Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.)

Burlesque of the Philosophers
Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser
Part II

Helmut Krasser, despite tragically passing away much too early in 2014, left his mark on more than one generation of scholars of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. An eminent specialist on the so-called “logico-epistemological tradition,” he devoted his Viennese dissertation and early work to the Buddhist philosopher Dharmottara, before broadening the scope of his research to Dignāga and Dharmaññatī, the tradition’s historical founders. In particular, he examined their ideas on the relationship between logic and soteriology. He also considered the very nature of their texts. Should they be understood as authored philosophical works? Or rather as edited lecture notes of students? Director from 2007 to 2014 of the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia at the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Helmut Krasser left behind a multi-faceted body of work, including editions of ancient Sanskrit manuscripts today found in the Tibetan Autonomous Region that had never before been published. This commemorative volume with more than thirty contributions not only reflects the multiplicity of his interests, it is also evidence of the deep impression he left on all those who met him. It is a document to the faithful friendship and highest respect still held by his friends and colleagues almost ten years after his death.
Hamburg Buddhist Studies 19
Part II

Series Editors:
Steffen Döll | Michael Zimmermann
Vincent Eltschinger, Jowita Kramer, Parimal Patil, Chizuko Yoshimizu (eds.)

**Burlesque of the Philosophers**

Indian and Buddhist Studies in Memory of Helmut Krasser
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A fragmentary manuscript of 
Dharmottara’s *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*

Yasutaka Muroya
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Introduction

An edition of the Tibetan version of Dharmottara’s (ca. 740–800 CE) *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi* (KBhS) was published in 1935 by Erich Frauwallner on the basis of the Narthang and Derge prints of the Tanjur. It appeared together with a German translation and Frauwallner’s today widely known analysis of the Buddhist theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) in the *pramāṇa* tradition. The Tibetan translation, by rNgog Blo ldan shes rab (1059–1109) together with *Bhavyarāja* (Tib. sKal ldan rgyal po), was completed in the second half of the eleventh century. For his edition, Frauwallner also consulted *Muktākalaśa*’s (Tib. [Bram ze] Mu tig bum pa) commentary on Dharmottara’s work, the *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhivivaraṇa* (KBhSV), also available only in Tibetan translation.

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1 For the colophon on the translators, see Frauwallner’s edition of the KBhS, (F) 237,10–11; cf. also Steinkellner/Much 1995: 71, no. 18.7.T1.

Frauwallner described Dharmottara as “seeing the things with his own eyes” and his approach as “new,” even though his treatise operates within the framework established by Dharmakīrti (ca. 6th or 7th century). Since then, Dharmottara’s independent treatise has drawn attention to his theoretical developments and novelty, as well as to the historical and philosophical significance of the KBhS. The text is indeed one of the more important works in the intellectual history of Indian Buddhist philosophy. It also had a great influence upon later developments in Brahmanical traditions of the refutation of momentariness.

Among the work that has been done on the KBhS, a complete Japanese translation of the Tibetan text has been offered in a series of articles by Tadashi Tani; these also include a collation of the Peking edition of the Tibetan translation, as well as a detailed study of related material, such as Dharmottara’s Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (PVinṬ), and a partial edition and translation of the KBhSV. A new era in the study of Dharmottara’s philosophy has been ushered in by Masamichi Sakai’s recent work, including his critical edition of relevant passages in the PVinT, as well as critical editions of other portions of the PVinT on the basis of a newly discovered Sanskrit manuscript.


3 Regarding the emergence of the concept of prāpaṇaśakti, Helmut Krasser (1991: II/14, n. 49) holds that the period of the composition of the KBhS, in which this concept remains unmentioned, is closer to the Nyāyabinduṭīkā than to the two Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā works and the Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā. Based on an analysis of parallel passages between the KBhS and the PVinT, Sakai (2010: Studie, xliii–xliv) suggests that the former is earlier than the latter, pointing out in particular the absence in the former treatise of the concept of bādhakapramāṇa-parikara (“ein vorbereitendes Hilfsmittel für die aufhebende gültige Erkenntnis” or “an assistive aid for the invalidating means of cognition”); cf. also Sakai 2015, who points out several parallels between “original arguments in the KBhS” and “re-used / paraphrased arguments in the PVinT.” One of these is presented in the present article, i.e., KBhS (F) 221,7–16 and PVinṬ Ms 98b1–4.

4 Vācaspati Miśra (ca. 10th century) is certainly to be counted among the various sophisticated philosophers who elaborated on Dharmottara’s arguments; on aspects of Vācaspati Miśra’s theoretical development, see, e.g., Muroya 2011.

5 See Tani 1997a, 1997b and 1997c, where also Sanskrit fragments from the KBhS are identified (cf. Sakai 2010: Studie, xxi).

6 See Sakai 2010: Anhang 2, et passim; cf. also Sakai (2013: 89, n. 33; 90, n. 34), who presents a Japanese translation of certain parts of the KBhS: (F) 238,28–239,5 and 231,7–232,13. On the two, albeit incomplete, manuscripts of the PVinT from the Potala, see Steinkellner’s introduction to PVin 1–2, xxx–xxxiii; cf. also Hugon and Tomabechi’s introduction to PVin 3, xx. Steinkellner (2006)
To the best of my knowledge, no complete original Sanskrit manuscript of the KBhS has ever been reported to exist. Indeed, it has long been considered lost. Thus the fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript of the KBhS that will be introduced in the present article may represent a contribution to the study of Dharmottara’s original language and of his theories concerning the universal flux of all entities. It will also contribute to the study of Dharmottara’s Brahmanical opponents.

1. Manuscript

1.1. Part of a composite manuscript

The manuscript in question is preserved in Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jñān Mandir in Patan (Pāṭaṇ, historically also known as Anahillavāḍa Paṭṭana), Gujarat. This manuscript is numbered 135(2) / (9) and belongs to the collection of Saṅghavīpāḍā Bhaṇḍār. The editors of the manuscript catalogues, Gandhi (1937, based on C. D. Dalal’s “notes”) and Muni Jambūvijayajī (1991, based on the compilation by Muni Puṇyavijayajī), refer to the portion of the manuscript in which the text of the KBhS appears as “kṣaṇikatvanirāsaprakaraṇa” (ff. 122r1–127v3).

Beginning (f. 122r1–2): namah sarvva jñāya || kṣaṇikā sarvvasamskārāḥ iti kcekana pratipannās tatra kṣaṇo ’syāstītī kṣaṇasambamdhī bhāvāh kṣaṇi || ko vaktavyāh

End (f. 127v2–3): tadanurodhāt sāṃvṛttam sāmānādhikaranyādi yuyjyata eva || paramārthena śabdās tu || mātā nirviṣayā ima iti || cha

As implied by the foliation of the manuscript, it is part of a composite manuscript (Saṅghavī Pāḍā Bhaṇḍār, no. 135[2], ff. 11–159) that according to the catalogues contains fourteen works. The first line of the kṣaṇikatvanirāsa-prakaraṇa, quoted above, appears also to contain part

has provided a critical edition and an annotated English translation of the final colophon of the PVinṬ based on a Sanskrit manuscript of the third chapter.

7 Regarding the library in Patan, see, e.g., Dalal’s voluminous contribution to Gandhi’s (1937) catalogue (“A report on the search for manuscripts in the Jain Bhandars at Pattan,” pp. 33–72, dated 17 April 1915) and an article by J. E. Cort (1995).


9 According to the catalogues, folios 19–59 are not available.
of the final colophon of the previous work, entitled “sarvājñavyavasthā prakaraṇa” (Ms no. 135[2] / [8]). This colophon is followed by two cha- symbols and an ornamental symbol, typical elements of a colophon (see § 3 below). Then follows the invocation (namah sarvajñāya) of our text. The text of the kṣaṇikatvanirāsa-prakaraṇa (Ms no. 135[2] / [9]) ends in the middle of a new folio, with the remaining part left blank. The composite manuscript then moves into a new text passage (Ms no. 135[2] / [10]), with a new folio presenting the well-known Pāśupata works Gaṇakārikā (ff. 128r1–5) and its commentary Ratnāṭikā (ff. 128r6–155v1), with the latter including an embedded version of the former’s mūla text.

The title “kṣaṇikatvanirāsa-prakaraṇa” that is assigned to our portion of this composite manuscript appears to be an editorial one. As seen in the concluding lines (cited above as “End”), our text lacks a colophon explicitly mentioning a work title. In my inspection in 2009, it turned out that the portion in question not only contains Dharmottara’s text, but also another text related to Śāntarakṣita’s (ca. 725–788) Tattvasaṅgraha (TS). How the text shifts from the KBhS to the TS is curious: they are separated merely by a single daṇḍa, not a contextually stronger double daṇḍa (f. 125r1). Furthermore, based on the corresponding Tibetan translation it seems that the final sentence of the available portion of the KBhS has been copied incompletely and with considerable modification: the phrase beginning with drṣṭādṛṣṭasamastavastuvyāpti, which might probably have been in the nominative (see my reconstruction), to a phrase in the locative (drṣṭādṛṣṭasamastavastuvyāpini in f. 125r1). While the subsequent sections of the KBhS have not been copied, this modified line

10 The colophon of Ms no. 135(2) / (8) reads (ff. 121v7–122r1): iti sarvajñavyavasthāpakaṃ [new folio] nāma prakaraṇaṃ samāptam iti | cha | cha | cha |

11 Cf. Dalal 1966. Appendix I to Dalal’s (1966) edition of the Gaṇakārikā contains the editions of four further works from the same composite manuscript. Ms no. 135(2) / (11), ff. 155v1–156v3 = ed. 24,3–25,18: the Yamaṇapraṇāna of Viṣuddhamuni; Ms no. 135(2) / (12), ff. 156v3–157r5 = ed. 25,20–26,18: the Ātmasamarpana (in Dalal’s edition) = the Lakuliśaprārthanā by Viṣuddhamuni (as entitled by Gandhi) or the Bakuliśaprārthanā (mokṣārthā) (as entitled by Jambuvijaya); Ms no. 135(2) / (13), ff. 157r5–159r4 = ed. 26,20–28,13: the Kāraṇapadārtha; and Ms no. 135(2) / (14), ff. 159r4–159v6 = ed. 28,15–28: the Rudranāmānī (in Dalal’s edition) = the Skandanāma (Skandapurāṇokta) (as entitled by Gandhi) or the Purāṇoktaskadandanāmānī (as entitled by Jambuvijaya). Catalogue numbers are based on Jambuvijaya 1991.

12 It is of interest to observe that Dharmottara’s treatise is related to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the same portion of the manuscript; see Krasser 1992 on the theoretical relationship between the three.

13 See the end of the reconstruction of the KBhS in the present article.
is followed by *atra*, which is the first word of the passage introducing the TS. Judging from the many scribal errors in our portion, it is tempting to assume that the copyist mechanically recorded what he saw in his exemplar without undertaking any editorial modification or compilation. Whether his exemplar of the KBhS was already in this unsatisfactory state remains unknown.

The unfortunately incomplete text of the KBhS is found on folios 122r1–125r1. The text comprises the entirety of the *pūrvapakṣa* (folios 122r1–124r1) and the beginning of the *uttarapakṣa* (folios 124r1–125r1), altogether slightly over three folios. It covers approximately three and a third pages (F 220,2–224,13) of the seventeen and a half pages of Frauwallner’s 1935 edition, thus representing about nineteen percent of the complete KBhS.

As mentioned above, the portion of the composite manuscript catalogued as the *kṣaṇikatvanirāsa-prakarana* also contains numerous citations from the *śabdārthaparīkṣā* of the TS as well as from Kamalaśīla’s (ca. 740–795) *Pañjikā* (TSP). The citations are mainly concerned with the *uttarapakṣa* part of the refutation of Brahmanical criticisms of the *apoha* theory. However, this second part does not simply cite the two texts as they are known in the printed editions. It seems that the passages from the TS ([K] 1104d = [S] 1103cd to [K] 1121cd = [S] 1120cd) and the TSP were selectively extracted and combined through brief glosses by (an) unidentified author(s). The text of the TSP is copied only in part, since its word glosses are often omitted. It remains unknown whether the copyist of the manuscript worked directly from specific TS and TSP manuscripts and editorially combined these passages from them, or whether there once existed a manuscript containing an unknown work that was a compilation of the TS and TSP.

The table below shows the correspondences between the manuscript text and that of the printed editions of the TS and TSP. The text identified with the TS or TSP is termed “fragment” (F), altogether fifteen fragments, and text that is obviously not cited from the TS and TSP is marked as “gloss” (G), altogether ten glosses, including two that link passages from the TS and TSP. These fragments and glosses are noted in my transcript by superscript enclosed by square brackets.
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<th>TS / TSP (K) = (S) [reference to the first volume of both editions]</th>
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<td>125r1–2</td>
<td><em>atra kecid vādino ... vyavasthā durghatā</em></td>
<td>G1</td>
<td>gloss on TS (K) 1104cd = (S) 1103cd</td>
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<td>125r2</td>
<td><em>tathā hi</em></td>
<td>F1</td>
<td>TS (K) 1105a = (S) 1104a</td>
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<td>125r2–4</td>
<td><em>vidhiśabdārthavādipakṣe ... jñātājñātatvavirodhā</em></td>
<td>F2</td>
<td>TSP (K) 341,14–16 = (S) 419,7–10</td>
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<td>125r4</td>
<td><em>tataś ca ... na prāpnoti</em></td>
<td>F3</td>
<td>TSP (K) 341,18–19 = (S) 419,12–13</td>
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<td>125r4–5</td>
<td><em>athā’pi syāt ... ‘nviṣyata eveti</em></td>
<td>F4</td>
<td>TSP (K) 341,20–21 = (S) 419,14–15</td>
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<td>125r5</td>
<td><em>tad ayuktām</em></td>
<td>G2</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1105 = (S) 1104</td>
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<td>125r5–</td>
<td><em>na hy ekasya ... yuyjate eva</em></td>
<td>F5</td>
<td>TSP (K) 341,21–27 = (S) 419,15–21</td>
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<tr>
<td>125v2</td>
<td><em>etad apy acāru</em></td>
<td>G3</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1107 = (S) 1106</td>
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<td>125v2–3</td>
<td><em>asmin pakṣe ... utpalam iti</em></td>
<td>F6</td>
<td>TSP (K) 342,6–8 = (S) 420,7–9</td>
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<td>125v3–4</td>
<td><em>athaivam ahn’idhīyate</em></td>
<td>G4</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TSP (K) 342,9 = (S) 420,10: <em>syād etat</em></td>
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<td>125v4–5</td>
<td><em>niśāsabdo p’ady ... bakulotpalaśabdayar ity</em></td>
<td>F7</td>
<td>TSP (K) 342,9–12 = (S) 420,10–13</td>
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<tr>
<td>125v5</td>
<td><em>etad apy asāraṃ ... apy abhidhīyamo’ne</em></td>
<td>G5</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1109 = (S) 1108</td>
</tr>
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<td>125v5–6</td>
<td><em>vyarthā syād utpalasrutis</em></td>
<td>F8</td>
<td>TS (K) 1109d = (S) 1108d; TSP (K) 342,18 = (S) 420,15</td>
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<tr>
<td>125v6–</td>
<td><em>tathā hi ... prayogaprayāsenā</em></td>
<td>G6</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1110 = (S) 1109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126r1–</td>
<td><em>syām’d etad ... vyarthā na bhavisyatīti</em></td>
<td>F9</td>
<td>TSP (K) 342,20–343,11 = (S) 420,17–421,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126v3–4</td>
<td><strong>tad asaṃbaddham ... nilotpalaśabdāv iti</strong></td>
<td>G7</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1111 = (S) 1110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126v4–5</td>
<td>athāpi syād yady … «nā»narthikā syāt’</td>
<td>F10</td>
<td>TSP (K) 343,16–19 = (S) 421,20–23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126v5</td>
<td><strong>tad eta 'py</strong>¹⁴ asobhanaṃ yato</td>
<td>G8</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TSP (K) 344,1 = (S) 422,8–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126v5–127r3</td>
<td><strong>na {na} hi nīlaguṇa° ... sārthikā syāt’</strong></td>
<td>F11</td>
<td>TSP (K) 344,1–9 = (S) 422,8–18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127r3–4</td>
<td>evam yathotpalaśrutir … tarūpādayādivat⁵</td>
<td>F12</td>
<td>TSP (K) 344,23–24 = (S) 423,11–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127r4–5¹⁶</td>
<td><strong>tad uktam ... kasmān na bhavatīty</strong></td>
<td>F13</td>
<td>TSP (K) 345,1–4 = (S) 423,14–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127r5–6</td>
<td>atrocyate</td>
<td>G9</td>
<td>gloss; cf. TS (K) 1118–1119 = (S) 1117–1118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127r6–127v3</td>
<td>nīlasabdēna prathamataram … yujyata eva</td>
<td>F14</td>
<td>TSP (K) 345,17–21 = (S) 423,24–424,10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127v3</td>
<td>paramārthena śabdōs ... ima</td>
<td>F15</td>
<td>TS (K) 1121cd = (S) 1120cd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127v3</td>
<td>iti</td>
<td>G10</td>
<td>gloss to indicate a conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹⁴ Read **etad apy** instead of **eta py**.

¹⁵ Read **tarupādapādivat** instead of **tarūpādayādivat**.

¹⁶ In this fragment, the text **bhavato ’jpi saugatasya pakṣe** (Ms f. 127r4) is seemingly a paraphrase of **bhavatpakte ’pi** in the TSP ([K] I/345,3 = [S] I/423,19).
1.2. Manuscript description

The following description and diplomatic edition (see § 3) are based on three sets of digital images of the manuscript that were documented on different occasions.¹⁷

1.2.1. Physical aspects

The palm-leaf manuscript (no. 135[2] / [9]) consists of six leaves (folios 122r1–127v3). It measures approximately 34 cm × 5.7 cm (f. 122r).¹⁸ Each folio page contains two columns of writing and a blank space around the string hole; the columns are enclosed by double border lines drawn from top to bottom in black ink. Thus, altogether four sets of border lines are found on each side. The writing area has five, six or seven lines to a page and is divided into left and right columns, with about 19 akṣaras in the left column and about 38 akṣaras in the right. The string hole is found inside a blank space to the left of the center of each folio and is surrounded by ornamental straight and wavy lines. Highlighting, probably in red ink, has been used in the areas around the string-holes, for the foliation numerals and occasionally for placeholder signs (see below). The final folio (f. 159v) contains two delicate flower-like drawings and ornamental patterns separating the columns in both red and black ink, partially faded due to age.

While the manuscript is in relatively good condition, it has suffered a certain amount of damage: the left and right edges are worn and occasionally torn, and a number of worm holes can be found. The letters are generally clear and can be read with confidence. The leaves of ff. 123v and 124r seem to have once been attached to each other, and thus the surface of these leaves is heavily smudged and the text faded, thus rendering certain parts difficult to decipher or illegible (indicated by the frequent usage of round brackets in the diplomatic edition).

The bundle containing the manuscript is held together by a set of wooden cover boards with a string hole. Directly on the front cover,

¹⁷ The first set of images were taken by Prof. Piotr Balcerowicz (February 2008), the second, by Prof. Hisataka Ishida (April 2009), and the third, by the Hemacandrācārya Library (January 2010).

¹⁸ According to Mahendra Kumar (1939: sampādakīya vaktavya, 9), the size of the manuscript is 14.5 × 2.25 inches. In his introduction to the edition of Akalaṅka’s trilogy (granthatraya), Kumar offers a manuscript description of our Patan Ms 135[2] with important observations probably referring to the manuscript of Akalanka’s Pramāṇasamgraha. He mentions the “ksanikavādanirāsaprakaraṇa” as no. 9 in the manuscript bundle (1939: sampādakīya vaktavya, 8).
“ādiḥ ||” is written in black; a label is also attached to the cover (with the first three lines in Nāgarī in black ink, and a final line in Gujarātī, seemingly written in blue ball-point pen; slash “/” denotes a new line): “nambar • 135–2 / strīnirvāṇādi 14 gramtha / patra • 18–159 / 11–18 + 6′0 – 159.” Directly on the back cover, “aṃtaḥ ||” is written in black.

1.2.2. Aspects of the writing

The manuscript is neatly and delicately written in black ink by a proficient copyist. The script type is not specified by the editors of the two catalogues, but it shares features with Jaina Nāgarī, also known as Nāgarī Jain. Medials e and o are written by use of prṣṭhamātṛā. Occasionally, these are written with an extended diagonal stroke above the top line of the akṣara, as commonly known in modern Devanāgarī script. This phenomenon is observed, though not always, in the first lines of each page, but with much less frequency in subsequent lines (e.g., tadvārēṇa on f. 125v4). Foliation is given in Jaina Nāgarī on the verso side in two different ways, namely, with letter-numerals (akṣarapalli) in the left-hand margin, and ordinary numerals (aṅkapalli) in the right-hand margin.19

Our portion of the manuscript does not feature a colophon, name of the author or copyist, the work title or date, or any historical or geographical information. Regarding a possible date for the manuscript, Mahendra Kumār Jain, a renowned paṇḍit at Benares Hindu University, states that “the manuscript appears to have been copied in the twelfth century” without specifying the era.20 This statement may be supported by paleographical observations based on a number of published charts of Jaina Nāgarī letters and excerpts from dated manuscripts. A comparison with our manuscript indicates notable similarities between certain letters—such as the initial i (f. 121v7) and the ligature jñā (f. 125r4) or jña (f. 121v7)—and those found in manuscripts dated to the second half of the eleventh or the first half of the twelfth century CE.21

19 On the Jaina system of numbering, see Bühler 1896: 75–76 and Kapadia 1937.
20 See Kumar 1939: 9. Hīrālāl Rasikdās Kāpadīā (Kāpaḍiyā), in his discussion of the Boṭikapratisedha (“Refutation of the view of the Boṭika, i.e., Digambara”) which is contained in the Patan manuscript (Ms 135[2]), also states that the “Ms. is said to be as old as the twelfth century A.D.” Cf. Kapadia 1947: Introduction, lxxi.
21 For the close affinity of the structure and shape of Jaina Nāgarī initial i to those in our manuscript, one may refer to Bühler 1896: Table VI, row no. 3 for columns XV, XVI and XVII (Eastern) from a Jaina manuscript, “Deccan College 1880/1, MS. No. 57, 1081 p. Chr.” (the Viśesāvaśyakabhāṣyaṭīkā of Kotyācārya, also called Śīlāṅka; on this manuscript, dated saṃvat 1138 in its colophon, surveyed originally by Ernst Leumann, cf. Bühler 1896: 52); for further details, see Kapadia (1955:...
Besides signs for the treatment of spaces and lines that are common in manuscripts, such as line-fillers using cancelled or slashed *daṇḍas*, the usage in our manuscript of what I tentatively call a placeholder sign is notable. This placeholder sign is roughly two *aksaras* wide and resembles the numeral “80” 🅏 in Jaina Nāgarī.\(^{22}\) The reason for its use remains

\(^{22}\) On signs to fill a line, see Einicke 2009: e.g., 354, § 9.1.2.1.8, “Zeilenfüller.” Cf. also MacDonald 2005: xi.
unknown. Single such signs or, more often, multiple signs with intervals between them are placed in the first and/or last line to fill writing columns (f. 123r1 and 7, l[eft] c[olumn]; f. 123v1, l. c.) or parts of them (125r, l. 6, r[ight] c.; 125v1 and 6, r. c.; 126r1, r. c.; 126v7, r. c.).

Further orthographical features are:

(1) geminations of \(t\) (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{nivarttaka}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{nivartaka}}\) in f. 122v2), \(d\) (\(\text{\textcircled{deva}}\) in f. 123v3), \(m\) (\(\text{\textcircled{dharmmi}}\) in f. 124v2), and \(v\) (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{sarvva}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{arvva}}\) in f. 122r1) after \(r\), as well as degeminations of \(t\) (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{tvā}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{sattvā}}\) in f. 122r5) and \(d\) (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{advāre}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{ndvāre}}\) in 125v4) before \(v\);

(2) non-application of classical \textit{sandhi} rules, though not frequently (\(\text{\textcircled{śabdo}}\) in f. 124r5);

(3) use of \textit{anusvāra} for homorganic nasal (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{nāmtara}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{anantara}}\) in f. 122r1);

(4) omission of \textit{avagraha} (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{pi}}\) for ‘\(\text{\textcircled{pi}}\) in f. 122v4 \textit{et passim});

(5) use of \textit{avagraha} to indicate \textit{savarṇa-sandhi} of final \(a/ā\) and initial \(a/ā\) (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{samavāyā’bhlnna}}\) in f. 123r3);

(6) lack of \textit{anusvāra} (\(\text{\textcircled{upapādayitu}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{upapādayitum}}\) in f. 122v6);

(7) a superfluous \(\text{\textcircled{danḍa}}\) (\(\text{\textcircled{na}}\) in f. 124r6);

(8) non-distinction between \textit{ba} and \textit{va};

(9) confusion of \textit{sa} and \textit{śa} (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{vinaśa}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{vināśa}}\) in f. 122v1; \(\text{\textcircled{atisaya}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{atiśaya}}\) in f. 122v2);

(10) confusion of \textit{pa} and \textit{ya} (e.g., \(\text{\textcircled{durupāyāda}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{durupāpāda}}\) in f. 122r5; \(\text{\textcircled{vaścāt}}\) for \(\text{\textcircled{paścāt}}\) in f. 123v3).

In contrast to the excellent handwriting, the text has not been copied with great precision. An editor thus needs to be cautious and reserved when accepting the text as transmitted. This tends to be problematic in cases where the manuscript evidence and the Tibetan translation disagree. Concerning the \textit{ksaṇikatvanirāsa-prakaraṇa}, the text occasionally contains grammatically imprecise spellings and forms; these are indicated by the sign ‘!’ in the diplomatic edition. Yet, the manuscript features corrections by the copyist or other, perhaps later readers in the form of one or two small strokes as a cancellation sign, or, seemingly, through erasure (one erased line remains visible). Additions are found between \textit{akṣaras} on the same line, or in interlinear spaces. One correction, clearly made by second hand, is found in our manuscript in the form of a so-called \textit{kākapāda} in the main text, together with a sign in the margin that resembles an ‘\(x\)’
in Roman script, and an indication of the relevant line-number counted from the top (f. 126v5). In addition to the relatively frequent omission of akṣaras (e.g., i for iti in f. 124r1) and other kinds of scribal errors, such as confusion between pa and ya and the writing of kṣi for kṣa (kṣiṇika for kṣanika, e.g., f. 124v4), there are errors that may have been caused by the deciphering of an old manuscript in a different script. For instance, confusion of ra and ca (pūrvvāyaca° for pūrvāpara° in f. 124r3), confusion of dha/dhā with va/vā (°kālābhivāyi for °kālābhidhāyi in f. 124r5; abhivanno for abhidhatte in f. 126v4), confusion of bha/bhi with ha/hi (havanto for bhavanto in f. 123r6; pratyahijñā° for pratyabhijñā° in 123v2; kālāhi° for kālābhi° in f. 124r2), confusion of śa with na (naknoti for śaknoti in 124v4), and confusion of sya with mya (tamya for tasya in f. 125r3).

2. **Critical edition with partial reconstruction**

In general, the text of the manuscript has been retained in cases of apparent conflict with what would be expected or assumed from the Tibetan translation. Changes to the manuscript text through selection of what is conceivable based on the Tibetan translation and after an examination of the context are duly recorded in the footnotes. However, I have not noted minor inconsistencies and variations, either with regard to rNgog blo’s rendition of the KBhS’s text or to the texts of the PVin and PVinṬ, if these can be regarded as equivalents of the Sanskrit word or expression in question. Obvious scribal errors are emended without adducing further evidence.

The text in *italics* marks those passages where the manuscript is illegible or the text appears to have a lacuna. In these cases, I have mostly provided a reconstructed text on the basis of the Tibetan translation and marked it as conjecture (“conj.”) in the footnote.

Emendations and conjectures offered by Sakai on various occasions are indicated as such in the footnotes.

Punctuation and division into sections and paragraphs are editorial.

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23 Hugon (2016) has surveyed the issue of Tibetan scholarship with great detail in the case of the PVin and PVinṬ, as well as their manuscripts. rNgog blo’s translation has its own characteristics and various kinds and grades of originalities, which require caution and consideration when applying textual criticism and making corrections to the manuscript evidence. On the issue of the evaluation and treatment of rNgog blo’s translation, see also Steinkellner’s introduction to PVin 1–2, xliii–xlv (§ 4.2.3); Hugon and Tomabechi’s introduction to PVin 3, xxii–xxiv (§ 3); and Sakai 2010: Einleitung, viii–xiii (§ 3.2.1–2) and xx n. 65.
The following variations are not reported\(^{24}\): (1) geminations of consonants after *r* as well as degemination of them before *v*; (2) non-application of classical *sandhi* rules; (3) use of *anusvāra* for homorganic nasal; (4) omission of *avagraha*; (5) use of *avagraha* to indicate *savarna-sandhi*; and (6) superfluous *danda*. Furthermore, the following scribal errors are not reported: non-distinction between *ba* and *va*, confusion of *sa* and *śa* (e.g., *vināsa* for *vināśa* in f. 122v1; *atīsaya* for *atiśaya* in f. 122v2), and confusion of *pa* and *ya* (e.g., in *durupayāda*\(^{o}\) for *durupapāda*\(^{o}\) in f. 122r5; *yaścāt* for *paścāt* in f. 123v3; see, however, nn. 46 and 54). Readings marked as unclear in the diplomatic edition, as well as readings before correction (*ante correctionem*) in the case of mere corrections go unmentioned. Due to the poor condition of some leaves, however, the marking of unclear readings and illegible *akṣaras* in the diplomatic edition are reproduced in the footnotes when they appear in variant readings.

The folio- and line-numbers of the manuscript are embedded in the text in subscripts enclosed in square brackets. As regards the Tibetan version, the location in the Peking edition (P), which was not consulted by Frauwallner, is noted together with the Derge (Tib. sDe dge) edition (D) at the beginning of each section. The section number is the one given by Frauwallner in his German translation.

**Editorial signs and abbreviations**\(^{25}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sign</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cf.</td>
<td>confer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conj.</td>
<td>conjectured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Derge edition of the Tibetan translation of the PVinṬ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>em.</td>
<td>emended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f.</td>
<td>folio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>folio- and line-numbers of the Tibetan translation in Frauwallner 1935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ms</td>
<td>manuscript</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>n.e.</td>
<td>no equivalent in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>om.</td>
<td>omitted in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{24}\) Most of this is adopted from E. Steinkellner’s edition of the HB; see HB, Introduction, xxiii.

\(^{25}\) The convention for the signs listed here largely follows the one in the editions of the PST 1, PST 2, PVin 1-2, PVin 3 and HB in the Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region (STTAR) series.
Peking edition of the Tibetan translations of the KBhS and PVinṬ

Tibetan translation of the KBhS in Frauwallner 1935; the siglum F is also used specifically to refer to the text as edited by Frauwallner when adducing variants in P

( ) contain unclear readings
[ ] contain editorial additions and notes
underlining marks expressions referring to persons
: separates the constituted text from the variant(s)
.. illegible akṣara
. illegible part of an akṣara
... editorial ellipsis

[§ I.1: Ms 122r1–5; F 220,1–13; D249b4–7; P268a3–7]

kaśṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti kecana pratipannāḥ. tatra kṣaṇo 'syāstiti kṣaṇasambandhī bhāvaḥ kṣaṇi ko vaktavyaḥ. na ca kṣaṇaśabdavācyārthavyavasthā paraḥ kartum pāryate.

utpādānantarapradhvaṃsabhājaḥ kṣaṇikā iti tesām paribhāṣā. avaśyam cotpannasya padārthsaya sattā samavāyakālavasthānam ity ato nodayānantaranāsasambandhe sādhye drṣṭāntaḥ kaścid upapadyate. vyāptisādhanaṃapradarśaṇaṃavīṣaya sādhye drṣṭānto nīyataṃ sannidhiḥ eva sādhanaṃprayogeṣu. buddhiṃvādayaś ca drṣṭāntabhaṃvenopādiyamāṇaḥ sandigdhakṣaṇamātrāvasthitayo nālam abhimatahetuvyāptisādhanaṃapraṇapradarśanāya.

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26 kaśṇikāḥ em.: kaśṇikā Ms
27 gzhung T for paribhāṣā
c29 don T for padārthsaya
30 gnas pa yin te | des na T for vāvasthānam ity ato
31 naśasambandhe em. (jig pa dang 'brel par ... la T): nāśaṃ sabāṃdhhe Ms.
32 rab tu bsgrub pa'i T for sādhana. On the expression vyāptisādhanaṃapraṇaṃapraṇaṃavīṣaya in relation to the example (drṣṭānta), see NBṬ 155.2 on NB 3.8.
33 sannidhir em. (nye ba yin no T): sānādher Ms
34 eva n.e. T
[§ I.2: Ms 122r5–122v6; F 220,14–221,6; D249b7–250a6; P268a7–268b6] hetuś ca sattvākhyo ’rthakriyākārītvasvabhāva35 upādīyamāno36 ’kṣaṇike ’pi sambhavadvṛttir37 iti kṣaṇikatvena durupapādavyāptika eva.36 tathā hy38 aksaṇīkā39 apekṣitasahakārisannidhayaḥ krameṇa kāryotpādasāṃarthym udvahantaḥ40 kena nirvāryante.

syād etat – akiṃcitkarāṇāṃ na paair apekṣya122v1 mānata41 ghaṭata iti. tad ayuktam42, yato vināśayitavyabhāvātiṣayādhānanirapekṣa43 api mudgarādayah sannihītā bhavanto bhāvān44 vinivartayanti. na ca45 taiḥ sa2 nnipatadbhir46 api nivartavyabhāvātiṣayaḥ kaścanādhiyate.

anvayavyatirekābhīyāṃ ca vināśakāḥ pratītanivartakabhbāvavyāpārā47 nāpahnotum śakyāḥ. yathā48 bijāda49 yo ’tyantam avidaṃ ilānāṅkurasya50 sāmarthyam udvahantaḥ49 kāryotpādanāmsaḥ saṃskārāḥ bhāvjitaḥ krameṇa eva50 bhāvābhāvānuvidhānadvāreṇa pratītikāraṇābhāvā asaṭyāpahnavāḥ, tathā mudgarādayo ’pi niva41 rtakāḥ. yathā ca51 sannihitebhīyo

35 ’rthakriyā° em. (don bya ba T) : rvvakriyā° Ms
36 nye bar bkod pa T for upādiyamāno
37 sambhavad° em. (srid pa’i T) : sambhad° Ms
38 tathā hy em. (’di ltar T) : te ’py em. (alternatively by Sakai) : tebhy Ms
39 dngos po skad cig ma ma yin pa yang T for aksaṇīkā
40 ò sāmarthyam udvahantaḥ em. (cf. nus pa dang ldan pa T) : òsāmarthyam udvamta Ms. This emendation is tentative. The Tibetan rendering with ldan pa could also be an equivalent of òsahitāh, òsamanvitāh and so on.
41 apekṣyamāṇatā em. (ltos [F : bltos P] par bya bar T) : apekṣamāṇatā Ms
42 ayuktam em. : ayukta Ms
43 dngos por khyad par sgrub [F : bsgrub P] pa’i byed pa la T for òbhāvātiṣayādhāna° de T for bhāvān
44 na ca em. (ni ma yin no T) : ni ce Ms
45 sannipatadbhir em. (nne ba dag las T) : sannipatadbhir Ms. Cf. Sakai 2010: Studie, xxviii, n. 23a, which discusses a passage containing the expression (saḥa-kārinah) sannipatanti in the Nyāyakandalī. It may also be possible to emend the manuscript’s text to sannidadhahbhir, based on sannihītā (ff. 122v1, 122v4, 123r7) and sannidhi (ff. 122r4, 122r6, 122v4, 123r5), which occur frequently in the manuscript. For similar forms related to the concept of sannidhi, see NAV 479,1 (§ 31.1): vināśahetavaḥ sannidhāṣantī prathamakṣaṇa eva sannidhadhatu; cf. also PVinṬ (S) 3,10: sannidhāpakah = (ST) 39,1: nye bar ’jog pa po’i.
46 òvyāpārā em. (byed pa ni T) : òvyāpā Ms
47 yang dper na T (confirmed by KBhSV D260b1, P279b8) for yathā
48 myu gu la sogs pa’i T for ankhuraṣa
49 eva n.e. T
50 ca n.e. T
mudgārādibhyo 'nāsādītabhedasāṃsargayo 'pi ghaṭādir
vināśakabhāvasannidhisāpekeśanirvadhakah, tathākṣaṇiko 'pi
sahakāri, bhir atiśayam akurvaḥbhir api sannipatadbhiḥ svasyām
arthakriyāyāṃ pravarteta. tataḥ ca "yat sat tat sarvām kṣaṇikam" iti
pakṣikṛtesv api sarvesu drṣṭesu sandigdhapakṣa vyāvṛttika evāyam
anaikāntiko hetvāhāṣaḥ.

§ I.3: Ms 122v6–123r3; F 221,7–16; D250a6–250b1; P268b6–269a1
kim cāsiddho 'py ayaṃ hetur upapādayitum śakyaḥ. tathā hi
pratyakṣapramāṇasiddham vastūnāṃ sattvaṃ hetuḥ. kriyāṃ
yādṛśam eva prasiddham tādṛśam eva grhyeta, aṣṭāṅkikāṃ
samastavastuvisayam sattvam prasiddham. tādṛśam ca virodhāt
kṣaṇikatvaprasādhanāsamartham nopādeyam. śuddham ca sattvam
upādiyamānaṃ na kvacitkenacit pramāṇena pratītam ity asiddham.
yādṛśam tu prasiddham tādṛśam upādiyamānam aksaṇām
sattvam grhyeta. tac ca kṣaṇikatvairuddham iti prāg eva pratipāditam.

§ I.4: Ms 123r3–123v1; F 221,17–32; D250b2–5; P269a1–6
tathā kṣaṇikatve drṣṭyamānāviṣayasārthayukte sādhye

52 sannidhi em. (nye ba T) : sanni Ms – nirodhakah em. : nirodhāh Ms. vinā śakabhāvasannidhisāpekeśanirvadhakah is equivalent to 'jig par byed pa'i dngos po nye ba la ltos [F : bltos P] nas 'gag pa (F 220,30–221,1). Cf. PVinṬ (S) 3,15: vināśahetusāpekeśanivṛttikāh = (ST) 39,5–6: 'jig pa'i rgyu la bltos pa dang bcas pa'i ldog pa; cf. also Sakai 2010: Anhang 1, 25–26, item 3 for its quotation in the Dravyālaṅkāraṭīkā; cf. also Balcerowicz 2001: 312, n. 842.

53 api n.e. T

54 sannipatadbhiḥ em. (nye bas T) : sanniyatadbhiḥ Ms. For another possible emendation to sannidadadbhiḥ, see n. 46.

55 arthakriyāyāṃ em. (don bya la T) : arthakriyāṃ Ms. Cf. PVinṬ (S) *2,12–13: arthakriyāṃ pravartate = (T) D239a4–5, P288b8, (ST) *38,13: don bya la 'jug pa yin te

56 kim cāsiddho em. (gzhan yang ... ma grub par T) : kim vāsiddho Ms

57 upapādayitum śakyaḥ em. : upayārupayādayitum śakyas Ms – bsgrub par nus te T for upapādayitum śakyaḥ

58 rab tu grub pa'i T for siddhaṃ

59 eva n.e. T

60 aksaṇikāṃ samastavastuvisayam sattvam conj. (Sakai) (dngos po mtha' dag gi yul can gyi yod pa nyid ni skad cig ma ma yin par T) : aksaṇikasamastavastuvisayam Ms. Sakai holds that sattvam may possibly be left out.

61 nye bar dgod par mi bya ba kho na'o T for nopādeyam

62 kvacit em. ('gar yang T) : kvaci Ms

63 kenacit conj. ('gas kyang T) : om. Ms

tathā bāhyapadārthasannidhisāpeksasvarūpatvād69 ānarthakym apī na kalpayitum šakyaṃ. yathā purovartinīlādimātrāhitakārānuvidhayīni70 cakṣurā dibhānāni nāsadbhūtavisyayagrahaṇavyāpārābhiḥnja, tathāmī pratyayā71 vyaktisū satīṣu bhavanto72 'bhinnam cākāram73 anuviddhānā vyaktisamavetabhinnarupagrāhi74 tavān nānarthakāḥ74. tad indriyavyāpārānuvidhānē75 sannihitārthagrāhitve ca pratyaksā bhaγvantaḥ kṣaṇi₁₁₂³⁴ katavyādām bādhante76.

[§ I.5; Ms 123v₁–6; F 222,1–12 and 222,24–28; D250b₅–251a₅; P269a₆–269b₇]

tathānumānabādhāpy77 atra śakyā pratipādayitum. iha78 yatraḥtiantikabhedasambhavas ta₁² tra₇₉ smaraṇapratyabhijñanādīnām₈₀

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64 (a – a): °viṣayasārthayukte … °pratibhāsamānā conj. (don gyi tshogs dang 'brel pa ... bsgrub par bya ba yin na mngon sum gyis gnod do || 'di litar dbang po'i byed pa'i rjes su byed pa snang bzhin pa'i T) : om. Ms

65 °sārthasamavāyā° em. (tshogs la 'du ba T) : °sārthāsamavāyā° Ms

66 de lta bu'i T for evamādy°

67 khyad par med par rtogs pa T for 'viśeṣaavyāvekita nāma

68 apratyakṣatayā em. (mngon sum ma yin par T) : prekṣāvatā Ms

69 don de'i nye ba la [em. F : ba P T] for °padārṇhasannidhi°

70 °nīlādimātrāhitā° em. : °nīlamātrāhitā° Ms – sngon po la sogs pa tsam gyis skyes pa'i T for °nīlādimātrāhitā°

71 rtog pa 'di dag kyang T for tathāmī pratyayā

72 bhavanto em. (cf. 'byung ba T) : havaṃto Ms

73 dang de la tha mi dad pa'i rnam pas T for 'bhinnam cākāram

74 nānarthakāḥ em. (don med pa can ma yin no T) : nānerthakāḥ Ms

75 °vyāpārānuvidhāne em. : °vyāyānuvidhāne Ms – rjes su byed pa T for °vyāpārānuvidhāne

76 bādhante em. : bādhate Ms

77 tathānumānabādhāpy em. (de bzhin du ... ni rjes su dpag pas gnod pa [em. F : pas P T] : tathā mānabādhēpy Ms

78 'di litar ... mthong ste T for iha

79 tatra conj. (de la T) : ta .. Ms

80 smaraṇapratyabhijñanādīnām conj. (dran pa dang ngo shes pa la sogs pa T) : .. .. .. pratyahijñanādīnām Ms
asambhavaḥ. na hi devadattaṁ dṛṣṭavatā
dṛṣṭavatā em. (mthong ba dang ldan pa T) : dṛṣṭa(c)a(tt)ā Ms
yajñadatte
eyajñadatte em. (mchod sbyin la T) : yajñadatta Ms
pratyabhijñāyate
dravyabhijñāyate em. (cf. ngo shes pa T); pratyakṣavijñāyāc(ā) Ms
na cānyasmin
cānyasmin em. (cf. gzhan du gyur na yang ... ma yin no T) : n(a) vānyasm(i)n Ms
mthong bar byed pa [em. F : pas P] T for draṣṭari
anyena
dravyabhijñāyate em. (cf. ngo shes pa T); pratyakṣavijñāyāc(ā) Ms
na cānyasmin em. (cf. gzhan du gyur na yang ... ma yin no T) : n(a) vānyasm(i)n Ms
anyena “ayam em. : aneṣāya(m) Ms – de yin no ... gzhan gyi T for anyena “ayam Ms
iti smaryate conj. (cf. zhes ... dran pa T) : sma(ryate) Ms
draṣṭrpratya
pratyanātṛbhedāt conj. (hta ba dang ngo shes par byed pa dag tha dag pa’i phyir T) : draṣṭ(r)pratya ... ... (bhedā) T Ms
rtogs [F : rtog P] pa yang T for 9(p)ratyayo
nopapadyeta em. (mi skye bar ’gyur te T) : nopapadyate Ms
yah pratyabhijñānāti conj. (cf. gang ngo shes pa T) : om. Ms
tadviṣayam ekatvaṃ em. : (tadv)iṣayam ikatvam Ms – de ni yul gcig nyid du T for tadviṣayam ekatvaṃ
tpratipadyate conj. (rtogs par bya’o T) : (pra).(i) ... ... Ms
(b – b): ... ... The text from the end of f. 123v4 to the beginning of f. 123v5, with space for approximately fourteen akṣaras, is illegible; moreover, the text corresponding to F 222,12–24 does not seem to be copied in the Ms. I refrain from offering a reconstruction.

81 dṛṣṭavatā em. (mthong ba dang ldan pa T) : dṛṣṭa(c)a(tt)ā Ms
82 yajñadatte em. (mchod sbyin la T) : yajñadatta Ms
83 pratyabhijñāyate em. (cf. ngo shes pa T); pratyakṣavijñāyāc(ā) Ms
84 na cānyasmin em. (cf. gzhan du gyur na yang ... ma yin no T) : n(a) vānyasm(i)n Ms
85 mthong bar byed pa [em. F : pas P] T for draṣṭari
86 anyena “ayam em. : aneṣāya(m) Ms – de yin no ... gzhan gyi T for anyena “ayam Ms
87 iti smaryate conj. (cf. zhes ... dran pa T) : sma(ryate) Ms
88 draṣṭrpratya
pratyanātṛbhedāt conj. (hta ba dang ngo shes par byed pa dag tha dag pa’i phyir T) : draṣṭ(r)pratya ... ... (bhedā) T Ms
89 rtogs [F : rtog P] pa yang T for 9(p)ratyayo
90 nopapadyeta em. (mi skye bar ’gyur te T) : nopapadyate Ms
91 yah pratyabhijñānāti conj. (cf. gang ngo shes pa T) : om. Ms
tadviṣayam ekatvaṃ em. : (tadv)iṣayam ikatvam Ms – de ni yul gcig nyid du T for tadviṣayam ekatvaṃ
tpratipadyate conj. (rtogs par bya’o T) : (pra).(i) ... ... Ms
92 bādhate
(b – b): ... ... The text from the end of f. 123v4 to the beginning of f. 123v5, with space for approximately fourteen akṣaras, is illegible; moreover, the text corresponding to F 222,12–24 does not seem to be copied in the Ms. I refrain from offering a reconstruction.
93 eva em. (kho na yin pas T) : (ava) Ms
94 kṣaṇīkatvakṛtaṃ em. (skad cig mas byas pa’i T) : kṣaṇīkatva(ṃ) kṛtaṃ Ms
95 nānātvaṃ em. (cf. du ma la T) : nā.āt(v)aṃ Ms
96 gnod pa nyid do T for bādhate
97 na sādhakaṃ pratyaṃkṣam conj. (sgrub par byed pa mngon sum med la T) : (na) ... ... (kṣa) Ms
98 nāpy anumānam em. (rjes su dpag pa yang med cing T) : (nā)y anu(māna). Ms

(b ... [5] ... [95] smaranam dṛṣyānam purvoktena nyāyena smartur ekatvam darsayad eva kṣaṇikatvakṛtaṃ nānātvaṃ bādhate.

tad evam kṣaṇikatvasya na sādhakaṃ pratyaṃkṣam anumānam ca pratyakṣam anumānam cāti.
A fragmentary manuscript of Dharmottara’s *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*  

[§ I.6: Ms 123v6–124r1; F 222,29–31; D251a5–6; P269b7–8]  
sakalajagatpratītā ca katipayakālavasthāpita bhāvānām iti pratītibādhāpi. tan na kṣaṇikatvaṃ sādhayituṃ.[124r1] śakyam iti.

[§ II.1.a; Ms 124r1–5; F 222,32–223,13; D251a6–251b2; P269b8–270a4]  
atra samādhiḥ śṛyuṭām. yad utkam – sa evārtho ya āsid iti[k] kṣaṇaśabdābhidheyakah syād iti, kad ayuktam, yato loke jyotirnānātante ca svalpakālā bhidhāyī prātitaprayogah kṣaṇaśabdah. tathā hi vaktāro bhavanti – kṣaṇam ekam āsveti. kṣaṇalavamuhūrta iti ca svalpakālaḥ bhidhāyī prātītah kṣaṇaśabdah. tasmāc chā, strāntarapratītityanusāritaya lokānuvṛttyā ca svalpaḥ kālo ’bhidheyaḥ kṣaṇaśabdasya.

yasmiṃś ca kāle pūrvāparau bhāgau na śakyau vyavasthāpayitum sa pūrvāparabhāgaḥ, bikalaḥ kālaḥ kṣaṇa ucyate. yasya hi kālasya kalāḥ pravibhajyante sa pravibhaktakalāpekṣayā nālpīyān vaktum

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102 *don gang zhig* T for ya āsid iti  
103 *iti* em. (*ches* T) : *i* Ms  
104 *jyotir* em. (*skar ma* T) : *jyoti* Ms – *gtug lag dag tu* T for *o* tantre  
105 āsveti em. (*sdod cig ces* T) : āsveti Ms  
106 *kālābhidhāyī* em. (cf. *dus ... brjod par* T) : *kālāḥ dhāyī* Ms  
107 *chāstrāntara* em. (*bstan bcos gzhan dag gi* [F : *gis* P] T) : *chās.ā(nta)ra* Ms  
108 *lokānuvṛttyā* em. : *lokānuvṛttyā* Ms – *jig rten pa’i rtogs pa’i rjes su zhugs nas* T for lokānuvṛttyā  
109 *ca* n.e. T  
110 *rnam par dbye* ba T for bhāgau  
111 *pūrvāparabhāga* em. (*snga phyi’i cha gnyis* T) : *pūrvvāyacabhā(ga)* Ms. On Dharmottara’s concept of *kṣaṇa*, see PVinṬ (S) 9,1–2 (Ms 86a2): *paurvāpyaraññitaḥ kalah kṣaṇa ucyate* = (ST) 42,12–13; cf. Sakai 2010: 132 (Übersetzung) and “Anhang 2,” 32, item 3.  
112 *kālaḥ* n.e. T  
113 *kṣaṇa* em. (*skad cig* T) : .. (ṇa) Ms  
114 *dus kyi* T for kālaḥ. rNgog blo’s rendering of *kalā* “a small part” with *dus*, where obviously no distinction between kāla and kalā was made, will not be noted in the following.  
115 pravibhajyante em. : pravibhajya(te) Ms – *rnam par dbye ba yod pa* T for pravibhajyante  
116 *sa* n.e. T
śakyaḥ\textsuperscript{117}. kalā tv alpīyasīti\textsuperscript{118} kalāyām eva paurvāpā,\textsuperscript{5} ryavivekinyām\textsuperscript{119} svalpakālābhīdhāyi\textsuperscript{120} kṣanāsabdo vṛtto draṣṭavyaḥ. tasmād vijñātapadārthakah kṣaṇāsabdaḥ.

[§ II.1.b; Ms 124r5–125r1; F 223,14–224,13; D251b2–252a3; P270a4–270b5]

yat punar\textsuperscript{121} uktam – kṣanikatve sādhye drṣṭāntāsambhava iti, tatrā\textsuperscript{[6]}-py abhidhiyate\textsuperscript{122}. iha saty api drṣṭānte na\textsuperscript{123} sādharṣyayamātrad\textsuperscript{124} eva\textsuperscript{125} kevalād bhāvāntarasya\textsuperscript{126} tādṛṣṭupatāpattir yuktimaṭī. tasmād vyāptisādhanena pramāṇena sādhyāsādhanayor vyā\textsuperscript{[124v1]}-pyavyāpakabhāvo darṣāniyāḥ. prasiddhavyāptike ca sādhana upadarṣi\textsuperscript{127} sādhyapraititir bhavati, nānyathā\textsuperscript{128}. tasmād\textsuperscript{129} yady api drṣṭānte kṣanabhāṅgah prasidhah\textsuperscript{130}, tathāpi\textsuperscript{131} vyāptisādhanapra\textsuperscript{12} māṇapradarṣānād\textsuperscript{132} eva kṣanabhāṅgah sidhyaty eva\textsuperscript{133}. c) yady evam\textsuperscript{134}, sādhyadharṣmy eva vyāptisādhanena\textsuperscript{135} kṣanikatve sādhite sattvākhyahetūpādānam anarthakaṃ syāt. c)\textsuperscript{136} na ca śakyaṃ dharmi.
A fragmentary manuscript of Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi

ny eva vyāptisādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ darśayitum\(^{137}\). tathā hy evaṃ vyāptisādhanam pramāṇaṃ darśayitavyam\(^{138}\) – yadi śabdo nityaḥ syāt, kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ\(^{139}\) arthakriyāyāṃ nopayogaṃ yāyā\(^{[4]}\) d iti.

\(^{(d)}\)atra ca śaknoti\(^{140}\) paro ’pi vaktum – yathā ghaṭo ’kṣaṇiko ’pi kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ\(^{141}\) abhimatakāryasādhakas\(^{142}\) tathā śabdo ’pi syād iti. atra punaḥ prativaktavyam – ghaṭo \(^{[5]}\) ’pi mayā\(^{143}\) bādhakapramāṇaviṣayīkṛta\(^{144}\) eveti. tad anena paryāyena samastam drṣṭam vastu parenopanyastam\(^{145}\) vādinā bādhakapramāṇaviṣayīkartavyam.\(^{3,146}\)

\(^{(e)}\)adrṣṭam api paro yadi \(^{[6]}\) sambhāvayet – kiṃcic vastu bhaved aksanikam kramayaugapadyābhyāṃ\(^{147}\) arthakriyāsamartham\(^{148}\) tathā śabdo ’pīti, \(^{149}\) atrāpi prativaktavyam\(^{150}\) – yadi\(^{151}\) tad bhavet kimapi, tenāpi kramayaugapadyā\(^{125r1}\) bhāyam aksanikenārthakriyā\(^{52}\) kartum aśakyeti. tataś ca\(^{153}\) tad api sambhāvyanām anadrṣṭaṃ

\(^{137}\) darśayitum em. : darśayatum Ms – rab tu bstan par T for darśayitum
darśayitavyam em. (bstan par bya ste T) : darśayitavya Ms

\(^{138}\) ōyaugapadyābhyāṃ em. : ōyaugapadyābhyāṃm Ms

\(^{139}\) śaknoti em. (nus so T) : naknoti Ms

\(^{140}\) ōyaugapadyābhyāṃ em. (cig car dag gis T) : ōyaugapadyām Ms

\(^{141}\) sādhakas em. : sādhanas Ms – bsgrub par nus pa T for sādhakaḥ

\(^{142}\) mayā em. (ngas T) : tādā Ms

\(^{143}\) viṣayīkṛta conj. (yul du byas pa T) : viṣayy Ms

\(^{144}\) pha rol gyi nye bar bkod pa T for parenopanyastam. Frauwallner (1935: 242 n. 1) would like to read pha rol pos instead of pha rol gyi.

\(^{145}\) (d – d): For this opponent (para) with a similar formulation, see PVinṬ Ms 99b4–5 ([T] D253b1–3, P306a2–4), in which the expression bādhakapramāṇaviṣayīkartavya appears. Cf. Tani 1997b: 41 with a Tibetan text and a Japanese translation.

\(^{146}\) ōyaugapadyābhyāṃ em. (cig car gyis [em. F : gyi P] T) : ōyaugapadyām Ms

\(^{147}\) samartham em. (nus pa T) : ‘marthaṃ Ms

\(^{148}\) (e – e): For this opponent (para) with a similar formulation, see PVinṬ Ms 99b5–6 ([T] D253b3–4, P306a4–6); cf. Tani 1997b: 41 with a Tibetan text and a Japanese translation.

\(^{149}\) spyir [F : phyir P] brjod par bya’o T for prativaktavyam

\(^{150}\) yadi em. (gal te T) : yad api Ms

\(^{151}\) ōarthakriyā em. : ōarthikriyā Ms

\(^{152}\) ca n.e. T
bādhakapramāṇaviṣayatāmāyād adhgantavyam. tathā ca sati drṣṭādrṣṭasamastavastuvyāptisādhanapramāṇapradarśanasya vyavasthitih.

3. Diplomatic edition of folios 122r1–127v3

In the transcript presented here, the spacing is editorial. The following signs and symbols are used:

ê medial e combined with a stroke above an aksara
ô medial o combined with a stroke above an aksara
t specific t in final position
. illegible part of an aksara
.. illegible aksara
* virāma
0 absence of virāma
, avagraha
\| daṇḍa
\|\| double daṇḍa
< > contain added aksara(s) in the margin or interlinear space
« » contain aksara(s) added by a second hand
( ) contain unclear aksara(s) or part of an aksara that is unclear
{ } contain aksara(s) deleted by means of one or two small strokes
{{ }} contain aksara(s) deleted by means of erasure

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154 bādhaka° em. (gnod par byed pa’i T) : bādhakaṃ Ms
155 yul nyid du T for viṣayatām āyād
156 adhgantavyam em. : api tavyam Ms – khas blang bar bya ba nyid T for adhgantavyam
157 samastavastuvyāptisādhanapramāṇapradarśanasya vyavasthitih conj. (dngos po mtha’ dag la [F : dag P] khyab pa sgrub pa’i tshad ma bstan par rnam par gnas pa na T) : samastavastuvyāpini Ms (the end of the portion of the KBhS). For the reconstruction of pradarśanasya vyavasthitih (or possibly: pradarśanam vyavasthāpyate), I basically follow Frauwallner’s (1935: 242) understanding.
158 The convention for the signs and symbols listed here largely follows the editions of the PST 1, PVin 1–2, PVin 3 and HB in the STTAR series.
159 On this type of t (so-called khaṇḍa-ta), see Steinkellner’s introduction to the HB, xv, n. 12, and xxvi, n. 19.
[x → y]  x corrected to y through overwriting
⊙  space for string-hole
\  line-filling sign
\|  double line-filling sign
●  placeholder sign
×  empty space for one akṣara
\ - /  sign of insertion (kākapāda) added between akṣaras in the main body of the text, or before akṣaras in the margin, and placed above and/or below the line
[]  contain editorial notes and additions, e.g., folio and line numbers
↑  Sic
?  uncertain
※  ornamental symbol used to mark the end of a work

[Folio 122 recto]

[1] nāma prakaraṇaṁ samāptam iti || cha || ◗ || cha || namaḥ sarvva ⊙
jñāya || kṣaṇikā sarvvasaṃskārāḥ iti kecana pratipannās tatra kṣaṇo
'syāstīti kṣaṇasamāṃbhadhi bhāvaḥ kṣaṇi \|\

[2] ko vaktavyaḥ | na ca kṣaṇaśabdavācyārthavyavasthā paraḥ | kartuṃ
\| pāryate utpādānāmṭarapradhvaṃsaḥbhāja[. → ḫ] kṣaṇikā iti teśāṁ
paribhāṣā avaśyaṃ cotpannasya padārthasya sattā ↑

[3] samavāyakālavasthānam ity ato nodayānātaranā \|\
śaṃ sabāṃdhhe sādhye drśṭāntāḥ kaścid upapadyate |
vyāptisādhanapramāṇapradarśanaviṣayaḥ ca drśṭānto niyata ↑

[4] sannidher eva sādhanaprayogeṣu | buddhijvālādayaś ca \|\drśṭāntabhāvenopādiyamanāḥ saṃdigdhakṣaṇamātrāvasthitayo
nālam abhimatahetuyāptisādhanapramā

[5] ṇapradarśanāya | hetuṣ ca satvākhyo rvv'akriyākāri \| tvasvabhāva
upādiyamāno 'kṣ{ī}aṇike pi saṃbha'dvṛttir iti kṣaṇikatvena
durupāyādavyāptika eva |

[6] tebhya' akṣaṇikā apektītasahakārisannidhayāḥ kra \| meṇa
kāryotpādanasāmarthyaṃ udvaṃta' kena nivāryante | syād etad
akīṃcitkarāṇāṁ na parair apektā ↑
[Folio 122 verso]

[1] māṇatā ghaṭata iti | tad ayukta' yatō vināśayitavyabhā | vātisayādāniranirapêkṣā api mudgarādayah sannihitā bhavaṃtō bhāvān* vinivarttayanti | ni' ce‘ taiḥ sa''

[2] nniy'atadbhīr api nivarttavyabhāvātisayaḥ kaścanādhīyatet | ānvayavyatirekābhīryāṃ ca vināśakāḥ pratītanivarttakabhāvavyāpā'-nāpahnotuṃ śakyāḥ yathā bijāda;

[3] yo tyāṃtam avidyāmāṃkurasya sāṃskārādāhānam akurvvāṇā | eva | bhāvabhāvānuvidhānadvāreṇa pratītakāraṇabhāva aśakyāpahnavās tathā mudgarādayo pi niva''

[4] rttakāḥ | yathā ca sannihitebhīyo mudgarādibhīyo 'nāsādi | tabhedasamsargo pi ghaṭādir vināśakabhāvasanīsāpekṣānirondhaḥ | tathā'kṣ{{i}}aṇiko pi sahakāri''

[5] bhir atisyayam akurvadbhīr api sanniyatadbhīḥ svāsyāṃ artha | kriyāṃ pravartteta | tataś ca yat sat tat sarvvaṃ kṣaṇikam iti pakṣikṛteṣv api sarvveṣu dṛṣṭeṣu sanṃdigdahivapakṣa

[6] vyāvṛtti evāyaṃ anaikāntiko hetvābhāsaḥ | kim○ vāsiddho py ayām hetur upayār'upayādayitu' śakyas tathā hi pratyaṅkṣapramāṇasiddham vastūnāṃ satvaṃ hetu;

[Folio 123 recto]

[1] × × × × × ● × × × ● × × × ● × × ● kriyamāṇaṃ yādṛśam ēva prasiddham tādṛśam ēva grhyēta | aṅkṣāṅkasamastastuvuṣīyayan prasiddham tādṛśam ca vi

[2] rodhāt () kṣaṇīkatvaprasādhanāyāsamarthanam nopādeyaṃ | śuddhaṃ ca satva'' m upādīyaṃānam na kvaci' pramāṇena pratītām ity asiddham | yādṛśaṃ tu prasiddham tādṛśam upādīyaṃānam akṣ{{i}}a

[3] nīkarūpaṃ satvaṃ grhyeta | tac ca kṣaṇīkatvaviruddham iti | prāg eva prāti ○ pāditam | tathā kṣaṇikatre

[4] dyākārā upajāyamāṇā bādhamaṃ kṣaṇīkavādaṃ | na cāmīśām imdiyā | bhāvabhāvānuvidhāityāyā tadanyebhya ṭmanda keṇa evam evam eva'

[5] tuṃ prekṣāvatā tathā bāhyapadārthasannidhisāpekṣasvarūpātva'd āna ○ rthakhyaṃ api ca kalpayitum śakyam | yathā purovarttinīramātrāhitākāraṇuvādhyāyīnī ca kṣurā'

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[6] di { m } jñānāni [ny’am → nā] sadbhūtaviṣayagrahaṇavyāpārabhāṃji 
tathā’mi ; pratyayā vyaktiṣu satiṣu h’avamti ’bhinnam cākāram 
ānuv.i-dadhānā160 vyaktisamavetābhinnarūpagrāhi

[7] x x x x x o x x x o x o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 

[8] di{ṃ}jñānāni [nY’am → nā] sadbhūtaviṣayagrahaṇavyāpārabhāṃji 
tathā’mi ; pratyayā vyaktiṣu satiṣu h’avamti ’bhinnam cākāram 
ānuv.i-dadhānā vyaktisamavetābhinnarūpagrāhi

[Folio 123 verso]

[1] x x x x x o x x x o x o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 

na śakyaṁ vyavsthāpayitum sa pūrvvāy'ac'abhā(ga) "

[4] vika(l)ah kālā .. (ṇa u)cyaṭe | yasya (h)i kālasya kalāḥ pravibhajya "
   Ø (te | sa pra)v(ī)aktakalāpekṣayā nālpīyaṁ vaktum śakyaḥ kalā tv
   alpiṣāti vikalāyāṁ eva puruvvāpa

[5] ryavivi'kinyāṁ svalpakālābhiv'ayī ksanaśabdo vṛttto draṣṭavyas ta | Ø
   smād vijnātapadārthakaḥ ksanaśabdo | yat punaṁ uktaṁ kṣaṇikatve
   sādhya drṣṭāntāsāmbhava iti | (tatrā ""

[6] (py adh)īyate | iha saty api drṣṭante | na | sādharmm'amātrād eva
   kevalā Ø d bhāvāntaraśya tādṛṣṭyapātattir yuktimatī | tasmā(d)
   vyāptisādhanena pramāṇena sādhyasādhanayor v(y)ā

[Folio 124 verso]

[1] pyavyāpakabhāvō darśanīyah | prasiddhavyāptikē ca sādhana u'darśi
   "Ø te sādhyaṇapratītir bhavati nānyathā | tasmā' yady api drṣṭāntē
   kṣaṇābhamgo na prasiddhas tathā vyāptisādhanapra ""

[2] mānaprasād[ō → ā]d eva kṣaṇābhamgaḥ siddhyaty eva || yady eva
   sādhyaṇadharmaṇi Ø Ø ny eva vyāptisādhanena kṣaṇikatve sādhite
   satvākhyaḥetupādānam anarthakaṃ syāt | na ca śakyaṃ dharmmi ""

[3] Ø ny eva vyāptisādhamkāṃ pramāṇaṃ darśaya'tum | tathā hy evaṃ
   vyāptisādhanam Ø Ø pramāṇaṃ darśayitavya' yadi sābdo nityaḥ syāt
   kramayaugapadyābhyaśyāṃ arthakriyāyāṃ nopayogasyā yāyā

[4] d iti | atra ca n'aknoti paro pi vaktum yathā ghato 'kṣ{i}aṇiko pi Ø Ø
   kramayaugapadyām abhimaṭakārṣyāsādhanas tathā sābdo pi syād iti |
   atra punaḥ prativaktavyaṁ ghato ""

[5] pi tadā bādhakapramāṇaṇiṣayyy eveti tad anena paryāyena
   sa Ø mastaṁ drṣṭam vastu paryopanyastam vādinā
   bādhakapramāṇaṇiṣayāśikarṃtavyaṁ | adṛṣṭam api paro yadi ""

[6] sambhāvayet kiṃcid vastu bhaved {{ā}}aṃkṣaṇikavā
ekramayaugapadyām artha Ø Ø kriyāmarthaḥ tathā sābdo
   pīty atrāpi prativaktavyaṁ | yad api tad bhavet kimapi tenāpi
   kramayaugapadyā ""
[Folio 125 recto]

[1] bhyām akṣaṇikēnārthikriyā karttum āsakyeti 161 tataś ca tad api sambhāvyya □ mānam adṛṣṭaṃ bādhakaṃ prāmaṇavīśayatām āyād api tavyaṃ | tathā ca satī dṛṣṭādṛṣṭasamastavastuvyāpīni | [G1] a □


[3] pakṣe nīlādiśabdenaivaikenotpalādisvalakṣāne bhīhite ki ḷ □ m utpalām āhosvid amjanam ity evam ajñānaṃ ve'śeṣāṃtare na prāpnoti sarvvātmanā tam'ya vastunāḥ pratipāditavā

[4] t | ekasyaikadā ekapratipatt'ay'ekṣayā jnātājñātattvavirodhā | □ □ [F3]
tataś ca samsayaviparyāsabhāvād utpalādiśabdāntaraprayogākāṃkṣā prayoktuś ca | na prāpnoti | [F4] athā'pi syā ;


[6] dhānāṃ syāt | ekatvānekatvayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitālakṣāna □ tvāt | tataś ca yāvaṃta ekadesēs tāvaṃty eva 162 × ● x × x × x × ● x × x × ● x × x × x

[Folio 125 verso163]

[1] kevalaṃ bhavatā vastraṭ pratipādin'ānīti naikam anēkaṃ siddhyēṭ 0 | syā □ □ 'tan na nīlaśabdena dravyam abhidhiyate kim tarhi nīlākhyo guṇa × ● x x x x x ● x x ||


[3] n pakṣe sutarām e śāmānādhikaranāṃ upapannam kulotpalāsabdāya □ □ r iva ekasminn arthe nilotpalāsabdāyor vṛtyabhāvāt na hi bhavati c'akulam utpalam iti | [G4] athaiwam ahh'iddhē ḷ


161 Addition resembling a comma in subscript, inserted between akṣaras; its function is unclear.
162 The two akṣaras tyeva of tāvaṃty eva seem to be surrounded by interrupted lines.
163 Directly below the regular foliation in the right-hand margin, there is the same set of numerals for 125 in Nāgarī written in what seems to be a second hand.
[.. .. → guṇa]tajjātibhyāṃ saṃbaddhaṃ dravyam api | tenābhidhiyate
tathāpi niśaśabdē[. → nā]pi jātidvārena tad eva dravya

[5]m abhidhiyate {} iti | atas tayor ekārthavṛttisambhavāt sāmānā
dhikaranyāṃ bhaviṣyati na bakulotpalasabdayar ity [G5] etad apy
asāraṃ yata evam apy abhidhiyamo‘ne [F8] vyarthā syā

dravyaṃ tad evo | tpalajātyāpi saṃbaddhaṃ tac ca niśasabdenaiva
pratipāditaṃ  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x

[Folio 126 recto]
[1] kim utpalasabdapravogaprayāsenā [F9] syām’d etad yady a[p → b]
i niśaśabde ✲ na guṇatajjātima’ dravyam abhidhiyate tathāpi
niśaśabdasyā ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲ ✲

[2] niṅkārpravṛttidarsanāṇ pratipattur upalārthe niścitarūpā
na buddhir upa ✲ jāyate kopīkilāder api niḻatvā’ | ato
rthāṃtaraṃśaśaṃvaśaccheśdāyatpalasrūta’ḥ prayogaḥ sārthaka

[3] eveti tad asamyak* prakṛtārthābhījātayābhīdhānāt |
vidhiśabdārthā | pakše hi sāmānādhihikaranyādi nopa’dyata ity etad
atra prakṛtāṃ | yadi cotpalaśabdaḥ saṃsaśaṃvaśaccheyai

[4] va vyāpriyate na dravyapratiṣṭhaye na tarhi vidhiḥ śabdārthhaḥ syāt
| ✲ utpalasabdrena bhrāṃtisamāropitkāravacchēyacchēyacchēyacchēyacchēyacchēya
pratipādanāt | parasparaviruddhaṃ cedaṃm a

[5] bhidhiyate niśaśabdenotpalādkam dravyam abhidhiyate atha ca prati
patta’s tatra niścayo na jāyata iti | na hi yatra śaṃsaya jāyate {śa}
śabdārtho yukto ‘tiprasaṃgāt nāpi

[6] niścayena viṣayikṛte vastuni saṃsaya vakāśan labhate niśca ✲ yāropamanasor bādh’yaśādhaḥ kāvāvāt | syād etad vaktavyaṃ yady
api niḻotpalasabdayar ekasmin a

[Folio 126 verso]
[1] t’ | evaṃ [tva → rūlparasaśabdayor api sāmānādhihikaranyāṃ syāt |
tadarthayo rūpa ✲ rasayor ekasmin* prthivyādidravyavrāṭṭeh | kim ca
niḻam upalam ity ekārthaviṣyāṇā buddhir na prāpnoti | eka

[2] dravyasamavetayor guṇajātyo dvābhyaṃ prthakh*
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prthagbhivābhāvāḥdbhāvāḥ 164

[3] līlaguṇatajñātibhiyāṃ saṃbaddhaṃ vastu tad evotpalasabdenōcyate
kim taḥ rhy anyad eva tenotpalaśrutir vyarthāḥ na bhavisyaśṭī [G7]
tad asaṃbaddham evam abhidhāne punar api vyadhikaraṇe syāḥ

[4] tāṃ nilotpalasabdāv iti [F10] athāpi syād yady ayī' tad eva dravyaṃ
nīlāśaḥ bdenocayate upalasabdenāpi tad eva tathāpi nīlāsabde
notpalajātisambāmdhirūpeṇā dravyam abhiv'ann'ōḥ

[5] kim tarhi nīlaguṇatajñātisamāṃbdhirūpeṇaiva
ta'notpatvajātisamāṃbdhiḥ rūpatvam asyābhiv'ātum upalasrutiḥ
pravarttayānāḥ ∼ « na 5»narthikā 165 syāḥ [G8] tad etā 'py aśobhanam
yato [F11] na {na} hi nīlauṇaḥ

tajjātisamāṃbdhirūpatvād anyad evotpalajātisamāṃbdhirūpatvām
yena nī latajñātisamāṃbdhirūpatvābhidhāne

dravyasyotpatalavajātisamāṃbdhirūpatvābhidhānāṃ na bhave' yāvata
ekaḥ

tadvat tayor aṃ e ṃ katvam evety ayuktam ekarūpābhidhāne
apararūpābhidhānāṃ kim vābhuyapagamyocyate bhavatu × ● × × ×

[Folio 127 recto]

[1] nāma upalatvasaṃbāṃbdhirūpatvāṃ nīlatajñātisamāṃbdhirūpatvād
anyat tatāhāpy upalapādāv a ]narthikaiva tathā hi yat tad
anāṃsāṃ vastūtpalajātya' saṃbāṃ'ddhanāṃ eva'bhyāṃ
nīlaguṇatajñātibhyāṃ

[2] saṃbāṃ'dhyata' nānyat' tac cānaṃśatvāt sarvottmanā
nīlāśa'atyavābhīhitam śābdyā ca buddhyā vya'm'āyātmikeṣā
viṣayikrtam iti kim aparām anabhīhitam asya svarūpām asti yad
abhidhā

kā tathāneṣām apy anityādiśabdānāṃ prayogā 'narthakaḥ prāptot
sati prayoge paryāyatvam eva syāt ta


164 An addition in superscript is inserted directly above the preceding akṣara “bhi.”
165 An addition clearly in a second hand is inserted in thinner black writing in the
top margin at a position directly above the akṣara “ca” of kim ca nilam in the first
line. The sign for insertion in the top margin resembles an “x” in Roman script.
vastuni; buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti | paryāyatā bhavet | syād etad bhavato pi saugatasya pakṣe ekena śabdenaḥbhīhi;  
[5] te vastuni bhedāṁtare saṃśayaviparyāśābhāvaprasaṅgaḥ śabdāntarapravṛt; ttiprasaṅgaḥ ca kasmān na bhavatiḥy | nāsmanmate śabdena bāhyo rthā'bhidhiyate | nāpi śabdajanitā bu  

[Folio 127 verso]  
[1] m anīlapadārthāvyāvṛttam utpalādiṣu plavamānarūpatayā teṣām a pratikṣeṣapakaṁ | adhyavasitabāhyāṃ rūpaṁ vikalpapratibimbake'm upajanyato' punar utpalaśrutya tad evānutpa  
[2] lavyāvṛttam āropitabāhyāikavastusvarupam upajanyate | tad evāṃ kra menānīlānutpalavāśvāvṛttam avyāvasitabāhyāikarūpaṃ bhrā'taṁ vikalpapratibimbam upajanyata iti tadanuro  
[3] dhāt sāṃvṛttam sāmāṇḍhikaranyādi yuyyata eva paramārthena śabdās tu matā nirviṣayā ima | paramārtha iti x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x}
Dalal 1966  
Ch. D. Dalal, *Gaṇakārikā of Ācārya Bhāsarvajña (With four appendices including the Kāravaṇa-Māhātmya).* Baroda 1966 (1920).

