṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>white; blue lily (<em>utpala</em>) with a sword standing on it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Sarvakarmāṇiṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>bright green; vajra on a white lotus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Aṣṭaḥṣaṇāṇiṇḍhāraṇī</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These forty-eight goddesses are spread throughout the Assembly Hall, beginning to the right of the entrance and ending to its left. The goddesses flanking the entrance are directed away from it with their backs towards each other. This is a hint that this is an overall composition, with each group commencing and ending near the middle of the respective walls. Thus, the bhūmi goddesses, nominally in the south, occupy the southeast corner of the Assembly Hall, the pāramitā, the southwest corner, the vaśitā, the northwest corner, and the dhāraṇī, the northeast corner. These directions align with the composition of the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala, whose deity families occupy the same corners (centre of Figure 9).

**Intertwined mandalas**

With the identification of the goddesses, the assembly of the Dharmadhātu mandala has expanded considerably, but many of the other deities cannot be found among the paintings. Most important among these are the sixteen Mahābodhisattvas surrounding the tathāgata in the mandala’s inner palace. The same group of Mahābodhisattvas, however, is also part of the Vajradhātu mandala; in the Tabo Assembly Hall this group is depicted in sculpture, with the goddesses of the second mandala palace of the Dharmadhātu mandala aligning with them (Figure 9). This indicates that this group is actually shared between the two mandalas, and that the Dharmadhātu mandala is represented in its entirety. In the following, this will be verified by surveying the entire Dharmadhātu mandala and identifying its deities within the Tabo Main Temple.

From among the core deities of the central palace, seventeen deities are represented in painting on the northern end of the west wall, above the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala. These are all the deities that differ between the central palaces of the Vajradhātu and the Dharmadhātu mandalas; those shared between the two are not represented in painting, as they are already present in form of the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala. Thus, of the thirty-seven deities of the Dharmadhātu mandala’s core assembly, twenty are represented through the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala, namely the sixteen Mahābodhisattvas and the four gate-keepers.
In Figure 9, I have numbered the deities in their succession—the Mahābodhisattvas following the respective Buddha—to demonstrate the arrangement of the deities of the Dharmadhātu mandala within the Assembly Hall. I have also coloured the halos to indicate the family they belong to. The assembly of the central palace comprises the deities numbered 1 to 37.

Here follow the goddesses discussed above from the assembly of the second palace of the Dharmadhātu mandala. As can be seen in Figure 9, their directions align with those of the Mahābodhisattvas of the same family and they number deities 38 to 85, distributed in clockwise succession around the Assembly Hall.

In addition, the second palace features an unusual set of four gatekeepers, namely the personifications of the four right cognitions (pratisaṃvid) of a bodhisattva. As can be seen from Table 5 below, these are iconographically close to the female forms of the regular gate-keepers and thus are not particularly distinctive. Nevertheless, they should be found in painting, since they are distinct from the gate-keepers in the Vajradhātu mandala.

Table 5: The four right cognition goddesses (pratisaṃvid)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dharma-pratisaṃvid</th>
<th>chos so so yang dag par rig pa</th>
<th>red; four-armed, with a goad and vajra in the right hands and anoose in the lower left hand, upper left not preserved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Arthapratisaṃvid</td>
<td>don so so yang dag par rig pa</td>
<td>lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nirukti-pratisaṃvid</td>
<td>nges pa’i tshig so so yang dag par rig pa</td>
<td>red; holds a chain with both hands in front of the chest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Pratibhāna-pratisaṃvid</td>
<td>spobs pa so so yang dag par rig pa</td>
<td>bright green; holds a bell with both hands in front of the chest</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, it turns out that the core group of deities of the Dharmadhātu mandala is actually expanded on both sides, but the additional deities are

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The numbering is the same as used in bSod nams rgya mtsho et al., 1991, with the exception that I count the four gate-keepers of the central palace as separate deities.
spatially separated from the others. One group of eight deities is found on the south end of the west wall, immediately to the side of the passage leading to the ambulatory, and thus in continuation of the core assembly. The other group is on the north end of the entry wall. On the inside of each group, namely, the side closer to the core assembly, are four goddesses; on the outside are four wrathful deities. All of these deities belong to the Dharmadhātu mandala, but their distribution only becomes clear through their iconographic details.

The pratisaṃvid goddesses are the four upper goddesses among these and are to be read from left to right (nos. 86–89 in Figure 9). Deviating from the text, Dharmapratisaṃvid is depicted with four arms and has a goad as one of her attributes (the upper left goddess in Figure 10). That her colour is red is a sign that she is not one of the common gate-keepers. Niruktipratisaṃvid and Pratibhānapratisaṃvid, in contrast, cannot be differentiated from generic Yoga Tantra gate-keeper goddesses, since their colour and attributes are the same (the upper left goddess in Figure 11).

The assembly of the second palace is concluded with the four inner offering goddesses beginning with Lāsyā. These are found among the sculptures of the Vajradhātu mandala and are again shared with it (nos. 90–93 in Figure 9).

The assembly in the third palace features at least thirty-two deities. The largest group among these is a group of sixteen Bodhisattvas that is distinct from those in the second palace of the Vajradhātu mandala. For neither of the two mandalas is this group depicted in the Assembly Hall, but two groups of sixteen Bodhisattvas are represented in the Ambulatory. While the new reading of the Dharmadhātu mandala now explains why there are two such groups, it does not help to identify the source of the Bodhisattvas’ iconography. Neither of the two groups conforms to the very detailed descriptions found in the Dharmadhātu vāgīśvaramaṇḍalavidhi, and at this stage I cannot say with certainty which of the two Bodhisattva groups belongs to which of the two mandalas. Nonetheless, one may assume that the lower ones belong to the Vajradhātu mandala and the upper ones, to the Dharmadhātu mandala, namely, deities nos. 94–109. One may further speculate that the Bodhisattva groups have been altered in relation to the texts to avoid

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21 While ten wrathful deities are described for this assembly, all early western Himalayan examples reviewed so far feature only eight, with those of the zenith and nadir not depicted.
overlap between them. Solving the puzzle of the identity and origin of these Bodhisattvas, however, is beyond the goal of this contribution.

The second largest group of this assembly are the ten wrathful deities occupying the gates and corners of the third palace. In all Tibetan versions surveyed so far, including the Tabo Assembly Hall, this group is reduced to eight deities, with the zenith and nadir protectors not represented. At Tabo, the eight protectors can be identified as part of the extension of the core deities to the side of the pratisamvīd goddesses. They are organised again in a clockwise direction, with the deity of the next intermediate direction situated above the one of the cardinal direction. Their iconographic details are listed below clockwise from the east (Table 6); in Figure 9 they are numbered 110–117.

Table 6: Eight wrathful deities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>Yamāntaka</td>
<td>gshin rje gshed, dark grey; six-headed, three above three; only the upper left arm holding a bow preserved</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Vajrajvalānalārka</td>
<td>rdo rje me ltar ‘bar ba, black; four heads and eight arms; all heads black and wrathful; sword and tantric staff (khatvāṅga), vajra and bell, wheel and noose, arrow and bow (Klimburg-Salter, 1997, fig. 111)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Prajñāntaka</td>
<td>shes rab mthar byed, red; four heads; only the upper four arms preserved, main ones holding a sword and goad, noose and bell; a bow and arrow are visible as well</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Van Ham, 2015, 150, depicts the remains of deities 110 to 113, but the identifications provided there are guesswork.
| 113 | Herukavajra | rdo rje khrag ‘thung | blue; four heads and eight arms; all heads blue and wrathful; black elephant skin held above head with two arms; vajra and skull-cup (kapāla); second skull-cup and tantric staff (khaṭvāṅga), arrow and bow; standing, with left leg stretched on red Brahmā and consort |
| 114 | Padmāntaka | pad+ma mthar byed | red; four heads and eight arms; all heads wrathful, with side ones blue, (top lost) and white; iron shackles in both hands in front of chest, vajra fist and bow, arrow and bell (?), gesture only), sword and noose; dancing on left leg |
| 115 | Paramāśva | rta mchog | green on yellow ground; four heads, eight arms and four legs; side heads blue, green horse head (top) and red; main arms sword and ?, vajra and bow, arrow and lotus, flag and club; two legs couching, two stretched; standing on six figures |
| 116 | Vighnāntaka | bgegs mthar byed | blue; four-headed and eight-armed; side heads white, red (top) and white, all but the last wrathful; main hands hold bell in front of the chest, sword and bow, arrow and bell, goad and noose; standing with left leg stretched on red Gaṇapati |
The iconography of these wrathful deities conforms to the descriptions, with minor deviations in how the attributes are paired. As an example I reproduce the group on the east wall, which has been damaged considerably by over-cleaning and sloppy repairs (Figure 12).\(^\text{23}\) They contain the western and northern deities of this group, that is, the red Padmāntaka, the green Paramāśva, the dark blue Vighnāntaka, and the bright blue Trailokyavijaya. As a minor inconsistency, this group of deities looks away from the centre of the Dharmadhātu mandala, and thus they do not reference it visually.

The remaining eight deities of the third assembly are again goddesses, of which four are distinctive to the Dharmadhātu mandala. The first group is also described as occupying the corners of this palace and conforms to the outer offering goddesses that are also part of the Vajradhātu mandala. In the Tabo Assembly Hall these goddesses are again shared (nos. 118–121 in Figure 9).

Finally, the gates of the third palace are additionally occupied by four goddesses personifying objects pleasing the senses, namely, form, sound, smell and taste. In the Tabo Assembly Hall they are represented directly underneath the four distinct goddesses of the second palace (nos. 86–89). The iconographic details of this last group are listed in Table 7 below; the deities are numbered 122–125 in Figure 9.

Table 7: Four goddesses pleasing the senses

<p>| | | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Vajrarūpā</td>
<td>rdo rje gzugs ma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>Vajraśabdā</td>
<td>rdo rje sgra ma</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{23}\) The same group is published in black-and-white in Klimburg-Salter, 1997, fig. 118.
Thus, once the Vajradhātu mandala and the Dharmadhātu mandala are read as being intertwined, all 125 deities of the three palaces of the Dharmadhātu mandala can be identified in the Tabo Main Temple, with all but the sixteen Bodhisattvas represented in the Assembly Hall itself. The dislocation of these Bodhisattvas into the Ambulatory is programmatic, since the Hindu and pan-Indian deities that occupy the outer circle of the Dharmadhātu mandala have also been dislocated and are found in the Entry Hall. Their representation can be seen as complementing the two mandalas in the Assembly Hall, but it is the Dharmadhātu mandala that has them fully integrated into its description. Were they not painted during the foundation period, this mandala would also explain the large number of figures—more than seventy deities—and their diversity. Does this mean that a Dharmadhātu mandala was part of the original programme? Not necessarily, since not only the Dharmadhātu mandala could explain them, but also the Sarvavid Vairocana mandala of the Sarvadurgatipariśodhanatantra. Indeed, in my opinion, the latter is a more likely candidate for the original late tenth-century programme of the Tabo Assembly Hall, since it aligns better with the Cella sculptures.\(^{24}\)

There is a striking discrepancy between the close link between all the Assembly Hall representations and the textual descriptions, and the divergence of those in the Entry Hall and the Ambulatory. For the Bodhisattvas, this signals that their individual descriptions were considered less important than their alignment and association with the Bodhisattvas of the Fortunate Aeon (bhadrakalpa) of the Vajradhātu mandala. In some commentaries, it is these which are coloured according to their directional affiliation, as is found in Tabo. However that may be, more work is needed to get to the root of the representations of the Bodhisattvas in the Ambulatory and their respective association with the two mandalas in the Assembly Hall.\(^{25}\)

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24 The deities in the Entry Hall would deserve a new study in this light. So far they have been discussed only rudimentarily, most importantly in Klimburg-Salter, 1997, 77–89.

25 The names given to the Bodhisattvas in their captions (see Luczanits, 1999, 147–159) have not helped to identify the sources; a new identification attempt would
The discrepancy with the deities of the fourth assembly of the Dharma-dhātu mandala, which is represented outside the mandala palace, can conveniently be explained by the temporal gap between these depictions and the mandalas of the Assembly Hall. But their preservation also means that they were not considered obsolete when the rest of the main temple was renovated. Independent of this, these deities are generally associated more loosely with the mandala, as is proven by the fact that the assembly in this circle could be expanded as was deemed necessary.26

**Double meaning**

Realising that actually two mandalas are represented in the Assembly Hall, these sharing most of the deities represented in sculpture, changes the perception of the temple considerably. It may also explain the temple’s refurbishing only forty-six years after it was founded. Clearly, the Dharmadhātuvāgīśvaramaṇjuśrī mandala is much more than just a secondary theme, as has been previously thought.27 Given the number of deities involved and their dispersal throughout the temple, with many of them above the Vajradhātu mandala sculptures, one may even take this as the ‘secret’ main theme of the temple.

If this reading is correct, the temple’s programme is much less conservative than it appears at first glance. Even though the Dharmadhātu mandala still counts among the Yoga Tantra mandalas, it is the most progressive and inclusive one. It is progressive because it includes consorts for four of the five Buddhas, just as postulated by the *Guhyasamājatantra*, whose main deities were represented contemporaneously at Radni.28 It is inclusive because this mandala incorporates the entire Bodhisattva career from different perspectives, including an esoteric conception through the integration of the *dhāraṇī*. It is likely that these aspects led to this mandala’s prominence in early western Himalayan monuments in general, where it is usually the second most important subject and the

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26 The *Vidhi*, for example, mentions additional unspecified assemblies several times, and also that other deities not mentioned in the text can be added if deemed appropriate.

27 Klimburg-Salter, 1999, 316, for example, states: “although it is adjacent to the Mahavairocarana image, it has a clearly subsidiary position to the Vajradhātu-mandala which is the main iconographic theme of the temple.”

28 On Radni, see Tshe ring rgyal po, 2006; Zhang Changhong 张长虹, 2010.
topic represented on the left wall of these monuments, thus to the proper right of the main wall or niche containing the main subject.\textsuperscript{29}

In the iconographic programme of the Tabo Main Temple, which goes back to its refurbishment around 1040 CE, the more obviously esoteric deities with their multiple heads and arms are placed in the less visible areas above the sculptures in the Assembly Hall.\textsuperscript{30} This study has shown that almost all of them are part of the assembly of the Dharmadhātu mandala, and despite their position are much more integrated into the temple’s programme than previously recognised. The deities of the Dharmadhātu mandala are also easy to evoke ritually, since the two mandalas converge at the level of the clay sculptures. One must only visualise the transformation of the five main Buddhas into their more esoteric Dharmadhātu form in order to literally sit among the Dharmadhātu deities in the same way one can sit among the Vajradhātu deities.

Functionally, both mandalas are the dynamic centre of the Tabo Main Temple, vertically connecting the themes of the Assembly Hall (Figure 13). The arrangement thereby emphasises the connection of the conventional and the esoteric path of a Bodhisattva, just as the Dharmadhātu mandala does, and hints at the Bodhisattva’s final awakening in the presence of the Buddhas of the Ten Directions.

There is also a progression from the Entry Hall towards the Cella surrounded by the Ambulatory; this progression is best expressed as a triad of ground, path and result (Figure 13). The two mandalas can be interpreted as facilitating this progression, even more so since parts of their respective assemblies are represented in all of the temple’s spaces. Thereby, the fully achieved Bodhisattvas of the Fortunate Aeon, attending the Buddhas in the Cella and Ambulatory, can be read as being a result of this progression. Their importance in the temple thus supersedes their role in the mandalas, which explains why representing the same Bodhisattva twice in this space has been avoided.

It is the Dharmadhātu mandala that brings all the themes depicted in the Tabo Main Temple together. Nonetheless, still too little is known to fully understand this integration or its relationship to the Vajradhātu. In the absence of any contemporaneous commentary, a better understanding of

\textsuperscript{29} This is the case in the Nako Lotsawa Lhakhang, the Alchi Dukhang, and the Main Temple of Sunda Chung. In one Dunkar cave it occupies the ceiling and thus is a main theme; in another, it is in third position, with the Guhyasamāja depicted on the main wall and the Vajradhātu mandala on the left wall. Descriptions of the iconographic programmes of all these monuments are found in Luczanits, 2004.

the Dharmadhātu mandala can only be gained through the careful study of the *Dharmadhātuvāgīśvaramaṇīṣuśrīmaṇḍalavidhi* and the commentaries on the *Maṇīṣuśrīnāmasaṃgīti* (*Litany of Names of Maṇīṣuśrī*), which is commonly referred to as a source for the Dharmadhātu mandala, although the mandala is not described therein. Later Tibetan commentaries may also be of use, since the Tabo representation documents a form of the Dharmadhātu mandala as it became distinctive in the Tibetan tradition, namely, differing from the *Niṣpannayogāvalī* description in its containing only eight of the ten guardians of the directions.

The intertwining of two mandalas in this way is rare. The only other example I am aware of is a painting in the Vajrāvalī set commissioned and planned by Ngørchen Künga Zangpo (ngor chen kun dga’ bzang po; 1382–1456) in the memory of his teacher Sabzang Phagpa Zhönnu Lodro (sa bzang ‘phags pa gzhon nu blo gros; 1346–1412), today in the Rubin Museum of Art. In this painting, the core deities of the Vajrādhātu mandala are shared by a Sarvavid Vairocana mandala, which is implied by an additional assembly around the four main mandalas and identified with the Pratyekabuddhas in the upper left corner (Figure 14). In this case, the eight-armed Vairocana of the Vajrādhātu also stands for Sarvavid Vairocana, even though their iconography differs considerably. It is to be expected that other paintings in this set contain similar intertwined mandalas.

What is shared between the Tabo Main Temple and the Ngør Vajrāvalī painting is that their arrangement is extremely sophisticated and the work of an erudite scholar. While we know who planned the Ngør mandalas, the Tabo renovation inscription only mentions lhatsunpa Jangchupö (*lha btsun pa byang chub ‘od*) as the initiator of the renovation. Of course, one would rather ascribe the programme to the erudition of Rinchen Zangpo, but if this were the case, one would expect him to be mentioned.

We can now be sure that no detail of the temple’s renovation was left to chance. The clue to this new understanding was provided by the

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32 For a more comprehensive graphic representation of the mandalas on this painting see http://rubinmuseum.org/education/ > “Four Mandalas of the Vajravali Cycle”.

33 It is common in Tibetan depictions for the esoteric Buddha of the Vajrādhātu mandala to replace the respective Buddha of the Sarvavid Vairocana mandala (see Luczanits, 2011, 47–50).
goddesses between the Vajradhātu mandala sculpture and their respective placements, allowing the Dharmadhātu mandala to be deciphered as the second major theme of the temple. Minor goddesses thus do matter, even if this is not apparent from the outset. The sophistication of the Tabo Main Temple continues to surprise, and future revelations will no doubt contribute to demonstrate this further.

Figures

Figure 1: Sudurjayābhūmi; Tabo Assembly Hall, east wall, south side; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 585), WHAV.
Figure 2: Adhimukticaryābhūmi; Tabo Assembly Hall, east wall, south side; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 572), WHAV.

Figure 3: Acalabhūmi; Tabo Assembly Hall, south wall, east side; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 484), WHAV.
Figure 4: Dharmameghābhūmi; Tabo Assembly Hall, south wall, east side; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 491), WHAV.

Figure 5: Vīryapāramitā; Tabo Assembly Hall, south wall, west corner; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 132), WHAV.
Figure 6: Āyurvaśitā; Tabo Assembly Hall, west wall, north side; photo C. Luczanits 1991 (33,23), WHAV.

Figure 7: Jñānavaśitā; Tabo Assembly Hall, north wall, west side; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 530), WHAV.
Figure 8: Cundādhāraṇī; Tabo Assembly Hall, east wall, north corner; photo J. Poncar 1984 (no. 530), WHAV.
Figure 9: Arrangement of the Dharmadhātu mandala deities in the Assembly Hall; the deities are coloured according to family association and numbered in sequence; graphic C. Luczanits 2018.
Figure 10: Four goddesses on the south side of the west wall; Tabo Assembly Hall; photo C. Luczanits 1994 (86,13), WHAV.

Figure 11: Four goddesses in the north corner of the east wall; Tabo Assembly Hall; photo C. Luczanits 1991 (20,33a), WHAV.
Figure 12: Four of the eight wrathful deities occupying the gates and corners of the Dharmadhātu mandala; Tabo Assembly Hall, east wall, north side; photo C. Luczanits 1991 (20,35a), WHAV.
Mandalas intertwined

Figure 13: Programme of the Tabo Main Temple; graphic C. Luczanits 2018.
Figure 14: Additional assembly of Sarvavid Vairocana mandala sharing a core of deities with the Vajradhātu Mandala; Mandalas of the Vajrāvalī cycle commissioned by Ngorchen Künga Zangpo (1382–1456) around 1429; 81.92 x 73.66 cm; Rubin Museum of Art, C2007.6.1 (HAR 81827); graphic C. Luczanits 2018.
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Karmay 1980b

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Klimburg-Salter 1999
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Details</th>
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’Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s momentariness of unconditioned buddhahood

Klaus-Dieter Mathes
University of Vienna

πάντα ῥεῖ
All flows.
– Heraclitus

With this short but striking statement by Heraclitus, I would like to commemorate my good friend and colleague Helmut, who left us much too early. In honor of Helmut’s enormous contribution to the field of Buddhist philosophy, I offer here some observations by a fifteenth century Tibetan master on the ultimate category of buddhahood (buddhatva), which, alas, it would seem, cannot be considered as an exception to the rule that all flows.

In Buddhism, it is commonly accepted that apart from a few unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) categories such as space (ākāśa), cessation without analysis (apratisamkhyañirodha), cessation due to analysis (pratisamkhyañirodha), and suchness (tathatā),1 all factors of existence are conditioned and thus momentary.2 The Ratnagotravibhāga extended this list of unconditioned factors (asaṃskṛtadharma) to include, besides its central concept of buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha), buddhahood (buddhatva). Most strands of the Ratnagotravibhāga suggest that buddha nature, buddha element (buddhadhātu) and dharmakāya (i.e., buddhahood) are ontologically identical, the dharmakāya being called buddha nature when still covered by adventitious stains.3 It goes without saying that most Buddhists were skeptical about the possibility of such a positively described, unconditioned ultimate, and in this light, ’Gos

1 According to Vasubandhu’s Pañcaskandhaka (Frauwallner 2010: 124). Suchness is not accepted by the Sarvāstivādin (ibid. 125), but in Mahāyāna texts, such as the Ratnagotravibhāga, the list was extended by what were considered synonyms of suchness, such as tathāgatagarbha and dharmakāya (see below).
3 See Mathes 2008: 8, 80.

Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392–1481) attempt to read momentariness into unconditioned buddhahood must be seen as a strategy to integrate the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the related Tathāgatagarbhasūtras into mainstream Buddhism.

The concept of an unconditioned buddhahood raises the question of whether or not it is identical with buddha nature, from which it emerges. For gZhon nu dpal, buddhahood is a dynamic principle, in which the seeds of buddha nature’s qualities have naturally blossomed once the hindering adventitious stains present in ordinary sentient beings are removed. But how can something that belongs to the category of *asamṣkṛta-dharmas* be seen as arising from seeds, even if it is only a natural blossoming? The solution gZhon nu dpal offers is that unconditioned buddha nature continues in a beginningless series of moments of the subtle seeds of buddha qualities. In other words, buddha nature is not truly unconditioned, but only not conditioned by adventitious stains. This is clear from gZhon nu dpal’s extensive commentary on *Ratnagotravibhāga*, verse I.5, in which he explains buddhahood in terms of buddha nature:

> With “unconditioned” it is taught that buddha nature is not artificially (Tib. *'phral du*) conditioned by adventitious causes and conditions but rather is permanent in the sense that it has forever been contained in its own sphere.  

The point here is that gZhon nu dpal attributes to a positively described ultimate, i.e., buddha nature, the two contradictory attributes of being unconditioned and momentary. In doing so, he tries to find a compromise between the buddha nature doctrine of a primordial buddha within and the momentariness of entities, which has become a Buddhist axiom at least by the time of Dharmakīrti. Buddha nature thus continues

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4 For gZhon nu dpal, the naturally blossoming qualities belong to the ultimate *kāya* (i.e., the *svābhāvikakāya*) and are referred to as qualities of separation, which naturally emerge from the naturally present potential. The latter is distinguished from the fortified potential, from which the qualities of maturation, the qualities of the form *kāyas*, arise. The fortified potential is acquired with effort and thus conditioned. See Mathes 2008: 12–13, 317.

5 *RGVV* 7.14-15: “Buddhahood is unconditioned, without effort, not realized through the help of others, and endowed with wisdom, compassion, and power. It has two benefits.”  

6 *DRSM* 83.11-12: *de yang ’dus ma byas pas ni de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po glo bur ba’i rgyu dang rkyen gyis ’phral du ’dus byas ma yin gyi | thog ma med pa’i dus nas rang ngang gis rjes su zhugs pa’i rtag pa yin par bstan la*  

7 Dharmakīrti developed the proof from existence (*sattvānumāna*) that derives the
as the natural luminosity of mind\(^8\) in a series of moments, each being conditioned by its preceding moment, but not by artificial causes. The influence Dharmakīrti exercised on gZhon nu dpal can be seen from his reference to Pramāṇavārttika, verse I.7,\(^9\) when he explains buddha nature as the complete causal complex for buddhahood.

Dharmakīrti claims that the fruit does not necessarily arise from its causal complex, because hindrances may still occur before the causal complex turns into its fruit.\(^10\) If we apply this to the Ratnagotravibhāga, buddha nature becomes a part of the causal complex and buddhahood, the fruit, with the consequence that both of them are subject to momentariness. This is, in fact, what gZhon nu dpal maintains. The removal of adventitious stains does not automatically disclose something pre-established, but enables the dynamic process of a causal complex to turn into its fruit. Interestingly, this causal complex includes the assisting cleansing properties (viśuddhiguna) of already transformed mind streams (i.e., assisting fully awakened Buddhas). This matrix of buddha natures and Buddhas constitutes a svabhāva,\(^11\) but only Dharmakīrti’s svabhāva\(^C\),\(^12\) which is here the concept or essential property of the causal complex.\(^13\) Excluded from that causal complex are all the artificial (Tib. 'phral) causes of the adventitious stains. As we have seen above, it is only this exclusion that is intended by unconditioned buddha nature or buddhahood. gZhon nu dpal’s analysis thus profits from Dharmakīrti’s embracing two levels of svabhāva. As part of the concept (svabhāva\(^C\)) of the complete causal complex, buddha nature is momentary, but as a true nature (svabhāva\(^N\)) that is independent of incidental stains, it can be still described as unconditioned in a particular sense.

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\(^8\) Mathes 2008: 139.

\(^9\) PV I.7 (ed. Gnoli 1960: 624.25): “The arising of the fruit (i.e., effect), [a process] which is inferred from the complete cause [as a logical reason], is described as the ‘nature’ (svabhāva) [of this cause], since [the arising of the effect] does not depend on other things.” (hetunā yah samagreṇa kāryotpādo 'numīyate | arthāntarānapakeśatvāt sa svabhāvo 'nuvarṇitāh ||). The numbering follows Steinkellner’s (1977) verse index.


\(^12\) For the usage of svabhāva\(^C\) and svabhāva\(^N\), see Steinkellner 2013, vol. 1, xxxv–xxxvi.

\(^13\) It should be noted that for Dharmakīrti, a svabhāva of the causal complex does not even really exist, because it cannot be a homogeneous reality (Steinkellner 1971: 186).
To exempt buddha nature or the luminosity of mind from the rule that only something conditioned is momentary can be traced back to a source of late Indian Buddhism. In an interlinear note (by a second hand?) on verse 28 in Sajjana’s *Mahāyānottaratantraśāstropadeśa* we find:

… the luminous mind (*prabhāsvaram cittaṃ*) is not conditioned, because [in the luminous mind] there is nothing to be done through causes and conditions coming together. This is based on the fact that the origination of the [luminous] mind in the following moment depends on [the mind] that was generated by its (i.e., the mind’s) own kind (*sajāti*) in the previous moment.15

The natural luminosity of mind continues as the mind stream’s primordial capacity of self-awareness—a quality any mental factor naturally has—without depending on external conditions. gZhon nu dpal opines that this luminosity contains the subtle seeds of buddha qualities, and compares them to subtle grains of rice continuing to exist in empty space after the dissolution of the old universe and becoming the cause of gross rice grains in the new universe. This enables the continued existence of seeds even at times when there is no universe (*pralaya*). In order to show that seeds are beginningless, gZhon nu dpal refers to Āryadeva’s *Catuḥśataka*, verse 8.2516:

Just as the end that is a seed (i.e., the seed as an end product) is seen
But its beginning is not found,
So too arising does not occur,
Since [any possible] cause [of it would be] incomplete.17

gZhon nu dpal also quotes Candrakīrti’s commentary on this verse:

Just as [the end stage of] the beginningless continuum of a seed which endures since a long time as cause and fruit, one following the other, is seen....18

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14 A Kashmiri *pandita* from the 11th century who figures prominently in the transmission of the Maitreya texts in India and thus indirectly influenced later Bka’ brgyud masters.

15 … *na ca prabhāsvaram cittaṃ saṃskṛtam, pūrvasajātimātraprasavāpekṣatvād uttarasamvitprasūtāḥ, samhatya hetupratyayair akaraṇāt*. (see Kano 2016: 227).

16 First quoted and translated in Mathes 2008: 335–36.

17 *CŚ* 86,13-14: *yathā bijasya drṣṭo ’nto na cādīs tasya vidyate | yathā kāraṇavāikalyāj janmano ’pi na sambhavah [ |]. For the Tibetan, Sanskrit and English, see Lang 1986: 86–7. The last line summarizes the Mādhyaṃkā’s opinion that arising from self, other, etc., is impossible. This, it seems, supports the beginninglessness of the seed.

18 *BYCŚT* 154,17-18: *yathā nāma ciraśālapravṛttasyāsyā hetuphalaparamparayā prayātmanānāsyā bijasantānasyaśānātimo ’nto drṣṭo ....*
Based on these quotations, gZhon nu dpal concludes:

Likewise, the continuum of a grain of rice must exist in a subtle way in empty space, which is apt to form again [another] world, after the [former] world has vanished. For were it not so, [its] continuity would be impossible. Likewise, [too,] it is the subtle seed of the stage of purification that I posit to be [buddha] nature. As to the coarse seed, I take it to be the fortified [bodhisattva] potential, which is made by that same the subtle [seed] inasmuch as it has become the root of conditioned virtue.

It should be noted that in contrast to gZhon nu dpal, rGyal tshab rje (1364–1432) only takes the fortified potential to be the substantial cause of buddha qualities, denying their primordial existence altogether. To be sure, this position involves denying emptiness or suchness the status of a substantial cause.

While gZhon nu dpal accepts that this applies in the case of the buddha qualities of the form kāyas (i.e., the qualities of maturation), he recognizes the primordial existence of the buddha qualities of the dharmakāya (i.e., the qualities of separation) on the grounds that they do not depend on a newly attained substantial cause for their abiding nature. It is possible that gZhon nu dpal derived the idea that these qualities of separation exist as subtle seeds in space, or emptiness for that matter, from Ratnapratisthāna, verse I.52, where the buddha element (buddhadhātu), a

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19 In this genre of literature, the short form snying po is often used for de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po.

20 The form kāyas of a Buddha and thus their qualities are obtained from the fortified potential, which is normally explained as the accumulation of merit. See Mathes 2008: 12–13.

21 DRSM 120, zhes ’byung ba ltar ’bras kyi ’bru’i rgyun ’di yang ’jig rten zhi gnas stongs pa’i nam mkha’ slar yang ’jig rten chags su rung ba de la phra ba’i tshul gyis yod par bya Qgs te | de lta ma yin na rgyun mi ’chad pa nyid mi rung ba’i phyir ro | de bzhin du rnam par bya’i phyogs kyi sa bon phra ba ni snying po la bzhag la | rags pa’i sa bon ni phra ba de nyid ’dus byas kyi dge ba’i rtsa bar gyur pas byas pa’i rgyas pa’i rigs la ’dod do | DRSM 509, The qualities of the dharmakāya are called the “fruit of separation.” They are like the spreading appearance of the light of a lamp [located in a vase] when the vase is broken, since that which abides primordially and without depending on a newly created substantial cause for them (i.e., the qualities), appears directly and blossoms merely by becoming free from hindrances (yang chos kyi sku’i yon tan rnam la ni bral ba’i bras bu zhes bya ste | de’i nye bar len pa gsar du sgrub pa la mi ltos par thog ma nyid nas gnas pa de sgrub pa dang bral ba tsam gyis mngon sum du snang zhing rgyas par gyur pa’i phyir bum pa bcag na mar me’i ’od rgya chen por snang ba bzhin no |).
synonym for buddha nature, is compared to space that remains pure because of its subtle nature, even though it reaches everywhere in the universe.

In order to make his model work, gZhon nu dpal needs to attribute momentariness not only to space-like buddha nature, but to space itself. This is precisely what he does in his introduction to the second chapter of his Ratnagotravibhāga commentary. Its central topic of fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti) is elaborated along the lines of the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga. Both texts refer to a positively described ultimate, which is revealed by removing adventitious stains. Whereas in the Ratnagotravibhāga this ultimate is buddha nature, it is the dharmatā of natural luminosity in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāga. In his commentary, the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti, Vasubandhu compares this dharmatā of luminosity to primordially pure space, gold, and water. The way gZhon nu dpal interprets these three examples in his commentary on RGV I.12, deserves special attention: space, gold, and water are taken to illustrate the natural luminosity of mind as being a “continuing in a continuum [of moments].” With the last example, however, Vasubandhu explains that the clarity of formerly muddy water does not newly occur in the substance, water, which is a “continuing in a continuum [of moments]” (Tib. rgyun gyis ’jug pa), and this predication cannot be applied automatically to all three examples. To make his point, Vasubandhu distinguishes space from both gold and water:

Since that (i.e., real change) does not exist, the true nature of phenomena (dharmatā) and the fundamental transformation, which is constituted by it, are permanent. Here, with the examples of gold and water, only a quality [of the example] was taught to be equivalent [to the transformation], [but] not [its] substance. With the example of space it (i.e., the transformation) was taught completely.

The most natural take on this quote is that only unconditioned space

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24 In the Ratnagotravibhāga’s chapter on tathāgatagarbha, the latter term is often referred to as dhātu (meaning buddhadhātu).

25 RGVV 426.7: “Just as all-pervading space is not defiled, in virtue of its subtle nature, so neither is this [buddha nature] defiled, which is found everywhere in sentient beings.” (yathā sarvagatam sauksamyād ākāśam nopalipyate | sarvatrāvasthitah sattve tathāyaṃ nopalipyate |). I thank Kazuo Kano for this observation.

26 DhDhVV 706-8: | de med pas ni chos nyid dang | des rab tu phyed ba’i gnas yongs su gyur pa rtag pa yin no | ’dir ṣer dang chu’i dpes ni rdzas la ma ltos par yon tan tsam chos mthun par bstan pa yin la | nam mkha’i dpes ni thams cad bstan pā yin no |
"Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s momentariness of unconditioned buddhahood

qualifies as a fully valid example for dharmatā, as gold and water are substances that continue in chains of momentary factors of existence. gZhon nu dpal, however, wants us to understand the permanence of the dharmatā in terms of an endless continuing of a continuum of moments, of which only the continuum of space is a fully valid example. This follows from his explanation of the three examples in the context of the buddha element (i.e., buddha nature) as pervading all three states of being impure, partly pure, and perfectly pure:

When the transformation of the basis is taught in the Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti with the examples of water, gold, and space, in all three, it is explained that there is a continuum. Therefore, it is not the case that space that exists only as enclosed space does not partake of the nature of momentariness along a continuum. If one takes time into account here, space at the beginning of an eon (kalpa) is not the [same] space at the time of [its] destruction. In terms of location, the substance that exists as the enclosed space of a golden receptacle is not that which exists as the enclosed space of an earthen receptacle. Likewise, a moment in the continuing of a continuum that has the quality of the [buddha] element’s awareness of sentient beings is not a moment in the wisdom of a Buddha.27 Notwithstanding, in the same way as the existence of the enclosed space of a golden and earthen receptacle is not different in terms of type (rigs), the non-conceptuality of a Buddha and the non-conceptuality of sentient beings are of a very similar type. They even admit of the conventional designation “identity”—in the same way as saying that I and the Buddhas share the same speech.28

In the eyes of gZhon nu dpal, space thus partakes of the nature of momentariness.29 In his commentary on RGVV I.12, in the context of

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27 The buddha element of sentient being refers to every mental factor’s ability of being self-aware. Freed from its adventitious stains, this self-awareness turns into a full realization of the true nature of mind.

28 DRSM 3396a: chos dang chos nyid rnam par ‘byed pa’i ‘grel par chu dang gser dang nam mkha’i dpe rnams kyis gnas yongs su gyur pa ston pa’i tshe dpe gsun po la rgyun yod par ‘chad de de bas na go skabs yod tsam gyi nam mkha’ skad cig ma’i bdag nyid du gnas pa rgyun dang ldan pa yang med pa ma yin no | de la dus kyi dbang du byas nas bskal pa dang po’i nam mkha’ ni ‘jig pa’i dus kyi nam mkha’ ma yin la | gnas kyi dbang du byas nas gser snod kyi go skabs yod tsam gyi rdzas de nyid sa’i snod kyi go skabs yod tsam ni ma yin no | de bzhin du sems can gyi khams rig pa’i chos can rgyun gyis ‘jug pa’i de’i skad cig de ni sangs rgyas kyi ye shes kyi skad cig tu ni mi ‘gyur ro | | ‘on kyang gser dang sa’i snod kyi go skabs yod tsam dag rigs la tha dad pa med pa ltar sangs rgyas kyi rnam par mi rtog pa dang sems can gyi rnam par mi rtog pa ris shin tu ‘dra zhing | de la gcig gi tha snyad kyang yod de | nga dang sangs rgyas rnam gsung gcig ces bya ba la bu’o |. First quoted and translated in Mathes 2008: 338–39.

29 On gZhon nu dpal’s discussion of the examples of water, gold, and space, see also
discussing the *Dharmadharmaṭāvibhāga*’s fundamental transformation, gZhon nu dpal claims that “not all that is expressed by the word ‘space’ is absolutely unconditioned.” The momentariness gZhon nu dpal has in mind does not involve a change in nature, but only quantity:

Even though there is a difference between the [buddha] qualities in terms of being subtle and having increased, depending on the extent to which adventitious stains have been purified or not, they do not have the attribute of being changeable by nature. This should be understood, [for example,] in the same way space is enclosed by a house: [the space] becomes wider by tearing down the house, but the nature of space itself does not thereby become subject to change.

With momentariness attributed to unconditioned buddha nature, gZhon nu dpal takes the liberty of calling it “reality in its definitive meaning” (*nges pa’i don gyi de kho na nyid*). This also applies to synonymous positive descriptions, such as luminosity or self-awareness. The strategy of positing something unchangeable yet in some sense momentary as the ultimate is clear from gZhon nu dpal’s treatment of RGV I.51, in which the unchangeable nature of buddha nature is taken as momentary self-awareness:

One may ask: “What is reality in its definitive meaning?” It is simply self-awareness itself, free from all forms of mental fabrication. One may object: “Well, if one [implicitly] calls it momentary, how then is it not a ‘concealing’ (i.e., apparent) [truth]?” It is not [apparent truth] because it does not “conceal reality,” which is the meaning of the term *apparent [truth]*. Moreover, it cannot produce defilements when focused on. Also, not [everything] that does not withstand logical analysis comes under apparent [truth]. This is so because if logical analysis is needed when the valid cognition, which assesses a sprout etc., [can]not prevent the

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30 DRSM 120.14: *nam mkha’i sgras brjod pa thams cad ni shin tu ‘dus ma byas pa ma yin te |

31 It should be noted that this does not refer to the artificially created fortified potential, but the naturally present one, which naturally blossoms.

32 DRSM 122.1-3: *glo bur gyi dri ma dag pa dang ma dag pa’i chos phra pa dang ‘phel ba’i khyad par yod kyang rang bzhin ’gyur ba’ichos can du mi ’gyur te | khyim gyi phugs kyi nam mkha’ khyim rdib pas nam mkha’ yangs par ’gyur yang de tsam gyis nam mkha’i ngo bo nyid ’gyur ba’i chos can du mi ’gyur ba de bzhin du rig par bya’o |. |

33 RGVV 41.20-21: “Because it is endowed with the state of having adventitious faults, and naturally endowed with qualities, it is of an unchangeable nature—as it was before, so it is after.” (*doṣāgantukatāyogā guṇaprakṛitiyogataḥ | yathā pūrvaṃ tathā paścād avikāritisvadharmaḥ ||*)
superimposition of taking that [sprout, etc.] for a [real] thing. [direct] valid cognition allows one to apprehend the very awareness itself, free of any characterizing signs and mental fabrications whatsoever. One can counteract all fabrications by precisely this valid cognition. So what then could the repeated use of analytic reasoning generate? This is the reason why the master Āryadeva said that one must apply many synonyms for the ultimate truth.34

To restate gZhon nu dpal’s position here: the ultimate is momentary self-awareness. Of interest is how he comments on unconditioned buddhahood in RGV I.5, which is for him, as we have seen, not entirely unconditioned and thus also acceptable as a positive description of the ultimate. In support of this, gZhon nu dpal reports that Vimuktisena and Haribhadra call emptiness the buddha potential (gotra) when on the path and the svābhāvikakāya at the time of fruition, i.e., buddhahood. As the latter is unconditioned, gZhon nu dpal does not mean that it is like “the emptiness of the non-affirming negation.” Following the Jñānāłokālaṃkārasūtra and the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, gZhon nu dpal takes “unconditioned” to imply that the Tathāgata neither arises nor ceases to exist. gZhon nu dpal further stresses that according to the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, the Tathāgata is only permanent in the sense of being a never-ending continuum. In support of this interpretation, gZhon nu dpal further adduces Buddhaguhya. The following passage from gZhon nu dpal’s commentary on unconditioned buddhahood in verses RGV I.5–8 outlines his hermeneutical strategy in detail:

Ārya Vimuktisena and master Haribhadra called emptiness a potential (gotra) at the time of the path and the svābhāvikakāya at the time of the fruit. Nature (svabhāva) means [here] to be uncontrived; and the meaning of attaining it is to attain through realizing all phenomena [as they truly are] with an illusion-like consciousness. “To attain” is thus taken in the sense of realizing [what is already there], and not that [something] newly arises. Moreover, master Ārya said it follows that the dharmakāya is conditioned because of being enjoyed. In

34 DRSM 340: 'o na nges pa’i don gyi de kho na nyid gang yin zhe na | spros pa’i mtshan ma mtha’ dag dang bral ba’i rang rig pa nyid do | | ’o na de skad cig mar ni smra na | de ji ltar kun rdzob ma yin zhe na | ma yin te | kun rdzob kyi sgra’i don de kho na nyid la sgrīb par byed pa ma yin pa’i phyr dang | de la dmigs nas kun nas nyon mongs pa skye ba mi srid pa’i phyr ro | | rigs pas dpyad mi bzd pa nyid kyis kun rdzob tu ’gyur ba yang ma yin te | myu gu la sogs pa ’jal ba’i tshad mas de la dngos por ’dzin pa’i sgrī ’dogs mi khēgs pas rigs pas dpyad par bya dgos na mtshan ma dang spros pa ci yang ma yin pa’i rig pa nyid tshad mas mthong nas tshad ma de nyid kyis spros pa mtha’ dag ’gog nus pa’i phyr slar dpyod par byed pa’i rigs pa bcug pas bskyed du bya ba ci zhig yod | des na de nyid la don dam pa’i bden pa’i ming gi rnam grangs mang po rnam sbyar bar bya bar slob dpon ā rya de vas gsungs pa yin no | First quoted and translated in Mathes 2008: 349.
short, the two masters (Vimuktisena and Haribhadra) took emptiness to be the dharmakāya, which is unconditioned. As for unconditioned here, one may think that they only referred to the emptiness of non-affirming negation. The two learned masters did well in presenting emptiness as the dharmakāya. But the unconditioned explained here is not like that.35

What is it like then? In the Jñānālokālāmkkārasūtra, it is said that the very meaning of ‘Tathāgata’ is “neither born nor passing out of existence.” That this is what is also expressed by the term ‘unconditioned’ becomes very clear in the [Ratnagotravibhāga]vyākhyā. And [the Buddha] clearly said in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that this [term ‘unconditioned’] refers to a dharmakāya that, although not born, has arisen from mind. In the [Laṅkāvatārasūtra on III.85] it is said36:

Then Bodhisattva Mahāsattva Mahāmati told the Illustrious One: “[Teach me, Illustrious One, teach me, Sugata!]37 In the teachings, the Illustrious One made use of the expression ‘neither cessation nor origination.’ You said how38 ‘neither cessation nor origination’ is a synonym for Tathāgata. But is this neither cessation nor origination not non-existence, Illustrious One? And is it then another synonym for Tathāgata?39

The Illustrious One explained that all phenomena neither pass out of existence nor are they born, because the [extreme] positions of existence and non-existence [can]not be observed.