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Kapadia 1937  

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Kapadia 1947  


KbhSV  *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhivivaraṇa, Tibetan translation: D4254, P5752.


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<tr>
<td>Tani 1997a, 1997b, 1999c</td>
<td>T. Tani, 谷貞志, Darumottara “Shunkantei shōmetsu ronshō” kaishaku no mondai (1), (2), and (3)” ダルモッタラ「瞬間的消滅論証」解釈の問題 (1), (2), (3) Problems of the Interpretation of Dharmottara’s Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi (1), (2), and (3)). Kōchi kōgyō kōtō senmon gakkō gakujutsu kiyō 高知工業高等専門学校学術紀要 (Bulletin of Kōchi Technical College) 41 (1997), (a) = (1) 19–37; (b) = (2) 39–57; (c) = (3) 59–77.</td>
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<tr>
<td>TS (K) / TSP (K)</td>
<td>Tattvasaṅgraha, ed. E. Krishnamacharya: Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntirakṣita with the commentary of Kamalaśīla, 2 vols. Baroda 1926.</td>
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An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of the verses in the Nyāyamukha’s jāti section*

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Introduction

For several years, I have been working on a project of editing chapter 6 of a Sanskrit manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s (ca. 8th cent.) Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā (henceforth PST) together with two colleagues, Yasutaka Muroya and Toshikazu Watanabe.¹ As one result of this project, I presented a tentative reconstruction of twenty-five verses from chapter 6 (jāti-pariccheda) of Dignāga’s (ca. 480–540 CE) Pramāṇasamuccaya/Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti (henceforth PS/PSV) at the 2016 Beijing International Seminar on Tibetan Studies.²

Regarding these kārikās of the PS, a number of scholars, after

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examining the Tibetan translations of the same, have pointed out that several are very similar to verses found in the jāti section of the Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論本, henceforth NMu; cf. Appendix I). The Sanskrit reconstruction of the kārikās of the PS’s chapter 6 may thus contribute to a better understanding of the verses in the NMu’s jāti section and, moreover, help in their Sanskrit reconstruction, the NMu being so far accessible only in Chinese translation.

Based on this, I already discussed a few points at the seminar mentioned above, including the Sanskrit reconstruction of one verse (v. 25) of the NMu. In this paper, I will present my attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of all the verses in the NMu’s jāti section (v. 19ab, 20–22, 23ab, 24–28). I will also clarify a few problems that have emerged in the process of the Sanskrit reconstruction related to the transmission of the NMu’s Chinese translation.

1. The verses in the Nyāyamukha’s jāti section and their contents

The Chinese translation of the verses in the NMu’s jāti section reads as follows:

能破闕等言 似破謂諸類 (v. 19ab)

示現異品故 由同法異立 <同法相似> (1) <餘> (2) 由異法分別 (v. 20)

差別名<分別> (3) 應一成<無異> (4) 顯所立餘因 名<可得相似> (5) (v. 21)

難義別疑因 故説名<猶豫> (6) 説異品義故 非愛名<義准> (7) (v. 22)

由此同法等 多疑故[似彼] (1) (v. 23ab)

若因至不至 三時非愛言 <至非至> (8) <無因> (9) 是名{似因闕} (2) (v. 24)

説前無因故 應無有所立 名<無説相似> (10) 生<無生> (11) 亦然 (v. 25)

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5 The last verse (v. 29), which is the concluding verse of the entire treatise, has been brilliantly reconstructed by Muroya (cf. Muroya 2016). Muroya has also attempted to reconstruct some relevant prose portions in Sanskrit (cf. Muroya 2017).
6 NMu 3c18; 3c29–4a5; 4c4; 5a7–8; 5a28–b2; 5c4–5; 5c10–11. Cf. Ui 1929: 652–689.
An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha’s jāti section

From the time of Vasubandhu’s (世親; ca. 4th–5th cent.) Vādavidhi (論軌, henceforth VVi), Buddhist treatises on dialectics and logic usually enumerate fourteen kinds of jātis (過類) as false rejoinders. In the above verses, Dignāga closely follows the names and explanations of the fourteen kinds of jātis as found in the VVi, giving brief definitions of each respective jāti (in brackets “< >”). The VVi, however, does not explain clearly why these fourteen jātis are false rejoinders, although it classifies, as does the RL, jātis into three groups: inverted (viparīta 顛倒), untrue (abhūta 不実義) and contradictory (viruddha 相違). It was Dignāga who criticized this classification and first explained why these jātis are false rejoinders from the viewpoint of logic.

At the beginning of this section, Dignāga first defines correct rejoinders (能破 dūṣaṇa) as those that point out the lack of the necessary members

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7 The Nyāyasūtra (5.1), which is the first treatise to give a comprehensive description of the jāti theory, enumerates twenty four kinds of jātis. The Rushi lun fanzhinan pin (如實論反質難品 = RL), a Buddhist treatise on logic probably written just before the VVi, enumerates sixteen kinds of jātis (cf. Ono 2017a). The VVi reduces the number of jātis to fourteen (cf. Frauwallner 1957: 129; Katsura 1984: 43–46). Regarding the VVi’s jāti theory, Frauwallner reconstructed its structure on the basis of fragments collected mainly from the Tibetan translation of the PST (cf. Frauwallner 1957: Anhang I, henceforth Ffrg.). My team has recently extracted the Sanskrit original texts of the VVi’s jāti theory by means of the Sanskrit manuscript of chapter 6 of the PST, whereby we are suggesting some changes to Frauwallner’s reconstruction (cf. Ono 2017b; Ono 2020: 317–323).

8 Cf. PSV ad PS 6.21: tatra távad viparītam sādharmyavaidharmyavikalpāviśeṣa-prāpyaprāpyahetūpalabdhisamśayānuktikāryasamādi (Ffrg.12); abhūtam prasaṅgārthāpattisamādi (Ffrg.19); viruddham anutpattinityasamādi (Ffrg.22) (cf. Ono 2017b: 45–46; Ono 2020: 310, 314–315). It seems that only the name anuktisama in the VVi deviates from the name anuktasama in the NMu (cf. Ono 2017b: 69).


10 Strictly speaking, the names “異法(相似)” and “無異(相似)” as objects of definition do not appear in the verses. Here, however, the words “餘” and “無異” in the definitions are placed in brackets for the sake of clarity.

11 Cf. PSV ad PS 6.21: viparītatvābhūtatvaviruddhatvāny uttaradosāḥ. (Ffrg.11; Ono 2020: 310). The same classification also appears in the Rushi lun (cf. RL 30b25–26: 雖有三種過失，一顛倒難二不實義難三相違難。若難有此三種過失則墮負處; Ono 2017b: 45–46). The basis of this classification, however, does not seem to be explicitly explained in the VVi.
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(闡 nyūnatā) in a proponent’s syllogism or fallacies in its respective members (諸分過失 avayavoḍa). He defines jātis (諸類) thereby as rejoinders that falsely (or pretend to) indicate such a lack or fallacies (似破 dūṣaṇābhāsa) (v. 19ab). This enables him to explain every false rejoinder as falsely indicating certain logical fallacies (sādhanābhāsa), whereby he classifies them on the basis of what kind of logical fallacies these are (cf. parts in brackets “{ }”).

In the next verses (v. 20–22), the first seven jātis—(1) sādharmyasama (同法相似), (2) vaidharmyasama (異法相似), (3) vikalpasama (分別相似), (4) avisēṣasama (無異相似), (5) upalabdhisama (可得相似), (6) saṃśayasama (猶豫相似) and (7) arthāpattisama (義准相似)—are defined and characterized as falsely indicating, in most cases, that the reason is uncertain (anaikāntika) in the proponent’s syllogism (v. 23b: 多疑故似彼). Next, (8) prāptyaprāptisama (至非至相似) and (9) ahetusama (無因相) are defined (v. 24abc) and characterized as falsely indicating that the reason is lacking (hetunyūnatā) (v. 24d: 似因闕).

Further, (10) anuktasama (無説相似), (11) anutpattisama (無生相似) and (12) kāryasama (所作相似) are defined (v. 25–26abc) and characterized as falsely indicating in most cases that the reason has not been established (asiddha) in the proponent’s syllogism (v. 26d). And last, (13) prasaṅgasama (生過相似) and (14) nityasama (常住相似) are defined (v. 27abc; v. 28abc), with the first characterized as falsely indicating that the example is not correct (drṣṭāntābhāsa) (v. 27d: 如似喩説), and the second characterized as falsely indicating that the thesis is not correct (pakṣadoṣa) (v. 28d: 如宗過説).

In this manner, Dignāga reclassified the fourteen kinds of jātis that in

12 Cf. NMu 3c19–20: 此中能破闕等言者，謂前所説闕。等言詞諸分過失。

13 Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 133, 3–7: “Er verwarf die alte Einteilung derselben in verkehrte, unrichtige und widersprechende falsche Einwände, wie sie das Tarkaśāstram und Vasubandhu gegeben hatten, und widerlegte sie im Anschluß an seine Auffassung von der Fehlerhaftigkeit eines Grundes.” [Trans. (MO): He (Dignāga: MO) abandoned the old classification of false rejoinders as inverted, untrue and contradictory, as found in the Tarkaśāstra and Vasubandhu, and criticized them according to his view of the fallacy of a reason.] Since what jātīs falsely indicate involves, in addition to the fallacy of the reason, also the lack of members of the syllogism and fallacies in both the thesis and the examples, in my opinion, it would have been more accurate if Frauwallner had said “Fehlerhaftigkeit eines Beweises (sādhanābhāsa),” not “Fehlerhaftigkeit eines Grundes.”

14 In the Chinese translation “多如似宗説,” there may be a problem with the text’s transmission, as will be shown below.

earlier treatises had been classified into three groups, creating five groups based on the criterion of logical fallacies. Thus, the NMu still follows the example of earlier treatises by “classifying” jātis. But Dignāga has introduced an important innovation: using the criterion of logical fallacies in explaining them. Also regarding the order of the jātis’ descriptions, in the NMu Dignāga basically follows the order of the VVi, although he changes it slightly to make it better fit his new classification principle.

However, as is clearly shown in the subsequent prose portions paraphrasing these verses, what the first three groups of jātis are considered to falsely indicate is not restricted to a single logical fallacy. In fact, “in most cases” (多), as Dignāga himself states in v. 23b, the logical fallacies that the seven jātis of the first group falsely indicate include not only an uncertain (anaikāntika 不定) reason, but also an unestablished reason (asiddha 不成), a contradictory reason (viruddha 相違), an antinomical reason (viruddhāvyabhicārin 相違決定) and a specific uncertain reason (asādhāraṇānaikāntika 不共不定). And in fact, the three jātis in the third group falsely indicate, as stated in v. 26d, again “in most cases,” not only an unestablished reason, but also the lack of a reason (因闕 hetunyūna), uncertain, contradictory and specific uncertain reasons, and the fallacy of the example (喩過 dṛṣṭāntadoṣa). Likewise, the two jātis in the second group are also regarded as falsely indicating an unestablished reason, although the expression “in most cases” does not appear in v. 24. In short, it is difficult to “classify” fourteen jātis systematically on the basis of the kind of logical fallacies that these jātis falsely indicate (cf. Appendix II).

It is probably for this reason that Dignāga again improves on the descriptions of jātis in PS chapter 6. He also changes the traditional

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16 For this reason, I do not agree with Kang’s view that “Diṅnāga does not seem to be concerned with the typology of jāti-s at all” (cf. Kang 2012: 617).

17 In the NMu the seven jātis from sādharmyasama to arthāpattisama are explained together as the first group, whereas in the VVi and the Rushi lun, upalabdhisama, samsayasama and arthāpattisama are explained in the seventh, eighth and twelfth positions, respectively. Also anutpattisama is classified together with anuktasama and kāryasama as part of the third group in the NMu, whereas in the VVi it is explained in the thirteenth position (and in the Rushi lun in the fourteenth position). Cf. NMu 4c2–4: 相似過類異因明師所説次第. 似破同故. 由此同法等 多疑故似彼 (23ab) 多言為顯或有異難. 及為顯似不成因過; NMu 5a18–19: 此中如前次第異者. 由倶説名似因闕故.

18 Cf. NMu 4c8–5a6.

19 Cf. NMu 5b19–c3.

20 Cf. NMu 5a24–25.
order of the \textit{jātis}' descriptions drastically, whereby they are now ordered according to the systematic order of logical fallacies: lack of the necessary members of the syllogism (\textit{nyūnatā}), fallacy of the thesis (\textit{pakṣābhāsa}), fallacies of the reason (\textit{hetvābhāsa}: asiddha, anaikāntika, viruddha) and fallacy of the example (\textit{drṣṭāntābhāsa}). Thus, in PS chapter 6, the explanations of the fourteen kinds of \textit{jātis} are based on the logical fallacies. There is, however, no further type of classification.

2. An attempt to reconstruct the verses of the NMu's \textit{jāti} section

Taking this difference between the \textit{jāti} descriptions in the NMu and the PS into consideration, in the following I shall present a tentative reconstruction of the verses in the \textit{jāti} section of the NMu and explain the process of reconstruction in detail.

In reconstructing the Sanskrit original, the starting point, as mentioned above, has been the correspondences found between the verses in the Chinese translation of the NMu and the reconstructed \textit{kārikās} of the PS. As we shall see, there are many parts that correspond very well. However, there are also parts of the Chinese translation, those in square brackets “[ ]” in the following descriptions, that do not correspond to the \textit{kārikās} of the PS. And the parts in square brackets “[ ]” in the following Sanskrit reconstruction have been reconstructed from the Chinese translation as well as some other sources. In any case, it seems that the verses of the \textit{jāti} section of the NMu, with the exception of v. 19ab and v. 23ab, were reused in some way by Dignāga himself in his PS chapter 6.

Thus, our reconstruction of PS chapter 6 could be of great help when searching for the original Sanskrit of the verses in the NMu. Nonetheless, one should not forget that many of the reconstructed \textit{kārikās} of PS chapter 6 are still uncertain. They involve, in addition to the parts well established by the \textit{pratika} in the PST (in \textbf{bold}) and other evidence (in normal font), parts that could be reconstructed only on the basis of the Tibetan translations (in \textit{italics}). In some cases, the Chinese translation of the NMu validates the reconstruction of the PS. At the same time, we are occasionally confronted with the suspicion, when comparing the PS’s

\footnote{Cf. Takemura 1968: 327. My understanding of Dignāga's changes in the \textit{jāti} descriptions between the NMu and the PS is quite different from that of Kang, although I agree in part with his statement that “in the \textit{Pramāṇasamuccaya} the \textit{jāti} list is structured according to the theory of \textit{anumāna} (inference)” (cf. Kang 2012: 629–631).}
An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha’s jāti section

An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha’s jāti section may have undergone some mistakes in the course of its transmission. In any case, I have tried to propose the most appropriate reconstruction through the most comprehensive examination of the materials possible.

2.1. NMu v. 19ab

[能破闕等言 似破謂諸類] (19ab)

[dūṣaṇaṁ nyūnatādyuktis tadābhāsās tu jātayaḥ]

Cf. Pramāṇaviniścaya (= PVin) III 85ab: dūṣaṇā nyūnatādyuktiḥ tadābhāsās tu jātayaḥ; Nyāyabindu (= NB) III 137–140: dūṣaṇāni (Stcherbatsky, cf. Tbh 49,8–9 : dūṣaṇā, Malvania 1,2, cf. TSoP) nyūnatādyuktiḥ. (...) dūṣaṇābhāsās tu jātayaḥ.

(English translation22:) The [genuine] refutation is a [proper] indication of [logical fallacies in a proponent’s syllogism] such as [its] lack [of the necessary members]. False rejoinders are, on the other hand, those which are falsely similar to a [genuine refutation] (tadābhāsa) [i.e., those which falsely indicate logical fallacies in a proponent’s syllogism].23

This verse introduces the topic of jāti and defines the concept. However, it has no obvious correspondence to the first two kārikās of PS chapter 6, although they seem to play the same role; the contexts of the PS and the NMu are slightly different. However, we find descriptions very similar to this verse in Dharmakīrti’s PVin and NB, as has been shown above.

In particular, the half verse PVin III 85ab appears to be almost the same as NMu v. 19ab. It must be noted however that in the former one finds the word tadābhāsās instead of 似破, as found in in the latter. When comparing the two, the PVin’s expression using the demonstrative pronoun seems more natural. It would seem redundant if the word dūṣaṇa/°nā were used twice in a single half verse of the Sanskrit text, although the word 破 corresponding to dūṣaṇa/°nā is used twice in NMu’s Chinese translation. A sentence like “dūṣanaḥbhāsās tu jātayaḥ”, being metrically fitting, can of course be assumed. However, it is possible that the original was tadābhāsās, which was rendered as 似彼, and that this was later incorrectly transmitted, becoming 似破, just as in the case of NMu v. 23ab, which we shall examine below. In order to draw my reader’s

22 For the reader’s convenience, in the following I limit myself to a very literal translation of NMu’s verses on the basis of my Sanskrit reconstruction. I would like to express my deep gratitude to Prof. Vincent Eltschinger, who kindly checked the English translation of these verses.

attention to this possibility, I propose here the above reconstruction.\footnote{In this case, however, it follows that also a part of the prose passage must be regarded as having been incorrectly transmitted (cf. NMu3a22–23: 所言似破謂諸類者，謂同法等相似過類名似能破.).}

Further, the first word of the verse in the PVin is $dūṣaṇā$; this feminine form is also found in certain editions of the NB. Since $dūṣaṇam$ in the neuter form is, however, more usual and also metrically possible in this case, I have selected the neuter form here.

2.2. NMu v. 20–21

示現異品故 由同法異立 同法相似餘 由異法\footnote{With regard to English translations of the names of $jātis$, I follow in principle Matilal’s example (cf. Matilal 1998: 61–73).}]


Corresponding to PS 6.8, PS 6.13ab and PS 6.16ab. Although the corresponding kārikās of the PS involve two parts that have been reconstructed only on the basis of the Tibetan translations, these parts...
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The prose portion following NMu v. 20 contains the statement “言相似者是不男聲，能破相應故，或隨結頌故,” meaning that in this verse “[not the feminine form °samā to qualify the word jāti, but] the neuter form (不男聲) °samam is used; this may be because it qualifies [a neuter word like] dūṣaṇa/uttara or it may be for metrical reasons.” This statement suggests that this verse involves a neuter word such as sādharmyasamam, which supports the above reconstruction. Further, using the character 應 as an equivalent of the verbal root pravṣaṇj or a derivative noun is attested also in other places in the NMu, like v. 25b. Thus it is most likely that the original Sanskrit of the sentence 應一成無異 (NMu v. 21b) was ekatvaprasaṅgād aviśeṣakṛt.

The passage 分別差別名分別 has no correspondence in PS 6.8 or PS 6.13ab; however its content does correspond to PS 6.12ab’. As a Sanskrit equivalent for 名分別, one can easily assume the word vikalpasamam; metrically this fits the first five syllables of NMu v. 21.28 Regarding the rest, 分別差別, however, what is needed is a concise expression that fits into the four restricted (short long short short/long) syllables of the last part of NMu v. 20. If one considers that vikalpasama and aviśeṣasama are in a sense a pair of jātis, I presume here the word viśeṣakṛt to be contrasting the word aviśeṣakṛt, which qualifies aviśeṣasama.

2.3. NMu v. 22

難義別疑因 故説名猶豫 説異品義故 非愛名義准 (22)

samśayākhyārthabhedenā hetoh samśayacodanā | (= PS 6.18ab)
vipakṣe ’ṛthād aniṣṭoktis [tathā]ṛthāpattisamājñikā ||

Cf. vipakṣe ’ṛthād aniṣṭoktis arthāpattisamātra tu | (PS 6.19ab)

(English translation:) [The false rejoinder] called “ambiguity-based” (samśayākhyā) criticizes the ambiguity of a logical reason by means of a differentiation of meanings. Likewise, [the false rejoinder] called “presumption-based” (arthāpattisamājñikā) indicates an undesirable consequence regarding the dissimilar class on the basis of implication.29

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27 NMu 4a9–10; cf. PSV ad PS 6.20d: yas tu napuṃsakalingena nirdiṣṭaḥ, sa uttareṇa sambandhāt.
28 If this presumption is correct, it follows that Xuanzang (玄奘) sometimes did not translate the word sama in the verses. This is, in my opinion, quite possible for metrical reasons in Chinese verses. This could be also the case of 無生 in v. 25, as will be described below.
This verse consists of two parts: The first, defining \( \text{saṃśayasama} \), corresponds to PS 6.18ab, whereas the second, defining \( \text{arthāpattisama} \), corresponds to PS 6.19ab. The original Sanskrit of the first half of the verse can be regarded as the same as PS 6.18ab, although the order of words is quite different between the Chinese translation of the NMu and the Sanskrit reconstruction of the PS. The statement “難義別疑因故説名猶豫者, 過類相應故女聲説”\(^{30}\) in the prose portion following this verse suggests that the Sanskrit word corresponding to the word 猶豫 was feminine (女聲) in the verse; this is in harmony with the expression \( \text{saṃśayākhyā} \) in PS 6.18ab. Also with regard to \( pāda-c \), the Chinese translation “説異品義故非愛” corresponds well to PS 6.19a. Translating the word \( \text{aniṣṭa} \) as 非愛 is attested also in NMu v. 24, as will be shown below.

On the other hand, \( pāda-d \) is a problem since the expression \( \text{arthāpattisama} \) appearing in PS 6.19b cannot simply be accepted as a part of the reconstruction. This is because the statement “應知, 此中略去後句, 是故但名猶豫義准”\(^{31}\) is found in the last part of the prose portion. Since this statement probably concerns the Sanskrit original (and was not added by translators),\(^{32}\) the two \( jātis \) in the verse must be called simply \( \text{saṃśaya} \) and \( \text{arthāpatti} \), without the \( \text{sama} \). The expression \( \text{saṃśayākhyā} \) (名猶豫) fits this statement, and a similar expression is also needed as

\(^{30}\) Cf. NMu 4b20–21.

\(^{31}\) Cf. NMu 4c1–2. English translation: “One should know that here, the latter parts [of the names of the two \( jātis \)] are left out, and therefore [the two \( jātis \)] are simply called \( \text{saṃśaya} \) and \( \text{arthāpatti} \).”

\(^{32}\) According to the SAT database (cf. http://21dzk.l.u-tokyo.ac.jp/SAT/satdb2015.php), among the texts involved in \( \text{大正大蔵経} \), the expression 略去後句 is, other than this case, attested only once, in 阿毘達磨俱舍論指要鈔 (T 2250, 839c14–15), a Chinese commentary on 阿毘達磨俱舍論 (Abhidharmakośabhāṣya) by Tanne (湛慧; 1675–1747), a Japanese monk of the Edo period. It might therefore be suspected that the statement including 略去後句 was added by the translators to explain the Chinese translation. Nevertheless, it is possible to assume that this expression is a Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit word \( \text{uttaralopa} \), since similar expressions like 略去中間(言), which can probably be regarded as rendering the Sanskrit words \( \text{madhyalopa} \), etc., are often attested in Chinese translations of Sanskrit texts, such as 大毘婆沙論 and 阿毘達磨俱舍論. Further, if this statement was added by the translators, it is difficult to explain why the statement does not appear until the description of 猶豫 and 義准, since the same kind of abbreviated expression, without 相似, already appeared as 名分別 in the previous description. If, on the contrary, the phrase does derive from the original Sanskrit, we might say that expressions without sama appear first in 猶豫 and 義准, since we assume, as shown above, that the original Sanskrit of 名分別 was \( \text{vikalpasama} \). Regarding \( \text{vaidharmyasama} \) and \( \text{aviśeṣasama} \), the names of the \( jātis \) themselves are not mentioned in the verses.
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the Sanskrit equivalent of the word 名義准. For this reason, I propose the above reconstruction.33

2.4. NMu v. 23ab

[由此同法等 多疑故似彼/破] (23ab)

[sādharmyādiṣu hi prāyah samśayo 'tas tadābhatā] ||

(English translation:) For, in [these seven jātis] such as sādharmyasama, the ambiguity [i.e., inconclusiveness of the reason] [is indicated] in most cases. From this, [all of them] are [the same in that they are] falsely similar to [the indication of] the [inconclusiveness].34

As explained above, this verse, unlike the preceding three verses, does not define one of the respective jātis, but explains the reason why the order of description of the first seven jātis is different from the order found in earlier treatises like the VVi.35 According to Dignāga, the reason the seven jātis are described together and classified as a group is that they are similar (似破同故); the similarity lies in the fact that in most cases these jātis, like sādharmyasama, falsely indicate that the reason is inconclusive (anaikāntika) in the proponent’s syllogism (由此同法等 多疑故似彼).36

With regard to this verse, as shown above, two different readings have been transmitted for the end of pāda b. If the above interpretation is correct (and I believe that it is), one should not adopt the reading 似破 as transmitted in the Ming edition as well as a few manuscripts, but the reading 似彼 supported by other editions and manuscripts. I have already discussed this in another article.37 Further, the original Sanskrit of the word 似彼 was probably tadābhatā or something similar, which is also attested in certain kārikās of PS chapter 6.38 Nevertheless, since the contents of this half verse are specific to the NMu and there are no corresponding descriptions in other treatises such as the PS, it is difficult to know the structure of this half verse. It can only be assumed that in this half verse, in addition to the word tadābhatā and so on, it contained

33 Regarding the reconstruction of this verse, I am basing myself on a suggestion of Muroya.
35 Cf. NMu 4c2–3: 復由何義此同法等相似過類異因明師所説次第．
36 Cf. NMu 4c3–4: 似破同故．由此同法等 多疑故似彼．
words such as *idam* (此), *sādharmyādi* (同法等), *prāyas/prāyenā* (多)\(^{39}\) and *saṃśaya* (疑).

Here I tentatively propose the above reconstruction. First, analogous to PS 6.12,\(^{40}\) I presume that the word *tadābhatā* was at the end of the verse. Next, following the structure of the same PS 6.12, in which the *jāti* under discussion is implied by the locative form of demonstrative pronoun (*atra*), I place the locative plural form of the word *sādharmyādi* at the beginning. Further, since this verse can be regarded as an explanation of the immediately preceding sentence, I presume the existence of the conjunction *hi*. This insertion of *hi* is also necessary for metrical reasons.\(^{41}\)

### 2.5. NMu v. 24

若因至不至 三時非愛言 至非至無因 是名似因闕 (24)

prāptyaprāptāv aniṣṭoktir hetoh kālatraye ’pi vā

te prāptyaprāpyahetvākhye hetunyūnatvarūpike \(\text{ (= PS 6.3)}\)

(English translation:) With regard to reaching and non-reaching, or even three times [i.e., beforehand, afterwards and simultaneously], undesirable [consequences] of a logical reason are indicated. The two [rejoinders] called “reaching and non-reaching” (*prāptyaprāpti*) and “absence of reason” (*ahetu*) are falsely similar to [an indication of] the lack of reason (*hetunyūnatvarūpike*).\(^{42}\)

The original Sanskrit of this verse describing *prāptyaprāptisama* and *ahetusama* is probably the same as PS 6.3. In the reconstruction of PS 6.3, the demonstrative pronoun *te* at the beginning of *pāda-c* is assumed only on the basis of the Tibetan translations. However, also in the Chinese translation of the NMu, the word *是* is found. Although the character *是* is used also as a copula, it is entirely possible to interpret it in this verse as rendering the word *te*, that is, a demonstrative pronoun *tad* in dual feminine form.

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\(^{39}\) Regarding the word *多*, an explanation is found in the prose portion (cf. NMu 4c5: 多言為顯或有異難, 及為顯似不成因過), and therefore the corresponding Sanskrit word probably was in the verse.

\(^{40}\) Cf. PS 6.12: *sādharmye ’pi viṣeṣoktir vikalpasamam atratu vyabhicāri viṣeṣena nityāsaktes tadābhatā* \(\text{ (= Ono 2020: 293)}\).

\(^{41}\) The reconstruction of the part “*saṃśayo ’tas*” was suggested by Muroya. Although the reconstruction of this half verse is, in any case, pure supposition, I would like to note it for future research on the NMu’s sanskrit manuscript.

2.6. **NMu v. 25**

説前無因故 應無有所立 名無説相似 [生無生亦然] (25)

\[
\text{prāg ukteḥ} \hspace{1em} \text{hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāväprasaṅjanam}^{43} \\
\text{anuktasamam} \hspace{1em} [\text{upatter anutpatistasamam tathā}] \hspace{1em} (\text{cf. PS 6.5abc}')
\]

Cf. PS 6.6abc': \text{prāg utpatter ahetutvād asidhaviparītabhāk} | anutpatistasamam

(English translation:) The non utterance based rejoinder (\text{anuktasama}) is [a refutation] which results in the non-existence of what is to be proven by means of the non existence of the reason before being uttered (\text{prāg ukteḥ}). Likewise, \text{anutpatistasama} is [a refutation which results in the non existence of what is to be proven by means of the non existence of the reason before] being produced (\text{utpatteḥ}).\(^{44}\)

I have already discussed this verse defining \text{anuktasama} and \text{anutpatistasama} in detail in another article.\(^{45}\) Here I would like to repeat only the conclusion of the earlier discussion: First, concerning NMu v. 25abc’, one can safely presume that this part is the same as PS 6.5abc’. The possibility that the character 應 is a Chinese equivalent of the verbal root \text{praśaṅj} has been mentioned above. Concerning पāda 'cd, on the other hand, if PS 6.6abc’ is taken into consideration, it is apt to assume first that the word \text{utpatteḥ}, the ablative of \text{utpati}, which can be an abbreviated form of the sentence “prāg utpatter hetvabhāvena sādhyābhāväprasaṅjanam” in this case, is the original Sanskrit for the character 生. The next 無生 can be assumed as rendering the word \text{anutpatistasamam},\(^{46}\) and the last two syllables are metrically fitting for the word тathā, which is often translated as 亦然.

2.7. **NMu v. 26**

所作異少分 顯所立不成 名所作相似 [多如似宗説] (26)

\[
kāryatvānyatvaleśena yat sādhyāsiddhidarśanam \\
tat kāryasamam [etāni pākṣābhāvanībhāni tu] \hspace{1em} (\text{cf. PS 6.7abc}')
\]

(English translation:) The effect-based rejoinder (\text{kāryasama}) is [a refutation] which shows that what is to be proven is not established due to a minute distinction of the property of “being an effect”. However, these [three jātis] are those which are falsely similar to [an indication of] the non existence of the subject of the thesis (pākṣābhāva).\(^{47}\)

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43 Cf. VVi (Ffrg.17); Ono 2020: 314.
46 Regarding the lack of the word 相似 in the Chinese translation, see fn. 28 above.
Also in this verse, *pāda*-abc of the Chinese translation, defining *kāryasama*, corresponds well to PS 6.7abc’, and the Sanskrit original of NMu v. 26abc’ can be regarded as the same as PS 6.7abc’. However, it is difficult to reconstruct *pāda*-cd, since it has no correspondence in the PS. This part ought to have a similar function regarding the three preceding *jātis* as v. 23ab had regarding the first seven *jātis*, namely to explain that the three *jātis* just defined are to be classified into one group since in most cases they falsely indicate the same logical fallacy. What then is the logical fallacy that is falsely indicated by all of these three *jātis*—anuktasama, anuptatisama and *kāryasama*? If the Chinese translation 如似宗説 is correct, it seems that it is the fallacy of the thesis (似宗 *pakṣābhāsa*).

In the prose portion following v. 25–26, however, there is no explanation for any of these *jātis* that they involve a fallacy of the thesis. Rather, the fallacy appears to be the unestablished reason (不成 *asiddhayatudoṣavat*). This is also clear in the corresponding PS 6.5–7 and the PSV thereon. And in the prose portion immediately following the verse, too, the Chinese translation explains the pratīka “如似宗説”, after having paraphrased it as 如似所立説, as 如不成因過 (*asiddhayatudoṣavat*). To begin with, if these three *jātis* can be explained as 如似宗説, why should nityasama, which is characterized as 如宗過説 (*pakṣadoṣatvarūpikā), be classified separately from these *jātis*?

In order to solve this problem, I propose the above reconstruction. My hypothesis is the following: The verse originally contained the expression *pakṣābhāva*. This expression, however, was later transmitted or read incorrectly as *pakṣābhāsa*, and this is what was translated as 似宗.

When comparing other parts of the NMu, it can be observed that the original Sanskrit of the word 似宗 was *pakṣābhāsa*. Since the word *pakṣābhāva*, on the other hand, can mean āśrayāsiddha (所依不成), a kind of *asiddhayatudoṣavat*, it is not unnatural for the word *pakṣābhāva* to be explained as 謂如不成因過 in the prose portion. Moreover, according to the above hypothesis, it follows that also the part 如似所立説 in the prose portion was the result of the original *sādhyābhāva* being incorrectly transmitted or read as *sādhyābhāsa*. The word *sādhyābhāva*, however, is used for the definitions of anuktasama and anuptatisama in NMu v. 25

48 Cf. NMu 5b17–c3.
49 Cf. NMu 5b17–18; 多如似宗説者, 如是無説相似等多分如似所立説, 謂如不成因過.
50 如似宗説 (pakṣābhāsa) and 宗過 (pakṣadoṣa) are synonyms (cf. NMu 1a22–23; 諸有説言. 宗因相違名宗過者, 此非宗過.).
51 Cf. NMu 1b4: 如是已説宗及似宗, 因與似因多是宗法.
for indicating the logical fallacy shown by the two jātis. In my opinion, the prose portion can only be understood if the word pakṣābhāva° in the verse is explained with the word sādhyābhāva°.

From the above considerations, I think it is possible that the original Sanskrit of pāda 'cd in this verse contained the word pakṣābhāva. However, the subsequent prose portion, just as in the case of v. 23ab, contains a comment on the word 多 in the verse.53 Therefore, if this statement was not added by the translators, a word such as prāyas needs to be added to the verse. However, it is difficult to construct a Sanskrit sentence including both words, pakṣābhāva and prāyas, that is also correct metrically. I have yet to come up with solution for this. Here I tentatively propose a reconstruction that does not contain the word prāyas.

2.8. NMu v. 27

prasaṅgasamam āpi dvayos tu hetumārṇaṁ |
дрṣṭāntabhāsavat tv etad [дрṣṭānte yadi codanā] || (cf. PS 6.20abc)

(English translation:) The infinite regression-based rejoinder (prasaṅgasama) is [a refutation which consists in] seeking for the reason also with regard to [the example] being recognized by both [the proponent and the opponent]. This [refutation] is, however, falsely similar to [an indication of] the fault of the example, if [the opponent] criticizes [the fault] with regard to the example.54

This verse defining prasaṅgasama corresponds well to PS 6.20abc, although the latter involves passages that have been reconstructed with the help of the Tibetan translations (倶許而求因 = āpi dvayos tu hetumārṇaṁ). If the Sanskrit original of NMu v. 27abc can be regarded as the same as PS 6.20abc, all that is still needed is to supply a passage corresponding the part 於喩設難 in pāda d. If it can be assumed that the word 設 is the Chinese equivalent of the Sanskrit yadi, the above reconstruction becomes possible. Cases in which yadi is translated as 設 seem to be testified in other Chinese translations.55

53 Cf. NMu 5b18–19: 多言為顯或如似餘. [= The word “in most cases” (is added) in order to show that (these jātis) falsely indicate other logical fallacies as well.]
55 Cf. the article on the character 設 in Charles Muller’s Digital Dictionary of Buddhism (http://www.buddhism dict.net/ddb/). The idea of assuming the word yadi derives from a suggestion of Muroya.
2.9. **NMu v. 28**

無常性恒随 名常住相似 此成常性過 名如宗過說 (28)

[anityatānvayān nityam nityasama tathāpi ca]  

Cf. nityākhyānityatānvayāt |  

nityatvāsaktir atrāpi pakṣadosatvarūpikā ||  

(English translation:) Likewise, the permanence-based rejoinder is, further, [a refutation which] results in permanence from permanently (nityam) connecting the impermanence. In this case, too, [it is a false rejoinder which is] falsely similar to [an indication of] the fault of a thesis.56

The last verse, defining *nityasama*, seems to correspond well to PS 6.4bcd, although it also involves a part reconstructed only on the basis of the Tibetan translations (此...名如宗過說 = atrāpi pakṣadosatvarūpikā). A problem is how to interpret the fact that the word sama as a part of the *jāti*’s name is lacking in PS 6.4b, although the word 相似 is found in the Chinese translation. In the previous verses, the Sanskrit names of *jāti* seem to bear the word sama whenever their Chinese translation includes the word 相似.57 For this reason, PS 6.4b cannot be used verbatim for the reconstruction; the word *nityasama* probably needs to be added. The above reconstruction reflects this consideration.

3. **Conclusion**

As a result of the above considerations, I would like to propose the following Sanskrit reconstruction of the verses in the *jāti* section of the NMu:

\[
\text{dūṣaṇaṃ nyūnatādyuktis tadābhāsās tu jātayah}  
\text{nidarśitavipaksabhâyāṃ sādharmyenaṁsādhhanam}  
\text{<sādharmyasamam> <anyay> tu vaidharmyena viśeṣakṛ}  
\text{<vikalpasamam> ekatvaprasaṅgād <aviśeṣa>kṛ}  
\text{<upalabdhhisamam> sādhyadarśanam anyahetunā}  
\]

(19ab) (20) (21)

57 Cf. 同法相似: sādharmyasama; 名可得相似: upalabdhhisama; 名無說相似: anuktasama; 名所作相似: kāryasama; 名生過相似: prasaṅgasama, but not vice versa (cf. 名分別: vikalpasama; 無生: anutpattisama; fn. 28 above). It was a suggestion of Muroya that helped me realize this.
An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha’s Jāti section

It has been reported that a Sanskrit manuscript on paper of the NMu is preserved in Tibet. However, this manuscript, most unfortunately, seems to have been damaged considerably by fire. If this article is somehow helpful for those who, in the future, examine and attempt to edit this very precious but probably not complete NMu Sanskrit manuscript, its purpose will be fulfilled.

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59 According to Prof. Steinkellner, Prof. Kanō and Mr. Do rgya dbang drag rdo rje, the “Luo Zhao Catalogue” states that fire has damaged the manuscript in question, namely, a quarter of all folios on the right ends as well as some of the left ends (cf. Steinkellner 2011: xx–xxi; Kanō 2012: 151–152; Do rgya dbang drag rdo rje 2016: 72). I would like to thank Prof. Kazuo Kanō, Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda and Prof. Shōryū Katsura for having kindly pointed out Mr. Do rgya dbang drag rdo rje’s interesting article to me.
Appendix I

Analysis of the jāti section of the Nyāyamukha (T 1628; 3c16–5c18)

0. Introduction: The definition of jāti (3c16–28; v. 19ab)
1. sādharmyasama (同法相似),
   vaidharmyasama (異法相似), vikalpasama (分別相似), aviśeṣasama (無異相似),
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   1.3.2.1. The criticism of the first interpretation of *upalabdhisama* (4c24–26)
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      2.1.1. Definition of *prāptyaprāptisama* (5a9–14)
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Appendix II

*Correspondence between jātis and logical fallacies according to the NMu*

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<td>似共不定 (sādhāraṇānaikāntikābhāsa) 似相違決定 (viruddhāvyabhicāryābhāsa)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>I 似不成因過 (asiddhābhāsa) Ⅱ 似 (= 似相違) (viruddhābhāsa) Ⅲ 似不成過 (asiddhābhāsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. 可得相似 (upalabdhisama)</td>
<td>I 似不定 (anaikāntikābhāsa) Ⅱ 似不成 (asiddhābhāsa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>似不定 (anaikāntikābhāsa) 似不成 (asiddhābhāsa)</td>
</tr>
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<td>12. 所作相似 (kāryasama)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha’s jāti section

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An attempt to reconstruct the Sanskrit of Nyāyamukha's jāti section


PSV ad PS 6  *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* Chapter 6, reconstructed Sanskrit text by M. Ono, Y. Muroya, T. Watanabe. Unpublished. In this reconstruction, **bold** script is used for words from the PSṬ, normal script for those from other sources, and *italics* for those retranslated from the Tibetan translations.


RL  *Rushi lun fanzhinan pin* 如実論反質難品, 大正蔵第32巻 (T vol. 32, no. 1633)


Takemura 1968

TBh

Tomabechi 2009

TSop

Tucci 1930

Ui 1929
On the history of branding (tāpa) in the tradition of Pāñcarātra*

Marion Rastelli
Austrian Academy of Sciences

Introduction
Since the thirteenth century CE, the branding (tāpa) of Viṣṇu’s insignia, usually a discus and a conch, on the upper arms of Śrīvaishnavas has been a feature of their self-identification. It is often considered inseparable from the tradition’s central concept of “self-surrender” (prapatti). The importance of branding can also be seen from the thirteenth century onwards in the tradition’s various textual genres. For example, scholastic texts, such as Veṅkaṭanātha’s Saccaritrarakṣā, whose first chapter (of a total of three) is devoted to branding, defend this practice against the tradition’s opponents. The Śrīvaishnava hagiography Ārāyirappati Kuruparamparāpirapāvam, dating to the fourteenth century, reports

* Although this article is not directly related to his area of research, I would like to dedicate it to the memory of Helmut Krasser, my long-year colleague and institute director, who open-mindedly and with great interest also supported research in many other fields. I would like to thank Srilata Raman for her useful remarks, and Dennis Johnson and Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for suggesting various stylistic changes to the English manuscript.

1 This can probably also be said for the Vaikhānasas, who are not Śrīvaishnavas themselves, but act as professional temple priests in Śrīvaishnava temples. They do not undergo physical branding, but perform a prenatal life-cycle ritual (saṃskāra), through which the unborn child is “branded.” For a detailed study on this topic and a general overview of the importance of branding for Śrīvaishnavas, see Hüsken 2009. On modern branding practices, see also Raman 2005.

2 Raman 2007b and Oberhammer 2004 are important studies on the concept of prapatti. For an overview of the close connection between the so-called pāñca saṃskāras (see below, p. 545) and prapatti also in later Pāñcarātra Samhitās such as the Parāśurasamhitā or the Bṛhadbrāhmaṇasamhitā, see Hüsken 2009: 125–127.

3 His traditional dates are 1268–1369; see Singh 1958: 3f. and 28.

4 For a survey of the main arguments of the first chapter of the Saccaritrarakṣā, see Raman forthcoming. For other scholastic treatises on the topic of branding, see Varadachari 1975: 460f. and Sampath 1975: 465f.
that several eminent Śrīvaiṣṇava teachers underwent the so-called five samskāras, of which the first is branding.⁵ While hagiographical accounts of this kind are often only semi-historical and thus cannot be read as reports reflecting historical reality, they do give evidence that these five samskāras were considered essential at the time these texts were composed. Vaiṣṇava Dharmaśāstras, such as the Vṛddhahārītasmṛti or the Parāśaraviśiṣṭaparamadharmaśāstra,⁶ which emerged at an uncertain date, also prescribe branding and emphasise its importance. Likewise, authors of certain Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās from a later period, probably after the thirteenth century, consider the five samskāras, including branding in particular, to be indispensable. They vividly describe the terrible consequences if a devotee does without, even beyond this life, and not only for the devotee himself, but for his entire family.⁷

While these copious sources demonstrate the significance of branding from the thirteenth century onwards, its origin and early historical development have remained little explored until now.

Śrīvaiṣṇavism arose as a fusion of several traditions, including the tradition following the Tamil saint-poets called Āḻvārs, the philosophical school of Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, and the ritual-oriented tradition of Pāñcarātra. During the evolution into Śrīvaiṣṇavism, these various traditions also had a significant influence between one another, and thus, the development of the rituals and concepts of Śrīvaiṣṇavism was quite complex. To investigate it adequately and arrive at a more complete picture, several kinds of textual sources emerging from these traditions must be examined.⁸

The present paper will investigate the development of the ritual of branding in an earlier phase of the Pāñcarātra tradition. Since the focus of Pāñcarātra is on ritual as the main means for achieving religious aims, it could be hypothesised that Pāñcarātra played a crucial role in the development and dissemination of the practice of branding. This paper will examine early Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās in which branding is mentioned or prescribed in order to determine if this was in fact the case.

⁵ See Raman 2007a.
⁷ See, for example, the story of Somaśarman and Hariśarman recounted in BBS 1.5.49ff.
⁸ For several studies on the “sub-traditions” of Śrīvaiṣṇavism and their mutual influences and relationships, see Oberhammer/Rastelli 2007.
Early evidence

In Periyāḻvār’s Tiruppallāṇṭu and Tirumoḻi, there is evidence that branding of Vaiṣṇava devotees was performed in South India already in the ninth century ce. Periyāḻvār, one of the twelve Tamil saint-poets (āḻvār), was a temple brahmin (nakar nampi, pūjārī) originating from Villiputtūr; he had close relations with Śrīraṅgam.9 In the Tiruppallāṇṭu, Periyāḻvār writes:

We have served generation after generation, each stamped with the temple mark of the brilliant holy disc, a shining red-hot fiery circle.10

This verse undoubtedly refers to branding. It describes the mark or seal (poṟi) as being related to a temple (kōyil), probably meaning that the branding took place within the sphere of the temple; however, considering the fact that Periyāḻvār was a temple functionary, it could also mean that this branding was expressly connected to the temple’s priests, who were considered the temple’s “property”. Periyāḻvār mentions branding again in his Tirumoḻi:

Having stamped myself and my property by means of the seal of your discus (…))11

These passages demonstrate that branding was in use among Vaiṣṇavas already in the ninth century.12 As we will see, it would take several centuries, however, until this custom entered the tradition of Pāñcarātra.

The ostensible earliest Pāñcarātra evidence

The earliest extant Pāñcarātra Samhitās are texts recently discovered by Diwakar Acharya, namely the Svāyambhuvapañcarātra, the Devāmrtaṇḍapañcarātra, the Aṣṭādaśavidhāna, the Jayottaratantra and the Vāsu-
devakalpa,\textsuperscript{13} as well as the so-called three jewels of the Pāñcarātra, the \textit{Jayākhyasaṃhitā}, the \textit{Sātvatasamaṃhitā} and the \textit{Pauṣkarasaṃhitā}. According to our present state of knowledge, the three latter texts were probably composed around the ninth century CE in North India, while the others predate the \textit{Jayākhyasaṃhitā}.\textsuperscript{14}

If we search these early Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās for references to branding, we find a single passage in a single manuscript, one of the five manuscripts used for the current edition of the \textit{Sātvatasamaṃhitā} (henceforth SS).\textsuperscript{15} This reference appears in chapter 22, where the four types of initiates are described, viz. \textit{samayin}, \textit{putraka}, \textit{sādhaka} and \textit{ācārya}. In a passage listing the generic qualities required from a \textit{samayin}—the lowest rank among the four—such as wearing clean garments, speaking kindly, and not desiring meat or alcohol, the manuscript bearing the abbreviation \textit{aṭī}, which contains the reading chosen by the editors, has the line:

\begin{quote}
\textit{ucchiṣṭavarjanaparaś cakrataptatanuḥ sadā ||} (SS 22.9cd)

(…) intent upon avoiding [the usage] of remnants, having branded the body with the discus forever (…)
\end{quote}

In comparison, the four other manuscripts used for the SS edition read:

\begin{quote}
\textit{utkṛṣṭamadhyamanyūnatapas taptatanuḥ sadā ||}

(…) [practising] superior, medium or inferior bodily mortifications, always mortifying his body (…)
\end{quote}

When choosing the variant in manuscript \textit{aṭī}, the editors have probably followed the principle of \textit{lectio difficilior}, but let us consider other reasons in favour of or against the one or other reading.

Considering the reading of the other four manuscripts, the line in question starts with a compound that extends beyond the \textit{pāda}-boundary. While this is generally avoided in the SS, other such cases can nonetheless be

\textsuperscript{13} The first three texts have been edited by Acharya 2015. For the others, see Acharya 2010.


\textsuperscript{15} Of five manuscripts used for the edition SS (see upodghātaḥ, pp. 1f.), only the manuscript \textit{aṭī} clearly mentions branding; for the readings of the other manuscripts, see below. The edition SS, does not indicate which manuscripts were used, nor does it give any variant readings. Its line 22.9cd is identical with the reading chosen by the editor of the SS. I assume that the edition SS, is based on the manuscript \textit{aṭī}, but of course we cannot exclude the existence of another manuscript with this reading.
easily found in the text (e.g. SS 22.27c: dravyamantrakriyābhāvabhāvadāt). The double mention of tapas—here understood as bodily mortifications—seems pleonastic, especially if we consider the fact that bodily mortifications do not play an prominent role in Pāñcarātra religious practices. But it may be possible that taptatanuḥ should be understood as “having a branded body,” as the reading cakrataptatanuḥ indicates more clearly.

Against this interpretation speaks the fact that the SS does not mention branding in any other place, whether in the chapters dealing with initiation (dīkṣā) or anywhere else in the text. If branding were a necessary prerequisite for an initiate, one would expect a prescription for the ritual connected to it, or at least some other form of reference. No other extant early Pāñcarātra Samhitā mentions branding either.

A passage in Alaśiṅga Bhātṭa’s commentary on chapter 19 of the SS, which deals with initiation (dīkṣā), also suggests that branding has gone unmentioned in SS 22.9. When commenting on the prescriptions for naming (nāmakaraṇa) in SS 19.39c–46b, he expresses the opinion that the rites of branding and the application of the ārđhvaṇḍra marks—two components of the initiation rites known as paṇca saṃskāras (see below, p. 11)—must be performed before the rite of naming. He gives two main reasons for this opinion. First, these rites are prescribed at this moment of initiation by the Īśvarasaṃhitā (henceforth ĪS), and second the SS itself mentions, in 18.35cd, the utensils necessary for branding, that is, branding irons. Alaśiṅga Bhātṭa’s opponent argues first that these utensils serve

16 The passage under examination does not explicitly differentiate between the prerequisites required from a person who wants to become a samayin and the characteristics exclusive to someone who is already a samayin. The first part of the list (SS 22.2–13b)—to which the line discussed here belongs—describes rather generic qualities that are expected from both a person who desires to become a samayin and a samayin himself. The second part of the passage (SS 22.13c–23) refers to a samayin’s religious practices, that is, to a person who is already a samayin.

17 Alaśiṅga Bhātṭa lived in the 19th century; see the upodghāta of this edition of the SS (p. 9).

18 For the prescription in the ĪS and its dependence on the SS, see below (pp. 543ff.).

19 SSBh 382.21–25: “On this occasion, before [ritually] naming the disciple, [the rites of] bearing [the discus] Sudarśana as well as [the conch] Pāñjajanya and bearing the ārđhvaṇḍra [marks] are to be performed, because [in ĪS 21.284ab]: ‘Branding, puṇḍra, name, mantra and worship as the fifth one,’ it is taught that these two are [to be performed] before naming. Further, branding itself, with conch and discus, which are mentioned above in the section about procuring the requisites [in SS 18.35cd]: ‘a twelve-spoked discus made of five metals together with a conch,’ is taught on another occasion.” (asminn avasare śiṣyasya nāmakaranat pūrvaḥ sudarśana paṇcāca janyadhiḥ ārđhvaṇḍradhāraṇam ca kāryam, yataḥ—“tāpaḥ puṇḍras tathā nāma mantra yāgaś ca paṇcamaḥ” iti
another purpose, and secondly that, if branding were required at this point of the initiation, there would be a regulation for it, but there is no such rule (niyama), either in the SS itself or in other Saṃhitās such as the Jayākhyasamhitā, the Lakṣmītantra, or the Pādmasaṃhitā.²⁰ Alaśinga Bhāṭṭa rejects these arguments and follows up with a long discussion in which he argues that branding does not necessarily need to be performed at this point of an initiation, that it could also be performed at an earlier time in life, but that it must be performed during the initiation at the latest.²¹ For interpreting SS 22.9, it is important to be aware that Alaśinga

20 SSBh 382,26–383,7: “If one objects: In the section about procuring the requisites, discus and conch are not taught for the purpose of branding at all, but they are taught for the use just as [described in SS 18.60c–62b]: ‘Having [placed the mantras on his hands and body], which ends with [showing] the [respective] mudrās, he should then bring both conch and discus, over which their mantras have been recited, with both hands in due manner. Then he should assume their nature, lay them down on the ground, look [in a purifying way] at everything that is there, and then he should commence the ritual.’ (…).” (nanu sambhārārjanaprakaraṇe cakrasaṅkhau na hi tāpārtham pratipādita, api tu—mudrāvasānāṃ kṛtva samyak tadānu cāharet || pāṇibhyām saṅkhacakre dre svamantreṇābhimantrite bhūtvā tadāmanā paścāt te nihāya dharātale || avalokyākhilam tatstham pravartetātha karmanī | ity etāvamātropayogārthaṃ pratipādītav iti cet […]); and 383,20–22: “If one objects: Let [the performance of the rites of] bearing [the discus] Sudarśana and [the conch] Pāñjajanya be proven by authorities. What is the rule that it must be performed only at this moment in the section of the initiation? If there were a rule just as for [the rite of] naming, the Venerable One (i.e., Viṣṇu, who is considered the author of the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās) himself would have explicitly mentioned it, too. For also in the Jayākhyasamhitā, Lakṣmītantra, Pādmasaṃhitā, etc., it is not taught as an auxiliary rite of the initiation at all (…)” (nanv astu nāma sudarśanapāñcajanyadhāraṇam pramānasiddham, tad idānīm eva dīkṣāprakaraṇe kāryam iti ko ‘yam niyamaḥ, tathā niyame nāmakaranayat tad api bhagavataiva kanṭharavenoktaṃ bhavet. Jayākhyalaksmtinentrapādādīv api na hi tad dīkṣāntavena pratipādītaṃ iti cet […]).

21 SSBh 383,7–19 and 383,23–387,22. There is evidence that branding was performed on other occasions, for example in connection with life-cycle rituals (saṃskāras) in childhood, as described in the hagiographical accounts presented by Raman (2007a: 268f.). Raman (ibid. 276), however, raises the question whether small children were in fact branded, or whether Viṣṇu’s insignia were merely painted on their upper arms. There are indeed prescriptions that infants should be given these insignia in the form of pieces of jewellery (see ŚāṇḍSmṛ 3.76c–79b and the unidentified statement attributed to the Vasiṣṭhasmṛti, both quoted in SCR 164,9–16) or that these marks should be painted by means of white clay (ParāśaraS 2.6; see also Hüskens 2009: 109f.). According to the BhārS (5.62), one of the later Saṃhitās focussing on prapatti, pieces of jewellery in the form of discus, etc., can be worn by women. Men may only carry these up to the age of eighteen, after which they must be branded (cf. also n. 58).
Bhaṭṭa, whose concern is to show that the SS prescribes branding, does not highlight its mention in SS 22.9, although this would have supported his argument.\(^{22}\) It is thus probable that the version of the SS that he had available did not contain any hints about branding in its chapter 22.

Since we know from Periyāḻvār’s evidence that branding was practised in the ninth century in Tamil Nadu, one could speculate that it was not necessarily considered a Pāñcarātra rite despite being a custom practised in the milieu of the Āḻvārs, but that it was nevertheless considered a prerequisite for an initiate, such as good breeding, which is also not specifically Pāñcarātric. This would, however, require that the SS originated from South India. However, influences of Kashmirian Śaivism traceable in the SS and mentions of iconographical features specific to Kashmir\(^{23}\) make this seem unlikely. It is more plausible that this line was changed or inserted into the text in South India at a time when branding had already become a general characteristic of Pāñcarātrikas.

The first half of the compound makes the line additionally suspicious: *ucchiṣṭavarjanaparaḥ*, “intent upon avoiding [the usage] of remnants.” Using the offerings to the god after he has departed, especially consuming food offerings following worship, is a controversial issue in the Pāñcarātra tradition. In the Samhitās, different opinions are expressed. Some prescribe that these offerings should be given to the deity Viṣvaksena after worship of Viṣṇu is completed, and that they should not be touched again, much less eaten. Other sources state that these offerings should be eaten or given to Vaiṣṇavas for their consumption, since this would effect good results, even as far as the liberation from transmigration.\(^{24}\) In Yāmuna’s Āgamaṇāmāṇya, a South Indian text from the tenth century defending the tradition of Pāñcarātra, the consumption of food offerings (*naivedya*) by the Pāñcarātrikas is one of the objections voiced by the Mīmāṃsaka opponents. Rather than denying that this is the practice in his tradition, Yāmuna in fact defends it.\(^{25}\) Venkatanātha also devotes the third chapter of his *Saccaritrarākṣā* to defending this practice.\(^{26}\)

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22 In Alaśiṅga Bhaṭṭa’s commentary on the passage devoted to the characteristics of the *samayin* in SS 22.2–31, which is cursory and comprises only three-and-a-half lines, there is no indication that this passage of the SS contained a mention of branding either.

23 See references in n. 14.

24 See TAK3 s.v. *nirmālya*.

25 ĀP 15,7f. and 158,5–169,2.

26 Note that the use of items and food previously offered to Viṣṇu is also mentioned as a characteristic of the Vaiṣṇavas described in verse 9 of Periyāḻvār’s *Tiruppallāṇṭu*. It seems that both this custom and branding were already closely
In the discussed line of the SS, the contrary opinion is expressed: remnants (ucchiṣṭa)\(^{27}\) of food offerings should not be used. Important for our context is the fact that the line SS 22.9cd mentions two disputed issues: the consumption of food offerings and branding, and it also advances a clear opinion as to whether or not they should be practised.

My opinion is that this line only makes sense in an environment where such a clear statement is necessary. There is no evidence that it was necessary in ninth-century Kashmir. This line must have been formulated in South India, and thus it does not belong to the original text of the SS.

We can only speculate about the date of the composition of this line. It could be as late as Alaśiṅga Bhaṭṭa’s lifetime, which was in the nineteenth century, but of course it could also have been added a few centuries before that.

**Other possible evidence?**

The Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās contain passages that could be understood as referring to branding, but which do not necessarily need to be interpreted in this way. For example, in descriptions of good conduct (ācāra), a few Saṃhitās give the instruction that one should be marked by the discus, e.g. in *Sanatkumārasaṃhitā* (SanS) *indrāṭra* 9.7:

> One should always walk around marked by the discus or [carrying] a discus-banner.\(^{28}\)

connected as features of self-identification of certain Vaiṣṇava groups in the 9th century.

\(^{27}\) In the context of this discussion, the terms ucchiṣṭa, naivedya and nirmālya do not refer to factually different objects. It is, however, striking that, for example, in Veṇkaṭanātha’s *Saccaritrarakṣā*—as in the passage of the SS under discussion here—the term ucchiṣṭa is more likely used by opponents (see SCR 219,4–220,14 and 256,9) than by the proponents of this practice. Thus, it gives the impression of being a pejorative term (see also SCR 231,5–8, where the term ucchiṣṭa is used for the remnants of Rudra and other deities considered inferior to Viṣṇu).

\(^{28}\) SanS *indrāṭra* 9.8ab: *caṅkāḥ sarvadā bhūtvā carec cakradhvajō ’pi vā|. See also ViṣṇuS 29.18cd: “One should be marked by the discus; one’s children, servants and cattle should bear Viṣṇu’s name and mark.” (cakrāṅko viṣṇunāṃkaputrabhyāpāsūr bhavet ||). Since the *Sanatkumārasaṃhitā* was known to Yāmuna (SanS *śivarātra* 5.48e–49b, ṛṣirātra 8.77c–78 and *indrāṭra* 9.2ab are quoted in ĀP, pp. 160–161, with attribution to the respective rātras), it must belong to the earlier Saṃhitās, but it also contains passages describing rituals that are characteristic for public worship in great temples as given in later Saṃhitās, such as temple processions (*utsava*, e.g. SanS *śivarātra* 9). Thus, it is probably a composite work comprised of earlier and later texts. The *Viṣṇusamhitā* was probably composed in the 13th or 14th century (see the introduction of N. P. Unni in the edition of the ViṣṇuS, p. 10).
This statement does not necessarily imply branding. It could also refer to a drawing of Viṣṇu’s discus. There are other examples in which people or deities are marked by particular signs but without being branded. In the frame story of the Paramasamhitā, which borrows motives from the Nārāyaṇīya,29 the siddhās living on the island Śvetadvīpa are also described as carrying marks of the four attributes of Viṣṇu on their hands:

There live the shining siddhās, who have four arms and are marked by conch, discus, mace and lotus in their hands.30

This probably does not mean that the siddhās were branded with these signs, but that they had these signs on their (four!) hands, perhaps in the form of drawings, thus demonstrating their resemblance to Viṣṇu.

Viṣṇu is usually depicted as carrying these four attributes in his four hands, but in some of his manifestations he is also only marked by drawings of these attributes. The Sātvatasamhitā teaches that the four Vyūhas—specific manifestations of Viṣṇu—appear in four states: in the fourth state (turya), in the state of deep sleep (suṣupti), in the dream state (svapna), and in the waking state (jāgrat). They become more and more manifest as each subsequent state is assumed. The form in the fourth state is described as “possessing two hands that grant boons and safety,31 that are marked by conch and discus, and that are able to rescue the three worlds.”32 The form of the first of the four Vyūhas in the state of deep sleep is the same as that in the fourth state; the other Vyūhas in the state of deep sleep have other attributes drawn (rekhāmaya) on their hands.33

The Vyūhas in the dream state already possess concrete attributes,34 and the characteristics of the Vyūhas in the waking state are also clearly

29 On the frame story of the Paramasamhitā, see Oberhammer 1994: 32–44 and 83–89. The Paramasamhitā is quoted by Yāmuna (ParS 28.33c–34 in AP 15,4f., with an attribution to the ParS) and thus is one of the earlier extant Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās.

30 ParS 1.22c–23b: tatra tejomayaḥ siddhā nivasanti caturbhujāḥ || 22 śaṅkhacakrānaṅkitāḥ sveṣu pāṇiṣu ||.

31 I.e. they show the varada- and the abhayamudrā. For descriptions of these mudrās, see, for example, JS 8.104–105b; for drawings, see PādS vol. 1, App. p. 24.

32 SS 2.71: varadābhayadenaiva śaṅkhacakrāṅkitena tu | trailokyoddhrtidakṣenā yuktah pāṇidvayena tu || 71. The description of the Lakṣmītantra, which is based on that of the SS, makes it clear that these attributes are drawn: “on [his] two hands marked by the discus and the conch made of lines” (LT 10.13c–14a: rekhāmayena cakreṇa śaṅkhena ca karadvaye || 13 aṅkitaṁ).

33 SS 3.8–10, for a translation of this passage, see Rastelli 2006: 336, nn. 1045–1046.

34 SS 4.14cd: “their hands raised with the best weapons, possessing their own marks” (varāyudhodyatakaraṇaḥ svakaiś cihnaṁ anujhitaiḥ ||).
manifest (suvyaktalaksana, SS 5.7c). Being marked by discus and conch thus does not necessarily signify that one is branded by these signs; drawings are also a possibility.

In other cases, being marked by the discus may be meant only in a figurative sense. The Ahirbudhnyasamhitā, which was probably composed in the twelfth or thirteenth century CE, is devoted to the worship of Sudarśana, the personified form of Viṣṇu’s discus. It is remarkable that in this text, with its focus on the discus, no branding with the discus is mentioned. It does, however, mention Sālagrāma or Śālagrāma, a place located on the river Gaṇḍakī. This place is famous for unusual black stones, also called śālagrāma. Containing a fossil ammonite, they are considered parts of the discus Sudarśana and thus they are sacred. For the author of the following passages of the AS, not only these stones but everything present in Śālagrāma is marked by the discus, which certainly does not mean that everything is branded by it:

Having assumed the form of a boar in the boar-kalpa, the Venerable One, the supreme person, pulled the earth out of the ocean. Then the goddess Earth, who was exceedingly exulted, spoke to the god (78c–79): ‘In order to rejoice those who are fond [of you], you should dwell in a territory on the earth forever, O Lord of the world, after having obtained a dear body.’ (80) Thenceforth Keśava, to whom the goddess had spoken in this way, dwelled in the auspicious territory of the earth called Sālagrāma (81) with the body of Sudarśana, the glorious one, the Venerable One, the one who is kind to [his] worshippers. Because of the majesty of the place, because of the compassion with [his] worshippers, [and] because of the request of the [goddess] Earth, Hari is always present there even today. The austerity that is performed in this place is multiplied thousandfold. (82–83) Human beings, animals, insects, and birds that die in this place are marked by the conch and the discus without doubt. (84) The Venerable One, the lotus-eyed one who bears the body of Sudarśana is always present there, an ocean of good, auspicious qualities. (85) The human beings, deities, animals, trees, and mountains who live at his place are all marked by the seal of the discus. (86)
On the history of branding (tāpa) in the tradition of Pāñcarātra

The unsurpassed place of Viṣṇu is called Sālagrāma. The lord of the world in the form of the discus is always present there. Everything immovable and moving there is marked by the discus.40

An actual case of branding can be found in the Pauskarasamhitā, one of the earliest extant Saṃhitās. It describes a ritual in which a bull is let loose. In this case, it is the bull that is branded with the symbol of a weapon of Viṣṇu, obviously in order to show its identity with Viṣṇu himself:

Having bowed to the teacher with devotion, he should let the excellent bull go, which should immediately be branded on the right shoulder with a desired weapon made of metal, which has been heated in fire. (...) He who lets a bull loose with reference to his mantra-lord, for his own sake or for the sake of another person, attains the brahma-world. For the bull is the Venerable One, the dharma [itself], because of [its] relation with pleasure (kāma) and wealth (artha) in the world. By this [bull] that is abandoned, suffering of birth is entirely abandoned forever.41

Branding of human beings, however, is not mentioned in the early Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās.

40 AS 50.19c–20: sālagrāma iti khyātam viṣṇusthānam anuttamam | 19 nityam samnihitas tatra cakraṛūpi jagatpatiḥ | tatra cakraṅkitaṃ sarvaṃ sthāvaraṃ jaṅgamaṃ ca yat || 20.

41 PauS 41.213–217b: praniḥtya (em., ed. praniḥpya) guror bhaktyā vrṣabham surabhīṃ tyajet | daksine skandhadeśe ca hetinābhimatena ca | 213 lohenānalaataptena mudraṅtyaṃ kṣaṇena ca | (...) svamantranātham (em., ed. samantranātham) uddīṣya hy ātmano ’rthe paraśyā vā | 215 vrṣotsargam hi yah kuryād brahmalokam vrajaṇy asau | vrṣo hi bhagavān dharmo loke kāmārthhabandhataḥ || 216 tena tyaktena saṃtyaktaṃ janmaduḥkhaṃ hi sāśvatam |.
The earliest unambiguous Pāñcarātra reference to a branding ritual

The earliest unambiguous reference to a branding ritual in a Pāñcarātra text is found in the *Pārameśvarasamhitā* (henceforth PārS) This text was probably composed in Śrīraṅgam in the twelfth or thirteenth century.\(^{42}\) There is no reason to think that the passage referring to branding was inserted at a later date, since already Veṅkatanātha, whose traditional dates are 1268–1369,\(^ {43}\) quotes this passage in his *Saccaritrarakṣā* (168,18–169,13) and attributes it to the PārS. The passage in question appears in the PārS in the chapter on the installation (*pratiṣṭhā*) of temples and images, following the statement that images of Viṣṇu should bear his marks on their bodies:

Likewise, his (i.e., Viṣṇu’s) Brahmins, Kṣatriyas, Vaiśyas, (961cd) Maudgalas,\(^ {44}\) etc., and other [groups] must by no means be without his marks. Therefore they are immediately to be marked with discus, conch, mace, and lotus\(^ {45}\) made of metal, which have been thoroughly heated in fire, perfumed while [reciting] their particular *mantras* and worshipped with *arghya*,\(^ {46}\) scents, etc. (962–963) When Brahmins, etc., who are versed in the three Vedas (*traividya*), who are perfect in knowledge, and who are firm in good conduct as taught, and also those who are Śūdras, are marked in this way, (964) they are known to be qualified for the rules of behaviour (*samaya*), listening [to the teachings], etc. (965ab) (…) Officiants, etc., who are marked with the discus, etc., in this way are suitable for the ritual. (970cd) Those who

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\(^{42}\) Rastelli 2006: 49–54.

\(^{43}\) See n. 3.

\(^{44}\) The Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās use the term *maudgala* as a designation for Śūdras. See e.g. JayS 22.38cd: “Hear about the characteristics of Brahmins, etc., up to the Maudgalas.” (*vipraśrāmaudgalāntānāṃ lakṣaṇam cāvadhāraya ||*); PauṣS 27.129; PādS cp 21.40cd and SSBh ad SS 7.43: “‘By [persons] up to Maudgalas’ means ‘by [persons] up to Śūdras.’ (*maudgalaṇtaīḥ śūdraṇtair ity arthaḥ*).

\(^{45}\) Here the devotees are branded not only with two but with four of Viṣṇu’s insignia. The so-called five weapons (*pañcāyudha*) are another alternative (see ŚāṇḍSmṛ 3.76, ParāśaraS 1.19). In his commentary on *Bhāradvājasamhitā* 3.61, the modern scholar Sarayuprasāda Miśra explains the branding with five weapons as follows: “The meaning is that one should brand the two upper arms with discus and conch, [i.e.,] the right [upper arm] with the discus [and] the left [one] with the conch, the forehead with the mace, the head with the bow, and the heart with the sword, while [reciting] their particular *mantras*.” (*bāhvoḥ śaṅkhacakrābhhyām tatrāpi daksīne cakreṇa savye śaṅkhenā latāte gadayā śirasi śāṅgena hṛdaye khadgena ca tattanmantreṇa dāhayed ityarthah*.) See also the discussion about the five weapons in his commentary on BhārS 3.66 and n. 79.

\(^{46}\) *arghya* consists of water and various other substances, such as grains, flowers, and fruits; see TAK1 s.v. *arghya* and *arghyadravya*. 
are marked with the marks of other deities, however, are not suitable for the ritual.  

The PārS does not contain a prescription for initiation (dīkṣā), since the particular group of Pāñcarātrikas to which its author(s) probably belonged and which was the target audience of the PārS, the so-called Ekāyanas, did not practise initiation but considered themselves to possess the authority (adhiṣṭa) to perform rituals from birth. Thus, if we take the passage quoted above seriously, we can draw the following conclusions: (1) Branding was performed independently from the ritual of initiation; (2) The Ekāyanas underwent branding, since the first sentence in the quoted passage aims at all persons and does not exclude the Ekāyanas; (3) Verse 964 gives information about persons other than Ekāyanas. Among the Pāñcarātrikas at the time of the composition of the PārS, the traividyaś, persons belonging to a Vedic-orthodox branch (śākhā), were clearly differentiated from the Ekāyanas. The Śūdras mentioned in this verse also do not belong to the Ekāyanas, since otherwise a statement about their qualification would not be necessary, because, as mentioned, Ekāyanas have this and other qualifications from birth. Verse 964 informs us that these persons, traividyaś and Śūdras, become qualified to follow the Pāñcarātra rules of behaviour and to study the Pāñcarātra teachings through branding. And, as stated in verse 971ab, temple officiants (here again, persons other than Ekāyanas must be meant) also receive the qualification for their office through branding. These verses do not give the impression that branding took place within the framework

PārS 15.961c–971b: evam tadīyā viprāś ca ksatriyā vaiśajātayaḥ || 961 maudgalāyās tathāe ca na taccihnavivarjitāḥ | bhaveyuh sarvathā tasmāc cakraśaṅkhagadāmbujaiḥ || 962 lohair analasantaptais tattanmantrādhibāsaitaiḥ | pujitair arghyagandhāyair ankitavyāḥ kṣaṇena tu|| 963 traividyaś jñānasampannā yathoktācārāniṣṭhitāḥ | viprāyās te ’pi śūdrāś ca yadaivam kṛtalakaṇāḥ || 964 tadā tu yogā vijñeyāḥ samayaśravanādīsau || (...) ārādhakādyāḥ karmāyā evam cakrālāṃcītāḥ || 970 devatāntararacnais tair akarmāyās tu lānchitāḥ ||


Unfortunately, Nṛsiṃhayajva, the 18th-century commentator of the PārS, does not provide any information on this point. With regard to the passage quoted above, he just writes: “By ‘likewise,’ etc., he extends the mentioned characteristic also to other cases.” (PārPV 162,22–163,1: uktalākṣaṇam anyatrāpy atidiṣati—evam ityādina). See n. 21 for other possible occasions for branding.

See Rastelli 2006: 216–223. For the traividyaś, see also below (p. 558).

There are indications that Śūdras may have belonged to the group of the Ekāyanas, but the focus of the PārS is definitely on Brahmins. See Rastelli 2006: 212f. and 83–86.
of the initiation ritual. Indeed, it is remarkable that it is branding which is described as necessary for obtaining these various qualifications, not initiation (dīkṣā).

What is also interesting is the mention of the “marks of other deities” (devatāntaracihna), obviously borne by devotees of other deities. We need, however, not necessarily conclude that these marks were also brandings, since less permanent marks such as the tripūndra worn by Śaivas could also have been meant.

The earliest Pāñcarātra prescriptions for branding

The probably earliest prescriptions for the ritual of branding in an extant Pāñcarātra text are found in the dīkṣā chapters of the Īśvarasamhitā (ĪS 21) and the Śrīpraśnasamhitā (ŚrīprśS 16). Both texts may have been composed around the same period.

The ĪS was composed after the PārS—which, as mentioned, is dated to the twelfth or thirteenth century—since the PārS served as a model for the ĪS. This ĪS should not be confused with an earlier, different text also called Īśvarasamhitā, which was quoted by Yāmuna in his Āgamaprāmānya and by Veṅkaṭanātha in his Saccaritrarakṣā.

The ŚrīprśS was composed after the PādS, as seen by the many passages from the PādS that have been adopted in the ŚrīprśS. The PādS was probably composed before the PārS, but not very long before, since the PādS belongs to the group of Saṃhitās of South Indian origin with a strong orientation toward public temple rituals. Thus the PādS could perhaps be dated to the twelfth century.

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53 See the quotations attributed to an Īśvarasamhitā in ĀP 163,5–164,2 and SCR 206,20f., 228,13–17, 229,4–8, 233,3f. (= ĀP 164,10), 234,19–235,6, 236,6f. (= ĀP 164,1f.), 251,4–6, 253,4–7, 257,5–9. None of these quoted passages can be found in the ĪS that is discussed here.
54 For a list of parallel passages, see the edition of the ŚrīprśS, pp. lxvii–lxxxix.
55 The PādS and the PārS have a few passages in common, and it is difficult to say which text borrows from which or whether they had a common source, but there are a few indications that the common passages are more in line with the PādS than with the PārS. See Rastelli 2006: 57–59.
56 On the shift from the earlier Saṃhitās, which were probably of North Indian origin and focused on individual ritual, to the South Indian Saṃhitās mainly dealing with public temple ritual, see Rastelli 2006: 91–98.
To date, I was unable to locate a quotation from the ĪS or the ŚrīprśŚ in any of Veṅkaṭanātha’s works. This is even more striking since Veṅkaṭanātha’s SCR abounds in quotations from the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās and other texts, such as Smṛtis, the epics, Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas, in order to prove that there is a Vedic enjoinement for branding. Among all these quotations is not a single one containing a ritual prescription for branding. Would Veṅkaṭanātha not have been eager to quote such a passage if he had known it? We cannot answer this question with certainty, but it is possible that Veṅkaṭanātha knew neither the ĪS nor the ŚrīprśŚ and that these two texts were composed after his lifetime.

The dīkṣā-chapter of the ĪS almost exclusively consists of passages taken verbatim from dīkṣā-chapters of the SS; see the following parallel passages:

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57 For the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās quoted or referred to by Veṅkaṭanātha, see also the list in Singh 1958: 110–112. The list does not include the ŚrīprśŚ, and the Īśvarasaṃhitā mentioned in the list is not the ĪS that is under examination here (see fn. 53, above).

58 See the quotations from several Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās in SCR 137,1–140,18 in order to prove that the statements about branding presented by Veṅkaṭanātha are Vedic statements, and the quotations from Smṛtis, the epics, Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās (quoted in order to corroborate Veṅkaṭanātha’s interpretation of the quoted statements from the Mahābhārata), Purāṇas and Upapurāṇas in order to show that branding is prescribed in SCR 164,1–176,18. It should be added that among these many quotations, actually only very few explicitly speak of branding. Most of the quotations are about bearing/wearing (dhāraṇa) or being marked (aṅkita) by the discus; this does not necessarily mean being branded, but can also mean, for example, wearing a discus as a piece of jewellery as described in ŚāṇḍŚmr 3.76c–79b quoted in SCR 164,9–13, or drawing a discus on the upper arm as described in the unidentified statement of the Vāmanapurāṇa quoted in SCR 175,8f. The quotations that undoubtly or probably refer to branding are attributed to the Vasiṣṭhasmṛti (unidentified, SCR 164,14–16), the Sanatkumārasaṃhitā (unidentified, SCR 171,6–10), the Agnipurāṇa (unidentified, SCR 174,2–9), and the Garuḍapurāṇa (unidentified, SCR 175,18f.), and derive from the PārŚ (PārŚ 15.959–973b in SCR 168,14–169,15; see p. 540).

59 For a study on the relation between the dīkṣā chapters of the SS and the ĪŚ, see Dębicka-Borek 2014. For a summary and translation of SS 16, 18 and 19, see Hikita 1992, 1993a and 1993b. The ĪŚ has been translated by Lakshmithathachar (2009).
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<th>Parallel passages</th>
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<td>ĪS 21.3c–28 ≈ SS 16.4–29b</td>
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| ĪS 21.29c–30b = SS 18.2  
ĪS 21.30c–74 ≈ SS 18.4–48b  
ĪS 21.76–91 ≈ SS 18.48c–64b  
ĪS 21.92c–98 ≈ SS 18.78–84b  
ĪS 21.99–246b ≈ SS 18.86c–233 | Preparatory rites for initiation;  
Rites on the first day of initiation |
| ĪS 21.247–283b ≈ SS 19.3–39b | Second day of initiation:  
Preparation of a maṇḍala;  
The teacher asks about the disciple’s dream, pacifying oblations to the fire in case of an inauspicious dream;  
Worship of god;  
Purification of the disciple by means of various samskāras;  
The teacher touches the disciple with the so-called mantra-hand |
| ĪS 21.283c–284b | Announcement of the pañca samskāras |
| ĪS 21.284c–292b | Branding (tāpa) |
| ĪS 21.292c–318b  
(ĪS 21.314–317b ≈ PārS 3.16c–19) | ārdhvapuṇḍra |
| ĪS 21.318c–325  
(ĪS 21.319–325 ≈ SS 19.39c–46b) | Naming (nāman) |
| ĪS 21.326–440 ≈ SS 19.47c–161b | Purification rites for the initiand, among others, performed by means of a thread (sūtra) representing his body⁶⁰ |

⁶⁰ For details of these prescriptions, see Hikita 1993b. The thread that represents the initiand’s body is often called māyāsūtra. By cutting it and offering its pieces to the fire, the tattvas constituting the body are purified and the initiand’s karman is destroyed; see Rastelli 1999: 159–161.
### Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ĪS 21.441–448b ≈ SS 19.161c–168</th>
<th>Teacher and initiand go to the temple, where the initiand is taught about the rules of conduct (<em>niyamas</em>), ritual worship, <em>mantras</em>, <em>mudrās</em>, etc.; The initiand worships the teacher; The teacher pours water on the head of the initiand and imposes his hand, on which a <em>maṇḍala</em> has been visualised, on the initiand’s head</th>
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<td>ĪS 21.464c–503b ≈ SS 20.2–40</td>
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This table demonstrates that between the lines that were originally taken from SS 19.39ab and 19.39cd (that is, ĪS 21.283ab and 21.319ab), the redactor of the ĪS has inserted a passage (ĪS 21.283c–318) announcing the description of the so-called *paṇca saṃskāras*, which are: (1) “branding” (*tāpa*); (2) *puṇḍra*, the first application of the *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* marks; (3) “name” (*nāman*), i.e., ritual naming; (4) the bestowal of a *mantra*; and (5) “worship” (*yāga*), i.e., the teaching of the procedure of ritual worship.\(^{61}\)

This announcement is followed by a section describing ritual branding (ĪS 21.284c–292b) and a section describing the *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* rite (ĪS 21.292c–318b), of which a part has been taken from the PārS (ĪS 21.314–317b ≈ PārS 3.16c–19).\(^{62}\) After announcing the prescription for naming (ĪS 21.318cd), the ĪS again uses a text passage from the SS for describing this rite and then continues again by taking over the text of the SS (ĪS 21.319ff. ≈ SS 19.39cff.). The last two *saṃskāras*—*mantra* and *yāga*—could be read into the section at the end of the ritual procedure, when the disciple is taught the *mantra*, the *mudrā*, and proper worship of god (ĪS 21.442c–443 = SS 19.163–164b).

\(^{61}\) That this is the meaning of the fifth *saṃskāra* called *yāga* can be seen, for example, in ŚrīprśS 16.141ab: “And, with the exception of a Śūdra, he should point out the procedure of worship.” (ārādhanakramam caiva vinā śūdram upādiśet).

\(^{62}\) The other verses of this passage may also originally derive from other sources.
As in the case of the ĪS, the chapter on initiation in the ŚrīprśS is based on other Saṃhitās, even if the textual passages were usually not taken literally from their sources. The sources of this chapter identified up to now are the Pādmasaṃhitā and the Lakṣmītantra.

See the following parallel passages:

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<th>Parallel passages</th>
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<td>Beginning of the ritual prescriptions in ŚrīprśS 16.37; Examination of the initiand (16.37–38); Preparation of the ritual place and utensils, presentation of sprouts (aṅkurārpaṇa) (16.39–42)</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.43–45b ≈ PādS cp 2.8–11</td>
<td>Preparation of pots (kumbhādhivāsana)</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.45c-49</td>
<td>Sprinkling of ritual utensils, the sacrificial pavilion, the teacher, the initiands, the sacrificial altar (vedi) (16.45c–47b); Preparation of a maṇḍala (16.47c–49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrīprśS 16.50–56 ≈ PādS cp 2.13–18</td>
<td>Installation of pots on the maṇḍala; Worship of Viṣṇu in the pot and the maṇḍala; Kindling of the fire; Preparation and distribution of a cooked food offering (caru); Fire oblations (homa)</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.57–87 ≈ PādS cp 2.19–47b</td>
<td>Various initiation rites with regard to the initiand, such as touching him, consumption of pañcagavya and the cooked food offering, ritual purification of the teeth, preparation of the māyā-thread (see fn. 60), sleeping, analysis of the initiand’s dreams, cutting of the māyā-thread</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrīprśS 16.88–94b ≈ LT 41.19c–24&lt;sup&gt;63&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>The pieces of the māyā-thread are offered into the fire in order to purify the tattvas constituting the initiand’s body</td>
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<tr>
<td>ŚrīprśS 16.94c–107 ≈ PādS cp 2.48–60</td>
<td>Recreation of the initiand’s body; Purification of the Paths (adhvaśuddhi)&lt;sup&gt;64&lt;/sup&gt;; Various fire oblations; Announcement of the name that will be given to the initiand; The maṇḍala is shown to the initiand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ŚrīprśS 16.108</td>
<td>The teacher draws a discus and a conch on his hands and touches the initiand’s body</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.109</td>
<td>Announcement of the five saṃskāras</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.110–123b</td>
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<td>ŚrīprśS 16.138ab</td>
<td>Teaching of the prescriptions for the rites during the five periods of time (pañcakālavidaḥ)&lt;sup&gt;65&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<sup>63</sup> LT 41.19c–26b ≈ JS 16.157c–174b.

<sup>64</sup> For a short explanation of this part of initiation, see TAK1 s.v. adhvaśuddhi.

<sup>65</sup> For these rites, see e.g. Rastelli 2000.
| ŚrīprśS 16.138c-140 (cf. PādS cp 2.61–65b) | Teaching of *mantras* |
|ŚrīprśS 16.141ab (cf. PādS cp 2.67c–81a: teaching of the rules of conduct [*niyamas]*) | Teaching of the procedure of worship (i.e., *yāga*, the fifth *samskāra*) |
|ŚrīprśS 16.141c–145c (cf. PādS *cp* 2.81b–83) | Concluding full oblation (*pūrnāhuti*); Dismissal of Viṣṇu present in the fire, *maṇḍala* and pot; Presents for the teacher |

These parallels demonstrate that the ritual prescriptions in the ŚrīprśS for the initiation are mainly based on those of PādS *cp* 2. The ritual procedure described in the ŚrīprśS more or less follows that of the PādS, up to the point when the name for the initiand is identified by tossing a flower on the *maṇḍala*⁶⁶ and then announced. Immediately following this, in the PādS (*cp* 2.58–60b), names for persons belonging to the various *varṇas* are indicated. In the ŚrīprśS, however, before describing these names in 16.136–137, a passage is inserted that starts with the description of the five *samskāras*. Branding and *ūrdhvapuṇḍra* are then described, as well as naming, which is parallel to the mentioned passage in the PādS. The ŚrīprśS enjoins that the prescriptions for the rites during the five periods of time (*pañcakāla*) should be taught to all initiands except Śūdras, and then, as the fourth *samskāra*, *mantra*s are taught to the initiand—here we find again a passage drawn from the PādS. Finally, the ŚrīprśS prescribes that the procedure of worship should be taught to all initiands except Śūdras, which is the fifth *samskāra* called *yāga*. Then, again with parallels in the PādS, the initiation is concluded with various rites.

Let us now look at the prescriptions for branding in the two Saṃhitās. We will see that they are quite similar. This may be due to the fact that they have a common source, or that the author of one Saṃhitā borrowed from the other. If the latter is the case, it was probably the author of the ŚrīprśS who borrowed from the ĪS, since the version in ŚrīprśS is more extensive.

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⁶⁶ For a description of this rite, see Rastelli 2003: 135–137.
Thereafter he should perform the five *saṃskāras* for the disciple in due order, [namely] branding, *puṇḍra*, name, *mantra* and worship as the fifth one. Listen to the prescription for branding among these, O Bulls of Sages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ĪŚ 21.283c–292b&lt;sup&gt;67&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>ŚrīprśŚ 16.109–123b</th>
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<td><em>ataḥ śiṣyasya vai kuryāt saṃskārān pañca ca kramāt</em></td>
<td><em>tataḥ śisyasya saṃskārān kuryāt pañca yathākramam</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>tāpah puṇḍras tathā nāma mantro yāgaś ca pañcamah</em></td>
<td><em>tāpah puṇḍras tathā nāma mantro yāgaś ca pañcamah</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>tatra tāpavidhānaṁ tu śṛṇudhvam munipuṅgavah</em></td>
<td><em>teṣu tāpavidhānaṁ tu śṛṇuṣva kamaleśane</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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A summary of this ritual is given in Hüsken 2009: 108f.

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<sup>67</sup> A summary of this ritual is given in Hüsken 2009: 108f.
The teacher should worship the Vaiṣṇavas present in the assembly-hall and, with their permission, he should go to the fire-pit accompanied by the disciple. He should worship the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been previously given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Twice-Born Ones.

Accompanied by the disciple [and] with the permission of the Vaiṣṇavas [present], the teacher should sit down to the west of the fire-pit, facing to the north, and then [he should worship] the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Beloved One.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sanskrit</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mūlamantreṇa juhuyāc</td>
<td>accompanied by the disciple [and] with the permission of the Vaiṣṇavas [present], the teacher should sit down to the west of the fire-pit, facing to the north, and then [he should worship] the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Beloved One.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chatam aṣṭottaraṃ ghṛtaiḥ</td>
<td>the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been previously given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Twice-Born Ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vaiṣṇavyā cāpi gāyatryā</td>
<td>the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been previously given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Twice-Born Ones.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tad viṣṇor iti vai ṛcā</td>
<td>the discus and the conch, which have been installed by means of their particular mantras and which have been previously given [to him] by his own teacher on the occasion of his initiation, O Twice-Born Ones.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Since the Sanskrit sentence is incomplete here, the verb given in the version of the IS is supplied in the translation.
He should offer 108 oblations of ghee while [reciting] the eight-syllable mantra, the gāyatrī that is devoted to Viṣṇu⁶⁹ and the ṛgvedic verse pra te viṣṇo, O Twice-Born Ones. Then the teacher should mentally create a seat in the fire, visualise the discus and the conch on it and offer arghya, etc. [to them] in due order. He should offer 108 or 28 oblations of ghee while [reciting] the cakramantra and the saṅkhamantra, the pavitraṃ te-mantra and the ṛgvedic verse pra te viṣṇo, O Beloved One, and 16 oblations of cooked food-offering (caru) while [reciting] the puruṣasūkta. Then he should heat the discus and the conch in due order, visualise the Venerable One first, then the lineage of teachers, …

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⁶⁹ In Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās, the expression gāyatrī viṣnupūrvā is frequently used as a designation of the viṣṇugāyatrī (e.g. PādS cp 3.87d, PārS 18.188 ≈ ĪŚ 25.97). Literally, this expression could be understood as “the gāyatrī that takes Viṣṇu as the first [god]”. Maybe this expression refers to the fact that there are several gāyatrīs, but this is the one that is devoted to Viṣṇu (see n. 70).
and then he should heat the discus and the conch while [reciting] their particular *mantras*. Having taken the discus first, while reciting this *mantra*: “O Sudarśana, who is blazing greatly, Expeller of all sins, O Venerable One, purify this [disciple] who is eager to worship Hari.” [And] having asked [him] by means of this *mantra*, …
After an introductory statement that is almost literally identical in both Samhitās, the texts commence the ritual prescriptions. Having worshipped the Vaiṣṇavas present at the ritual place (in the case of the ĪS) and having asked them for permission to perform the five saṃskāras, the teacher and the initiand move to the fire. The discus and the conch, most probably in the form of the particular branding irons, are to be worshipped.

Then 108 oblations of ghee are offered into the fire, while reciting the eight-syllable mantra (oṃ namo nārāyaṇāya), the viṣṇugāyatrī,70 and the verse ṛV I.22.20.71 In the ĪS, the mentioned mūlamantra is also

70 The viṣṇugāyatrī is a Vaiṣṇava version of the Vedic gāyatrī (RV III.62.10: tāt savitūr vāreṇyaṃ bhārgo devaśya dhīmahi | dhyāyo yo nāḥ pracoḍāyāt ||. “Might we make our own that desirable effulgence of god Savitar, who will rouse forth our insights”; translation of Jamison/Brereton 2014/I: 554); it seems that there are several versions of this Vaiṣṇava gāyatrī. The Jayākhyasaṃhitā (JS 7.104–106), for example, teaches the viṣṇugāyatrī as follows: oṃ viśvarūpāya vidmaye viśvātītāya dhīmahi tan no viṣṇuḥ pracoḍayāt. According to Srinivasa Chari (1994: 132 and 151, n. 3), the following verse is from the Mahānārāyanopaniṣad: nārāyaṇāya vidmahe vāsudevaśya dhīmahi tan no viṣṇuḥ pracoḍayāt (MNU 78), which Varenne (1960: 31) interprets as follows: “Puissions-nous connaître (le Mystère) de Nārāyaṇa, puissions-nous méditer sur le dieu des trésors ! Cela, que Viṣṇu nous le révèle !”

the eight-syllable mantra, which manifests the supreme god Nārāyaṇa.\textsuperscript{72} The recitation of these particular mantras, all of which are devoted to Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu, make clear that Nārāyaṇa or Viṣṇu, both names of the supreme god of the Pāñcarātrikas, is present in the sacrificial fire and worshipped by these oblations.

After this, according to the ĪŚ, the branding irons of the discus and the conch are put into the fire and worshipped there. According to the ŚrīprśŚ, a seat for discus and conch in the fire should be mentally created, discus and conch should be visualised on it, and arghya and other substances should be offered to them. Now, according to both Saṃhitās, oblations devoted to them are offered into the fire. The cakramantra, the śaṅkhamantra, the pavitraṃ te-mantra, i.e., RV IX.83.1,\textsuperscript{73} and the pra te viṣno-mantra are recited. The cakramantra and the śaṅkhamantra are probably not the words given in ŚrīprśŚ 16.118c–119b and 121, since these rather have the form of requests (prārthana). However, the actual wording of the two mantras is not completely clear. A probable possibility are the mantras om prabhaviṣṇave kālamūrtaye hum phaṭ for the discus and om sarvāntaścāriṇe gaganamūrtaye svāhā for the conch, which are given in ĪŚ 23.235–239b together with the mantras of the two other weapons of Viṣṇu, lotus and mace.\textsuperscript{74}

The pavitraṃ te-mantra, originally devoted to Soma in the Ṛgveda, is a mantra that, among several others, is related to the discus Sudarśana in the Pāñcarātra. It is recited, together with these other mantras, during the installation (pratiṣṭhā) of the discus in a temple (PārŚ 15.981cd ≈ ĪŚ 18.508ab). Furthermore, Veṅkaṭanātha gives this mantra as evidence that branding is enjoined by the Veda (SCR 131,17–19) and explains in detail why this mantra refers to Sudarśana (SCR 160,15–162,14).

\textsuperscript{72} See, for example, the praise of this mantra in ĪŚ 23.52–56b. For a study on the mūlamantras of the various Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās, see Rastelli forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{73} pavītraṃ te vītatam brahmaṇas pate prabhūr gātrāṇi pāry ēsi viśvātah | ātaptatanūr nā tād āmō aśnute śṛtāsa id vāhantas tāt āśata ||, “The filter is outstretched for you, O lord of the sacred formulation. Advancing, you circle around its limbs on all sides. A raw one, with unheated body, does not attain it [= filter]; only the cooked ones, driving along, have attained it entirely.” (Trans. Jamison/Brereton 2014/III: 1317).

\textsuperscript{74} See also the translation of the ĪŚ in Lakshmithathachar 2009/IV: 1453. In the case of the cakramantra, another possibility would be the six-lettered sudarśanamantra (sahasrāra hum phaṭ) given in ĪŚ 7.115–118b (see also Lakshmithathachar 2009/II: 323), but then the wording of the śaṅkhamantra would remain doubtful. I was unable to locate any information about the wording of these two mantras in the ŚrīprśŚ.
The ĪŚ and the ŚrīprṣŚ also designate the *pra te viṣṇo-manaṭra* as *ṛc*, a verse from the *Ṛgveda*. In the extant *Ṛgveda*, however, this verse cannot be found. Like the *pavitraṃ te-manaṭra*, this *manaṭra* is related to Sudarśana in the Pāñcarātra tradition. It is also recited during his installation\(^\text{75}\) and in the context of a spring festival (*vasantotsava*).\(^\text{76}\) Veṅkaṭanātha also gives this *manaṭra* as evidence that branding is enjoined by the Veda (SCR 130,16–131,2) and explains its meaning (SCR 149,11–150,13). Veṅkaṭanātha ascribes the *pra te viṣṇo-manaṭra* to the (lost) Bāṣkala recension of the *Ṛgveda*\(^\text{77}\) and quotes it in full:

\[
ṛci bāṣkalasaṃhitāyām – “pra te viṣno abjacakre pavitre janmāmbhodhīṁ tartave carṣaṇīndrāḥ | mūle bāhvor dadhate ‘nye purūnā liṅgāny anže tāvakāny arpayanti ||” iti (SCR 130,16–131,2)
\]

In the Rgvedic verse in the *Bāṣkalasaṃhitā*: “O Viṣṇu, the best among men place your water-born one\(^\text{78}\) and your discus, which are purifiers, on [their] upper arms in order to cross the ocean of births, others belonging to ancient times fix [all\(^\text{79}\)] your characteristics on [their] body.”

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\(^{75}\) PārS 15.980b = ĪŚ 21.289d. Here this *manaṭra* is also designated as *ṛc*.

\(^{76}\) PārS 17.586cd = ĪŚ 12.84ab. Here it is recited together with seven other *manaṭras* related to Sudarśana (cf. PārS 17.589cd ≈ ĪŚ 12.87ab).

\(^{77}\) Maybe this ascription is motivated by the fact that while PārS 15.980b designates this verse as *ṛc*, it cannot be found in the extant *Ṛgveda*.

\(^{78}\) See Veṅkaṭanātha’s interpretation of this part of the *manaṭra* with regard to the fact that the expression *abja*, “water-born,” could refer to a conch or a lotus (this meaning is actually more common in Sanskrit): “Here by the expression ‘water-born one’ the conch is stated, as [the conch] is well known as a mark of the Venerable One, as [this] accords with the fact that [this] same meaning [of the expression ‘water-born one’ can be found also] in other Vedic statements, and as the words *abja*, *jalaja*, etc., are conventionally used also for the conch. There is no fault [either], even if [the expression ‘water-born one’] means “lotus,” because it is prescribed that also the lotus should be borne as his mark just as the discus and [his] other [weapons].” (SCR 149,14–17: *atrābjaśabdena śaṅkha ucyate, bhagavaccihnatvena prasiddheḥ, śrutantaraiḥkṛthvānuṣśāt, abjajalajādiśabdānāṃ śaṅkhe ‘pi raḍhatvāc ca. padmaparavat ’pi na doṣah. cakrādivat padmasyāpi taccihnatvena dhāryatvānuṣśāsanāt.*)

\(^{79}\) This translation follows Veṅkaṭanātha’s interpretation: “In this manner some bear conch and discus. Others, however, [that is] the supreme seers, who fully follow [the prescriptions and] divulge the dharmas, bear all your five marks in the form of [your] weapons on all five [bodily parts] called the pair of upper arms, forehead, head and heart. This he says by means of ‘others belonging to ancient times.’” (SCR 150,7–10: *evaṃ śaṅkhacakre kecid dhārayanti. anye punah paripārṇānuṣṭhāyino dharmapraṇvartakāḥ paramarsayah pañcāpy āyudharūpāni tāvakāni liṅgāni pañcasya api bhujaśikharayugalalalātamūrundhāṛdākhyesu dhārayantīty āhanye purūṇā iti.*)
After the recitation of all these mantras, according to the ŚrīprśS, sixteen oblations of cooked food-offering (caru) should be made while reciting the Puruṣasūkta (ṚV X.90). According to the ŚrīprśS, the two branding irons are heated only at this point. According to both Samhitās, Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa and the lineage of teachers should be visualised. Now the disciple is branded, first on the right upper arm with the discus, then on the left upper arm with the conch. According to the ŚrīprśS, two verses requesting the discus and the conch to purify the disciple and to remove his sins should be recited. The discus and the conch are sprinkled and worshipped by offering food, and finally, the concluding “full oblation” (pūrṇāhuti) is offered while reciting the mūlamantra.

To summarize, it may be said that the two Samhitās containing the earliest extant prescriptions for branding in the Pāñcarātra tradition take over their prescriptions for initiation from an earlier Samhitā and supplement these prescriptions with prescriptions for the pañca samaskāras, of which the first is branding. This clearly shows that the pañca samaskāras were originally not part of the Pāñcarātra initiation ritual, but that they were introduced into it only at a particular point in time, probably not earlier than the thirteenth century.

Both texts insert the pañca samaskāras at the same point of the inherited ritual procedure of initiation, namely, when the initiand is given a name. In the ĪS this takes place before the ritual purification of the initiand and the removal of his karman by cutting and burning pieces of a thread representing the initiand’s body, which is one of the most important components of the initiation ritual. In the ŚrīprśS, the pañca samaskāras are performed after this crucial part of the initiation. Whether or not the disciple is already purified and freed from his karman thus does not play a role in the performance of the pañca samaskāras.

The crucial point is the rite of naming, which was already given as part of the original model, but is also a part of the “new” pañca samaskāras. Before naming, the rites of branding and the application of the ūrdhvapuṇḍra marks are inserted, which now form the first three of the pañca samaskāras. And when mantras and the procedure of worship are taught according to the original prescriptions—even if other important rites are performed in between, as is the case in the SS—the set of the pañca samaskāras is complete.

80 Hüskens (2009: 109) notes that sprinkling with milk and offering sweets in the case of the ŚrīprśS recalls the Vaikhānasa viṣṇubali ritual, which is a prenatal life-cycle ritual in which branding of milk-porridge “substituting” branding of the upper arms was included (see also ibid. 79).
The nature of the *mantras* used in the ritual of branding is striking. A considerable amount of the *mantras* recited during this ritual are Vedic or presented as being Vedic. The *tad viṣṇoḥ-mantra* and the *pavitraṃ te-mantra* originate from the *Ṛgveda*, the *pra te viṣṇo-mantra* is presented as belonging to the *Ṛgveda*, and the *viṣṇugāyatrī*—independent of its exact wording—at least “gives the impression of being Vedic,” since it has a Vedic predecessor. The presence of Vedic *mantras* in Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās is not unusual, although *mantras* that are specific for the Pāñcarātra tradition are more often used. In the case of this ritual, however, it seems that there is an emphasis on Vedic *mantras* in order to give the impression that the entire ritual is of Vedic origin.

This is indeed one of Veṅkaṭanātha’s main lines of argumentation in his *Saccaritrarakṣā*. As mentioned above, he presents these and other *mantras* as Vedic evidence that branding is enjoined. These *mantras* are related to the discus Sudarśana. The relation of these *mantras* to Sudarśana and their representation as Vedic was not Veṅkaṭanātha’s idea or invention, but was already expressed in the Pāñcarātra ritual, as mentioned above (p. 554).

How this set of *mantras* came into existence and their relation to Sudarśana cannot be investigated in the context of this paper, but will have to be the topic of a separate study. It then remains to be clarified whether there is a specific relation between Sudarśana worship and a particular Vedic-orthodox tradition. The *Ahirbudhnyasamhitā*, a South Indian Pāñcarātra Saṃhitā from probably the thirteenth century, like most of the Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās under investigation in this paper, but belonging to another sub-tradition of the Pāñcarātra and focusing on Sudarśana worship for royal purposes, has been shown to be related to the *Atharvaveda*. The present context, however, seems to be less concerned with the *Atharvaveda* than with the *Ṛgveda*. Or could the contrary be the case: Was there an urgent need to represent Sudarśana worship as Vedic because it derived from a tradition that was distant from Vedic-orthodox traditions?

When we search for reasons why the set of the *pañca saṃskāras* and consequently branding were added to the original initiation procedure, we find answers in texts such as the *Saccaritrarakṣā* and the Śrīvaisṇava hagiography *Ārāyirappatī Kuruparamparāpirāpāvam*, which were perhaps composed around the same time as the ĪŚ and the ŚrīprśŚ. These texts indicate that the *pañca saṃskāras* that included branding had

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81 SCR 130,10–132,2.
82 See Rastelli 2018.
become a feature of self-identification for Śrīvaiṣṇavas. Thus they needed to be introduced also into the Pāñcarātra rituals.

The passage presented in the next section of this paper, however, demonstrates that not all Pāñcarātrikas accepted branding without reservation.

The five *saṃskāras* as an option

We now turn to the *Bhārgavatantra* (henceforth BhṬ). This Samhitā is related to the PādS and borrows at least a few passages from it.\(^83\) Dating the BhṬ will only be possible after a close examination, which has not yet been undertaken. While it must have been composed later than the PādS and could thus date back to the thirteenth century, like most of the other texts examined in this paper, it could also have also been composed much later. Veṅkaṭanātha does not seem to quote or refer to the BhṬ.\(^84\)

H. D. Smith (1978: 91) thinks that the BhṬ is a “relatively late work,” but it remains unclear what this assessment means in terms of dates.

The BhṬ describes two groups of Pāñcarātrikas: the pure ones (*śuddha*) and the mixed ones (*miśra*). The former follow the so-called Ekāyanaveda, the latter the three (well-known) Vedas.\(^85\) While the pure ones do not undergo an initiation,\(^86\) the mixed ones, also called *traṇividya*, “those versed in the three Vedas,” require initiation in order to obtain the eligibility (*adhikāra*) to perform rituals. For this group—which is clearly the target audience of the BhṬ\(^87\)—two kinds of initiation rituals are described, a principal one and an inferior one:

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83 Cf. BhṬ 24.19–26b and PādS *cp* 21.36–54b, of which parts are identical, or BhṬ 22.88–93 and PādS *cp* 19.113c–125.

84 The quotation attributed to a person called Bhārgava in SCR 186,12–14 cannot be found in the edited BhṬ. A variant of the quotation attributed to a text called *Bhārgava* in PRR 22,11–13 can be found in the *Prakīrṇādhikāra* of the Vaikhānasa *Bhrgusamhitā* (PrA 11.2).

85 BhṬ 24.17–18. These two groups were already mentioned above (see p. 541). For a detailed study of these groups, see Rastelli 2006: 185–247.

86 See BhṬ 24.25a (= PādS *cp* 21.53a), quoted below, p. 561; see also above, p. 541.

87 For example, in the BhṬ’s description of the *siddhāntas*—sub-traditions of the Pāñcarātra—the *mantrasiddhānta*, which is that of the *traṇividya*, is mentioned before all others (BhṬ 22.87–94b). BhṬ 24.41–58 gives detailed prescriptions connected to the *aṣṭākṣaramantra*, which is the *mantra* of the *traṇividya* (see BhṬ 24.18). No detailed prescriptions connected to the *dvādaśaḵṣaramantra*—the *mantra* of the “pure” Pāñcarātrikas—are given. The prescriptions for the rites during the five periods of time (*paṇcakāla*) given in BhṬ are specifically meant for initiated *traṇividya* (see BhṬ 25.1), although Ekāyanas usually also perform these rites.
On the history of branding (tāpa) in the tradition of Pāñcarātra

The one versed in the three Vedas (traividya) becomes fit for worshipping god by means of the initiation. (27cd) The initiation in the cakrābjamaṇḍalā³⁸⁸ is praised as the principal one for him. An initiation just in the presence of fire can be a substitute. (28) An initiated man can perform the rituals of ploughing, etc.,³⁸⁹ for the god of gods. A twice-born man who lacks initiation, however, cannot be eligible [for performing these rituals]. (29) Therefore, one who desires to worship Hari should undergo initiation in the presence of Hari. He should invite Hari to the pot, the maṇḍala and the fire, and worship [him there]. (31) And having destroyed the māyā-thread, the man becomes pure. Having got rid of the blindfold and having seen the cakrābjamaṇḍalā, (32) having scattered gold and flowers [onto the cakrābjamaṇḍalā],³⁹⁰ having received the puṇḍras and a name from the teacher, having learned all mantras beginning with the eight-syllable mantra and] (33) the knowledge consisting in the worship of Hari,³⁹¹ having become consecrated (abhiṣikta) by means of [showers of] water from pots, he is entitled to worship and install Viṣṇu according to the prescriptions (34) [and] to perform great festivals, etc., which are [to be performed] on a regular basis, on a particular occasion, and others. This should be the principal initiation.

The [initiation] of low rank will be explained [now], listen! (35) He should worship Viṣṇu’s sacrificial ground, image, pot and fire, or, according to whatever one can get, only the fire. (36) Being marked with the king of missile weapons (i.e., the discus) together with Pāñcajanya (i.e., the conch) indeed on the upper arms, he should offer oblations [to the fire]. Then having received a name and the other [saṃskāra]s from the teacher as [described] above according to the teachings, he should [be entitled for] the performance of worship on a regular basis, on a particular occasion [or] through a particular desire, [and] for rituals such as ploughing, etc. (37–38) This should be the second [kind of] initiation, which is characterised by the five saṃskāras.³⁹²

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³⁸⁸ This is a maṇḍala that is often used in Pāñcarātra rituals. For a short description, see Rastelli 2003: 124.
³⁸⁹ This means all rituals connected to temple construction and consecration; see TAK2 s.v. karṣaṇādi.
³⁹⁰ For these rites during the initiation ritual, see Rastelli 2003: 133–137.
³⁹¹ Note that these are four of the five saṃskāras, namely, puṇḍra, nāman, mantra and yāga.
³⁹² BhT24.27c–39b: dīkṣāvajyate yogyas traivedyadevapūjane | 27 cakrābjamaṇḍale dīksā tasya mukhyā prakṛtiḥ | anukalpā bhaved dīksā kevalam vahnisannidhau || 28 dīksito devadevasya karṣaṇādikriyāṃ caret | nādhikāri bhaved yas tu dīksāvivahito dvijāḥ || 29 (There is no verse with number 30 in this chapter.) tasmād dhāryacanākānksī dīkṣeta harisannidhau | kumbhe ca maṇḍale cāgnau harim āvāya pājayer | 31 māyāśūtraṃ ca nirbhidyā pūto bhavati mānavaḥ | netrabandhād vinirmukto drṣṭvā cakrābjamaṇḍalam || 32 vikṛṇasaṃvārahakusumo labdhapuṇḍrāhvayo guroḥ | adhītya sakalān mantrān aṣṭākṣarapurārasarān ||
The first initiation procedure described in this passage consists of the main elements known also from other dikṣā prescriptions: invitation and worship of god in the pot, maṇḍala and the sacrificial fire—the usual places for Viṣṇu’s ritual worship—destruction of the karman by means of the māyā-thread, leading the blindfolded disciple to the maṇḍala and showing it to him, scattering gold and flowers onto the maṇḍala, then applying the ārdhvaṇḍra, naming, teaching mantras and the procedure of worship, as well as a concluding consecration (abhiṣeka). We observe that this procedure includes four of the five saṃskāras, by excluding branding.

The second initiation procedure, which is considered the inferior one, may also include invitation and worship of god in the pot, maṇḍala and fire, or in an image—which was not mentioned for the first initiation—but may also consist only of invitation and worship of god in the fire. Then the five saṃskāras are performed for the initiand.

Comparing the two procedures, we see that in the second version a few important components of initiation are omitted—which may be the reason for considering it inferior—but another rite is added, namely, branding. Here branding seems to serve as a substitute for the omitted rites, insofar as the same goal is achieved by both versions of initiation, namely, eligibility to perform ritual worship.

How should we interpret this description of the two initiation procedures? Its author is far removed from the attitude observed in later Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās, namely, that branding is indispensable. Neither does he just add branding to a given ritual structure, as done by the redactors of the ĪŚ and the ŚrīprśŚ, nor does he consider branding necessary, viewing it rather as a substitute for other rites that are to be preferred. On the other hand, by taking it into account as a valid alternative, he does not simply ignore branding.

We can only speculate on the socio-historical backdrop of this attitude. The group to which the author probably belonged, a particular group among the traividya, does not seem to have practised branding. However, there must have been another group of traividyas in the milieu of the author that was practising branding. The author of the BhT seems

33 vidyām haryarcanamayīm abhiṣikto ghatodakaiḥ | arhaty arcayitum viṣṇum pratiṣṭhātum yathāvidhi || 34 mahotsavādikam kartum nityanaimittikādikam | eśā mukhyā bhave dīkṣā jaghanyā vaksyate śṛṇu || 35 sīṇḍilam pratimāṃ viṣṇoh kumbham arciś ca pūjayet | athavā tu yatālabham kevalam vā hutāśanam || 36 juhuyād dhetirājena bāhumūle samaṅkitaḥ | pāṅcajanyena vā sākam tato nāmādi pūrvvat || 37 labhivā gurogyathāsāstraṃ bhūyādeṣo 'rcanāvidhau nityanaimittike kāmye karsaṇādiṣu karmasu | 38 eśā dīkṣā dvītyā syāt paṅcasamśāralakṣanā |

93 See p. 530, above.
to have had reservations about this group, since he considers their mode of initiation inferior, but he obviously accepted their existence and their ritual rights.

The BhT does not seem to mention anything about the branding of Ekāyanas, although according to the PārS they also practised branding (see above, p. 540). The reason is perhaps that the focus of the BhT was rather the traividyas and not the Ekāyanas.

However, it may be useful to examine another verse from the same chapter of the BhT to see if it might also be a statement about branding. This verse belongs to a section borrowed from the PādS and describes the Ekāyanas:

Neither initiation, nor purification of the body by burning, etc., nor the entire [set of rites] starting with placing the aṅga[-mantras onto the body] is approved in the school of the Ekāyanas.94

This statement is a description of the Ekāyanas that reflects the point of view of the traividyas rather than their actual ritual practice, but we need not discuss this here.95 However, it is necessary to examine whether the expression “purification of the body by burning, etc.” (dehasya dahanādiviśodhanam) could refer to the practice of branding.

What speaks for or against this? To understand the expression “purification of the body by burning, etc.” as referring to branding would fit well into the context of the chapter BhT 24, in which, as we have seen, branding is one topic among others. However, as mentioned, this verse is originally from the PādS, which according to my knowledge does not mention branding in any other passage. Why would it be important for the author of the PādS to state that a particular group does not practise a specific ritual, if this ritual does not carry any importance for his own group?

The statement in PārS that the Ekāyanas practise branding would not be a real argument against interpreting the expression as branding, since the PādS contains several statements about the Ekāyanas that the authors of the PārS would not subscribe to.95 A more convincing argument would be that the term dahana, “burning,” is usually not employed to describe the rite of branding.96


95 On this topic, see Rastelli 2006: 200ff.

96 To date, I have found a single passage in a Pāñcarātra text that uses the term dahana in the context of branding, but probably here it must be understood in the sense of “fire”. “Those, however, who will bear [the discus] on the right upper
What else could be the meaning of the expression “purification of the body by burning, etc.”? More probable than branding would be the purification of the body that a devotee usually performs before ritual worship in order to make himself fit for it. This ritual is called “purification of the elements” (bhūtaśuddhi). During this procedure, the elements that constitute the devotee’s body and the world are mentally dissolved into each other, and then both the body and the world are mentally burnt and re-created. The expression “etc.” (ādi) would then refer to the mental recreation of body and world, usually designated as āpyāyana, “fortifying [ritual].” For the sake of completeness, we need to add that there is no indication that the Ekāyanas did not practise the purification of elements. On the contrary, the PārS prescribes it in the context of the daily ritual. But as already mentioned, the PādS’s description of the Ekāyanas is one by outsiders and does not necessarily have a link to historical reality.

The five saṃskāras as a conversion ritual?

Srilata Raman’s examinations of the Śrīvaiṣṇava hagiography Ārāyirappaṭi Kuruparamparāpirāpāvam have demonstrated that the five saṃskāras can serve as conversion rituals. Among other situations in which these rituals are performed, namely, in early childhood and when entering a teacher–pupil lineage, they are performed when a person converts to Śrīvaiṣnavism.

Ewa Dębicka-Borek considers conversion the primary function of the five saṃskāras. Her main argument is that in the ĪŚ, the initiation

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97 For a detailed description of the “purification of the elements”, see Rastelli 1999: 213–238.

98 See e.g. PārS 10.355–356b: “(...) and where the purification of the elements by means of the five fixations related to earth, water, fire, the one called wind and ether, and by means of the two fixations called ‘burning’ and ‘fortifying’ [are prescribed] (ksmājalānalavāyvākhyanābhasīyena vai dviva | dhāraṇāpañcakenaiva dhāraṇādvitayena ca || 355 dahanāpyāyanākhyaṇa yatra śuddhiḥ ca bhautikī |, > PauśS 32.141c–142; ≈ ĪŚ 23.12–13b). For the context of this passage, see Rastelli 2006: 117.

99 PārS 3.140–230, borrowing from several other Pāñcarātra Saṃhitās (see Rastelli 2006: 556).

100 Raman 2007a. In this paper, Raman also thoughtfully discusses what conversion actually means in this specific historical context (see pp. 279–286)—a topic we cannot deal with here.
procedure borrowed from the SS is supplemented with the *paṇca saṃskāras*. In contrast, the rituals connected with the *narasiṃhamantra* and the so-called *nārasiṃhī dīkṣā*—which Dębicka-Borek, following D. Dennis Hudson, interprets as a conversion ritual—described in chapter 17 of the SS are omitted in the ĪŚ. This would mean that one conversion ritual, namely, the *nārasiṃhī dīkṣā*, would have been replaced by another conversion ritual, namely, the five *saṃskāras*.

I agree with Raman that the hagiography is good evidence for the fact that the five *saṃskāras* can function as a conversion ritual. However, I do not agree with Dębicka-Borek that they are primarily a conversion ritual. In the ĪŚ and the ŚrīprśS, the five *saṃskāras* have been inserted almost at the end of the initiation procedure. Would one make a person undergo first an initiation ritual and only then convert him or her? The other way around is more probable: first conversion and then initiation. In contrast, the *nārasiṃhī dīkṣā*—if it is really a conversion ritual—takes place before the actual initiation.

The texts that were examined in this paper do not contain any indication that the five *saṃskāras* were primarily meant as a conversion ritual. It may be the case that the entire initiation ritual, of which the *paṇca saṃskāras* can be a part, or the *paṇca saṃskāras* alone could serve as conversion ritual, but this was certainly not their primary function.

**Conclusion**

Although there is evidence in Periyāḻvār’s writings that branding was already practised in the ninth century in South India, the earliest extant Pāñcarātra Samhitās do not explicitly and unquestionably mention branding. The earliest unambiguous reference to branding—as known to date—is made in the *Pārameśvarasaṃhitā*, which was composed in the twelfth or thirteenth century. The two earliest ritual prescriptions for branding are found in the chapters on initiation in the *Īśvarasaṃhitā* and the *Śrīpraśnasamhitā*, both perhaps from the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The authors of both Samhitās adopted their prescriptions for initiation from earlier Samhitās and supplemented these with the ritual of branding. The example of the *Bhārgavatantra* shows that even after the introduction of branding into the Pāñcarātra, the rite was not accepted without reservation by all sub-groups of Pāñcarātrikas and that there was still a long way to go to reach the prevalent attitude in later Śrīvaisṇavism

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and Pāñcarātra that branding and the five *saṃskāras* in general were indispensable.

The examination of the presented texts thus makes clear that the ritual of branding did not originate in the tradition of Pāñcarātra, but was only introduced into it at a time when there was a need for features of self-identification among adherents to the tradition.

References

Acharya 2010  

Acharya 2015  

ĀP  

AS  

Ate 2011  

BBS  

BhārS  

BhT  
On the history of branding (tāpa) in the tradition of Pāñcarātra


Lakshmithathachar See ĪS.
2009

LT


Mani 1975


Matsubara 1994


MNU


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PādS


ParāśaraS

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PārPV

Pārameśvarapadyavivṛti: Institut Français Pondichéry, transcript 82.
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ParS  Paramasamhitā: Paramasamhitā [of the Pāñcharātra], ed. and translated into English with an introduction by S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar. Baroda 1940.


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On the history of branding (tāpa) in the tradition of Pāñcarātra


SSBh  Sāttvatasaṁhitābhāṣya: See SS.


Varenne 1960  See MNU.

Apology for omniscience:  
An eighth-century demonstration of the Buddha’s sarvajñatva*

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The last email exchange I had with Helmut was precisely about an article. In his own funny and lovely way, he had invited me to participate in a volume he was editing. I am not aware of what happened to that volume, but I never managed to send my article. For me, this is THAT article, the one he asked for.

1. Introduction

The *Sarvajñasiddhikārikā (SSK) (Verses on the Demonstration of the Omniscient One) (Tib.: Thams cad mkhyen pa grub pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa) by the Buddhist philosopher Śubhagupta¹ is one of the earliest works specifically devoted to the systematic demonstration of the Buddha’s omniscience. It is in fact a pivotal text in the history of the development of this concept in Buddhist thought.²

¹ I would like to thank Vincent Eltschinger for his invaluable help, comments and feedback on a previous version of this article as well as Birgit Kellner, Francesco Sferra and Péter-Dániel Szántó for their suggestions on various parts of it. My gratitude also goes to Nicoletta Fossa and Hiroko Matsuoka for their help with the Japanese translation contained in Watanabe 1987, and to Kristen de Joseph for revising my English.

² To the best of my knowledge, the earliest systematic defenses of the omniscience of the Buddha were introduced in the eighth century by Śubhagupta (ca. 720–780), Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788), Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795) and Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810). Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla aim to demonstrate the omniscience of the Buddha in the TS and the TSP, respectively, in particular, in the Atīndriya-darśipurusaparīksā. On this, see Kawasaki 1992, Kawasaki 1995 (8–11), and McClintock 2010 with literature (2010: 3–4 n. 5). McClintock (2010: 165) argues that, in the last chapter of the TS and the TSP, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla want to prove the theoretical possibility of omniscience in general, and not in connection to a particular person. When dealing with the subject of the omniscience of

Within Śubhagupta’s corpus, this small treatise represents what could be defined as an “orthodox” work, one in which the author plainly and openly adopts the views of the Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrtian mainstream logico-epistemological tradition. This does not hold true for his magnum opus, the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK, Verses on the Demonstration of External Objects) (Tib.: Phyi rol gyi don grub pa zhes bya ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa), in which Śubhagupta takes issue with some of the main tenets of the logico-epistemological tradition, particularly the “idealistic” (vijñānavāda) turn represented by the Vasubhadhu-Diṅnāga-Dharmakīrti lineage.

The chronological order of Śubhagupta’s works has yet to be determined. The first stanza of the SSK refers to an argument that had been discussed in an earlier writing. Based on a comparison with analogous arguments in certain chapters of the Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) by Śāntarakṣita and the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā (TSP) by Kamalaśīla, one could surmise that this earlier text was the *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā (Tib.: Thos pa brtag pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa), and that this and the SSK were conceived of as parts of a set of works. The *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā, in turn, was preceded by yet another text, most likely the *Anyāpohavicārakārikā (Eltschinger 2016: personal communication)—amounting to the first chapter of a “trilogy.”

The SSK is roughly divided into two parts. Part 1 (kk. 1–12) concerns the denial of the Veda’s authority, unless an omniscient being is admitted the Buddha as treated in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapter of those two works, McClintock (2010: 350) notes that both sections bearing on that problem are responses to Śubhagupta’s arguments. Prajñākaragupta discusses the topic in the Pramāṇavārttikālāṃkārabhāṣya ad PV Pramāṇasiddhi 8–10, 29–33. On this, see Moriyama 2014.

Five works are found in the Bstan ’gyur and are explicitly attributed to Dge srungs, i.e., Śubhagupta. These are: 1. *Sarvajñasiddhikārikā (SSK, Tōhoku no. 4243); 2. *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā (BASK, Tōhoku no. 4244); 3. *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā (Tōhoku no. 4245); 4. *Anyāpohavicārakārikā (Tōhoku no. 4246); and 5. *Īśvarabhangaśākārikā (ĪBhK, Tōhoku no. 4247). All of them are recorded in the Lhan kar ma (711, 713, 722, 710 and 714, respectively). Another work that is found in the Lhan kar ma (no. 712) and is attributed to him, namely the *Nairātmyasiddhi (see Frauwallner 1957: 100), is now lost. Steinkellner (1985: 216–218) regards also the *Paralokasiddhi and its commentary (Lhan kar ma 715, 716), both lost, as his.

In the TS, the last chapter (which bears similar arguments to those expounded in the SSK) is introduced with a reference to a reasoning found in the immediately preceding chapter, i.e., the Svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā. However, Kamalaśīla—in discussing the argument that the Veda must be admitted as having an author (which is also Śubhagupta’s point in the incipit of the SSK)—refers to the chapter entitled Śrutiparīkṣā.

On the *Śrutiparīkṣākārikā, see Eltschinger 1999.

For a critical edition, English translation and analysis of kk. 1–12 of the SSK, see Saccone 2019b.
as its author. It aims at demonstrating the necessary relationship between the authoritativeness (prāmāṇya)\(^7\) of scriptures and the perception of extrasensory objects (atīndriyārtha) by their author. These ideas are advanced against the Mīmāṃsakas and their theory of the absence of an author (apauruṣeyatā) of the Veda. Part 2 (kk. 13–25) introduces actual proof of the Buddha’s omniscience. Mainly, he is established as being the only omniscient one among several authors of scriptures admitted by different traditions.

As a matter of fact, moreover, the SSK offers—arguably for the first time—arguments to prove the omniscience of the Buddha that are grounded in His teaching mantras. This certainly has somehow a Dharmakīrtian background.\(^8\) However, as we shall see, it is Śubhagupta who explicitly connects those with a demonstration of the Buddha’s omniscience.

Just like part 1, part 2 features many arguments that parallel those of the TS and the TSP. This holds to such an extent that the TSP in particular appears to provide exegetical tools for a better understanding of Śubhagupta’s terse verses. It is very likely that, with reference to the proof of omniscience, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla owe a great deal to their earlier contemporary Śubhagupta.

In this paper, I shall present a critical edition and the first English translation of the second part of this work (kk. 13–25).

2. Śubhagupta’s *Sarvajñasiddhi as a “digest.”* A new “genre” within Buddhist philosophical literature

Śubhagupta’s intellectual contribution to the history of Buddhist thought can only be properly assessed by taking into account the reception of his works and ideas within the tradition in which he was active (i.e., the Buddhist school of logic and epistemology).\(^9\) This is particularly evident

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\(^8\) See Eltschinger 2001.

\(^9\) On the details of Śubhagupta’s doctrinal affiliation, see Saccone 2018 and Saccone 2022. This is one of those instances where a sharp distinction cannot be—or does not need to be—drawn between doctrinal affiliations with one school or the other. With all his works belonging by character to the so called logico-epistemological tradition (and showing strong Dharmakīrtian influence), his BASK, in particular, features ontological and epistemological views that oscillate between what is traditionally defined as Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika (see Saccone 2014, Saccone 2015, Saccone 2018). In his AJPSV, Haribhadra Śūrip refers to him as a vārttikānusārin (follower of the Vārttika). See AJPSV I, p. 337, 23–24: yathoktaṃ vārttikānusārinā śubhaguptena.
from the analysis of contemporary authors such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. He is responsible for major innovations within the tradition: formally, the elaboration of a writing genre—that of manuals, or anthologies, for debates (the parīkṣās of the TS and the TSP follow along these lines); and doctrinally, his attempt to validate, within this tradition, a form of bāhyārthavāda, externalism, with reference to ontology, and a form of nirākāravāda, absence of images in cognition, with reference to epistemology.¹⁰

Unlike the writings of previous or contemporary representatives of the logico­epistemological and Dharmakīrtian tradition,¹¹ Śubhagupta’s works are not devoted to the exegesis of Dharmakīrti’s corpus. They are rather synopses of arguments, some of which are found in the works of that master, to use against opponents and/or to establish Buddhist truths. The form is that of concise verses that probably offered the monks/disputants a mnemonic device for debates. The subjects were single themes from among the most relevant ones of that time, for example, the Vedic revelation, the existence of an Omniscient being, the reality of God and the apoha theory. In his brief digests, Śubhagupta follows and utilizes Dharmakīrti’s views and arguments in so many respects that he can be considered as the first systematizer of Dharmakīrti’s theories and argumentations in an “anti-non-Buddhist-opponent” key. This is especially evident for the views introduced in the PV (or, rather, in some parts of it).

¹⁰ His bāhyārthavāda and nirākāravāda must have been regarded as disruptive elements within that tradition, since they went against the Vijñānavāda, i.e., “idealistic,” turn of the Vasubandhu-Dīṇāga-Dharmakīrti lineage. In particular, Śubhagupta’s nirākāravāda is tailored to refute the sahopalambhaniyama argument as that which better represents this turn in Dharmakīrti. This is particularly evident from the analysis of the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the TS and the TSP. There, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla fully represent the perspective of that lineage, which had assumed the status of an established “orthodoxy” in the eighth century. In those chapters (particularly in the TSP), which are meant to defend the view of vijñaptimātratā, Śubhagupta is the main antagonist and is introduced as the nirākāravādin par excellence. On this, see Saccone 2018.

¹¹ To the best of my knowledge, within the logico­epistemological and Dharmakīrtian tradition, no previous author had composed treatises of such a nature. An exception could be Arcaṭa, whose dates are not definitively fixed. He appears to have composed two digests that are centered on specific themes: the Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi and the Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi. They are not preserved, but are mentioned in his HBT (82,14; 87, 24; 189, 2). Funayama (1995: 195) argues that Arcaṭa lived slightly before Śāntarakṣita and Jīnendrabuddhi. If this is the case, he might also have preceded Śubhagupta and introduced the genre before him. On the possible identification of a fragment of the Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi, see Saccone/Szántó 2022.
The *Śarvajñasiddhi, particularly in its first part (kk. 1–12), exemplifies this new genre rather well. In the first part, Śubhagupta recreates a fictional debate by putting forth a set of arguments (as well as objections) in order to prove the logical necessity of an omniscient person. Such a person must be admitted as the author of the scriptures that teach extrasensory soteriological truths, if those are to be regarded as authoritative. The second part offers less in the way of a back-and-forth debate, and is more straightforwardly centered on providing positive arguments to establish the Buddha’s omniscience. At the same time, the proof is also partly based on a refutation of the Veda’s author being omniscient.

In Śubhagupta’s oeuvre, we find at least two statements that show how he understood the intellectual scope of those works (and their place within his own tradition—whatever he considers that to be.) One is in the *Īśvarabhāṅgakārikā (Verses on the Refutation of God), which might indeed be the earliest of his writings that have reached us. There, in k. 3, he argues:

In the SSK, omniscience is intended as the knowledge of soterically relevant truths. McClintock (2010, particularly pp. 23–38; 132–135) notes that there are three ways of construing omniscience in Buddhist sources: (i) knowing what is soterially relevant (upayuktasarvajñatva) which she translates as “dharmic omniscience”; (ii) thoroughly knowing all that is knowable (sarvasarvajñatva) rendered as “total omniscience”; (iii) having the capacity for knowing absolutely everything to which the attention is directed, like fire that is all-burning (“capacity omniscience”). For the latter type, McClintock (2010: 32 n. 86) mentions the Pudgalavādapratiṣedha of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh). See naiva ca vayam sarvatra jñānasamvakhyāḥ buddham sarvajñam acakṣmahe | kim tarhi sāmarthyaḥ | yā hy asau buddhāḥ khyā saṃtātis tasya idam uṣṭa sāmarthyam yad abhogamātrenāvapi pāram jñānām upadhyate yat reṣṭam | āha cātra — samānena sarvapratyayāḥ yathāgniḥ sarvabhuṁ mataḥ | tathā sarvavid eṣṭavyo ’sakṛt sarvasya vedanāt | (AKBh p. 467, 16–21). “And indeed we do not proclaim the Buddha as omniscient because of [His] knowledge being turned to everything, but rather because of capacity. For that specific continuum that is called “awakened” (buddha) has the following capacity, that [for Him] a non-erroneous cognition arises, by virtue of mere inclination, in relation to what is desired. And on this point he says, ‘As the fire, because of [its] continuous (continuously [samānena] capacity), is considered all-burning, likewise, [the Buddha] must be admitted as omniscient, because He knows everything, [but] not synchronically.’” In the SSK, Śubhagupta wants to establish the possibility of omniscience in the sense of knowledge of those truths that are the object of scriptures. On this, see Saccone 2019b.

In the SSK, Śubhagupta clearly shows himself to be a follower of the Dharma-kīrtian tradition.

For a list of his works, see fn. 3 above. As a mere hypothesis, the *Īśvara-bhaṅga could indeed be his first work, being the only one (along with the *Bāhyārthasiddhi) that does not start with de’i phyir, “therefore.” The other three, the *Anyāpohavicāra, the *Śrutiparīkṣā and the *Śarvajñasiddhi, all start with that “therefore,” which thus connects them with earlier discussions.
And that fool who says ‘everything is produced by Īśvara’ [should] be clearly told [the following arguments], in an assembly (‘khor/*pariṣad), in order to dispel ignorance.\textsuperscript{15}

The other is in the *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā, his magnum opus and likely his latest work. At the end of it, he declares:

In the investigation of what is logical or illogical, I am not extremely wise; however, let me briefly show many truths stated by others.\textsuperscript{16}

The latter is of course quite a common disclaimer and need not be construed literally. However, both verses can be read as Śubhagupta assessing the nature of his works as being digests (in verses, hence very concise) and having the aim of systematizing and making available arguments, stated by previous masters, for use against opponents. The first one, specifically, appears to refer to an assembly of learned men, maybe the context for a debate, as well as to the dismissal of ignorance (that of the opponents, but perhaps also that of the individual monk). However, with particular reference to the first verse, we see a declaration of intent that informs at least four of his works, if not also his magnum opus.

With the introduction of this “genre,” Śubhagupta also initiates a new trend in the logico-epistemological tradition, the earliest and most accomplished examples of which are the many parīkṣās of the TS and the TSP.

3. Analysis of the contents

As mentioned previously, unlike kk. 1–12, the second part of the SSK provides explicit proof of the omniscience of the Buddha. The first part is devoted to establishing that, if scriptures are to be regarded as authoritative, their authors must be admitted as omniscient. Omniscience in this case is tantamount to the extrasensory perception of soterially relevant truths that are the objects of scriptures, not to total omniscience. An opponent could reveal a logical defect in the argument. The fact of

\textsuperscript{15} IBhK 3: glen blo gang zhig ’di dag kun | dbang phyug gis ni byas so zhes | smra ba de yang mi shes pa | gzhom phyir ’khor du gsal bar brjod | Tibetan text from Eltschinger/Ratié, “A Buddhist Refutation of the Existence of a Creator God: Śubhagupta’s Īśvarabhaṅgakārikā,” in this volume, pp. 29–72. My English translation is based on theirs.

\textsuperscript{16} BASK 185: rigs dang mi rigs dpyad pa la | bdag la mkhas blo mtshang bcas med | ’on kyang gzhan smras bden pa ni | mang po mdor bsdus nas bstan gys |.
their teaching extrasensory truths is brought forward as evidence of the omniscience of the authors of those scriptures. However, there are many scriptures admitted by many traditions, and they all state very different and contradictory things. Accordingly, not all of the authors can be omniscient,\textsuperscript{17} hence, there is no pervasion between omniscience (i.e., the \textit{sādhya}) and the fact of teaching extrasensory truths (i.e., the \textit{hetu}).

A similar objection is found in the TS and the TSP:

Moreover, since numerous omniscient [beings] teaching contradictory things all have the same cause [for the ascertainment of their omniscience], which one could be surely determined as the one and only [omniscient being]?