“If all phenomena thus are unborn, Illustrious One, then the expression ‘phenomena’ does not apply, [precisely] because they have not been

35 DRSM 84.21-85.3: ’phags pa rnam par grol ba’i sde dang | slob dpon seng ge bzang po yang stong pa nyid la lam gyi dus kyi rigs dang | ’bras bu’i dus su ngo bo nyid kyi sku zhes brjod par mdzad de | ngo bo nyid kyi don bcos ma ma yin pa dang | de thob pa’i don rnam par shes pa sgyu ma lta bus chos thams cad rtogs pas thob pa yin no zhes thob pa’i don rtogs pa la bzhed kyi | gsar du byang ba la mi bzhed do | yang slob dpon ’phags pas spyod pa’i don yin pa’i phyir chos kyi sku ’dus byas su thal bar ’gyur ro zhes gsungs te | mdor na slob dpon de dag stong pa nyid la chos kyi skur bzhed cing | de ’dus ma byas su yang bzhed pas ’dir dus ma byas zhes pa ni med par dgag pa’i stong pa nyid de nyid la brjod pa yin no snyam na | slob dpon mkhas pa de dag gis stong pa nyid la chos kyi skur rnam par bzhag pa de yang legs par bzhag pa yin gyi | ’dir bshad pa’i ’dus ma byas ni de lta bu ma yin no |

36 DRSM 85.3-8: ‘o na ci zhe na | ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo las skye ba med cing ’gag pa med pa de bzhin gshegs par gsungs pa’i don de nyid ’dir dus ma byas kyi sgras brjod par ni ’grel pa ’di nyid las shin tu gsal la | skye ba med pa yang yid las byung ba’i chos sku la brjod par lang kar gshegs pa las shin tu gsal bar gsungs pa’i phyir te | de las ji skad du |

37 Supplied from the Sanskrit edition of the sūtra.

38 The translation follows the Sanskrit here (uktam ca tvayā yathā tathāgatasayaitat adhivacanam arirodhānuttādā iti).

39 The phrase that follows in the Sanskrit (yad bhagavān evam āha) is missing in the Tibetan.
born. Well then, Illustrious One, if that is another name of something, tell us!’\textsuperscript{40}

The Illustrious One said: “Listen well then, Mahāmati, and pay attention carefully! I will tell you.” Bodhisattva Mahāsaṃsattva Mahāmati listens to the Illustrious One, whereupon he says: “Mahāmati, it is not that the Tathāgata does not exist nor is he an expression for phenomena neither passing out of existence nor being born. He does not depend on conditions either. Still, I have not used the expression ‘not being born’ in a senseless way. It is a synonym for the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya, which is mental by nature. It is not an experiential object of any non-Buddhist, Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha or [even] Bodhisattva abiding on the seventh level. ‘Unborn’ is another expression, a synonym\textsuperscript{41} for the Tathāgata.’\textsuperscript{42}

As for [the reference] ‘in the teachings,’ they are from the Jñānālokākāra-śūtra. When it is said in these teachings that ‘neither being born nor passing out of existence’ is an expression for the Tathāgata, then, what is this neither being born nor passing out of existence? Is it non-existence? Since it has been taught as even an expression for the Tathāgata, it is a phrase synonymous with the Tathāgata. First, [Mahāmati concludes] non-existence, and then he contradicts his own words when [saying] that phenomena are unborn for lack of the extremes of existence and non-existence. Since by saying ‘phenomena,’ one maintains [their] existence, and this contradicts their being unborn.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Skt.: “Well then, this other synonym for certain phenomena, tell it, illustrious one!”
\item Based on the equation of \textit{tshig bla dwags} and \textit{rnam grangs gi tshig} I have translated the former as ‘synonym.’
\item My translation follows the Sanskrit, which is LAS 191-192:\textit{atha khalumahāmati bodhisattvah mahāsattvah punar api bhagavantam etad avocet | deśayatu me bhagavāna deśayatu sugato yad deśanāpāthe bhagavatā anirodhānupādāgraṇāhām kṛtam | uktaṃ ca tvayā yathā tathāgatasyaitad adhi vacanam anirodhānupādāda iti | tat kim ayam bhagavāna bhavāvo ’nirondānupādāda uṭa tathāgatasyaitad paryāyaṃ taram ya bhagavān evam āha | aniruddhā anutpannāś ca bhagavatā sarvadharmā deśyante sadasatpakṣādārśanāt | yady anutpannāḥ sarvadharmā iti bhagavān dharmagraṇāhāṃ na prāpnoty ajātata vī sarvadharmāṇām | atha paryāyaṃ taram etat kasyacic dharmasya tad ucyatāṃ bhagavān | bhagavān āha | tena hi mahāmate śṛṇu sādu ca suṣṭhu ca manasikuru | bhāṣisye ’ham te | sādhu bhagavān iti mahāmatir bodhisattvo mahāsattvo bhagavato pratyāśravaṃ | bhagavāṃs tasyaitad avacat | na hi mahāmate abhāvas tathāgato na ca sarvadharmāṃ anirodhānupādāgraṇāḥ | na pratyayo ’pekṣitavyo na ca niraṛthakaṃ anupādāgraṇāḥ kriyate mayā | kim tu mahāmate manomaya-dharmakāyaṃ tathāgatasyaitad adhi vacanam yatra sarvādhiṣṭhakarasrāvaḥ-pratyekabuddhaḥsaṃtaptahūmiprātiṣṭhitānāṃ ca bodhisattvāṃ aviṣayayo so ’nutpādās tathāgatasya | etan mahāmate paryāvavacanam. The Tibetan translation quoted by gZhon nu dpal is on DRSM 85\textsuperscript{5,19}.
\item DRSM 85\textsuperscript{19-24}: gang ’di bstan pa brjod pa las shes (=zhes) pa ni ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo las so || bstan pa de las skye ba med pa dang ’gog pa med pa de
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[The Buddha] is then requested to say of what [precisely ‘neither being born etc.’] is a synonymous name, if it is only a synonymous name. His answer is that this phrase does not mean that the Tathāgata does not exist nor does it refer to the neither being born nor passing out of existence of all phenomena. Nor does he explain neither being born nor passing out of existence with the intent of [indicating] non-arising without conditions. The phrase ‘neither being born nor passing out of existence’ thus is not a meaningless one. What is its meaning then? It is an expression teaching the Tathāgata’s dharmakāya, which is mental by nature. Said [dharmakāya], mental by nature, is taught to be an extraordinary body, which is not obtained by non-Buddhists, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, or [Bodhisattvas] up to the seventh level. It is taught that even the dharmakāya has a mental body, because it is stated in this very Lankāvatārasūtra:

Now what is the mental body, which acts [on the basis] of the formations [of sentient beings] and [thus] emerges together with the [different] types [of sentient beings]? Having realized what is characterized by bliss, i.e., having individually experienced all buddha qualities, one is said to have such a mental body. 44

Therefore, it must be understood that the following has been explained: Here, too, even the word (i.e., the dharmakāya), stated [with the meaning] ‘unconditioned,’ refers to this mental body of the dharmakāya. Likewise, it is said in the Jñānālokālaṃkāra that even though momentary, [the Tathāgata] is an endless continuum:

44 DRSM 85.24–86.5: ming gi rnam grangs tsam yin na gang gi ming gi rnam grangs yin pa gsungs shig ces zhus so || lan ni tshig des de bzhin gshegs pa dngos med du bstan pa yang ma yin || chos thams cad skye ’gag med par bstan pa yang ma yin || rkyen med par mi skye ba la bsams nas skye ’gag med par bshad pa’ang ma yin || de lta na yang skye ’gag med pa’i tshig ’di don gyis stong pa’i tshig ma yin no || ’o na don ci yod ce na || de bzhin gshegs pa’i yid kyi rang bzhin gyi chos kyi sku ton pa’i bla dwags yin no || gang la yid kyi rang bzhin du bshad pa ’di yang mu stegs dang nyan thos dang rang rgyal dang sa bdun pa man chad du ma thob pa’i lus khyad par can zhig ston pa yin no || lang kar gshegs pa ’di nyid du || de la ris su lhan cig skyes pa’i ’du byed kyi bya ba’i yid kyi lus gang zhes na || ’di lta ste || sangs rgyas kyi chos thams cad so so rang gis rig pa bde ba’i mtsan nyid khong du chud pas ris su lhan cig skyes pa ’du byed kyi bya ba’i yid kyi lus zhes bya’o || zhes gsungs pas chos kyi sku la yang yid kyi lus yod par bstan pa yin no ||. My translation of the Lankāvatārasūtra quotation (DRSM 86.1–5) follows the Sanskrit, which is from the introduction to the third chapter (LAS 137.8–10): tatra nīkāyasahajasamskārakriyāmanomayā kāyāḥ katamo yad uta sarvabuddhadharmapratyātmādhiḥgamasukhalakṣaṇāvabodhān nīkāyasahajasamskārakriyāmanomaya ity ucyate ||.
Mañjuśrī, the Tathāgata is momentary and has the defining characteristic of being imperishable. He is fixed in the ultimate nature\textsuperscript{45} of being imperishable and the ultimate nature of reality.\textsuperscript{46}

[In his Vairocanaḥbhisambodhitrantrapindārtha,\textsuperscript{47}] Buddhaguhya, too, says:

Here, the dharmakāya is wisdom, as any basis for concepts has been removed. Definitely free from any aspects, it is very luminous. Being the ultimate perfection of mere self-awareness, it is uninterrupted as long as saṃsāra exists. It possesses the accumulation of a momentary, ever-continuing stream. It is the level of non-abiding nirvāṇa. As for the defining characteristics of the dharmakāya, it is explained in the [tantra]\textsuperscript{48}: “Because even notions are absent, its own nature cannot be taught. Awareness (shes pa), that which must be [directly] experienced by oneself (i.e., self-awareness?) is the Tathāgata.”\textsuperscript{49}

The dharmakāya is thus said to be momentary and continuing in a continuum. To sum up, because nothing whatsoever fulfills a function when not endowed with moments, and because [the dharmakāya] is said to have the power [of unfolding buddha activity], one must oppose

\textsuperscript{45} I.e., taking koṭi in the sense of dharmadhātu or tathatā. See MAV I.14, where bhūtakoṭi is listed together with suchness, signlessness, ultimate truth and dharmadhātu as a synonym of emptiness. In his gZhi lam 'bras bu'i ngo spro, Jo nang Phyogs las rnam rgyal takes mtha’ (koṭi) in a similar way. Referring to Mūlamadhyamakakārikā XXV.20 (MMK 458\textsuperscript{25,26}: nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭih saṃsāraṇasya ca | na taylor antaram kincit susūksman api vidyate ||), Phyogs las rnam rgyal says (gZhi lam 'bras bu'i ngo spro 159\textsuperscript{5,7}): “Nāgārjuna said: ‘The koṭi of nirvāṇa is the koṭi of saṃsāra. There is not the slightest difference between the two.’ Koṭi here is the koṭi of reality, the very dharmadhātu.” (mya ngan ‘das mtha’ gang yin pa || de ni 'khor ba'i mtha’ yin te || de gnyis khypad cung zad ni || shin tu phra ba'ang yod ma yin || zhes gsungs te || mtha’ zhes pa ni 'khor das kyi yang dag pa'i mtha’ chos kyi dbyings nyid do ||)

\textsuperscript{46} DRSM 86\textsubscript{5,8}: des na 'dir yang 'dus ma byas su brjod pa'i tshig kyang chos kyi sku'i yid lus de nyid la bshad par rig par bya'o || de bzhin du ye shes snang ba rgyan gyi mdo yang || 'jam dpal de bzhin gshegs pa ni skad cig pa ste mi zad pa'i mshan nyid dang || mi zad pa'i mtha’ dang || yang dag pa'i mthar nges pa yin no || zhes skad cig ma yin yang zab ni shes pa'i rgyun yin par gsungs so ||. The Sanskrit of the Jñānālolālāmkāra quotation is as follows (JĀA 80\textsubscript{3-4}): kṣaṇiko hi manjuśrīs tathāgataḥ | aksāyalaksanāḥ | aksāyakoṭibhūtakoṭinīyataḥ |

\textsuperscript{47} Derge bsTan 'gyur no. 2662.

\textsuperscript{48} I.e. the Mahāvairocanābhisambodhihikurvitādhīśthānavaipulyasyaśtrendrarājanaḥmadharmaparyāya, Derge bsTan ’gyur no. 494.

\textsuperscript{49} DRSM 86\textsubscript{13}: sangs rgyas gsang bas kyang || de la ye shes rnam par rtag pa'i rten thams cad bsal ba || rnam pa thams cad las nges par grol bas shin tu 'od gsal ba || rang rig pa tsam gyi mthar thug pas 'khor ba ji srid par rgyun mi 'chad pa || skad cig ma'i rgyun brgyud pa'i tshogs can || mi gnas pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i gnas skabs gang yin pa de ni chos kyi sku yin no || chos kyi sku 'di'i mshan nyid ni 'di las || 'du shes tsam yang spangs pa'i phyir || rang gi ngo bo bstan du med || 'shes pa rang rig bya ba 'di || de bzhin gshegs pa yin zhes bshad || ces 'byung ba yin no ||
the view that it (i.e., the dharmakāya) is absolutely unconditioned. This is precisely what the [Ratnagotravibhāga]vyākhya [on I.8] says:

Unconditioned must be taken as the opposite of conditioned. Here [something] is called conditioned whose arising is detected, as well as [its] abiding and destruction. Being without that, buddhahood must be seen as being without beginning, middle, or end, [i.e..] as being characterized by the unconditioned dharmakāya.

Buddhahood is here the characterized subject. It must be seen to be characterized, in distinction from other phenomena, by the particular features of the dharmakāya. Even though the dharmakāya is without artificial conditions, it evolves in its own sphere. It is not like arising, abiding, vanishing clouds, but rather, space. For this reason [alone], it is called unconditioned. So it is said.

Conclusion

The foregoing indicates the extent to which gZhon nu dpal is opposed to the idea of static permanence. Not only buddhahood is denied this status, but also space. Being subject to quantitative change over time, even space partakes of momentariness. Buddhahood, or buddha nature for that matter, is only unconditioned in the sense of not depending on artificial causes. For this reason, it continues in an endless flow, the only type of permanence accepted in gZhon nu dpal’s system. Against this background, gZhon nu dpal can feel justified in accepting buddha nature, luminosity, or self-awareness as ultimate truth without further qualification. In drawing attention to their momentariness, he remains at a safe distance from non-Buddhist ātman-theories.

50 DRSM 86:13–15: zhes chos kyi sku skad cig ma dang rgyun gyis ’jug par gsungs so ||
don bsdu na skad cig dang Idan pa ma yin pas don bya ba ci yang mi nus pa’i phyir ’dir nus pa dang Idan pa smos pas shin tu ’dus ma byas par lta ba las bzlog par bya’o | de nyid ’grel pas bshad pa ni |

51 My translation is from the Sanskrit (RGVV 8.29): samskṛtaviparyayenaśamskṛtam veditavyam |atra samskṛtam ucyate yasyotpado ’pi prajñāyate sthitir api bhango ’pi prajñāyate | tadabhāvāt buddhatvam anādidadhyānīdhanam asamskṛta-dharmakāyaprabhāvītam draṣṭavyam |. The Tibetan translation quoted by gZhon nu dpal is on DRSM 86:15–17.

52 DRSM 86:7-20: zhes bya ba la sansg rgyas nyid ni khyad par gyi gzhi yin la | de ni chos kyi sku i khyad par gyischos gzhān las rab tu phyé bar blta bar bya ste | chos kyi sku ni ’phral gyi rkyen med kyang rang gi ngang gis ’byung bas skye ba dang ’gag pa dang gnas pa sprin lta bu ma yin gyi nam mkha’ lta bu yin pas ’dus ma byas zhes brjod do zhes pa’o |. First quoted and translated in Mathes 2008: 334.
‘Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s momentariness of unconditioned buddhahood

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MAV  *Madhyāntavibhāga*. See MAVBh


RGV  *Ratnagotravibhāga*. See RGVV


Perceived but not known:

*gṛhītagrahaṇa* and Prajñākaragupta’s criticism of Dharmottara*

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From seminars on the *Hetubindu* that Helmut taught at the University of Vienna, I know that he was never quite satisfied with Dharmottara’s theory that perception needs ‘to ride the carriage of vikalpa’ in order to be a means of valid cognition. The following two arguments by Prajñākaragupta involving *gṛhītagrahaṇa* indicate an alternative to Dharmottara’s interpretation. I would have enjoyed discussing this with Helmut.

1. Introduction: The problem of *gṛhītagrahaṇa*

   The Buddhist epistemological tradition to which Prajñākaragupta’s ca. ninth century *Pramāṇavārttikālankāra* (PVA) belongs upholds two criteria for what it is to be a means of valid cognition. Dharmakīrti specified them with regard to a Buddha in his ca. sixth or seventh century PVₘ *pramāṇasiddhi* 1–7:

   1. avisaṃvādin—a cognition must be non-belying
   2. ajñātārthaprakāśa—it must show a hitherto unknown object

   There are intricate debates (both in classical commentaries and modern research) about the relation of these two criteria, arising mainly from Dharmakīrti’s choice to connect them with vā, “or”, and from the question of whether they should be regarded as characterizations or proper definitions.¹ The question that is to be discussed here, however, is how

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¹ I wish to thank Prof. Motoi Ono and Dr. Taisei Shida for inviting me twice to Tsukuba University to present and discuss many of the ideas in this paper. Without their help, and that of the participants in the reading sessions, I would not have been able to make much progress with Prajñākaragupta. The errors which remain are my sole responsibility.

¹ The discussion between Franco (1999a, b) and Oetke (1999a, b) explores all philosophical aspects, whilst Krasser (2001) gives more importance to the historical circumstances.

the second criterion, that cognition must make a previously unknown object known in order to count as a means of valid cognition, was used in the context of explaining everyday activity and the means of valid cognition involved therein. The focus will be specifically on two of Prajñākaragupta’s arguments where the usage of this criterion seems problematic when seen in the context of the Buddhist epistemological system of Dharmakīrti. But before that, it will be useful to present a short overview of how Dharmakīrti and especially Dharmottara (ca. eighth century) used this criterion in their explanations of everyday behaviour.

1.1. Dharmakīrti
Krasser (2001: 191 f.) has shown that the fact that there are two characterizations (rather than only one) in PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 1–7, which are furthermore connected by a disjunctive, had historical rather than purely philosophical reasons: The first is the Buddhist criterion, and the one prevailing in Dharmakīrti’s own work. The second reflects Kumārila’s definition that, with certain modifications, was equally acceptable to Dharmakīrti. Perhaps the best argument for proving that avisaṃvādi jñānam is the Buddhist characterization of pramāṇa is the one suggested by Krasser (2001: 195): “I have not yet been able to locate a passage in [Dharmakīrti’s] works where the validity of perception or inference is derived in terms of ajñātārthaprakāśa.” Even in the locus classicus for this criterion, HB 2–3, the notion of apūrvārthādhigama, conceptually equivalent to ajñātārthaprakāśa, is used only as a negative criterion which shows that a conceptual cognition following perception is not a pramāṇa.

1.2. Dharmottara
It will be helpful to remind ourselves of Dharmottara’s arguments for two types of valid cognition and their objects. He maintained that the object at which activity is directed is a particular which is determined as

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2 The term ‘everyday activity’ translates vyavahāra. In its usage by Buddhist epistemologists, it refers to the activities of unenlightened beings that concern mind-external, temporally persistent entities. These activities can be verbal, mental, and/or practical. These activities often, but not always, involve the usage of concepts.

3 Likewise in PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 101. The interpretation of the first criterion as the Buddhist one is discussed and accepted by Krasser 2001: 192–195, based on the interpretation of the two characteristics by Arcaṭa in the context of the HB.
a continuous object, both in the case of perception and inference. This is summarized by Krasser (1995: 254):

But the object of activity (pravṛttiviṣaya) which can be obtained is only that which is determined. [...] 

In the case of perception the grasped phase is determined as a stream or continuum (santāna) of phases. And because a continuum of phases is not limited in time as one single phase, it is the continuum that can be obtained. And inference determines an external object by means of a superimposition (āropa) of the difference (vyāvṛtti) from that which does not have its nature. And this external object can be obtained. [...] In the strict sense, however, it is not the continuum of phases itself that can be obtained, for this is merely imagined and thus not real. It is only the absolutely real (paramārtha) or momentary thing that can be obtained [...], i.e., a later phase belonging to the determined continuum.

Another point we should bear in mind for the following is that Dharmottara routinely defends the fact that only the first moment of either perception or inference is what causes successful activity and thus is a means of valid cognition by stressing that any following moment in the cognition only grasps what has already been grasped, and thus fails to fulfill the second criterion of valid cognition specified by Dharmakīrti.

1.3. Prajñākaragupta

Prajñākaragupta is known to have given a complex and perhaps somewhat idiosyncratic interpretation of the second characteristic of a valid cognition specified by Dharmakīrti in PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 5c, ajñātārthapraṇāṣṭa. It is certainly true, as stated by Franco (1997: 50),

4 See also Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: (9),12–(10),3, with a Sanskrit parallel given in Steinkellner/Krasser 1989: 35 corresponding to DhP 18,20–23, and especially NBT 72, 1–2: nataḥ svalaksanam avastītān pravṛttiviṣayā 'numānasya. (Trans.: Therefore the determined particular is the object of activity for inference.) For a translation and discussion of the passage in which the last statement occurs, see McCrea/Patil 2006: 325 ff.

5 Krasser (1995: 248–249) remarks that Dharmottara uses this criterion even though he does not explicitly quote PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 5c, ajñātārthapraṇāṣṭvā. See also Krasser 1991 vol. 1, 11,1–12,4, and the translation and notes Krasser 1991 vol. 2, 45–47. Also relevant to our context are NBT 19,2–4 and DhP 18,20–23 (a quote from Dharmottara’s commentary on the Pramāṇaviniścaya), cf. Krasser 1991 vol. 2, 46–47, n. 69.

6 Franco (1997: 50) translates PVA 30,19–22, a passage from Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 5, corresponding to Ono 2000: 79,15–19, as follows: “This, (i.e., the illumination of an unapprehended object) is the definition
that Prajñākaragupta interpreted this second characteristic as concerning ‘ultimate reality’, whereas the first characterization as ‘non-belying cognition’ in PV, \textit{pramāṇasiddhi} 1 should refer to ‘conventional reality’. In fact, Prajñākaragupta gave at least two explanations of the second characteristic, as is also recognized by Franco (1997: 50): “The first definition is meant for empirical reality, the second for the absolute. This is perhaps only implicit in the above quoted discussion, but it becomes entirely clear in the next passage, where Prajñākaragupta proposes another explanation of the [second, PMA] definition […].”

2. **Two passages on \textit{gṛhītagrahaṇa}**

But if the second criterion—that a valid means of cognition must not make known something that is already known—is meant for ultimate reality, then how does it apply to the common cognitions which facilitate everyday activity that is engaged with temporally unique particulars that are misapprehended as temporally extended, mind-external objects? To answer this question, we will consider two passages from Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on Dharmakīrti’s PV \textit{pratyakṣa}, both from the section where Dharmakīrti intends to prove that inference is the only means of valid cognition besides perception.

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of the means of knowledge relating to absolute reality, whereas the previous one (i.e., a cognition that does not belie) is [a definition] of [the means of knowledge] relating to the conventional (sāmyvyavahārika).”

Cf. also Krasser 2001: 189–190: “[…] this second qualification \textit{ajñātārthaprakāśa}, when understood as qualified by \textit{avijñāte svalakṣane}, is a necessary condition for a conventional cognition’s being a \textit{pramāṇa}. From this it follows that Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of \textit{artha} in \textit{ajñātārthaprakāśo vā}, as referring to absolute reality consisting in the cognition’s non-duality, and of PV 2.1ab and 5c as presenting conventional and absolute definitions respectively, is not in accordance with Dharmakīrti’s own intention.”

Cf. also Iwata 2004.

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7 In the context of the \textit{pratyakṣa} chapter of the PVA, McCrea (2011: 323, n. 13) expressed the opinion that Prajñākaragupta does not think that a conceptual cognition following perception grasps what is already grasped, and accepts it as a means of valid cognition. This is a position that, as McCrea notes, would indeed be strongly opposed to Dharmakīrti’s. See Kellner 2004: 9–10 for a study of “perceptual ascertainment” and its difference to “inferential ascertainment”, where two passages are referred to: HB₅ 2, 18 ff., and a prose passage to PV in III k. 48. Also Dharmottara was clear on this point, cf. Krasser 1995: 248–249, though he seems to have struggled with certain difficulties this position entails, as evidenced by perception “riding on the carriage of vikalpa” (Krasser 1995: 253). See Miyo 2014 for a discussion of PV in I 18,10–19,2 with respect to Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta.
2.1. **First passage: The validity of perception and its ascertainment**

The first passage to examine occurs in Prajñākaragupta’s lengthy commentary on PV *pratyakṣa* 56. The general purpose of this verse is to show that a cognition, though it is erroneous insofar as it does not make a particular that can fulfil an expectation known as it is, can be considered a means of valid cognition if it is reliable with regard to a person’s expectations. In Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, the gist of the argument is that not only inference must be considered as an erroneous cognition in this sense, but also perception: just like inference, it does not show the particular that will be able to fulfil a purpose, although, unlike inference, it is not erroneous with regard to the thing it directly presents. Anyone who would want to deny that inference is a means of valid cognition because it does not show the object of activity directly would then have to draw the same consequence for perception.

At this point in the discussion (PVA 218, 5), the opponent has already accepted that inference and perception are similar in respect of their reliability. The opponent then asks why they are differentiated: both are erroneous with regard to the future particular that will be attained, yet are not unreliable for someone acting in accordance to them. In answer to this question, Prajñākaragupta restates his main argument for the existence of two rather than only one means of valid cognition, namely that perception and inference have two different objects insofar as the one has a distinct (*spaṣṭa*) and the other an indistinct (*aspaṣṭa*) form. The arguments that are exchanged in this passage all serve the purpose of showing that other ways of differentiating between the two means of valid cognition result in insurmountable problems. The discussion starts with the following statement by Prajñākaragupta, PVA 218, 5–6 (see section 4.1.1. below for the Sanskrit):

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8. PV *pratyakṣa* 56: *abhīpṛayāvisamvādād api bhṛnteḥ pramāṇatā | gatir api anyathā drṣṭā paksā cāyam kṛtottaraḥ |* Franco/Notake 2014: 142 translate this verse: “[Reply:] Even false cognition is sometimes a means of knowledge because [when people act upon this cognition] their intention is not belied (i.e., the intended object, which is capable of efficient action, is attained). Even a false apprehension [of the particular with another form] is observed [to lead to an object which is capable of efficient action]. And that position [that inference is a means of knowledge because it apprehends something real] has already been answered.”

Or, [to prove the difference of the objects of valid cognition] in another way\(^\text{10}\):

Inference is assumed as a means of valid cognition when a future [object] is cognized. When acting, due to [habituation] beyond the ordinary measure, towards a present [object], perception is [assumed as] the means of valid cognition.

It is important to note two things about this verse: first, when exactly inference is a means of valid cognition, or the implication of \(bhāvigati\); second, what \(vartamāne\) means in this context.

The first point about inference could be understood in two ways: First, as formulated on the background of Prajñākaragupta’s general position that, as far as everyday activity is concerned, the object of valid cognition, both for inference and perception, is the future thing that will be obtained.\(^\text{11}\) However, it is also possible that “the cognition of a future object” (\(bhāvigati\)) should be taken as contrasting with the cognition of a present thing in the next line. I prefer this second interpretation to the first, because Prajñākaragupta’s idea is precisely that both inference and perception have a future thing as the object that they direct activity towards, and not only inference. I therefore read the verse as portraying a position that is only partially in line with Prajñākaragupta’s own.

The next question is how to understand the qualifier \(vartamāne\) in the second line. Certainly, it cannot mean the thing ‘present’ in the strict terms of the Buddhist \(kṣaṇabhaṅga\) theory, for that thing lasts only for a moment and has already passed at the time the perception of it arises as its effect. So \(vartamāna\) must be understood in the conventional sense of ‘currently present’, which Buddhist epistemologists analyse as a \(santāna\), an object falsely taken to be present in a temporally extended sense.\(^\text{12}\)

In the following prose section, Prajñākaragupta explains the second line of śloka 240 in more detail, PVA 218, 7–8 (see section 4.1.1. for the Sanskrit):

Perception is a means of valid cognition when there is activity due to an excessive habituation, even without [this perception] causing a conceptualization. Otherwise, it [would] result that conceptual

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\(^{10}\) In another way, that is, than the explanation that was just given, i.e., that there are two objects of valid cognition because of the different superimpositions: something indistinct (\(aspaṣṭa\)) onto something distinct (\(spaṣṭa\)) in inference, and vice versa in perception.

\(^{11}\) See Kobayashi 2011, McAllister 2020.

cognition is a separate means of valid cognition, if perception were what prompts activity and [hence were] a means of valid cognition only in [the case] where there is [this] conceptual cognition.

Prajñākaragupta thus refines the statement in the verse about what perception is, and indicates a problem: if a conceptual cognition were somehow necessary so that perception can reliably cause a person to act successfully, then this conceptual cognition would have to be recognized as a means of valid cognition. With this unwanted consequence the stage is set for the following discussion, in which an opponent tries to avoid having to draw this conclusion, PVA 218, 9–26 (see section 4.1.2. for the Sanskrit text). Before investigating the details, it helps to outline the passage:

1. One could try to differentiate inference and perception like this: inference applies to future objects, and perception only to present objects.

2. For Prajñākaragupta this definition is acceptable if abhyāsa is taken into account, and perception aided by a following conceptual cognition is not considered as the means of valid cognition ‘perception’.
   a) For, if perception were a means of valid cognition only in dependence on conceptual cognition, conceptual cognition would also be a means of valid cognition.

3. Attempts to prove that a conceptual cognition following perception is not a means of valid cognition:
   a) [Opponent:] Conceptual cognition cannot be a means of valid cognition, because of grasping what has already been grasped (gṛhītagrahaṇa)

   Accordingly, perception is a means of valid cognition in and of itself only when it is connected with habituation. This simplification works for the purposes of explaining behaviour towards mind-external objects. See McAllister 2020 for a more differentiated treatment.

   It is difficult to say who the opponent is in this passage. The most likely candidate is a Cārvāka, because they are sometimes portrayed as not accepting inference, or at least not all kinds of inference, as a means of valid cognition (see the schematic overview in Bhattacharyya 2002: 600). There are also two fragments (Bhattacharya 2002 Bhā 3, 4, both sourced from the beginning of PVSVT) which indicate a rather differentiated treatment of inference according to the criteria discussed here: the first says that inference is accepted as a means of valid cognition conventionally, but the characterization of a logical mark (liṅga) is incoherent; the other that, since a means of valid cognition is what determines a previously unknown object (anadhigatārthaparicchitti), inference cannot be one.
b) [Proponent:] But if the conceptual cognition is necessary, then how can it not be a means of valid cognition? If it is not necessary, why not allow its absence?
c) [Opponent:] Conceptual cognition cannot be a means of valid cognition, because of not touching a real thing’s nature.
d) [Proponent:] Various unwanted consequences arise.

4. Attempts to show that perception can be a means of valid cognition without the conceptual cognition being so:
   a) [Opponent:] Even when not in direct contact with the activity it causes, perception must be considered the means of valid cognition since it is what gives the conceptual cognition the capacity to produce activity.
   b) [Proponent:] This would violate the principle that a cause must immediately precede its effect.
   c) [Opponent:] Perception is a means of valid cognition because it causes activity towards an object purely on account of that object appearing in it.
   d) [Proponent:] It can be excluded that this mere appearance is sufficient to cause activity, so only the conceptual cognition would be the means of valid cognition in this case.
   e) [Opponent:] It cannot be the means of valid cognition, because of grasping what has already been grasped (gṛhitagrahaṇa).
   f) [Proponent:] It must be the means of valid cognition, because, like an inference based on an essence reason (svabhāvaheṭu), it causes activity.

The discussion thus contains two parts (items 3 and 4) after the introductory statement of Prajñākaragupta’s own position.

In the first part, the opponent is still trying to avoid having to admit that a conceptual cognition following a perception (and which a perception needs in order to cause reliable activity) must be considered a means of valid cognition. He gives two reasons in support of this: first, the conceptual cognition grasps what has already been grasped, and so would not fulfil the criterion of a means of valid cognition specified in PVₘ pramāṇasiddhi 3ab and 5cd; second, the conceptual cognition, unlike perception, is not in contact with a real thing, meaning that it does not present a particular but only a general form or concept.

Prajñākaragupta’s answer to the second point is fairly straightforward: perception cannot be considered a means of valid cognition due to
being in direct contact with a real thing, because the real thing that it so presents is precisely not the one that is able to satisfy a person’s expectation: perception does cause successful activity; but when the thing has finally been reached, it cannot be the same as when it was first perceived, according to the central tenet of the Buddhist epistemologist’s kṣanabhaṅga theory.\footnote{Prajñākaragupta is here reusing more extensive arguments he made shortly before: cf. PVA 216, 13–16 and PVA 217, 18–22. The conclusion that Prajñākaragupta draws is this, PVA 217, 21–22: tasmād abhipretārthāvisaṃvādāt pramāṇam. na vastugrahaṇam upayogi. anyathā pratyakṣam apramāṇam eva bhavet. (Trans.: Therefore, [a cognition] is a means of valid cognition because of not being unreliable with regard to an expected object. Grasping a real thing [however] is not helpful [for its being a means of valid cognition]. Otherwise, perception would certainly not be a means of valid cognition.)}

The answer to the first reason that the opponent uses, that a conceptual cognition grasps what has already been grasped, is not quite as easy to understand. My best explanation is that Prajñākaragupta is being very strict in the application of Dharmakīrti’s two criteria here, and is forcing the opponent to choose between two equally unattractive alternatives: the first is that the conceptual cognition following perception does not serve any purpose in making the perception into a means of valid cognition, i.e., in allowing perception to reliably enable successful activity. But if this is the case, then the conceptual cognition must be dispensable. This is unacceptable to the opponent however, since perception has no way of leading to activity without a conceptual cognition.\footnote{Again, this was discussed by Prajñākaragupta in more detail (though without the explicit mention of grhītagrahaṇa) in the previous passages following PV pratyakṣa 56, e.g., PVA 217, 28, where the opponent says: atha tād eva pratyakṣam tatra pramāṇam tadvikalpajājanānd īti (“Now, this perception alone is a means of valid cognition with regard to this [thing that satisfies an expectation] since it generates this conceptual cognition [that cognizes the connection of the present particular with a future particular].””) Note also that Kobayashi 2011 has suggested that in one of the relevant preceding passages, PVA 216, 24–27, Prajñākaragupta criticizes Dharmottara’s idea that a perception’s awareness of a moment (kṣaṇa) results in a conceptual cognition of a continuum that this moment belongs to. I fully agree that this is a fundamental difference between the two, and that this explanation of how perception causes activity would be something that Prajñākaragupta cannot accept. In the current context, however, the commentators do not mention Dharmottara by name. It is perhaps possible that Prajñākaragupta is here arguing against a Cārvāka position whilst at the same time showing that Dharmottara’s model of perception would allow a Cārvāka to successfully deny inference by reducing it to a perception followed by a conceptual cognition.}

If, on the other hand, the conceptual cognition is necessary for perception to cause activity, then this conceptual cognition must be the
means of valid cognition. This would mean that the opponent’s appeal to *grhītagrahaṇa* is a last-ditch effort to exclude this conceptual cognition from being a means of valid cognition, even though his idea of how perception is a means of valid cognition crucially depends on it. In other words, Prajñākaragupta is here not entering into a discussion about whether this conceptual cognition is afflicted by *grhītagrahaṇa*, but is focusing on the analysis of *pravartakatva*. This is the criterion that, at least for Prajñākaragupta, corresponds closely to being *avisamvādin*, the criterion for positively identifying a means of valid cognition in Dharmakīrti’s epistemological system.

This line of argumentation becomes more apparent with the verses 242–243 and the following exposition in the first passage (section 4.1.3.). Again, Prajñākaragupta stresses that if a conceptual cognition is not a causal factor in the reliable generation of activity that characterizes a means of valid cognition, it would not have to be a means of valid cognition. But if it is what constitutes the capacity of the perception to produce such activity, then it must be counted as a means of valid cognition, either in addition to perception or instead of it. A similar position as is being attacked here, that perception gives its capacity to cause activity to the following conceptual cognition, is well attested as that of Dharmottara.17

After drawing a few unwanted consequences from the opponent’s assumption that perception is the cause of activity even though it does not immediately precede that activity, the opponent reverts to the weakest position, namely that it is only through the mere appearance of a thing in it that perception can be said to be active towards a (future) object of activity, but not because it can be said to determinately know anything about its object. After Prajñākaragupta responds (section 4.1.4.) that it would still only be the conceptual cognition that would be the cause of activity, the opponent again falls back on the last defence: how can Prajñākaragupta claim this whilst accepting that the conceptual cognition grasps what has already been grasped? Prajñākaragupta’s answer is that if the opponent wishes to apply this criterion here, he might as well apply it to all cases of inferences that operate with a thing’s nature as the logical reason, most notably the case of an inference grasping a momentary thing.18 For in a *svabhāvahetu* inference the cognition “That’s a tree”

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17 Dharmottara describes this as *prāpanasakti*, cf. Krasser 1995: 248–249. Again, Prajñākaragupta’s commentators do not specify who the opponent is in these sentences.

18 I interpret this as an inference which grasps that a particular object is momentary, as distinct from the inference which grasps universal momentariness or an inference that grasps a momentary thing in the sense of a *svalakṣaṇa* (the latter
Perceived but not known: *gṛhītagrahaṇa* and Prajñākaragupta’s criticism

could then be said to follow the mere appearance of a fir (with at least one intermediary conceptual, but not inferential, step “That’s a fir”). So also these inferences would then fall foul of the rule that a means of valid cognition must not grasp what has already been grasped. The consequence for the opponent would thus be that this attempt to save perception as a means of valid cognition would inadvertently declassify all *svabhāvahetu* inferences.¹⁹

Prajñākaragupta is here leading the opponent (or opponents) through a maze of alternatives, none of which leads to the opponent’s desired result, that perception operates through a conceptual cognition which is not a *pramāṇa*. We should not conclude, however, that Prajñākaragupta rejects the second criterion of what it is to be means of valid cognition: rather, he is saying that if the opponent were to use it in order to exclude a conceptual cognition following a perception from being a means of valid cognition for the sake of explaining conventional activity following upon perception, the consequences would be quite serious, since either a new means of valid cognition would have to be recognized or a whole class of inferences would have to be dropped. To this extent, Prajñākaragupta can indeed be taken as revising the position that Dharmakīrti endorsed in HB 2–3, and that Dharmottara, judging by his detailed treatment of the same problem, also thought to be in need of further explanation.²⁰

### 2.2. Second passage: Cognizing smoke and fire

In PV *pratyakṣa* 82–83, Dharmakīrti characterizes the cognition of the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin*.²¹ Prajñākaragupta’s commentary on these verses allows us to trace a historical debate that highlights some driving systematic

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19. This too suggests a Buddhist opponent, since a Cārvāka (the only group that might want to prove that only perception is a means of valid cognition, see section 2.1.) might conceivably be quite at ease with this consequence.

20. See the references cited in fn. 7.

21. See PV *pratyakṣa* 82–83: *liṅgaliṅgidhiyor evam pāramparyena vastuni | prati-bandhāt tadābhāsaśūnyayor apy avaṇcanam | tadrūpaṇḍhyavasāyāc ca tayos tadrūpaśūnayah | tadrūpāvaṇčakatve ’pi kṛtā bhrāntivyavasthitih | (Trans.: In this way, both the awareness of the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin* are reliable because they are indirectly connected to a real thing, even though this [real thing] does not appear in them. And the two are classified as erroneous cognitions, even though they are reliable with regard to the nature of that [real thing] because of determining the nature of that [real thing, when in fact] they are devoid of the nature of that [real thing].)
considerations in Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s interpretations of Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference and his characterization of the relation of inference to perception. It also lets us see how these considerations were used to respond to criticism of Dharmakīrti’s statements.

Before entering a detailed explanation, it is helpful to have a general idea of the philosophical problem that these verses can lead to. The core of this problem lies in the fact that in these two verses Dharmakīrti unmistakably endorses both that

1. the cognition of the reason-characteristic (liṅga) does not contain an appearance of this characteristic, and
2. that this cognition is not unreliable (avañcaka).

These two properties are identical to two statements that are central to Dharmakīrti’s epistemological system: The first is equal to the position that a conceptual cognition does not show its object as it is, a defining characteristic in the differentiation of conceptual and perceptual cognitions. The second property is equal to the general characterization of a means of valid cognition (pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam, PV pramāṇasiddhi 1), at least if we take avañcana to be equal to avisamvādana.

The endorsement of these two facts together for a cognition constitutes its classification as an inference: the lack of a thing’s appearance excludes the possibility that the cognition is perception, and reliability entails that it is a means of valid cognition, at least as long as gṛhītagrahaṇa is not taken into account. The only candidate that fulfills both criteria is inference.

Prajñākaragupta’s commentary (section 4.2.) mentions the following problems that arise from this constellation, the first two apparently pointed out by a non-Buddhist opponent, and the last described by Prajñākaragupta himself:

1. If the liṅgajñāna, like the liṅgijñāna, is understood to be an inference, then Dharmakīrti has no reason to discuss them separately here.
2. If the liṅgajñāna is interpreted to be a perception, then this contradicts Dharmakīrti’s explicit statement that it is free of the appearance of its object.

Cf. mānam dvividham meyadvaividhyāt … viśayāviśayatvataḥ | śabdasya PV pratyakṣa 1–2, the point being that there are two types of objects for valid cognitions because the one is, and the other is not, an object of words (and conceptual cognitions).

This is explicitly supported in PVV 142, 1–2: [...] liṅgalīṅgavastuny avañcanam samvādanam.
3. If taken as an inference, an infinite regress looms: if the *liṅgajñāna*, a necessary constituent of any inference, is itself an inference, every inference depends on another inference.\textsuperscript{24}

The first and third problems both result from presupposing that the *liṅga-jñāna* is an inference. Whilst the first problem accuses Dharmakīrti of a procedural error or imprecision in his explanation, the third claims that there is a logical error. The second problem is one that followers of Dharmakīrti’s system cannot allow without admitting to a wide-reaching deficiency in that system.

The third problem raises a theoretical difficulty in Dharmakīrti’s theory of inference, which holds that all of an inference’s constituent parts must be certain. If one wishes to avoid founding any inference upon another inference (in the specific way of saying that one constituent of inference, the cognition of the *liṅga*, is itself an inference), then it seems one will have to appeal to perception for the cognition of this *liṅga*: the cognition of smoke that is presupposed in the inference “There is fire on the hill because there is smoke there” would have to be a perception, rather than an inference, to avoid this regress. But this would contradict Dharmakīrti’s own statement here that the *liṅgajñāna* does not directly show the *liṅga*.

Other, theoretically possible, solutions to this problem are these:

1. The conceptual yet non-inferential cognition “Smoke is there” is founded on, but not the same as, perception. This is essentially what Dharmottara assumes; it bridges the divide between perception and conceptual cognition, but results in another problem, seen and addressed by Dharmottara: Is this conceptual cognition caused by perception itself a means of valid cognition, or not? If it is, then it is neither inference nor perception, and hence would contradict Dharmakīrti’s doctrine that only those two are means of valid cognition. If not, then how can this conceptual cognition (and, we might ask, the following inference) be certain? Dharmottara’s answer is that it has the certainty of the preceding *pramāṇa*, but not its status, because it does not fulfil the second criterion.\textsuperscript{25}

24 A similar regress is mentioned in PVSVṬ 19, 6–12 ad PVSV 2, 13–14, where Dharmakīrti speaks of ascertaining the three characteristics of a logical reason. In PVSVṬ it is connected with ŚV Ap 153, the last of a group of verses showing the problems that result for inference from the Buddhist denial to accept that a universal can be the object of perception.