Since numerous [beings,] such as the Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇabhakṣa (Kaṇāḍa), Aksāpāda, are conceived, i.e., are to be established, as omniscient by their devotees, which one and only among these “could be determined,” i.e., ascertained, as an omniscient [being]? This is because for all of them the fact of teaching extrasensory objects, which is the cause for the ascertainment of omniscience, is the same. And it is not tenable that they are all ascertained as omniscient, because they all teach contradictory things. For it is not logical that all of them, teaching [things] that contradict each other, [can] be perceiving the truth, since, regarding things, there cannot be the mixing of many natures that contradict each other, because they have one nature.\textsuperscript{18}

\textit{Ś}ubhagupta answers that the pervasion holds true provided that those extrasensory objects are shown to be real, which is the case only with the doctrine of selflessness of the Buddha. Since the Buddha is the only

\textsuperscript{17} This is introduced as an objection in the first part of k. 13. Following the flow of the argument, the “author” (\textit{byed po}\/*\textit{kartṛ}) here must be intended more generally as \textit{any} author of scriptures, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike. At the same time, one could argue that this objection might be from someone, such as a Jain, who questions only the Buddha’s omniscience. Cf. McClintock 2010: 38–42. In this case, the meaning of the objection would be as follows: if the Buddha knows all the soteriologically relevant truths, and \textit{nairātmya} is one of those truths, how come he teaches about self and sentient beings, etc.?

\textsuperscript{18} TSP \textit{ad} TS 3147 p. 995, 14–19 [Jp273b5–273b7]: \textit{sarvajñesu ca bhāvassu viruddhārthopadeśiṣu | tulyahetuso sarvesu ko nāmaiko ’vadhāryatām ||} (TS 3147) bahutaresu sugatakapilakanabhaksākṣapādaśiṣu taubhaktāiḥ sarvajñātvopakalpiṭeṣu sādhyeṣu katama eko ’tra sarvajñatvenāvadhāryatāṃ niścīya tāṃ, sarveṣām atīndriyarthopadeśṭrīvasya sarvajñaniścayāhetos tulyavāt | na ca sarva eva sarva’ṇā ity avadhārayitum yuktam sarvesaṃ parasparaviruddhārthopadeśeṣṭrīvāt | na hi parasparahatopaṭeṣṭārah sarva eva tattvadarśino yuktāḥ, vastuṇāṃ ekārāpatvena parasparaviruddhāne-kasvabhāvasamśargābhāvāt || (parasparahatopaṭeṣṭārah em.) parasparahatopaṭeṣṭārah Jp S; parasparahatopaṭeṣṭārah K). As for the Sanskrit text of the TS and the TSP, I refer to S, mentioning only the most significant variants from K, Jk and Jp.
one who teaches about the true reality of selflessness, he is the only omniscient being (k. 13). Analogously, in the TS and the TSP, the previous objection is (also) refuted as follows:

To show that what was said previously by him [i.e., Śāntarakṣita], beginning with “Moreover, since numerous omniscient [beings]” was also responded to, he says [the words] beginning with, “And Vardhamāna and the other [alleged omniscient beings].”

“And Vardhamāna and the other [alleged omniscient beings] do not have this knowledge of selflessness of such a kind, since all non-Buddhists (ṭīrthika) stick to the false view of the self.”

If Vardhamāna, Kapila and the other [alleged omniscient beings] can have the previously stated knowledge of the truth, then we grant that they are also omniscient. All these [beings], taken by [that] disease that is the false apprehension of a self that is the cause of the setting in motion of all the [moral] defects, teach about things that are non-momentary, etc., which are invalidated by the pramāṇas, such as direct perception. Accordingly, for those who stumble on things, even though [they are] known up to the children that cognize [them] very well, how will the vision of extrasensory objects attain the condition of adequacy?

Not only he is the only omniscient being, he is also able to teach all sentient beings according to their spiritual needs (k. 14), that ability being another characteristic of the omniscience admitted for the Buddha, who has abandoned the obstacles to the knowable.

19 See Moriyama 2014: 11–17. According to Moriyama, Dharmakīrti defines the Buddha as “pramāṇa,” in the sense of the first characteristic to be as such, namely, being reliable. This distinguishes him from the other āptas in other traditions, who are also regarded as pramāṇa. The Buddha is the only real pramāṇa because he teaches the truth that he has seen for himself, that being, particularly, the doctrine of selflessness.

20 TSP ad TS 3324 p. 1049, 18–23 [Jk170a4; Jp287a7–287a8]: etena yad utkam – sarvajñesu ca bhāyassv ityādi, tad api pratyuktam iti darśayann aha – idaṃ cetyādi | idaṃ ca vardhamānāder nairātmyajñānam īdṛṣām | na samasti, ātmadrṣṭau hi niviṣṭāḥ sarvatārthikāḥ (TS 3324) yathoktam tattvajñānam yadi vardhamānakapilādināṃ sambhavet tadā teṣām api sarvajñatvam bhavatu, yāvata sarva evāmi sarvadosaprasavahetuvitathātmagrahagrahagṛhitāḥ pratyaksādipramāṇābhadhitāksaniṇākādpādārthānām upadeśārāh, tat katham ā kumāram atiprattipatham upagateṣe api padārthās āpatrukhālas atiḥārthadārśaanām sambhāvanāpatham avatariṣyati | (sarvajñesu Jp K) sa sarvajñesu Ś; niviṣṭāḥ Jk Ś vinaṣṭāḥ em. K.; yāvata Jp Ś yathā K).

21 Cf. Kamalaśīla on this: dṛṣṭasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānanam pratipādanāsāmarthyam ca taj jñeyāvaranam | (TSP ad TS 3337, ed. p. 1052, 23–24 [Jp 288a2]) (taj Jp Ś deest K). “[And,] regarding the reality of what is to be abandoned or taken up, even though it is seen, the incomplete knowledge of all [its] aspects and the incapability of teaching [it] is the obstacle to the knowable.”
In k. 15, Śubhagupta proceeds by advancing a possible objection to his own argument, albeit not introducing it as such. The real intention of a person cannot be known from the investigation of his linguistic or practical activities, since the person can act in a certain way but have a different intention behind his activity. Therefore, the various omniscient beings admitted by others cannot be ascertained as truly believing in the idea of the self.

Another possible interpretation of k. 15 would be that the opponent is arguing that the intentions that one cannot ascertain are, in fact, the Buddha’s (and not those of the other alleged omniscient beings). However, I lean towards the first interpretation based on a similar objection that is found in the TSP:

Let the following be the case: they may well teach false things, nevertheless from that it cannot be determined that they are endowed with false cognitions, since common practices can also be undertaken otherwise, because people have various intentions.22

Those both seem to echo a passage in Dharmakīrti’s Svaśṛtti to PV Svārthānumāna:

For people act correctly or falsely due to mental qualities or defects, and these, being beyond the reach of the senses, could be inferred from the physical and linguistic activities that are produced by them. However, the activities can be done, for the most part purposefully, also in a different way, since [they] occur due to people’s desires, and those [people] have various intentions. Therefore, not being certain, due to the confusion of inferential marks, how can this [person] know [whether or not someone else is endowed with moral faults]?23

The response to this appears to be entrusted to k. 16. Unlike the other cases, one can explain why the Buddha is teaching about sentient beings. He really intends mental continuums, but is aiming to correct a false notion through that teaching. In this sense, while the other omniscient

22 TSP ad TS 3330 p. 1040, 16–18 [Jp 287b2–3]: syād etat – yadi nāma viparītārtha-prakāśanam eṣām, tathāpi mithyājñāna-ānusāṅgītvam aito 'vasātuḥ na śakyate, yato 'nyathāpi vyavahārāḥ śakyante kartum vicitrābhisandhītvāt puruṣānām […].

23 PVSV ad PV Svārthānumāna 219, p. 110, 11–15: caitasebhyaḥ hi guṇadosebhyaḥ puruṣāḥ samyānmithyāpyāpravṛttayah, te cāttīndriyāḥ svaprabhavakāya-vāgyavahārānumeyāḥ syuḥ | vyavahārāś ca prāyaśo buddhipārvaṃ anyathāpi kartum śakyante, puruṣecchāpravṛttitvāt, teṣāṃ ca citrābhisandhītvāt | tad ayam lingasamkarāt katham anisācinvan pratipadyeta | (caitasebhya em.) caitasye bhya Gnoli ed.)
beings’ intentions are not known, one can infer those of the Buddha through observing the nature of His teachings. K. 16 is also offered as another (alternative) argument to use against opponents to establish the Buddha’s omniscience.

The following four kārikās (kk. 17, 18, 19, 20) are, in my interpretation, aimed at proving that the Veda’s author cannot be admitted as being omniscient. This appears to resume the direct anti-Mīmāṃsaka polemic. In doing this, Śubhagupta connects it with the previous argument in k. 15. If one cannot be totally certain, i.e., have direct access to the real intentions of the Veda’s author, he can still plausibly infer them based on the scriptures themselves. The Veda shows a total lack of compassion and is the expression of self-centered desires by specific categories of people. It cannot, especially in Buddhist terms, be authored by omniscient beings who are expected to be compassionate, free from moral faults and fully aware of selflessness of all things.

Finally, in k. 21, Śubhagupta argues that the omniscience of the Buddha is grounded in the fact that he teaches things that are true and, at the same time, beyond the reach of cognition for ordinary beings. These things cannot be learned through concepts, like the visual experience of water cannot be conveyed through words, if someone has not already seen it. Accordingly, someone must directly know these things before talking about them. This theme had already been introduced in k. 6\textsuperscript{24} in order to prove that the authority of scriptures was based on the direct perception of a person. In this case, however, Śubhagupta uses explicit reference to mantras and incantations as the kind of things that are taught by the Buddha and are true, i.e., effective. The same holds true for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the TS and the TSP, although they do mention other types of truth in this respect. In this specific case,\textsuperscript{25} they mention that kind of knowledge as belonging to other exceptional people, along with the buddhas:

\textsuperscript{24} SSK 6: mngon sum min pa‘i dgongs rnams la || rigs dang dngos la brten ma yin || lung la brten pa yin zhe na || de nyid dngos su rtogs pa yin || “If [it is said by the Mīmāṃsaka that] one cannot rely on reasoning and real things regarding the intended meanings related to [objects which are] not directly perceived (mngon sum min pai/*apratyakṣa), [however,] [they] depend on scriptures (lung/*āgama), [then it will be answered:] precisely these [objects] [must] have been cognized directly (dngos su/*sākṣāt) [by some person].” On this, see Saccone 2019b: 471, 475–476.

\textsuperscript{25} As we shall see, immediately after, Śāntarakṣita mentions the teaching (and knowledge about) the mudrās and maṇḍalas as proof of the fact that only the Buddha possesses extraordinary perception.
How is that capacity of mudrā, maṇḍala and mantra, etc., regarding the liberation from piśācas and dākinīs as well as the eradicating of a poison, etc., which is far beyond [the reach of the] senses, spoken of, if there is no pure cognition of the munis and Garuda (tārkṣya), etc., [regarding those mantras, etc.,] by virtue of a direct cognition, which is different from what is learned[, i.e., scriptures] (śruta), and inference?

Moreover, if the buddhas, etc., do not know directly this capacity of the mantras, etc., with reference to the eradicating of a poison, etc., which is far beyond [the range of] the senses, how [can] they talk about it? This must be said.26

An opponent states that the power of mantras can indeed be known through scriptures.27 Śubhagupta’s answer is that such power cannot be known only through concepts; there needs to be a person who, having directly seen it, teaches it.

As noted by Eltschinger (2001: 45–81), Dharmakīrti uses the power of discerning mantras as evidence against the Mīmāṃsā theme of the untenability of atīndriyārthadarśana for human beings. According to him, the philosopher adopts a “confessionally” neutral position on mantras, admitting the power of creating them also for other exceptional persons besides the buddhas. His main interest is that of joining forces with other traditions against the Mīmāṃsakas. However, given the flow of the argument, Śubhagupta appears to be doing more than that. He draws on Dharmakīrti’s tenet, but adapts it to the specific needs of his own argument. While Dharmakīrti talks about the creation of mantras by specific exceptional people, Śubhagupta refers only to the knowledge (and teaching) of the power of mantras by someone who has direct perception of extrasensory things. The power of these mantras appears to be intended by him as independent from human creation.28

26 TSP ad TS 3451–3452 p. 1083, 17–18 [Jk176b4–176b5; Jp299b2]: mudrāmaṇḍalamantrādhyāyaṃ tāmārthāyaṃ tātāndiyāṃ piśācādākinīmoksaviśāpaparāyanaśisu || (TS 3451) śrutānumānaḥkīrnena sāksājñānena nirmalam muni-tārksyādivijñānena na cet tad gaditaṃ katham || (TS 3452) kīnaḥ – yad etan mantrādīnāṃ viśāpanayanādīsāmarthyaṃ atyantaraparokṣam tad yadi buddhādi-bhiḥ sāksāna na viditaṃ tat katham tair bhāṣitam iti vaktavyam ||.

27 Eltschinger (2001: 86–88) notes that Dharmakīrti ascribes to the Mīmāṃsakas the theory that mantras produce their results through bhäväśäkti, a natural power. This theme, he argues, cannot be found in any extant Mīmāṃsā sources.

28 While Dharmakīrti also talks about the authoring of mantras by specific exceptional people (Eltscherger 2001: 18–21), here Śubhagupta refers only to the knowledge of the power of mantras by someone who has direct perception of extrasensory things. This person, though not explicitly stated, cannot be but the Buddha.
Śubhagupta employs the power of discerning mantras not only as proof of *atīndriyārthadarśana* for human beings in general, but as evidence for the Buddha's omniscience in particular. This also seems to be the case for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla.  

In the overall scheme of the work, I believe that the general proof of *atīndriyārthadarśana* for the authors of scriptures must be considered to be concluded within the first part (kk. 1–12). The second part must instead be regarded as the actual demonstration of the Buddha being the only omniscient person among many other alleged omniscient beings, who are admitted by other traditions as the authors of their scriptures. There are two arguments for the Buddha's omniscience: (i) since he is the one and only being who teaches about selflessness; and (ii) because he knows and teaches true, i.e., effective, mantras.

In the final two verses, Śubhagupta expounds some of his views on spiritual/soteriological matters. To the best of my knowledge, those are the most (and only) explicit statements in his oeuvre regarding such matters. He appears to be including the knowledge of mantras within the overall structure of the attainment of omniscience as consisting in the abandonment of *kleśāvaraṇa* as well as *jñeyāvaraṇa*. This is ultimately connected with the demonstration of the Buddha’s omniscience. Virtuous human beings, even after having abandoned the obstacles [consisting]...

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29 In this article, I do not expect to give an accurate account of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s positions on the argument that proves the Buddha’s omniscience/extrasensory perception based on His knowledge and teaching of mantras. I am only providing a brief and tentative analysis of some of the verses and prose passages that can be found in the TS and the TSP.

30 As noted by Moriyama (2014: 24–25), while commenting on PV Pramāṇasiddhi 7, Prajñākaragupta defines the Buddha as the only and one omniscient being since he teaches the truth in order to dispel the errors. See *abhūtanivṛttaye bhṛntinivṛttyartham yatasya bhagavato bhūtoktis tataḥ sa eva sarvajñāḥ, nāparaḥ*. (Sanskrit text from Moriyama 2014: 24.)

31 Bobh p. 62, 1–5: *tatra bodhiḥ katamā | samāsato dvividhaṇ ca prahāṇaṃ dvividhaṇ ca jīnāṇam bodhir ity ucyate | tatra dvividhaṃ prahāṇaṃ jīnāṇaṃ prahānaṃ aprahānaṇaṃ jñeyāvaraṇaṇaṃ prahānaṇaṃ | dvividham punā jīnāṇaṃ yat kleśāvaraṇaprahānāc ca nirmalaṃ sarvakleśanirvandhajñāṇaṃ | jñeyāvaraṇaprahānāc ca yat sarvasmin jñeye ’prathitam anāvaraṇaṃ jīnāṇam | “In this respect, what is the awakening? In short, both the twofold abandonment and the twofold knowledge are called ‘awakening.’ Among these, the twofold abandonment is the abandonment of the obstacles [consisting] in passions and the abandonment of the obstacles to the knowable. As for the twofold knowledge, [this] is that stainless cognition that is not connected with all the passions, due to the abandonment of the obstacles [consisting] in passions. And [it is also] that cognition devoid of obstacles that is not hindered with regard to every knowable, due to abandonment of the obstacles to the knowable.”
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in passions (*kleśāvaraṇa*), cannot access that extraordinary type of omniscience that is related to the discernment of mantras and their effects. Such omniscience is intended in the meaning of knowledge of what is soterially relevant. Moreover, the Buddha is indeed proved as being omniscient since he knows about that power of mantras. This knowledge, which Šubhagupta evidently regards as important, cannot be obtained only through mere practice devoted to it (k. 24). It is a person, i.e., the Buddha, (k. 25) who, being established as having extraordinary knowledge, i.e., being omniscient, is also able to teach those extrasensory truths. He does so through the scriptures. In this way he is the source of that knowledge. Analogously, in the TS, the proof of the Buddha's perception of soterially relevant truths is demonstrated indeed through His teaching and knowing of *mudrās* and *maṇḍalas*, etc.:

That [person,] who teaches about a true object that is not learned or inferred, being intent on that, teaches as such having known its nature through direct perception. [This is] like [someone] who has seen water through direct perception [and] teaches other [people about it].

Then (*tat*), the supreme Muni has stated, with certainty, for His own sake and that of the others, a truth that is not learned or inferred, [which is] the characteristic of the *kalpas*, etc., related to *mudrās* and *maṇḍalas*, [which is] extrasensory [and] has a capacity unknown to others.

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32 I have based my interpretation on TSP ad TS 3458–3459 p. 1087, 25 [Jp300a2]: *prayogah–yas tatparo ‘śrutānumitasatyārthopadeśī sa sāksād vividitatadarthatatattvah, yathā pratyakṣajñātātasalilādis tadupadeśtā [...]* (vividita° Jp K) *vidita° Ś; upadeśtā K Ś* upadiśtās Jp). “The proof statement is [as follows]: That [person,] who, being intent on that, teaches a true object that is not learned or inferred, has directly known the true reality of that object. [This is] like [when], for example, [someone,] having known water through direct perception, teaches it.”

33 Kamalaśīla appears to be commenting on *munisattamaḥ* with bhagavān.

4. Critical edition

4.1. Sources and method

The SSK is lost in its original Sanskrit and preserved in full only in the Bstan 'gyur. Since it is mentioned in the Lhan kar ma (dated ca. 812; see Hermann-Pfandt 2008: xxii), it must have been translated before or around the beginning of the ninth century. Accordingly, given Śubhagupta’s plausible dates, the translation must have been carried out very soon after the composition of the text. The colophon does not record the names of the translators.

This critical edition relies on two sources:

P: 5741, tshad ma, ze, 199a6–199b7;
D: 4243, tshad ma, zhe 189a2–189b2;

As well as on:


My interpretation of the Tibetan translation was guided by an attempt to determine what Sanskrit text was most likely behind it. Generally, with reference to the corresponding Sanskrit terms for Tibetan words, I refer to Negi 1993–2005 and more rarely to the Mahāvyutpatti.

4.2. Tibetan Text

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gal te byed po shes ldan na || ji ltar bdag la sogs pa bstan ||
bdag med kho na zhes bshad la || de ni gzhan du mi smra’o || 13 |
de lta ’ang gzhan don gnyer ba ni || ’ga’ zhis nyan pa po la ltos36 ||
dgongs pa’i dbang gis37 ’ga’ zhis na38 || de ni gzhan du ston par ’gyur ||14||
tha snyad ’dogs pa’i sms can ni || bsam pa sna tshogs snang bas na ||
de phyir de yi bsam pa yang || bdag ’dres39 shes par mi nus so || 15||
yang na sms rgyun la dgongs nas || log40 pa’i lta ba yongs spong ba’i ||
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35 This is the case for all of Śubhagupta’s works. The BASK represents a unique case due to the presence of many Sanskrit fragments from it in several works by Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist authors. The most conspicuous sources of these are the Bahirarthaparīkṣā chapters of the TS and the TSP. For a detailed discussion of the nature and classification of quotations from the BASK in the TS and the TSP, see Saccone 2018, particularly pp. 48–52.

36 ltos D W] blos P
37 gis D W] gi P
38 na em.] ni P D
39 ’dres W] ’dres P D
40 log D W] ldog P
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'bras bu ster bar 'gyur ba ni || de ni sems can ston pa yin41 || 16 ||
rig byed mchod sbyin las la ni || srog42 gcod43 la sogs gang bshad dang ||
cho ga la ni mngon spyod sogs || ma rungs44 sems can gnod byed pa || 17 ||
de dag don byed la ltos nas || 'ga' zhig gis ni yir rang ste ||
dper na yul 'khor bsrong ba'i phyir || sdang ba'i sems can btang ba bzhin || 18 ||
yang na nga rgyal can gyi mi || 'ga' zhig gi45 ni ched du bstan ||
cho ga gzhan gis mnyes pa yi46 || lha rnams gsol ba'i las byed do || 19 ||
yang na sngon las rnam smin gys47 || de ni mthu dang ldan pas na ||
gang zhig srog gcod byas na yang || mthu las nyams par mi 'gyur ro || 20 ||
sngags sman gdon 'dre'i mthu la sogs || rab tu ston par byed pa'i phyir ||
de shes skyes bu 'ga' zhig 'byung || mi shes phyir na ji ltar ston || 21 ||
'on te rang gi blos btags nas || 'ga' yis de ni rab bstan te ||
'jig rten 'di na de tshun chad || lung ni rab tu gnas she na || 22 ||
de rigs ma yin gdon 'dre dang || gsang sngags ched dpyad rig48 pa rnams ||
mind tsam gis ni ji ltar yang || shes par nus pa ma yin no || 23 ||
chags la sogs dang bral ba49 ni || mkhas la mngon par brtson50 yang ni ||
gdon51 dang gsang sngags mthu yi52 ni53 || rnam pa kun tu shes dbang med || 24 ||
de phyir gang gis lung bstan nas || da dung shes pa skye 'gyur ba ||
mngon sum ma yin mthong ba yi || 'jug par byed pa'i skyes bu yod || 25 ||
thsams cad mkhyen pa grub pa'i tshig le'ur byas pa | slob dpon Dge srungs kyis mdzad pa rdzogs so ||

41 yin P W] yan D
42 srog P D] sreg W
43 gcod P W] gcad D
44 ma rungs em.] ma bgrungs P D W
45 gi W] gis P D
46 yis D W] yis P
47 gys D W] kyi P
48 rig P W] rigs D
49 dang bral ba em.] dang 'brel pa P D W
50 brtson P W] brtsan D
51 gdon D W] gnod P
52 yis D W] yis P D W
53 ni W D] na P
5. **English translation**

k. 13. [Objection:] If the author (byed po/*kartr) [of scriptures] has [extrasensory] knowledge[, i.e., is omniscient], how is it that he teaches about the self, etc.?\(^{54}\) [The answer will be that:] The [one and only Omniscient one] teaches that there is only non-self and (la) does not say [it] differently.\(^{55}\)

k. 14. Nevertheless, striving for (gnyer ba/*arthin) the sake of others, depending on certain specific listeners (*śrotr), by force of an intended meaning (dgongs/*abhiprāya),\(^ {56}\) in certain cases (‘ga’ zhig na/*kvacit), He can [also, provisionally,] teach differently [i.e. doctrines that are apparently similar to the non-Buddhists’ ātmavāda].

k. 15. Since sentient beings involved in ordinary practices are observed as having various intentions, therefore, one cannot know (shes par min/na jiṭātuṃ sakyate) whether also the intentions of these [different omniscient beings, which are admitted by others,] are mixed with [the wrong notion of the] self.\(^ {57}\)

\(^{54}\) Here an objector argues that if one admits that the authors of scriptures must necessarily be omniscient, then there are many omniscient persons, since there are many scriptures accepted by different people. All of their authors, since they all teach about extrasensory things, must equally be admitted as omniscient. However, they say very different and contradictory truths like, for example, the self, which is denied by the Buddhists. Accordingly, those truths cannot all be true, and the authors cannot all be omniscient. Hence, the proof is faulty. Śubhagupta’s response to this is that the only omniscient person is the Buddha, who teaches selflessness.

\(^{55}\) Śubhagupta replies by specifying that omniscience is related to the teaching of true things. Not all the authors of scriptures are omniscient, since not all of them talk about real extrasensory things. The one and only omniscient being is the Buddha, because he shows the real supersensible truth of selflessness. On this, cf. TS 3339: \textit{etac ca sugatasyaṣṭam ādau nairātmyakīrtanāt | sarvatīrthakṛtāṃ tasmāt sthito mūrdhni tathāgataḥ .}

\(^{56}\) On the concept of \textit{abhiprāya} and \textit{dgongs pa}, see, e.g., Seyfort Ruegg 1985, 1988 and 1989. In this case, \textit{abhiprāya} (translated into Tibetan with the honorific term \textit{dgongs pa}) refers to the word for the final and ultimate intention/intended meaning of the Buddha, while also teaching different things.

\(^{57}\) This appears to be advanced in the way of an objection. The real intention of a person cannot be known from the investigation of her/his linguistic and/or practical activities. Accordingly, the different omniscient beings admitted by others cannot be ascertained as truly believing in the idea of the self. Exactly like the Buddha, they might be saying one thing, but really mean something else. My interpretation is based on a parallel passage found in Kamalaśīla’s TSP (see §3). However, it is also possible to regard that \textit{de’i} (de yi in the verse) as “His,” i.e., as referring to the Buddha himself. In other words, the objection would be pointing to the fact that one cannot be sure that the Buddha does not believe in the self when he teaches things that are reminiscent of the opponents’ ātmavāda.
k. 16. Or else [(another argument)], intending mental continuums, He can give the fruit of abandoning a wrong belief, [therefore,] He teaches about [the existence of] sentient beings.\textsuperscript{58}

k. 17. And the slaughtering [of animals] (srog gcod/*prāṇātipāta), etc., that is prescribed with reference to the actions related to the Vedic sacrifices, and the rites of harming (*abhicāra), etc., [which are dictated] in the prescriptions (*vidhi/*vidhāna), are cruel (ma rungs) [and] harm sentient beings.

k. 18. Depending on their [= of the rituals] causal efficiency, there is the rejoicing by a certain specific [person], for example the riddance (btang ba/*tyāga) of malicious sentient beings in order to protect the kingdom.

k. 19. Or else, for the sake of some self-conceited man, [the rituals] are taught [so that] the gods that are pleased through a different ritual make the requested actions.\textsuperscript{59}

k. 20. Or else, that [person], because he is endowed with a power (*śakti) due to the maturation of previous actions, in spite of having killed some [sentient being], cannot lose (nyams par/*cyu) that power.

k. 21. Since he teaches about mantras (sngags), antidotes, the power of evil spirits (gdon 'dre), etc., there is a certain person who knows about those [things]. Since/If he [would] not know about that, how [could] he [possibly] teach about it?

k. 22. If [it is argued:] (*atha) having conceptually determined [them] with her/his own thought,\textsuperscript{60} someone teaches these [mantras and so

\textsuperscript{58} Here, Śubhagupta responds to the previous objection as well as provides another argument for the Buddha’s superiority over the omniscient beings that are admitted by others. While the real intentions of the other omniscient beings are not known, one could at least infer the Buddha’s intentions from the observation of His teachings. The Buddha talks about sentient beings, really knowing that there are just mental continuums, in order to help some abandon wrong doctrines. This recalls the reverse order (pratiloma) argument, as present in the PV Pramāṇasiddhi. On this chapter and its structure (as well as later interpretations), see Pecchia 2015: 53–74 with literature.

\textsuperscript{59} Though being aware of the idiomatic use of lha gsol ba, “worshippng a god,” I believe that the sentence should rather be translated as such.

\textsuperscript{60} The interpretation of rang gi blo s brtags nas as “after imagining them with her/ his own thought,” i.e., creating them, is also possible.
in common usage (*jig rten ’di na*/*loke ’smin*), the scriptures are [considered as] established based on this.

k. 23. [the reply will be:] This is not correct. The sciences [of spells] with regard to evil spirits, mantras [and herbs], cannot be known in any way through mere verbal expression.

I believe that, here, the opponent is suggesting the possibility that such a type of knowledge can be acquired conceptually, not through direct perception. He implies that a person might have learned it through inference or from someone else’s words. People can make true statements also based on their own inferences, such as in the case of impermanence, and do not need to have immediate access, through perception, to those truths. This is valid also for the Buddhists. A similar objection is found in the TS and the TSP, following the statement of an argument that resembles the one found in k. 21. See TS 3453 and TSP *ad* TS 3453–3454, ed. p. 1086, 19–1087, 11: anumānato jñātvā bhāṣṭam iti ced āha – na cānumānata ityādī | na cānumānato jñānam tasya pūrvam adṛṣṭiḥ | tena lingasya sambhandharśanānupapattitā bhī (TS 3453) na hy aviditālaṃ asan bandham vastv anumānāviiṣayā na ca tenātyantaparokṣena vastunā saha kasyacil lingasya sambhandhaḥ śākyate niścetom | (TSP *ad* TS 3453) paramah śrutvā proktam iti cet, na tasyāpi tulyaparyayogāt | tathā hi – tathāpy ayam vicāro ’vatarati, tenāpi pareṇa katham jñātam, na hy ajñātvā tathopadesāḥ sambhavet | tenāpy anyato jñātam iti cet, evam tarhy anavasthā syāt | tataś cāndhaparamparāyāṃ satyāṃ savvasēm anabhijñāvī na samyagupadesāḥ syāt | yathoktam – naivaṇāṇāviiṣayārthasa ṭv pravavacanan prāmāṇyam upaiti, andhānām iva vacanaṃ rūpaviśeṣaṃ iti | (TSP *ad* TS 3454).

“If it is argued: Having known it through inference, [He] talked about [that], [to this, Śāntarakṣita] states[, as a response, the words] beginning with, ‘And there is no cognition.’ ‘And there is no cognition of those [extrasensory objects] through inference, because of the logical incongruity of observing a relation between an inferential mark and the [extrasensory objects], since those [extrasensory objects] were [ever] seen before.’ For it is not the case that one thing that has a relation, the defining characteristic of which is not known, can be the object of an inference. And a relation between any inferential mark [whatsoever] and that completely extrasensory thing cannot be ascertained.” “If it is argued that it is said having heard [it] from another [person, the response will be:] No. [It is not like this,] because, also with reference to it, there is the same objection. To explain, also like this, the following consideration fits: How also by this other [person] is that known? For, if one does not know [something], teaching about it (tathā) is not possible [for him]. If it is argued that also by that [other being] [it is] known from another, in this way, then, there would be a regressus ad infinitum. Moreover, accordingly, there being a succession of blind men, since they all are non-knowing, there would not be a correct teaching. As it is said, the word of a person regarding things of this sort[, i.e., extrasensory objects,] does not gain authoritativeness, like the word of blind men regarding different visual forms.”

For this correspondence, see BASK 71a and its original Sanskrit found in the Bahirarthaparīkṣā of the TSP: "jig rten ’di na lhan cig sgra | (BASK 71a); sahaśabdaś ca loke ’smin (TSP *ad* TS 2029–2030 p. 190, 4).

The opponent raises the objection that a person can know extrasensory truths also based on a merely conceptual investigation, namely without accessing them through direct perception. This is the very principle on which the authority of scriptures is based.
Apology for omniscience

k. 24. Even though [someone], devoid of attachment (*rāga) and the other [kleśas], makes a zealous practice (*abhiyoga) with regard to [that] skill/knowledge,⁶⁴ [she/he still] will not be able to know all the aspects [i.e., to be omniscient] related to the power of evil spirits and mantras.⁶⁵

k. 25. Therefore, there is a person engaged in the vision of what is not directly perceived (*apratyakṣadarśana=atīndriyadarśana), thanks to whom, once He has taught [that] āgama, an even superior cognition will arise [for those who follow His teaching].⁶⁶

The *Sarvājñasiddhikārikā, composed by Ācārya Śubhagupta, is concluded.

6. Conclusion

The SSK, particularly its second part, represents a pivotal text within the history of Buddhist thought. It can be seen as one of the earliest systematic demonstrations of the Buddha’s omniscience. In kk. 13–25, Śubhagupta goes beyond the mere proof of extraordinary perception by human beings (which is the subject of the first part) to establish the

⁶⁴ Here, abhiyoga could refer to abhyāsa, the longtime and attentive cultivation of the vision of selflessness connected to the abandonment of obstacles to the knowable. Śubhagupta seems to be suggesting that, once the abandonment of the kleśas is attained, that cultivation is not enough or apt to obtain the kind of supersensory knowledge related to all the aspects of mantras, etc. On the two types of abandonment, see TSP ad TS 3337, ed. p. 1052, 21–1053, 1: kleśa-jñeya-varana-prahānato hi sarvājñatvam | tatra kleśā eva rāgādayo bhūtadarśana-pratibandhabhāvāt kleśāvaranam ucye | dṛṣṭasyāpi heyopādeyatattvasya yat sarvākārāparijñānaṁ pratipādaśāmāntritvam ca taj jñeyāvaranam | tatra kleśāvaranasya nairātmya-pratyākṣikarānāt prahānīḥ | jñeyāvaranasya tu tasyaiva nairātmya-varanasya sādām iḍānārataradgakālābhāyāsāti | (pratibandhabhāvāt K Š) pratibandhabhāvāt JpR, pratibandhāt JpR; ucye Jp Š Jcyante K; taj Jp Š) deest K) “For omniscience is from the abandonment of obstacles [consisting] in passions and obstacles to the knowable. Between these, attachment, aversion and ignorance are nothing but the afflictions; [they are] called ‘obstacles [consisting] in passions’ because they hinder the vision of true reality. [And,] regarding the reality of what is to be abandoned or taken up, even though it is seen, the non-knowledge of all [its] aspects and the incapability of teaching [it] is the obstacle to the knowable. Between these, there is the abandonment of obstacles [consisting] in passions due to the direct perceiving of selflessness (nairātmya). However, [the abandonment] of obstacles to the knowable is due to the attentive, continuous and longtime cultivation of that very vision of selflessness.”

⁶⁵ Here, Śubhagupta refers to the cognition of the power of mantras, etc., as a superior form of direct perception of extraordinary truths.

⁶⁶ Cf. a somewhat similar idea in TS 3461: tasmād atiśayajñānair upāyabala-vartibhiḥ | sarva evādhikō jñātum śakyate yo ’py atīndriyāḥ ||
Buddha as the one and only omniscient being. In doing so, among other things, he employs His knowledge related to mantras as evidence of His *sarvajñatva*. Before him, Dharmakīrti had already introduced the idea of that type of knowledge as proof of extraordinary perception in human beings. However, Śubhagupta is the first (and one of the few) who revisits that proof in his writings and explicitly relates it to the Buddha’s omniscience.

In the final part of the treatise, he argues that, even though the moral faults are abandoned, a mere *abhiyoga*, zealous cultivation, is not enough to account for the type of omniscience related to the knowledge of mantras. The Buddha, who teaches this, is established as possessing perception of extrasensory truths and is the source of that kind of superior knowledge.

As mentioned above, this can be regarded as an attempt of an author merely concerned with logic and epistemology (*pramāṇa*) to include the knowledge of mantras as proof of the Buddha’s omniscience. In this sense, in the SSK, Śubhagupta puts this type of knowledge into relation (albeit indirectly) with the Buddhist soteriological path.

References


BASK *Bāhyārthasiddhikārikā*. See Saccone 2018: 345–350 (Tibetan Text of kk. 2–8; 29; 32–58; 66; 68; 71–74; 77–92; 95; 101; 185).

BoBh *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. N. Dutt, *Bodhisattvabhūmi (Being the XVth Section of Asaṅgapāda’s Yogācārabhūmi)*. Patna 1966.


Eltschinger (2001: 123–126 and 2008: 206) notes that Śubhagupta is the only Buddhist logician to use this proof of omniscience as based on the knowledge of mantras.
| Jk | Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatriya Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 377. |
| Jp | Śrī Jinabhadrasūri Tāḍapatriya Granthabhaṇḍāra, Jaisalmer, no. 378. |


Lhan kar ma See Hermann-Pfandt 2008.


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68 Starting from k. 527, corresponding kārikā numbers are one higher than those found in Ś.
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On the problem of identity between vināśa and bhāva in the Buddhist theory of momentariness: The view of Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta*

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1. Introduction

In the pramāṇa works of medieval Indian philosophy, momentariness was one of the most contentious issues between Buddhists and their main rivals, realist Hindu philosophers. Among the many problems discussed in connection with the theory of momentariness, a fundamental one was how to understand the phenomenon that things such as a pot cease to exist (na bhavanti / na santi), that is, perish (vinaśyanti) or are destroyed (vinaśyante).¹ Buddhist philosophers believed that this is possible only insofar as things are identical with their perishing (vināśa) which, in the final analysis, is taken to mean that things are momentary. However,

* The first, rather primitive version of this article was a handout which I read at the XVIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies held in Taiwan, June 2011. My sincerest thanks go to Prof. Birgit Kellner, who during that same summer kindly read through the handout for its future publication. It must be noted that it was my beloved teacher, Helmut Krasser, who recommended me to ask her for advice at that time. As a result, her numerous pertinent suggestions, corrections and questions enabled me to write this improved, basically new version. Needless to say, any shortcomings that remain are my own. The writing of this article was supported in part by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 17K18249.

¹ As we will see in Section 2 and 3 below, in the context of the Buddhist theory of momentariness, the verb विनाश (and also विनाश) is always used as intransitive verb by the Buddhists, that is, it always means “perish.” So, for them, the word vināśa means “perishing.” On the contrary, for their orthodox Hindu debate opponents, mainly Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas, “vināśa” always means the act of “destruction,” deriving from the transitive (and causative) verb “destroy.” Thus, in debate texts, it is not possible to give the word vināśa any consistent translations: its translation depends on context. For this reason, I shall often have to leave the term vināśa untranslated in this paper. For the problem of translating the word vināśa in Dharmakīrtian contexts, cf. Steinkellner 2013: xli. He suggests that, in Dharmakīrtian ontology, translations such as “cessation, decay, perishing” and the like, or even “death,” are preferable to “destruction.”

Hindu philosophers never accepted this, since this kind of an identity relation appeared to them to be incoherent in this case; to them, it seemed impossible for existing things (bhāvāḥ) to be identical with their non-existence (abhāva).

As we will see, the debate on this “problem of identity” seems to have a long history in Indian philosophy, one which, to the best of my knowledge, has not yet been fully explored in modern scholarship. The purpose of this article is to introduce and analyze two Buddhist attempts to characterize this identity relation, namely, that of Dharmottara (ca. 740–800) and Prajñākaragupta (ca. 750–810), both of whom are known to have been highly influential for the development of Buddhist logic and epistemology after Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660, or mid-6th century). In my view, these attempts merit careful, individual examination, as they represent different, perhaps paradigmatic, approaches to the historical problem. More specifically, Dharmottara takes an ontological approach to the problem, justifying the simultaneous coexistence of existence and vināśa with the help of the concept of capacity (śakti). Meanwhile, Prajñākaragupta, relying on the momentariness (ksanikatva) of perception (pratyakṣa), argues, from an epistemological perspective, that it is knowledge of existence that coexists with knowledge of perishing. In presenting their arguments, I hope this article will provide new textual material and ultimately enable more detailed philosophical research into this problem.

In the following, I first delineate the two rival views regarding the phenomenon that things cease to exist (Section 2). I then introduce some typical criticisms against the Buddhist view from the non-Buddhist camp (Section 3). After that, I briefly jump ahead to the early history of the debate as understood by a later Buddhist commentator, Karṇakagomin (ca. 770–830) (Section 4). Finally, on the basis of these three points, I analyze in detail the two Buddhist suggestions for how to solve the problem (Sections 5 and 6 for Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, respectively).

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2 The most recent, but at the same one—as far as I know—contribution to this topic in the modern scholarship has been made by Muroya 2011, which has clarified Bhāsarvajña’s response to Dharmakīrti’s view that vināśa and bhāva are identical (cf. fn. 4 below).
2. The difference of views between Buddhists and realists concerning vināśa

Suppose that a pot sitting on a table perishes (vinaśyati) or is destroyed (vinaśyate) and is no longer there.

The main Buddhist rivals, i.e., Hindu orthodox realists, specifically those of the Nyāya or/and Vaiśeṣika school, interpreted the vināśa of the pot on the table as the pot’s non-existence (abhāva) coming into existence (bhavati) on the table. Furthermore, they considered the pot’s non-existence as the effect (kārya) of various causes of destruction (vināśahetu) such as a hammer. They further believed that there is a real thing called non-existence (abhāva), and that this non-existence has an ontological status that is independent of existence (bhāva). They reasoned as follows: In our everyday life, we have cognitions (jñāna or pratyaya) such as “there is no pot (ghaṭo nāsti) on the table” or “a pot does not exist (ghaṭo na bhavati) on the table.” If non-existence did not exist independently of existence, then for us to have such a cognition would be, according to the realist, impossible. Thus, non-existence is concluded to exist. And, in the same way that a pot is produced by causes, such as clay, potter etc., so too does non-existence need causes such as a hammer and the like in order to be produced.

Buddhists, on the other hand, interpreted the pot’s vināśa as nothing other than its own nature (svabhāva) which is intrinsic to it since its creation. They did not consider vināśa to be a different thing (arthāntaram or bhāvāntaram), ontologically speaking, from the existing thing itself. The position is well encapsulated by Dharmakīrti when he says:

There is nothing at all called vināśa which is different from an existing thing, for an existing thing itself is vināśa (bhāva eva hi nāśah).

Therefore, according to Buddhists, nothing called non-existence and belonging to the pot comes into existence on the table; rather, the pot merely ceases to exist there, as Dharmakīrti again clearly asserts in his Pramāṇavārttika 1.277cd:

I refer here to the explanation given in Vibha 1987: 50: ghaṭo dhvastah, ghaṭa-dhvamso jātah. “The jar is annihilated and the annihilation of the jar has occurred.”

Cf. PVSV 100,3–4: na vināśo nāma eva kaścid bhāvāt, bhāva eva hi nāśah... For Bhāsarvajña’s criticism of this statement, see Muroya 2011. Also cf. PVA 643,4: tasmān nānyo ‘bhāvo bhāvāt. “Therefore, non-existence is not different from an existing thing.” I will deal with this statement of Prajñākaragupta in Section 6.2 below. For Prajñākaragupta’s modification of Dharmakīrti’s statement “bhāva eva nāśah,” see fn. 31 below.
It is not the case that it (= a thing such as a pot) has something (i.e., in this context: abhāva, i.e., non-existence) that comes into existence. But [it is] rather [the case] that [it] simply does not exist.”

According to Buddhists, the pot spontaneously perishes (vinaśyati) without needing any external causes of destruction. In other words, the pot arises from its own cause (svahetu) of generation, i.e., its causal complex, and possesses vināśa as its characteristic. Therefore, at the same moment the pot arises from its own cause, it already has the characteristic, perishing. In this sense, the pot is momentary, since, at the ontological level, the pot’s production is identical with its perishing. This is often described in both Buddhist and non-Buddhist texts as follows: “an existing thing perishes immediately upon its arising.”

3. Problems with the Buddhist understanding of the relation between bhāva and vināśa

In their debates, one of the questions raised by Hindu philosophers concerning the above-mentioned Buddhist position is that, if vināśa were not different from the existing thing itself, then, because of the causelessness of destruction, a thing could not exist for even a moment. Namely, if it is supposed that 1) an existing thing is perishable, and that 2) there are no causes of destruction, which is to say that, in order to perish, an existing thing does not need any causes and conditions other than its generating cause (janakahetu), then it follows that the production of an existing thing temporally coincides with its perishing. If this is the case, then it turns out that coming into existence (bhavana) and perishing (vināśa) occur at the same time. Regarding this point, for example, Vyomaśiva, a Vaiśeṣika philosopher of the tenth century, levels criticism against the Buddhist position represented by Dharmakīrti in Pramāṇavārttika 1.277cd, pointing out the following three undesirable consequences:

5 PV 1.277cd: na tasya kiñcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam || Also cf. PVSVT 90.20–21: bhāvasyaṁityatā bhavatity [bhavatity cf. Watanabe 2003: 351,12 (with fn. 5); Ishida 2011: 67 (Anm. 30) : bhavatity PVSVT] evamādhīhir vākyair bhāvasya na kiñcid rūpam vidhīyate. api tu dr̥ṣṭam rūpam nāstīty ayam artho 'bhiddhīyate. “No nature of an existing thing is affirmed by sentences such as ‘the impermanence of an existing thing comes into existence.’ Rather this meaning is expressed: ‘the visible [thing] which was [once] perceived does not exist.” For a Japanese translation, cf. Watanabe 2003 (II): 357. Also, cf. PVinṬ 2I 8,8–10.

6 Regarding this point, for example, Śākyabuddhi states in his Pramāṇavārtтikā the following: PVṬ Ms Ta3: kṛtakasvabhāvanispattav evāniyatyāsabhāvanispattah... “[The produced thing (kṛtaka) is momentary,] because the nature of being impermanent is realized whenever the nature of the produced thing is realized.” Cf. Sakai 2011: 412–413.
Furthermore, that which has been said [by Dharmakīrti in his Pramāṇavārttika 1.277cd]: ‘It is not the case that it (= a thing such as a pot) has something (i.e., in this context: abhāva i.e., non-existence) that comes into existence. But [it is] rather [the case] that [it] simply does not exist,’\(^7\) is spoken by a madman. This is because 1) [if this were so] it would be impossible for a pot whose vināśa is unproduced to come into non-existence (abhavana); 2) or (tu), if vināśa were not different [from an existing thing, that thing, e.g., a pot] could not have been perceived earlier either, since [it] would have already been destroyed (vinaṣṭatvād eva); 3) moreover, if it were the case that [an existing thing, e.g., a pot] is not incompatible with non-existence (abhāva), then [that thing would have to] continue to exist later, too. Therefore, [it] would be eternal.\(^8\)

1) If vināśa did not exist, it would be impossible for it to be present in a pot, since something that cannot exist (asat) in the first place cannot be brought into existence. As a result, a pot would never cease to exist, since, without vināśa, it could never be destroyed.

2) On the other hand, if, as the Buddhists propose, vināśa were not different from an existing thing itself, then a pot, from the beginning, could not be perceived even for a single moment, since it would have already perished,\(^9\)

\(^7\) Cf. fn. 5 above.

\(^8\) Vyom Ms\(^a\) 91b5–6: \(\text{yac cedam (yac cedam emended : yac cedam Ms) na tasya kiñcit bhavati na bhavaty (bhavaty emended : bhaty Ms) eva kevalam (PV 1.277cd) ity unnattabhaṭṣam etat, anuppannavināśasya} \)\(^b\) \(\text{ghaṭasyābhavanāsambhavāt. ayaṭiṭeke tu vināśasya} \)\(^b\) \(\text{pūrvaṃ apyaupalambho na syāt, vinaṣṭatvād eva; abhāvena cāvirodhe paścād apya avasthānām iti nityatvāṃ syāt.} \)\(^a\) On the manuscript of the Vyomavatī, see Stern 2007.

\(^b\)–\(^b\) The part “\(\text{ghaṭasyābhavanāsambhavāt. ayaṭiṭeke tu vināśasya} \)” is omitted in the edition of Gaurinath Sastri, see Vyom 145,7–9.

\(^9\) We find the same objection in PV 4.284ab: \(\text{kṣaṇam apy anapekṣate bhāvo bhāvasya neti cet} | ’[Objected:] If an existing thing were independent [with reference to its vināśa], there would be no existence (bhāva) of an existing thing even for a moment.’ Dharmakīrti’s rejoinder to this objection is simple. He answers in PV 4.284cd: \(\text{bhāvo hi sa tathābhūto ‘bhāve bhāvas tathā katham ||} \)’[This is not correct.] for this existing thing has become so. If there were no existence [of this existing thing], how [could we say that this] existing thing is so?’ Answering the objection, Dharmakīrti asserts: Even the opponents accept the impermanence of things, if a thing did not exist, even for a moment, the opponents could not accept this either. Therefore, at the outset a thing must exist, and then it perishes. It must be the case that a thing’s origination occurs, temporally, earlier than its perishing, although the production of a thing coincides temporally with its perishing.

Manorathanandin’s commentary on PV 4.284 runs as follows: PVV 512,11–13: \(\text{kṣaṇakṣayisvabhāvā bhāvāḥ svahetor eva jāyante. vināśaṃ praty anapekṣate bhāvasya yatāḥ dvītye kṣane bhāvo nāsti, tathā prathame } \)\(^i\) \(\text{’pi kṣane na syād iti kṣaṇam api bhāvasya bhāvo na syād iti cet.} \)’[Objected:] [You have said that] existing things arise only from their own cause, with having the nature of passing away in
in other words, since it itself is nothing but \textit{vināśa}, i.e., non-existence.

3) Moreover, if Buddhists admitted that an existing thing is not incompatible with non-existence, because of the undesirable consequence mentioned in 2), then an existing thing could never perish, since the compatibility of an existing thing with non-existence means that an existing thing that possesses existence (\textit{bhāva} or \textit{sattā}) could coexist with non-existence (\textit{abhāva} or \textit{asattā}) which in turn implies that an existing thing can endure while possessing non-existence.

In this way, Vyomaśīva points out problems in the Buddhist position, according to which, \textit{vināśa} is not different from an existing thing (\textit{bhāva}) and therefore there is nothing called \textit{vināśa} that is different from the existing thing.\textsuperscript{10} Of course, the Buddhist accepts both that a thing comes into existence and that it perishes. So, the challenge for him is to explain these two phenomena while still maintaining that \textit{vināśa} is identical with an existing thing itself.

\subsection*{3.1. The realist’s understanding of \textit{vināśa}}

In contrast to Buddhists, Vyomaśīva interprets the phenomenon of a thing’s \textit{vināśa} from a realist point of view. He argues as follows: As long as a property bearer, \(x\), is connected to the property, existence, it exists. When it loses this existence through the force of external causes,

\begin{quote}
\begin{verse}
\textit{a moment (\textit{kṣaṇa-kṣaya})}.  [However,] if \textbf{an existing thing were independent} with reference to \cite{Muroya2011} for \cite{Muroya2011} to maintain. Therefore, \textbf{there would be no existence of an existing thing even for a moment.}” \textit{PVV} 512.13–6: \textit{ayuktam etat. hi yasmāt sa bhāvas tathā} naśv&śvabhāva isyate. \textit{yadā tu bhāva eva nāsti, tadābhāve bhāvasya bhāvas tathā} naśvarah kathām ucyate. \textit{tato labdhajāmnato bhāvasya kṣaṇāntarānanuvṝttā naśvaratā. “[Answer:] This [objection] is not correct—}’\textit{for}’ (\textit{hi})’ [means] because—[because] it is accepted that \textbf{this existing thing is} so, namely, of a perishing nature. If, however, [this] existing thing itself does not exist, then [namely] if \textbf{there were no existence} for [this] existing thing, \textbf{how} could we say that [this] \textit{existing thing has become so}, namely, perishable? Therefore, an existing thing, which has obtained origination, is perishable because of [its] non-continuity in the next moment.”
\end{verse}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} In terms of content, the two undesirable consequences 2) and 3) asserted by Vyomaśīva are essentially identical with the views of Bhāsarvajña. For the views of Bhāsarvajña, see Muroya 2011: 349. Consequence 2) corresponds with that which is named “fault of no cognition” by Muroya 2011: 349, whereas consequence 3) is identical with that which is called “fault of continuous cognition” by Muroya 2011: 349. Also, cf. Muroya 2011: 355–356 (section 4.3.1), where he reports that Vācaspatimiśra’s two arguments against the Buddhist identification of an existing thing and \textit{vināśa} have already been adduced by Bhāsarvajña.
then non-existence replaces existence in that locus. External causes of destruction function to produce destruction and to connect it with \( x \).

From this criticism of the Buddhist position, the realist can derive two important claims: i) a thing’s \( \text{vināśa} \) has to occur at a time after the thing was produced (\( \text{paścātkālabhāvin} \)). Otherwise, a thing could never be perceived, even for a single moment, since existence (\( \text{bhāva} \)) cannot temporally coexist with non-existence (\( \text{abhāva} \)); and ii) \( \text{vināśa} \) occurring at a later time must be brought about by external causes. That is, at the moment that a thing originates from its generating cause, i.e., causal complex, the generating cause finishes its role; it cannot do anything else, including producing another effect such as the \( \text{vināśa} \) that occurs at a later point in time. Thus, \( \text{vināśa} \) needs another, external cause. These two points were used by realists to argue for the non-momentariness of objects. For example, Śrīdhara says in his \textit{Nyāyakandalī}:

An existing thing is not momentary, because there is no necessity (\( \text{niyamābhāva} \)) that its (i.e., the existing thing’s) non-existence, which occurs at a later time and is [therefore] dependent on another cause [than its generating cause, occurs] immediately upon [its] arising (\( \text{bhāvānantarya} \)). For instance, we perceive that it is only after some time (\( \text{cireṇa} \)) that, with the stroke of a hammer, \( \text{vināśa} \) [occurs] to a pot which has previously arisen.\(^{11}\)

That is, since non-existence (\( \text{abhāva} \)) cannot coexist with existence (\( \text{bhāva} \)), due to their incompatibility, \( \text{vināśa} \) must occur later and therefore must depend on external causes. If this kind of \( \text{vināśa} \) were to always happen to a thing immediately upon its origination, one could agree with the thing’s momentariness. However, according to the realist, it is not the case that this kind of \( \text{vināśa} \) occurs in this way. Thus, this should disprove the momentariness of things.

4. The early history of the controversy

The criticisms raised by Vyomaśiva, and specifically the second argument mentioned above, can be dated back to at least the time of the early Nyāya philosophers Adhyayana, Aviddhakarna, and Uddyotakara (ca. 500–600). It is to these three that Karṇakagomin, in his \textit{Pramāṇa-}\(^{11}\)NKan 199,3–5: \( \text{na bhāvasya kṣaṇikatvam, paścādbhāvinas tadabhāvasya hetvantaráspekteṣasya bhāvānantaryaniyamābhāvāt. tathā ca dṛśyate ghaṭasyotpannaḥ sva cireṇaḥvināśo mudgarābhīghatūt.} \)
vārtikasvavṛttiḥ,\textsuperscript{12} ascribes a set of counterarguments to the Buddhist theory of momentariness.\textsuperscript{13} Among them, the following argument is relevant:

That which was taught by Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara and so on, [namely, the following argument]: ‘…And, if an existing thing itself is nāśā, [then] there would be no existence for an existing thing at the first moment either, since vināśa [already exists] exactly at this moment, [namely, at the very first moment]…’ is also rejected.\textsuperscript{14}

In this objection, we can already see the same line of argumentation that is raised by Vyomaśīva in his second argument. The history of the controversy between Buddhists and realists on this point, then, seems to be quite long.

According to Karnākagomin, Dharmakīrti, in refuting this objection, regards impermanence (anityatā) in the sense of vināśa as an existing thing itself which has the property of persisting for a moment (kṣaṇasthiti-dharmā). Dharmakīrti’s answer to this objection is as follows:

Namely, that very existing thing which has the property of persisting for a moment is impermanence.\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{13} Cf. Thakur 1954: 386. It is difficult to determine the approximate dates of Adhyayana and Aviddhakarṇa with certainty. According to Matilal 1977: 84, Adhyayana is placed between Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara; Aviddhakarṇa, on the other hand, is supposed to come after Uddyotakara and Dharmakīrti. Whether the order Karnakagomin refers to Adhyayana, Aviddhakarṇa, and Uddyotakara is a reflection of their actual chronology is a point to be examined. For Aviddhakarṇa, James Marks quite recently argued that Aviddhakarṇa is an alias for Bhāvivikta or vice versa, namely that the two are not two distinct authors but different names for the same person. Cf. Marks 2019.

\textsuperscript{14} PVSVṬ 90,26–91,5 (...)90,29–30, ...91,6): yad apy ucye ṭhāyaṇāviddhakarnoddhotakarādbihīḥ ... yadi ca bhāva eva nāṣaḥ, prathame ‘pi kṣane bhāvasya na sattā syāt, ‘vināśat tadaiva, *... tad apāstam. For a Japanese translation of this passage, cf. Watanabe 2003 (II): 358.

In the following, I introduce how Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta accounted for the Buddhist position that vināśa is ontologically not different from an existing thing itself. What attracts our attention in their respective arguments is that they deal with effectively the same problem—of which Dharmakīrti seems not to be fully aware—namely, the problem of the connection (sambandha) between vināśa and an existing thing that has already perished (vinaṣṭa). This, in my view, constitutes the greatest virtue of their interpretations.

5. Dharmottara

Dharmottara’s explanation appears in his commentary on the second chapter of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya, where Dharmakīrti explains why ordinary people cannot determine a thing’s momentariness through perception (darśana or pratyakṣa). The text being commented upon reads as follows:

Furthermore, there is nothing at all called vināśa which is different from an existing thing; rather an existing thing is itself vināśa. It is the case that the very [existing thing] is produced [from its own cause alone] as something that persists [only] for a moment.

Dull [people] determine that nature of this [existing thing] afterwards, not before, since—even though [that nature] is perceived [by them beforehand]—[they] have no sharpness [of perception]. Therefore, by force of this, [that nature] is determined later, just as poison is [determined later] by ignorant [people] upon experiencing sickness.\(^{16}\)

Dharmakīrti’s position is that there is not an entity, “vināśa,” that is ontologically distinct from an existing thing. Existing things are necessarily vināśa, which amounts to them being momentary. To exist at some moment is to be vināśa at that moment. Therefore, when we perceive an existing thing, we should also perceive it is vināśa.

5.1. The worldly understanding of vināśa as non-existence (abhāva)

In Dharmottara’s commentary, his opponent rebuts this Buddhist view, appealing to the worldly (laukika) understanding of vināśa as non-existence (abhāva).

[Objection:] But surely among everyday people (loka), vināśa is not said to be constitutive of a real thing (padārthātmaka)? Rather, they say that [vināśa is] merely non-existence.

[Answer:] Against [this objection, Dharmakīrti] said ‘that [nature] of this [existing thing]’ (‘tam asya’). Dull [people], who are, as long as saṃsāra endures, bound to ignorance, are not able to know all the properties of an [existing thing] while it is being seen [by them]. They ascertain (ava-√so) the property called ‘not persisting’ in that [existing thing] afterwards, [namely] after the time when [it] had existed, not before, [that is, not] at the very time when [it] was existing. ‘Even if [that nature] is perceived’ (‘darśane ‘pi’) means: Even if this kind of nature [of the existing thing] is perceived [by them], there is no ascertainment [of it] at the time when [the existing thing is being] perceived [by them], since [they] have no sharpness of perception because of the dullness [caused] by ignorance.17

Dharmottara’s opponent (supposedly the three early Naiyāyikas referred to earlier18) states the following: When normal people perceive a real entity (padārtha) such as a pot, they do not recognize vināśa; rather, it is only after it perishes, that is, only after they can no longer perceive it, that they finally recognize vināśa. Therefore, vināśa is not a real entity that is perceived when the pot is perceived. Rather, what is real must be non-existence (abhāva), i.e., the extinction of an existing thing (bhāvanivṛtti).

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17 PVinṬ 2 Ms 95b2–4: nanu ca padārthātmako vināśo loke nocyate, api tv abhāva evety aha—tam asyeti. ā samsāram avidyānubaddhā mandās tasya drśyamānasya sarvān dhrṁan adhigantum aśaktāḥ. anavasthāyitvam nāma [nāma emended (zhes bya ba’i T): na[ma]a Ms) dharmaṁ tatra sattākālaṁ ārdhvaṁ avasyanti, na prāk sattākāla eva. darśane ‘pi ti. tathābhūtasya svabhāvasya saty api darśane na darśanakāle ‘dhyavasaśya ‘sti, avidyāmāndyād darśanapāṭavasyābhāvāt.

a The akṣara ma seems to be deleted in the Ms.

18 It seems to me that, in terms of content, this objection is identical to one of the objections ascribed by Karṇakagomin to the three Naiyāyikas, namely: PVSVṬ 90,26–91,5: “loke ca bhāvanivṛttir vināśah pratītaḥ, na bhāva eva." “Moreover, among everyday people, vināśa is understood as the extinction of an existing thing (bhāvanivṛtti), not as an existing thing itself.”

...I emend the reading of the PVSVṬ on the basis of the quotation in TBV 333,3–4 (cf. fn. 14 above). PVSVṬ reads: (...bhāvanivṛttis) ca vināśo lokapratīto na bhāva eva. TBV reads: (...tadaiva) loke ca bhāvanivṛttir vināśah pratītaḥ na bhāva eva.
On the problem of identity between vināśa and bhāva

Thus, the Buddhist position is not acceptable since it contradicts our everyday understanding.

Importantly, according to Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara, this is indeed how things seem to us. It is only when a thing has perished that can one determine its transient nature. However, this is said to be due to a lack of sharpness in our perception, which is caused by ignorance. It does not reflect how things really are.

5.2. The problem of the connection between vināśa and an existing thing that has perished

Dharmottara then brings up the problem that confronts ordinary people who consider vināśa to be non-existence (abhāva), namely, that of the connection (sambandha) between vināśa and an existing thing.

However, even ordinary people (laukika) do not comprehend that vināśa is just the state of extinction (nivr̥ttyavasthā), since, otherwise, it would turn out (syād eva) that there is no connection [between an existing thing and vināśa], which is expressed [in verbal expressions such as]: "the pot has perished" [or] "[there is] the destruction (vināśa) of the pot." Namely, there is no connection at all between the substantial (vastu) and the unsubstantial (avastu), which stand in mutual exclusion. However, there is [indeed] a verbal means of expressing the connection [between an existing thing and vināśa]. Therefore, [those people] who make use of language (vyavahartāraḥ) agree that vināśa is the very nature of an existing thing (bhāvasvabhāva), [a nature that] has extinction as a property (nivr̥ttidharman) [and] is qualified by the time when its extinction is confirmed. [However, that is] merely because existence and non-existence are incompatible. They (= those people) are full of themselves (abhimanyante), thinking (iti): “we understand (pratipannāḥ smaḥ) how vināśa is a state of non-existence that is not incompatible with the state of existence.”

19 PVinṬ 2 Ms 95b5–96a1: na punar nivr̥ttyavasthaiva [nivr̥tyo emended (ldog pa’i T): nivr̥tyo] vināśo laukikair apy anugamyate. itarathā hi vinaṣto ghato ghataṣya vināśa iti sambandho na syād eva. na hi vastvavastunoḥ parasparaparīhārena sthitayoh kaścit sambandhah. asti ca sambandhavyavahārah. tasmāt tam eva bhāvasvabhāvaṁ nivr̥ttidharmāṇaṁ nivr̥ttiṁścayakālopādhikāṁ vināśaṁ vyavahartāraḥ pratipannāḥ, kevalaṁ sattvāsattvayor virodhāt. asattāvasthāṁ sattāvasthayāvirodhinīṁ [‘avasthayāvirodhinīṁ emended (gnas skabs dang ’gal ba med pa’i T) : ‘avasthayāvirodhinīṁ Ms] vināśaṁ pratipannāḥ sma ity abhimanyante. In a later passage of his tikā on PVin 2 90,11–12, Dharmottara summarized this passage PVinṬ 2 Ms 95b5–96a1. Cf. PVinT 2’12,13–13,5: kathāṁ paścāt sattākālasāmya ghaṭāder bhāvasyānupalabdhyā hetubhūtyā ghaṭaviviktaprādeśajñānātmatayāśtiteḥ pratipattih, tasmāṁ naśvarasvabhāvasya paścāṁ niścayakāla iti tasmād
If one considers vināśa to be non-existence (abhāva), then a problem arises: the connection between vināśa and an existing thing such as a pot would be impossible. This is because the connection between that which is substantial (vastu), i.e. an existing thing (bhāva), and that which is unsubstantial (avastu), i.e. non-existence (abhāva) as vināśa, is impossible. It is the case that connection between two is only possible when both substantially exist, like a connection between a man and a walking stick. In other words, when a pot has perished and nothing remains—what is called the state of extinction (nivr̥ttyavasthā)—then how could the connection between the pot and its vināśa be established?

According to Dharmottara, in order to solve the problem of the connection, ordinary people must give up regarding vināśa as the state of extinction, that is, the state of non-existence, despite the fact that they confirm vināśa only by means of perceiving this state. In order to be able to connect vināśa with an existing thing—there is the need for them to make the connection possible on the ontological level or in the external world, since indeed the connection is expressed in our verbal expressions such as “the pot has perished” or “[there is] the destruction (vināśa) of the pot.”—ordinary people, according to Dharmottara, would next reinterpret vināśa as the nature (svabhāva or rūpa) of an existing thing, a nature of having extinction as a property, which is in turn qualified by a certain moment in time. This is a technical way of expressing a simple idea. To put it concretely: Assume that a pot is destroyed by a hammer at a certain point in time T-x. At this point in time, ordinary people ascertain its destruction (vināśa) with the thought “the pot has perished,” or “there

\[\text{yadā niścayāḥ, tadānityatā vyavasthāpyate.} \text{ nivr̥tte vastuni yah kālah,} \text{ tadupādhir anityatā nivr̥ttyavasthātmikā vyavasthāpyata ity etad apy uktam—} \]
\[\text{vikāradarśaneny atra} \text{b.} \text{ tasmān nivr̥ttyavasthāparyatam svabhāvam eva tasya nivr̥ttidharmānām anityatām samālambante, na tu kevalām eva nivr̥ttyavasthām,} \text{ tasya [tasyā emended : tasya PVinṪ 2, PVinṪ 2 Ms] bhāvena sahāsambandhāt.} \text{ bhāvabhāvayos tu virodhād abhāvākālopaḥdhim avasyanto nivr̥ttim eva—} \]
\[\text{ani-} \text{tyatāṃ pratipannāḥ} \text{ sma iti muhyantīty apy uktam tatraiva. For a German} \]
\[\text{translation, see Ishida 2011: 74–75.} \]
\[\text{a PVin 2 90,11–12: antyakṣaṇadarśināṃ niścayāt paścād asyānupalabdhyāsthitit-} \]
\[\text{pratipatte niścayakāla iti tadānityatā vyavasthāpyata ity uktam.} \]
\[\text{b Cf. PVin 2 82,5–10 cited in fn. 16 above.} \]
\[\text{c Here I emend the edition PVinṪ 2.} \text{ With regard to its contents, the demonstrative} \]
\[\text{pronoun tasya in the edition must designate the previous word nivr̥ttyavasthā,} \]
\[\text{which is a feminine noun. It seems to me that in his German translation, Ishida} \]
\[\text{has also understood this to be so. His edition, however, reads tasya.} \]

In this context, perceiving the state of nothing means perceiving the place where the pot has ceased to exist, namely, a place without a pot (ghataviviktapradeśa) such as an empty tabletop. Cf. PVinṪ 2 12,13–13,5 cited in fn. 19 above.
is the destruction of the pot.” They then comprehend that the pot had, while it existed, the nature of perishing at T-x. They see no contradiction in the fact that the pot had this nature of perishing at T-x even while it existed. Indeed, such non-existence (abhāva) seems compatible with existence (bhāva). Thus, in this way, the connection between a pot and its vināśa can be explained by ordinary people.

Whether the thought process of ordinary people conforms to Dharmottara’s description is difficult to say. What is clear is that behind ordinary people’s treatment of this issue of vināśa, there is a (somewhat naïve) expectation that as long as a connection can be expressed through language, then that connection must have a real, ontological correlate, as well.21

5.3. Dharmottara’s explanation: destruction as capacity

In the final analysis, however, Dharmottara does not accept this conventional understanding of vināśa by everyday people. This is because, for him, any property that is actualized after a thing has come into existence cannot be considered part of that thing’s nature (rūpa). In the above-mentioned case of the pot, starting from the moment of its creation, the pot has the property of perishing. However, this property is not actualized until time T-x, according to ordinary people. Yet it still seems possible, unless the future is written in stone, that the pot that perished at time T-x could alternatively have been destroyed sooner, had we hit it with a hammer at another, earlier time such as T-w, T-v, etc. Dharmottara therefore rejects the position that such a property is a part of a thing’s nature. He explains his own, Buddhist position, by referring to Dharma-kīrti’s example in the Pramāṇaviniścaya, namely, that of poison (viṣa):

21 I have not yet tracked down exactly from where this idea emanated, although the Sanskrit grammatical tradition, i.e., vyākaraṇa, would seem like a good place to start. The motivation seems basically to be that of finding a ground or basis (nimitta) of relation (sambandha) between two words as expressed in a Sanskrit sentence: for example, in the case of the sentence “vinaṣṭo ghaṭaḥ” (“the pot has perished”), the subject-predicate relation between the pot (as subject) and the vināśa (as predicate), or, in the case of the sentence “ghaṭasya vināśaḥ” (“there is] the destruction of the pot”), the possession relation between the pot (as possessor) and the vināśa (as possessed). Just as realists believe that a physical pot is the ground for application (pravr̥ttinimitta) of the word ‘pot’, so too do they want there to be some real ground for both the vināśa and its connection to the pot, since in fact the relation is expressed in the two types of sentences; otherwise the relation expressed in the sentences would become groundless.
Furthermore, can there exist in a certain real entity a nature which is ascertained [only] later, though it is perceived [beforehand and] is not ascertained [at the time of perception], like [the nature] of having extinction as a property? [Answer:] With the phrase ‘sickness’ (‘vikāra’), [Dharmakīrti] answered: [such a nature] does exist. For instance, poison, though perceived by ignorant [people], cannot, at the time [of its perception], be ascertained as being fully endowed with a capacity to kill. [This capacity] is ascertained [by them later] once there is a state of sickness. [Poison] is an instructive example to the extent that (etāvatāṃśena) there can be a property [of a real entity] that is not ascertained at the time the real entity is being perceived. However, for poison, a capacity to kill at a later time is not established. Namely, the killing capacity [of poison] is the very capacity to bring about an effect; and, capacity should be understood through positive and negative concomitance; and conformity to positive and negative concomitance is a matter of the nature (rūpaviṣayaḥ) of things (bhāvānām). Therefore, it is only [its] nature that is capable. [But] it is merely (kevalam) because of dependence at a certain time (kadācīdapekṣayaḥ) that capacity is treated as being different [from the thing’s nature]. There is no incompatibility at all between capacity and [that which] possesses capacity. Therefore, for a real entity (vastu), a capacity that is qualified by a later state is not established. But even [those people] who speak of the nature of an existing thing as having extinction as a property speak of vināśa as if it came about at a later time, 1) because [they] confirm the nature (rūpa) later in the form that ‘the pot has perished’ [or] ‘[there is] the destruction of the pot,’ and (ca) 2) because it is inconsistent that there is existence in the state of non-existence, [and both of these reasons, 1) and 2), are] due to the incompatibility between existence (sattva) and non-existence (asattva).22

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22 PVinT 2 Ms 96a1–6: asti punaḥ kvacit padārthe svabhāvo [kvacit padārthe svabhāvo emended (don 'ga' zhi g la T) : kvacit padārthe svabhāvo Ms] drṣṭo 'py anavasitah, yah paścād adhyavasīyatate [paścād adhyavasīyatate emended : paścād apy avasīyatate Ms ; physi nges par 'gyur ba T , nivṛttidharmakatavat. astity āha – vikāreti. yathā drṣṭam api viṣam ajñair [ajñair emended (cf. ajñaiḥ PVin 2 82,9) : ajñai Ms] māraṇaṃaktisamanvitam tadānīm avasātum aśakyam vikāravasthāyām avasīyatate. padārthadarśanakāle 'navasīyamāno dharmah sambhavatīty etāvatāṃśena [etāvatāṃśena emended (cha de tsam gyis T) : etāvatāṃśe Ms] drṣṭāntaḥ. na tu māraṇaṃaktiḥ paścātkālabhāvinī vyavasthāpyate viṣaya. tathā hi kāryakaraṇasyaktiḥ ["karana" emended (byed pa'i T) : "kāraṇa" Ms eva māraṇaṃaktiḥ. "anvayavyatirekakasamadhirīgamyā ca śaktiḥ. Anvayavyatirekānugamaḥ ca rūpaśrīva eva bhāvānām. tasmād rūpaṃ eva śaktam. kevaloṃ kādācīdapekṣayaḥ śaktiḥ vyatirekinaḥ vyavahāriyate. na śaktisaktimatar virdhah kaścit. tena nattāvasthāpādhikā śaktiḥ avasthāpyate vastunah. sattvāśrīvyavahāravāyasya tu virdhāḥ bhāvāsa nivṛttidharmakaṃ svabhāvam vyavahāranāḥ 'pi ghato vivāṣo ghātasya vināśa iti paścād rūpanīcayād asattvāvasthāyāṃ ca sattvāvirdhāḥ paścātkālabhāvināṃ iva vināśaṃ vyavahāranti.
Just as a poison’s capacity to kill is only determined by ignorant people after they have swallowed it—they cannot determine its capacity to kill until they have ingested it and then feel ill—so the nature of an existing thing to have extinction as a property is determined by ignorant people after the thing has ceased to exist as well.