25 This problem is often considered as motivating Dharmottara’s difficult position that perception needs conceptual cognition to be a means of valid cognition,
2. One could allow perception to have conceptual content: this would be close to the first option, but Dharmottara explicitly excludes this (in line with Dharmakīrti), even if the difference between his own model and this one is not easy to explain.\footnote{Sometimes Dharmottara comes so close to claiming savikalpakapratyakṣa that it is hard to see how he can actually avoid it. Cf., for example, Krasser 1991 vol. 2, 51–52, with notes, a German translation of PPar II 15, 1–16, 14, and the English summary in Krasser 1995: 253.}

We can now turn to a more detailed examination of Prajñākaragupta’s discussion of, and solution to, this puzzle, starting with PVA 229, 8–230, 4 (see section 4.2. for the text).

As before, let us first look at the structure of this passage: After quoting PV pratyakṣa 82–83 (82 for the second time), Prajñākaragupta presents us with a discussion between two parties. The first of these (introduced with atra kecid āhuḥ, section 4.2.1.) gives a certain interpretation of PV pratyakṣa 82. Through this interpretation (tena), so Prajñākaragupta, something that was said by a second party was refuted (yad uktam … tan nirākṛtam, section 4.2.2.). After this, Prajñākaragupta asks and answers the question in his own words (atrocyate, section 4.2.3.).

Unlike in the first passage that we examined, the two different parties involved here are identified by marginal annotations in PVA-msB and by the commentator Yamāri: the first is slob dpon chos mchog la sogs pa (PVATS D me 130a1; PVATS p me 173a6–7), “the teacher Dharmottara and so on”, that is, Dharmottara and his followers. The second party, who, according to Prajñākaragupta’s presentation, upholds something that Dharmottara and his followers wanted to refute, is identified by Yamāri and in the margin of PVA-msB as Śaṅkara.\footnote{These two identifications in the marginal material of PVA-msB 114a were duly noted by Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953: 229, nn. 1, 2.}


\footnote{Iwata (1991: 122, n. 138) and Ono (1995: 144, and n. 18) identify the quote as from Dharmottara. Solomon (1978–1979: 1) translated the passage attributed to Śaṅkara. The commentator Jayanta is silent on these issues. In all likelihood this Śaṅkara is the one who authored the Nyāyabhāṣyaṭīkā (see Steinkellner 1977: 215 f., Solomon 1978–1979). I suspect this is also what Sāṅkṛtyāyana (1953: 229, n. 2) assumed, asking “(naiyāyikena?)”.

\footnote{These two identifications in the marginal material of PVA-msB 114a were duly noted by Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953: 229, nn. 1, 2.}}
2.3. Śaṅkara

Śaṅkara criticises Dharmakīrti by asking whether the liṅgajñāna should be considered an inference or a perception. A Buddhist defender will thus be forced to admit either to an unnecessary elaboration by Dharmakīrti, or to a contradiction to Dharmakīrti:

1. If the liṅgajñāna is an inference, why is it spoken of here separately, and not together with the liṅgijñāna?
2. If the liṅgajñāna is a perception, then how can Dharmakīrti say that it is devoid of an appearance of an object, or call it erroneous?

The problem of the infinite regress is not explicitly mentioned in this passage. The first point, however, can be considered a precursor to this claim insofar as it points to a problem in Dharmakīrti’s presentation of the liṅgajñāna as separate from the final inferential awareness—the liṅgijñāna: if the former is, ultimately, an inference just like the latter, then why should they be discussed separately? The notion expressed here, that both are inferences, leads to the regress problem by the argument that, if the liṅgajñāna and liṅgijñāna are both inferences, one must conclude that each liṅgajñāna, because it is an inference, itself implies another liṅgajñāna, that is, another inference, ad infinitum.

2.4. Dharmottara and his followers

In Prajñākaragupta’s presentation, the main defence that Dharmottara and his followers developed against this criticism was twofold: first, the liṅgajñāna and the liṅgijñāna have the same object; second, they are not perceptions (ekaviṣayatvāl liṅgaliniṅgidiyor apratyakṣatvāc ca). Perhaps it is not immediately obvious how the passage introduced by kecid āhuḥ supports this summary. There, we find that two arguments are made. The first is that grasping a liṅga, like smoke, is not the same as a perception of smoke; rather, it is a conceptual cognition of smoke as connected to fire, i.e., the liṅgin or that qualified by the liṅga. The second aspect stressed in this part is that grasping a connection is impossible without grasping the two connected things. The only difference between cognizing the liṅgin and the liṅga lies in the predominant element: each must be secondarily present in the cognition of the other so that one can speak of an awareness of a liṅga or a liṅgin, that is, of smoke or of fire as relevant for an inferential cognition. As far as this passage is concerned, therefore, Prajñākaragupta’s summary of two reasons can be made sense of: that these two cognitions have the same object is supported directly
(tatra yathā lingigrahanāṃ lingiviṣayaṃ tathā liṅgagrahaṇam api); what we have to add is that they do not have the same simple object, but the same complex object (the liṅga and liṅgin as connected). That these two cognitions are not perception seems an acceptable conclusion: a connection between two things cannot be grasped as such by perception, since the cognition of a connection presupposes the conceptual categorization of relata, something that perception is not capable of, according to basic principles of Buddhist epistemologists.

A separate question is whether this is a fair representation of Dharmaottara’s views. Two sources can be drawn on for this purpose. The first is a passage from Dharmaottara’s commentary on Dharmakīrti’s PVin II.28 The passage follows Dharmaottara’s comments on PVin II 46, 9, tathā tayor abhāve tajjām jīānam. Dharmakīrti has just made the point that neither a thing’s essence nor an effect, two valid reason-characteristics in his system of inference, exist when, respectively, the thing that the essence belongs to or the cause is absent. In this statement, he says that it is the same for the cognition arising from either an essence or an effect: in the absence of the two, there is no cognition of them (the tathā continues the negation from the previous sentence, so Dharmaottara).

For our purposes, the most important point in Dharmaottara’s short discussion of this statement is this one, PVinṬ, dze 201a2–3 (=PVinṬD, dze 171b5–6):

de las skies pa'i (P: pa mi) shes pa yang rang gis (D, P: gi) bsgrub par bya ba la mi 'khrul pa nyid kyi yul can yin gyi, rtags kyi rang gi mshan nyid 'dzin pa ni ma yin no. du ba'am byas pa rang gi ngo bos gzung ba ni rtags ma yin gyi, 'on kyang bsgrub bya med na mi 'byung bar gzung ba yin no. de'i phyir rtags bsgrub bya dang 'brel par 'dzin pa ni rtags shes pa yin no.

Furthermore, the cognition which arises from these [two, the effect and the essence,] is possessed of an object that is not mistaken with regard to what is to be established through itself; nevertheless, [this cognition] does not grasp the svalaksana [that is] the liṅga. Smoke or something that is produced is not a liṅga which is grasped with [its] own nature; nevertheless, [they] are grasped as not existing without the sādhya, [their cause or nature, respectively]. Therefore the cognition of a liṅga is the grasping of a liṅga as connected with [its] sādhya.

Dharmaottara here unequivocally states that the cognition of either kind of a liṅga, the svabhāva or the kārya, does not grasp a svalaksana, which is the proper object of perception. The cognition of the liṅga must therefore

28 This was identified by Iwata 1991: 122, n. 138; cf. also Ono 1995: n. 18.
be a conceptual cognition. In addition, he maintains that they are grasped as ‘not existing without’ (probably for Skt. *avīnābhāva*) what can be concluded from them in an inference, the *sādhya*, and that therefore the cognition of a *liṅga* is always one in which it is grasped as connected to the *liṅgin*. This closely (though not literally) corresponds to what Prajñākaragupta characterizes as a cognition of the *liṅga* as connected to the *liṅgin*. There is, however, no mention of the predominance (*pradhanatā*) of the *liṅga* in this passage of Dharmottara, nor an explicit statement that the object or objects are the same in the two cognitions.

A second passage of interest is NBṬ 162, 1–7, critically edited and translated by Kellner (2008: 406–407) as follows:

> *punar anumānākāle sādhanam sādhyanāntarīyakam sāmānyena smartavayam. [...] tatra sāmānyasmaranam liṅgajñānam. viśiṣṭasya tu śabdagatakṛitakatvānyatvavasvabhāvasya smaranam anumāna-jñānam.*

Then, at the time of the inference, the proving [property] is to be remembered in general as inseparably connected with the inferendum. [...] The cognition of the indicator (*liṅga*) is among these [cognitions] (*tatra*) the recollection [of the proving property] in general. Inferential cognition, on the other hand, is the recollection of the particular producedness that belongs to sound, [the producedness] which has impermanence for [its] nature.

As before, Dharmottara maintains that the cognition of the *liṅga* is not a perception, since it is cognized in a general form, and that its cognition involves the element of a connection to the *liṅgin*. However, neither is there an explicit endorsement that they have the same complex object, nor any mention of a predominance of one or the other, even though both positions seem compatible to what he says. So we can observe a close conceptual proximity of Dharmottara’s ideas to those portrayed by Prajñākaragupta, and can conclude that the position attributed to “Dharmottara and his followers” appears like a fair, if perhaps not literal, representation.

A new element contained in this second passage is that of *smarana*, the recollective awareness that the *liṅgajñāna* is said to be, which is not an inference but is conceptual. This element gains importance in Prajñākaragupta’s discussion.

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29 This element is also mentioned later in the previous passage, PVInṬ, dze 201a4 (=PVInṬ, dze 171b7): *de las ni rjes su dpag pa'i shes pa skye ba ma yin gyi, 'on kyang bsgrub par bya ba la mi 'khrul pa nyid dran pa nyid las yin te.* (Trans.: It is not a cognition [of the type] ‘inference’ that arises from these [causes, effect and nature]; but [inference] does [arise] from recollecting that [the cognition of the effect or nature] is not erroneous with regard to the *sādhya.*)
2.5. Prajñākaragupta’s discussion

Next, in a passage starting with three verses (see section 4.2.3.), Prajñākaragupta restates the main objections of the opponent in what seems like a more refined form, and makes it clear that the problems have not yet been solved by the previous defence. Everything up to tasmād anyathā is spoken from the perspective of someone who has heard the defence by “Dharmottara and his followers”, but does not believe that they have managed to avert the errors that Śaṅkara drew attention to. These problems are repeated in the three verses opening the section: if the liṅgajñāna is inferential, there is an infinite regress; if it is perceptual then why should Dharmakīrti have said that it is free of the appearance of the liṅga?

In the prose following these verses, some new elements are introduced into the discussion of this dilemma: smarana is now mentioned for the first time, and, instead of two possibilities (inference and perception, as mentioned before and in the three verses), now three different attempts of solving the problem are discussed.

The introduction of smarana in the first option is supposed to save the previously advanced interpretation of Dharmakīrti by clarifying that, even though the liṅga (as a particular instance of smoke or similar) is actually grasped by a perception, it is cognized as being the liṅga only with the aid of a recollection. This is obviously the same position as we saw Dharmottara maintain in the two passages above. The opponent rejects this by saying that then we cannot explain why Dharmakīrti would have specifically added the specifier avañcakatva to this cognition in PV pratyakṣa 82. For smarana is not recognized as a means of valid cognition by Dharmakīrti, and so this specifier would be problematic: at worst, it would make smarana a means of valid cognition.

As a second option, a defender of Dharmakīrti actually accepts this: let smarana be a means of valid cognition. The opponent counters that then this recollection would be the liṅgijñāna and therefore simply the inferential cognition, and repeats the previous argument that then there would be no reason for Dharmakīrti to have explained the liṅga- and liṅgijñāna separately.

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30 I am not aware of any Buddhist epistemologist having actually maintained this. I take it that Prajñākaragupta is here just following the argument through in all its (logical) possibilities, and is not describing historically held positions. Dharmottara’s explanation in the NBT passage just discussed does support the conclusion that anumānajñāna can be viewed as a type of smarana, but not that a recollecting awareness would generally be a means of valid cognition.
As a third option, a defender might say that the *liṅgajñāna* cannot be classified as a means of valid cognition because it grasps what has already been grasped. This too, is commonly seen in Dharmottara for excluding the conceptual cognition following perception from being a means of valid cognition. Here, it is supposed to show that the conceptual cognition of smoke as connected to fire is not a means of valid cognition, even though it fulfils the first criterion of one. The opponent quickly rejects this with another argument that we commonly see in Dharmottara: then the previously occurring perception must be the means of valid cognition, and this cannot be said, as Dharmakīrti does, to be free of an appearance of its object. As it stands, this argument is not very satisfactory, since obviously the perception has a different object than the cognition of smoke as connected to fire, so that there seems to be a shift from the conceptual cognition of the *liṅga* to its perceptual cognition.

The most charitable interpretation is that the opponent insists on the fact that the *liṅgajñāna* must be a means of valid cognition because it is characterized as *avañcakatva*. Then we could understand how the shift from the conceptual cognition to the perception preceding it is motivated by finding a *pramāṇa* that would validate the *liṅgajñāna*.

After the presentation of this exchange, Prajñākaragupta presents his own solution, which is intended to finally dissolve these problems. The passage is a rather dense one, and it will not be possible to explore all its aspects in detail here. A realistic aim will be to understand how Prajñākaragupta sees it as avoiding the two problems mentioned above—the infinite regress and that of a direct appearance of the object.

First of all, Prajñākaragupta distinguishes between two kinds of inference, one which operates with an essence reason (*svabhāvahetu*, as in “A fir, therefore a tree”) and that which operates with an effect reason (*kāryahetu*, as in “Smoke, therefore fire”). The inference based on an essence reason is, so Prajñākaragupta, characterized by the fact that the cognition of the reason-characteristic is the cognition of that which it qualifies, because the respective objects of these two cognitions are not different in reality. In the other case, the cognition of the effect is not the same as the cognition of the cause, because effect and cause are different (again, we should add, in reality). Taking into consideration that this distinction is introduced by *tasmād anyathopavyākhya-yate*, I take Prajñākaragupta’s claim here to be primarily about Dharmakīrti’s statements in *PV pratyakṣa* 82.

Thus, as far as a *svabhāvahetu* inference is concerned, the phrase *pāramparyena vastuni pratibandhāt* in *PV pratyakṣa* 82 speaks of one and the same object: in the classic example of the ṣimiṇsapā tree, this means that

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31 See fn. 7.
both the cognition of the liṅga, “That’s a śimśapā”, and the cognition of the liṅgin, “That’s a tree”, point to the same real object that one could obtain upon acting on the inference. For a kāryahetu inference, however, we should take Dharmakīrti’s words as saying that the cognition of the liṅga and the liṅgin are connected to different real entities: a particular smoke in the first case, and a particular fire in the latter. Understood like this, what Dharmakīrti says is true for both sorts of inference: both the conceptual cognition “A śimśapā” and “Smoke” are devoid of an appearance of a real object, but can reliably prompt activity towards it. The only difference is that in the first case activity would attain the same object as one would attain by the conclusion of the inference (a particular tree), but in the second one would attain smoke instead of fire. Though not expressly stated by Prajñākaragupta (or his commentators), this explanation of PV pratyakṣa 82 seems to circumvent the danger of the cognition of a liṅga containing an appearance of the real thing, and supply a reason for Dharmakīrti’s differentiation between liṅga- and liṅgidhī: they are the same for the svabhāvahetu inference, but not for the kāryahetu one.

However, the infinite regress still looms: if cognitions of the liṅga are conceptual cognitions, then they would either be unreliable, defeating the validity of the inference using them, or would have to be inferences themselves. This is addressed by Prajñākaragupta in the next few statements, where he explains how a liṅgajñāna can be an inference without this resulting in an infinite regress.

Prajñākaragupta distinguishes two ways that an inferential awareness (liṅgijñāna) can come about: first, an inference has constituted a habit, such that the perception of smoke directly causes the ascertainment of fire, without any conceptual or recollective intermediary. The second case is where

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32 Specifically, the paksadharmaṭā could not be established. Cf. the introduction to the phrase starting with atyantābhyaśāt in Yamārī, PVATS D me 131a; PVATS P me 174b5–6: gal te rjes su dpag pa ’di la yang de’i (D: de) rang bzhin gyis rtags phyogs kyi chos su grub pa’i don du rjes su dpag pa gzhag dang gzhan gyi rjes su ’brang (D: ’gro) ba’i phyir thug (P: thugs) pa med par ’gyur ro zhe na, shin tu goms pa las so zhes bya ba’o. (Trans.: As [an opponent might say:] “Now, because also in this inference yet another inference [must] be applied for the purpose of establishing the liṅga as the nature of this, that is, as a property of the instance [that the inference is about], an infinite regress would result”, [Prajñākaragupta said] because of complete habituation.)

33 A fuller interpretation of the sentence starting with na cātyantābhyaśād must be the topic of a separate study. This sentence is, I believe, an aside with which Prajñākaragupta reserves the possibility that a cognition—similar to the liṅgijñāna in that it has the same object but dissimilar in that it does not have the same logical reasons—can come about in such a way that no conceptual cognition is involved in its generation. In other words, it is possible that, with the help of
the liṅgajñāna is itself an inferential awareness (the liṅgijñāna of another inference), which could itself have come about in either of these two ways.

Prajñākaragupta’s argument is somewhat obscure because he is using an idea that we find repeatedly throughout the PVA, but which is not expanded on here. It is that the recognition (pratyabhijñāna) which is the foundation of the liṅgajñāna must be a proper inference, and not just a conceptual cognition that is generated by perception. The recognition is characterized by Prajñākaragupta as the realization that smoke is smoke (dhūmasya tattvena grahaṇam eva pratibaddhatā), where the concept ‘to be smoke’ is understood to imply that of ‘to be an effect of fire’. This is the liṅgajñāna in the fullest sense, smoke as connected to fire, because the conceptual cognition of smoke as being smoke is a liṅga for an inference to fire only if this connection is known. There are thus two possibilities of how the liṅgajñāna is caused: a perception of smoke either leads directly to the liṅgajñāna “This is smoke”, or leads to

strong habituations, the perception of smoke leads directly to the (conceptual) cognition of the fact that fire is present. This is, strictly speaking, not at issue in PV pratyakṣa 82–83, where the liṅga- and liṅgijñāna are discussed. In the case referred to here, there would be neither a liṅgajñāna nor a liṅgijñāna that deserves the name, because no actual inference is happening. The example of a spontaneous cognition of fire from smoke is also discussed by Dharmakīrti (cf. Kellner 2004: 9–17), though in the context of the question whether inference always removes doubt or misconceptions.

34 Miyo (2014: 1289–1290, 1291, n. 10) comes to the same conclusion based on other passages. See, for example, yatra tu nābhyaśah, tatrānumānam eva pratyabhijñānādayaḥ (Ono 2000: 55, 18–56, 1), and its context; pratyabhijñānānam katham vyavahārahetur iti cet. pramāṇatvenaiveti vadāmahe. pramāṇata cānu-mānatvena. (PVA 577, 7) Perhaps also PVA 173, 17–22 (Inami et al. 2002: 42, 10–16) should be read in this sense. It is important to distinguish two arguments: that pratyabhijñāna is not a means of valid cognition in its own right, and that pratyabhijñāna is not a means of valid cognition other than inference. Prajñākaragupta makes both arguments.

35 It is questionable whether this is not in contradiction to HB 2, 11–4, 8. Dharmakīrti here says that both perception and inference can found the cognition of the liṅga, and then explains mainly the case where the liṅga is ascertained through perception. It is in this part that Dharmakīrti, like Dharmottara, appeals to gṛhitagrahaṇa to exclude the conceptual cognition that perception needs in order to make the liṅga known, and thus endorses what Prajñākaragupta is (in my interpretation) trying to avoid. Cf. also Steinkellner 1967: 92 ff. and Dunne 2004: 412–414.

36 So a full liṅgajñāna could look like this: “There is smoke there”, where ‘smoke’ is understood as a thing caused by fire. It is essential that the pratibandha is cognized in the concept of smoke. If this connection were not known, then the person who sees the smoke could not perform the inference due to ignorance of the relation between smoke and fire, and we could therefore not speak of a liṅgajñāna.
it through a recognition that is itself analysed as an inference.\textsuperscript{37} In both cases, for these cognitions to count as \textit{liṅgajñāna}, the concept ‘smoke’ in the resulting cognition “This is smoke” must imply smoke as the effect of fire. The dependency is not endless in this interpretation, because at some point there will be an inference such that not only the \textit{liṅgajñāna} but also the \textit{liṅgijñana} has become a habit, and therefore no separate inferential event is required any more.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, in this constellation of the arguments, we can see that the rejection of a cognition’s being a \textit{pramāṇa} due to \textit{grhītagrahaṇa} is not considered a strong enough argument by Prajñākaragupta: it is made by the Buddhist defendant whose position is described in this section, but from Prajñākaragupta’s evaluation of this defence we must conclude that he did not accept it. Again, this does not mean that the criterion of making a previously unknown object known was dropped by Prajñākaragupta, but rather that he thought its use at this point to be of no avail. It seemed preferable to him to explain recognition as an actual inference, so that it would not violate the second criterion, instead of excluding the \textit{liṅgajñana} from being a means of valid cognition because of this violation. For if the first criterion were not only met, but were also necessary in order to guarantee that the \textit{liṅgajñāna} is valid, then a subsequent disqualification of such a cognition on account of the second criterion would not be viable: it would result in an inadequate interpretation of PV \textit{pratyakṣa} 82, such that Dharmakīrti would either be contradicting himself or making inference impossible due to an infinite regress.

3. Conclusion

On the limited basis of these two passages, there is no reason to think that Prajñākaragupta did not accept the second criterion of being a means of valid cognition—that such a cognition does not grasp what has already been grasped—also in the realm of conventional activity. He evaluated its usefulness quite differently from Dharmottara, however. Whereas the latter readily used it to exclude those conceptual cognitions from being \textit{pramāṇa} which perception needs to lead to reliable activity (and thus fulfil the first criterion), Prajñākaragupta does not use this argument. He has

\textsuperscript{37} Prajñākaragupta classifies this inference as operating with an ‘essence reason’ (\textit{svabhāvahetu}), cf. Inami et al. 2002: 42, 12–13 (=PVA 173, 18–19): \textit{atah śābdapratyayagocara eva saddṛṣyāḥ svabhāvahetunā pratīyate}.

\textsuperscript{38} This, I believe, would solve the logical regress of one inference implying another, but not the factual one which would need a ‘first inference’ that would actually found all others.
developed Dharmakīrti’s theories regarding both the relation of inference and perception to each other, and how they function to enable everyday activity, in such a way that inferences can unproblematically depend on other inferences. Cognitions which are, as it were, coincidentally reliable must not be means of valid cognitions, but systematically reliable ones must be. And if these latter are conceptual, then, so Prajñākaragupta, they must therefore be inferences.