In the case of a poison, however, its capacity to kill is, in reality, always present—whenever someone ingests it, they become ill. It can always produce an effect, i.e., illness. Dharmottara asserts that any capacity producing its corresponding effect only at a certain point in time cannot be considered a thing’s nature (rūpa), since such a capacity is not understood through positive and negative concomitance (anvayavyatireka) with a thing as its possessor. According to him, the relation between a capacity-possessor (x) and capacity (y) must be understood in the following way: Whenever x exists, y is in effect. When, although x exists, y is not in effect, y cannot be considered to be a capacity of x. That is, as long as x exists, y must always be in effect. Regarding this point, Dharmottara makes the important point that there is no incompatibility at all between capacity and capacity-possessor and therefore, for a real entity a capacity that is qualified by a later state is not established.

In the case of vināśa, too, as long as it is the nature (svabhāva or rūpa) of a thing, it must be a capacity that is always in effect. Therefore, the relation between an existing thing and vināśa should be understood in the same way as the relation between capacity-possessor and capacity. This is Dharmottara’s conclusive answer to the problem of the identity relation between an existing thing and its vināśa. However, there is no chance for ordinary people to interpret the relation in such a way because their analysis of vināśa continues to assume that vināśa is non-existence;

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even if they try to reinterpret vināśa as being the nature of an existing thing, still, because of their focus on the incompatibility of non-existence (abhāva) with existence (bhāva), they designate vināśa as something that develops at a later time, rather than as something that is always present.

This interpretation of Dharmottara is apparently based on Dharmakīrti’s assertion in Pramāṇavārttika 3.106, where Dharmakīrti equates nature with capacity.

Although a capacity is the nature of a thing, it is not seen because of the interval [of time] with reference to [its] effect. Therefore, an error [occurs]. That is because [the person] who ascertains [this capacity] is not [cognitively] sharp.24

It is, therefore, concluded that the relation between an existing thing and its nature of having perishing as a property can be taken to be the same as the relation between capacity and capacity-possessor.

What is crucial in Dharmottara’s interpretation is that he deals with the problem of the connection between vināśa and a thing that has already perished. In other words, his focus is the linguistic issue of the identity relation between an existing thing and its vināśa. It is obvious that he is quite aware of the fact that whenever an ordinary person gives an account

24 PV 3.106: bhāvasvabhāvabhūtāyām api śaktau phale ’dṛśah | anānantaryato moho viniścetur apāṭavāt || For a Japanese translation, see Tosaki 1979: 182. This verse is also discussed in Kellner 2004: 31–32 (with fn. 44). Also cf. PVSV 21,11–13: kāryotpādanaśakteḥ kāraṇasvabhāvāvate ’py adṛṣṭataatkāryasya kāraṇadarśane ’py apratipannatadbhāvasya kāryadarśanat tatpratipattivat. “Just like [the following case]: Although the nature of a cause is the capacity of producing an effect, [the person] who does not [yet] see that effect cannot understand this nature of [a cause], even if [she or he actually] sees the cause; [but] through seeing the effect, [she or he] understands it (= this nature of a cause to produce an effect).” For a Japanese translation of this passage, cf. Watanabe 2003 (I): 148.

Manorathanandin’s commentary on PV 3.106 runs as follows: PVV 149, 9–11: bhāvasya bijādeḥ svabhāvabhūtāyām apy ankurādijanikāyām śaktau phale ’nkurādv anānantaryato ’dṛśa ’darśanat, viniścetuh puṃso ’pāṭavāt, moho ’śaktabhramah. tathā kṣaṇikeṣu bhāvesu sadṛśāparāparotpatter bhāva­śūnyakṣaṇādarśanāc ca sikhābhramah. “Although a capacity of producing a sprout, etc., is the nature of a thing such as a seed, etc., it is not seen, [namely, not] experienced, because of the interval [of time] with reference to [its] effect, [namely] a sprout. Therefore, an error, [namely,] the illusion that [a nature] is not able [to produce an effect, occurs]. That is because the person who ascertains [capacity] is not [cognitively] sharp. In the same way, with reference to momentary things, the illusion that [they] are lasting [occurs] because of the rise of successive [things] that [look very] similar, and because of the non-seeing of the moment in which there is no existing thing.”
of a thing’s vināśa, the relevant thing to be described by him has already perished and thus there is no referent (adhi karana) for the word “vināśa.” By introducing the worldly person’s treatment of the linguistic issue of the connection, and then Dharmakīrti’s equation of a thing’s nature with a capacity, Dharmottara shows a worldly person (and also the Naiyāyikas) a way to give up their fixed view of assuming vināśa to be non-existence.

To conclude, Dharmottara considers the ordinary person’s view to be a lesser of two evils compared to that of the Naiyāyikas, since at least the former takes vināśa to be the nature (svabhāva) of thing. This being the case, Dharmottara’s argument as a whole can be said to be an indirect and ironic criticism against the Naiyāyikas who consistently hold vināśa to be non-existence (abhāva).

6. Prajñākaragupta

Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation appears in his commentary on Dharma-kīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika 4.282. As in the case of Dharmottara, he also deals with the linguistic problem with regard to the connection (sambandha) between an existing thing that has already perished and its vināśa.

6.1. The simultaneity of an existing thing with vināśa

In the relevant passage of the Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra, Prajñākaragupta’s opponent (probably a Naiyāyika or Vaiśeṣika) insists that the temporal relation between an existing thing and its non-existence is the same as that between cause (kāraṇa) and effect (kārya). That is, in the same way that a cause, such as a seed, perishes and its effect, such as a sprout, subsequently arises, so an existing thing perishes and its non-existence subsequently arises. Prajñākaragupta denies this, insisting that the temporal relation between an existing thing and its non-existence is fundamentally different from that between cause and effect.

This is not so, because—

A cause is necessarily prior [to an effect]. That which is contemporaneous (samakālam) [with an effect] is not a cause. But vināśa does share the same time with an existing thing. Therefore, [your] reply is not correct. (PVA 3.595)

Namely, it is not tenable that an existing thing [exists] at one time and vināśa at another. If vināśa [exists] (vināśe [sati]) at exactly the same

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25 PVA 642,23–24 (PVA Ms 312a3): nanu bhavatpakṣe ’py ayam eva dosaḥ. kāryakāle hi na kāraṇam. kathaṃ tasya tatkāryam.
time at which an existing thing [exists], it is tenable to say that “[the existing thing] has perished” (vinaṣṭaḥ). However, it is not tenable [to say] that there is non-existence in non-existence, because what is dead cannot die. On the contrary, it is very tenable that there is an effect, even if [a cause] has died, because it (= the effect) is a different thing [from the cause]. Non-existence, however, [means] the absence of exactly that [existing thing] itself, for [the word abhāva] is construed as being co-referential (sāmānādhikaranya) with the expression, “nāsti tat.”

In his response, Prajñākaragupta claims that, in order to say that “the existing thing has perished” (bhāvo vinaṣṭaḥ), vināśa must exist at the

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26 PVA 642, 24–29 (PVA Ms 312a3–312a4): naitad asti, a yataḥ – kāraṇam pūrvabhaivy eva samakālam na kāraṇam | vināśaḥ samakālas tu bhāvenety asad uttaram || 595 | na hy anyadā bhāvah, anyadā vināśa ity upapattimad etat. yadaiva bhāvo vināśe vinaṣṭa iti yuktam. na tv abhāve 'bhāvo yuktah, mṛtasya maṇaṇabhāvāt. kāryaṃ tu (kāryaṇa PVA) myte 'pi yuktam eva, tasya bhāvāntaratvāt. abhāvas tu tasyaiva śūnyatā, nāsti tād iti sāmānādhikaranyena pratīteḥ.

a Yamāri comments on this as follows: Y 241b5–6: de ni ma yin te zhes bya ba'i lan gyi (gyi D : gyis P) don ni 'di yin te | rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po ni dus mi mtshungs pa dag kho na la rigs pa yin gyi | 'jig pa ni dus mtshungs pa kho nar khas blang par bya ba ste de lta ma yin na (na D : na n.e. P) mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro || zhes bya ba'o || “The meaning of [Prajñākaragupta’s] answer ‘this is not so’ (naitad asti)’ is as follows: There is validity in the point that an existing thing as cause (*kāraṇabhāva) and an existing thing as effect (*kāryabhāva) do not share the same time. But, by contrast, one should accept that vināśa inevitably shares the same time [with an existing thing], for, otherwise, it is not reasonable.”

b Y 241b6: o na ci liar dngos po zhig go zhes brjod ce na | gang gi tshe zhes bya ba'o || “Why, then, is it said that ‘the existing thing has perished (*bhāvo vinaṣṭaḥ)? If [the opponent] says so, [Prajñākaragupta] says: ‘at exactly which time’ (yadaiva).”

c I take this vināśe to be constructing a locative absolute, supplying it with sati. Moreover, I construct this locative absolute vināśe [sati] with tadā eva, which is, in term, related to the yadā eva clause. To me the Tibetan version seems to go the same direction. Cf. PVA (T)(D) 276b3: gang gi tshe dngos po yod pa de nyid kyi tshe 'jig pa yod pa de na 'jig pa dang ldan pa zhes bya ba 'thad do ||

d Y 241b7: gal te ci liar dngos po log pa la de'i 'jig pa mi 'thad pa de bzhin du sa bon log pa na myu gu skye bar yang mi gyur zhes dogs na | 'bras bu ni zhes bya ba'o || “When an existing thing has perished, its destruction is impossible. In like manner, when a seed has perished, the origination of a sprout is not possible either. If [the opponent] doubts this, [Prajñākaragupta] says: ‘On the contrary, there is an effect’ (*kāryaṃ tu).”

e Y 241b7–242a1: dngos po med pa yang 'bras bu dang 'dra ba dngos po gzh an kho na yin no zhe na | dngos po med ba ni zhes bya ba'o || “Just as an effect [is a different thing from a cause], non-existence is a different thing [from an existing thing] as well. If [the opponent says] this, [Prajñākaragupta] says: ‘Non-existence, however’ (*abhāvas tu).”
same time as an existing thing. This is because non-existence denotes the absence (śūnyatā) of exactly that very existing thing itself; thus, when an existing thing has already perished and has been absent, what does non-existence belong to? His statement “because what is dead cannot die (mrṛtasya maraṇābhāvāt)” aptly describes this notion. Here we see that Prajñākaragupta, too, like Dharmottara, explicitly deals with the linguistic problem of the connection between vināśa and an existing thing that has perished.

Moreover, he makes the important point that what the word “abhāva” (non-existence) designates is coreferential with the expression, “nāsti tat.” That is, Prajñākaragupta construes the word “abhāva” as a karma-dhāraya compound analyzed into a and bhāva, which corresponds to nāsti and tat, respectively. In this interpretation, we can see the vivid contrast between the Buddhist position and that of Hindu realists. Based on the fact that the word “abhāva” exists in expressions such as “abhāvo bhavati” (non-existence occurs or comes into existence) or “abhāvo ‘sti” (there is non-existence), realists believe that a real entity called abhāva (non-existence), that corresponds to the meaning of a word (padārtha), exists (there is non-existence). In contrast, for Buddhists, abhāva (non-existence) means nothing other than the fact or situation that it (= tat, i.e. something existent) does not exist (= nāsti).27 That is to say, in this context, with reference to the word “abhāva,” Buddhists interpret it as non-implicative negation (prasajyapratiṣedha), and the opponents take it to be implicative negation (paryudāsa), which means the word abhāva implies the existence of non-existence.

6.2. Prajñākaragupta’s explanation based on the character of direct perception

Against this explanation, the opponent criticizes the Buddhist position that what the word “abhāva” designates is co-referential with “nāsti tat.” His point is the following: If the word “abhāva” designates nothing but the situation that an existing thing does not exist, how on earth, in this case, can the co-referentiality be established in reality, since in fact there is nothing? Namely, there is no referent (adhikaraṇa) of the word “abhāva” in this case. Rather, one must understand this situation

27 Cf. fn. 5 above. Also, cf. PV 1.278cd: na bhāvo bhavatīty uktam abhāvo bhavatīty api || “Even though one states that ‘non-existence occurs,’ it is meant [by this statement] the fact that ‘an existing thing does not exist.’” For a Japanese translation, cf Ōmae 1991: 105.
as follows: An existing thing that existed once, but no longer and that is being remembered now has perished.

[Objection:] Is it not the case that in reality there is also no co-referentiality concerning it (= the word “abhāva”), for it is understood that a former visible [thing] (rūpa) that is remembered has perished.\(^{28}\)

In his rejoinder to this objection, Prajñākaragupta clarifies how the co-referentiality expressed by “nāsti tat” can be explained on the ontological level. In order to rebut this objection and hold his view of co-referentiality, Prajñākaragupta has to explain that the word “abhāva” has a referent. That is, his challenge is to elucidate how an existing thing and its non-existence can coexist temporally—the former is expressed by “tat,” the latter by “nāsti.” It is highly characteristic of his philosophical style that his interpretation justifies this temporal coexistence from an epistemological, i.e., perceptual point of view.

… Non-existence is not different from an existing thing. Therefore, there is co-referentiality. This is because the non-existence of [a thing \((x_1)\)] that comes into existence at a later time (uttarakālabhāvin) is none other than the existence of the preceding [thing \((x_1)\)] that is excluded (vyāvṛttimat) from the [posterior thing \((x_2)\)]; and, the non-perception of the posterior [thing \((x_2)\)] is the perception of the [preceding thing \((x_1)\)]; and this [non-perception of the posterior thing \((x_2)\)] is of the nature of the direct perception that grasps the present form to be grasped (vartamānarūpagrāhya). It has already been explained that if [a thing which] is merged with the posterior [thing] were grasped, it would provoke the undesirable consequence that the boundary of [its] death (marāṇāvadhī) is [also] grasped. Thus, [vināśa] of the very [thing \((x_1)\)] that is not merged with another [thing \((x_2)\)] is comprehended solely on the grounds that [the perception of the thing \((x_1)\)] occurs. Therefore, vināśa is not dependent on other [causes of destruction].\(^{29}\)

\(^{28}\) PVA 642, 31–32 (PVA Ms 312a4–5): nanv atrāpi na sāmānādhikaranyam paramārthataḥ. smaryamāṇam hi pūrvakaṃ rūpaṃ vināṣtaṃ iti pratiyātate.

\(^{29}\) PVA 643,4–8 (Ms 312a6–7): … nänyo ’bhāvo bhāvāt. tataḥ sāmānādhikaranyam. uttarakālabhāvino hi sa evābhaih, yas tadyāvṛttimatataḥ pūrvasya bhāvaih. tasya kopalabdhir uttarasāyupalabdhiiḥ (”opalabdhir uttarasyāśa emended [phii ma ... dmigs pa T]: ”opalabdhirū (pa)ttu<u>ttt?rasya“ Ms; ”copalabdhirūpa[ā]ntarasyā“ PVA). sā ca vartamānarūpagrāhyagṛhāgṛhāptāyakasvabhāvā. “uttareṇa saha sanāghatitasya grahahe maranaśvadigrhaṇaṃaprasāṅga (maranā° Ms [”chi ba’i T]: kāraṇā° PVA) iti pratipāditaṃ. atah parāsaṃghaṭitasyaiva pratītir udayamātrād eveti parānakpeṣo vināśaḥ.

\(^{a+}\)The passage “uttareṇa ... iti pratipāditaṃ” probably refers directly to PVA 3.406 (PVA 592,6) (PVA Ms 290a2): yadi kālakalāvyāpiṣṭugrahaṇam akṣataḥ | sarvakālalalālombe grahaḥ (grahaḥ Ms : graha(l) PVA) syān maraṇāvadhēḥ || 406 || “If by means of a perception an entity which pervades a
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It is on the basis of the characteristic of direct perception (pratyakṣa) to grasp only the present moment that Prajñākaragupta elucidates how an existing thing and its vināśa coexist temporally. His theory can be summarized as follows: Since direct perception grasps only the present moment, that is, it grasps only the present object at the present moment (vartamānarūpa), the present direct perception (vartamānapratyakṣa), whose object is the present thing $x_1$, cannot grasp the subsequent thing $x_2$, which comes into existence in the next moment.30 If this present direct perception grasped, all at once, not only $x_1$, but also $x_2$, we would have to perceive the boundaries (avadhi) between the two, that is, the boundaries between the destruction $x_1$, and the origination of $x_2$. But, in fact, we do not see these boundaries.31 Stated differently, the boundaries are not manifest in our cognition: what is manifest or appears is only

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30 The essential features of this theory already appeared in the first chapter of the Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra. Cf. PVA 17:12–20: yo hi yadrūpatayopalabhyate, sa tatsvabhāvah.² na cāniṣpannam upalabdhum śakyaṃ. paścād upalabhaya iti cet, tad ayuktam. yataḥ—tatsvabhāvatayā paścād upalabhum na śakye | vartamānasvarūpasya grahane ‘dhyaṇasvayttitah || 40 || na khalu vartamānarūpo-pagrahāpravṛťtam adhyakṣam pūrvāpararūpam ikṣitum kṣamate. tasmāt— na pūrvam ekatāvittir na paścād aksajanmanah | ‘jīnasvāsasvarṣaṇād adhyakṣam iti mīyate || 41 || For a German translation, see Ono 1993: 36,19–37,11. In this passage, Prajñākaragupta firmly asserts that perception can grasp only the present, and therefore it is not able to grasp either what was earlier or what will follow. The theory that direct perception can only grasp the present seems to be a concept held by all Indian philosophers at that time. Cf. Hattori 1968: 162 (6.2).

31 The same line of argument can be found in Mokṣākaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā. Cf. TBh 58,16–59,3: na hi kṣanikam pratyakṣam aksanikam ikṣitum kṣamate. anekakṣanāvāpāro hy aksanikah. sa katham ekakṣanabhāvādhyākaṇṭha grahtum śakyaḥ. na hi prāg uṛdhvam cāvasthānam adhūnā prakāśate, tasyāpy adhunātatanātāprasaṅgat. janmavināśāvadhipratibhāsasparsaṅgad iti nedaṃ pratyakṣaṃ pūrvāparakāla vāyāpam arthaṃ kiñcid api grahtum alam. “The direct perception that is momentary is not able to grasp the non-momentary. Namely, a non-momentary [thing (bhāva or artha)] functions for many moments. How can it be grasped by the cognition that operates in a single moment? That is, neither the anterior state nor the posterior state is manifest at this time, since, [if it were manifest,] it would [undesirably] follow that it (= the anterior state
the form of $x_1$ alone. Therefore, it can be said that $x_1$ does not exist in the subsequent moment. In this sense, epistemologically speaking, the vināśa or non-existence of $x_1$ is equated with the non-perception of the subsequent moment (uttarakālānupalabdhi). Thus, one can conclude that the perception of the present $x_1$ means the non-perception of $x_1$ in the subsequent moment. In short, the fact that we perceive $x_1$ in the present moment means at the same time that we do not perceive the very same $x_1$ in the next moment. That is, seeing $x_1$ in the present moment is the non-

and the posterior state, respectively) also belongs to the present time [and] that the boundary of [that thing’s] origination and the boundary of [that thing’s] vināśa are manifest. In this way, this [momentary] direct perception is not fit for grasping any object that pervades the former and the later time whatsoever.” For another English translation, see Kajiyama 1998: 131–132. At the moment, I am unable to make a definite judgment whether the direct source of this description by Mokṣākaragupta is Prajñākaragupta’s theory, but it does seem very likely.

Regarding this “boundary argument,” attention should be paid to the fact that Prajñākaragupta makes a slight modification to the Buddhist formula “bhāva eva nāśaḥ” (an existing thing itself is destruction, cf. fn. 4 above), stating the following: PVA 643,23: “bhāva evottarabhāvāsaghaṭito vināśaḥ.” “An existing thing itself that is not merged with the subsequent thing is vināśa.” We can see Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation accurately reflected in this additional adjective, uttarabhāvāsaghaṭitah. As Muromura 2011: 345 has pointed out, the formula “bhāva eva (vi)nāśaḥ” appears three times in Dharmakīrti’s works. Cf. PVSV 100,3–4: bhāva eva hi nāśaḥ (cited in fn. 4 above); PVSV 145,5–6: bhāva eva tu kṣaṇasthitidharmā vināśaḥ (cited in fn. 15 and 16 above); PVin 2 82,6: bhāva eva vināśaḥ (cited in fn. 16 above). In my view, Prajñākaragupta, fully aware of these statements of Dharmakīrti, is reformulating this phrase from his unique point of view. However, historically speaking, it seems that this formula is not ascribed to Dharmakīrti himself, since the phrase already appears in the objection of the three early Nyāya philosophers Adhyāyan, Avidddkaraṇa and Uddyotakara. Cf. fn. 14 above. This fact suggests that Buddhist opponent(s) of these three early Naiyāyikas had already used the phrase bhāva eva nāśaḥ before the phrase was used by Dharmakīrti.

In PVA 569, 21–22, Prajñākaragupta regards vināśa as the non-perception of the subsequent time: tasmād vidyudo ’py uttarakālānupalambha eva vināśaḥ. sa ca sarvapadaṭhānām iti na nityatā grahitum śākyā. “Therefore, even for a thunderbolt [whose vināśa (destruction or perishing) is considered by the opponent to be brought about by obstruction (or covering) by a cloud)], vināśa is just the non-perception of the subsequent time. And this [vināśa] is applied to each real entity. Therefore, it is impossible to grasp permanence [by means of direct perception].”

Cf. PVA 569,23: meghāvaṣṭambhād eva vināśa iti cet.

Muroya (2011: 349–350) introduces an explanation of Bhāsarvajña’s anonymous Buddhist opponent who tries to declare that the Buddhist position does not contain a contradiction between a thing and its vināśa: NBhūṣ 527,27–528,1: atha nāśya svabhāvena virodhaḥ. kim tathā. svahetor evyām ekakṣaṇasthāyī jātaḥ. kṣaṇāntare nopalabhyate. tathā cāha — "bhāva eva kṣaṇasthitidharmā nāśa" iti. “But, there is no incompatibility of this [existing thing] with [its] nature
On the problem of identity between \( \text{vināśa} \) and \( \text{bhāva} \)

seeing of \( x_1 \) in the subsequent moment, which implies the non-seeing of \( x_2 \) now. When we see \( x_1 \) at the present moment, we see at the same time the non-existence of \( x_1 \) at the next moment. In this case, it is safe to say that the existence of \( x_1 \) and non-existence of \( x_1 \) coexist at the moment \( x_1 \) is perceived. In this way, Prajñākaragupta explains the co-referentiality, namely, the relation between an existing thing and its non-existence from an epistemological point of view.

It should be additionally noted that, in this theory, it is not important whether a thing in the present moment and a thing in the subsequent moment belong to the same continuum (\( \text{santāna} \)). Even if one accepts a continuum, it will not be an issue. One can reason as follows: The present direct perception that grasps the pot at the present moment (pot\(_1\)) cannot grasp the pot in the next moment (pot\(_2\)). What happens is merely that, immediately after pot\(_1\) is perceived, pot\(_2\) is perceived. Thus, from the present perception of pot\(_1\), it can be concluded that pot\(_1\) no longer exists in the subsequent moment. What is grasped in the subsequent moment is pot\(_2\), not pot\(_1\).

6.3. Prajñākaragupta’s explanation of the causelessness of destruction

The \( \text{vināśa} \) of \( x_1 \) is understood solely on the basis of the present perception of \( x_1 \). Prajñākaragupta associates this notion with the causelessness of
Namely, according to him, it is not that case that the vināśa of $x_1$ depends on external cases of destruction, because the vināśa of $x_1$ can be understood solely on the basis of the present perception of $x_1$. Simply by seeing $x_1$ at the present moment, we know that $x_1$ does not exist in the next moment. In this case, there is no need for $x_1$ to have causes of destruction. To the best of my knowledge, no other Buddhist philosopher explains the traditional Buddhist theory of the causelessness of destruction in this manner. This is a very striking as well as curious explanation.

7. Conclusion

As has been observed above, Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta explain the temporal coexistence of an existing thing with its vināśa or non-existence. They deal with the connection between them and share the same view that vināśa must exist simultaneously with an existing thing. Otherwise, the connection between a thing and its vināśa, which is expressed in expressions such as “the pot has perished,” would not be possible. But how is this seemingly contradictory fact explained? They give different explanations.

In Dharmottara’s interpretation, vināśa is regarded as the capacity to perish. Thus, it is safe to say that an existing thing always has vināśa built in, because there is no incompatibility between capacity, i.e., vināśa, and capacity-possessor, i.e., an existing thing. Since this is so, we can explain the fact that a pot can be destroyed at any time by hitting it with a hammer. If we interpret vināśa in this way, the Buddhist theory of momentariness becomes easy to comprehend, although in reality we ordinary people cannot intuitively know or perceive the fact that a pot is perishing at every moment, due to our perception’s lack of sharpness. What we are left to comprehend from our actual daily experience of seeing the state of non-existence of a pot on the table is that it had always had a capacity to perish built in when it existed.

On the other hand, Prajñākaragupta takes an epistemological approach to the problem. Seeing $x_1$ in the present moment means the non-seeing of $x_1$ in the next moment. Therefore, non-existence of $x_1$ exists simultaneously with existence of $x_1$ at the present moment. In this novel

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35 See the passage PVA 643.7–8: atah parāsaṅghaṭitasyaiva pratītir udayamātrād eveti parānapākṣo vināśah cited in fn. 29 above. For Dharmakīrti’s concept of the causelessness of destruction (vināśasya ahetutva) as well as that of the independence of destruction (vināśasya nirapekṣatva), cf. Sakai 2012.
interpretation, the problem of the Buddhist position, which is pointed out by Vyomaśiva and other early Nyāya philosophers, no longer seems to be a subject of controversy, since the problem of the temporal coexistence of vināśa with existence or an existing thing is resolved not by an ontological argument, but by an epistemological one. In other words, he views the problem from a different angle. It is, however, not so hard to detect that Prajñākaragupta’s interpretation, in order to work, requires some fundamental presuppositions. Namely, that direct perception functions momentarily, and that what truly exists is only that which is grasped by present, momentary perception, in other words, that which is now manifest or appearing in a momentary present cognition. An investigation of the validity of these presuppositions, and also opponents’ reaction against these presuppositions, should be left for a future philosophical research.

To conclude, I would argue that Dharmottara’s and Prajñākaragupta’s views are not incompatible: they merely approach the same historical problem concerning the Buddhist theory of momentariness from different angles or perspectives, reflecting their individual styles of thinking. Whether their respectively ontological and epistemological styles, apparently on display in this discussion, would be consistently reflected also in connection with other issues is a question ripe for further exploration.

References


KBhS *Ksanabhāṅgasiddhi* (Dharmottara), ed. E. Frauwallner, see Frauwallner 1935.


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P  

PV 1  
The first chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika (svārthānumāna)*, see PVSV.

PV 3  
The third chapter of the *Pramāṇavārttika (pratyakṣa)*, see Tosaki 1979.

PV 4  

PVA  

PVA Ms  

PVAo  

PVA (T)  
*Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (Tibetan)*: P 5719, D4221.

PVin 2  

PVinṬ 2†  
*Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara)*, ed. H. Ishida, see Ishida 2011.

PVinṬ Ms  
Sanskrit Manuscript of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara)*, see PVin 2: Intro. xxx–xxxi.

PVinṬ (T)  
*Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (Dharmottara) (Tibetan)*: P5727, D4227.

PVSV  

PVSVṬ  

PVSVṬ Ms  
PVT Ms

PVV

Sakai 2011

Sakai 2012

Steinkellner 1979

Steinkellner 2013

Stern 2007

TBh

TBV

Thakur 1953
On the problem of identity between vināśa and bhāva


Y  Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāraṭīkā Supariśuddhī: P5723, D4226.
Materials for the study of the 
*Pudgalavāda* and its criticism: 
Critical edition and English translation of the 
*Vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā*

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Ξένος—λέγω δή το καὶ ὀποιανοῦν τινα κεκτημένον δύναμιν εἶτʼ εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἔτερον ὁμοιόν πεφυκός εἰτʼ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ ομικρότατον ὑπὸ τοῦ φαινολόγου, κἂν εἰ μόνον εἰς ἀπαξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι: τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον δρόειν τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις. 

— Plato, *Sophist*, 247d–e

Stranger—I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else but power.¹

¹ The text edited here was read and discussed at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” during the first term of the academic year 2018–2019 with advanced students of Sanskrit. Some passages of this work were also read in a seminar at the University of Bologna (‘Lettura e commento della *Vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā*', 11–12 December 2018) and at the University of Manipal (Centre for Religious Studies / Manipal Centre for Humanities: *Three Day Buddhist Pramāṇa Workshop*, 10–12 February 2019). I would like to thank Saverio Marchignoli and Mrinal Kaul for having kindly offered me that opportunity and for the very nice and fruitful discussions that characterized the seminars they organized. I wish to thank Vincent Eltschinger and Harunaga Isaacson for their suggestions and comments, and Kristen de Joseph, who kindly revised the English of the second section of the introduction and of the notes to the Sanskrit text and English translation. Further acknowledgments are due to Florinda De Simini, Gianni Pellegrini, and Margherita Serena Saccone, who read this paper and provided me with useful suggestions. Giovanni Vitiello kindly helped me in reading the Chinese sentences quoted in this paper. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek gently revised the English of the entire paper.

The following pages are dedicated to the memory of Helmut Krasser, a person I had the privilege to know and who impressed me for his humanity and knowledge. The topic discussed here concerns a field of study in which he was a master. I love to think that he would have accepted this contribution with the same smile, welcoming and frank, with which I remember him on various occasions.

Introductory remarks

1. In the *Tattvasaṅgraha*, in connection with the various topics dealt with in the text, Śāntarakṣita (ca. 725–788) is used to summarizing, paraphrasing or even quoting stanzas that are drawn from the works of the authors as well as the traditions that he intends to criticize. This leads us to think that he might have acted in the same way also in the *Vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā* (or simply *Vātsīputriyātmaparīkṣā*), corresponding to the sixth and last section of the *Ātmaparīkṣā* (= *Tattvasaṅgraha* chapter 7.6 = stt. 336–349), which focusses on the refutation of the personalists’ point of view (*pudgalavāda*). Unfortunately, the stanzas contained in this section of the work do not find strict parallels in the *pudgalavāda* sources that are presently accessible to us, even in quotation or translation (both Tibetan and Chinese). Therefore we cannot verify whether the verses expressing the *pudgalavādin*s’ point of view preserve their original wording or have been reformulated or modified by Śāntarakṣita.

The only stanza that could have been actually cited *verbatim* from a *pudgalavāda* text—and which could be labelled as *citatum ex alio usus secundarii* (Ce’) in Ernst Steinkellner’s terminology⁴—is No. 337. In this we can add another line extracted from stanza 338. I assume that the latter verse is arranged in such a way that the personalists’ words (in bold type) are intertwined with those of Śāntarakṣita:

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³ On the *pudgalavāda* sources available to us, see Thiên Châu 1984: 7–8, and Priestley 1999: 43–52.

Most likely Śāntarakṣita’s intent was to highlight the contradiction of the opponents’ thesis immediately, and not without some subtle sarcasm, by using their own words, as is evidenced by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795) in the *avataraṇikā*:

> te vācyāḥ ityādinā vastusan pudgalo na bhavatīty avācyatvād iti svavacanād eva bhavadbhīḥ pratipāditam iti darśayati.  

With the words: ‘To them we should say’, etc. [Śāntarakṣita] shows the following: ‘It is precisely by means of your own words, i.e. “since it is inexpressible”, that you establish that a really existent *pudgala* does not exist.’

If my assumption is right, the three lines that contain the *pūrvapakṣa* of the *pudgalavādins* would run as follows:

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skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthyadr̥ṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ | 
nānanyo 'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā || 
[ = Tattvasaṅgraha 337 ]
tattvānyatvādyavācyatvāt pudgalaḥ pāramārthikaḥ | 
[ ≈ Tattvasaṅgraha 338 ]
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The *pudgala* is neither different from the aggregates, because there would be the undesired consequence [that one would fall into] the [false] view of the non-Buddhists, nor is non-different [from the aggregates,] because [its] manifoldness would follow, etc. Therefore, the best is [to admit its] inexpressibility. Since it is inexpressible on the basis of identity, difference, etc. [with respect to the aggregates], the *pudgala* is absolutely real.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla are engaged in a double confrontation: on the one hand they must try to invalidate this thesis through exquisitely logical arguments, on the other hand they must offer an alternative and ‘orthodox’ explanation of the scriptural passages that are quoted by the adversaries in support of their own statement. It is worth noting that in

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5 For the critical apparatus, see below, fns. 55–57.

6 As Vincent Eltschinger pointed out (2014: 472, n. 53), these words were kept present (and reformulated) also by Prajñākaramati in his *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (*ad* st. 9.73cd): pudgalavādibhis tattvānyatvapratīṣedhapākṣābhāypuṣṭaḥ svayam eva vastuṣṭvam pratiṣiddham | (ed. p. 474).

7 As is clear from the commentary on st. 337cd and from stt. 346–347, the word ‘etc.’ refers to permanence and impermanence.
order to prove the existence of the *pudgala*, in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* and in its *Pañjikā*, the personalists are presented as offering only the argument that is put forward in the aforementioned verses, but as resorting to four scriptural passages\(^8\) that would prove that the *pudgalavāda* was an integral part of the original teaching of the Buddha and therefore perfectly acceptable by Buddhist orthodoxy. This does not prove that philosophical arguments and logical demonstrations had not been elaborated in the *pudgalavāda* environment, but, no doubt, the fact that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, like their predecessors, have not staged an elaborated debate on this regard suggests that these were not very sophisticated.

The first part of the *Vātsīputriyātmaparīkṣā* consists of the *reductio ad absurdum* of what is introduced as the *pudgalavāda* tenet, namely that the *pudgala* is at the same time really existent (*vastusan*) and inexpressible (*avācya*) as either identical with or different from the aggregates. A short comment is needed.

Let us start by saying that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who follows him, put this in logical terms, advancing the inexpressibility as the logical reason (*hetu*) of the absolute non-existence of the *pudgala*. The *pudgalavādins* would have stated the opposite: the above-mentioned inexpressibility is for them the logical reason of the *pudgala*’s *pāramārthika* nature. It is however noteworthy that such a precise and formalized statement, which involves a thesis and its logical reason, is not made in the *pudgalavāda* sources that are presently accessible to us. We can only deduce this from the three lines quoted above. As regards the term *pāramārthika*, assuming that it was actually employed by the personalists to define the *pudgala*,\(^9\) it is very likely that it was used by them according to the most common and widely attested meaning in Buddhist texts, i.e. in order to attribute to the *pudgala* the ontological status of something belonging to the absolute truth, or at least to define something ontologically different from all the other things. From the words of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla it seems instead that this word was used by the personalists to indicate the substantial nature of the *pudgala*, its ultimately real essence. Like other Buddhist authors—in particular Maitreya (4th cent.) and Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430)\(^10\)—Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla believe that the *pudgala* has a purely nominal existence, namely, that it is *prajñaptisan* (‘conceptually existent’, ‘real [only] as/
through designation’),\textsuperscript{11} and attribute to the *pudgalavādīns* the definition of the *pudgala* as a substantial, real entity (*vastusat* or *dravyasat*). To the best of my present knowledge, we do not find any trace of such an explicit statement in the *pudgalavāda* sources accessible to us, and therefore we cannot exclude that the identification, *sic et simpliciter*, of the *pudgala* with a real entity, capable as such to produce effects also on the level of the conventional truth, is—in the ‘orthodox’ doxography—the result of a simplification or distortion of their tenets. Rather, it seems that even the personalists have described the *pudgala* as *prajñaptisan*, at least initially,\textsuperscript{12} and that—as Leonard Priestley points out—they have gradually reinterpreted their doctrine on the *pudgala* in a substantialist key only later, probably under the influence of their opponents’ criticism.\textsuperscript{13} What we certainly find in *pudgalavāda* sources is the claim that the *pudgala* is inexpressible. It can be read in the *Sanfadu lun* (三法度論\textsuperscript{14}), in a passage of the *Sanmiddi bu lun* (三彌底部論, *Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra*\textsuperscript{15})

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
  \item See *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* 18.92 (the words within square brackets in the translation make Vasubandhu’s interpretation explicit): \texttt{prajñaptyastitayā vācyah pudgalo dravyato na tu | nopalambhād viparyāsāt saṃkleśāt kliṣṭahetutaḥ} || ‘The *pudgala* is expressible as a [purely] conceptual entity but not as a substance, because there is no perception [of it as a substance, i.e. *rūpa* and so on], because [to consider it as a substance] is an erroneous conception [as when one sees the Self in what is not the Self], because [when there is this erroneous conception] the impurity [of conceiving I and mine] occurs, [and] because [the latter] is the cause of [attachment, etc.], which are impure’. See also *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* chapter 9, ed. Lee and Ejima, pp. 4–5, 14.
  \item See, for instance, the following passage from the *Sanmiddi bu lun* (*Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra*): \texttt{如佛為外道說。雖有我是假名我非實說我依有漏陰。佛見去來法說是我非實我。} T. 1649, xxixi, 464b 6–8, ‘As the Buddha said to the *tīrthikas*, “although the self exists, it is conceptual; the self is not substantial. The self is spoken of on the basis of the existing impure aggregates”’. With regard to the dharmas that go and come, the Buddha spoke of the self, but it is not a substantial self’ (trans. Priestley 1999: 85; cf. also Venkataramanan 1953: 174). See also Thiên Châu 1984: 10; 1987: 42–43.
  \item See Priestley 1999: 87, 94, 100–101, 117; no date: 6–7.
  \item The title of this text has been retranslated into Sanskrit as *Tridharmakaseśastra* (Thiên Châu 1999), *Tridharmakhandaka* (Priestley 1999), and *Tridharmikakhanda* (see \url{http://www.buddhism-dict.net/cgi-bin/xpr-ddb.pl?q=三法度論}, last accessed 8 November 2020).
  \item 问:云何不可说? 答:不可说者,受,过去,灭施设. T. 1506, xxv, 24a\textsubscript{29}p, ‘What is the inexpressible? The inexpressible is conceived (or designated) according to appropriation, past and cessation’ (trans. Priestley 1999: 56). See also Thiên Châu 1999: 68.
  \item The spelling *sāṃmitīya* is apparently attested only in the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, where it occurs three times (*ad* 7.4 [*avatāraṇikā*], 9.1, 15.11). I have adopted the reading *saṃmatīya*, since together with *saṃmatīya* it is better attested
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
where, among the various positions about the nature of the Self that are considered erroneous or only partially acceptable, it is presented a point of view that recalls what we read in stanza 337 of the Vātsīputriyātmapiṣṭikā, and, finally, in one verse of the first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā of the sammitīya Saṅghatrāta. After the list of the rūpiṇo dharmāḥ and the arūpiṇo dharmāḥ, in the latter text we read the words pudgalo ’vācyah sarvam evānyad anyathā (corr.; evāvadanyatatā MS): ‘The pudgala is inexpressible. Any other entity exists in a different way [that is to say, is expressible]’. The last pāda is uncertain, and there is no guarantee that the correction I propose is the right one, but the statement about the inexpressibility of the pudgala is very clear.\(^{18}\)

No doubt describing the relationship between the pudgala and the phenomenal world (as well as nirvāṇa) must have been a difficult task for the personalists. From their sources available in Chinese translation and from the accounts of their critics, it seems that, despite its absolute nature, the pudgala was deemed to be tied to the ‘phenomenal’ reality of the aggregates, although their relationship cannot be determined in clear terms. And it is precisely this indeterminacy in the nature of the pudgala that according to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla represents the weak point of the pudgalavādin’s position and which is the main target of their criticism. In their words we find numerous echoes of earlier authors, in particular of Maitreya (or Asaṅga ?) in his Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra,\(^{19}\) at the beginning of the section dedicated to the demonstration of the insubstantiality of the pudgala (pudgalanairātmyasādhana), namely in stanzas 18.92–103, and

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17 又諸部說。不可言有我。不可言無我。何以故。答我相不可言故。[…] 復次何以故有我無我不可說。答定異合故。若有我便應可說。為是行為異行。為是無為異無為。此二種說既不定。是故不可言有我。不可言無我。T. 1649, xxxii, 462c, 18, ‘Again there are all those schools who hold that we can neither say that the self exists nor that the self does not exist. But why? Because the nature of the self is unspeakable. […] And for what further reason is the self unspeakable either as existent or as nonexistent? Because the relation (between the self and its constituents is not) definite. If the self were existent it should have been possible to say whether it is identical with the skandhas or it is different from them, whether it is the same as the composite or different from it. These two descriptions are just un-settled. They hold that the self cannot be called either existent or nonexistent’ (trans. Venkataramanan 1953: 168; see also pp. 173–176, 178).

18 The first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccayakārikā is edited and translated in Sferra 2020. I refer to that paper for a short introduction to this text, a description of the codex unicus that keeps it, and in particular to pp. 670–671, and 675 for further information on this verse.

19 On the disputed authorship of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, see Delhey 2019: 74–75.
of Vasubandhu in the Ātmavāḍapratiṣedha, i.e. the ninth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Despite the differences, Maitreya’s passage with its commentary by Vasubandhu and the Ātmavāḍapratiṣedha may have represented a model for Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, at least as regards the general framework of the criticism and the use of some arguments. The technical terminology used by them shows an evident debt towards the categories that were developed in the Buddhist tradition of logic and

20 The opening stanza of the Pudgalanairātmyasādhana section of the Mahāyāna-sūtrālāṃkāra formulates the pratijñā and states—likely in contrast to the pudgalavādin’s thesis—that the pudgala is describable as a prajñāpti and not as a substance (dravya) (see above, fn. 11). Stanza 93 contains the premises of the pūrvapakṣa attributable to the pudgalavādins (see Vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā, st. 377), though Vasubandhu’s comment does not clearly say so, or at least recognizes the value their tenet. Starting from stanza 94 the refutation of the pudgala’s inexpressibility and substantiality begins, first, as is typical, with arguments based on reasoning (yukti) (stt. 95–100), then with a reference to Scripture (āgama) (stt. 101–103). The critique of the inexpressibility of the pudgala is mainly dealt with in stanzas 95–97ab, while the critique of the conception of the pudgala as a substance, which involves also the discussion of the logical impossibility of its being a permanent causal condition, is found in stanzas 97cd–100. The Pudgalanairātmyasādhana with its commentary by Vasubandhu has been studied and translated into English by Vincent Eltschinger in an article published in 2010 to which I refer the reader for further information. The Ātmavāḍapratiṣedha also begins with the declaration that the conception of a self (ātmaprajñāpti) refers only to a continuum of aggregates. Direct perception and inference are unable to establish the existence of the self (p. 4). The Vātsīputrīyas instead believe that the pudgala exists (vātsīputrīyāḥ pudgalaṃ santam icchanti, p. 5). The view accepted by Vasubandhu, and considered by him to be orthodox, is that the pudgala is simply a prajñāptisat (p. 14 [tasmāt prajñāptisat pudgalo rāśidhārādivat]; cf. also p. 5). In this regard it is worth noting that he presents the point of view of the Vātsīputrīyas in a different way from what we read in the works of Maitreya, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, since, while pointing out that it is an obscure statement (andhavacana), he specifies that the Vātsīputrīyas do not believe that the pudgala exists as a dravya nor that it exists as a prajñāpti (naiva hi sa dravyato ’sti nāpi prajñāptitah). The pudgala, according to them, is conceived with reference to the aggregates (skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñāpayate) (p. 5). The rest of the text presents an articulated demonstration of the logical inconsistency of this statement, taking into consideration some of its reformulations, corollaries, extensions and defenses, citing numerous scriptural and non-scriptural sources, and criticizing, step by step, the personalists’ interpretation of the scriptural passages they cite to confirm their own thesis. We note en passant that all the passages cited in the Vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā are found in the Ātmavāḍapratiṣedha, with the sole exception of the words nirātmānah sarve dharmāḥ (see below, note δ), the concept of which is however expressed in Vasubandhu’s work through two other scriptural quotations (rūpam anātmaḥ yāvad vijñānam anātmeti, p. 9; sarvadharmā anātmāna iti, p. 13). For a study on the Ātmavāḍapratiṣedha, which includes also an English translation of the text, see Duerlinger 2003.
epistemology (pramāṇa) and in particular in the work of Dharmakīrti (ca. 570–640). A detailed analysis of the differences between the critique of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and that of the other previous and following Buddhist masters who addressed the same issue goes far beyond the limits of this study. Suffice here to note that unlike their predecessors, they make explicit use of the ‘pervasion’ (vyāpti): a logical category that developed gradually and that was apparently formalized first by Dignāga (ca. 430–500)—any real entity (vastu, dravya) must be expressed in terms of identity with (tattva) or difference from (anyatva) other real entities, since at the level of the conventional truth (saṃvr̥ti) expressibility (vācyatva) ‘pervades’ the fact of existing as a real entity (vastutva): in the absence of expressibility one cannot speak of real existence. In other words, if the pudgala is inexpressible, it is necessarily unreal and its relationship with the aggregates that are expressible and real cannot be established in any way; on the other hand, if it is a real entity it must be expressible either as identical with or different from them: tertium non datur (stt. 339–345).

Stanzas 346–347 extend the application of vyāpti to another aspect—momentariness (ksanikatva) pervades vastutva and therefore a real entity cannot but be momentary. If we maintain that the pudgala is inexpressible as a momentary reality, we must admit that it cannot be a real entity and, as such, that it lacks causal efficiency (arthakriyā), the latter being a specific property of real entities.

At this point Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla present the only attempt of the pudgalavādin to defend the substantialist definition of the pudgala on a purely argumentative basis: the latter try to maintain the pudgala’s ability to produce effects by resorting once again to the logical reason of inexpressibility. They admit that the ability to produce effects is certainly impossible for an eternal entity; the point is—so they state—that the pudgala cannot be expressed as either permanent/eternal (nitya/akṣaṇika) or impermanent/momentary (anitya/ksaṇika).24 A reference to the pudgala as being neither nitya nor anitya is actually found in a very short but illuminating citation from a Prakrit recension of the Bhārahārasūtra that we find in two passages of the Vimalaprabhā by Puṇḍarīka (beginning 11th cent.) and in the Tattvaratnāvalī by Advayavajra (11th cent.), and

21 For the dates of Dharmakīrti, see Deleanu 2019: 24–39.
22 For an investigation of Dharmakīrti’s critique of the pudgalavāda, see Eltschinger/Ratié 2010, and Eltschinger/Ratié 2013, in particular 64–116.
23 See Katsura 1986: 63. For the dates of Dignāga, see Deleanu 2019: 12–19.
24 See the commentary ad st. 347.
might trace back to a *pudgalavāda* version of the canon.25 It is relevant to observe that this reference is absent both in the Pāli *Bhārasutta* and in the Sanskrit recension of this *sūtra*, which is quoted by Uddyoṭatakara and by Yaśomitra (ca. 6th cent.)26:  
\[\text{atthi puggalo bhāravāho, na niccam bhaṇāmi nāniccam bhaṇāmīti }, \text{‘There is the pudgala, the “burden-bearer”. I do not call [it] permanent, I do not call [it] impermanent’.}\]27

This, however—Kamalaśīla points out—contrasts with a fundamental principle of the two-valued logic: being permanent and being impermanent are properties in contrast with each other, they cannot belong to the same entity.

Making use of the same arguments and sometimes with further elaborations, Kamalaśīla briefly deals with the criticism of the *pudgala* also in other works, in particular in some pages of his *Vajracchedikāṭīkā*. Some relevant passages are quoted below in the Appendix 2.

The first part of the *Vātsīputriyatmaparīkṣā* ends with a subtle mockery of the *pudgalavādins’* claim. In the commentary on st. 347 Kamalaśīla grants the expressibility of the *pudgala*’s inexpressibility, because there is no limit to the freedom of expression: the fact remains that an inexpressible entity cannot play a role on the level of conventional truth. At this point there is nothing left for the *pudgalavādins* other than resorting to scriptural passages.

The second part of the text (stt. 348–349) is devoted to what is probably the main concern of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, as the position of this *parīkṣā* in the *Tattvasaṅgraha* suggests—the *pudgalavāda* is presented in this text as the last bastion of the *ātmavāda*, an *ātmavāda* in Buddhist dress (the personalists are assimilated to the non-Buddhists [tīrthya / tīrthika] since the beginning of the chapter). It goes without saying that the stumbling block is not so much in the doctrine itself of a permanent agent (*kartr̥*) and experiencer (*bhoktr̥*) of actions, which was already widely criticized in the previous sections of the *Ātmaparīkṣā*, but in the fact that this specific variant of the *ātmavāda* is based on Buddhist scriptural passages. Given the importance (and sometimes even the pre-

25 It is probable that Advayavajra (a.k.a. Maitrīpāda, Maitreyanātha, etc.) was familiar with the *pudgalavāda* scriptural sources. According to the ‘Siddha-Biography’ codex (= Kathmandu, Kaiser Library MS No. 142), he was ordained as a Sammatiya monk: ‘[…] tato vikramapuraṃ gatvā sammatiyānīkāye maitrī- 

26 See below, note v. For an in-depth study of the Sanskrit version of the *Bhārahārasūtra*, see Eltschinger 2014.

27 The three passages in which this quotation appears are given in the Appendix 1 below.
eminence) of Scripture (āgama), it is essential for the two masters—as well as it was for their predecessors—to offer an ‘orthodox’ explanation of the scriptural passages used by the adversaries and to show how those passages, once correctly interpreted, find an absolutely coherent justification in their own vision.

Like Maitreya and Vasubandhu, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also believe that the Buddha used the word pudgala only to refer to a conceptually existent being (prajñaptisat) in order to emphasize that there is a continuum underlying the series of actions, without referring to a real being (vastusat). This expedient would also have served to counteract a nihilistic interpretation of his own teaching. In this regard Kamalaśīla employs a metaphorical image that we also find in earlier Buddhist sources, both in Pāli and in Sanskrit, namely, the image of the mountain range of the wrong views about the real existence of a Self, satkāyadr̥ṣṭi—the first of the ten samyojanas or ‘bindings’—which consists of twenty peaks, that is to say, twenty propositions, in turn divisible into four groups of five items each: 1) the Self is identical with the aggregates; 2) the Self is in the aggregates; 3) the Self possesses the aggregates; 4) the aggregates are in the Self. These twenty propositions can be divided into two groups: the first five propositions would represent five nihilistic views, since in them the Self is identified with each of the five aggregates, which are subject to destruction; the remaining fifteen propositions, instead, are considered to be eternalistic views, since they are based on the presupposition that the Self is different from the aggregates. According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, the target of the Buddha’s specific negation of the Self would have been the refutation of nihilism (the first group), without the implication of any statement in support of any eternalistic view-point.

2. The Vātsīputrīyaparikalpitātmaparīkṣā and its pañjikā have been edited two times, first by Embar Krishnamacharya (1926) and then by Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī (1968). The latter edition was reprinted in 1988 and with a different layout in 1997 and 2006, with some corrections but also the introduction of several typos. The first editor had access only to two codices, kept in Pāṭan at the Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira,

28 See, for instance, Samyutta Nikāya 22 (Khandhasamyutta), and the Abhidharmasamuccaya by Asaṅga, ed. Pradhan p. 8. See also Mahāvyutpatti 4671–4691. Cf. also Paṭisambhidāmagga, Diṭṭhikathā, ed. pp. 149–151.

29 On this list, see also Venkataramanan 1953: 167; Wayman 1984; Thiên Châu 1999: 141–142.
that is, MS 6679 for the *mūla* text and MS 6680 for the *pañjikā* (henceforth Pk and Pp), while the second also claims to have had access to the two earliest manuscripts of the work that are currently available to us, that is, MS 377 and MS 378, kept at the Śrī Jinabhadrāsūri Tādapatriya Granthabhaṇḍāra in Jaisalmer, which respectively contain the *mūla* text and its *pañjikā* (henceforth Jk and Jp). Neither of the two editors provided the readers with a full critical apparatus. Occasionally, Krishnamacharya proposes some corrections to the transmitted text, printing them within parentheses, while Śāstrī records his variants in the notes, including some supported by the Tibetan translation (no details on the Tibetan edition used are included in the introduction). A closer examination of Śāstrī’s work reveals that he checked Jk and Jp only sporadically, and that in the case of Pk and Pp, he simply relied on Krishnamacharya’s edition.\(^{30}\)

For the present edition, it was possible to make use of digital colour images of both Jk and Jp, and Pp and Pk. I very gratefully received images of the first two manuscripts from Hiroko Matsuoka through the good offices of Margherita Serena Saccone, and images of the second two manuscripts from Paolo Giunta.

A rigid application of the *eliminatio codicum descriptorum* would have necessitated not registering the variants of Pk and Pp, since it is certain that these manuscripts are the copies of Jk and Jp, respectively.\(^{31}\) This basic principle of textual criticism presupposes that a copyist is only able to introduce new errors or changes. However, I have preferred to record the variant of Pk and Pp for three reasons:

1) Pk and Pp often report in a clearer way what can be read in Jk and Jp. This is particularly evident in the case of the right side of Jp fol. 63v, which has been rubbed out and then rewritten with a yellowish ink, resulting in a text that is not clearly readable.

2) In at least one case in this section, it is clear that the copyist of Pp diverged slightly from the exemplar, producing a more correct text, a text which I assume is even closer to the author’s original formulation and that therefore I believe it is right to give due value.\(^{32}\) This should not surprise us, because it is known that philosophical texts in Sanskrit were not copied by devotees to increase merit, but often by

\(^{30}\) See also Saccone 2018: 141.

\(^{31}\) See Giunta 2018.

\(^{32}\) Cf. below, fn. 74. Several further instances, usually of minor corrections implemented by the copyist of Pp, can be seen in the apparatus of the recently published new edition of the *Bahirarthaparīkṣā* by M.S. Saccone (2018).
scholars who were interested in the texts they were copying and who, on occasion, emended and annotated them.\textsuperscript{33}

3) The examination of the variants of Pk and Pp can give an idea of the type of errors that are more frequent in Jainanāgarī script.

However, in order not to burden the apparatus, the \textit{ante correctionem} and \textit{post correctionem} variants of Pk and Pp have not been recorded when only Pk and Pp are involved, nor have divergences from the previous editions (K and Ś), which are pointed out only in particular cases—namely, when I accept their emendations/conjectures and when their reading is different from the accepted one.

For a thorough description of the four manuscripts used, the reader is referred to the pages written by P. Giunta in the introduction to the new edition of the \textit{Bahirarthaparīkṣā} by M. S. Saccone.\textsuperscript{34}

As regards the policy adopted in this edition, it suffices here to say that \textit{avagrahās} have been silently introduced when necessary, and that in general the orthography has been standardized. In particular, in words like \textit{satva} and \textit{tatva}, the cluster \textit{tva} has been normalized to \textit{ttva},

\begin{itemize}
\item A famous example of ‘scholar-copyist’ is Vibhūticandra, whose glosses on Manorathanandin’s \textit{Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti} 2.190–216 have recently been studied by Cristina Pecchia (see Pecchia 2015, in particular pp. 50–52 for references to other studies on annotations). Another example of a ‘scholar-copyist’ can be seen in the transmission of the \textit{Yuktīdīpikā}. Among the manuscripts used by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi for their critical edition of the text (1998), there is a paper Devanāgarī manuscript kept in the National Archives of New Delhi, which they label with the siglum \textit{D} and which is certainly ‘a very modern transcript of \textit{K}’, a Śāradā manuscript deposited at the University of Kashmir in Śrīnagar. As Wezler and Motegi point out, the manuscript preserved in New Delhi “is particularly noteworthy in that, on the margin, it quite often gives the readings of a \textit{kha-pustaka}, called \textit{Dkha} by us—which is often in agreement with \textit{A}—, and at least twice also of a \textit{ga-pustaka}, showing that the copyist had access to two more MSS and was scholar enough to note down the variants he found in them. […] The identity of both \textit{kha-} and \textit{ga-pustaka}, however, remains an open question” (Wezler/Motegi 1998: xvi). Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that the copyist of \textit{D} has recorded all the variants of the other two manuscripts he used, nor do we have clues about the date, provenance or even appearance of those manuscripts: we do not know for instance if they were complete or fragmentary, old or new, etc. We can suppose that if the copyist of \textit{D} copied \textit{K} and simply recorded the variants of \textit{kha-} and \textit{ga-pustaka} in the margins, the latter were likely newer than \textit{K} or in worse condition. We note \textit{en passant} that the variants of \textit{kha-pustaka} can sometimes contain original readings or corrections of the transmitted text, such as on p. 34, \textit{ad st. 2ab}: \textit{abhidhīyamānāṃ no nābhiprāyaṃ} (sic for \textit{abhidhīyamānāṃ nābhiprāyaṃ} or \textit{abhidhīyamānāṃ na no ‘bhiprāyaṃ}) instead of \textit{abhidhīyamāno nābhiprāyaṃ}.

\item See Giunta 2018.
\end{itemize}
although the latter is almost never represented in the manuscripts used here. The akṣaras rū and ru are very often hardly distinguishable or even not distinguished at all in Jp; it seemed pedantic to me to report this in the apparatus. Punctuation (including daṇḍas) has been introduced, or sometimes silently modified. For further clarity, in some cases, typical Western punctuation marks have also been introduced, in particular quotation marks (‘…’) to indicate short citations and direct speech, and commas to separate two coordinated sentences. Sandhi has usually been applied, except for some cases in which its non-application allows for a less impeded reading of the text (e.g. ṛupe ātmā…).

Words or short sentences from the Tibetan translation of the mūla text by *Guṇākaraśrībhadra and (dPal lha bstan po śā kya’i dge sloṅ lha bla ma) Ži ba ’od (before mid-11th cent.), as well as the Tibetan translation of the pañjikā by *Devendrabhadra and Grags ’byor śes rab have been reproduced and referred to in the notes, when necessary, with the sigla Tk and Tp, respectively.

The critical apparatus also includes the seven short marginal notes present in Jp and copied, with only one omission, in Pp. References to parallels and to the sources of the quotations are indicated with Greek letters in the notes. The layout, which involves subdivision into paragraphs, punctuation (daṇḍas and commas), bold type, etc., is designed to allow for an easier interpretation of the text.

The Vātsīputrīyātmaparīkṣā (stanzas and commentary) was translated into German by Stanislaw Schayer in 1932, into English by Ganganatha Jha in 1939, and into Italian by me in 2004 (the last translation—I now realize—contains some inaccuracies and mistakes). Some passages are also rendered into English in Eltschinger/Ratié 2010: 206–208, as well as in Eltschinger/Ratié 2013: 113–115.

In the translation presented here, I try to offer a rendering as literal as possible of the original Sanskrit, although for the translation of some terms I have preferred to maintain some flexibility. For example, svabhāva has been rendered as ‘nature’, ‘intrinsic nature’, or ‘essential property’, depending on the context; the same goes for vastu, which has been translated with ‘real thing’, ‘entity’, or even ‘object’.