In addition, if the historical context given to the second passage by Yamāri and the scribal annotations is accurate, this solution was a response to Śaṅkara’s attacks on Dharmottara’s interpretation of Dharmakīrti.

4. Appendices

The Sanskrit text of the two passages discussed above follows here. This is a simplified version of a critical edition of PVA on PV pratyakṣa 54–84 that the author is currently preparing; only the most important variants have been selected.

4.1. Passage 1: PVA 218, 5–26 (= PVA $D$ te 203b5–204a6, PVA $p$ te 241b6–242b3)

4.1.1. A PVA 218, 5–8

atha vānyathā—
yatra bhāvāgatis tatrānumāṇaṁ mānaṁ iṣyate |
vartamāne ’timātreṇa$^{40}$ vṛttāv adhyakṣamānātā || 240 ||
yatrātyantābhāyāsād avikalpayato ’pi pravartanam tatra pratyakṣam pramāṇam. anyathā vikalpasya pramāṇāntaratā prāptā yadi yatra vikalpas tatraiva pratyakṣaṁ pravartakaṁ pramāṇaṁ ceti.$^{41}$

4.1.2. B PVA 218, 9–15

atha pratyakṣaṁ eva tatra$^{42}$ pramāṇam, na vikalpo grhītagrahaṇād iti cet. vicāritam etad$^{43}$ yathā grhītagrāhītā nāsti. punar apy ucyate. tathā hi—

$^{39}$ McAllister 2020 tries to show its corollary, that perceptions can lead to activity through habituation, and thus without the intervention of conceptual cognitions.

$^{40}$ PVA-msB adds abhyāsena as a gloss.

$^{41}$ See section 2.1. above for a paraphrase.

$^{42}$ tatra PVA-msE, der PVAD, PVA$^{-}$p: no equivalent in PVA-msB.

$^{43}$ vicāritam etad PVA-msB: vicāritam eva tad PVA-msE. I am not certain which
discussion this is referring to. One candidate is a section starting with this rather provocative question, PVA 216, 18: 

\[ \text{atha kim vikalpasya pravartakatvam asti yena taddvarena pratyaksasya pravartakatā.} \] (Trans.: So now, is it a conceptual cognition that makes [a person] act, so that it is by means of this [conceptual cognition] that perception makes [that person] act?) This passage seems to be meant by the gloss on \textit{vicāritam} in PVATS\textsubscript{D} me 110b5–6; PVATS\textsubscript{P} me 146b2–3

\[ \text{dp Yad zin to zhes bya ba ni ci rnam par rtog pa 'jug par byed pa nyid yod dam zhes bya ba der ro.} \]

\[ \text{sahāyena kasyacid arthitā PVA-msB: kasyacid asahāyenārthitā (?)} \] PVA-msE.

\[ \text{saṃsparśāt PVA-msB: saṃsparśāt PVA-msE.} \]

Paraphrase:

[Opponent:] Now, there [between conceptual cognition and perception] only perception is a means of valid cognition, not the conceptual cognition [following it], because [this conceptual cognition] grasps what has [already] been grasped.

[Proponent:] This was examined, how [a conceptual cognition following perception] does not grasp what has [already] been grasped. And again, it is stated [here]. For it is so:

If a conceptual cognition does not assist an activity, then what is it for?

If a conceptual cognition assists activity, then why is it not a means of valid cognition?

If a conceptual cognition is not what assists [activity] at all, then how is it assumed to be a companion of perception? As is well known, no one aims [to achieve] an end by a companion who, though present, is of no use [for that aim]. [Opponent:] Now, without that [conceptual cognition] there is no activity. [Answer: Then] perception would not be a means of valid cognition. [Opponent:] Also without that [perception], [a person] would not act. [Proponent:] Then a dual means of valid cognition [consisting of conceptual cognition and perception] follows.

[Opponent:] Now, conceptual cognition is not a means of valid cognition, because it does not touch the nature of a real thing. [Proponent: Then] also perception is not a means of valid cognition, because it does not touch the nature of that which is to be attained. That was said just now.
4.1.3. C PVA 218, 15–21

tasmāt—

anvayavyatirekābhīyāṁ vikalpasya pravartane
| yadi kāraṇatā47 nāsti tadā syād apramāṇatā || 242 ||

pratyakṣāḥ parato vṛttir vikalpasya pravartane
| śaktiś ced vyavadhānena48 pratyakṣasyāpramāṇatā || 243 ||

atha vyavahitasyāpi pramāṇatā.49 tathā sati caṅkurādīnām api pravarta-
katve pramāṇatā syāt. ajñānatvān neti cet. samanantarapratyayasya
syāt. anyaviṣayyatvāt tasya neti cet. samānaviṣayatve syāt. bhavaty
eveti cet. na tatra pravartye 'jñānatvāt. na hi pravartyaviṣayatvaṃ
pūrvaksanagṛhāhinah pratyakṣasyāsti. tasmād anantaravāt pramāṇaṃ
vikalpa eva syāt.50

47 kāraṇatā PVA-msB, rgyu nyid PVA_D, PVA_p: karaṇatā PVA-msE.
48 vyavadhānena pratyā PVA-msB: vyavadhānenaṭya (?) PVA-msE.
49 vyavahitasyāpi pramāṇatā PVA-msB post correctionem, PVA-msE: vyavahita-
syāpy apramāṇatā PVA-msB ante correctionem. Tibetan: ci ste chod mang tshad
ma nyid min na PVA_p ci ste tshad kyang tshad ma nyid yin na PVA_D.
50 Paraphrase:

Therefore,

if it is not [the case] that a conceptual cognition is an activity’s cause in
terms of [the] joint presence or joint absence [of the cause, conceptual
cognition, with the effect, activity], then [the conceptual cognition] would not be a means of valid cognition.

If [you claim, however, that] the occurrence of a conceptual cognition after perception is [perception’s] capacity for activity, then perception is not a means of valid cognition due to [its] separation [from its own
capacity].

[Opponent:] Now, even though [perception is] separated [in this way, it] is a means
of valid cognition. [Proponent:] If so, then also the eyes and so on, given that
they are what prompts activity, would be means of valid cognition. [Opponent:] No, because [they] are not cognition. [Answer: Then] the immediately preceding
cause, [which is a cognition], would be a [means of valid cognition]. [Opponent:] No, because that has an object different [from the one that is to be attained],
[Proponent: So] if [it has] the same object, it would be [a means of valid cognition]? [Opponent:] It would certainly be! [Proponent:] No, [the immediately preceding
cause cannot be a means of valid cognition] because there, [that is, in the case of
that immediately preceding cognition,] there is no cognition with regard to what
is to be acted towards. For perception, which grasps the previous moment, does
not have what is to be acted towards as its object. Therefore, only the conceptual
cognition [but not perception] would be a means of valid cognition, because of
immediately [preceding the cognition that acts].
4.1.4. D PVA 218, 21–26

athāpi pravṛttivisaye pratyakṣam pravarteta pratibhāsamātreṇa. tathāpi pramāṇaṃ vikalpaḥ. grhītagrāhitve katham pramāṇam iti cet. pravartakatvā, yathā svabhāvānunāmam. na hi pratibhāsamātreṇa pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam. kṣaṇikatve 'pi pratyaksagrāhyatā syāt. bhavaty eveti cet. kṣaṇikagrāhaham anumāṇam na pramāṇaṃ bhavet, grhītagrāhitvā. atha vyavahārasādhanāt pramāṇam. vikalpo 'pi tatheti pramāṇam bhavet. tasmāt paroksaviṣayapravartakatve 'pi spaṭāspaṭabhedāt pramāṇadvitayam eva.52

4.2. Passage 2: PVA 229, 8–230, 4 (= PVA_D te 213a7–214a4, PVA_p te 254b1–255b3)

4.2.1. A PVA 229, 8–229, 13

atra53 kecid āhuḥ—liṅgabuddhir liṅgipratibaddhatayā dhūma dder buddhiḥ. na hi liṅgam indriyavat sattāmātreṇa gamakam. nāpi svālambanavijñānapratiḥbāsamanātreṇa. adṛṣṭam tadrūpaṃ tatsam-bandhasyāpi54 pratipattiprasaṅgāt. tasmāt pratibaddhatayā grahaṇam liṅgagrahaṇam. sa ca pratibandho nobhayarūpasparsām antareṇa grahītuṃ śakyah. anyathā grahaṇasyādarsanāt. tatra yathā liṅgigra-

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51 pratibhāsamātreṇa pratyakṣaṃ PVA-msE; pratibhāsamātreṇatyakṣaṃ PVA-msB
52 Paraphrase:
[Opponent:] Still, perception might act towards the object of activity by [the] mere appearance [of the present object in it]. [Proponent:] Even if it is so, the conceptual cognition is the means of valid cognition. [Opponent:] How would such a conceptual cognition be a means of valid cognition when it grasps what has [already] been grasped? [Proponent:] Because it causes activity; like an inference [using] an essence reason. For perception is not a means of valid cognition merely through the appearance [of an object in it. For, if it were, then] even momentariness would have [already been] grasped by perception. [Opponent:] Certainly that is [the case]! [Proponent: Then] an inference grasping [something] momentary would not be a means of valid cognition, because of grasping what has [already] been grasped. If [you say that inference is] a means of valid cognition because of establishing everyday activity, [then] also a conceptual cognition would be like that. So it would be a means of valid cognition.
Therefore, even though [they both] cause activity towards an object hidden [from them], there are exactly two means of valid cognition because of the difference [in the objects being] distinct and indistinct.

53 This passage is not fully covered in PVA-msE, because folio 225 is missing.
54 The Tibetan reads differently: de’i rang bzhin dang ’brel pa ma mthong bas kyang
haṇaṁ liṅgiviṣayaṁ tathā liṅgagrahaṇam api. kevalaṁ prādhānyetaratā. 
liṅgagrahaṇe hi liṅgaṁ pradhānatatayā liṅgigrahaṇe ca liṅgī pradhānatatayā 
pratīyatayate.55

4.2.2. B PVA 229, 13–18

tena yad uktam—liṅgijñānam atrānumānaṁ tasya cāvisamvādana- 
brāntate56 prastute. tat ko liṅgagater avasaro yena tasayā api vicāraḥ 
krtaḥ. atha sāpy anumāntmikā. tathā sati liṅgiratipattir etevi na 
prthagnirdeśas. pratyakṣarūpāpi ca liṅgapratipattiḥ, na sā liṅgā- 
bhāsāsūnyā. liṅgyābhāsāsūnyatve ca saty api na bhrāntatā tadavi- 
śayatvāt. na hi stambhavijñānam kumbhākāraśūnyatatayā bhrāntam57 
iti tan nirākṛtam. ekaviṣayatvāl58 liṅgaliṅgidhiyore apratyakṣatvāc59 ca.60

Paraphrase:

About this [passage] some [people] said: “The awareness of the liṅga [consists in] 
the awareness of [a liṅga like] smoke and so on as being connected to a liṅgin. For 
the liṅga does not let [a person] understand [the liṅgin] simply by [its] existence, 
like the sense faculties [do], nor by [its] mere appearance in a cognition whose 
basis is itself. The nature of this [thing] is not seen, because it would follow that 
there is a cognition even of that connected to it. Therefore, the grasping of the 
liṅga [consists in] grasping [it] as being connected. And this connection cannot 
be grasped without a mixing together of both natures [of the relata], because 
otherwise one would not observe the grasping [of a connection]. There [amongst 
the cognitions of the liṅga and the liṅgin], in the same way as the grasping of the 
liṅgin has the liṅgin as its object, so also the grasping of the liṅga [has the liṅgin 
as its object]. However, [one] is primary and [the other] is not. For in the grasping 
of a liṅga, the liṅga is understood as being primary, but in the grasping of the 
liṅgin the liṅgin [is understood] as being primary.”

Paraphrase:

Through this what was said—“Here [in PV pratyakṣa 82–83], inference is the 
cognition of the liṅgin, and the fact that this [cognition of the liṅgin] is non- 
belying and erroneous is made the topic. Therefore, what space is there for 
the cognition of the liṅga, so that this [cognition] would also be investigated? Even 
if [you say that] this [cognition of the liṅga] has the nature of inference, [then], if 
it is so, [it is] simply the cognition of the liṅgin. So there [should be] no separate 
description [of the cognition of the liṅga]. But [if] the cognition of the liṅga 
has the nature of perception, [then] it is not devoid of an appearance of the liṅga. And, 
even though it is [true that the cognition of the liṅga is] devoid of the appearance
4.2.3. C PVA 229, 18–230, 4

atrocyate$^{61}$—

pratibaddhatayā liṅgagrahaṇaṃ yadi liṅgadhīḥ
pratibandhagrahaḥ sāmyadharmayor$^{62}$ anumānataḥ || 266 ||
tathā saty anavasthā syāt tatrāpi pratibandhavit
anumāṇāntarād eva tatrāpi ca tadantarāt || 267 ||

atha pratyaksato liṅgam liṅgatvena pratīyate
evaṃ sati tadābhāsaśūnyatasya katham bhavet || 268 ||

atha grhīto$^{63}$ ’pi pratyakṣena tadā smaryate liṅgatvena dhūmādikah. evaṃ sati smaraṇam apramāṇam eva. kim asyāvaṅcakatvapratipādanena. na hi tat tatra pramāṇam. pratyakṣānumānayor eva pramāṇatvenāvi-samvādasāṅgamaḥ.

atha smaraṇam api pāramparyena pratibandhāt pramāṇam eva. tad eva tāri liṅjijñānam anumāṇam ceti kim liṅgaliṅginor bhedena nirdesaḥ. atha tad apramāṇam eva grhītagrahaṇād ity ucyate. tathā sati prākpravṛttam pratyaksam eva tatra pramāṇam. tac ca tadābhāsaśūnyam na bhavitī virodhah. tasmād anyathopavyākhyāyate.$^{64}$ liṅgadhīḥ svabhāvaheṭor jātā liṅgadhīḥ eva liṅgaliṅginoh paramārthato bhedanāh. liṅgadhīḥ kāryaheṭoh kāraṇaviśayā. tatra bhedād asau na liṅgadhīḥ. na cātyantābhyaśād akasmād$^{65}$ dhūmād aṅgirdhīḥ svalakṣaṇagrāhiniyā dhūmādhiyo nodeti. dhūmasya ca tatvena grahaṇam eva pratibaddhataḥ. tattvaṃ ca pratyabhijñānāt pratyabhijñānam ca tadrūpadarśanād anumāṇam eva. tadrūpadarśanām ca pratyakṣam atyantābhyaśād vyavahāra-kāraṇam

of the liṅgin, it would not [therefore] be erroneous because it does not have that as its object [anyway]. For, the cognition of a pillar is not erroneous because it is devoid of the form of a pot.”—is refuted, because both the cognition of the liṅga and the liṅgin have a single object, and because they are not perceptions.

61 PVA 229, n. 5 notes that avaśeṣa (“the rest”) was added here in the margin. I cannot decipher this addition, but follow Sāṅkṛtyāyana in taking it as a gloss.

62 sāmyadharmayor PVA-msB: bras bu’i chos kyi PVA$_D$, PVA$_P$. PVA 229, n. 6 notes that sādhārana-dharmayoh is found in the margin here.

63 grhīto em. (as in PVA): grhaḥīto PVA-msB.

64 anyathopavyākhyāyate PVA-msE (gzhan du bshad par bya ste PVA$_D$, PVA$_P$): anyathopatyāvyākhyāyate PVA-msB. PVA chooses to emend to anyathopa(pa) tīyā vyākhyāyate.

65 cātyantābhyaśād akasmād PVA-msE, PVA-msB post correctionem: cātyantābhyaśād asmād PVA-msB ante correctionem, PVA. Cf. glo bur (PVA$_D$, PVA$_P$).
Paraphrase:
To this is said:

If the cognition of the *liṅga* is the grasping of the *liṅga* as being connected [to the *liṅgin*], [then] one [must] grasp the connection of the two factors, which are universals, because of an inference.

If it is so, there would be no stopping: in this [inference] too the connection is known only because of another inference, and in this [second inference] too [it is known only] because of [a third inference] other than that [second inference].

[You might say:] “Now, the *liṅga* is cognized as being a *liṅga* because of a perception.” If it is so, how would this [perception] be free of the appearance of this [*liṅga*]?

[Opponent:] Now, even though it has been [first] grasped by perception, [a *liṅga* like] smoke and so on is then remembered as being [the] *liṅga*. [Proponent:] If it is so, remembering is not a means of valid cognition at all; what [use] is the explanation of its not being unreliable [then]? For this [remembering] is not a means of valid cognition in that case. For only perception and inference are, due to being means of valid cognition, correctly connected to [the property of] not being belying.

[Opponent:] Now, remembering too is certainly a means of valid cognition, since there is an indirect connection [to a real thing]. [Proponent:] Then this [remembering] as such is the cognition of a *liṅgin*, and [hence] inference. So why [this] explanation of the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin* as different? [Opponent:] Now, it was said that this [remembering] is not a means of valid cognition at all, because it grasps what has already been grasped. [Proponent:] If it is so, then the perception alone, as it has occurred before, is a means of valid cognition there [amongst perception and conceptual cognition]; but this [perception] is not devoid of the appearance of this [*liṅga*]. So there is a contradiction [to Dharmakīrti’s statement *tadābhāsāśūnyayoḥ* in PV *pratyakṣa* 82]. Therefore, [Dharmakīrti’s point] is explained in another way: [In the verse] the cognition of the *liṅga* is just the cognition of the *liṅgin* which has arisen from the essence-reason, because in reality there is no difference [between] the *liṅga* and the *liṅgin*. The cognition of the *liṅgin* which [has arisen] from an effect-reason has the cause as its object. Because [in reality] there is a difference amongst them, [i.e., the effect and the cause], this [cognition of the *liṅgin*] is not the cognition of the *liṅga* [in the verse]. But it is not the case that, on [the basis of] complete habituation, a cognition of fire does not arise spontaneously from smoke because of a cognition of smoke.
which grasps [that] particular, [the instance of smoke]. And the fact that smoke is connected [to its cause] is precisely the grasping of [smoke] as being that [i.e., smoke]. That [smoke] is that [namely smoke] is due to recognition, and [this] recognition is due to observing the nature of this [smoke]; [so it] is only inference. But [this] observation of its nature is a perception that, due to complete habituation, is the cause for everyday activity. So, there is no failure to stop. Therefore, the cognition of the liṅga is precisely the grasping of a particular. But the [grasping] of [smoke’s] being connected to fire is the grasping of a universal. That which comes into existence out of seeing the form of this [liṅga] is simply inference, which has the nature of a cognition of the liṅga.

Therefore [there should] not be a designation [of a cognition of the liṅga] in another way, [i.e., as something other than inference].


Perceived but not known: *gṛhitagrahaṇa* and Prajñākaragupta’s criticism

**NBṬ**


**Oetke 1999a**


**Oetke 1999b**


**Ono 1995**


In Japanese, with English summary.

**Ono 2000**


**P**

Peking edition of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon.

**PPar II**


**PV III**


PVAṬS  *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā supariśuddhi (Tshad ma rnam ’grel gyi rgyan gyi ’grel bshad shin tu yongs su dag pa).* D 4226, phe 174b1-tse 251a7. P 5723, phe 208a7-tse 321a5.


PVInṬ  *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Tshad ma rnam par nges pa’i ’grel bshad).* D 4227, tshe 1b1–178a3. P 5727, dze 1–we 209b8.
Perceived but not known: gṛhītagrahaṇa and Prajñākaragupta’s criticism

PV$_{M}$$^{\text{Pr}}$ramāṇasiddhi

PVSV

PVSVṬ

PVV
$^{\text{Pr}}$Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti, ed. R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana: Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika with a Commentary by Manorathanandin. Patna 1938–1940.

Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953
R. Sāṅkṛtyāyana, ed., Pramāṇavārtikabhāshyam or Vārtikālaṅkāraḥ of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārtikam). Patna 1953.

Solomon 1978–1979

Steinkellner 1967

Steinkellner 1977

Steinkellner/Krasser 1989

ŚV Ap
Introduction

In Buddhist epistemology, especially from the time of Dignāga, the distinction between particulars (svalakṣaṇa) and universals (sāmānyalakṣaṇa) was generally seen as the grounds for the distinction between the two means of valid cognition—namely, perception and inference. Dignāga’s successor Dharmakīrti further maintained that particulars are the ultimately existent (paramārthasat), distinct from the conventionally existent (saṃvṛtisat). Of the two concepts, the ultimate level of existence is often defined by the notion of causal efficacy (arthakriyā) or, more precisely, an entity’s capacity (sāmarthya) to produce the effect expected from it. For instance, a pot is existent due to its capacity to produce the effect of holding water for a person who uses it. A microscopic analysis, however, reveals not a pot, but the assemblage of atoms that constitute the pot. This is said to be the particular that momentarily exists by producing the perception of the object in the moment.¹ In other words, an object’s ultimate existence is defined by its

¹ This article is based on a presentation I gave at the 16th World Sanskrit Conference, Bangkok, 30 June 2015. I have already discussed the same topic in an earlier paper (Moriyama 2015 [in Japanese]), and several arguments are repeated in this article, though it contains some revised ideas. I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Birgit Kellner for kindly sending me her dissertation, which contains her detailed analysis of upalabdhi and sattā together with text editions and translations of PVA ad PV IV 263–275. Her dissertation is one of the most helpful earlier studies on this topic. I would also like to thank Prof. Masahiro Inami, Prof. Chizuko Yoshimizu, Prof. Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, Prof. Motoi Ono, Prof. Taisei Shida, Dr. Mai Miyo-Shida, Dr. Hayato Kondo, and Mr. Akito Yokoyama for their valuable comments on a draft of this paper that I presented at a meeting held at Tsukuba University on 22 February 2019. I dedicate this article to the memory of Prof. Helmut Krasser, who kindly helped me in my studies of Prajñākaragupta’s religious philosophy during the years 2002–2007 in Vienna.

¹ For an analysis of arthakriyā, see Dunne 256–260.
perceptibility. On such particulars as perceptible objects, J. Dunne (2004: 85, fn. 52) provides an interesting note:

Perhaps Dharmakīrti’s most concise statement of this point is: “Existence is just perception” (sattvam upalabdhir eva). This claim, which might even be rendered “To exist is to be perceived,” indicates the close relation between perception and the ultimately real in Dharmakīrti’s philosophy.