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35 This omission is potentially significant because the marginal note in Jp (see below, fn. 106) betrays an incorrect interpretation of the text.
Sigla

Jk  Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrāsūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, MS 377, *Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra*

Jp  Jaisalmer, Śrī Jinabhadrāsūri Tāḍapatrīya Granthabhaṇḍāra, MS 378, *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikāvṛtti*


Pk  Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, MS 6679, *Tattvasaṅgrahasūtra*

Pp  Pāṭan, Śrī Hemacandrācārya Jaina Jñānamandira, MS 6680, *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā*

Ś  Ś1 and Ś2


Tk  *De kho na źid bsdus pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa (= Tattvasaṅgraha)*, translation by *Guṇākaraśrībhadra and (dPal lha bstan po śa kya’i dge sloṅ lha bla ma) Ži ba ’od


N = sNar than, bsTan ’gyur, vol. ’e, fols. 16v₁–17r₂

D = sDe dge, Tōh. 4266, bsTan ’gyur, tshad ma, vol. ze, fols. 14r₃–14v₄

Tp  *De kho na źid bsdus pa’i dka’ ’grel (= Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā)*, translation by *Devendrabhadra and Grags ’byor šes rab

P = *The Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition*, Ōta. 5765, bsTan ’gyur, mDo ’grel, tshad ma, vol. ’e, fols. 271r₃–276r₇
Materials for the study of the Pudgalavāda and its criticism

N = sNar thāṅ, bsTan ’gyur, vol. ’E, fols. 250v₂–255r₅
D = sDe dge, Tōh. 4267, bsTan ’gyur, tshad ma, vol. zE, fols. 221v₁–225v₂

Symbols and abbreviations

[...] enclose the pagination of MSS
{...} enclose variants of the Tibetan blockprints
] separates the accepted reading, emendations or conjectures from other readings
◇ separates the commentary on different lemmas within the same compound or series of words that are graphically connected
$ac$ $ante$ correctionem
$deest$ absent / omitted
$pc$ $post$ correctionem
$r$ recto
$v$ verso
$x \rightarrow y$ from $x$ to $y$

Text

[Jp 61v₃, Pp 41v₆] vātsīputrīyaparikalpitapudgalapratisedhārtham āha—
kecit tv ityādi |

[Jk 17r₂, Pk 7v₈] kecit tu saugatammanyā apy ātmānam pracakṣate |
pudgalavyapadesa tattvānvādvādivarjitaṃ || 336 ||

kecid iti vātsīputrīyāḥ | te hi sugatasutam ātmānaṃ manyamānā$^{36}$ api pudgalavyājena skandhebhyaḥ tattvānvābhāvām avācyam$^{37}$ ātmānaṃ kalpayante | ye hi nāma bhagavato nairātmyavādīnāḥ$^{38}$ sugatasya sutatvam

$^{36}$ manyamānā Jp$^{pc}$ Pp | manyamā Jp$^{ac}$
$^{37}$ ātmānaṃ → avācyam Jp Pp Tp (the entire sentence runs as follows: de dag ni bdag ni bde bar gšag pa’i sras su rlom na yan bdag gan zag gi {D, kyi PN} thabs kyi puṅ po dag las de ŋiṅ dān gzaṅ du brjod du med par {P, pa ND} rtogs {PN, rtogs D} par byed do ||, P 271r₂, N 250v₂₋₃, D 221v₁₋₂) K | deest in Ś
$^{38}$ o’vādināḥ K Š | o’vādinā Jp Pp
abhypagatās te katham ātmadṛṣtrim abhiniviṣṭāḥ⁴⁹ syur iti
darśayann upahāsapadam āha—sau̇gatammanyā⁵⁰ apīti |
tathā hidam ātmano lakṣaṇam—yo hi subhāsubhakarmabhedānāṃ
kartā, svakṛtakarmaphalasya ceṣṭāniṣṭasya⁴¹ bhoktā,⁴⁷ yaś ca pūrva-
skandhaparityāgād aparaskandhāntaropādānāt⁴² saṃsarati, moktā⁴³ ca, sa
ātmeti⁸ | etac ca sarvam pudgale 'pīṣṭam iti kevalam nāmini vivādaḥ ||
atha pudgalasyāvācyatve kā punar yuktir ity āha—skandhebhyā
ityādi |

skandhebhyāḥ pudgalo nāyas tīrthyadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ⁴⁴ |
yadi hi skandhebhyo⁴⁵ 'nyāḥ pudgalaḥ syāt tadānīṃm ti[Jp 62r]
rthikaparikalpitātmadṛṣṭir⁴⁶ bhavet, tataś ca śāśvatātmaprasaṅgah⁴⁷ | na ca
śāśvatasyātmanāḥ kartṛtvabhogkṛtvādi⁴⁸ yuktam, ākāsavat tasya sarvād
nirviśiṣṭatvāt | pratiśiddhaḥ ca bhagavatā⁴⁸ śāśvata ātmā | nirātmānah⁴⁹
sarve dharmā iti ca vacanāṃ⁵⁰ vyāhanyeta ||
ananyas tarhi bhavatv iti ced āha—nānanyo ityādi |
nānanyo 'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvi tasmād avācyatā || 337 ||
yadi hi skandhā eva rūpādayah⁵¹ pudgalaḥ syāt tadā bahubhyaḥ
skandhebhyo 'nanyatvāt tatsvarūpavad anekatā prāpnoti pudgalasya |

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³⁹ abhiniviṣṭā Jp | abhiniviṣṭā Pp 
⁴⁰ saugatammanyā Jp[cc] Pp | saugatammanyā Jp[acc] 
⁴¹ ceṣṭāniṣṭasya em. (see below, note α) | ceṣṭāniṣṭasya ca Jp Pp K Ś; note that
the omission of the second ca is supported also by Tp (the entire clause runs as
follows: raṅ gis byas pa’i las kyi ’bras bu ’dod pa daṅ mi ’dod pa’i za ba po daṅ |,
P 271r6-7, N 250v4-5, D 221v3-4) 
⁴² aparā° Jp[cc] Pp | aparī° Jp[acc] 
⁴³ moktā Jp Pp Tp (grol ba, P 271r7, N 250v5, D 221v4) | bhoktā K Ś 
⁴⁴ tīrthya° Jk Pk | tīrtha° K Ś 
⁴⁵ skandhebhyo Jp Tp (puṅ po dag las, P 271v1, N 250v6, D 221v3) | samskebhyo Pp 
⁴⁷ kartṛtvā° K Ś | kartṛ° Jp Pp; note that in Tp there is no abstract suffix also after
the rendering of the following word bhoktr (the entire clause runs as follows:
bdag rtag pa ni byed pa po daṅ za ba po la sogs par mi rigs te |, P 271v2, N 250v7,
D 221v5-6) 
⁴⁸ bhagavatā Jp[cc] Pp | bhagatā Jp[acc] 
⁴⁹ ātmā | nirātmānah Jp[cc] Pp | ātmānah Jp[acc] 
⁵⁰ vacanām Jp[cc] Pp | vanām Jp[acc] 
⁵¹ rūpādayah Jp | rūpādaya Pp
ekaś ceṣyate | yathoktam—“ekaḥ pudgalo loka utpadyamāṇa utpadyate yadvat tathāgataḥ” iti | ādiśabdenānityatvādiparigrahaḥ | evaṃ ca saty uccheditvām skandhavat pudgalasyāpi syat, tataś ca kṛtakarmavipraṇāśaprasaṅgaḥ | pratisiddhaḥ ca bhagavatocchedavāda ity ato ’sty avācyah pudgala iti siddham

te vācyāḥ ityādinā vastusan naiva vidyate pāramārthikah |
tattvānyatvādyavācyatvān nabhaḥkokenadāditav || 338 ||

prayogaḥ—yad vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhhyāṃ vācyam na bhavati, na tad vastu, yathā gagananalinam na bhavati ca vācyah pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ vaidharmyeṇa vedanādāh ||

vastu vastusan naiva vidyate prakalpyate

vastuno yat tu nīrūpaṃ tad avācyam prakalpyate || 339 ||

vastu hi sacaśād vastu naiva tattvānyatve vyatikrāmati, gatyantarābhāvāḥ | anyathā rūpādīnām api parasparato ’vācyatvaṃ syāt | tasmān nīrūpam asvabhāvam evāvācyam prakalpyate, na tu vastu ||

katham ity āha—bhedābhedaḥ avācyaḥ ||

Pp 42r]no hi sakāśād vastu naiva tattvānyatve vyatikrāmati, gatyantarābhāvāḥ | anyathā rūpādīnām api parasparato ’vācyatvaṃ syāt | tasmān nīrūpam asvabhāvam evāvācyam prakalpyate, na tu vastu ||

vastu [Pp 42r]no hi sakāśād vastu naiva tattvānyatve vyatikrāmati, gatyantarābhāvāḥ | anyathā rūpādīnām api parasparato ’vācyatvaṃ syāt | tasmān nīrūpam asvabhāvam evāvācyam prakalpyate, na tu vastu ||

katham ity āha—bhedābhedaḥ avācyaḥ ||
bhedābhedavikalpaśya\(^{64}\) vastvadhiśṭhānabhāvataḥ |
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo\(^{65}\) niḥsvabhāvėṣu yuyjate \(\text{|| 340 ||}
\)
na vastuni

vastv eva hi bhedābhedavikalpa\(_{\text{yor adhiśṭhānam, nāvastu | tena}}\)
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo\(^{66}\) niḥsvabhāveṣv eva svabhāvavirahiteṣv eva
yuyjate | na vastuni tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo yuyjata iti sambandhaḥ |
tatra bhedābhedābhyaṁ gatyantarābhāvāt ||
kathaṃ punar gatyantarābhāva ity āha—\(\text{yad etad dhītyādi |}
\)

\(\text{yad}^{67}\) etad dhi tan neti pratiśedhanam |
tad vastvantaravat tasmād vyaktaṁ anyatvam ucyate \(\text{|| 341 ||}
\)
atadbhāvaniṣedhaś\(^{68}\) ca tattvam evābhidhīyate |
nātikrāmati tad vastu tattvaṁ bhedaṁ ca vastunaḥ \(\text{|| 342 ||}
\)

\(\text{tathā hi—rūpādisvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavatītī}^{69}\) \(\text{yad etat tan neti}^{70}\) niṣedhanam \(\text{tat tasmād} \) rūpādeḥ sakāśād anyatvam\(^{71}\)
evābhidhīyate | svabhāvāntaravīdhānāntarīyakatvād\(^{72}\) vastuno vastvantarabhāvaniṣedhasya |
prayogah—yad vastu yatsvabhāvavirahitaṁ 
tat tato 'nyat, yathā rūpam vedanātaḥ | rūpādisvabhāvavirahi ca
pudgalākhyaṁ vastv iti svabhāvahetuh |
\(\text{yaś cāyaṁ vastu} \) tadbhāvaniṣedho \(\text{tadrūpaniṣedhaḥ sa}
\)
tattvam avyatireka evābhidhīyate | tattvavidhināntarīyakatvād\(^{73}\)
vastusato 'rthāntara bhāvaniṣedhasya\(^{74}\) | anyathā hi yadi tasya na kaścit

\(64\) \(\text{vikalpaśya K Ś Jk Pk; in Tk we read} \) \(\text{rnams rtoqs (P 17v} _{1}, N 16v}_{3}, \)
\(\text{D 14r}_{6})\)
\(65\) \(\text{tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo Jk}^{\text{pc}} \) \(\text{(tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo) Pk Tk \( (\text{de} \) \( \text{nid gzan sogs}
\) brjod med pa, P 17v}_{2}, N 16v}_{3}, \)
\(\text{D 14r}_{6}) \) \(\text{tattvānyayānirdeśo Jk}^{\text{ac}}\)
\(66\) \(\text{nirdeśo Jp}^{\text{pc}} \) \(\text{Pp} \)
\(67\) \(\text{yad Jk Tk (gañ, P 17v}_{2}, N 16v}_{4}, \)
\(\text{D 14r}_{6}) \) \(\text{tad Pk}\)
\(68\) \(\text{atad}^{\\circ} \) \(\text{Jk}^{\text{pc}} \) \(\text{P})\)
\(69\) \(\text{na bhavatītīi em. supported by Tp (ma yin no || žes bya ba, P 272r}_{6}, \)
\(\text{N 251v}_{3}, \) \(\text{D 222r}_{7}) \) \(\text{na bhavati Jp Pp}\)
\(70\) \(\text{neti Jp Tp (med ces, P 272v}_{7}, \) N 251v}_{3}, \)
\(\text{D 222r}_{7}) \) \(\text{ne Pp}\)
\(71\) \(\text{anyatvam Jk}^{\text{ac}} \) \(\text{K Ś Jk}^{\text{ac}} \)
\(72\) \(\text{vidhe}^{\circ} \) Jp \(\text{or vidhe}^{\circ} \)
\(73\) \(\text{Marginal note: tattva = svarūpa (Jp Pp)}\)
\(74\) \(\text{rthāntara bhāva}^{\circ} \) \(\text{Jp}^{\text{pc}} \) \(\text{(rthāntarabhāva) | arthāntarabhāva}^{\circ} \) \(\text{Jp}^{\text{pc}} \) \(\text{(rthāntarabhāva) K Ś; arthāntare bhāva}^{\circ} \) \(\text{Jp}^{\text{pc}}; \)
\(\text{rthāntaro bhāva}^{\circ} \) \(\text{Pp}^{\text{pc}}; \) \(\text{in Tp the entire}
\) \(\text{sentence runs as follows: \(\text{dños po yod pa la don gzan bkag pa ni de ŋid sgrub pa}
\) \(\text{med par mi 'byuñ ba'i phyir ro || (P 272v}_{1-2}, \)
\(\text{N 251v}_{5-6}, \) \(\text{D 222v}_{2})\)
svabhāvo vidhīyate tadā sarvasvabhāvanīṣedhād avastutvam\textsuperscript{75} eva syāt | sarvasvabhāvanīṣedhalaṅkaṇatvād avastutvasyeti | prayoga—yad vastu yato 'rthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvaṃ tat tad eva, yathā rūpaṃ svavabhāvād\textsuperscript{76} arthāntaratvena pratiṣiddhātmatattvam | pratiṣiddhātmatattvaś ca rūpādibhyo 'rthāntaratvena pudgala iti svabhāvahetuh |

\textit{tat} tasmād \textit{vastunaḥ} sakāsāt tattvānyatve \textit{vastu nātikrāmatī}ti siddhā vyāptir maulya\textsuperscript{77} hetoḥ ||
evam tāvad avācyatvābhhyupagame praṇāptisattvaṃ\textsuperscript{78} pudgalasya prāptam iti pratipāditam | idānīṃ vastutvābhhyupagame vā pudgalasyāvācyatvam ayuktam | anyathā svavacanavirodhaḥ [Jp 62v] pratijñāyāḥ syād iti manyamāno nigamayati\textsuperscript{79}—\textit{skandhebhya}  ityādi |

\textit{skandhebhyaḥ} pudgalo nānya ity eśānanyasūcanā |
\textit{skandhā}\textsuperscript{80} na pudgalaś cety vyaktā tasyeyam\textsuperscript{81} anyatā\textsuperscript{82} || 343 ||

api ca “avācyah pudgalaḥ” iti bruvaṇaḥ bhavadbhiḥ sphiṭataram eva skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasyānyatvam uccair udghoṣitam iti darśayati—\textit{viruddhadharmasaṅgo} hītyādi\textsuperscript{83} |

\textit{viruddhadharmasaṅgo} hi\textsuperscript{84} vastūnāṃ bheda ucyate |
\textit{skandhapudgalayoś} caiṣa\textsuperscript{85} vidyate bhinnatā na kim || 344 ||

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\textsuperscript{75} avastutvam Jp ] avastutam Pp; *avastu Tp (dīnōs po med pa, P 272v₂, N 251v₆, D 222v₃)

\textsuperscript{76} svasvabhāvād Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] svasvābhāvā Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{77} Marginal note: maulya = tattvānyatvābhhyām avācyatvalaṅkaṇasya (Jp [partly broken] Pp)

\textsuperscript{78} Marginal note: praṇāpti = praṇāpānā (Jp Pp)

\textsuperscript{79} nigamayati Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] nigayati Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{80} skandhā Jk Pk ] skandho K Ś

\textsuperscript{81} tasyeyam K Ś ] tasyoyam Jk Pk

\textsuperscript{82} anyatā Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pk ] anyata Jk\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{83} °saṅgo hītyādi K ] °saṃśleṣa ityādi Jp Pp Ś1 (pointing to a reading \textit{viruddhadharmasaṃśleṣo} in st. 344a, which is virtually possible and which is the reading adopted by Ś, albeit it is not confirmed by Jk and Pk); the \textit{pratīka deest} in Ś2

\textsuperscript{84} hi Jk ] pi hi Pk (contra metrum)

\textsuperscript{85} caiṣa Jk Pk Ś ] caiva K; *caivāṃ Tk (yañ | de bźin, P 17v₅, N 16v₅₋₆, D 14v₁)
prayogaḥ—yau parasparaparīrāhasthitadharmaḥdhyāsītayau tāu\textsuperscript{86} parasparabhinnaḥ, yathā rūpavedane mūrtatvāmūrtatvadharmaḥyukte\textsuperscript{87} vācyatvāvācyatvādiparasparavīruddhadharmaḥdhyāsītayau ca skandhapudgalāv iti svabhāvahetuḥ

na cāyam asiddho hetur iti darśayann āha—tathā hītyādi

[Jk 17v] tathā hi vedanādibhyāḥ pudgalo ’vācyā ucyate
tattvānyatvena vācyās tu rūpasamjñādayastataḥ || 345 ||

tathā hi—pudgalo vedanāsāmjñādibhyās tattvānyatvābhyāṃ avācyā iṣyate | rūpavedanādayas tu tato vedanādibhyāḥ parasparam tattvānyatvena\textsuperscript{88} vācyā ity alo nāsiddhatā hetoh ||

ito ’pi viruddhadharmaḥdhyāsāḥ siddha ity ādarśayati—anityatvenetyādi |

anityatvena vācyāś ca\textsuperscript{89} rūpaskandhādayo matāḥ |
pudgalas\textsuperscript{90} tu tathā neti tato vispaśṭam anyatā\textsuperscript{91} || 346 ||

anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti vacanāḥ rūpāhoh hy anityatvena vācyāḥ |
pudgalas tu tathā nānityatvena vācyā iṣṭah, sarvapraṅkāreṇa tasyā-vācyatvāt | na cāyam anaikāntikatā\textsuperscript{92} hetoh, etāvanmātranibandhanatyāt bhedavyavahārasya | anyathā hi sakalam eva viśvam ekaṃ vastu syāt | tataś ca sahotpādavināsāsaprastānāh ||

na kevalaṃ tattvānyatvābhyāṃ avācyatvād avastu\textsuperscript{93} pudgalo ’yam iti pratipāditam ito ’py anityatve[Ps 42v]nāvācyatvād evāvastv iti pratipādayann āha—arthakriyāśv\textsuperscript{94} ityādi |

\textsuperscript{86} tāu Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp Tp (de dag, P 273r, N 252r, D 222v,) ] deest in Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{87} mūrtatvāmūrtatvadharmaḥyukте Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp Tp (lus can dan lus can ma yin pa’i chos daň ldan pa, P 273r, N 252r, D 222v,) | mūrtatvādharmayukte Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{88} parasparam tattvānyatvena conj. ] parasparam anyatvena Jp Pp Tp (phan tshun gzan ndi du, P 273r, N 252r, D 222v,)

\textsuperscript{89} vācyāś ca Jk\textsuperscript{pc} ] the reading ante correctionem is uncertain, perhaps vācyā hī; bādhyāś ca Pk

\textsuperscript{90} pudgalas Jk\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] pudgalās Jk\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{91} anyatā Jk\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] the reading ante correctionem is uncertain, perhaps anyāta

\textsuperscript{92} °kā Jp\textsuperscript{pc} ] °kā Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{93} avastu Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] astu Jp\textsuperscript{ac}

\textsuperscript{94} kriyāśv K Ś1 ] kriyāś tv Jp Pp; the pratīka is omitted in Ś2; the pratīka in Tp corresponds to the translation of the second pāda of st. 347 (note, however, that in Tk the two pādas are rendered in the same order of the Sanskrit)
Materials for the study of the Pudgalavāda and its criticism

arthakriyāсу śaktis ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam

kṣaṇikeśv eva niyatā tathāvācyena vastutā | 347 |

idam eva hi vidyamānatvalaṅkaṇāṁ vastusvabhāvo yad utārthakriyāsu śaktih, sarvasāmarthavyavirahalakṣaṇatvād avastutvāyeti sāmarthyād arthakhriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam eva vastutvam avatiṣṭhate | sā cārthakhriyā kṣaṇikeśv eva niyatā | kṣaṇikatvenaiva vyāpteti yāvat | nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakhriyāvirodhāt | atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācyena pudgale vastutā nāsti | tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvasya nivṛtter vrksatvanivṛttatāi śiṃśapātvādinivṛttitvād iti | yathoktama—

anityatvena yo 'vācyah sa hetur na hi kasyacit

iti |

syād etad—yadi pudgalo nityaḥ syät tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakhriyāvirodhah syāt | yāvatā yathāsāv anityatvenāvācyaḥ tathā nityatvenāpīti | ato 'rthakhriyāsāmarthyaṃ asyāviruddham eveti |

tad asamyak | na hy ubhayākāravinimuktam vastu svalakṣaṇam yuktam, nityānityayor anyonyavṛttītiparīhārasthalakṣaṇatvāt | vastuny ekākārathyāgagaripraphrāyah tadaparākārapariprahyāganāntariyakatvāt | na hy asmabhīr avācyasabdaniśvatanam pudgale pratiśidhyate, svatāntrecchāmātrādhīnasya100 kenaicit pratiśeddhum asākyatvāt | kim tv idam iha vasturūpam nirūpyate | kim asau pudgalākhysya vastunāḥ svabhāvāḥ sarvadāstā āhosvin nāstīti | yady asti tadā nitya evāsau | na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścid api tu yaḥ svabhāvāḥ sadāvasthāyi na vinaśyati sa nitya ucyate | yathoktama—

nityam tam āhur vidvāmso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati

iti | atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpy anitya evāsau, anavasthāyisva—

95 vidyamāṇa° Jkpc Pp | vimāṇa° Jkac
96 avastutva° Jpvc Pp | avatvāstutva° Jpac
97 kṣaṇikatvasya Jpvc Pp | kṣaṇikasya Jpac
98 śiṃśapātvādi° K Ś | śiṃśapādi° Jp Ppvc; śiṃśapādīḥ Jp Ppac; *śiṃśapātva° Tp (śiṃ śa pa niid, P 273v4, N 252v6, D 223v1)
99 kasyacit Jpvc (kasyacid) Pp | kacid Jpac
100 dhīnasya Jp Tp (rag las pa, P 274r, N 253r, D 223v3) Ś | vīnasya Pp; nītasya K
101 pratiśeddhum Jpvc Pp | pratiśiddhum Jpac
bhāvalaṅkaṇatvād anityasya | atāḥ kṣaṇīkākṣaṇīkavyatirekena
gal[63] jyantaraṅghaṅvāt, akṣaṇīkavya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām
arthakrīyāvirodhāt, kṣaṇīkatvarathakrīyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam sattvāṃ
vyāptam iti pudgale kṣaṇīkatvanivṛttau sattvanivṛttīḥ siddhā ∥
yady evaṃ yadi pudgalo nästy eva 104 kasmād bhagavata “sa jīvas
tac charīram anyo jīvo ’nyac charīram” iti prṣṭenoktam “avyākr̥tam etat” iti|
yāvata “nästy eva” iti kasmān noktam ity āha—āgamārthavirodhe tv
ityādi |

āgamārthavirodhe tu parākrāntaṃ mahātmabhiḥ |

yadi hi pudgalo dharmī siddho bhavet tadā tasya tattvāntvādīdharma
vyākr̥tim arhet 105 | 106 yāvataḥ sa eva dharmī na siddhas tat katham
asataḥ tasya dharmo nirdiśyeta | na hy asataḥ kharaviśaṅādēs
tīkṣṇatādī 107 sambhavati yenāsau vyākriyā 108 | atāḥ prajñāpatisattvam
eva khyāpayan pudgalo “avyākr̥tam etat” iti bhagavān uvāca |
nāstīty eva 109 tu noktam, pareṇa dharmisvarūpasyapr̥ṣṭatvāt 110 | athāva
prajñāpatisato ’py abhāvabhinivēśaparihārāḥ śūnyatādesanāyāṃ
abhavyavineyajanāśayāpekṣāyā nāstīty eva noktam | yathoktām 111—

dṛṣṭidamśrāvabhedam 112 ca bhramāṃ cāvekṣya karmaṇāṃ |

desayanti jinā dharmāṃ vyāghṛiḥpotapahārāvavat \[κ\]

102 evāsāv anavasthāyi Jp | evāsādhanavasthāyi Pp
103 gatyantarābhaṅvāt Jp | gatyantarāvāt Jp ac | skandhāantarābhaṅvāt Tp (phuṅ po gźan med pa'i phyir la, P 274r₃, N 253r₆, D 223v₉)
104 eva Jp ac | aiva Jp ac
105 vyākr̥tim arhet em. (cf. Tp: luṅ bstan {D; bstan bstan PN} par ’os na, P 274r₈, N 253v₃, D 224r₂) | vyākr̥tim arhet Jp ac; vyākr̥tim arhet Jp ac K Ś; adhyākr̥tim arhet Pp
106 Marginal note: ’vyākr̥tam = avācyatvam (Jp, deest in Pp)
107 tīkṣṇatādī K Ś | tīkṣṇādī Jp Pp Tp (rno ba la sogs pa, P 274v₁, N 253v₃, D 224r₂)
108 vyākriyā Jp ac Pp | vyatikriyā Jp ac; vyākriyate K Ś
109 eva em. | evam Jp Pp K Ś; this word is not rendered in Tp
110 pareṇa dharmisvarūpasyapr̥ṣṭatvāt Jp Pp | in Tp we read: gźan gyat cok tam can gyt {D; gyt deest in PN} raṅ bźin mi ’dri ba’i phyir ro ∥ (P 274v₂, N 253v₃-₄, D 224r₃).
Read gźan gyis instead of gźan gyi ?
111 yathoktām Jp Tp (ji skad du {PD; du deest in N}, P 274v₃, N 253v₄, D 224r₄) Ś | yac cok tam Pp K
112 dṛṣṭidamśrāvabhedam Jp Pp Tp (lta ba’i mche bas {D; ba PN} smas {ND; smras P} pa, P 274v₃, N 253v₄, D 224r₄) Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (see below, note κ) K | dṛṣṭidrāṣṭavyabhedam Ś₂; dṛṣṭidrāṣṭrvyabhedam Ś₁
iti | evam ācāryavasubandhuprabhrtibhiḥ113 kośaparamārthasaptatikādiṣvābhiprāyapraśaṇanāt parākrāntam, atas tata evāvagantavyam114 | iha tv atigranthavistarabhyān115 na likhyata iti bhā[Pr 43r]vah ||
yady eva ‘asti sattva116 upapādukaḥ117’ ity118 etat kathaṃ nīyata ity āha118—nāstikyetyādi |

nāstikyapraṇīśedhāya citrā vāco dayāvataḥ || 348 ||
sattvāstitvābhidhāyino hi desanāś citrā dayāvato na virudhyanta iti vākyāṣeṣaḥ | yatra hi cittasantarāne sattvapradhānakṣaṇaparāmānām api samskārānām abhāvāvagamāt, paralokino ‘sattvāt paralokāsiddhir iti nāstikyadṛṣṭayo112 iti bhaveyur vineyāḥ ||
yat tarhidam uktam—‘bhāraṃ vo bhikṣavo desayiṣyāmi bhārādhānām bhāraniṣṭhavāhām ca | tatra bhāraḥ pañçopādaṃkāṇḍhāhāh, bhārādhānāṃ trṣnā,121 bhāraniṣṭhē mokṣaḥ, bhārāhārāḥ pudgalaḥ’112 iti tad etat kathāṃ nīyate | na hi bhāra eva bhārāhārō123 yukta ityāḥ āha—samudāyādityādi |

113 ⁹bandhu° Tp (gñen, P 274v₄, N 253v₃, D 224r₃) Š | ⁹bandha° Jp Pp K

114 Tp punctuates in a different way: de tta bu {ND; bur P} slob dpon dbyig gñen la sog pa mdod dani don dam pa bdun cu pa la sog par dgoṅs pa gsal bar byas pa’i phyir ro || brtsan pa byas pa yin na de’i phyir rtogs pa de ŋid du go bar bya’o || (P 274v₅, N 253v₅-six, D 224r₅).

115 ⁹bhayān Jp (jigs nas, P 274v₅, N 253v₆, D 224r₅) || ⁹tayān Pp, ⁹bhiyā K Š

116 Marginal note: sattva = ātmā (Jp Pp)

117 upapādukaḥ (upapāduka) Jp (the vowel u is scarcely visible) Tp (rdzus {ND; brdzus P} te byuṅ ba, P 274v₄, N 253v₆, D 224r₆) | upapādakaḥ Pp (upapādaka) K Š

118 ity āha Jp⁹ Pp | ityādi āha Jp⁹

119 tasyāyaṃbāḥ em. (cf. Vimsiṭkā ad st. 8: yathāsti sattva upapāduka ity uktam bhagavatābhiprāyasvaśc cittasantarānakṣaṇaparāmānām āyatām abhipreta, ed. p. 63) | tasyāṃ satyāṃ Jp Pp; Tp slightly differs from the Sanskrit: sans kyi rgyud gaṅ la {em., las PND} sans can biṅg pa de ni ’khor ba rgyun mi ’chad pa {D, deest in PN} la dgoṅs nas becom ldan ’das kyi{s {PD, kyi N} sans can yod do ŋes gsums so || (P 274v₇, N 253v₇-254r₇, D 224r₇, etc.)

120 ⁹drṣṭayo Jp | ⁹drṣṭayor Pp

121 trṣnā Jp Pp TpN (sred pa, N 254r₇) Š | tṛptih K; *bhavah TpDP (srid pa, P 275r₂, D 224v₁)

122 pudgalah Jp Pp (pudgala) | pudgalā K Š

123 ⁹hāro Jp⁹ Pp | ⁹hā Jp⁹
samudāyādicitenna bhārahārādidesanā

tatra samānakālāḥ skandhā eva sāmastyena vivaksitāḥ samudāya-vyapadeśabhājāḥ |
etva hetupalabhāhūtā ayugapatkālabhāvinaḥ124 santāna iti vyapadiśyante | ekākāraparāmarśāhetavaś ca sambhavantaḥ {Jp 63v} santānīsamudāyisabdabhyām nirdiśyanta ity atah samudāyādicitenna samudāyādyabhiprāyenā bhārahārādidesanā125 na virudhyata iti śeṣaḥ | prathamaniśabdabena santāṇādiparigraphaḥ dvitiyena126 bhārādeḥ |
tatra eva skandhāḥ samudāyasantāṇādirūpaṇa vivaksitāḥ pudgalo bhārahāra127 iti128 vyapadiśyante | tatraiva loke pudgalabhimānā129 atatva bhagavatā—“bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ pudgalaḥ” ity utkva “śaśū yuṣmān130 evamāt evamjātir evamsukhaduhkhapratisamvedi131 evamādhīryāhūḥ” ityādino132 pudgalo vyākhyaṭāḥ | sa eva132 skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñapti sa eva133 skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |

tatra eva skandhāḥ skandhasamudāyalakṣaṇaḥ prajñaptiṣa evaṃsukhaḥ pratisaṃvedī134 evaṃdīrghāyuḥ” ityādino pudgalavat skandhānāyānādiṣvāyate |...
pūrvakās\textsuperscript{140} te bhāra iti kṛtvoktāḥ\textsuperscript{141} | ye tūtpādyante\textsuperscript{142} phalabhūtās te bhārahāra\textsuperscript{143} ity uktā ity ajñāpakam\textsuperscript{144} eta\textsuperscript{145} \textsuperscript{146} uddyotakaras\textsuperscript{146} tv āha—ātmānam anabhyupagacchatā nedam tathāgatavacanam arthavattāyāṁ śakyaṁ vyavasthāpayitum,\textsuperscript{147} yasmād idam uktam—rūpam bhadanta\textsuperscript{148} nāham vedanā sañjñā saṃskāro vijñānam bhadanta nāham, evam etad bhikṣo rūpam na tvam vedanā sañjñā saṃskāro vijñānaṁ na tvam iti\textsuperscript{149} | etena hi rūpādayaḥ skandhā ahānkāravisayatvena pratisiddhāḥ | viśeṣapratīṣedhas ca yām na sāmānyapratīṣedhāḥ | ātmānam cānabhyupagacchatā sāmānyenaiva\textsuperscript{149} pratisiddhavyam—naivāham asmiṁi naiv ahaṁ asīti\textsuperscript{150} | viśeṣapratīṣedhas tv anyavidhināntarīyako bhavati | yathā vāmenāksṇā na paṣyāṁyti ukte gamyata eva\textsuperscript{151} daksīṇena paṣyāṁyti | tenāpy adarśane vā māna vaham, evam etad bhikṣo rūpam na tvam atmā yāvan na hi vijñānam ātmye ukte\textsuperscript{153} tadvilakṣaṇo ‘sty ātmeti sūcitaṁ bhavati | sa ca viṣayoc ‘uyo vā bhavatu sarvathāasty ātmeti || [Pp 43\textsuperscript{v}] atrāha—viśeṣapratīṣedhas cetyādi |

viśeṣapratīṣedhas ca taddṛśtin prati rājate \textsuperscript{149} 349 \textsuperscript{151}
etad uktam bhavati—vimsatiśikharasamudgato ‘yam satkāyadrśtiśailah kumātīnām pravartate, yad uta—rūpam ātmā yāvad vijñānam\textsuperscript{154} ātmā | rūpe ātmā yāvad vijñāne ātmā\textsuperscript{155} | rūpavān ātmā yāvad vijñānavān ātmā |

\textsuperscript{140} pūrvakās Jp K Ś | pūrvikās Pp
\textsuperscript{141} kṛtvoktāḥ Jp ] kṛtvoktaḥ Pp
\textsuperscript{142} tūtpādyante em. (cf. Tp: skye ba, P 275v\textsuperscript{3}, N 254v\textsuperscript{3}, D 224v\textsuperscript{7}; cf. also Eltschinger 2014: 474) ] tūtpāsyante Jp; tūpesyante Pp; tūpesyaṁte K Ś
\textsuperscript{143} bhārahāra Jp Pp Tp (khur khyer ba, P 275v\textsuperscript{3}, N 254v\textsuperscript{3}, D 224v\textsuperscript{7}) ] bhārahāra K Ś
\textsuperscript{144} Marginal note: ajñāpakam—ātmana iti śeṣaḥ (Jp Pp)
\textsuperscript{145} etat Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] eteta Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{146} uddyotakaras Ś ] udyotakaras Jp Pp K
\textsuperscript{147} vyavasthāpayitum Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp | vyavasthāyitum Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{148} bhadanta Jp\textsuperscript{pc} (bhadantā) Pp | deest in Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{149} sāmānyenaiva Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] sāmānyaināiva Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{150} naivāham asmiṁīi naiv tvam asiti conj. (cf. Tp: khyod ŋid daṅ | bdag ŋid ni ma yin pa, P 275v\textsuperscript{6–7}, N 254v\textsuperscript{6–7}, D 225r\textsuperscript{3}, and Nyāyavārttika p. 702: nāhaṁ naiv tvam asiti) ] naiv tvam asiti Jp Pp
\textsuperscript{151} eva Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] e Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{152} ahānkāravisayatvena → vācyam syāt | Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] deest in Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{153} ukte Jp\textsuperscript{pc} Pp ] akte Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{154} vijñānam Jp\textsuperscript{pc} ] vijñānām Jp\textsuperscript{ac}
\textsuperscript{155} vijñānam ātmā | rūpe ātmā yāvad vijñāne ātmā Jp Tp (rnam par šes pa bdag yin pa’i
In order to refute the pudgala (‘person’, ‘individual’) postulated by the Vātsīputrīyas, [Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘Some, for their part’.

336. Some, for their part, although they think to be followers of the Sugata, with the pretextous appellative pudgala refer to the Self (ātman), which is devoid of identity and difference, etc. [with respect to the aggregates (skandha)].

‘Some’ means the Vātsīputrīyas. Indeed, ‘although’ they think themselves to be [spiritual] sons of the Sugata, under the pretext of the ‘pudgala’ conceive a ‘Self’ that is inexpressible on the basis of ‘identity and difference’ with respect to the aggregates. Actually, those that have really become sons of the Bhagavān, the Sugata, who taught selflessness, how...
could they ever adhere to the false view of a Self? To show this, using a derisive expression, [Śāntarakṣita] said: ‘although they think to be followers of the Sugata’.

To explain, the definition of the Self is as follows: ‘The Self is the agent of different actions, pure or impure; it is also the experiencer of the result of the actions he himself performed, which are desirable and undesirable”; it is, then, the one who wanders in transmigration abandoning the previous aggregates [at the time of death] and taking on new ones [with the new birth], and who gets liberation”. And all this is also admitted for the pudgala. Therefore the disagreement (vivāda) [between ātmavādins and pudgalavādins] is only about the name.

§ 2. Pūrvapakṣa

‘But—one might ask—what is the reasoning with regard to the inexpressibility of the pudgala?’ [In view of this possible question, Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘[The pudgala is not different] from the aggregates’.

The pudgala is not different from the aggregates, because there would be the undesired consequence [that one would fall into] the [false] view of the non-Buddhists.

For, if ‘the pudgala’ were ‘different from the aggregates’, there would be the [same] ‘[false] view’ of the Self that is postulated by the non-Buddhists, and therefore [there would be] ‘the undesired consequence’ of an eternal Self. And it is not logically sustainable that an eternal Self can be an agent, an experiencer, and so on, since, like space, it is never differentiated. And an eternal Self has been denied by the Bhagavān, and [if the opposite were claimed,] the [scriptural] statement: ‘All dharmas are selfless” would be contradicted.

‘Let it be non-different [from the aggregates], then!’ [To respond] to those who say so, [Śāntarakṣita, letting the pudgalavādins speak,] says [the stanza] beginning ‘[The pudgala] is not non-different’.

The pudgala is not non-different [from the aggregates] because [its] manifoldness, etc. would follow. Therefore, the best is [to admit its] inexpressibility.

For, if the pudgala would coincide with the aggregates starting from corporeality (rūpa), then, not being different from these, which are many, it would follow that it [too] is manifold, as their own nature. However,
[the pudgala] is admitted as being one. As has been said: ‘One person (pudgala), being born in the world, is born as a Tathāgata’.

The word ‘etc.’ includes impermanence and other [properties of the aggregates]. And this being the case, even the pudgala, like the aggregates, would be subject to annihilation and, consequently, the karman that was done would undesirably be destroyed. And annihilationism has been denied by the Bhagavān. Therefore it is established that there is a pudgala that is inexpressible.

§ 3. Criticism

With the words: ‘To them we should say’, etc. [Śāntarakṣita] shows the following: ‘It is precisely by means of your own words, i.e. “since it is inexpressible”, that you establish that a really existent pudgala does not exist’.

338. To them we should say: ‘An absolutely real pudgala does not exist at all, since it is inexpressible on the basis of identity, difference, etc., like a red water-lily or something else in the sky’.

The proof statement is as follows—What cannot be expressed on the basis of identity with and difference from a real object is not a real object, like a water-lily in the sky; and the pudgala is indeed not expressible; therefore, [the logical reason involved in this argument] is the non-perception of the pervader [i.e., of the pervading property] (vyāpakānupalabdhi). Feeling and the other [aggregates instead are an example] by dissimilarity.

‘And how is the pervasion (vyāpti) established here?’ [In view of this implicit question, Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘[A real thing never passes beyond] diversity’.

339. A real thing never passes beyond diversity from or identity with an[other] real thing. But what is devoid of nature is conceived as inexpressible.\(^{163}\)

\(^{163}\) The position of the particle tu after yat suggests that the first sentence of this stanza ends with the word vastunah. The pronouns yat and tat are not commented upon by Kamalaśīla, although we cannot completely rule out that he is alluding to them with the words hi and tasmāt (although a less cryptic wording would be expected). In this case, the stanzas could be translated as follows: ‘And since (yat = hi) a real thing never passes beyond diversity from or identity with an[other] real thing, therefore (tat = tasmāt) a [thing that is] devoid of nature is conceived as inexpressible’. The Tibetan translation (dṅos po dṅos po las gźan nam || gźan min par yaṅ mi ‘da’ ŋid || de phyir brjod du med pa gaṅ || dṅos po med par rtog {PN, rtogs D} pa la || P 17v₁, N 16v₂₂, D 14r₃) differs from the Sanskrit slightly and suggests the following interpretation: ‘A real thing never passes beyond diversity
'Since a real thing never’ transgresses identity with or diversity from ‘an[other] real thing’, because there is no other possibility [for a real thing]—otherwise, also [the aggregates] starting from corporeality could be mutually inexpressible—therefore, ‘a [thing that is] devoid of nature’, i.e. only a [thing that is] devoid of svabhāva, ‘is conceived as inexpressible’, but not a real thing.

‘Why?’ [In view of this implicit question, Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘[Since] the alternative between distinction and non-distinction’.

340–341a. Since the alternative between distinction and non-distinction has as its basis a real thing, the non-specification of identity, difference, etc. is logically applied [only] with regard to [entities] that are devoid of own nature, not with regard to a real thing.

Since only ‘a real thing’ is the ‘basis’ of the two alternatives ‘distinction and non-distinction’, not something that is not a real thing, therefore, ‘the non-specification of identity, difference, etc. is logically applied’ only ‘with regard to [entities] that are devoid of intrinsic nature’, that is, only with regard to [entities] that lack intrinsic nature. It does not apply—this is the syntactic connection—‘with regard to a real thing’. In respect of the latter there is no possibility except for distinction and non-distinction.

‘Why then is there no other possibility?’ [In view of this implicit question, Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘for the [negation in the form:] “this [is not this other]”’.

341a–342. for the negation in the form: ‘this is not this [other]’ is clearly said ‘diversity’ from this, as another thing. On the other hand, the negation of not­being­­­­­this is called ‘identity’ and nothing else. Therefore, a real thing does not go beyond identity or difference with respect to an[other] real thing.

To explain: that which, in the statement: ‘the pudgala is not endowed with the nature of the [aggregates] starting with corporeality’, is ‘the negation in the form: “this is not this [other]”’, is precisely called ‘“diversity” from this’, i.e.[, in the case of the pudgala, diversity] from the corporeality and the other [aggregates], since denying that a thing has the nature of another thing implies the affirmation of its having a different nature. The proof statement is as follows—an object X that lacks the essential property of Y is different from Y, like corporeality from sensation. And

from or identity with an[other] real thing. Therefore, what is inexpressible is conceived as devoid of nature...’
that entity which is called *pudgala* is devoid of the essential property of corporeality, [sensation,] etc. Thus, the logical reason [implied here] is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).

And ‘the negation of not-being-this’ of an object, namely, the negation of not-having-its-nature, ‘is called “identity”’, i.e. non-difference, ‘and nothing else’, since denying that a real thing does not have the nature of another thing implies the affirmation of its having the same nature. For, otherwise, if of this [thing] no essential property is affirmed, then, due to the negation of all [its] essential properties, its absolute unreality (*avastutvam eva*) would follow, since the latter is [precisely] characterized by the negation of all the essential properties. The proof statement is as follows—it is identical to Y an object X whose inner nature (*ātmatattva*) is denied as being another thing (*arthāntara*) from Y, like corporeality, whose inner nature is denied as being another thing from its own nature. And it is denied that the *pudgala* has its inner nature another thing from corporeality, [sensation,] etc. Thus, the logical reason [implied here] is an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*).

‘Therefore’ (*tat = tasmāt*), ‘a real thing does not go beyond’ identity or difference with respect to ‘an[other] real thing’. Thus, the pervasion (*vyāpti*) of the basic logical reason is demonstrated.

In this way it has been first of all demonstrated that if the inexpressibility of the *pudgala* is accepted, it follows its having a purely conceptual existence (*prajñaptisattva*). Now [it will be demonstrated that], if, the other way around, its objective reality is accepted, the inexpressibility of the *pudgala* is illogical. Otherwise there would be a contradiction between your own statements and the [initial] thesis. While considering this, [Śāntarakṣita] sums up [this argument with the stanza] beginning ‘This [statement]: “The *pudgala* is not different from the aggregates”’.

343. *This [statement]: ‘The pudgala is not different from the aggregates’, is an indication of identity. [By declaring:] ‘And the pudgala is not the aggregates’ its diversity is made manifest.*

Moreover, by saying that the *pudgala* is inexpressible, you proclaim aloud the absolutely evident diversity of the *pudgala* from the aggregates [which are expressible]. This is what [Śāntarakṣita] shows [with the stanza] beginning ‘In fact, the association with contradictory properties’.

344. *In fact, the association with contradictory properties is called ‘difference’ among things. And this [association] exists between pudgala and aggregates. Is there no difference [as well]*?
The proof statement is as follows—two things that are inhabited by properties that are in mutual opposition are mutually distinct, like corporeality and sensation, which are [respectively] connected with the properties of being corporeal and being incorporeal. ‘And’ aggregates and pudgala are inhabited by ‘properties’ that are mutually ‘opposed’, such as expressibility and inexpressibility. Therefore, [in order to affirm that pudgala and aggregates are different] there is a logical reason as essential property.

And in order to show that this is not unestablished logical reason, [Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘To explain’.

345. To explain, the pudgala is said to be inexpressible with respect to feeling, etc., while corporeality, ideation, etc. can be expressed as identical or different from that.

‘To explain: the pudgala’ is held ‘to be inexpressible’ on the basis of identity and difference ‘with respect to feeling’, ideation, ‘etc., while corporeality’, feeling, ‘etc. can be expressed as’ reciprocally ‘identical or different from that’, i.e. from feeling, etc. Therefore the logical reason is not un-demonstrated.

[With the stanza] beginning ‘[Moreover, the aggregates, corporeality, etc., are held to be expressible] as impermanent’, [Śāntarakṣita] shows that the presence of contrasting qualities [between pudgala and aggregates] is also established for a further [reason]:

346. Moreover, the aggregates, corporeality, etc., are held to be expressible as impermanent, but the pudgala is not [held to be expressible] in this way; therefore there is clearly a difference.

\[164\] The text here is likely corrupt and the proposed correction (tattvānyatvena, like in pāda c, in place of anyatvena, which is the reading of Jp and Pp, and which is supported by Tp) is only tentative. A possible alternative, suggested to me by Harunaga Isaacson, again as a hypothesis that implies an equally heavy correction of the text, would be rūpasamjñādayas, like in pāda d, instead of rūpavedadādayas and to retain the reading anyatvena. In this case, the text could be translated as follows: ‘[…] “while corporeality, ideation, etc. can be expressed as” reciprocally “different from that,” i.e. from feeling, etc.’ The sense would be that each of the aggregates is different from the other four. The Tibetan translation confirms neither of the two corrections: ‘di ltar gan zag ni tshor ba dan’ du sēs la sog pa dag las de nīd daṅ gzān dag tu brjod du med par ‘dod la | gzugs daṅ tshor ba la sog pa ni tshor ba la sog pa [PD, ni tshor ba la sog pa deest in N] de dag las phan tshun gzān nīd du brjod pas de’i phyir gian tshigs ma grub pa ma yin no || (P 273r₃-₄, N 252r₆-₇, D 223r₁-₂).
On the basis of the scriptural statement: ‘All conditioned things (saṃskāra) are impermanent’, ‘corporeality, etc. are’ indeed ‘expressible as impermanent, but the pudgala is not’ held to be expressible ‘in this way’, i.e. as impermanent, since it is [considered to be] absolutely inexpressible. Nor is the logical reason inconclusive, since the common idea of difference (bheda vyavahāra) is based merely and solely on this [i.e. on that which has been said in stanza 344], for otherwise the whole universe would be neither more nor less than one thing, and therefore the co-arising and co-destruction [of all things] would undesirably follow.

In order to show that the pudgala is a non-real-thing (avastu) not only because, as has been shown, it is inexpressible on the basis of identity and difference [with respect to aggregates], but also because it is inexpressible as impermanent, [Śāntarakṣita] says [the stanza] beginning ‘[Furthermore,] the capacity of producing effects’.

347. Furthermore, the capacity of producing effects (arthakriyāsu śaktiḥ) is the characteristic of what is existing; it is limited just to momentary entities (kṣaṇika). There is no reality (vastutā) in what is inexpressible in this way.

Surely, ‘the characteristic of what is existing’, that is to say the essential property of a real thing, is precisely this, namely, ‘the capacity of producing effects’, since a non-real-thing is lacking—by its nature—any capacity (sāmarthya). Consequently, the fact of being real (vastutva) exists only as being characterized by the capacity of producing effects, but the latter ‘is limited just to momentary entities’. This means that it is pervaded precisely by momentariness, since it is impossible for a permanent entity to be efficient in succession or simultaneity. Therefore, in the pudgala, which ‘is inexpressible in this way’, i.e. as a momentary entity, ‘there is no reality’, because of the absence in it of momentariness, which pervades this [= reality], in the same way as when being a tree is missing, being a śiṃśapā, for example, is [also] missing. As has been said:

What is inexpressible as impermanent is indeed not the cause of anything.¹

‘Let the following be urged: if the pudgala were eternal, then it would be contradictory for it to be causally efficient either successively or simultaneously. The point is that in the same way it is inexpressible as impermanent, it is inexpressible also as permanent, and therefore its causal efficiency is not at all contradicted!’

This is wrong, for an object, [more properly] a particular (svalaṅkṣaṇa), that lacks both aspects is not logically tenable, since ‘[being] permanent’
and ‘[being] impermanent’ are mutually exclusive characteristics [and] since, in a real thing, the abandonment or the assumption of an aspect entails the assumption or abandonment of an aspect different from that. Actually, we do not deny the application of the word ‘inexpressible’ to the pudgala, since nobody can refute that which depends solely on [your] free will. However, what is described here [on your part] is the nature of a real thing[, i.e. of the pudgala as a real entity]. Does this essential property of the [allegedly] real entity that is called pudgala always exist or does not exist [= it exists only under certain circumstances]? If it exists [always], it is permanent, for there is no other thing that is said to be permanent other than an essential property that always remains, i.e. that does not decay; this is called ‘permanent’. As has been said:

*Wise people have defined as permanent that very essential property that does not decay.*

If we assume the hypothesis that [the essential property of the pudgala] does not exist [except under certain circumstances], then it is absolutely impermanent (*anitya eva*), since it is proper to an impermanent entity to be characterized by a transient nature. Therefore, since there is no other possibility except being momentary and non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that a non-momentary entity can be efficient by succession or simultaneity, [it follows that] it is momentariness that pervades the ‘true existence’ (*sattva*), the characteristic of which is the capacity to produce effects. Thus it is established that true existence is absent in the pudgala, in which momentariness is absent.

‘If this were the case, if the pudgala does not exist at all, why the Bhagavān, when he was asked [about the view-point]: “This is the living being (*jīva*), this is the body; one thing is the living being, another thing is the body”, replied: “This was not explained (*avyākr̥ta*)”? At this point why did not he [simply] say: “It does not exist at all”?’ [In response to this implicit question Śāntarakṣita] says [the line] beginning ‘When there is a conflict between [the letter of] the Scripture and [its] meaning’.

348ab. *When there is a conflict between [the letter of] the Scripture and [its] meaning, the magnanimous ones, for their part, display [their] power.*

If, in fact, it were established that the pudgala is a property-possessor (*dharmin*), then its properties, namely identity, difference, etc., would be worthy of explanation. In as much as it has not been established as a property-possessor, then, of it, which is unreal (*asat*), how could a property be described? For, there can be no sharpness, etc., by means
of which the horns of a donkey and of other [similar entities], which are unreal, could be explained. Therefore, while proclaiming a purely conceptual existence (prajñaptisattva) of the pudgala, the Bhagavān said: ‘This was not explained’, but [by him] it was not stated: ‘[The pudgala] does not exist at all’, since he was not asked by someone else about the specific nature (svarūpa) of the property possessor (dharmin)[, i.e. he was asked only about the properties]. Alternatively, [by him] it has not been said: ‘It does not exist at all’ in order to prevent the adherence to [the false idea of] the non-existence even of a conceptual being (prajñaptisat) in consideration of the expectations of those beings who must be led to spiritual maturation (vineyajana), who are not ready for the teaching of emptiness. As has been said:

Considering both the tear [generated] by the fang of the [wrong] view [of a Self, i.e. eternalism,] and the destruction of actions [in the case one erroneously adheres to insubstantiality and falls into nihilism], the Victorious Ones teach the Dharma in the same way as the female tiger picks up her cub.κ

Therefore, in the [Abhidharma]kośa, in the Paramārthasaptatikā and in other works, the master Vasubandhu and others ‘display [their] power’ by revealing the [real] intention [of the Buddha’s teaching]; and so it must be learned precisely from these [works]. Here, however, out of fear of extending the treatise too much, we do not dwell on this point. This is the intended meaning [in Śāntarakṣita’s reference to the power of the great masters].

‘If this were the case, how is this [scriptural passage] interpreted: “There is a being that is born spontaneously”?κ In view of this question Śāntarakṣita] says [the line beginning] ‘In order to refute nihilism’.

348cd. In order to refute nihilism there are various words of the Compassionate One.

Indeed, ‘there are various’ teachings ‘of the Compassionate One’ which tell about the existence of a being (sattvāstitva), which are not incompatible. This is understood in the verse. For the Bhagavān said: ‘There is a being’, having in view the nonannihilation in the future of the mental continuum (cittasantāna) with regard to which the idea ‘being’ (sattvaprajñapti) arises. For, otherwise, due to the [mis]understanding that the conditioning factors (saṃskāra) are non-existent, even as an uninterrupted chain of moments [in relationship] of effect and cause, those who must be led to spiritual maturation would end up by adhering
to a nihilistic point of view, considering that there is no realization of the other world (paralokāsiddhi) due to the non-existence of a transmigrating entity (paralokin).

‘Then, how is the following teaching to be interpreted’: “O monks, I will teach you the burden, the taking of the burden, the abandonment of the burden, and the burden-bearer. Among these, the burden is the five aggregates which are [the basis of] clinging (upādānaskandha), the taking of the burden is craving (tr̥ṣṇā), the abandonment of the burden is liberation (mokṣa), the burden-bearer is the pudgala”? For it is not correct that the burden-bearer is nothing but the burden!\[5\] [In view of this objection Śāntarakṣita] says [the line] beginning ‘[It is with the thought of] the collection’.

349ab. It is with the thought of the collection (samudāya), etc. that there is the teaching of the burden-bearer, etc.

Here, connected with the appellative ‘collection’, only the aggregates that are synchronic have been intended, as a totality. And precisely these, which are causes [of future aggregates] and effects [of the previous aggregates], while existing at different times, are called ‘continuum’. And becoming together the cause of a unitary synthetic cognition (ekākāraparāmarśa) are indicated with the two words ‘subject of a continuum’ (santānin) and ‘subject of a collection’ (samudāyin). Therefore, ‘with the thought of the collection, etc.’, that is, with the intention of the collection, etc., ‘the teaching of the burden-bearer, etc.’ is not contradicted; the [last words] were understood in the verse. [In the verse,] the first of the two ‘etc.’ refers to the continuum, etc.; the second to the burden, etc.

Here, it is precisely the aggregates that have been intended as a collection and as a continuum, etc., that have been called ‘pudgala’, i.e. ‘burden-bearer’, because in this very world there is the conception of a pudgala. And it is precisely for this reason that the Bhagavān, after having said: ‘Who is the burden-bearer? It is the pudgala’, explained who was the pudgala with the words beginning ‘It is that venerable that has such name, such birth, such family, such food, who experiences such pleasure and such pain, who has such lifespan’.\[6\] [And the Bhagavān said this] in order to teach that it must indeed be known as a conceptual being (prajñāpārāśa), characterized by a collection of aggregates, [and certainly] not as another entity (anya) [i.e. different from the aggregates], which is supposed by others [to be] permanent [and] real (dravyasat). And one must necessarily know in this way, otherwise also the ‘taking of the burden’ should have nothing to do with the aggregates, since it has been taught...
apart from the aggregates, like the pudgala, but this would be clearly contradictory. Therefore, those very aggregates that operate to give rise to other aggregates, these, existing previously, have been taught by saying ‘burden’; but those that arise as ‘result’ are called ‘burden-bearer’. Thus, this [sūtra] does not make known [the real existence of a pudgala].

‘But Uddyotakara says: “The one who does not admit the Self (ātman) cannot consider these words of the Tathāgata full of sense, because [he] said: ‘O venerable, I am not corporeality, feeling, notion, volition; venerable, I am not primary awareness (vijñāna)! Similarly, o monk, you are not this corporeality, feeling, notion, volition; you are not primary awareness!” Indeed, with these [words] he denied corporeality, etc., namely the aggregates, as being the object of the ego (ahaṅkāra); and this is a specific negation (viśeṣapratiṣedha), not a general negation (sāmānyapratiṣedha). And the one who does not admit the Self must make a general negation, such as: ‘I am not, you are not’. In a specific negation, in fact, the affirmation of another thing is implicit, as when one says: ‘I do not see with the left eye’, it is understood: ‘I see with the right’; but if [he] does not even see through that [eye], mentioning the left is [completely] useless; one should simply say: ‘I do not see.’ Thus, also in this case, when it is said: ‘The Self is not the corporeality’, and so on up to: ‘Indeed, the Self is not primary awareness’, what is suggested is [in fact the opposite]: ‘There is a Self whose characteristics are different from those [that have been mentioned]’. And this, be it inexpressible or different [from the aggregates], in any case exists as a Self’.

In this regard [Śāntarakṣita] says [the line] beginning ‘And the specific negation’.

349cd. And the specific negation [of a Self] shines against those who hold such points of view.

The point is as follows: this mountain range of the personalistic wrong view (satkāyadrṣṭi), which belongs to those who think incorrectly (kumati), rises with twenty peaks, that is to say: 1) ‘Self is corporeality’, etc. up to: ‘Self is primary awareness’; 2) ‘Self is in the corporeality’, etc. up to: ‘Self is in primary awareness’; 3) ‘Self is endowed with corporeality’, etc. up to: ‘Self is endowed with primary awareness’; 4) ‘Corporeality is in the Self’, etc. up to: ‘Primary awareness is in the Self’.

Among these, in order to refute the first pentad of [wrong] views, a ‘negation’ in a ‘specific’ form will shine ‘against those who hold such points of view’—those who hold these points of view are precisely those who support the first [pentad of wrong] vision[s], that is to say: ‘Self is
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corporeality’, etc.—for it is precisely what could cause perplexity in a mentally immature person that has been repeated and then refuted. But here it is [certainly] not meant to affirm anything, for, otherwise, by saying something that does not purify [the mind of] the listeners [the Buddha] would have been a totally injudicious teacher.

Notes

α Another definition of ātman, which contains parallels (here in bold type) to this passage, occurs in the Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā ad stt. 171–172, at the beginning of the Ātmaparīkṣā (Jp fol. 45r, Š1 p. 101, Š2 p. 74; this passage is missing in K): anye punar ityādi | anya iti | te pāpiṅkā vaiśesikāḥ | (anye → vaiśesikāḥ Jp ) | anye punar ityādi | Š1; deest in Š2) te hi śarīrendriyabuddhvitatritam ātmākhyam dravyam icchādevaprayatnasu-khaduhkhajñānadharmedharmasamskārānām āśrayaṃ samavāyikāraṇam (samavāyī Jp° | samavāyī Jp°) acidrūpam avināśi sarvagataṃ subhāsabhākarmabhedānāṃ kartṛ tatpahalasya ceṭṭanīṣṭasya bhoktṛ parikalpa-yanti | anyathā yady ātmā na bhavet tadā kah pretya karmaphalāni bhūṣijita | na hy anyena kṛtam anyo bhūntke | [...] tasmād avāsyant ya eva kartā sa eva bhoktāṅgikartavya iti | tena yo ’sau kartā bhoktā ca sa ātmā | (”ṅṅīkartavya iti | tena yo ’sau kartā bhoktā Jp° | deest in Jp°).

β The description of the pudgalalātman as kartṛ, bhoktṛ and moktṛ also occurs in other Buddhist works. See, for instance, the following two passages: asty eva pudgalo ya eṣa draṣṭā yāvad vijñātā, kartā bhoktā jñātā moktā ca | na sa draṣṭā yujyate | nāpi yāvan moktā | sa hi darśanādisamjñakānāṃ vijñānaṃ pratayabhāvena vā kartā bhavet svāmitvena vā | [...] (Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya ad 18.95, ed. pp. 156–157); sa idam yād vēc vacanīyaḥ | kaccid icchasi yo viṣayanirjātābhhyāṃ sukhahukkhaḥbhūyāṃ viṅkārāṃ āpadyate | yaś ca cetanāyāḥ viṅkārāṃ āpadyate | yaś ca klesopakleśair viṅkāram āpadyate | sa bhoktā vā kartā vā moktā vēti | yo vā na viṅkāram āpadyate | saced viṅkārāṃ āpadyate | tena samskrār ēva bhoktāraḥ kartāro moktāra ity anitya ātmā [iti] na yujyate | sacen na viṅkāram āpadyate | tena bhoktā (em. ) moktā ed.) kartā moktāmeti nirvikāro na yujyate | (Yogācārabhūmi [ātmavāda], pp. 134–135).

γ The underlying assumption is that in order to become active, an agent, experiencer, etc. must abandon his/her previous condition/state of non-agent, non-enjoyer, etc., but this is impossible for eternal entities such as the Self, which never move from one condition to another. To use Kamalaśīla’s words, the Self cannot be the experiencer [and so on] of the objects since it cannot be distinguished from the state in which it was not [their] experiencer [etc.] (abhoktravasthānirviśiṣṭatvāt, ad st. 288). This topic is repeatedly dealt with and elaborated upon in the Tattvasaṅgraha and in its Pañjikā (see, e.g., Tattvasaṅgraha, stt. 227, 272–273). In this connection, the comparison with the space (ākāśa) occurs in two other passages of the Pañjikā: yat pūrvottarāvasthāsu na viṣayate tat pariṇāmi na bhavati yathākāśaṁ, na viṣayate ca caitanyāṁ sarvāvasthāsviti vyāpakāṇupalabdhīḥ (”ānupalabdhīḥ

This passage, which is also quoted in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (ed. Pradhan/Haldar p. 468; ed. D. Šāstrī p. 1207; ed. Lee/Ejima pp. 16, 90), in the Sanmīdi bu lun (三彌底部論) is referred to as an authoritative source of those (i.e. the Vātsīputrīyas) who believe that the ‘person’ (人) is really existent (T. 1649, xxxii, 463a: 復次諸部何故說有我。答一人出世多人得安樂生故。佛語諸比丘。一切功德人生在世間。多人得安樂故。若無人誰生功德。是諸部見一人生故。是故有我。’And for what further reason is the self actually existent? Because when one man renounces the world many derive peace and joy. The Buddha told the Bhikṣus, “For every man of virtue taking birth in this world, many enjoy (the benefit of) peace and joy”. If there were no person, who would bring forth virtues? So these schools see the teaching that there is a person taking birth and hold therefore that the self is actually existent’ (trans. Venkataramanan 1953: 169–170; see also pp. 173, 186; see also Thiên Châu 1999: 103). In the Pāli Canon, this sentence occurs with similar words in the Ekapuggalavagga of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (= 1.13, ed. vol. I, p. 22): ekappuggalo, bhikkhave, loke uppajjamāno uppajjati bahujanahitāya bahujanasukhāya lokānukampāya atthāya hitāya sukhaḥ devamanussānaṃ | katamo ekappuggalo | tathāgato arahama sammāsambuddho | ‘O monks, there is one person who, arising in the world, arises for the welfare of many people, for the happiness of many people, out of compassion for the world, for the benefit, for the welfare, for the happiness of devas and men. Who is that one person? He is the Tathāgata, the Venerable, the Perfectly Awakened One.’

This is the first pāda of a famous stanza that in its Pāli version occurs several times in the Canon (e.g. Samyutta Nikāya 1.2.1, ed. vol. I, p. 6): aniccā sabbasaṅkhārā uppādavayadhammino || uppaśītaṃ nirujjhītaṃ tesam vūpasamo sukho || ‘All conditioned things are impermanent, subject by nature to arise and die; after arising they disappear. The calming of them is [true] joy’. In the first pāda, some texts (e.g. Dīgha Nikāya 17.2.17, ed. vol. II, p. 199; Apadāna 2.115a, 34.123a, 43.100a) have the variant reading aniccā vata saṅkhārā: ‘Conditioned entities, indeed, are impermanent.’ Cf. aslo Abhidharmakośabhāṣya 9: sarva ime dharmā anityāḥ sanmukṣītaḥ ceti tathā pratītyasamutpānā iti (ed. Lee and Ejima, pp. 11, 70).

This passage occurs in several Pāli sources. See, e.g., Dīgha Nikāya 9.26 (Poṭṭhapādasutta), ed. vol. I, p. 188, and Majjhima Nikāya 63 (Cūlasaccakasutta), ed. vol. I, pp. 430–431: tam jīvanam tam sarīram […] aṇāṇam jīvanam aṇāṇam
This stanza is also quoted, without indication of the source, by Vasubandhu in his Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (it is introduced there simply by aha cātra; see ed. Pradhan & Haldar p. 470; ed. D. Śāstrī p. 1211; ed. Lee & Ejima pp. 18, 104), and with the reading cāpeksya instead of cāveksya in pāda b. This stanza, together with another verse that is quoted immediately after it in the Abhidharmakosabhāṣya (ātmāstitvam hy upagato bhinnah syād dṛṣṭidamśtrayā | bhramśāṁ kuśalapotasya kuryād aprāpya saṃvr̥tim || ‘... since the one who admits the existence of a Self would be “severed” by the tusk of [wrong] vision; [on the other hand,] without obtaining the [knowledge of] relative truth, he would cause the loss of the cub that is the wholesome [action]’), is usually attributed to Bhadanta Kumāralāta (3rd cent. CE [Katō 1980]): see ed. Lee & Ejima p. 104, n. 437 for references. In his Vyākhyā, Yaśomitra explains these stanzas as follows (ed. Wogihara vol. 2, pp. 708–709; D. Śāstrī pp. 1210–1211; the pratikas and the commented words are in bold):

āha cātra iti bhadantakumāralātaḥ | dṛṣṭidamśtrāvahhedam ca iti vistarāh |

drṣṭir eva daṁśtrā tayāvahhedam apekṣya desayanti buddhā bhagavanto dharmam nairātmyam | tatratiṣṭipakṣena bhramśāṁ ca karmanām apekṣya kṛtvipraṇaśam apekṣya pudgalāstitvam iva darśayanto 'nyathā desayanti |

vyāghrīpotāpahāravad iti yathā vyāghrī nātiṣṭhureṇa dantagrahaṇena svapotam apaharati nayati–“māśya daṁśtrā śarīram kṣataṁ bhūt” iti nāpy atiśithilena dantagrahaṇena tam apaharati–“māśya bhramśapāto (sic for bhramśo or pāto or even for bhramśāḥ pāto? [one of the two words could be interpolated])'śmin visaye bhūt” iti yutenaiva grahaṇenāpaharatī 'arthāḥ | apaharatīty apare paṭhanti sthānāntarād apaharathay apanayatīty arthāḥ | tathārthadharsāne kāraṇām darśayann āha—ātmāstitvam iti vistarāh |

ātmāstitvam pratipannaḥ cet kaścid dṛṣṭidamśtrayā satkāyadṛṣṭilokasāṇayā bhinnah sa vineyajanah syāt | aprāpya saṃvr̥tigatim dharmasāṅketam ajānānah kuśalapotasya kuśalakarmano vyāghrīpotabhūtasya bhramśāṁ kuryāt—“nāsti karmanāḥ phalam” iti || ‘[...] “The tear [generated] by the fang of the vision”, etc. The fang is the [incorrect] vision [the compound dṛṣṭidamśtrā being a karmadhāraya]; considering the laceration produced by this [vision], the Blessed Buddhas “teach the Dharma”, i.e. the insubstantiality. “And”, [on the other hand,] “considering the destruction of actions”, i.e. considering the loss of what has been done, that is produced by this antidote, they “teach” the other way around, showing as if there were a pudgala. [And they do this] in the same way that the female tiger picks up her cub. The female tiger picks up, i.e. carries off, her own cub with her teeth, in a grip that is not overly tight, thinking, “Let us not injure the body of this [cub] with our fangs!”; nor exceptionally wide, thinking, “Let him not fall to the ground!” The sense is that she picks him up with the right grip [...]’.

The Paramārthasaptatikā was written by Vasubandhu in order to refute the theses of Vindhyavāsin, a Sāṃkhya master who probably lived in the 4th cent.

Similar words occur several times in the Pāli Canon (atthi sattā opapātikā; see, e.g., Dīgha Nikāya 1.2.27, Brahmajālasutta, ed. vol. I, p. 27; Ānguttara Nikāya 3.117 and 10.211), as well as in Sanskrit sources: santi khalu punar atra bhagavan sattvā ya aupapādukāḥ padmeṣu paryaṅkaiḥ prādurbhavanti | tat ko 'tra bhagavan hetuḥ kah pratyayo ya'd anye punar garbhāvāse pratisaṃvanti, anye punar aupapādukāḥ paryaṅkaiḥ padmeṣu prādurbhavanti | bhagavān āha—ye te 'jita bodhisattvā anvēṣu buddhakṣetresu sthitāḥ sukhāvatāṃ lokadhātāv upapattaye vicīkṣām utpādayanti, tena cittena kuśalamālānay avaropayanty, teṣām atra garbhāvāse bhavati | ye punar nirvicīkṣās ečchinnakāṃkṣāḥ sukhāvatāṃ lokadhātāv upapattaye kuśalamālānay avaropayanty, buddhānāṃ bhagavatāṃ asaṅgajñānāṃ avakalpayanty abhiśraddhaḥ adhimucyante, ta aupapādukāḥ padmeṣu paryaṅkaiḥ prādurbhavanti | (Sukhāvatīvyūha, vistaramātr̥kā, p. 68). See also Viṃśikā ad st. 8 (ed. Silk p. 63; see also the note on pp. 156–157). In the Sanmiddhi bu lun (三彌底部論) these words are referred to as an authoritative source of those who believe that the ‘person’ is really existent (T. 1649, xxxii, 463a4–6: 复次何以故有我。 答正见故。 佛言。 有人见化生故。 正见。 彼诸部见。 正见故。 是故有我。‘And for what further reason is the self an existent? On account of samyagdrṣṭi. The Buddha said that there are men who see the aupapātika, (seeing which is) a samyagdrṣṭi (and so as seeing aupapātika is) samyagdrṣṭi therefore these schools hold that the self is (actually) existent’ (trans. Venkataramanan 1953: 169 [verbatim]); see also Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ed. Pradhan & Haldar p. 468; ed. D. Śāstrī p. 1207; ed. Lee & Ejima p. 90).

The following passage is a shortened quotation from a Sanskrit version of the Bhārahārasūtra, which is quoted almost in its entirety by Yaśomitra in his Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (ed. D. Śāstrī p. 1206) (cf. also Nyāyavārttika by Uddyotakara, p. 703): bhāram ca vo bhikṣavo deśayiṣyāmi bhārādānaṃ ca bhāranikṣepaṇaṃ ca bhārahāraṃ ca | tac chr̥ṇuta sādhu ca suṣṭhu ca manasikuruta bhāsiṣye | bhāraḥ katamaḥ pañcopādānaskandhāḥ | bhārādānāṃ katamat | tṛṣṇā paunarbhavikā nandīrāgasahagatā tatra tatrābhinnandinī | bhāranikṣepaṇaṃ katamat | yad asyā eva tṛṣṇāyāḥ paunarbhavikāyā nandīrāgasahagatāyās tatra tatrābhinnandinīyā aśeṣaprahāṇaṃ pratiniḥsargo vyantībhāvaḥ kṣayo virāgo nirodho vyupaśamo 'staṅgamah | bhārahāraḥ katamaḥ | pudgala iti syād vacanīyam yo 'śāv āyuṣmān evamānām ā evamānām (evamānyasavyāya Eltschinger 2014: 457 evamjanya ed.) evamgotra evamāhāra evamsukhadhkopratisamvedī evamdvīghāyu evamchāristhikā evamāyusparyanta (evamāyusparyanta Eltschinger 2014: 457 evamāyuṣmanta ed.) iti. On the Sanskrit Bhārahārasūtra, its reconstruction and scholastic interpretation, see Eltschinger 2014. In the Pāli Canon, this passage corresponds to Saṃyutta Nikāya 22.22 (Bhārasutta, ed. vol. III, pp. 25–26). In the Sanmiddhi bu lun (三彌底部論) the Bhārahārasūtra is referred to as an authoritative source of those who believe that the ‘person’ is different from the aggregates (T. 1649, xxxii, 463b9–12: 又諸部說人異五陰。 何以故。 答如擔重擔人故。 佛言。 重擔是五陰。 擔者是人。 如是。 以是故人與陰各。 是故人與陰異。‘Again there are all those who say that the five skandhas are different from the self. But why? On the
account of the example of the man carrying heavy burden. The Buddha said, “The load is the five skandhas and their carrier is the person”. Therefore the person and the skandhas are separate and so the person and the skandhas are different’ (trans. Venkataramanan 1953: 170–171).

The words na hi bhāra eva bhārahāro yuktaḥ occur verbatim in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (ed. D. Śāstrī pp. 1206, line 4; ed. Lee and Ejima, pp. 15, 88).

ξ

Cf. above, note ν.

ο

Cf. Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: skandhā eva ca skandhānām upaghātāya samvartante pūrvakā uttaraśām iti bhāraṃ ca bhārahāram ca kṛtvoktaḥ | upaghāṭartha hi bhāra iti (ed. D. Śāstrī pp. 1206–1207), and the corresponding commentary by Yaśomitra: tatra ye upaghāṭaḥya samvartante duḥkhahetavaḥ skandhās te bhāra iti kṛtvoktaḥ | utte ye pīdyante te bhārahāra iti kṛtvokta iti | (ibid.).

ρ

I was unable to find a precise parallel of this quotation.

σ

The first part of this passage is a quotation, with a few variants, from the Nyāyavārttika by Uddyotakara (ca. 550–610), introd. ad Nyāyasūtra 3.1.1 (ed. A. Tarkatirtha p. 702). The second part (yathā vāmenākṣṇā → sarvathāstya ātmeti) is apparently absent from the Nyāyavārttika.

Appendix 1

Excerpts from the Vimalaprabhā and the Tattvaratnāvalī

1. Vimalaprabhā ad Laghukālacakratantra 2.173a

iha vaibhāṣiko166 yas tattvam pudgalākhyam vadati tanugatam tatsvabhāvāt sa naṣṭa iti167 | iha yadi pudgalāntarvartī upapattyāṅgikaḥ pudgalo ’sti, tādā svabhāvo vācyah | kiṃ jñānasvabhāvo ’jñānasvabhāvo vā | yadi jñānasvabhāvas tādānityah, iha ghatajñāne niruddhe paṭajñānān utpadyate, ato ’nityah | athājñānasvabhāvasa tadājñānasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvah | atas tatsvabhāvād vicāryamānah sa naṣṭo vaibhāṣika iti | “ihāsti pudgalo bhāravāho, na niccaṃ bhanāmi nāniccaṃ bhanāmi” iti | yad bhagavato vacanaṃ tad jñānapaṭale vistareṇa vaktavyam iti |

a athājñānasvabhāvas em. ] atha jñānasvabhāvah ed.;
athājñāśvabhāvas MS fol. 363v

165 Quoted with slight changes from Vimalaprabhā ad st. 2.173a, p. 266. For an English translation, see Wallace 2004: 242.

166 According to Bu ston, a Vaibhāṣika is here specifically a Vātsīputrīya (gnas ma bu’i sde pa, cit. in Wallace 2004: 242).

167 The words in bold correspond to Laghukālacakratantra 2.173a.
2. Paramāksarajñānasiddhi (Vimalaprabhā 5.6)\textsuperscript{168}

mlecchā asuradharmāsṛtiṭā kartṛvādino jīvavādino jātvādaraḥita | eśaṃ mlecchānām ubhayagrahaḥ—paramāṇusamdoḥagraha upapattyāṅga-pudgalagrahas ceti | eśaṃ abhiprayaḥ—yadi paramāṇusamdoḥātmake šarire 'ntarvartyupapathyāṅgikapudgalo nāsti, paramāṇusamdoḥātmake kāye vinaṣte saty aparakāyagrahaṇaṃ kaḥ kariṣyati | tasmād upapādukapudgalo 'sti, tena sādhitena svargapalām nirvānapalām ca bhavati | svargaphalaḥ aparām nirvāṇam nāma na syād iti tattvapṛcchākāle teṣām svacittabhāprrayam abhijñāya tattvavidā bhagavatoktām—“atthi puggalo bhāravāho, ṇa ṇiccaṃ bhaṇāmi ṇāniccaṃ bhaṇāmi” iti | etad eva satyam bhagavato vacanam | svapnāvasthāyāṃ cittavāsanāpudgalo nānityo na nityo vakṭum śakyate | anena tathāgatavacanena mlecchadharmam tyaktvā baubdhā vaibhāṣikā bhāvanā dhyanam |

Among them[, i.e. the three kinds of Hearer, we describe first] the examination of the Hearer of lesser capacity. The exposition [of this examination] is as follows: having first accepted the [existence of] external referents, such as a blue or a yellow [object], he states that the pudgala[, which is its perceiver and experiencer,] is free from being permanent or impermanent. [In scriptures] it has been taught: [...] ‘There is the pudgala, the “burden-bearer”. I do not call [it] permanent, I do not call [it] impermanent’. And the pudgala that is endowed with attachment transmigrates. Therefore, [for this kind of practitioner,] in order to destroy attachment, the meditation is the repulsive contemplation.

\textsuperscript{168} Quoted with slight changes from the Vimalaprabhā, vol. 3, p. 86. This passage has been translated into Italian by Raniero Gnoli (Gnoli 1997: 52).

\textsuperscript{169} The Sanskrit text is quoted with only slight changes in the editorial conventions from Gerlof 2018: 818–819.
Appendix 2
Excerpts from other works of Kamalaśīla

1. II Bhāvanākrama

de la rnal ’byor pas ’di ltar rnam par dpyad par bya ste | gaṅ zag ni phuṅ po daṅ khams daṅ skye mched las gud na mi dmigs so || gaṅ zag ni phuṅ po la sogs pa de dag ni mi rtag pa daṅ du ma’i ŋo bo ŋid kyaṅ ma yin te | phuṅ po la sogs pa de dag ni mi rtag pa daṅ du ma’i ŋo bo yin pa’i phyir daṅ | gaṅ zag ni rtag pa daṅ gcig pu’i ŋo bo yin par gźan dag gis brtags pa’i phyir ro || de ŋid dam gźan du brjod du mi ruṅ ba’i gaṅ zag gi dṅos po yod par mi ruṅ ste | dṅos po yod pa’i rnam pa gźan med pa’i phyir ro ||

2. III Bhāvanākrama

bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate | bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgala-dharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṁ a yā skandhānām ātmātmāyaharaḥitaḥ | dharmanairātmyaṁ yā teṣām eva māyopamatā | tatraivaṃ b yogī nirūpayet—na tāvad rūpādvyaṭiriktāḥ pudgalo ’sti, tasyāpratibhāsanāt, c rūpādiś evāham iti pratyayotpatteś d ca | na cāpi rūpādīskandhasvabhāvah pudgalah, teṣām rūpādīnāmanityānekasvabhāvavatvāt, e pudgalasya ca nityaikarūpeṇa parair upakalpitatvāt | nāpi tattvāyatvābhyām avācyasya pudgalasya f vastutvam yuktam, vastutataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt |

This excerpt is quoted on the basis of the edition by Kiyotaka Goshima (1983: 37). With a few changes here follows the retranslation of this passage made by Gyaltsen Namdol: tatraivaṃ yogī vicārayet—pudgalo na skandhādvāyatanavatāyaḥ | pratyayotpattatvaḥ | nāpi tattvāyatvābhyām avācyasya pudgalasya | vastutvam yuktam, vastutataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt | (cf. Namdol 1985: 241).

170 This excerpt is quoted on the basis of the edition by Kiyotaka Goshima (1983: 37). With a few changes here follows the retranslation of this passage made by Gyaltsen Namdol: tatraivaṃ yogī vicārayet—pudgalo na skandhādvāyatanavatāyaḥ | pratyayotpattatvaḥ | nāpi tattvāyatvābhyām avācyasya pudgalasya | vastutvam yuktam, vastutataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt | (cf. Namdol 1985: 241).

171 MS fol. 2v1–3 (Note that in the reproductions of the manuscript published in Obermiller 1963, fols. 2r and 2v are printed in reverse position and with the wrong label, i.e. 2a instead of 2b and viceversa. Here sandhi and punctuation have been silently changed); cf. ed. Tucci, pp. 5–6, and Namdol 1985: 226.
3. *Madhyamakāloka*\(^{172}\)

\[\text{gañ gzan dag rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa ṇid la sosgs par brjod par bya ba ma yin pa gañ zag la sosgs pas bsgrub pa gñi ga yan ma ñes pa ṇid yin no ņes smras pa}^a \text{ de yañ rigs pa ma yin te | ños po yod pa la ji ltar yan brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ṇid mi srid pa}^b \text{ ai phyir ro | } \text{'di ltar rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa}^c \text{'i mtsshan ṇid dag ni cig sgrub pa dañ | dgag pa}^d \text{ gzan dgag pa dañ | sgrub pa med na med pa yin pa}^e \text{ ai phyir cig dgag pa gañ yin pa de ṇid ños po gzan sgrub pa yin pa}^f \text{'i phyir ji ltar na ños po brjod par bya [P 223r] ba ma yin}^g \text{ ek ņes bya ba ṇid yin | de lta ma yin na khyad par med pa}^h \text{'i phyir thams cad brjod par bya ba ma yin pa kho nar}^i \text{d 'gyur ro ||}

[\ldots]

\[\text{gañ dag gis gañ zag ces bya ba}^a \text{'i ños po rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa}^b \text{'i ño bo dag tu brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ṇid du kun brtags par phyur pa de dag gis kyaṅ | 'di gcig dañ du ma dañ bral ba ṇid du ños su khas blaṅs pa ṇid de | gcig gi ño bo ṇid dañ ldan pa yañ | rtag pa ṇid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ṇid du rigs pa ma yin la | ño bo ṇid gzan dañ gzan du ñams}^c \text{e su myoṅ ba yañ skad cig ma ṇid du brjod par bya ba ma yin pa ṇid du rigs pa dañ ldan pa ma yin no ||}

\[^a \text{ pa D | ba P}
\[^b \text{ pa P | pa dañ | D}
\[^c \text{ yin D | yin pa P}
\[^d \text{ yin pa kho nar D | yin par P}
\[^e \text{ ñams D | ma ñams P}

4. *Vajracchedikāṭikā*\(^{173}\)

\[\text{gañ dag yañ gañ zag brjod du mi ruñ bar 'dod pa de dag gi yañ de ni phun por gtogs pa}^a \text{'i chos dañ mtsshan ṇid mi 'dra bar khas blaṅs pa}^b \text{'i phyir śugs kyis don gzan pa kho nar khas blaṅs pa yin te | thams cad kyaṅ brjod du mi ruñ bar thal bar 'gyur ba}^c \text{'i phyir ños po ni nam yañ brjod du mi ruñ ba mi srid do ||}

\[172 \text{ P fols. 222}_{6-223r}, 239r_{6-6}; D fols. 202r_{3-6}, 216r_{3-4}. For a retranslation into Sanskrit, see Dorjee 2001: 94, 113. For an English translation of the second passage with references to further parallels, see Keira 2004: 185.}

\[173 \text{ P fols. 219v}_{2-6}, 221v_{-222r}, 223v_{-3-8}; D fols. 212r_{6-7}, 214r_{-14v}, 215v_{-216r}. For a retranslation into Sanskrit, see Tenzin 1994: 114, 118, 121.}
Materials for the study of the Pudgalavāda and its criticism

[...] de ltar gal te bdag phuñ po dag las gžan ma yin na ni de’i tshe phuñ po bžin du skad cīg par ’gyur ba’am | yaṅ na bdag bžin du phuñ po rtag pa dag tu ’gyur te | de daṅ tha mi a dad pa’i phyir ro || phuñ po bžin du du ma ṅid du thal bar ’gyur ba yaṅ bzlog dka’ bar ’gyur ro || de bas na phuñ po rnams kho na la bdag ces miṅ ’dogs b | P 222r| pa yin te | miṅ la ni brtsad pa med do || ’on te phuñ po bdag daṅ tha dad par ’dod’ na ni de’i tshe bde ba la sog pa daṅ ’brel ba d med pas de za ba po la sog par mi ’grub par ’gyur ro || sbyar ba ni gaṅ žig e bde ba daṅ sdbus bsṅal la sog pa f daṅ ’brel ba e med pa de ni byed pa po ’am za ba po ma yin la | grol bar byed pa ’am ’khor bar byed pa yin par yaṅ mi rigs te | dper na mo gśam gyi bu bžin la | bdag kyaṅ bya ba la sog pa daṅ ’brel ba h gaṅ yaṅ med pas žes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa’i dmigs pa yin no || gtan tshigs ma grub pa ṅid kyaṅ ma yin te | ’di ltar l bde ba la sog pa daṅ ’brel ba k žig yin na gzi daṅ gnas pa’i mtshan ṅid dam | ldan pa’i mtshan ṅid dam | rgyu daṅ ’bras bu’i mtshan ṅid dam phyogs | D 214v| gsum du ’gyur graṅ na | [...] gaṅ zag dag kyaṅ gal te ’jig na ni phuñ po rnams kho na’i naṅ du ’dus par thal bar ’gyur te d | phuñ po rnams kyis ’dus byas mtha’ dag bs dus pa’i phyir ro m || ’on te mi ’jig na a de’i tshe phuñ por gtogs pa’i chos | D 216r| rnams daṅ mi ’dra bas de las don gžan pa kho nar ’gyur te | de’i ņes pa ni brjod zin to || de lta bas na brjod du mi ruṅ ba žes bya ba dnos po cuṅ o zad kyaṅ med de | des nachos thams cad bdag med do || žes bya ba bcom ldan ’das kyi seṅ ge’i sgra ni mu stegs byed glaṅ po che’i khyu mtha’ dag skrag par mdzad ciṅ brdzi ba med pa yin pas maṅ du mi dgos so ||

a  mi P | me D
b  ’dogs P | ’dod D
c  ’dod P | ’don D
d  ba em. | pa PD
e  žig D | žig bya ba daṅ P
f  pa D | par P
g  ba P | pa D
h  ba em. | pa PD
i  pa P | pa ni D
j  ’di ltar D | ’di ltar de P
k  ba em. | pa PD
l  te P | ste D
m  ro P | ra D
n  na D | na ni P
o  cuṅ D | chud P
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Tattvaratnāvalī by Advayavajra

See Gerloff 2018.

Dīgha Nikāya

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**Mahāyānasūtra-lāṃkārabhāṣya**

**Mahāvyutpatti**

**Yuktidīpikā**

**Yogācārabhūmi by Asaṅga**

**Vimalaprabhā by Puṇḍarīka**


MS = Rome, National Library, Giuseppe Tucci’s Collection, photographic reproductions of a manuscript of the Vimalaprabhā, Catalogue No. 3.4.1.

**Viṃśikā**
Materials for the study of the Pudgalavāda and its criticism

Saṃyutta Nikāya


Sukhāvatīvyūha


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*Saṃmitīyanikāyaśāstra

Taishō 1649, xxxii, 462a6–473a14.

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sGom pa’i rim pa

(*Bhāvanākrama—second treatise) by Kamalaśīla

See Goshima 1983.

See also Namdol 1985: 81–140.

'Phags pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phin pa rdo rje gcod pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa (*Āryavajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitātiṭikā) by Kamalaśīla


See also Tenzin 1994: 229–416.

dBu ma snañ ba

(*Madhyamakāloka) by Kamalaśīla


See also Dorjee 2001.
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I hope I will be forgiven for starting on a personal note, but it does have a bearing on the matter at hand. I am deeply honoured to be part of this volume, but when I was first asked to submit a contribution, I was slightly puzzled as to what I could write about, since my main area of study is late Indian esoteric Buddhism. My initial reaction was of course misguided. There is a great body of evidence showing the interaction between Buddhist epistemology and what we might call the mystical side of the religion, but this is usually thought of as a one-way street. In other words, it is assumed that pramāṇa had a major influence on the mantranaya, but there was nothing going the other way. As a consequence, we find that many scholars of tantric Buddhism will at some point dabble—as I will do here—in epistemological śāstra, however, very few experts in pramāṇa will ever venture into the murky and mercurial field of tantra. There are, of course, very honourable exceptions; we need not look far. Yet, the two fields perhaps have much more to learn from each other than it appears, and in this short essay I hope to provide two very modest examples to illustrate this point. I should immediately warn the reader that both have serious shortcomings: the first is perhaps somewhat frivolous, while the second raises a question it does not ultimately answer. However, Helmut Krasser possessed a wonderful sense of humour and was a man of insatiable intellectual curiosity; I therefore hope that he would find such a tribute not ill-fitting.

1. On a new old folio of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇaviniścaya

We need to start from afar. The apabhramśa songs of the great siddha Saraha were among the first items of tantric Buddhist literature to capture the attention of modern scholars. I too became prone to this fascination when I discovered—or rather: re-discovered—two unedited manuscripts

* I thank Mr. Samuel Grimes for his suggestions.
of the *dohā*-collection. The first can be found in a multiple-text manuscript, perhaps the only available non-Nepalese copy of the collection, held at Tokyo University Library.\(^1\) The second, a self-standing witness in Old Newar script, was photographed by Rāhul Sāṅkṛityāyana at Ngor Monastery\(^2\); it can be accessed in the Göttingen copies.\(^3\) Sāṅkṛityāyana himself produced an edition of the *dohās* accompanied by a Hindi translation and study in 1957, and for a while I assumed that this latter was the witness he used. I was wrong. In fact, Sāṅkṛityāyana reproduced his witness in the plates accompanying the volume, and, curiously, never even mentioned the Ngor manuscript. His manuscript was found at Sa skya. The 1957 volume contains much other miscellaneous material, including plates of other manuscript fragments. It was one of these that caught my attention—the third item on plate 11. My first impression was that the script looked quite old, at least tenth century or thereabouts. After having made out a few random words, I realised that it was definitely not a witness of the (or a) *dohā* collection and the subject matter did not seem to be tantric either. I perused the volume several times to find out more about the leaf, but I could find nothing that would identify it. I then tried to decipher it more methodically. The first words I could make out were \(\text{tannītī uddyottaye} \parallel \text{hitāhitaprāptiparihārayor niyamena,}\) which sounded terribly familiar. It took a good few minutes suffused with increasing disbelief to realise what the leaf actually contained: the beginning of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. There is nothing sensational about this discovery anymore, since we now have the entire Sanskrit text of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in multiple witnesses and splendidly edited.\(^4\) However, up to January 2004, the date ‘when a general agreement of cooperation was reached between the China Tibetology Research Center and the Austrian Academy of Sciences’ (Steinkellner 2007: ix), it would have counted as a very important fragment indeed. A case in point is an article by Matsuda and Steinkellner (1991), which discusses a single folio of Dharmakīrti’s masterpiece that was discovered in Nepal in what is known as ‘Bendall’s Puka’ (Matsuda/Steinkellner 1991: 139–141). Barring citations and other kinds of testimonia, for a long time this was the only fragment of the original. Sāṅkṛityāyana’s 1957 plates and their odd-one-out folio simply went unnoticed. Fortunately, Matsuda and Steinkellner 1991 also contains an image

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\(^1\) Now no. 517, old no. 557; see Matsunami 1965: 182–183.
\(^2\) Sāṅkṛityāyana 1937: 18, 53.
\(^3\) Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Xc 14/16; see Bandurski 1994: 48.
\(^4\) The first two chapters in Steinkellner 2007, the third in Hugon/Tomabechi 2011.
of the Bendall folio, between pages 144–145 (the verso is also printed in Steinkellner 2007). And here is the next oddity—it is almost certain that the folio on Śaṅkṛityāyana’s plate and the Bendall folio were once parts of the very same manuscript. The scribal hand is the same, as is the layout. Both folios contain five lines of writing arranged around two string spaces, where the left string space is kept completely empty, but the one on the right is empty only in the middle; in other words, the first and final line are not interrupted for the right-hand side string space. On the Bendall folio, the final line on this side is actually the penultimate line, but this is simply because of the shape of the leaf, which did not allow for the fifth line to be completed all the way to the right margin. Thus, while this single-folio fragment is not a sensational find, it is nevertheless not unimportant. Discounting the Gilgit fragment of the Hetubindu, the folio in Śaṅkṛityāyana’s plate is, together with the Bendall folio, as far as I can tell, the earliest manuscript attestation of Dharmakīrti’s oeuvre.

How did one folio end up in Kathmandu and one at Sa skya? I do not have a definitive answer. However, it should be noted that this is not the first time we have parts of the same manuscript not only in different places, but also geographically quite far from each other. For example, what I termed Ms S of Bhavabhaṭṭa’s Catuspīṭhanibandha in my doctoral thesis was pieced together from folios kept in the National Archives in Kathmandu and the Asiatic Society of Bengal in Kolkata. Based on the history of the old manuscript of the Rājatarāṅgiṇī, I suggested there that the breaking up of manuscripts could have been the result of inheritance procedures. Once the owner of a manuscript who actually read and understood it passed away, the bundle lost its textual value and became a family heirloom of sorts, distributed among the inheritors. These parts could then travel on with their owners. The Kathmandu Valley and the Sa skya heartland were certainly not disconnected areas, distance and terrain notwithstanding.

Suppose then that a bundle containing more than just a single folio of the Pramāṇaviniścaya manuscript made it to Tibet. What happened to the rest of it? Unfortunately, and this may sound very strange indeed, the best hypothesis is that it was partially willingly damaged by water and partially eaten. This is what Śaṅkṛityāyana says in his introduction:

> The way in which I obtained [this manuscript of the Dohākośa] was very strange. On my second journey searching for Indian palm-leaf manuscripts, I arrived at Sa skya. There were some palm-leaf manuscripts there. Upon my inquiries, someone said that the chaplain

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Péter-Dániel Szántó

(H. *pujārī*) of a local temple has a bundle of palm-leaf manuscripts in his possession. My memorable friend who has now passed away, Geshe Sanghadharmavardhana (Gendun Chomphel), went there and somehow obtained the bundle. In Tibet, palm-leaf manuscripts that came from India are thought of as extremely holy (H. *pavitr*). If a drop of water that has washed a palm-leaf manuscript enters the mouth of a moribund person, his/her sins are washed away; of this they have no doubt. This is a belief similar to what we [Indians] think Ganges water does for a person on the verge of death. [So] it should not come as a surprise that there [too] every pious householder would wish to keep such holy things in their house. For those devotees wishing to be even more pious, the chaplain gave as holy victuals (H. *prasād*) pieces he had broken off a palm-leaf manuscript, and it was for this purpose that he was in the possession of the bundle of leaves from various books. Who could say how many leaves from what variety of books have been distributed in this way? I was not going to allow this chaplain to resume custodianship⁶ of these important leaves. He did receive a small fee, so he did not object.⁷

Although the passage refers to the *Dohākośa* manuscript, it is understood that the other leaves came from the same source as well: a monk at Sa skya who made it his business to administer water through pennaed palm leaves to moribund locals and to distribute pieces of the same for pious consumption. So, it seems that in Tibet Dharmakīrti was digested in more ways than one.

The Tibetans’ harsh treatment of manuscripts, including textophagy, is otherwise also noted by Sāṅkṛityāyana’s companion, Gendun Chopel:

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⁶ The Persianate idiom *sapurd karnā* is not listed in the standard dictionary (McGregor 1993); see Varmā *et al.*, 2000, *sub voce*.

⁷ Sāṅkṛityāyana 1957: (67): *iskī prāpti baṛe vicitr ḍhaṃg se huī. maiṃ bhārat se gaī tālpatr kī pothiyom kī khoj mem apnī dūsrī yātrā mem sa.śkya pahumcā. vahāṃ tālpatr kī pothiyom thīm. khoj karne par kisī ne kahā, vahāṃ ke ek mandir ke pujaṃ̄ri ke pās tālpātrom kā baṃḍal hai. mere cīrasmaraṇīy mītr aur ab divamgat geśe samghadharmavardhana (gendun chomphel) jākar kisī taraḥ baṃḍal ko le āye. tībbat mem bhārat se gā tāl-pothiyom kō bahut pavītṛ mānā jātā hai. maraṇonmukh vyakti ke mūṃh mem yadi tālpōthī kā dhula ek bāṃḍal jal par jāy, to uske pāp dhul jāne meṃ koī sandeh nahīṃ. yah usī taraḥ kā viśvās hai, jaisā hamāre yahāṃ maranāsann ke lie gaṃgājal kō samajhā jātā hai. aisi pavītṛ vastu ko vahāṃ kā harek sadgrhasṭh apane ghar mem rakhnā cāhe, to isṃm aścary kyā? adhik caṛhāvā caṛhānevāle bhakt ko pujaṃ̄ri tālpōthī kā ek tukrā kāṭkar prasād ke rūp mem de diyā kartā tha, aur isī udēsēy se nānā punastōkem ke patrom kā yah baṃḍal uske pās thā. kaun-kaun-se granthom ke khine patre is prakār baṃṭe, ise kaun batlā saktā hai. mahattvāpuṃ patrom ko phir pujaṃ̄ri ko sapurd karṇā mere baś kī bāt nahīṃ thī. pujaṃ̄ri ko bhī kuch daksīṇā āi gāi, islie usne āpatti nahīṃ kī.
Likewise, once when they were dusting the texts in the Gorum temple at Sakya, pages of about five or six Indian volumes became mixed up. There, some religious-minded sentient beings said that keeping mixed-up scriptures brings bad luck so they threw them in the rubbish heap in the cellar, causing all the texts to be wasted. Even in India, it is extremely difficult to find even a few pages of ancient texts written on palm leaves; how sad that there is so little regard for this kind of precious treasure [in Tibet]. Similarly, some of the faithful have stolen pages from a text that is complete to make a protection amulet. They have torn the page of a book into little pieces and eaten it, saying that this is a blessing. They have offered them as texts to be placed inside statues and reliquaries. Thus [these ancient texts] are nowhere to be seen today.  

All that remains for this first note is to give a diplomatic edition of the text with some very minor observations about the readings. The sign Ø denotes the string space area, bracketed akṣaras are plausible reconstructions where the folio is damaged or too difficult to make out.

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[line 1] (siddham⁹ namo) mañjuśriye | sa śrīmān a(kalaṅka)dēh(ḥsva)yaṃ upetārya nūjāgrāha yaṃ vyaktan tasya(?) na vetty ayaṃ jadamatir loko garīyaḥ padam  
[subject]  
[object]  
[line 2] (?) tannītir uddyotyate || hitāhitaprāptiparihārayor niyameōna samyagijñānapūrvvakaṅvād aviduṣān tadvyutpādanārtham idam ārabhyate || Ø tad dvividham samyagijñānam¹⁰ pratyakṣam anumānaṇī ca¹¹ | na hy ābhīyām artham pariṣṭhāyam pra(va)-  
[line 3] rttamāno rthakriyāyām visamvādyate || nann anyad api śabdopamāṇāōdikāṃ prāmāṇam asti || prāmāṇasya sato
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⁸ Rinpoche 1986: 14: de mtshungs sa skya'i sgo rum lha khang du yang lan cig dpe cha rul bkrug byas pas rgya dpe pod lnga tsam 'khrug [] der chos sems can 'ga' zh[l][g] gis dpe 'khrug pa 'nyar na bkra mi shis pa 'ong zer nas 'og khang gi phyag dar khrod du 'phangs pas thams cad chud zos | ta la'i lo mar bris pa'i dpe rnying shog ldebs re tsam rgya gar du yang ches shin tu rnyed dka' ba lags pas | gces nor la rtis thang de tsam du med pa ya cha | de bzhin dad pa can 'ga' zhig gis gzhung cha tshang re nang nas shog gu re tsam brkus te mgul byed pa dang | dpe ldebs rnams dum bcad de byin rlaus zhes za ba dang | sku brnyan dang | mchod rten gyi gzungs gzhung tu phul te nam yang mthong rgyu med par byas nas [...] Translation from Jinpa/Lopez 2014: 39. I thank Birgit Kellner for bringing this source (the Gser gyi thang ma) to my attention in 2012.

⁹ Expressed by a symbol.

¹⁰ The word samyagijñānam is added above the line.

¹¹ The ed. (Steinkellner 2007) has an iti after this.
2. On Samantabhadra, Jitāri, and Mokṣākaragupta

The second note is concerned with a somewhat puzzling example of intertextuality demonstrating the influence of tantric authors on epistemology.

By way of introduction, I will first summarise my arguments in Szántó 2015: 543–554. One of the most important authors of early-mature tantric Buddhism was Jñānapāda, who lived sometime at the end of the eighth and the beginning of the ninth century. One of his chief works is a meditation manual for the Guhyasamāja system, called the Samantabhadra. This text, although known to have survived in the original, is only partially available to us. There are several commentaries on it, one of the most important ones being the Sāramañjarī of an author called Samantabhadra. This text survives in at least three recensions. A fragmentary Sanskrit witness of a shorter recension has been identified and published by Tanaka (2017); for convenience, based on the fragment’s provenance, I call this the ‘Nepalese recension’. A somewhat longer recension once stood behind the canonical Tibetan translation of the commentary, which I call the ‘Tibetan recension’. The longest, and presumably latest and most mature, recension is extant in Sanskrit in a magnificent manuscript.

12 The ed. has sadṛśatmanā.
13 The ed. has a tu after this.
14 This witness too has yathāvidhe; the Ed. emends to yathāvidhaḥ. See Isaacson 2009: 18–19.
15 The current whereabouts of the manuscript are not known to me. I have read it first from photographs in the Tucci collection (courtesy of Francesco Sferra) and later from the photographic archives of Beijing University (courtesy of Ye Shaoyong). It is a very long text, here penned on 37 densely written, large folios; my draft edition at this point runs over 150 pages.
copied sometime in the fifth decade of the eleventh century in the Pāla Empire. I refer to it as ‘the Pāla recension’. I have little doubt that all three versions of the text are by the same author. Samantabhadra can be shown to have flourished in the middle of the ninth century. There are two pieces of evidence to show this. First, in the ‘Tibetan recension’ he mentions a man called *Śrīkīrti as the person who commanded him to write a commentary. A short work by Śrīkīrti survives in a Nepalese fragment, where he eulogises Pālitapāda as his guru. This same Pālitapāda was Jñānapāda’s erstwhile guru when he spent some time on the Konkan coast, possibly in what is now Kadri Mañjunāth in Mangalore. Jñānapāda eventually left the Konkan, but later returned for a visit, and it was at this time that Pālitapāda requested him to write a work, which eventually materialised as the Samantabhadra. The author Samantabhadra was therefore about a generation younger than Jñānapāda, since he had in his life a figure of authority, possibly his master, Śrīkīrti, who was a co-disciple of Jñānapāda with the Konkani guru, Pālitapāda. The second piece of evidence to show that Samantabhadra was indeed a relatively early author is the textual pool he is citing. There is nothing there later than ca. 900 CE, most notably not a single mention of the Hevajratantra, a crucial text precious few authors could afford to ignore after its rise. Moreover, the texts he does cite are all typical favourites of other authors who can be dated to the ninth century.

The ‘Pāla recension’ of the Sāramañjarī is a fascinating document in many respects, but we need not go into details here since I intend to publish a monograph centred on it. I will discuss only one passage from the text. Verses 109–129 of the Samantabhadra teach the third stage of the meditation process called binduyoga. This process entails a small philosophical reflection on the practitioner’s part, culminating in the realisation that everything is mind only (cittamātratā). To start this reflection, the meditator contemplates the fact that external objects do not in reality exist. According to Samantabhadra’s exegesis, verses 110–112 teach that one cannot marshal any good positive proof (sādhakapramāṇa) for the true existence of external objects, while verses 113–114 list actual negative proofs (bādhakapramāṇa) for the same idea.

While I was preparing the draft edition of this second part (Ms fol. 27 recto, l. 2 to 27 verso, l. 7), I noticed some rather striking parallels in both wording and reasoning with passages from Mokṣākaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā. The quantity and closeness of these parallels made it clear that this could not have been an accident. Although Mokṣākaragupta’s
dates are not settled precisely (ca. 1050–1202 CE),\textsuperscript{16} he is doubtless later than Samantabhadra (active ca. 850 CE). This realisation led me to the somewhat uneasy hypothesis that Mokṣākaragupta, who was writing a beginners’ digest of Dharmakīrti,\textsuperscript{17} was recycling entire passages from a discussion by a tantric commentator. There was one possibility leading out of the conundrum, namely that both Samantabhadra and Mokṣākaragupta are copying from the same source. However, while the actual arguments cannot be said to be highly original, no such source could be found.

It was at this point that Kazuo Kano made me aware of Kenjo Shirasaki’s formidable work on Jitāri’s *Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā and its auto-commentary, the *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya. The root verses survive in Sanskrit, but the commentary is available only in Tibetan translation. Since I unfortunately do not read Japanese, I failed to profit extensively from these studies. Nevertheless, an English article\textsuperscript{18} discusses the undeniable parallels between Jitāri’s auto-commentary and the Tarkabhāṣā for the passage concerning us here. While the textual parallels between the Sāramañjarī and the Tarkabhāṣā are not quite exact, only very close, even a superficial look at the *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya makes it clear that certain passages from Jitāri’s text (most notably his treatment of the Yogācāra)\textsuperscript{19} and the aforementioned passages from the Sāramañjarī match almost verbatim. But this shows only a missing link, and not the common source, since Jitāri is usually thought of as active in the late tenth and/or early eleventh century\textsuperscript{20} or only slightly earlier\textsuperscript{21}; still a century or so later than Samantabhadra.

It is thus clear that there is a very good chance that a tantric author from the ninth century strongly influenced a doxographical-epistemological author of the tenth. If the timeline holds, this fact also tells us something about Jitāri’s character as an author. As far as I know, he is usually regarded as a highly original and influential writer. For example, it is well-known that Ratnakīrti reproduces Jitāri’s Vedāprāmāṇyasiddhi (with due attribution) in its entirety in his Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa.\textsuperscript{22} On the other hand, it has also been shown that his *Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā

\textsuperscript{16} Kajiyama 1966 [1998]: 1, 6–11.
\textsuperscript{17} See his introductory verse, Kajiyama 1966 [1998]: 23.
\textsuperscript{18} Shirasaki 1984.
\textsuperscript{19} Shirasaki 1984: 96–107.
\textsuperscript{20} Thus Bühnemann 1985: 7, citing Dietz and Tucci.
\textsuperscript{21} Thus Eltschinger 2003: 137–138 summarising all previous work on these dates.
\textsuperscript{22} Bühnemann 1985: 13; Eltschinger 2003: 142.
is essentially an extract from Āryadeva’s *Jñānasārasamuccaya*, provided of course that we know to which Āryadeva we are specifically referring. My example tends to tilt the balance in favour of the latter view, namely that Jitāri is more of an anthologist. However, as any student of mediaeval Indian authors will know, we also have to entertain the not-unlikely scenario that there were several Jitāris, or that some works were attributed to him in order to increase their prestige. The possibilities are thus numerous, and only a careful study of his thought will be able to shed light on this issue. This said, I hasten to add that Samantabhadra is probably not highly original either; he too is more of an anthologist. It is not impossible that his wordings ultimately go back to the founder of the school, Jñānapāda, or somebody else from that intellectual circle. Moreover, as far as the philosophical formulations are concerned, these might go back further still to Śāntarakṣita (whom he quotes) and Kamalaśīla, and ultimately to Dharmakīrti. The circle, as it were, is complete.

Naturally, the appreciation of a work will become higher once we possess attestation in the original. I therefore sincerely hope that the *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya* will be revisited in light of its partial virtual survival in the Sanskrit text of the *Sāramañjarī*. In order to show some of the striking parallels between the two texts, I chose only a couple of very straightforward examples, incidentally both of which also show that the Tibetan translation of Jitāri’s work is not always adequate.

This is how the *Sāramañjarī* begins the discussion on the negative proofs:

\[
bāhyam \text{ vastv artho guṇadravyādibhedena bahuprakāraḥ parair upavarnyate} | \text{ tatra guṇānāṃ dharmāṇām āśrayo dravyam tanni-} \\
\text{ṣedhenaiva te samūlam unmūlitā bhavatīti na prthag dūṣaṇam} \\
\text{upavarṇyate} | \text{ na cāsati samavāyīni samavāya iti} \text{ taddūṣaṇam api} \\
\text{nākhyāyate | dravyam ca prthivy ēp tejo vāyur ākāśaṃ kālo dig ātmā} \\
\text{mana iti navavidham} |\]

To summarise: Samantabhadra first glosses Jñānapāda’s *vastu* as ‘external object’. He then states that various schools conceive of this in various ways. He tacitly begins with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and its categories.
(padārtha). He states that it is pointless to refute the category of qualities (guṇa), because their locus is in substances (dravya); thus, if one refutes the idea of substance, those too will fall into philosophical oblivion. The same holds good for the idea of inherence (samavāya)—if there is nothing to inhere in, it is pointless to discuss the very concept. He then lists the nine substances.

Excepting the lemma, this formulation is followed word for word by Jitāri:\n
\[
\text{phyi rol gyi don yang gzhan gyis yon tan dang rdzas la sogs pa'i bye brag gyis [sic for gis!] rnam pa mang por brtags pa yin la | de la yon tan la sogs pa chos rnams kyi rten rdzas yin te | de bkag pa nyid kyis de dag drungs phyung bar 'gyur bas na gud du sun dbyung bas brtag par mi bya'o | 'du ba can med na 'du ba yod pa ma yin pas na de'i sun 'byung ba yang rjes su mi bya'o | rdzas kyang sa dang chu dang me dang rlung dang nam mkha' dang dus dang phyogs dang bdag dang yid ces bya ba rnam pa dgu yin no ||}
\]

In light of the Sanskrit it becomes quite clear that the phrase yon tan la sogs pa chos rnams kyi contains a contamination, namely la sogs pa. What Samantabhadra is doing here is perhaps nothing more than giving his Buddhist readers a more familiar term, dharma in the sense of ‘property’ for guṇa.

At the end of having refuted ideas that an object is a composite whole (avayavin) and that the subtle atoms (paramāṇu) are real existents, the Sāramañjarī states:\n
\[
mīmāṃsakaiś ca nāvaśyam iṣyante paramāṇava iti na paramāṇunirāvkaranaṃātretena nirākritah syād avayavīti nāsya vyarthamānānu dūṣaṇam
\]

The statement is not paralleled in the Tarkabhāṣā and it is not present in the ‘Tibetan recension’ of the Sāramañjarī either. It can be regarded as an afterthought of sorts, the author seeking to justify the seeming repetitiveness in his argumentation. He says that apparently it should have been enough to refute the reality of atoms, since when those are disproved, a composite of those atoms cannot be real either. However, this is not so, because proponents of the Mīmāṃsā doctrine do not necessarily accept

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28 Shirasaki 1984: 96.
29 Ms fol. 27 verso, ll. 6-7.
30 iṣyante] corr., iṣyante Ms
31 iti] corr., iti | Ms
the existence of atoms either (but do uphold the reality of external objects for reasons entirely different). If we read the introductory part carefully, we note that the part up to the first iti is metrical. It is indeed a quotation from the Ślokavārttika.32

This is how the Tibetan translation of the *Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya renders what was most certainly identical in Sanskrit to the passage above33:

spyod pa pa rnams rdul phra rab nges par ’dod pa ma yin pas na | rdul phra rab sun phyung pa tsam gyis yan lag can bkag pa yin pas na gud du de sun ’byin pa don med pa yin no ||

To make matters even worse, according to Shirasaki, the Derge and the (dependent) Cone prints omit the word don. Even discounting this mistake, we can identify two serious problems with the translation. First, it does not recognise that the introductory statement is in metre, which makes the identification of the sentence very difficult, if not impossible. Second, the absence of the two negations (na ... nirākṛtaḥ syāt ... na vyartham dūṣaṇam), while it produces a perfectly intelligible sentence, is completely out of tune with the previous passages, which do indeed refute both avayavin and paramāṇu.

There is at least one slight trace of evidence in Jitāri’s epistemological oeuvre showing his allegiance to the Jñānapāda-school, namely the benedictory verse in his Jātinirākṛti.34 The deity in the stanza is called Mañjuvajra, a tantric form of Mañjuśrī and the chief god of the Guhyasamāja system according to the Jñānapāda-school. He is presented as conferring initiation, which is probably yet another allusion to the tantric ectype.

34 Bühnemann 1985: 18, 30 given here without critical notes:

mugdhāṅgulīkisalayāṅghrisuvārṇaṃkumbha-vāṃtena kāntipayasā ghusrnārunena |
yo vandamānam abhiśiṇcati dharmarājye jāgartu vo hitasukhāya sa mañjuvajraḥ ||
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Dignāga and Kumārila on *apoha*
and the hierarchy of concepts

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At *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (PS) 5.35 Dignāga makes the following mysterious statement:

\[
vrksatvapārthivadrayasajñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ
catustrídvyeka sandehe nimittaṃ niścaye 'nyathā
\]

Treeness, earthen, substance, existent, and knowable are the cause of doubt in regard to four things, three things, two things, and one thing [, respectively,] in reverse order. Otherwise, [i.e., in direct order, they are the cause] of certainty. [35]¹

In this paper I would like to try to understand what Dignāga means by this statement and how he thinks it supports his Apohavāda. There have been some previous attempts to make sense of this stanza.² So far, however, no one seems to have noticed that Kumārila addresses the argument Dignāga is making with PS 5.35 in Ślokavārttika, *Apoha* 158-162.³ By connecting up Kumārila’s and Dignāga’s discussions I hope to shed light on the theory Dignāga is developing in PS(V) 5.34-35. This will, I hope, provide for a deeper appreciation of some of the most profound differences of their perspectives on word meaning, to which I draw attention at the end of the article.

Dignāga states PS 5.35 as the conclusion of his discussion in PS(V) 5.34, as if it were decisive evidence for his argument there. In order to understand PS 5.35, therefore, it is necessary to start with PS(V) 5.34.

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¹ See Appendix for text and translation of the entire passage under consideration here, PS(V) 5.34–35.
³ Pind 2015: I.42, n.226 does note that ŚV *Apoha* 158 is an allusion to PS 5.35 but does not go into Kumārila’s critique. Obviously, however, this article would not have been possible without the reconstruction and analysis of PS 5 in Pind 2015. Everyone now acknowledges a profound debt to Pind. See Yoshimizu 2017: 974, n. 1; Ogawa 2017: 83, n. 1.

Up to this point in the fifth chapter Dignāga has been primarily concerned with the problems of coreference and qualification. While arguing that other theories of meaning would not allow for two words being used together to refer to the same thing, as in the expression “an existent pot,” or for one word to qualify another, as in “blue lotus,” he explains how both kinds of locution would be possible if words indicate *apohas* (PS[V] 5.14-27). He also explains how the Apohavāda can account for the fact that in some cases two words cannot be used together, e.g., one cannot say *
śiṃśapā khadiraḥ* (PS[V] 5.28-32).

Earlier, however, he has raised other, more basic problems for specific theories of meaning. At PS(V) 5.2ab he rejects the view that a word expresses (vācaka) individuals, e.g., the word “cow” expresses all individual cows. Such a theory is untenable, he argues, because if it were true it would be impossible to learn what a word means. There being countless cows, one could never apprehend the relation between the word “cow” and all the things it supposedly expresses. Moreover, words would become ambiguous if they expressed individuals. If one heard “cow,” one would not know which individual cow is meant.

But is the Apohavāda any better off in this respect? If words refer to *apohas*, how can we learn their meanings? *Apohas*—exclusions, which are a kind of negation, namely, the negation of what is other—after all, are not perceptible. How could one, then, ever establish the relation between a word and an exclusion? Thus, PS 5.34 is introduced with the question, “But how do the previous[ly mentioned] problems [, beginning with, How would the meaning of a word be learned?], not follow if a word indicates

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4 See Taber/Kataoka 2017; Ogawa 2017.
5 PS 5.2ab : *na jātiśabdo bhedānām ānantyād vyabhicārataḥ* (Pind 2015 : I.2.5–3.1). “A general term is not *expressive* of individuals, because they are infinite [and] because there would be ambiguity.” The example Dignāga uses is the word “existent” (*sat*). “Existent” would be ambiguous, he says, if words expressed individuals, because one would not know whether a substance or a quality, etc., is meant (Pind 2015 : I.3.2–3).
its own referent by excluding other referents?”⁶⁷ He replies,

\[ \text{adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṁśe 'pi darśanāt śruteh sambandhasaukaryām na cāsti vyabhicāritā} \]

The relation of a word [with its meaning] is easily made, and it is not ambiguous, because it is not observed [employed] for the referent of another word, and it is observed [employed] for part of its own extension as well. [34]

As Dignāga explains in his *Vṛtti*, a word indicates its own referent by means of positive concomitance (anvaya) and negative concomitance (vyatireka), that is, the use of the word for what is “similar” and the non-use of the word for what is “non-similar.” For example, by observing that the word “cow” is used for cows and not used for non-cows, the word “cow” indicates, for someone observing how it is used, all cows. Of course, one can never observe the word “cow” being used for every individual cow. That was the problem with the theory that words refer to individuals, as Dignāga interpreted it. A positive concomitance for the word “cow” can never be established because it has countlessly many referents—cows. A negative concomitance, however, can be established, Dignāga maintains, *simply by never observing that the word is used for non-cows*. Since the relation of the word with what it refers to is established, then, primarily by negative concomitance, a word’s indicating, on a particular occasion

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⁶ *katham punah śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadosāprasāṅgaḥ* (Pind 2015: I.40,2–3). Pind has reconstructed Dignāga’s Sanskrit text, basing himself primarily on the Tibetan translations of Vasudhararakṣita and Kanakavarman, Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya* Viśālāmalavatī, and Śimhasūri’s *Nyāyāgamānusārinī* commentary on Mallavādin’s *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, as well as available Sanskrit fragments in post-Dignāga philosophic literature. Jinendrabuddhi explains that *pūrvadosa* refers to the problems raised by Dignāga earlier in regard to the four theories of meaning he refutes in PS 5.2–11c: \[ śabdārthāntarāpohena yathoktasya svārthābhidhāyaka ity asmin pakṣe catrusu pakṣeṣu pūrvaṃ ya uktā doṣas teṣām katham abhāvaḥ (PSṬ Ms B 226a1; see Pind 2015: II.116, n. 410) \]; “Why do the problems that were previously stated in regard to the four [incorrect] views not exist for this view, that [a word] is indicative of its own referent, as described, by excluding the referents of other words?”

⁷ Just as the word “meaning” is ambiguous in English—it can mean, essentially, either the referent (of a particular use) of a term, or the extension of a term (that is, the set of all things it can be used for), or the intension of a term (Frege’s sense or concept)—so is *artha* for Dignāga. Where it seems clear that he is not employing it ambiguously (which he, however, sometimes does) but has one of its specific meanings in mind, I translate it accordingly. This is also the practice of others. Cf., however, Yoshimizu 2017: 974, n. 4, who distinguishes referent from denotation. Yoshimizu loc. cit. notes that Katsura 1991: 140 translates *svārthasyāṁśe* as “members of its own extension.”
of use, its own referent—say, *that cow*—is, as Dignāga puts it, “the inference of an exclusion from those [other things it does not refer to], due to not observing it used for something besides its own relata,” i.e., the referents it is connected with. Thus, while it is correct to say that the meaning of a word is an exclusion, where the exclusion has the status of a (pseudo-)universal under which all of the word’s referents fall—Dignāga will actually argue, PS(V) 5.36d, that *apohas* have all of the features normally associated with universals—he also sometimes says that a word refers to its own referent or referents, which are individuals, through the exclusion of other referents.\(^8\)

Thus, one of the oddities of the Apohavāda as Dignāga conceives it is that, ultimately, words do refer to individuals, as we employ them.\(^9\) After all (as Dharmakīrti will later emphasize), we use words to direct people’s attention to concrete objects that they might want to obtain or avoid; Dignāga, moreover, believed that only particulars are real. There was an ancient tradition in Indian semantics that held that a word indicates the individual “substance” (*dravya*), and Dignāga appears to be its heir.\(^1\) He avoids the problem that a relation can never be established between words and individuals, however, by claiming that in fact it can be established by negative, not positive, concomitance—as if other theorists who held that words indicate individuals simply neglected that negative concomitance could play a role. If one, then, wishes to consider all of the individuals a word indicates (on different occasions) collectively, one can say that the word indicates the “exclusion” of things other than the things it indicates (i.e., its referents), where an exclusion is something—dare we say, a kind

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\(^8\) svasambandhibhyo ‘nyatrādarsanāt tadvyavacchādānumānāṃ svārthābhidhānāṃ ity ucyate (Pind 2015: I.41,2–4).

\(^9\) Hence, Dignāga says PS 5.11d that “therefore[,] because the previously considered theories are not viable[,] a word *causes* the exclusion of another”; *tenānyāpohakṛc chrutiḥ* (Pind 2015: I.15,4). At PSV 5.36d he says that “a word expresses entities precisely insofar as they are qualified by the negation of other referents”; *śabdo ‘ṛthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha* (Pind 2015: I.45,2–3). Just before that, however, at PSV 5.36c, he says, “Thus, because of the absence of the previously mentioned problems it is correct that the meaning of a word is indeed the exclusion of other referents”; *evam pūrvadosābhāvād arthāntarāpohā eva śabdārthāḥ sādhūḥ* (Pind 2015: I.44,7–8).

\(^10\) pace Yoshimizu 2011: 575. Whatever Dignāga meant by PSV 5.45, “For the object of perception is inexpressible”; *anirdeśyo hi pratyakṣārthaḥ* (Pind 2015: I.55,3; cf. PS 1.5cd), he could *not* have meant that we never use words to talk about things! I believe this agrees with Katsura 1991: 132–139.

\(^11\) Mahābhāṣya ad P 1.2.64 documents (*vārttikas* 45–52) the view of the ancient grammarian Vyāḍi that a word denotes an individual substance (*dravya*). See Scharf 1996: 52–56. See also NBh 129,5–17 (2.2.60).
of abstract entity?—having the same features as a universal, without of course being a real universal. In particular, it is one thing extending over many. This is, as I see it, the essence of Dignāga’s position.

It would seem, however, that Dignāga is left with a different problem of his own: How is it any easier to determine that a certain word is never used for non-X than it is to determine that it is always used for X? Jonardon Ganeri has cogently drawn attention to the puzzle.

Dignāga’s use of the method of association and dissociation (anvaya-vyatireka), as well as his concepts of what is alike and what is unlike (tulya-atulya) are very important, and we will see them playing a large part in his theory of inference. He concedes that likeness classes cannot be determined directly, but argues that they can be determined by mere non-observation, and a likeness class is then fixed as the complement of an unlikeness class. This doctrine has puzzled scholars for understandable reasons. As a principle of reasoning, it looks disastrous. Is Dignāga really saying that one is entitled to believe that all F’s are G’s as long as one has not observed an F which is non-G?¹²

The answer to this question, in fact, seems to be simply, yes. Dignāga subscribed to the widely held view among Indian philosophers in his day—it was soon to be overturned by Dharmakīrti—that one establishes the non-existence of something just from the fact that there is no pramāṇa, or one could say, no evidence, for it.¹³ For Dignāga, this is a way one might prove that there is no pradhāna.¹⁴ For Vasubandhu, it is how one proves the non-existence of a self, and perhaps even the non-existence of external objects.¹⁵ Hence, if one has not observed the word “cow” being used for things that are not cows, one may conclude that the word is not used for non-cows, which of course is equivalent to its being used only for


¹³ I owe to Kei Kataoka the insight that Dignāga, ultimately, is adhering to the principle that non-existence is established by “non-apprehension” (anupalabdhi) in maintaining that a vyatireka, i.e., negative concomitance, is established by just non-observation (adarśanamātra) of the hetu in the vipakṣa. See Kataoka 2021. For alternative attempts to explain Dignāga’s appeal to adarśanamātra as the basis for negative concomitance see Pind: 2015: I.lvii–lviii and Ogawa 2017: 98–101.

¹⁴ See PVSV 105,15 : na santi pradhānādayo ’nupalabdher iti|. “It is said, ‘The pradhāna, etc., do not exist, because they are not apprehended.’” Gnoli (ad loc.) identifies this as a quotation from Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha. Cf. PVSVT 383:17-18; Tucci 1930: 16. However, Dignāga may be just mentioning this as an example of a negative existential inference without subscribing to it himself. See Yaita 1985: 1, 7 (n. 1).

¹⁵ See Kellner/Taber 2014.
cows. The relation between the word and the things it indicates, cows, is “easily made,” because one does not have to do much, if anything, to make it. In particular, one does not have to conduct an exhaustive investigation to determine that “cow” is always used for cows and never for non-cows. One need only never observe that it is used for non-cows. Although this may be more than just a “temporary non-observation,” it is by no means a complete and through examination. Otherwise, as Ganeri implies, the non-use of “cow” for non-cows would be just as difficult to establish as the use of “cow” for all cows.\(^\text{17}\)

Once again, since the relation between a word and its meaning is fixed in this negative way, a word can acquire a meaning, it can serve to designate something, even though it has perhaps been seen used only once

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\(^{16}\) Pind 2015: II.lvii.

\(^{17}\) Ganeri 2001: 110: “The problem with this is that it is difficult to see why the negative epistemic principle should be true, but not the corresponding positive principle.”
or twice for that kind of thing.\textsuperscript{18} If matters were the other way around, Dignāga goes on to say in his Vṛtti on 5.34—if, that is, one established the meaning of a word primarily by observing what it is used \textit{for}—then “from the word ‘tree’ there would not be doubt, in regard to the same real thing, that presents a śiṃśapā, etc. [i.e., doubt whether it is a śiṃśapā or not].”\textsuperscript{19} That is to say, whenever a word for X is used, the hearer would know all of the specific properties of X.

Why? Surely, this suggestion is just as mysterious as the idea that negative concomitance is established by mere non-observation. Here, I believe, the commentators can help. By “commentators” I mean not just Jinendrabuddhi, but also Simhasūri Gaṇivādikṣamāśramaṇa, the author of an important commentary on Mallavādin’s Dvādaśāranayacakra, who also apparently had access to an older commentary on PS 5 that was one of the sources of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.\textsuperscript{20} Both Jinendrabuddhi and Simhasūri explain Dignāga’s statement “from the word ‘tree’ there would not be doubt, in regard to the same real thing, that presents a śiṃśapā, etc.” in a very similar way that probably derives from this older commentary. Quoting from Jinendrabuddhi:

\begin{quote}
If it is thought that there is an indication indeed by means of positive concomitance, then in that case, since there is a positive concomitance of the word “tree” together with its meaning [i.e., treeness], etc., in a śiṃśapā, etc., then just from the word “tree” there would be no doubt that presents a śiṃśapā, etc. in regard to the same real thing. Rather, there would be certainty.\textsuperscript{21}
\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item On the role of ostention in the process of learning the meaning of words (vyutpatti), see PS(V) 5.50cd, explained by Pind 2015: I.liii–liv.
\item \textit{anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne vrkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyābhāsah samśayo na svāt} (Pind 2015: I.41,4–5).
\item And which was also used by Mallavādin. Pind 2015: I.xxxiv–xxxvi speculates that it may have been Devendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā.
\item \textit{yady anvayadvāreṇaivābhīdhānāṃ isyata evam sati vrkṣaśabdasyārthādīsahitasya śiṃśapādiṣu anvayo śtīti kevalād vrkṣaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śiṃśapādyābhāsah samśayo na svāt} (PST Ms B 226b6–7; cf. Pind 2015: I.41, n.225). I am grateful to Horst Lasic for making available his own transcription of the manuscript of Jinendrabuddhi’s \textit{Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā Viśālāmalavatī} that Pind cites as Ms B, from 226b1 to 227b7. Cf. NĀA 652,23–24: \textit{anvayadvāreṇa cānumāne ‘yaṃ doṣaḥ | yasmād anugamo ‘stīr vrkṣaśabdasyārthādīsahitasya śiṃśapādiṣu tasmāt kevalenāpy anumānam prāpnoti |}. “If inference were by means of positive concomitance there would be this problem: Since there is joint presence of the word ‘tree’ together with its meaning in a śiṃśapā, etc., there would be an inference [of that] even by [the word] alone.” Cf. Pind 2015: II.125, n. 428.
\end{enumerate}
The idea seems to be this. Unlike negative concomitance, where the word is not found where something other than the referent is found, when it comes to positive concomitance, the referent would be found where the word is found. In that case, the word would correspond not just to one aspect of its referent, say treeness, but to all of its aspects, including its specific nature of being, say, a śimśapā. Dignāga could very well have in mind here the idea that is later more explicitly expressed by Dharmakīrti, that the nature of an object is unified. If one apprehends one aspect of the nature of a thing, one will apprehend all of its aspects.\(^{22}\) Thus, if the word “tree” were positively related to a real property of its referent — again, let that be treeness — then since that property would be inseparable from all its other real properties, when one hears “tree” one would comprehend all of its properties.

This idea is made more explicit by Śiṃhasūri when he says earlier, “Therefore, the mere non-existence of another is excluded in a general way by a word or inferential mark, which is not in contact with the natures of its differences.”\(^{23}\) Negative concomitance does not present one directly with the referent at all. Positive concomitance, on the other hand, would establish an actual relationship with the referent—and not with just one isolated property of it but all its properties. It would present the object itself, just as perception does.\(^{24}\)

If, conversely, Dignāga then goes on to say, there were doubt about whether the referent of “tree” is a śimśapā or some other kind of tree — for, after all, when learning the meaning of the word one notices that it is just not used for trees that are śimśapās; sometimes one sees it used for a palāśa, a khadira, and so forth — then there would also be doubt about whether it is earthen, a substance, existent, and knowable: “[If there were a doubt as to what specific type of tree is meant] then like that doubt there would be doubt that presents earthenness, substancehood,

\(^{22}\) See PVSV 27,7–15; Eltschinger et al. 2018,41.


\(^{24}\) This idea was already presented clearly in PS 2.15: drṣṭavad vidhirūpeṇa yadi liṅgāṃ prakāśayet | sarvatrādarāsanān na syāt sarvathā vā gatir bhavet |. “If an inferential mark revealed [the liṅgin, that is, the thing that has the inferential mark] positively [i.e., by positive concomitance], in the way it was [previously] perceived, then there would not be [any comprehension of it], due to [the inferential mark] not being observed for every instance [of the liṅgin], or else there would be total comprehension [of the liṅgin].” Cf. Hayes 1988: 245. See Pind’s discussion of PS(V) 2.15, which includes the restoration of the Sanskrit stanza above based on Jinendrabuddhi’s Ṭīkā, Pind 2015: II.225–229.
and so forth.” According to the same line of reasoning followed above, if the meaning of a word were learned by positive concomitance and there were doubt, when it is used, about one real property of its referent, then – given that its properties are united – there would be doubt about all of them. But in fact there is never doubt about its more general properties (e.g., earthenness, etc.), while there is doubt about its more specific properties (śimśapā-ness, etc.).

Hence, by modus tollens, the meaning of a word cannot be learned by positive concomitance, but rather only (or primarily) by negative concomitance. The word “tree,” that is to say, correlates with just what is other than a non-tree. Hence, while referring to all trees, it does not refer only to śimśapās; that is to say, it does not exclude non-śimśapās. Hence, when it is used, there can be doubt about whether the tree in question is a śimśapā, etc. On the other hand, it does give rise to ideas of earthenness, etc.; that is to say, it does exclude non-earthen things, non-substances, and so forth. As Dignāga goes on to say, “But since the word ‘tree’ is not observed when there are things that are not earthen, etc., there is an inference [from the word, of its referents] just by means of negative concomitance.”

25 Cf. PST Ms B 226b7–227a1, which however suggests a somewhat different argument: athānekatra darśanāt samśayaḥ | evaṃ tarhi tatsamśayavat pārthiva-dravyatvābhāso ‘pi samśayah syāt pārthivatvādyanekadarśanāt | niścayas tu drṣṭaḥ | (cf. Pind 2015: I.41, n. 225). “If, conversely, there were doubt because [the word ‘tree’] is observed [used] for many [types of trees], then like that doubt there would be doubt that presents earthenness, substancehood, etc., since [the word] is also observed [used] for the many things earthenness, etc. Yet certainty [in regard to those things] is observed.” See also NĀA 652,24–653,12, translated by Pind 2015: II.125, n. 428. My thanks to Vincent Eltschinger for convincing me that atha at the beginning of this passage does not introduce an objection, and also for pressing me to clarify my explanation.

26 The structure of the argument as I have understood it is: A > (B > C); B ∧ ¬C; therefore ¬A. (A = the word “tree” is learned by positive concomitance. B = “tree” causes doubt about the specific type of tree. C = “tree” causes doubt about earthenness, etc.)

27 yatas tu vrksaśabdo ‘pārthivādiṣu na drṣṭaḥ, ato vyatirekamukhenai*vānumānam (Pind 2015: I.41,6–42,1). For an alternative explanation of PSV 5.34 see Hayes 1988: 298. Hayes’ translation of the passage, loc. cit., does not appear to render tattsamśayavat (Pind 2015: I.41,5), which may partially explain the difference in his approach. I do not think, however, that Hayes’ interpretation can be entirely ruled out.

A much more ambitious, and more recent, interpretation of Dignāga’s entire theory of linguistic meaning is Yoshimizu 2017. Section 1.2 presents a careful analysis of PSV 5.34, which partially coincides with and partially diverges from mine. I do not feel confident enough of my own understanding of Dignāga to mount a critique of it; rather, I recommend it to the reader as another perspective, well worth taking into consideration, on the material presented here. I will say
The argument is perhaps not very convincing philosophically; for one thing, it involves the questionable assumption that all the properties of a thing are unified. Nevertheless, it may have been effective polemically. If Helmut Krasser was right about the purpose of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, that it is not a “pure philosophical [work] structured according to philosophical needs” but rather a manual for teaching students how to argue with non-Buddhists, then this should not be too surprising.

Dignāga then offers PS 5.35 as an “intermediate stanza” (antaraśloka) to support what he has just explained. Again,

Treeness, earthen, substance, existent, and knowable are the cause of doubt in regard to four things, three things, two things, and one thing [, respectively,] in reverse order. Otherwise, [i.e., in direct order, they are the cause] of certainty.

Because the meaning of a word is determined by negative concomitance—and, hence, indicates its referent by excluding it from the referents of other expressions—the word “knowable,” or the property of being knowable, which is indicated by that word, will be the cause of doubt as to whether its referent is existent, a substance, earthen, or a tree. The word “existent,” in turn—proceeding in the “reverse order” of the terms in the compound vrkṣatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ—will be the cause of doubt as to whether its referent is a substance, earthen, or a tree. And so, continuing in the reverse order of the terms of the compound, “substance” will be the cause of doubt in regard to two things (earthenness and treeness), and “earthen” in regard to one thing (treeness).

Hence, “tree” also will

in general that I find Yoshimizu’s attempt, in this article and his earlier article Yoshimizu 2011, to show that Dignāga understands apoha as involving a kind of componential analysis to be very intriguing and certainly not to be dismissed. But I find the evidence that he cites (in particular PSV 43b; see Yoshimizu 2017: 984–987) difficult to assess.


On antaraśloka see Mimaki 1980. Jinendrabuddhi, PST Ms B 227a, introduces the stanza by saying: vyatirekamukhenaiva pratyāyanam ity etat sambandhayitum antaraślokam āha]. “In order to reinforce (lit.: bind up) that it is made known only by negative concomitance, he states the antaraśloka.”

The fact that the first term of the compound, “treeness,” is an abstract noun suggests that all of the terms are to be taken as abstract nouns. According to this reading, the property of being knowable is the cause of doubt in regard to four things: existence, substancehood, earthenness, and treeness, and so forth. See Hayes 1988: 298–299. All of the commentators, however, explain the stanza to mean that the word “knowable” is the cause of doubt in regard to existence, substancehood, earthenness, and treeness, and so forth. E.g., PST Ms B 227a2–3: jñeyaśabdāḥ saddravyapārthivavrksatvēṣu catuṛṣu sāṃśaya-
be the cause of doubt as to whether its referent is a śiṃśapā, etc. If the relation of a word to its referent were determined, on the other hand, in a positive way, that is, by positive concomitance, then any expression would reveal everything to be known about its referent, and none of these words would be the cause of doubt about any of its referent’s properties.

At the same time, because the meaning of a word is established by means of negative concomitance, each of these words, or each of the properties they indicate, taken now in the order they occur in the initial compound of the stanza, is the cause of certainty about all of the properties that are mentioned after it. That is to say, “tree” will be the cause of certainty that the referent is earthen, a substance, existent, and knowable. “earthen” will be the cause of certainty that its referent is a substance, existent, and knowable. And so forth. For the word “tree,” by indicating what is other than non-trees, will at the same time indicate what is other than non-earthen things, non-substances, non-existent things, and non-knowable things. “earthen,” by indicating what is other than non-earthen things, will at the same time indicate what is other than non-substances, non-existent things, and non-knowable things. And so on.  

In this way the Apohavāda—the theory that a word indicates its own referent by excluding the referents of other words—accounts for the hierarchy of concepts that was well known to other Indian philosophers. In Vaiśeṣika philosophy this hierarchy is understood as an ordering of more or less inclusive universals: all universals, except for being, are according to one’s understanding (buddhyapekṣa) either universals (sāmāṇya) or differences (viśeṣa), and can therefore be arranged from lower to higher.

hetur yataḥ sa tadabhāve drṣṭaḥ | evam uttaratrāpi vācyam sacchabdo dravya-pārthivavrksatvesu triṣu dravyaśabdah pārthivavrksatvayor dvayoh pārthiva-śabda ekasmin vrksatve |. Conversely, the word “tree” is the cause of certainty regarding earthenness, substancehood, existence, and knowability, and so forth. Simhasūri, NĀA 653,12–14, explains the stanza in a similar way. See Pind 2015: II.126, n. 430, which however in part mistranslates PST. See also the passage quoted from ŚV Kaś below.

31 Cf. PS 2.14, reconstructed and discussed by Pind 2015: II.243–245, which explicitly concerns the exclusion of properties by other properties (not words): guṇatvagandhasaurabhyaṭadvīśeṣair anukramāt | adravyādiyavaccheda eka-vṛddhyotpalādivat ||. “Just as, in the case of a lotus, etc., there is exclusion of non-substance, and so forth [i.e., non-earthen, non-sweet, and not a particular variety of sweet], by being a quality, a smell, a sweet smell, and varieties of the latter, in order by an increase of one.”

32 VS 1.2.3: sāmāṇyaṃ viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam |. “Whether something is a universal or a difference depends on [one’s] cognition.”

33 See Halbfass 1992: 116–117. Cf. PDhS 82,1–12, where the hierarchy is implied. Note that “knowability” in Vaiśeṣika is not considered a universal that includes
But not only that. It also accounts for a peculiar epistemic asymmetry that pertains to this hierarchy. Namely, if one knows that something falls under a certain concept, one will also know that it falls under all of the higher-order concepts. However, one will not know that it falls under any lower-order concepts. What Dignāga is in effect saying with PS 5.35 is that only the Apohavāda can account for this epistemic asymmetry, not any other theory of meaning. Hence, PS 5.35 provides key support for the Apohavāda.

Before turning to Kumārila’s refutation of Dignāga’s claim it will be helpful to see how Kumārila’s commentator Sucaritamiśra summarizes the Buddhist position, in his introduction to ŚV Apoha 158.

In regard to this it is taught by the Buddhist that if the words “tree,” “earthen,” “substance,” “existent,” and “knowable” expressed a universal positively, then there would be a making known of the entire referent (sārvatma-kārtha) in both direct and reverse order. For a word that touches a real thing would indicate a real thing as it really is; for otherwise, it would not touch a real thing. Since a tree has the nature of being earthen, and so on, from the word “tree” five natures are comprehended, beginning with tree and ending with knowable. And since these are the natures of the knowable, when knowability is comprehended from the word “knowable,” too—since knowability has the nature of treeness, hence is not different from a tree—there would be a cognition of the entire [referent] (sārvatma-kārthā) [from knowability down to tree]. And the observation of an ascertainment in direct order of four things—earthen, and so forth—from the word “tree,” of substance, existent, and knowable from the word “earthen,” of existent and knowable from the word “substance,” [and of just] one thing, knowability from the word “existent,” but in the reverse order the observing of doubt from the word “knowable” in regard to existent, etc., in precisely that sequence—that would not be logical. For each [word] expressing that referent would indicate it in its entirety. Therefore, it is alone correct that diverse words, insofar as they do not touch objects, produce diverse concepts, but there is no real difference of meanings.34

Sucarita then quotes PS 5.35. Besides explaining PS 5.35 along the lines I have suggested, Sucarita offers a fairly plausible interpretation of the

being (sattā), though it is predicated of it, along with “isness” (astiśva) and “nameability” (abhidheyatva). See Halbfass 1992: 144–145, 158–159.

34 ŚVKāś 272(49),3–271(50),2: atra bhikṣunā vrkṣapārthivadrayasajñeyasab-dānām vidhimukhena jātivacanatve prātilomyāṇulomyena sarvātma-kārthāva-bodhanam āpāditam | vastusamsparśī hi śabdo yathāvasthitam eva vastv abhidadhyaḥ itarathā tv arthāsamsparśatvaprasaṅgāḥ | vrkṣo hi pārthivādīrūpa iti vrkṣaśabdām vrkṣādijñeyāvasānaḥ pañcātmāvagamyate | te ca jñeyasyātmāna iti jñeyasyātmāna api jñeyatvāvagatau jñeyatvasya vrkṣātmakātvād vrkṣād
frequently-quoted statement, also commonly attributed to Dignāga, that words “do not touch objects,” in light of the Apohavāda.\(^{35}\) According to Sucarita this simply means that words are not directly connected with their meanings by virtue of positive concomitance, but indirectly, by negative concomitance. In learning the meaning of a word one is not even presented with what it means, i.e., its referent, but once or twice!

Kumārila, then, addresses PS 5.35 directly in ŚV Apoha 158–162:

As for what is said [in PS(V) 5.34–35], that [if a word were learned and used] positively, it would make all meanings known, in [both] reverse and direct order, of treeness, earthen, substance, existent, and knowable—that is incorrect; for it is not the case that every word is observed [used] for everything. (158–159ab) [If one claimed that a word like “knowable” could indicate existence] due to the non-separation of their location [i.e., because both knowability and existence are located in the same thing, then there would be] a functioning of the eye in regard to taste, etc., also[, since both color and taste are found in the same object, e.g., an apple]. (159cd) [Objection:] But [something’s] functioning as an agent of apprehension (grāhaka) is fixed according to its type (pratijāti). [Reply:] In just the same way as in the case of [perceptual faculties] such as vision, here [in the case of the functioning of words] there will not be a confusion. (160) But when the [designative] activity of a word has ceased, there would be the making known of existence, etc., by the increase or decrease of one, due to pervasion and non-pervasion. (161) This fault [that a word would convey all aspects of a thing] would really (eva) be yours, because you (yasya) hold the view that a general word occurs [also] in regard to a subtype (viśeṣa). Nor [if one takes apohas residing in the same locus to be different from each other, like the universals of the universal theorist, so that a word referring to one will not refer to the

\begin{quote}
abhedāt sarvātmakapratītiprasaṅgaḥ | yac cedam ānulomyna vṛkṣaśabdāt 
pāṛthivādiṣu caturṣu niścayadarśanam pāṛthivāsabdāt triṣu dravyasajñyeṣu 
dravyaśabdād sajñyevatavyoḥ sacchabdād ākṣam jñeyatve prātītiprasaṅgaḥ ca 
jñeyādiśabdāt sadadiṣu tenaiva kramaṇaṃ samśayadarśanam tan nopapadyeta 
sarvo hi tam artham ācaksānah sarvātmakam abhidhyāt | ato ’rthāsamsparsinō 
vicitrān vikalpāḥ vicitrāḥ śabdāḥ janayantīty etad eva sāmpratam | na tu vāstavo ’rthabhedaḥ |.
\end{quote}

\(^{35}\) Simhasūri quotes the following verse, NĀA 243,8–9; 547,7–8 (attributed to Dignāga in Jambūvijayajī’s notes ad loc.): vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdavonayah | teṣām atyantasambandhe nārthāṃ śabdāḥ spṛśanty amī ||

“Words arise from concepts and concepts arise from words. They are interrelated. Those words do not touch objects.” Variants of the second line are found in other authors, e.g., Jayanta, NM I.416,8–9: teṣām atyantasambandho nārthāṃ śabdāḥ spṛśanty amī ||. “There being a mutual relationship between them, those words do not touch the object.” See Pind 2015: II.158–159, n.530; Houben 1995: 393, n. 834; Taber 2002: 163.
Kumārila rejects Dignāga’s understanding of the epistemic asymmetry of concepts. To begin with, he does not believe that a word makes known more than just one universal. To be sure, the word “tree” does not produce ideas of a śiṃśapā, a palāśa, etc. But it also does not produce ideas of earthenness, substancehood, existence, or knowability. The words that would give rise to those ideas would be: “earthen,” “substance,” “existent,” and “knowable.” The word “tree” just gives rise to the idea of a tree, nothing more, nothing less.

Even though we learn the meaning of “tree” at least in part by positive concomitance, observing that “tree” is employed for trees, and trees have many other properties besides just treeness—for the tree will always at least be a specific type of tree, earthen, substance, and so forth—nevertheless, the designative potency or śakti of the word “tree” restricts it just to treeness. Similarly, a particular sense faculty, such as vision, even though it is in contact with an object possessing a variety of sensible qualities, will be restricted to apprehending only that quality for which it is suited—visible form—and not also its taste, smell, and so forth.

How, then, should we explain the epistemic asymmetry of concepts that Dignāga has drawn attention to? Not by the designative capacity of words, but by inferential relations. Because treeness is indeed invariably concomitant with earthenness, in fact, treeness is pervaded by earthenness, from the awareness that something is a tree due to hearing the word “tree,” one will know inferentially that it is earthen, and so on. But since treeness is not pervaded by śiṃśapā-ness, rather their relation is the other way around, one will not derive the idea that what is being talked about is a śiṃśapā.