Dunne carefully translates the term upalabdhi as both “perception” and “to be perceived,” likely because he knew Dharmakīrti’s explanation on the basis of grammatical analysis and also because the phrase reminds us of G. Berkeley’s famous phrase reflecting his idealism, “esse est percipi.” Certainly, if the term upalabdhi is understood as “to be perceived,” it is not a problem for us to understand Dharmakīrti’s statement as an expression of existence defined by perceptibility—namely, an object’s capacity for producing its image in one’s cognition. This is perfectly suitable for the causal account of perception in Buddhist epistemology. However, we should not overlook “perception,” the first alternative of the translation of upalabdhi, which leads us to the following question: What does it mean when an object’s existence is defined only by the act of its perception rather than its perceptibility?

Unfortunately, no answer to this question is found in Dharmakīrti’s writings. His follower Prajñākaragupta, however, provides a clue that could lead to an intelligible interpretation. Thus, the aim of this paper is to examine Prajñākaragupta’s argument concerning the phrase sattvam upalabdhir eva.

1. Dharmakīrti on sattvam upalabdhir eva

Before entering Prajñākaragupta’s analysis, let us first examine the root argument in Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (PVSV) and Pramāṇavārttika (PV) I. 3ab. Since excellent studies by E. Steinkellner and B. Kellner already exist, I shall simply summarize their points. Dharmakīrti explains the logical reason called anupalabdhihetu that is used to introduce a negative judgement regarding nonexistent objects as follows:

The non-occurrence of any means of valid cognition, namely, non-cognition [of an object],\(^2\) results in [the cognizer’s] non-

\(^2\) I will translate the term upalabdhi/upalambha both as “perception” and as “cognition”
activity with regard to the nonexistent object (PV I. 3ab).
That is, it results in [the cognizer’s] negation of [activities like] cognizing, uttering, and treating [the object] as existent, because those [activities] presuppose perception. This is a common nature for logical reasons for the negation of [something] nonexistent and the affirmation of [something] existent. That is to say, [an object’s] existence (sattva) is nothing but either [its] perceptibility (upalabdhi) that is characterized by the causal capacity of a real entity [to produce a cognition of itself], or the act of perception (upalabdhi) as the occurrence of cognition on the basis of the [real entity’s capacity], because due to this [upalabdhi] one cognizes, utters, and treats [an object] as existent. Moreover, for a nonexistent [object], non-cognition amounts to [its] nonexistence.\(^3\)

Concerning the issue of existence/nonexistence, Dharmakīrti explores its meaning within the context of our everyday activities. When we perceive an empty space on the table where a pot previously stood, we understand the situation and say, “A pot does not exist on the table,” and perform an action that is appropriate for the context. Dharmakīrti claims that such activities (i.e., abhāvavyavahāra) occur from the inference based on a logical reason called anupalabdhihetu that functions for the nonexistence of a certain perceptible object.

On the meaning of the logical reason, Dharmakīrti provides a detailed analysis of the term upalabdhi. As he explains, according to Sanskrit grammar, the noun stems from the verb upa-LABH, and thus he analyzes the action “to perceive”\(^4\) from the perspective of both the object (karman) and the agent (kartṛ). From the former, the term indicates an object’s fitness (yogyatā) for being perceived—namely, perceptibility—and from the latter, the same term indicates the occurrence of its cognition in this paper. While there are several contexts in which the term implies not only perception (pratyakṣa) in its strict sense (i.e., non-conceptual cognition), but also conceptual cognition, there are cases where it is better to translate it as “perception” especially in Prajñākaragupta’s explanations, in which the term is understood as a synonym of sākṣātkaraṇa (immediate experience).

\(^3\) PVSV 4.5–12: apravṛttih pramāṇānām anupalabdhiḥ apravṛttiphalā ’sati (PV 1.3ab), sajjñānaśabdavahārāpratīśedhaphalā, upalabdhipārvakatvāt teśām iti. idām sadasatpratīśedhavidhīhetvos tulyām rūpam. tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva vastuyogatālaksanā tadāśrayā vā jñānapravṛttih. tataḥ sajjñānaśabdavahārāpravṛttih. asatāṃ cāsattvam anupalabdhiḥ. For other translations, see Kellner 2003: 125–126, Steinkellner 2013 [I]: 10–11. For an analysis of this passage, see Kellner 1999: 58, Dunne 2004: 85, fn. 52.

\(^4\) Kellner (1999: 56, fn. 72) gives a detailed explanation of this term.
At first glance, the distinction between these two interpretations is subtle; yet, when we look at their contexts more carefully, a significant difference becomes manifest. Whereas the former is simply a paraphrase of Dharmakīrti’s well-known position that defines the ultimately existent by its causal efficacy, particularly its capacity to produce a cognition of itself as an object, the latter seems to be an idealist interpretation that does not allow any mind-independent entities. Did Dharmakīrti really intend to assert such a position?

On this point, it is noteworthy that commentators such as Devendrabuddhi, Šākyabuddhi, Dharmottara, and Manorathanandin

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5 For the two interpretations, see Steinkellner 2013 [II]: 50–51, fn. 55.

6 Cf. PVP D, Che, 322a5–6; P, Che, 385a3–4 (ad PV IV 263ab): byed pa po la gnas pa nyid yin na ni dmigs pa'i shes pa dmigs pa yin te | de yang de 'dra ba'i don yod pa nyid kyi rgyu nyid yin pa'i phyir ro || khyab pa dang ldog pa med na ni 'khrul pa med pa can yin pa de ltar na yang yod pa nyid bzhin du nye bar btags pa las yod pa nyid yin no. “When [the action ‘to perceive’] is [understood] in terms of the agent (*kartṛṣṭha), upalabdhi is the cognition of non-perception, because this [cognition] is also the cause of such an object’s existence. When there is no negative concomitance with the pervader (*vyāpaka, i.e., cognition), there is no deviation. In this case, too, it is almost like existence. [Thus,] through [its] metaphorical usage (*upacāra), [cognition] is existence.”

7 Cf. PVT, D, Je, 13b2–3, P, Je, 16a1–3: gang gi tshe byed pa po la yod pa'i bya ba yin pa'i phyogs de la ni de'i rten can gyi shes pa 'jug pa yin te | shes pa 'jug pa gang la rten dngos po rung ba de yod pa de la de skad ces bya 'o || de ni nye bar btags pa'i phyir yod pa zhues bya 'o || “When [one follows] the position in which [the action ‘to perceive’ is understood to be] the action that is contained in the agent (*kartṛgatakriyā), [the existence] is the occurrence of cognition (*jñānapravṛtti) that is based on this [existence]. The occurrence of cognition, on the basis of which the fitness of the entity (*vastuyogyatā) exists, is said [to be] so (i.e., ‘existence’). The [occurrence of cognition] is, because of its metaphorical usage (*upacāra), [cognition] is existence.”

8 Cf. PVinṬ (ad PVin II 59.2–3) D, Dse, 203a7–b1, P, Dse, 241b3–5: gal te de (D : de om. P) yod kyang mi skye ni ni nam yang skye bar mi 'gyur ro || gan tshigs des na don gyi yod pa gang yin pa de nyid la dmigs pa brjod pa yin no || de'i phyir de ltar nye bar btags nas shes pa nyid la snang ba'i don yod par brjod pa 'am | nye bar btags pa kho nas don yod pa la yang shes par brjod pa yin no || “If [a cognition] does not occur even in the case of its (i.e., an object’s) existence, [the cognition] would never occur. For this reason, the existence of an object is called ‘cognition.’ Therefore, based on this metaphorical usage (*upacāra), cognition is called the ‘existence of a perceptible object (*dṛśyārtha).’ Or, through the same metaphorical usage, the existence of an object is also called ‘cognition.’” For text and translation, see Kellner 1999: 202, 373, and Kellner 1997: 134, fn. 21.

9 Cf. PVV 505.27–506.1 (ad PV IV 263ab): atha kartṛdharmo jñānam, tadā tadaṇṇayayatirekānudvihānād bhāvasattāvyavasthānasy-apacārāt saiva sattā. “If [the term upalabdhi denotes] the agent’s property, namely, cognition, [it is] said metaphorically that only this [cognition] is the existence, because the settlement of an entity’s existence follows the co-presence and co-absence of it (i.e., cognition).”
regard the second interpretation as a metaphorical usage (nye bar btags pa, upacāra) of the word upalabdhi. According to this interpretation, an entity’s existence is primarily defined by its capacity for producing cognition, not by the actual occurrence of perception. In contrast to this, Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation does not rely on a metaphorical explanation of upalabdhi. Let me now present an outline of his interpretation.

2. Prajñākaragupta on sattvam upalabdhir eva

As is well known, Prajñākaragupta did not write a commentary on Dharmakīrti’s PV I, nor on its auto-commentary (PVSV), which is where the phrase sattvam upalabdhir eva appears. There are, however, materials that indicate how Prajñākaragupta understood this statement. These are found in his commentary on PV IV 263, in which Dharmakīrti repeated his claim regarding anupalabdhihetu, focusing especially on the necessary connection (pratibandha) between the reason and the object to be proved (i.e., in this case, nonexistence\(^\text{10}\)). Repeating the point made in PVSV ad PV I. 3ab, Dharmakīrti argues that a relation of identity (tādātmya) exists between them because existence (astitva) is not different from upalabdhi.\(^\text{11}\) In this half verse, which immediately reminds us of Dharmakīrti’s phrase sattvam upalabdhir eva, Prajñākaragupta spells out his own ideas by replying to the following objection:

[Objection:] Non-perception (anupalabdhi) is something different from perception, and nonexistence (abhāva) is something different from existence. How, then, could the two (i.e., anupalabdhi and abhāva) be really identical? Moreover, just as a cognition (jñāna) and its object (jñeya) are distinct, the negation of this [cognition] and the negation of this [object] are also distinct. Indeed, it is not the case that a thing’s existence is nothing but [its] perception, for this (i.e., a thing’s existence) is possible even in the absence of [its] cognition. To explain:

"Even the imperceptible existence of things is also grasped by inference. Isn’t the existence of fire inferred from the observation of smoke?" (568)

But even in this [imperceptible existence], the existence is not [necessarily equal to] the inferential cognition, because there is a

\(^{10}\) To be precise, the “treatment as nonexistence” (abhāvavyavahāra) is the object to be proved by non-perception. Cf. PVA 633,2: upalabdhiḥākṣaṇaprāptasya hi (hi Ms : (hi) S) tadanupalabdhyā ’bhāvavyavahāreṇa sādhyate. Concerning the translation of abhāvavyavahāra, see Kellner 1997: 132, fn. 3.

\(^{11}\) PV IV 263ab: tatropalabhyeṣv astitvam upalabdher na cāparam.
deviation in the case that [an object] exists even in the absence of inference. [Moreover,] it is not the case that the negation of inference makes [an object’s] nonexistence known, because inference occurs even with respect to [nonexistent objects like] past and future ones.\textsuperscript{12}

Here an opponent argues against Prajñākaragupta’s position, which assumes the identity between an object’s nonexistence and its non-perception by presupposing the identity between an object’s existence and its perception. According to the opponent’s view, perception does not cover the entire realm of existing entities: while some existing objects are known by perception, others are accessible through inference. Moreover, an object’s existence/nonexistence is absolutely independent of one’s cognition, regardless of whether that cognition is due to perception or inference. Thus, we can imagine the difficulty of the opponent to accept the equation of what exists and what is perceived, since he sees a gap between the physical world and the mental stream of the subject that perceives it.

In response to the opponent, Prajñākaragupta maintains that there is no gap. He points out that it is inconsistent to claim that an entity is capable of being perceived \textit{(upalabdhiyogā)} but is not perceived.\textsuperscript{13} With regard to entities that fulfill conditions for perception \textit{(upalabdhilaksanaprāpta)}, the equality of their existence and their perception is established. The core of his exposition is clear in the next passage:

To explain: if [the term] \textit{upalabdhi} indicates “being perceived” \textit{(upalabhyamānātā)}, it is the nature of a thing \textit{(padārtha)}; but if [the term] \textit{upalabdhi} is used [in the sense of] “perceiving” \textit{(upalambhana)} as the agent’s state \textit{(kartṛstha)}, in this case, too, the existence of things that fulfill conditions for perception is pervaded by it (i.e., perception). Moreover, if [perception] is inseparable from it (i.e., existence), it is not understood that [existence] is different [from perception], because the difference is known through the separation. As [Dharmakīrtī] has

\textsuperscript{12} PVA 632.25–632.30 (cf. PVin II 58.13–14; Kellner 1999: 171–172): \textit{nanu jñānavyatireko 'nupalabdhiḥ. sattavyatirekā ścābhāvah (sattavyatirekā ścābhāvas Ms : sattavyatirekonupalabdhiḥ (?) sattavyatirekas tv abhāvas S)}. \textit{tat katham anayos tādātmyam. yathā ca jñānajñeyayor bhedaḥ, tathā tadabhāvayor api. na khalu jñānam eva padārthasya sattā, jñānavyatirekenāpi tasyā bhāvāt. tathā hi—}

\textit{
  sattā paroksāpy arthānām anumānena grhyate |
  pāvakasya na kim bhāvo dhūmadṛṣṭyānumīyate |[568]| 
}

na ca tatrāpy anumānapalambah eva sattā, anumānabhāve ‘pi sattayām vyabhicārat. nānumānavirūḍha abhāvam gamayati, attiṅgatayor apy anumānavṛtteḥ. For another translation, see Kellner 1999: 319–320.

\textsuperscript{13} PVA 632.3.
already said [in PVin II 59.2–3], “existence is nothing but perception because [perception] does not deviate from it (i.e., existence).” And, the perception of things does not occur due to perception that is distinct from [a thing] and that occurs simultaneously with [the thing], but rather due to “perception” that is characterized by “being perceived” (upalabhyamānatā), which is entailed in the [thing]. Therefore, existence is nothing but perception, and hence, [Dharmakīrti] will

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14 The referent of the pronoun *tad* is not unproblematic. I follow Yamāri’s interpretation, according to which the pronoun *tad* refers to “entity” (*dngos po*)—namely, “thing” (*padārtha*)—in the previous sentence. Cf. Y, D226b3–4: *dngos po der rjes su chud pa dngigs par bya ba'i las kyi chos su gyur pa gang yin pa de'i mtshan nyid kyi dngigs pa las don rnams dngigs pa yin no || “There is a perception of a thing due to ‘perception’ that has the characteristic which is the attribute of object, [namely,] ‘being perceived’ that is penetrated into this entity.” However, it is also possible to understand the referent as “cognition” (upalambha) in the previous sentence. Indeed, as Kellner (1999: 321, fn. 755) has noted, another sub-commentator, Jayanta, understands that the term *anupraviṣṭa* indicates something different from “senseless matters” (*bems po*, *jaḍa*). Cf. JD302b7–303a1: *de'i phyir gdon mi za bar dngigs bzhin pa ni | dngigs pa kho na yin par bstan pa ni | tha dad par dus mtshungs pa zhes bya ba ste | rjes su zhugs pa ma yin na bems po'i bdag nyid ni rnam grang ma yin zhes bya ba'i don to | dngigs pa'i rig byar gyur pa dngigs bya nyid yin gyi dbang po la sogs pa ni ma yin no zhes bya ba ni de dag gi dbye ba yin | “Therefore, in order to teach that [the state of] being necessarily perceived is nothing but perception, [Prajñākaragupta states:] vyatiriktasamānakālo-. This means: Inasmuch as it is not penetrated (*anunupraviṣṭa*), [merely] senseless entities (*jaḍātmaka*) are not the synonym [of upalabhī]. To be perceived is to be the cognizable object of a perception, but not sense faculties, etc. Therefore, there is a difference between them (i.e., the cognizable object and sense faculties, etc.).” Moreover, among the several usages of *anupraveśa* in PVA, including *pradhānānupraveśa* (PVA 156.16) and vyaktriṇānupraveśa (PVA 211.11), etc., we see usages relating to reflexive awareness (svasamvedana): PVA 393.26: *ato bāhye ’rthe svasamvedanam eva phalam, nārthasamvedanam, tasya svasamvedanānupraveśāt. “Therefore, with respect to an eternal object, only the reflexive awareness is its result, but not the cognition of an object, because it (i.e., the cognition of an object) penetrates into the reflexive awareness”; PVA 410.17 (cf. Kellner 1999: 321, fn. 755): ekapratītyanupraveśād eva na tayor virodhaḥ. “As [two different properties] penetrate into one and the same apprehension, there is no contradiction between the two (i.e., permanence and its opposite property).” However, we have several other usages of *anupraveśa* connected to something different from cognition (e.g., PVA 156.16: *pradhānānupraveśa*), and thus the term’s colocation with “cognition” does not necessarily support that interpretation. As we will argue below, one important point is that even if we take the pronoun to refer to “thing,” the sentence is still intelligible as Prajñākaragupta’s idealist position, regardless whether the “thing” is an external object (bāhyārtha) or not. Now, if compared to the second interpretation, the first is more understandable. Thus, in the above translation, I follow the first alternative. I thank Prof. Masahiro Inami, Prof. Taisei Shida and Dr. Mai Miyo (Shida) for their valuable comments, which helped me change my mind from the second interpretation to the first.
say [in PV IV 265] that [a thing's] nonexistence is nothing but its non-perception (i.e., the non-perception of a thing that fulfills conditions for perception).\(^{15}\)

To all appearances, in this explanation Prajñākaragupta follows Dharmakīrti’s two interpretations of \textit{upalabdhi}—namely, one that is object-based (\textit{karmaśthā}) and the other that is agent-based (\textit{kartṛstha}), with the first indicating a thing, the second indicating the act of perception that is not deviant from the object’s existence. At first sight, this explanation seems just to reflect Dharmakīrti’s. However, we should notice the absence of the term “fitness” (\textit{yogyatā}) in Prajñākaragupta’s explanation, which implies that he does not follow the causal account of perception. Since the term \textit{yogyatā} refers to the possible state of a thing being perceived, it is different from the actual state of being perceived. We must make a careful distinction between the two following positions:

1. An entity exists because it is capable of producing a perceptual cognition of itself.
2. An entity exists because it is actually perceived.

We can further distinguish between the two positions as follows: Whereas the former presupposes the distinction between an entity and its perceptual cognition, the latter emphasizes the non-distinction between the two and claims that all entities are mind-dependent.

In order to explain the non-distinction between a thing’s existence and its perception, Prajñākaragupta first discusses the object-based interpretation of \textit{upalabdhi}, according to which the nature of being perceived is essentially identical with that which we call a “thing.” He then turns to the subject-based interpretation, explaining that such a thing’s existence is identical with the act of perception because there is no deviant case where perception occurs without a thing’s existence. Finally, he returns to the object-based interpretation to clarify the mind-dependency of everything. Therefore, we should understand the expression “perception of things” (\textit{upalambhah padārthānām}) to denote not perception that is caused by things, but perception that is identical to things. What is called a “thing”

here is something mental that is characterized by the nature of being perceived.

Based on this idealist view of existence, which is opposed to the opponent’s view of the mind-independency of objects, Prajñākaragupta further criticizes another opponent, called the Vyāpakānupalabdhīvādin, who advocates anupalabdhīhetu as the reason that presupposes the distinction between existence and perception. On the premise that an object’s existence is pervaded by its perception, the opponent, who is identified as Dharmottara by Yamāri, asserts that an object’s nonexistence is proved by the non-perception of the “perception” pervading the object’s “existence.” An object’s existence necessarily produces its perception, but not vice versa. That is, the sentence, “I do not perceive this [object]” (iddam nopalabhe), does not necessarily imply: “This [object] does not exist” (iddam naṣṭi). In reply to this Vyāpakānupalabdhīvādin, Prajñākaragupta states:

On the other hand, the usage of [the verb in] the first person, “I do not perceive this [object],” [occurs only] in the context of [describing] non-perception that has the characteristic of implicative negation of cognition (jñānaparyudāsa), but not in order to deny “object’s nonexistence” [as its implication]. Since [non-perception] is inseparable from this [nonexistence], this [non-perception of an entity] is also [equivalent to] the entity’s nonexistence.

Furthermore, the distinction between vyāpya and vyāpaka is also rejected in the following manner:

On this [inference of an object’s nonexistence], ultimately, there is no difference between what is pervaded (vyāpya) and what pervades it (vyāpaka), because it has already been said that existence is nothing but perception. (583)

16 For the difference between the Svabhāvānupalabdhīvādin (i.e., Prajñākaragupta) and the Vyāpakānupalabdhīsādhanavādin (i.e., Dharmottara), see Tani 2000: 191–192, and Kellner 1997.
In this manner, Prajñākaragupta again stresses the non-distinction between existence and perception. To conclude, he then equates all four items relating to anupalabdhi—namely, an object $x$’s nonexistence, $x$’s non-perception, $x$’s correlated $y$’s existence, and $y$’s perception.\footnote{PVA 638.31–32: \(\text{tasmād anyabhāva evāparasyābhāvo 'nyopalabdhir eva cānyasyānupalabdhiḥ. sā ca svabhāvānapalabdhir eva.}\)\footnote{Franco/Notake 2014: 35. PV III 3ab: \(\text{arthakriyāsamartham yat tad atra paramārthasat}\)\footnote{PV III 53d–54: \(\text{meyaṃ tv ekaṃ svalakṣaṇam || tasmād arthakriyāsiddheḥ sada-sattāvicāraṇāt || tasya svaparārūpābhāṃ gater meyadvayaṃ mātāṃ || "As for the object of knowledge, it is [actually only] one, [namely] the particular, because, since efficient action is established from the [particular, it is the particular that] is examined [by people engaged in everyday practice] as to whether it is existent or non-existent [in a certain place]. It is held [by Dignāga] that the object of knowledge is of two kinds, because [we] apprehend that [particular] in its own form [by perception] and in another [by inference].” Translation Franco/Notake 2014: 136–140.\)\footnote{PVA 213.22: \(\text{upalambhena yal lakṣyaṃ pāramārthikam eva tat | sattopalambha eveti bhāvānām pāramārthikī 230}\)}} The important thing is that the equation is different from the position that accepts the causal relation between the existence of an object and its perception—the position that allows for the metaphorical usage of upalabdhi. Unlike other commentators, Prajñākaragupta presents a more straightforward interpretation of Dharmakīrti’s statement sattvam upalabdhir eva, an interpretation oriented toward the non-distinction between existence and perception from the ultimate point of view of non-difference.

3. **Upalabdhi as the ultimate existence**

The equation between an object’s existence and its perception is also the focus of the definition of existence in the ultimate sense. Commenting on PV III 53d–54, in which Dharmakīrti explains particulars (svalakṣaṇa) to be the only object for a means of valid cognition that is causally efficient (arthakriyāsamartha) and common to perception and inference, Prajñākaragupta offers a different position, whereby the ultimate existence of an object is defined by its perception:

> What is defined by perception (upalambha) is indeed the ultimate existence. The ultimate existence of entities is expressed in this way: “Existence is nothing but perception.” (230)\footnote{PVA 213.22: \(\text{upalambhena yal lakṣyaṃ pāramārthikam eva tat | sattopalambha eveti bhāvānām pāramārthikī 230}\)}

Here, we should pay attention to the fact that the above definition forms an alternative to the well-known definition of existence through causal
efficacy. From the ultimate point of view of non-difference, Prajñākaragupta rejects any causal account of perception, such as “The existence of an object is made known by its perception” (upalambhena jñāpyate sattā) or “That which is apprehended by non-perception is nonexistence” (anupalambhena yat pratiyate tad asattvam), because such expressions presuppose the distinction between existence and perception or between nonexistence and non-perception. His position is, on the contrary, to posit no barrier between an object’s existence and its perception. To justify this position, he supposes three options for the causal account of non-perception and concludes that all three are impossible without presupposing the thesis: “Existence is nothing but perception.” The three options are as follows:

1. The nonexistence of a thing is known by the nonexistence of perception (upalambhābhāva).
2. The nonexistence of a thing is known by the perception of another entity (anyopalabmha).
3. The nonexistence of a thing is known by the conceptual cognition “I do not perceive it” (nopalabha iti vikalpa).

The discussion rejecting each option can be summarized as follows:

1. The first alternative (PVA 213.28–214.11) reflects the doctrine of the Mīmāṃsā, especially the Bhāṭṭa school, which accepts the “nonexistence [of cognition]” (abhāva) as a sixth means of valid cognition for comprehending the nonexistence of an object. However, how the “nonexistence” of cognition is known is in question. If it is known through another abhāvapramāṇa—namely, the nonexistence of cognition—how is the nonexistence known? In this manner, the fallacy of infinite regress (anavasthā) occurs. To this, the Mīmāṃsaka opponent argues that the nonexistence of cognition is different from the nonexistence of a thing, because a cognition’s existence is accessible only through a presumption (arthāpatti) that logically leads to a conclusion by eliminating other alternatives. However, this position of the opponent is rebutted because it brings about another infinite regress, since to justify the existence of presumption, it is counted as cognition by another presumption. The discussion continues, with the opponent claiming that the “nature of being perceived”

Cf. PVA 213.26–28: nanu tatrāpy asattve ’nupalambho na tv anupalambhā evāsattvam. nānupalambhāvyattirekenāsattvam aparām. anupalambhena yat pratiyate tad asattvam iti cet, ko ’yam anupalambhāh. kim upalambhābhāvāh, athānupalambhāh, kimvā nopalambha iti vikalpaḥ.

The following summary is based on Moriyama 2014.
(upalabhyamānatā) or “perceptibility” (aparokṣatā), which reminds us of Kumārila’s school’s concept of “cognizedness” (jñātatā), is applied not only to a thing but also to cognition. In this case, too, just as the nonexistence of a thing is known by the nonexistence of cognition, the nonexistence of that cognition would be known by another nonexistence of cognition, and its nonexistence would further be known by still another nonexistence of cognition, and in this manner, infinite regress is inevitable. Finally, the opponent proposes the equation of the non-perception of a thing (padārthānupalambha) with the non-perception of perception (upalambhānupalambha) and claims that non-perception is nonexistence. However, the opponent then comes to accept Prajñākaragupta’s original thesis: “Existence is perception”.

2. The second alternative (PVA 214.11–23) is close to the Buddhist account in which non-perception of an object is equated with the perception of the other (anyopalambha). Given a perceptible object x, under appropriate conditions, its perception should occur. If one perceives something other than x, it is called the non-perception of x. To be more precise, this non-perception is the same as the perception of the image of x’s co-related object y (pratiniyatākāropalambha). Certainly, this process looks like presumption (arthāpatti); yet, if this were so, the same fallacy of infinite regress would occur. Thus, the alternative should be understood as follows: The perception of the image y is identical with the nonexistence of perception of its co-related x. There is no genuine nonexistence of x apart from the existence of y. As the co-related nature is known through its being perceived, the principle of co-relation is based on exactly the thesis “Existence is perception”. To this, one might ask: How is it known that x is co-related to y if x is not perceived? Prajñākaragupta replies that this is known through the recollection of x’s nature of being perceived.

Note, however, that according to Yoshimizu 1985, Kumārila does not accept jñātatā as an external property.

Cf. Y D 101a6–7; P 133b2–3.

Note that the discussion is partially based on PV IV 274–275, where Dharmakīrti explains that non-perception is established by itself, namely, by reflexive awareness (svasamvedana), and thus, there is no infinite regress. Cf. PV IV 274–275: tasmād anupalambho ‘yam svayam pratyakṣato gataḥ | svamātravṛtter gamakas tadabhāvavvavasthiteḥ ||274|| anyathārthasya nāstitvam gamyate ‘nupalambhataḥ | upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenety anavasthitih ||275||.

PVA 214.19: ... nābhāvo nāma kaścid anyatrāparabhāvāt.

Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition (PVA 214.23, this part of Ms 106a5 is illegible) reads: upalabhyaṁanātāprasādād eva. However, following Yamāri’s pratīka (Y D 102b2, P 135a2: dmigs pa dran pa nyid las), it is corrected to: upalabhyaṁanātāsmarād eva.
of an object is inseparable from the nature of its being perceived.

3. The third alternative (PVA 214.24–26) takes non-perception as a conceptual cognition (vikalpa)—"I do not perceive it." However, this position does not need to be examined because the root of this conceptual cognition—non-perception—has already been examined in the previous two alternatives.32

As seen above, when examined it is revealed that each alternative presupposes the claim that ultimate existence is identical with perception, namely, that the true nature of cognizable objects is defined by its "being perceived" (upalabhyamānataḥ).33 An object is said to exist only if it is actually perceived in a cognition. If so, however, it should be questioned whether the object’s existence is the same for anybody.34 For instance, a fire on a mountain is imperceptible for a person standing far away from the mountain; it is counter-intuitive to define the fire’s existence by that person’s perception. In this situation, it seems reasonable to say that whereas the fire exists for a person standing in front of it, it does not exist for a person who has inferred it from a remote place. Prajñākaragupta does not agree with this. Then, how does he explain the fire’s existence for the second person? Prajñākaragupta’s reply is that its existence is determined as being perceived. That is, it is not true that the fire does not exist when one infers it. Rather, it should be said that it certainly exists even when one infers it, because the inference presupposes the object’s existence that is determined to be perceived at the time when one approaches the object on the basis of its inference.35

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32 This third alternative is related to Dharmakīrti’s PV IV 270, where the conceptual cognition “I do not perceive x” is said to arise from one’s experience (anubhava) of the perception of x’s co-related object. Cf. PV IV 270: ekopalambhānubhavād idam nopalabhe iti | buddher upalabhe veti kalpi kāyāḥ samudbhavāḥ ||. Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin gloss the term anubhava as reflexive awareness (svasamvedana). Cf. PVA 635.21–22: yo ‘nubhavaḥ svasamvedanatayā ...; PVV 508.3: -opalambhānubhavāt svasamvedanād anantarāṇi ...

33 After each of the three alternatives of the causal account of perception/non-perception, Prajñākaragupta states similar concluding sentences: PVA 214.11: yady anupalambho ‘bhāvah, upalambho ‘pi bhāva iti prāptam; PVA 214.21–22: tata upalambhāḥ sattocate ... tasmād upalabhyaṃnataiva sattā; PVA 214.25: tasmād upalabdhiḥ satteti upalabhyaṃnataiva prameyatattvam. In this connection, it is also remarkable that Prajñākaragupta defines svalaksana with the term “[object’s] own nature” (svarūpa). Cf. PVA 169.22–23: svena rūpeṇa laksyamānmatvat svalaksanat; 213.15: svarūpapratisibhāsaṇa nilādayo ‘nantabhedavate ’pi svalakṣaṇanam eva, svena rūpeṇa laksanat.

34 PVA 214.26: yadi tarhi tad eva paramārthasattvaṃ na kasyacid anyathā bhavet.

35 Cf. PVA 215.2–4.
In this context, another question arises: Why, then, is it said that an object of inference differs from that of perception? Prajñākaragupta’s reply is the following: This is due to the difference of the modes of apprehension (pratipattibheda), not to a difference of the object itself. In the case of inference, one superimposes another nature (pararūpa) onto the object being perceived, which is why inference is distinguished from perception. However, people’s use of the term “real entity” (vastu) in everyday activity (vyavahāra) expresses this as if there were a difference of the object.36 He concludes the status of inference in the following verse:

Since the difference is conceptually constructed, this [difference] is not ultimately real. [In our everyday activity,] however, that which has the nature of a real entity to be obtained [in the future] is not different from the ultimate one. (231)37

In this verse, Prajñākaragupta describes the contrast between difference as conceptually constructed and non-difference as ultimately real. From the above discussion, we may interpret non-difference as that which lies between existence and perception. In contrast to the state of non-difference, in our everyday activity we do not discern a distinction between difference and non-difference and thus a so-called “real entity” is considered to be the ultimate reality that is common to both perception and inference. Thus, inference is also called a means of valid cognition insofar as it is in agreement with a real entity to be obtained in the future. It is noteworthy that the equation explaining the relation of existence and perception is established only at the ultimate level. This is in contrast to the conventional level, which is constructed by conceptual thought. In the following section, I will focus on the same point with regard to the Buddha’s omniscience.

36 PVA 215.6–7: vastusamvādaadvārenā vyavahāribhir alaksitanānātvair vasty iti vyavahriyate. tena tadapeksayedam ucyate prameyadvaidhyam. Commenting on this sentence, Yamāri explains the difference between the appearance (snang ba, *pratibhāsa) in a cognition and what is conceptually constructed (rnam par brtag par bya ba, *vikalpya). Cf. Y D 103b7–104a1; P 136b7–137a1.

37 PVA 215.15: bhedaḥ kalpitarūpatvāt sa evāpāramārthikah | vasturūpan tu yat pṛāpyam paramārthetaran (paramārthetaran em. cf. Tib. don dam las gzhan : paramārthataran Ms, S) na tat ||231||. For Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation of svalakṣaṇa in this connection, see Kobayashi 2011 and McCrea 2011.
4. The Buddha's omniscience and the existence of past and future entities

In his commentary on PV II, which aims at establishing the Buddha’s authority, Prajñākaragupta describes the Buddha’s wisdom several times as omniscience that covers past, present, and future entities beyond our senses. In the context of establishing the Buddha’s authority, omniscience plays an important role in justifying the Buddha’s ability to teach everything related to all kinds of living beings. Although Dharmakīrti did not discuss omniscience as such in PV II, Prajñākaragupta writes a long excursus on the topic, especially in PVA ad PV II 136‒137. Various points related to omniscience discussed in this section also deal with the equation of existence and perception. Since omniscience is also a kind of cognition, it should be classified as perception or inference. Prajñākaragupta regards it as a kind of perception. If this is the case, however, one wonders how perception can relate not only to present objects, but also to past and future objects, which are usually considered nonexistent at the present time. To solve this problem, Prajñākaragupta introduces the definition of existence and its relation to temporal difference.

How do past and future entities exist? In reply to this question, Prajñākaragupta presents the following verse:

Only immediate experience (sākṣātkaraṇa) is said to be an entity’s existence. In every case, an entity’s existence is known from immediate experience. (PVA 112.1)38

The verse echoes Dharmakīrti’s sattvam upalabdhir eva. However, instead of upalabdhi, the term sākṣātkaraṇa “immediate experience” is used here. In Buddhist pramāṇa texts, this term reminds us of the basis of occurrence (pravṛttinimitta) of the word “perception” (pratyakṣa/adhyakṣa), which is applied not only to sensory perception but also to perception based on manas, the mental faculty.39 According to Prajñākaragupta’s account, omniscience is the immediate experience of things in all aspects, this arising from a specific inference of all aspects of everything (sarvākārānumāna), namely, a kind of mental cognition in meditation concerning various kinds of causal relations between deeds

38 Cf. PVA 112.1: sākṣātkaraṇam evāsya bhāvasyāṣṭītvam ucyate | sarvatrasākṣātkaranāt sattvam bhāvasya gamyate |604|. For the context of this verse, see Franco 2011 and Moriyama 2014: 68–74.

39 Cf. NBṬ 38.36. See Moriyama 2014: 68–74, esp. fn. 44. In addition, it should be noted that the term is often used for the Buddha’s experience of the cessation of suffering (nirodha). Cf. MMK 24.27
and their results. Thus, although past and future entities do not seem to exist at the moment the Buddha or a yogi is mediating, these entities do exist as being immediately experienced by the Buddha’s or a yogi’s mental cognition.

To this, however, one might argue that Prajñākaragupta’s explanation focuses only on the subjective aspect of one’s experience of time and ignores the objective or commonsense view that past and future entities do not exist at the present. Indeed, we can cognize past and future entities to a certain extent by inference, even though they do not exist now. Thus, it is doubtful whether existence must be defined by one’s immediate experience, as Prajñākaragupta claims. On this point, he presents the following discussion:

[Objection:] Even with respect to [an entity] that is not immediately experienced, like a fire [on a mountain], its existence is known by inference. [Therefore, defining existence by immediate experience is incorrect.]

[Reply:] No. In this case, too, the inference is concerned with [an object] of this kind (i.e., a perceptible object). One infers [an object] that has been immediately experienced, that is being immediately experienced [by other persons], and that will be immediately experienced, because otherwise, no inference occurs. The inference that follows seeing (darsana) only allows one to infer its perceptibility, because otherwise, [inference] is impossible. On the contrary, if [an object] has never been seen by anyone, or if it is not seen by anyone, or if it will not be seen by anyone, it is as nonexistent as a rabbit’s horn. [The absolute nonexistence] that is beyond direct indication (anupākhyā) is that which lacks any direct indication as to its capacity.40,41

40 For the term anupākhyā, see Steinkellner 1979: 89, fn. 323. The term is used in PVin II 79.5. Cf. Y D16a7–b2: nus par nye bar brjod pa thams cad ces bya ba ni mngon sum gyi rjes las byung ba’i rnam par rtog pas bskyed pa de ni ’di ’o zhes bya bar bsnayad pa ’o || de dang bral ba ni med pa ’o || de nyid ni gzhans ma yin te | nye bar brjod pa med pa nyid yin no || nye bar rjod par byed pas na nye bar brjod pa ste | de gang la med pa ’o || de ’i ngo bo ni nye bar brjod pa med pa ste, mi snang ba ’o || dus gsum mthong ba med pa zhes bya ba’i don to || “[The sentence] sarvasāmarthyarāpayā [etc.] means: A conceptual cognition arisen subsequently to perception directly indicates [an existent object] in the form: “This is it.” That which lacks [direct indication] is nonexistence. Since [nonexistence] is not different from [anything], it cannot be directly indicated. That which directly indicates [an object] is called ‘direct indication.’ [Nonexistence is] that which lacks such a [direct indication]. The nature of [nonexistence] is not directly indicated, and thus, it does not appear [in a cognition]. It means that [the object] is never seen in [all] the three time periods.”

41 PVA 112.3–6: nanv asākṣātmte ’pi vahnyādāv anumānamagamany asitivam. na, tatrāpi tathābhūtasayaivānumānam. sākṣātmte kriyamānam kariṣyamānaṇ
As we have seen in the previous section, Prajñākaragupta assumes that inference is also related to ultimate existence as defined by “perception.” The above discussion repeats the same point. That is, although inference is usually thought to be concerned with imperceptible objects whose perception is inaccessible, Prajñākaragupta claims that inference is concerned with “perceptible” objects. One infers nothing that is inaccessible to our perception. In other words, an object of inference is imperceptible at a certain time for the subject inferring it, but is perceptible for the same subject at a different time or for others who are standing near the object at that certain time. Similarly, the Buddha or a yogi infers his past existences and other living beings’ past and future existences in their transmigration, because it is what he has immediately experienced or what other living beings have experienced or will experience. Therefore, not only objects that the subject is immediately experiencing now, but also objects that the subject and others immediately experience in different times are taken to be “perceptible” and “existent.”

If this is the case, however, there must be two different “immediate experiences,” namely, a subject’s inner experience and its outer one. While so-called past and future entities are said to be “existent” because of their being perceived by the Buddha or a yogi in meditation, those entities are also “existent” because they have been perceived or will be perceived by other living beings. On this, if the difference in the tense of the verb “to immediately experience/to perceive” determines temporal differences between entities, it follows that the Buddha or a yogi perceives only present entities in his inner experience of meditation, never past or future ones. But this is clearly inconsistent with the description of the Buddha’s omniscience and yogic cognition as covering past and future entities. Therefore, a reasonable account to fill the gap between the two different kinds of immediate experience is required.

Prajñākaragupta explains this by focusing on omniscience as a combination of perception and the “inference of all aspects.” Through a specific inference, the Buddha takes the same viewpoint as ordinary people, namely, that some entities are past or future, and accepts their temporal distinction. But since this inferential element is part of the


PVA 113.5–9; cf. Franco 2009: 124.
Buddha’s mental cognition of all entities, it is said that the Buddha perceives all entities in the same way he infers them with temporal aspects like past-ness or future-ness. To put it differently, while the Buddha’s omniscience has the aspect of “perception,” which defines the existence of what he perceives, it also has another aspect, that of “inference,” which determines temporal differences between past, present, and future, just as ordinary people believe. If this analysis of omniscience is correct, we can find here, too, the same contrast between the state of non-difference and that of conceptually constructed difference. In this manner, the theorem of \textit{sattvam upalabdhir eva} functions well in the background of arguments regarding the Buddha’s omniscience, this finally leading to the idea of non-dual cognition (\textit{advayajñāna}) at the core of Prajñākaragupta’s philosophy.\footnote{For Prajñākaragupta’s philosophy as centered on \textit{advayajñāna}, see Inami 2011.}

5. Concluding remarks

The above examination may be summarized in three points:

1. The two interpretations of \textit{upalabdhi} are based on Dharmakīrti’s initial idea, but Prajñākaragupta does not use the notion \textit{yogyatā} and stresses the non-distinction between the act of perceiving and the nature of being perceived. His position differs from other commentators’ metaphorical interpretation, which supports a causal account of perception. Instead, in the analysis of \textit{anupalabdhihetu}, he concludes that there is equality between existence and perception as well as between nonexistence and non-perception.

2. The equation relating existence and perception is also adopted to define ultimate existence, which is common to both perception and inference. Rejecting three options for a causal account of the non-perception of an object, Prajñākaragupta concludes that existence is nothing but perception without appealing to the notion of causal efficacy. Furthermore, he explains how inference is also related to ultimate existence and how the duality of cognizable objects is explained through the conceptual construction of difference.

3. The same idea is at the basis of the Buddha’s omniscience of past and future entities. According to Prajñākaragupta’s account, past and future entities are existent because they are immediately experienced by the Buddha in meditation. Any temporal distinctions are made in
dependence on ordinary people’s conceptually constructed differences. The Buddha’s omniscience can be seen as the primary motive behind Prajñākaragupta’s understanding of *sattvam upalabdhir eva*.

In addition to these results, a connection to his epistemological position admitting cognition endowed with an image (*sākārajñānavāda*) might also be assumed, although this is not explicitly stated. According to this position, an object’s existence corresponds to its image in the cognition. Since this is related to reflexive awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), which is the ultimate foundation of the cognition of non-duality, it seems reasonable to understand the equation between existence and perception within the framework of reflexive awareness. However, we have no evidence as yet to support this assumption.

Finally, it is also interesting to note the possibility of Prajñākaragupta’s influence on later Buddhist arguments concerning the definition of existence through illumination (*prakāśa*). For instance, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti offer an idealist view of this type as an alternative to the externalist view that accepts external objects as having causal efficacy.\(^{44}\) It is difficult to imagine that this new tendency in Buddhist ontology suddenly emerged out of nowhere. Indeed, it seems more reasonable to assume that it was the result of the thinking of these authors’ predecessors, a strong candidate being, in my opinion, Prajñākaragupta.

References


\(^{44}\) SSŚ 398.24–399.2: nānu prakāśo nāma vastunah sādhakaṃ pramāṇam. na ca pramāṇaniyṛttāv arthābhāvaḥ. arthakriyāśaktiś ca vastuṣatvam. tac ca nā-prakāśasyāpi virudhyata iti cet. satyam etat, bahirarthavāde ’prakāśasyāpi tasyābhhyupagamāt. keśādīpratībhāse ’dhyavāsanāraśāhāśaktyaśaktiṣyogād evābhāva-siddheḥ. sarvathābhairarthabhāve tu jñānasya prakāśāvabhiṣācārāt tāvatai̊va sattve kim arthakriyāyā. CAP 132.22–25: bahirarthavāde ’prakāśasyāpi sāmarthyaḥbhhyupagamāt. keśādīpratībhāse ’dhyavāsanāraśāhāśaktyaśaktiṣyogād evābhāva-siddheḥ. sarvathābhairabhāve tu jñānasya prakāśāvabhiṣācārāt tāvatai̊va sattve kim arthakriyāyā. For a Japanese translation, see Moriyama 2011: 70. For Jñānaśrīmitra’s definition of existence by the term *prakāśa*, see Kyuma 2010. Especially, in fn. 23, he refers to PVSV 4.9–12 and PVA 213.22f, 412.25f.
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Prajñākaragupta on sattvam upalabdhir eva


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Shinya Moriyama

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PVin II  

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Yoshimizu 1985  
Helmut Krasser, despite tragically passing away much too early in 2014, left his mark on more than one generation of scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. An eminent specialist on the so-called “logico-epistemological tradition,” he devoted his Viennese dissertation and early work to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, before broadening the scope of his research to Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the tradition’s historical founders. In particular, he examined their ideas on the relationship between logic and soteriology. He also considered the very nature of their texts. Should they be understood as authored philosophical works? Or rather as edited lecture notes of students? Director from 2007 to 2014 of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Helmut Krasser left behind a multi-faceted body of work, including editions of ancient Sanskrit manuscripts today found in the Tibetan Autonomous Region that had never before been published. This commemorative volume with more than thirty contributions not only reflects the multiplicity of his interests, it is also evidence of the deep impression he left on all those who met him. It is a document to the faithful friendship and highest respect still held by his friends and colleagues almost ten years after his death.