Finally, Kumārila charges that it is the Apohavādin who will be beset by the problem that a word would indicate all aspects of its referent. He refers back to certain details of Dignāga’s theory of apoha that are too complex and technical to enter into here. Very briefly, however: in PS(V) 5.18 Dignāga has argued that a word can be considered to indicate also the subtypes or “differences” of its referent, insofar as it does not exclude

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36 vrksatvaparthaśvadavvyasajñyeśu yad ucyate | prātilomyānulomyena vidhau sarvārthabodhanam || tad ayuktam na sarvo hi śabdaḥ sarvatra drśyate | desāviḥbāgato vr̥ttir netrasyāpi rasādiṣu || grāhakatvena vr̥ttis tu pratiḥāt vyavasthitā | cakṣurādīvad evātṛa sankaro na bhaviṣyati || nivr̥ttaeṣeṣe śabde tu vyāptiyāṃkṛtam punah | sattvāder bodhakatvaṃ svād ekanyānaśīkṣetraḥ || tavaiva dosaḥ svād eṣa viśeṣe yasya vartate | sāmānyaśabdo vācyānām bheda nāpy asti vastutoḥ ||. Translation Kataoka/Taber 2021: 158–163.
them.\textsuperscript{37} This accounts for how two words, such as “blue” and “lotus,” can be used coreferentially (in the compound “blue lotus,” \textit{nīlotpala}), which Dignāga thought could not be accounted for if words refer either to universals or individuals possessing universals (the \textit{jātimat} theory). Both words “blue” and “lotus” indicate the differences of blue and lotus, respectively, as well as blue and lotus themselves. That is to say, “blue” indicates, not just blueness, but specific blue things – eyes, lotuses, whales, etc. – insofar as they are, just like blueness, \textit{not} excluded by it; “lotus” indicates, not just lotusness, but specific lotuses – blue lotuses, red lotuses, white lotuses – insofar as they are, like lotusness, \textit{not} excluded by it. Hence, “blue” can be used together with “lotus.”\textsuperscript{38}

Obviously, this theory implies precisely the same mistake that Dignāga imputes to the view that the meanings of words are learned by positive concomitance: when one hears “tree,” one will know specifically what type of tree it is. The Apohavādin also could not argue that distinct \textit{apohas} can reside in an individual and be discretely indicated by different

\textsuperscript{37} In general, as we have seen above, Dignāga believes that what is indicated by a word is what is \textit{not} excluded by it.

\textsuperscript{38} See PSV 5.17d: \textit{dvāv api višeśārthau sāmānye višeśāntarbhāvāt} (Pind 2015: I.19,8). “Both [words ‘blue’ and ‘lotus’] mean the difference/subtype, because the subtype is included in the universal” (cf. Pind 2015: II.67). Each word indicates the differences or subtypes of the universal as well the universal itself, just \textit{insofar as they do not exclude them} (PS 5.18b’: \textit{anapohanāt}).

Kumārila’s commentators, however, offer a different explanation of ŚV \textit{Apoha} 162. They take \textit{višeše} in 162b to mean the particular, thus understanding the line as, “This fault [that a word would convey all aspects of a thing] would really (\textit{eva}) be yours, because you (\textit{vasya}) hold the view that a general word occurs in regard to a particular.” Since the particular is “without parts” (\textit{nirbhāga}), the indication of one of its aspects would bring to mind all of its aspects. Thus, e.g., ŚVKāś 269(52),9–12: \textit{evam svapakṣe doṣaparihāram ukvā parapakṣe ʿyam eva doṣah prasajyata ity āha – tavaīvēti ʿbauddhasya hi pakṣe ye ʿsmākaṃ sāmānyasyabdāḥ te višeše svalaksane varante ʿarthāntarabhāvāt | tac ca nirbhāgam eveti ya eva kaścit tadvacanaḥ tenaiva sarvātmakpratītiprasaṅga iti |}. “In this way, having explained the removal of the problem for his own view, he states that precisely this problem results for the other view: ‘for you (\textit{tava})’ [and so forth]. For on the Buddhist’s view, what are for us [Mīmāṃsakas] words for universals occur in regard to a difference, that is, a particular, because there is not another meaning [it \textit{could} refer to, such as a universal]. And since that [particular] is without parts, whatever [word] expresses that, by precisely that [word] there is a cognition of the entire [particular].” Even though I have suggested above a way in which Dignāga can be seen to think that words indicate individuals, this interpretation nevertheless strikes one as anachronistic, reflecting Dharmakīrti’s emphasis on the undivided nature of things, such that if part of something’s nature is cognized in a positive way (e.g., by perception) its entire nature will be cognized. See PSVS 26,2–27,6; Eltschinger \textit{et al.} 2018,38–40; Kellner 2004.
words, analogous to what Kumārila believes to be the case for universals, because exclusions cannot be distinct from each other. Kumārila has argued earlier at length (ŚV Apoha 42–46), that exclusions, being absences (abhāva), cannot really be different from each other. Thus, all words are synonymous. This, by the way, implies that for the Apohavādin there could not be a hierarchy of concepts. If all words were synonymous, they would have the same extension: the extension of one word would not be more or less inclusive than that of another.

But why does Kumārila think that the word “cow” refers just to cows—or, more precisely, cowness—nothing more, nothing less? It is here where anvaya and vyatireka are relevant for Kumārila—in restricting the meanings of words once it is known that they are designators of an initially “mixed” or “confused” meaning. Kumārila develops this theory in another chapter of his Ślokavārttika, the Sambandhākṣepavāda. There, he is considering an objection raised by an opponent introduced by the so-called Vṛttikāra, whom Śabara quotes at length in this section of his Mīmāṃsāsūtradhyaya, that there is no relation of any kind between word and meaning. Hence, contrary to what Mīmāṃsāsūtra 1.1.5 states, an innate (autpattika) relation between word and meaning could not be the cause of knowledge of Dharma deriving from the Veda.

I shall conclude my discussion of PS 5.34–35 by presenting the view of the relation of word and meaning that Kumārila works out in this passage, which provides an illuminating contrast to Dignāga’s position.

According to Kumārila words do not indicate their meanings on the basis of an observed invariable concomitance between word and meaning; a word does not function as an inferential mark. A word, rather, is a factor in the act of designating something. The word is the agent or means in this act; the meaning or what is expressed, the object (karman); and a cognition of the meaning, what is brought about by the act.

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39 See Frauwallner 1965: 36,6–7: syād etad evam : naiva śabdasyārthenāsti sambandah. kuto ’syā pauruṣeyatā apauruṣeyatā vā. “Perhaps the following is the case: there is no relation of the word with the meaning at all, [so] how is it either of human origin or not of human origin?”

40 The context of the objection is explained clearly by Kumārila at the beginning of the Sambandhākṣepavāda chapter, vv. 1–5.

41 For another discussion of this passage, contextualized by reference to various other passages concerning the relation of word and meaning in Kumārila’s works, see Eltschinger 2007: 125–128.

42 ŚV Sambandha 12cd–13ab: abhidhānakriyāyām hi karmatvam vācyasamśritam || śabdānām karaṇatvam vā kartrtvam vā nirāpītam |. “In the act of designating, being the object concerns what is expressed. Being the means or the agent is ascertained as belonging to the words.” In the context of Kumārila’s theory,
brought together and restricted to each other in the act of designation, word and meaning are perceived as having a relation (sambandha). The word is first seen to assist in bringing about a cognition of the meaning, in other words. Only later, due to this capacity to make its meaning known, is it seen to have a relation to its meaning. It is not because the word is ascertained as related to its meaning by invariable concomitance that it has the capacity to make it known.

“designate,” which connotes a specifically linguistic function, seems a more appropriate translation of abhiDhĀ than “indicate.”

ŚV Sambandha 13cd–14ab: pratipattāv upādānāt sāhitye ca vivakṣite || nīyamete1 yad ekasyāṃ sambandhaḥ so ‘ṛthasabdayoḥ || nīyamaye ŚV₁ : niyamete ŚV₅. “And the fact that they are restricted [to each other] in a single [act of designation], their association being intended due to being taken up in order to cognize [the meaning]—that is the relation of word and meaning.” Pārthasārathimiśra clarifies that Kumārila understands the act of designation as analogous to a sacrificial action in an interesting excursus, ŚVN 355,9–24. Just as sovereignty (svārājya) calls forth the vājapeya sacrifice in order to bring it about, and the sacrifice in turn takes up the various auxiliaries necessary for its performance, so that relations are established between all these entities which did not exist before, so “the meaning, which serves as the principal thing [i.e., the point of reference, uddeśya, analogous to sovereignty], takes up the activity of designation in order to be cognized, and that [activity of designation takes up] the word as one of its auxiliaries. Thus, there is a relation of word and meaning due to being restricted [to each other] in the same action”; arthāḥ pradhānabhūtā svapratipattisiddhaye ‘bhidhāvyāpāram upādattae sa ca svāṃśabhūtam śabdam ity asti śabdārthaḥ ekakriyāniyamāt sambandhaḥ (ŚVN 355,13–14). On the relationships of the various factors of a sacrifice as pradhānabhūta-gunabhūta (predominant and subordinate) and uddeśya-upādeya (point of reference and what-is-to-be-taken up), see McCrea 2000: 440–441.

ŚV Sambandha 14cd–16ab: tatra yady apy asambandhaḥ kārakām paraśparam || tathāpi yat kriyāḥ upakāryopakāritāḥ sa kriyāsāṅgatēḥ paścāt sambandhaḥ kīrtyate tayoh || na cāpy atrāvinābhāvaḥ upayogītā sādhitam || cāpy atrāvinābhāva ŚV₁ : cāturāpy avinābhāva ŚV₅. “In regard to that, although there is no mutual relation of the factors of action [prior to the action], nevertheless, when there is an action, there is a relation of assisting and assisted. That is said to be the relation of those two [things] after their association with the action. Nor, moreover, is it established in regard to this that invariable concomitance has [any] application.”

Of course, prior to the action of designation, word and meaning have a natural or innate (autpattika) relation, in that the former has the capacity (śakti), i.e., is suitable, for designating the latter and the latter has the capacity for being indicated by the former. Cf. VP 2.400–401, discussed by Houben 1995: 235–236: yathā pranihitam caṣkṣur darśāṇāyopakalpate || tāthāḥ bihaṃ sa ṣabdo bhavatī arthasya vācakāḥ || kriyāvyavetah sambandho drṣṭah karana-karmanoḥ || abhidhāniyamas tasmād abhidhānabhidhheyayaḥ. “Just as the eye is suitable for seeing when it is directed [toward something], so does a word become expressive of a meaning when it is aimed [at something]. It is observed that the relation between instrument and object is mediated by action. Therefore, designation and thing designated are restricted [to each other in/by
Thus, in the *Sambandhākṣepavāda* chapter Kumārila emphatically rejects the Buddhist, i.e., Dignāga’s, position.\(^{45}\) Mainly, Kumārila asserts that “here there is no cognition of invariable concomitance [between word and its meaning] prior to its expressiveness.”\(^{46}\) This statement is partially based on the Vṛttikāra’s claim that there is no relation of any sort: certainly not contact, but also not causation nor dependence nor ancestry (*yauna*?).\(^{47}\) But it is also based on the idea that an invariable concomitance, established by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, that restricts the designative capacity of a word to just one universal, indeed emerges later.

Initially, one comprehends that a word is expressive from one’s elders. One is either taught directly, “This is to be known from this,” or, “This is the expression, this is what is expressed.” Or else, one just observes linguistic interactions: one notices that the utterance of a certain word, such as “cow” (in the sentence, “Bring the cow”), evokes an action in regard to a certain object.\(^ {48}\) This expressiveness of a word, however, the act of] designating” (trans. adapted from Houben). Cf. Eltschinger 2007: 126–127.

\(^{45}\) The Buddhist position is presented ŚV *Sambandha* 16cd–18c: *samjñeti gamakatvam cen na tadaṅgam iyam bhavet || gamayantiṁ śrutīṁ dṛṣṭvā kalpyate vyawahārataḥ || na caissā gamayaty arthanā sambandhe ‘navadhārite || tasmād gamakatā paścād dhūmāder iva jāyate || sānaṅgam tadvad eva syāt.... “If [it is thought that] there is a capacity to make something known insofar as [the word] is a name – this [name by itself] could not be an integral factor of that [making known]. [The capacity to make something known] is only postulated after observing a word that makes something known, from everyday usage. And that [word] does not make a meaning known if a relation [between the word and the meaning] is not ascertained. Therefore, the capacity of making something known [for a word] arises later, as it does for [inferential marks such as] smoke. That [word] would not be an integral factor [of the capacity to make something known], like that [inferential mark, smoke].”

\(^{46}\) ŚV *Sambandha* 20ab: *iha vācakatāyāḥ prāṇ naṃ nāvinābhāvitāmatiḥ ||

\(^{47}\) Frauwallner 1968: 36,9–11: *kāryakāraṇanimittanaimittikāśrayāśrayibhāvaya- unādāyas tu sambandhāḥ śabdasya anupapannā eva iti. “Relations such as cause and effect, occasion and occasioned, support and supported, and ancestry are not at all possible for a word.”

\(^{48}\) ŚV *Sambandha* 21cd–24ab: *kathayanti kvacit tāvad boddhavyo ’smād ayam tv iti || kvacid vācaka ity evam vācyo ’yam iti cocyate || kvacid uccaritāc chadbād dṛṣṭvārthavisayāṃ kriyām || keśān cīt tatra boddhrtvam anumānāt prakalpyate\(^1\) | etenāsmād yataḥ śabdād artho ’yam avadhāритāḥ || teneśnām imau siddhau vācyavācakasākti kau || ’prakalpyate ŚV\(^{R}\) : pratīyate ŚV\(^{Ś}\). “Sometimes, to begin with, they [i.e., the elders] teach, ‘This is to be known from this [word].’ Sometimes it is said, [‘This is the expression.’ Similarly, ‘This is what is expressed.’ Sometimes, seeing an action in regard to a certain object due to the utterance of a word [e.g., ‘Cow!’], it is understood by inference, for some, that [the word] makes known that [object]. Therefore, since from this word this object is ascertained, both are indeed
is undefined. The word “cow” refers to something in which numerous universals, qualities, and motions inhere; it can, moreover, refer to different subtypes of cow. Ordinary people may not be concerned about the precise meaning of cow—namely, cowness; but the learned must distinguish what is directly expressed by a word and what is indirectly expressed, so that they are able to tell the relative force of a statement. This is where positive and negative concomitance come in.

It is anvaya and vyatireka that restrict the expressiveness of a word to just one universal. Thus, we observe “cow” applied to individual cows, which are also substances. However, we also see that it is not applied to horses, etc., even though they are substances, too. (Hence, it does not directly mean substancehood.) And “cow” is applied to spotted cows when black cows are not present, but also to black cows when spotted cows are not present. (Hence, it does not refer to a specific kind of cow.)

established as having the capacities of expression and [thing] expressed”—which, of course, they always naturally have. Cf. Eltschinger 2007: 127–128.

“the knowers of sentences” (vākyajñāḥ, ŚV Sambandha 27b), i.e., Mīmāṃsakas.

A prescription that expresses something directly has more force than one that expresses something indirectly. See Pārthasārathi’s excursus, ŚVN 357,27–358,4.

ŚV Sambandha 24cd–29ab: ittham vācakatā siddhā sankīrnāpi1 tataḥ param || anvayavyatirekābhyaṃ niṣkrṣte ‘rthe niyamya ṭi bahujaṅguṇadraryakarmabhedāvalambanān || pratyayān sahasā jātān śrāutalākṣaṇikātmākān2 na lokāḥ kārānābhāvan nirdhāravyātum icchati || balābalādisiddhyartham vākyajñās tu viviṅcāte | kaksāntaritasāmānyavisēsuṣo hi durbalāḥ | sāmānyavacanāḥ sabdo jāyate lakṣaṇābalāt | tenāvasyaṃ vivektyayam śabdena kiyad ucyate4 || kiyad vā nityasambandhād abhidhēyena lakṣyate.1 sankīrnāpi ŚVₜ : sankīrnārthā ŚVₜ.2 bahujaṅguṇadraryakarmabhedāvalambanān || pratyayān sahasā jātān śrāutalākṣaṇikātmākān ŚVₜ : bahujaṅguṇadraryakarmabhedāvalambanābh | pratyayāt sahasā jātāt śrāutalākṣaṇikātmākāt ŚVₗ.3 kaksāntaritasāmānyavisēsu ŚVₗ : kaksāntaritasāmānyavisēsu ŚVₗ.4 sabdena kiyad ucyate ŚVₗ : jāyate lakṣaṇābalāt ŚVₗ. “In this way the expressiveness [of a word], though [initially] established as mixed, is subsequently restricted to an isolated meaning by positive and negative concomitance. The ordinary person does not care to distinguish cognitions that arise randomly (sahasā) [from a word on different occasions] that pertain to numerous specific universals, qualities, substances, and actions and are [sometimes] literal [and sometimes] figurative, because he has no reason [to do so]. But those who are versed in [the meanings of] sentences [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] distinguish [the literal and figurative meanings] in order to know which [word] has more force and which has less; for a word which is [directly] expressive of a [certain] universal becomes weaker [when used to refer] to [the other] universals and differences included within its scope (? kaksāntarita), because it indicates [them] figuratively. Therefore, one must necessarily discern to what extent something is directly expressed (ucyate) by the word or to what extent, due to an eternal relation, it is indirectly indicated by the primary meaning (abhidhēya).”
In this manner, by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, one ascertains that the primary meaning of “cow” is just cowness. Moreover, its extension is narrower than “substance,” but broader than “spotted cow” and “black cow.” In this way a hierarchy of meanings becomes apparent.\(^{52}\)

Hence, Kumārila concludes, while the relation of word and meaning is that of name (*samjñā)* and thing named (*samjñīn*), which is known at the beginning by either observing or being informed of the expressive nature of the word, it is restricted, or precisely defined, by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. And so, the relation of word and meaning will appear to be that of invariable concomitance, when fundamentally it is not.\(^{53}\) Once again: a word, like an inferential mark, has the capacity to make something known, but it does not function in the same way. It does not have that capacity by virtue of one’s ascertaining its invariable concomitance with its meaning. Rather, it has that capacity naturally, and it is established *for us* by observing that the word is used effectively, in linguistic interactions, to *designate* that meaning. We have seen that Dignāga’s Apohavāda is inextricably bound up with the idea that a word functions like an inferential mark. By rejecting the latter idea, Kumārila takes a decisive step toward the refutation of the Apohavāda.

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\(^{52}\) ŚV Sambandha 29cd–31ab: *tatraprayogābhulyāttadviśeṣeśvasatsvapi* || *prayogāt parasāmānye sati cāpy aprayogataḥ*\(^1\) *sāsnādyēkārthasambandhigotvamātrasya*\(^2\) vācakah || *gosābda iti vijñānam anvayavyatirekajam*. \(^1\) *cāpy aprayogataḥ ŚV* \(^R\): *vācyaprayogataḥ ŚV* \(^S\). \(^2\) *sāsnādyēkārthasambandhigotvamātrasya ŚV* \(^S\) : *sāsnādyutpannasambandhagotvamātrasya ŚV* \(^R\). “In regard to that, from numerous cases of its use, because the word is used in regard to something even when its [various] differences are absent and is not used when another universal is present – [in this way] the knowledge that the word ‘cow’ is expressive of cowness, which is associated exclusively with dewlap, etc., arises by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*.”

\(^{53}\) ŚV Sambandha 31cd–32cd: *tasmād gamakataivādāv abhidhāyakatā punah* || *tannimitteti sambandhah samjñāsambjñīntvalaksanāḥ* || *sambandhaniyamo ‘yam tu yāvinābhhāvitocyate*. “Therefore, the capacity to make something known exists at the beginning, while the capacity to designate something is based on that. And so, the relation [of word and meaning] is of the nature of name and thing named. But it is this restriction of the relation [to just one universal by *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, as explained] which is said to be the relation of invariable concomitance.”
Appendix

PS(V) 5.34–35 (Pind 2015: I.40,2–42,4)

*kathaṃ punaḥ śabdasyārthāntarāpohena svārthābhidhāne pūrvadośā-prasaṅgaḥ? yasmād*

*adṛṣṭer anyaśabdārthe svārthasyāṁśe ’pi darśanāt śruteḥ sambandhasaukaryaṃ na cāsti vyabhicāritā [34]*

anvayavyatirekau hi śabdasyārthābhidhāne dvāraṃ, tau ca tulyātulyayor vṛttyavṛtti. tatra tu tulye nāvaśyaṃ sarvatra vṛttir ākhyeyā kvacid, ānanye 'ṛthasyākhyānāsambhavāt. atulye tu saty apy ānanye śakyaṃ adarśanamātreṇāvṛttī ākhyānam. ata eva ca svasambandhibhyo 'nyatādarśanāt tadvayacchedānumānaṃ svārthābhidhānam ity ucyate. anvayadvārena cānumāne vrksaśabdād ekasmin vastuni śimśapapādībhāsaḥ saṃśayo na syāt. tatsaṃśayaḥ pārthivatvadrvayatvādībhāso ’pi saṃśayaḥ syāt. yatatas vrksaśabdo ’pārthivādiṣu na drśṭāḥ, ato vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. āha ca

*vrksatvapārthivadravyasajjñeyāḥ prātilomyataḥ catustridvyeka sandhe niścaya ’nyathā [35]*

ity antaraslokaḥ.

But how do the previous[ly mentioned] problems[, beginning with, How would the meaning of a word be learned?], not follow if a word indicates its own referent by excluding other referents? Because

The relation of a word [with its meaning] is easily made, and it is not ambiguous, because it is not observed [employed] for the referent of another word, and it is observed [employed] for part of its own extension as well. [34]

For positive and negative concomitance are the means of a word indicating a [certain] meaning, and those are the occurrence and non-occurrence [of the word] in regard to what is similar and what is not similar[, respectively]. In the case of what is similar [the word’s] occurrence necessarily cannot be stated for each one, in some cases (kvacit) [namely, in the case of general terms]; since the extension [of the word] is infinite, it is impossible to state it. In the case of what is not similar, on the other hand, even though it is infinite [too], the statement of non-occurrence [of the word in regard to those things] is possible merely
by non-observation. Just for this [reason] it is said that the inference of an exclusion from those [other things it does not refer to] due to not observing it used for something besides its own relata—that is a word’s indication of its own meaning. But if there were an inference by means of positive concomitance, [then] from the word “tree” there would not be doubt, in regard to the same real thing, that presents a śimśapā, etc. [i.e., doubt whether it is a śimśapā or not]. [If there were a doubt as to what specific type of tree is meant then] like that doubt there would be doubt that presents “earthenness,” “substancehood,” and so forth. But since the word “tree” is not observed when there are things that are not earthen, etc., there is an inference [from the word, of its referents] just by means of negative concomitance. Moreover, it is explained that
treeness, earthen, substance, existent, and knowable are the cause of doubt in regard to four things, three things, two things, and one thing [, respectively,] in reverse order. Otherwise, [i.e., in direct order, they are the cause] of certainty. [35]

This is an intermediate stanza. (Cf. Pind 2015: II.116–126)

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P  *Pāṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī*


PS  *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. See Pind 2015: I.

PSṬ Ms B  The Sanskrit *codex unicus* of Jinendrabuddhi’s *Pramāṇasamuccayatīkā Viśālāmalavatī*, excerpted in Pind 2015. Transcription of 226b1 to 227b7 made available by Dr. Horst Lasic.

PSV  *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*. See Pind 2015: I.

Dignāga and Kumārila on *apoha* and the hierarchy of concepts

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**PVSVṬ**  

**Scharf 1996**  

**ŚV R**  
Ślokavārttika, Ramanatha Sastri edition. See ŚVTṬ.

**ŚV Š**  

**ŚV Apoha**  

**ŚVKāś**  

**ŚVN**  
Nyāyaratnākara. See ŚV Š.

**ŚVTṬ**  

**Taber 2002**  

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**VP 2**  

**VS**  
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Chinese whispers?
Transmitting, transferring and translating Buddhist literature*

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Chinese whispers … is an internationally popular children’s game, in which one person whispers a message to the ear of the next person through a line of people until the last player announces the message to the entire group. Although the objective is to pass around the message without it becoming garbled along the way, part of the enjoyment is that, regardless, this usually ends up happening. Errors typically accumulate in the retellings, so the statement announced by the last player differs significantly from that of the first player …¹

The transmission of Buddhist literature (just like any other religious literature), be it within a given cultural environment or across borders of any kind, in the source language or in translation, shares the characteristic feature of the game of Chinese whispers. Basically, it means passing on at every step of its transmission whatever the editor or translator thinks or even wants the message to be. Unavoidably, there is a good deal of interpretation implied, and there are many opportunities for errors and voluntary alterations. After several steps the text will differ—occasionally even significantly—from its initial version.

* This article is indebted to Dan Martin, who, in his blog “Generating sacred symbols” (Martin 2012) and in a series of e-mail communications, brought my attention to the verses of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra that will be discussed and their potential relevance for Kanjur research, eventually provoking me to write this paper. My sincere thanks are due to: Max Deeg, Erika Forte, and Patrick Suchy for their help with reading and interpreting the Chinese; to Toshio Horiuchi and Lambert Schmithausen for sharing secondary literature, information regarding the Sanskrit manuscripts and valuable comments; to Bruno Lainé for his help with the Mongolian; to Cristina Scherrer-Schaub for advice regarding the Dunhuang manuscripts; to Dorji Wangchuk for his reference to the sūtra quotation by Rong zom Chos kyi bzung po; to Chizuko Yoshimizu for making Japanese literature available; and to Sarah Teetor for correcting my English.


Contrary to the game of Chinese whispers, however, the errors and alterations that “accumulate in the retellings” of Buddhist literature are not easily revealed; there is no “last player” to announce a “final” result, and the “first player” will most probably never be found to reveal the initial message. Only with sufficient textual material available for comparison is it occasionally possible to detect or infer such alterations and their genesis in philological research. The version at the beginning of the particular line of transmission which results in a particular version of a text is simply not known and most probably no longer exists. Even if a Sanskrit version of that text is extant, it is certainly not identical with the version at the beginning of the line, and a particular Tibetan version of it does not necessarily trace back to the same Sanskrit version as the extant Sanskrit or Chinese versions do. Although the comparison of as much textual material as possible is crucial in textual research, there are restrictions to the comparative method.

In fact, the translation made from a Chinese version could also and indirectly stand upon Indian versions earlier than that actually used by the team of Indian panditas and Tibetan lo tsā bas in the process of translating the India text into Tibetan. This fact is crucial in many respects. Indeed, if we know the exemplars or copies of Buddhist texts in Tibetan translations, attested among the Dunhuang Mss, as well as the canonical Tibetan translations, we know nearly nothing about the precise identity of their India antecedents. And still, we proceed by comparing relatively uncomparable matter. (Scherrer-Schaub 2010: xxvi)

But one might add to this last sentence of Cristina Scherrer-Schaub that it occasionally does work, to some extent at least, against its bad odds.

Every extant version of a text, no matter how old it might be, represents merely one step in its transmission. The only exception could be the “autograph,” but for a great part of Buddhist literature this category is highly hypothetical or even fictive.

It is not possible here to give a detailed survey of the transmission of Buddhist literature; a few general and simplifying remarks will suffice to bring to mind its complexity.

As for “autograph” or Urtext, the earliest Buddhist literature was passed on exclusively orally in various Indian vernaculars and in various lines of transmission for more than a century before it was put down in writing. By that time, the texts have already undergone a number of changes, and parts of different traditions may have been incorporated.
Even several “originals” of the same text may exist or have existed that had their impact on the further transmission.

Similarly, also Mahāyānasūtras, at least some of them, represent the written documentation of ideas that were, first, developed and transmitted orally for a certain period of time.

Also later, primarily philosophical, texts might go back to oral “autographs” and be ascribed to certain masters although they actually consist of “lecture notes” taken by students. Such cases are well known in Tibetan literature, but there is evidence that they might also occur with Indian texts. The relevance of this fact for the actual transmission of a text or doctrine has not yet been studied in detail, but it seems to be obvious when one finds divergences or even contradictions between the notes of either different students on the same lecture, or the notes on different lectures of the same master.

The earliest manuscripts of these texts were then copied and re-copied several—probably many—times, experiencing the fate every manuscript will experience in the course of its history, including misreadings, scribal errors, corrections or attempted corrections thereof, conflations, etc.

By the time they were transferred to a different cultural environment and translated into other languages like Chinese or Tibetan, they were already “copies many stages removed from the originals, copies of which not a single one is free from error,” and various versions of the same text were in circulation.

Any of these copies could become the source for a translation, and occasionally even several copies were translated independently. These

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2 Helmut Krasser detected such evidence, e.g., in Bhāviveka’s *Tarkajvālā*. See Krasser 2011: 63ff. and 2014: 306ff.

3 See Tauscher 2010: 13ff. on the work *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* ascribed to Phya pa Chos gyi seng ge.

4 It would lead too far to discuss in detail what sort of voluntary or involuntary alterations may happen to a manuscript in the course of this transmission. An—admittedly extreme—example is given by Horst Lasic in two articles on Pramāṇa material from Tabo (Lasic 2007a and 2007b). He could demonstrate that the sometimes confusing or even incomprehensible formulations in the canonical version of rNgog Blo Ildan shes rab’s translation of *Nyāyabindhuṭīkā* are caused by an “editorial accident.” When revising the older translation of Dharmāloka, rNgog obviously wrote his occasionally quite substantial alterations directly into the manuscript, and when the text was copied, the corrections did not replace the old translation, but were incorporated into it.

5 I borrow here from the phrasing of West 1973: 7 (quoted in Silk 1994: 8): “In almost all cases those writings have survived, if they have survived at all, only in copies many stages removed from the originals, copies of which not a single one is free from error.” Martin West makes this statement about Greek and Latin texts, but the general message holds true also for Indian writings.
translations, too, were copied and re-copied and transmitted in the same way the “originals” were.

In translating, the Tibetan lotsābas of the old days had a big advantage over modern translators: they did not have to ponder over a suiting terminology; the Mahāvyutpatti provided it, at least in theory. Nevertheless, translation always implies interpretation, due to the ambiguity of words, the fact that there are, as far as I know, no two languages in the world where words cover exactly the same range of meanings, and that words change their meanings in the course of time, and also due to doctrinal or philosophical intention.

To complicate matters, not everything that appears as a variant reading in Tibetan translations necessarily reflects a textual discrepancy or hints at an alteration in the course of transmission. It might simply result from the use of different terminologies in translating from either Sanskrit or Chinese.6

Three verses from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (henceforth LAS), 2.203=10.457, 2.204=10.458, and 2.205=10.445, have been chosen here as a basis to reflect upon and illustrate some of the problems indicated above.

The importance of the LAS for the Buddhist tradition as well as for Buddhist studies is clearly reflected by the lengthy title of Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki’s (1930) pioneering work: Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, One of the most important texts of Mahayana Buddhism, in which almost all its principal tenets are presented, including the teaching of Zen, and nothing really needs to be added to that. Some quotations from this work, however, may serve to illustrate the message of its title:

… Bodhidharma … handed the mind-seal over to the second patriarch, Hui-k’ê, and afterwards said: ‘I have here the Laṅkāvatāra in four fasciculi which I now pass to you. It contains the essential teaching concerning the mind-ground of the Tathagata, by means of which you lead all sentient beings to open their eyes to the truth of Buddhism.’ (p. 59)

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra is one of the nine principal Mahayana texts in Nepalese Buddhism; in China and Japan it also occupies an important position in the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism as containing the doctrines of Mind-only, Tathāgata-garbha, and Ālayavijñāna, and again in the literature of Zen Buddhism.

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6 On this topic, see Stein 2010: 1‒96: “The Two Vocabularies of Indo-Tibetan and Sino-Tibetan Translations in the Dunhuang Manuscripts.”
“The study of the sutra,” Suzuki continues, “however, owing to various reasons has not been very popular.” (p. 3) One of these reasons might be that “the whole Laṅkāvatāra is just a collection of notes unsystematically strung together, and, frankly speaking, it is a useless task to attempt to divide them into sections, or chapters \( \text{parivarta} \) … Gunabhadra [who translated LAS into Chinese in 443] has done the wisest thing by simply designating the entire sutra as ‘The Gist of the Buddha’s Teaching’ \( \text{Buddhāpravacanahṛidayam} \).” (p. 17f.; see below, p. 728.)

Suzuki made these statements in 1930, when the discipline of Buddhist studies still was in its infancy, and it shall not be discussed here whether or to what extent the study of LAS has become more popular ever since. Be this as it may, from the point of view of modern Buddhist studies, a revision of both the edition of the Sanskrit text and its translation is still a desideratum. All this, however, is not our present concern.

The overall topic of this paper is the transmission of Buddhist literature and, more precisely, Kanjur research with its two main aims: a) to study the development of the Kanjur as a literary corpus and to trace its lines of transmission with their inter-relations and mutual dependencies through the structural analysis of canonical collections and through text-critical investigation of individual texts, and b) to establish possibly authentic versions of individual texts. Obviously, however, “authentic” has to be taken here in a limited and relative sense.

While Csoma de Kőröss in his pioneering work (Csoma 1836 and 1839) considered the Tibetan Kanjur to be one homogenous work, contemporary research assumes different lines of canonical transmission, which are conceptually indebted to the Old Narthang Kanjur (~ 1310) and independent in their actual execution (Skilling 1997, 100), but show various degrees of inter-relation and conflation. These lines of transmission are generally classified in four groups of Kanjurs: the Tshal pa and Them spangs ma groups, a “mixed” group, which combines features of these two, and a group of “local” or “independent” Kanjurs, which encompasses all the Kanjurs that do not belong to any of the first three groups.


These groups are discussed in more detail, e.g., in Tauscher 2015.
Scholars have been aware of the existence of a great number of such “local” Kanjurs already for more than seventy years:

The religious and sectarian propensities of the Tibetans must have made it a point of ambition for every province or center of intellectual life to have its Kanjur recension. But it is also obvious that many of them remained merely ‘local’ editions without ever gaining a recognized position in the literature. May be, it will mean waste of time [sic] to occupy oneself in the future with all these unimportant and secondary editions. So far, however, we are seldom quite sure, which are to be considered secondary, and thus the luxury of selection must be postponed until we obtain absolute clarity on the matter. To us all editions are equally important at present, the more so as the ‘local’ ones were certainly not without influence on the editions available to us, and as, in turn, they themselves reflect upon the influence of earlier editions no longer extant. This is especially important with regard to the handwritten copies which were mostly rewritten, usually with ‘corrections’, in several lamaseries. (Kunst 1947: 127f., quoted in Silk 1994: 6f.)

Although Kanjur research has made considerable progress since then, it is still far from “absolute clarity,” and “the luxury of selection” still cannot be afforded with regard to local Kanjurs. Quite the contrary, for the reasons mentioned already by Kunst, and because they occasionally contain texts absent from the mainstream Kanjurs, texts in different recensions or translations, or even translations from a different version of the Sanskrit text, and their sources may pre-date the archetypes of the two main groups of Kanjurs, the local Kanjurs are increasingly moving to the centre of scholarly interest. In a more recent publication, Robert Mayer breaks his lance for the study of these Kanjurs:

The moral of the story is this: we should not allow ourselves to become excessively swayed by the grand reputations and religious-political support invested in the few mainstream editions of the canons. Don’t forget the ‘Hidden Land’ principle, which tells us that just occasionally the most valuable editions can be located in the least expected places. This was something well understood by the great Tibetan critical editors of the past, men like Situ Panchen, Tsongkhapa or Kathok Rigdzin Tsewang Norbu, who became dissatisfied if they found reasons to suspect that the standard canonical fare was deficient, and who left no stone unturned in seeking out rare witnesses in Sanskrit and Tibetan to complete their own critical editions. (Mayer 2011)

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9 See Eimer 2012: xxi. For the attempt to define the terms “local” and “independent,” see also Tauscher/Lainé 2015.
Presently, the Kanjurs of Phug brag (~1700; Samten 1992), O rgyan gling (~1700; Samten 1994) and Bathang (15th–16th cent.; Eimer 2012), as well as the “Early Mustang Kanjur” (1436–1447), as Helmut Eimer (1999) named it in his edition of its catalogue (dkar chag), are generally regarded as local Kanjurs. The manuscript Kanjurs of gLang Monastery in Dolpo and rNam rgyal Monastery in Mustang (both 14th cent.?), and of Hemis and Basgo (both ~1630) in Ladakh could be counted among this group.

Strong commonalities of Hemis and Basgo with the Early Mustang Kanjur, however, suggest the postulation of a “Mustang group” as a fifth group of Kanjurs (Tauscher/Lainé 2015). The Kanjurs of gLang and rNam rgyal, too, appear to be related to this group. Some evidence supporting this theory is contained in the textual material investigated in the present paper (p. 726 and fns. 43 and 58).

Discussing the three verses from LAS mentioned above has the sole purpose of illustrating some problems of textual transmission and of tracing its various steps as well as the genesis of textual divergences and their possible reasons, as needed to establish a possibly “authentic” version of any text. It is, however, neither intended to establish the “true” message of these verses, nor is it the aim of this paper to study LAS as such and the history of its transmission. Nevertheless, some general remarks and reflections on the material consulted for textual comparison are unavoidable.

*Sanskrit:*

The edition of Bunyiu Nanjio (1923), based on four manuscripts that do not, within the verses of our concern, show major variants that would suggest different lines of transmission.

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10 The gLang Kanjur, presently kept at gNas gsar Monastery in Upper Dolpo, has been digitized and studied by the “Tibetan Manuscript Project”, University of Vienna (TMPV) since 2018. Radiocarbon analysis (Heller 2009: 77) and some peculiarities of the manuscript suggest a preliminary dating to the 14th century for its oldest parts.

The rNam rgyal Kanjur was discovered and provisionally dated to the 14th century by Christian Luczanits in 2015 (Luczanits 2016) and digitized by Luczanits and TMPV in 2015–2017.

If the provisional dating of these two Kanjurs proves correct, they would be the oldest Kanjurs known to exist as physical entities, predating the Early Mustang Kanjur as well as Them spangs ma and being more or less contemporary with the Tshal pa Kanjur. For both Kanjurs, see Viehbeck 2020.


12 The nature and extent of these relations is subject of ongoing research.

13 The edition of P. L. Vaidya (1963) is not taken into account, as it is “merely a reissue of the Nanjio Edition with a few corrections” (Takasaki 1981: 10) and does not offer any additional information with regard to the verses discussed in this paper.
**Chinese:**
The Taisho (T) collection of the Chinese Buddhist canon contains three translations of LAS:

T 670: 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經, translated by Guṇabhadra (443).
In full, the title of this translation reads:

楞伽阿跋多羅寶經一切佛語心品
(Lengjia’abaduoluo baojing Yiqie foyu xinpin) Laṅkāvatāra-jewel-sūtra, the chapter of the essence of the teaching of all Buddhas.\(^\text{14}\)

This translation does not include chapter ten (Sagāthakam).

T 671: 入楞伽經, translated by Bodhiruci (513).
T 672: 大乘入楞伽經, translated by Śikṣānanda (700–704).

**Tibetan:**
Tibetan Kanjurs contain two versions of LAS.

Version A, being a translation from Sanskrit, bears the title:

’Phags pa Lang kar gshegs pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo ji snyed pa/gsum khri drug stong pa

For this version, the following editions have been compared:\(^\text{15}\)

D 107, F 86 and 87, H 110, He (mDo La 78b2-252b9), J 52, N 95, Lg 18.3, Ng 17.4, S 96 and 245, Q 775, X (mDo La 71a4-245a7), Z 127 and 276; Ba₃ (mDo La 71b5-249a1), Ba₄ (mDo La 76b4-272b2), Bd (Ka, Cha 1b1-128a5), Cha 2.1, Go 18.1; PT 608.

A text-critical analysis of manuscript Kanjur texts is very often complicated by the fact that they contain a great number of individual scribal errors that do not necessarily and in all cases hint at a direct or indirect relation between the various editions. Therefore, the form in which the title of a text is quoted gains some relevance, as here—except for minor variants—such individual errors can be largely excluded.

In the present case, instead of ji snyed pa (“all that there is”), which seems to indicate that it is the complete sūtra, including chapter ten (Sagāthakam), the Kanjurs of gLang (Lg), rNam rgyal (Ng), Hemis (He),

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\(^\text{14}\) See below. Welter 2011: n. 79 translates the title as “The Mind Which All the Buddhas Spoke of” and DDB gives “Chapter on the Buddha’s Thoughts and Words.” Both interpretations of the Chinese title are supported by neither the Sanskrit (sarvabuddhavacanahṛdaya) nor the Tibetan (sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsung rab kyi snying po).

\(^\text{15}\) The various editions are quoted with their numbers in the respective catalogues or on the website of the Tibetan Manuscript Project, University of Vienna: “Resources for Kanjur & Tanjur Research” (www.rkts.org).
If no catalogue reference is available, they are quoted by volume and folio numbers.
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and Basgo (X and Ba)\(^{16}\) give *sum khri drug stong pa* (“consisting of 36,000 [śloka]”) as a specification of LAS. In Sanskrit, at least in the published version, this form of the title appears exclusively at the end of chapter two (*Sarvadharmasamuccaya*). It reads: *Laṅkāvatāre ṣaṭtriṃśatsāhasre sarvadharmasamuccayo*,\(^{17}\) and this addition to the title (\(\text{lang kar gshegs pa sum khri drug stong pa las} \ldots\)) is retained in all the Tibetan editions of version A. The four Kanjurs mentioned, however, apply it to the entire sūtra. This fact can be taken as evidence supporting the hypothetical postulation of a “Mustang group” of Kanjurs mentioned above.

Version B is a translation from the Chinese (T 670), and its full title reads:

\[\text{’Phags pa Lang kar gshegs pa rin po che’i mdo las} \text{ Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsung gi snying po zhes bya ba’i le’u} \]

The following editions have been compared:

D 108, H 111, J 53, N 96, Q 776.

Its title is a faithful rendering of the Chinese, but by adding *mdo las* (“from the sūtra”), it suggests that “the essence of the teaching of all Buddhas” does not refer to LAS as a whole, but only to a part of it. In the same form the title of the sūtra appears also in the Tibetan translation of Wen hui’s commentary.\(^{19}\) However, both the sūtra and its commentary were translated by ’Gos Chos grub, and this version of the title might reflect merely his (mis-)interpretation of the Chinese.

\(^{16}\) The gSer zangs lha khang at Basgo, Ladakh, houses one complete Kanjur which was compiled in the late 20th century from 17th century material. It is referred to by the siglum X. In addition, there are fragments of at least four sets of Kanjur, labelled Ba. For details, see Tauscher / Lainé 2015.

\(^{17}\) Vaidya 1963, referring the epithet to the chapter-title, reads *ṣaṭtriṃśatsāhasrasarvadharmasamuccayo*. In the same way it is apparently taken by Suganuma 1978, “The Ṣaṭtriṃśatsāhasrasarvadharmasamuccayaaparivarta of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, its translation and commentaries” (reference from Horiuchi 2017).

\(^{18}\) In the \(lHan kar ma\) catalogue (No 252), among the Mahāyānasūtras translated from Chinese, apparently the same translation appears as ”Phags pa lang kar gshegs pa rin po che’i le’u” (see Hermann-Pfandt 2008: 136).

\(^{19}\) ”Phags pa lang kar gshegs pa rin po che’i mdo las || Sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsung gi snying po’i le’u rgya cher ’grel pa (IOL Tib J219).
In the Sanskrit version, the epithet “essence of the teaching of all Buddhas” to LAS appears at the end of chapter eight\(^{20}\) on “(not)\(^{21}\) eating meat”: \textit{Laṅkāvatārī Sarvabuddhavacananārdayān (A)māṃsbhakṣaṇaparivarta}. As \textit{sangs rgyas thams cad kyi gsung rab(s) gyi snying po} it is retained in the Tibetan translation of version A as well. The Kanjurs of the postulated “Mustang group,” in addition, combine this epithet with the specification \textit{sum khri stong pa}, which they use for the entire LAS.

It might be the case that it was Guṇabhadra’s idea to designate the entire sūtra as “the gist of the Buddha’s teaching” (Suzuki 1930: 17f.), as it is done in chapter eight of the Sanskrit version. But why, then, would he refer to it as “chapter” (品 \textit{pin}, parivarta)? This question, just like other questions related to the application of epithets to the title, might have some relevance for the history of the transmission of LAS. It is, however, doubtful whether they will ever be answered, and for the time being they shall not be pursued.

The question of dating the Tibetan translation(s) of LAS, on the other hand, deserves a short consideration. All the colophons of version B agree that it was translated by ’Gos/mGos Chos grub (mid-9th cent.)\(^{22}\) “at the command of Lha btsan po (i.e. King Khri gtsug lde btsan \textit{alias} Ral pa can) and consulting the commentary composed by the Chinese master Wen hui” (\textit{dpal lha btsan po’i bka’ lung gis rgya’i slob dpon Wen hwi yis mdzad pa’i ‘grel pa dang sbyar nas}). It has been ventured that ’Gos Chos grub might also have consulted an earlier translation of LAS made from Sanskrit, i.e., the version preserved at Dunhuang (PT 608) (Takasaki 1978: 460).

Regarding version A, the situation is not equally clear. The colophons of five of the twenty-one editions consulted for this paper (D, H, N\(_{1}\), S\(_{1}\), Z\(_{1}\)) state in conformity that it was “translated from an Indian (?) model by the follower of the Bhagavat’s tradition, ’Gos Chos grub” (bcom ldan ‘das kyi

\(^{20}\) The Kanjur editions of D, F (both copies), H and N count it as chapter seven, not indicating chapter seven of the Sanskrit version (\textit{nairmāṇikaparivarta}). The majority of the Tibetan versions, in addition, number both preceding chapters with “five,” and consequently the chapter in dispute appears as number six. Version B of LAS (D 108, etc.) does not indicate any chapter titles or numbers.

\(^{21}\) Nanjio 1923 gives the title of this chapter as \textit{māṃsbhakṣaṇaparivarta}, but the majority of manuscripts now accessible read \textit{a-māṃsbhakṣaṇaparivarta}. The negation is also attested in Chinese 遮食肉品 (\textit{zheshiroupin}, T 671) and 断食肉品 (\textit{duanshiroupin}, T 672)—T 670 does not give a chapter-title—as well as by the Tibetan translation, which in all editions reads \textit{sha mi bza’/za ba’i le’u} (see Schmithausen 2006: 86).

\(^{22}\) On this translator, see Takasaki 1978: 459f.
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apparently, they all depend on only one common source. The other editions do not indicate any translator, and, for several reasons, the credibility of this information may be doubted. In particular, also the information that it was translated from an Indian (?) model (rgya dpe) is suspect. Version A of LAS was clearly translated from Sanskrit, and the abbreviation rgya could equally represent rgya gar (India) and rgya nag (China). Usually, however, it is used for China, and the wording of the colophon appears in an almost identical form also in the Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra translated by ’Gos Chos grub from the Chinese (D 555): “translated from a Chinese model and revised by the follower of the Bhagavat’s tradition, the monk Chos grub” (... bcom ldan ’das kyi rgya dpe las bgsyur cing zhus te ...).

The sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa contains a reference to earlier translations of the Ratnamegha and the Laṅkāvatāra. The version of the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa contained in the Tanjur and extant among the Dunhuang manuscripts is generally accepted as dating from the horse-year 814, during the reign of King Khri lde srong btsan alias Sad na legs. It places these translations at “the time of lha sras yab” (Khri srong lde btsan), i.e., during the eighth century.

Fragments of the same text found at Tabo, Himachal Pradesh, however, suggest an earlier version of the sGra sbyor, dating to the pig-year 795, during the reign of King Khri srong lde btsan (755–797) (Panglung 1994: 167). According to this version, these translations were made “in the times of the ancestors,” which might even refer to the reign of Srong btsan sgam po (7th cent.).

In the Tabo version, the reference to these translations reads:

gzhan ní yab myes kyí sku ríng la | mkhan po dang lo tsha bas Dar ma dkon mchog sprín dang | Lang kar gshegs pa bgsyur te ...

As for the rest translate in the same way as Dar ma dkon mchog sprin and Lang kar gshegs pa had been done by the mkhan po and the lo tsha ba in the time of the ancestors!

It is uncertain whether any of the entries in the catalogues of Tibet’s imperial period refer to this translation of LAS, but most probably

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23 According to Tibetan historiographers such as mKhas pa lDe’u or Bu ston the Ratnameghasūtra was translated during his reign (Panglung 1994: 165, n. 13).
24 Translation of Panglung 1994: 165 (my Tibetan transliteration; í = inverted gi gu).
25 lHan kar ma lists one translation made from Sanskrit (No 84) in 3,300 śloka = 11 bam po, and one made from Chinese (No 252) in 2,400 śloka = 8 bam po, which
the canonical version A represents a revised version of the translation mentioned in the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa.\textsuperscript{26} In this case, 'Gos Chos grub could be responsible for this revision—if we accept some factual foundation to the tradition that names him as the translator.

Some passages of the original translation, however, might be preserved in quotations or in anthologies of sūtra passages, particularly if the latter were compiled prior to or, at least, not too long after the canonical translation. A promising candidate for such an anthology could be the rNal 'byor chen po bsgom pa'i don by sPug Ye shes dbyangs (8th cent.).\textsuperscript{27} Among its 441 quotations it collects 53 passages from LAS, of which only two show major and essential deviations. All the others are to a high degree in agreement with the canonical main-stream tradition of version A. This fact certainly supports the theory that the canonical version represents a revision of the earliest translation. Interestingly, one of these deviating passages appears in exactly the same wording in the mDo lung rin chen spungs pa by Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po (discussed below).

Some quotations of LAS 2.204 preserved in both the Tanjur and in texts of Tibetan masters from eleventh to thirteenth centuries will be discussed below.

\textit{Mongolian:}

Mongolian printed Kanjur No. 862: Qutug-tu langka-dur ajiragsan-u yeke kölgen sudur.

For the greater part, this is a “faithful” translation of the Tibetan in its mainstream tradition as it is represented in the Derge Kanjur (D 107), and thus it is of no particular direct relevance for our present purpose. Indirectly, however, it might provide some information (p. 733).

In addition, the commentaries Āryalaṅkāvatāravṛtti by Jñānaśrībhadra (Ye shes dpal bzang po, 11th cent.) (LAV) and Āryalaṅkāvatāra-nāma-mahāyānasūtravṛtti Tathāgataahṛdayālaṃkāra by Jñānavajra (11th/12th cent.)\textsuperscript{28} (THA) have been consulted. For these texts, the Tanjur

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\textsuperscript{26} Takasaki 1978: 460 holds this opinion; Panglung 1994: 165, n. 13 doubts a connection between them.

\textsuperscript{27} On this text see Otokawa 1999 and Tauscher 2007 and 2021.

\textsuperscript{28} According to Kim 2002: 57; all other dates in this paper are according to the website of the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center: http://www.tbrc.org.
\end{flushleft}
editions of Derge and Peking were used; references within this paper are to Derge, if not stated otherwise. The particular circumstances under which they were composed were not investigated.

In general, one would expect commentaries by Indian authors to be based on a Sanskrit manuscript and, thus, to reflect a particular Sanskrit version of the root-text rather than its Tibetan translation at any state of its transmission. In the case of LAV, however, the situation might be different; it appears to be based on Jñānaśrībhadra’s lectures to a Tibetan audience, recorded by Tibetan disciples (Kim 2002: 13f.). Thus, its actual wording might be influenced by the Tibetan translation of LAS prevalent at the particular time and area (see below, p. 739).

LAS, verse 2.203 (= 10.457) presents the “five vehicle model,” and serves as an introduction and indicates the context for the succeeding verses:

\[
\textit{devayānaṃ brahmayānaṃ śrāvakīyaṃ tathaiva ca |} \\
\textit{tāthāgatam ca pratyekaṃ yānāny etān vadāmy aham} ||
\]

The Deva vehicle, the Brahma vehicle, the Śrāvaka vehicle, the Pratyekabuddha vehicle, and the Tathāgata vehicle, of these I speak.

Verses 2.204 (= 10.458) and 2.205 (= 10.445) continue:

\[
yānānāṃ nāsti vai niṣṭā yāvac cittaṃ pravartate | \\
citte tu vai parāvṛtte na yānam na ca yāyinaḥ || [204] \\
yānavyavasthā naivāsti yānam ekam vadāmy aham | \\
parikarṣaṇārthaṃ bālānaṃ yānabhedaṃ vadāmy aham || [205]
\]

乃至有心轉 諸乘非究竟
若彼心滅盡 無乘及乘者 [204]
無有乘建立 我説為一乘
引導衆生故 分別説諸乘 [205]

\footnote{On this, see Wangchuk 2007: 116, on various \textit{yāna} models in general 109ff.}

\footnote{In general, the Sanskrit text throughout this paper follows Nanjio 1923; for verses 2.204 and 205, however, the readings of 10.458 and 445 are adopted, which are also attested in several manuscripts (Toshio Horiuchi, e-mail communication from 4 July 2017): 204d: \textit{yāyinaḥ} : \textit{yāninah}, 205a: \textit{yānavyavathā} : \textit{vyavastānāṃ}, 205b: \textit{yānam ekam} : \textit{yānabhedaṃ}. The Chinese is the text of T 670, the Tibetan of D 107. The English translations are those of Suzuki 1932, although they are sometimes problematic, and better solutions could be found. Verse 2.203 is quoted only in Sanskrit and English, as its Tibetan translation does not contain any relevant variant readings that require discussion in this paper.}
So long as there is a mind making conscious efforts, there can be no culmination as regards the various vehicles; when a revulsion takes place in the mind, there is neither a vehicle nor one who rides in it. [204]

There is really no establishment of various vehicles, and so I speak of the one vehicle; but in order to carry the ignorant I talk of a variety of vehicles. [205]

These two verses appear to convey a rather obvious and simple message, which could be roughly paraphrased as: As long as the mind is active, there will be various vehicles; when the mind ceases to be active, the vehicle(s) become meaningless, and there will be neither a vehicle nor anybody who rides it. These various vehicles are, in fact, not distinct; the Buddha teaches the one-vehicle (ekayāna). Only in order to guide the unenlightened beings does he teach different vehicles.

Nevertheless, they pose a number of problems, and they also reveal how textual alterations may generate and develop in the course of transmission.

2.204a/b: nāsti vai niṣṭhā – thug pa med – “there will be no culmination”

At first sight, the translation “culmination” for niṣṭhā appears to be a bad choice. However, the Sanskrit term is ambiguous. Among its equivalents that might be relevant in the present context, Monier-Williams 1899 gives “certain knowledge of,” “decision about,” “completion, perfection, culminating or extreme point,” “conclusion, end, termination, death.” For a particularly Buddhist context, Edgerton lists only “assurance, certitude.”

Due to this ambiguity, the term niṣṭhā, together with its translations, leaves room for interpretation. Will there be no culmination or no end to the vehicle(s), as long as the mind is active, or will there be no certainty about them?

31 Golzio 1996 chooses the expression “Gipfelpunkt,” which seems to be a translation of Suzuki’s “culmination” rather than of niṣṭhā, and thus is not helpful with regard to the interpretation of the sūtra text.

32 Edgerton 1953, s.v. niṣṭhātva.
This ambiguity is also reflected in the Chinese translations. In 2.204, all three of them render the term as 究竟 (jiujing), for which DDB\textsuperscript{33} gives the basic meaning “ultimate,” in the sense of—among others—“unsurpassed, final,” “ultimate culmination,” “utmost,” “limit,” “to thoroughly realize or comprehend,” attested as translation of Skt. atyanta and niṣṭhā, and Tib. gtan du and mthar thug pa. However, as 究 (jiu) bears the basic meaning of “to go to the end of,” and 竟 (jing) that of “finish,” the whole expression has also, or primarily (?), to be taken as “end, termination.”\textsuperscript{34} In the second appearance of this verse in chapter 10.458, however, T 761 expresses the same concept with 盡 (jin), which leaves no doubt that the meaning of “extinction, termination” is intended, at least in the interpretation of Bodhiruci.

In Tibetan, all the canonical editions of Version A consulted agree upon the expression thug pa med representing nāsti niṣṭhā, and this reading is preserved also in the Dunhuang manuscripts (PT 608). The Tibetan thug pa is rather unusual as an equivalent for niṣṭhā. The Mahāvyutpatti gives as equivalents mur thug pa (No 372), and mthar phyin pa (Nos 368, 784, 6363), both “positive” terms, denoting perfection rather than termination. In addition, niṣṭhā is also translated as mthar thug, which is synonymous with the other two terms.\textsuperscript{35} Without specification, however, thug pa is commonly understood as a synonym of reg pa (“to touch,” etc.) and ’phrad pa (“to meet,” etc.). Accordingly, verse 2.204ab would, rather absurdly, have to be understood as: “As long as the mind is active, the vehicles are not touched/reached/met.” This is exactly how the Mongolian translation reads: kürküi (“to touch, reach”) ügei (“without”). If anything, this shows that the expression thug pa med was not clear to the Mongolian translator.

In the negation thug pa med (pa), this term apparently bears an additional connotation which is not attested for its positive form. Here, it does not simply denote the negation of [mthar] thug pa with the meanings mentioned above, but conveys the notion of “not being fixed or stable, not staying or remaining,” or similar. In this meaning thug pa med pa appears, e.g., in LAS 10.617c, where it represents anavasthā in the sense

\textsuperscript{33} Digital Dictionary of Buddhism. http://www.buddhism-dict.net. This is the reference work for all Chinese lexical remarks in this paper.

\textsuperscript{34} Accordingly, Carré 2006: 155, translating the Chinese version T 672, renders the respective pāda by: “On ne touche pas au terme des véhicules.” The similarity with the Tibetan phrase thug pa med is coincidental.

\textsuperscript{35} E.g., in DBhS 4B: nīṣṭhā(gamana) (“arrival at the final limit”) and 5G: (asaṅgajñāna)niṣṭhā (“highest point of unobstructed knowledge”); translations of Honda 1968.
of an infinite regress, translated by Suzuki as “non-finality.”

The connotation of “infinity” implied here is even more evident in Daśabhūmikasūtra 8B. Within a series of expressions denoting non-origination and non-destruction, thug pa med pa nyid possibly represents aniṣṭhitatā, translated by Honda 1968 as “not exhausted.” Vasubandhu explains: sems can rnams rdzogs pa yod pa de’i gnyen por thug pa med pa nyid ces gsungs so | | (DBhV 218b6f.) “As an antidote against [the idea that] sentient beings come to an end, it is said ‘not being exhausted.’”

The same usage of the term has to be expected in Jñānavajra’s commentary on 2.204b, where he uses the same verbal expression thug pa med, and explains “the vehicles” (theg pa dag/rnams) to which this expression refers as path and fruit (lam dang ’bras bu): de las byung ba’i gnas skabs kyi lam dang ’bras bu’i gnas thug pa med pa’o | | (THA 186a5) “The states of path and fruit resulting from this situation (= the activity of ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi ’jug pa) are not exhausted (?).”

In various canonical quotations, mainly in tantra commentaries, however, 2.204b appears in a considerably different wording: theg pa’i mtha’ la thug pa med

No attempt shall be made to reconstruct which Sanskrit expression is

36 LAS 10.617: artham apy anyam āśritya tad apy anyasya khyāyate | anavasthā prasajyeta kimīc ca kim ca no bhavet || | gal te gzhan la de rt en cing || de yang gzhan la snang gyur na | thug pa med par rab ’gyur te || ci zhig ci yang med par ’gyur | If [it is said that] there is another reality which [it] (my emendation) is depended on, then this must have still another [reality to depend on]; this is committing the fault of non-finality; may it not end in reaching nowhere?

(Translation of Suzuki 1932)

Cf. e.g., Bodhicāryāvatāra 9.110c, where anavasthā = thug pa med is translated by Sharma 1990 as “de-stabilisation,” and by Steinkellner/Peck-Kubaczek (in Schmidt-Leukel 2019) as “there is no end of this.”

37 Lokesh Candra 1959 lists only this sole reference for aniṣṭhitatā being translated by thug pa med pa [nyid], and it cannot be taken for granted that both the Sanskrit and the Tibetan represent the same source.

38 The meaning of thug pa med pa is not clear, but one would suspect an expression like aniṣṭhitatā in DBhS.

39 GSMSṬ 180a3, NSV 30b1, PJP 90b5, TR 119b5f., Rin rtsod ’kor 214b7, lHag mthong 249b1.

Cf. also a verse in ŚAT 236b6, which expresses the same idea as LAS 2.204ab: | chos tshul du ma’i bye brag dang || mos pa du ma’i bye brag dang | | ‘du shes du ma’i bye brag gis || theg pa’i mtha’ la thug pa med | Because of the diversity of religious precepts, the diversity of beliefs, and the diversity of conceptions, the end of the vehicles will not be met.
represented by mtha’ la thug pa, but there can be little doubt about the message of this pāda: one will not meet with the end of the vehicles; the vehicles will not be exhausted. With some effort, this pāda could be read as: theg pa’i – mtha’ la thug pa (= mthar thug pa) – med and interpreted as “there will be no completion/perfection of the vehicle(s),” but this option is rather hypothetical and can be neglected.

The same reading is preserved also in non-canonical quotations dating from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, i.e., pre-dating the first compilation of any Kanjur:

Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po (1042–1136):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{ji srid sems 'jug gnas pa'i bar} \quad \text{theg pa'i mtha' la thug pa med} \\
&\text{du shes med par gyur na} \quad \text{theg pa med cing 'grol ba'ang med}
\end{align*}
\]

(Rong 47,12.; Wangchuk 2007: 118f.)

Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po (1110–1170):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{ji srid 'du shes yod kyi bar} \quad \text{theg pa'i mtha' la thug pa med} \\
&\text{du shes med par gyur tsam na} \quad \text{theg pa med cing brjod du med}
\end{align*}
\]

(Phag 480,4f.)

mKhas pa lDe’u (13th cent.):

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{ji srid 'du shes yod kyi bar} \quad \text{theg pa'i mtha' la thug pa med} \\
&\text{du shes yongs su spangs tsa na} \quad \text{theg pa med cing grol ba'ang med}
\end{align*}
\]

(lDe’u 82,12–14)

Zhang g.Yu brag pa brTson ’grus grags pa (1123–1193) quotes the same passage as:

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{ji srid 'du shes ma zad bar} \quad \text{theg pa'i mtha' la zad pa med}
\end{align*}
\]

(Martin 2001: 233)

The formulation of pāda b (“there will be no end of Vehicles”; Martin 2001: 200), too, seems to convey the same message, with the term zad pa (“extinct, finished”) clearly indicating that, at least in the opinion of Zhang g.Yu brag pa, the notion of “termination” is implied. In this respect (though not in others) it is irrelevant whether Zhang’s deviations from the other three quotations (ma zad bar : gnas pa’i bar or yod kyi bar in pāda a, zad pa med : thug pa med in pāda b) are due to some sort of “error,” editorial intention,40 or any other reason.

40 The last line before the quotation reads: gsung gi ’phrin las theg mtha’ zad pa med “The compassionate verbal actions, the Vehicles [of the Sage], are inexhaustible” (text and translation of Martin 2001), and it might be the case that this formulation
As stated above, these quotations pre-date the earliest compilation of a Kanjur, but for some reason or other, their source(s) did not leave any traces in the known canonical collections. It could be the case that they reflect an older or more authentic version of the translation made from Sanskrit than the canonical collections do, but this is not a necessary implication; between the seventh to eighth and fourteenth centuries there was certainly time enough for a distinct version to develop and be rejected again by various editors. Other variants mentioned in the following section, however, suggest that it might be a different translation, maybe even from a different Sanskrit version.

All this favours the interpretation of yānānāṃ nāsti vai niṣṭhā = theg pa dag la thug pa med as simply meaning that there is no end or limit to the vehicles.

However, in version B, translated by 'Gos Chos grub from Chinese, 2.204ab reads:

| ji srid sems rnams 'jug pa'i bar || de dag mthar phyin min par bshad |

As long as minds are active, I declare them (= the vehicles) not to be perfect/completed (?)."

Did 'Gos Chos grub understand the term in question here in the sense of Suzuki’s “culmination”? If he was the reviser of version A as well, did he change his mind? Did he understand niṣṭhā in the sense of “termination,” while he took 究竟 (jiujing) as “perfection”? Or, was he not involved in the production of version A at all? If he only turned to it when translating T 670 as Takasaki (1978: 460) suggests, he must, at least, have disagreed with its interpretation of verse 204ab. Was this due to the influence of Wen hui, whose commentary he consulted?\(^41\) However, all these speculations are rendered futile by the second half of the verse:

| gal te sems de zad gyur na || theg pa med cing gdegs pa med |

When this/these mind(s) have become extinct, there is neither a vehicle nor anyone who rides it.

Could it be that, in this case, mthar phyin is not synonymous with pha rol tu phyin pa but simply means “come to an end” in a very general sense? Is this an example of two different Tibetan terminologies, depending on

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\(^41\) Unfortunately, the respective passage is not extant in the manuscript of the India Office Library (IOL Tib J 219).
whether a translation is made from Sanskrit or from Chinese, which R.A. Stein detected in the Dunhuang manuscripts (Stein 2010: 1–96)? For the time being I cannot offer an answer to these questions.

2.204b/a: yāvac cittām pravartate – ji srid sens can ’jug pa’i bar – “so long as there is a mind making conscious efforts”

Obviously, the Tibetan sens can for citta does not make sense.\(^{42}\) Version B and all manuscripts of version A from Western Tibet (FSLgNgHeXBaZGoChaBd) and Dunhuang (PT 608) offer this pāda in a corrected form:

\[
\text{\begin{center} ji srid sens rnams ’jug pa’i bar } (\text{LgNgHeXBa}_{3,4} \text{ phyir})\end{center}}
\]

In the Kanjurs of Basgo (X) and Shey (Z) this correction was made in a very similar way in the course of writing:

- X mdo La, 138a4
- Z mdo Da, 230b2

Further investigation will have to show whether this fact allows for any conclusions on the model or models they were copying.

It is easy to imagine that at some point of its transmission, this verse was corrupted by a scribal error into ji srid sens can ’jug bar du ni, and in a second step this error was “corrected” by reducing the number of syllables again to seven by replacing ’jug bar du ni by ’jug pa’i bar, omitting, unfortunately, the wrong syllable. In a third step, the remaining fault was detected, but, with the editor being unaware of the translation of verse 10.458a (see below), not the original reading was restored, but can was replaced by rnams, in order to maintain the correct number of syllables. All this must have happened during the ninth or tenth centuries, as its final “corrected” version appears already in the Dunhuang manuscripts.\(^{44}\)

\(^{42}\) Here, again, the Mongolian translation is faithful to the Tibetan and reads amitan (“sentient beings”). The Chinese translations all have simply 心 (xin “mind”).

\(^{43}\) Although this common reading of gLang, rNam rgyal, Hemis and Basgo is only a minor variant, it might serve as evidence for the “Mustang group” of Kanjurs mentioned above (p. 725).

\(^{44}\) It might be sheer coincidence that the respective pāda in PT 806 (Ka 85a5)
These hypothetical considerations might, to some extent, be plausible for version A of LAS. But what about version B? It is a translation of T 760, where 2.204a reads, without distinction of the number: 乃至有心轉 (naizhi you xinzhuang) “as long as there is activity of mind(s).” How, when, and why could the reading sems rnams have sneaked into version B, where the other pādas are considerably different from version A? Scribal errors and their (attempted) corrections in the transmission of version A should not have affected it, and 'gos Chos grub’s consulting the older translation from Sanskrit when translating T 760 is not a satisfactory explanation in this case either.

However, also the secondary—if the hypothetical genesis of this variant is correct—plural form sems rnams looks a bit awkward as a translation of the singular cittam. A much more elegant (and more authentic?) solution is offered by the repetition of this verse in 10.458a:

\[
\text{ji srid sems 'jug bar du ni}
\]

This pāda appears in various quotations in very similar forms:

- TR (119b5): \[
\text{ji srid sems ni 'jug bar du}
\]
- JP (90b5): \[
\text{ji srid sems ni 'jug pa'i bar}
\]
- Rong zom (47, 12): \[
\text{ji srid sems 'jug gnas pa'i bar}
\]
- GSMST (180a3): \[
\text{sems ni ji srid yod kyi bar}
\]

To complicate matters and to question all the above reflections, the commentaries of Jñānaśrībhadra (LA V 148b4) and Jñānavajra (THA 186a5), as well as Vimalamitra’s Nāmasaṃgīti (NSV 30b1), quote this pāda with a plural:

\[
\text{ji srid sems rnams 'jug pa'i/gi bar}
\]

Unless all three authors quote from a Tibetan translation of LAS, which seems highly improbable, though not altogether impossible, in the case of Vimalamitra,\(^{45}\) one could suspect a Sanskrit version which is no longer known and suggests, in some way or other,\(^{46}\) a plural reading.

\(^{45}\) The \textit{Nāmasaṃgīti} was composed and translated into Tibetan by gNyags lotsāba Ye shes gzhon nu (Jñānakumāra) in the 8th century. Theoretically, both the author and the translator could have known the translation of LAS mentioned in the \textit{sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa}.

\(^{46}\) The plural form yāvac citāni pravartante is not possible for metrical reasons, and it is not attested in any of the known manuscripts (Toshio Horiuchi, e-mail communication from 4 July 2017).
Both commentaries explain *sems rnams* as “store consciousness” (ālayavijñāna, kun gzhi and kun gzhi rnam par shes pa), and Jñānavajra specifies: “the ālayavijñāna endowed with the seed of deception” (*phyin ci log gi sa bon dang bcas pa’i kun gzhi*). This, however, is a bit irritating. In the context of this paper it is not possible to discuss the concept of ālayavijñāna in any detail, but a pluralistic interpretation seems to contradict its very nature. Unless “the ālayavijñāna endowed with the seed of deception” can be understood in the sense of “any mental activity,” which seems conceivable but problematic, I am unable to explain the plural reading *sems rnams* in the commentaries. One might, however, also consider the possibility that the Indian masters explained the text according to a Sanskrit version which had *cittam* (in singular), and the Tibetan students recording these lectures simultaneously read and copied a Tibetan translation which, for some reason or other, transmitted the plural. This, however, must have happened in exactly the same way with both the commentaries.

A considerably different version of verse 2.204a is presented in the quotations by Phag mo gru pa, mKhas pa lDe’u, and lHag mthong skyed pa’i thabs:

\[
\text{ji srid ’du shes yod kyi bar}
\]

and by Zhang g.Yu brag pa:

\[
\text{ji srid ’du shes ma yod bar}
\]

Would anybody express the idea of “any mental activity” in a kind of *pars pro toto* by “discriminating, conceptualizing consciousness” (*’du shes, saṁjñā*), without being forced to do so by the laws of metrics or other causes (which are not evident in the present case)?

Unless a specific Yogācāra interpretation (see below) of this stanza is intended and the plural “minds” (*sems rnams*) in the sense of “any mental activity = defiled ālayavijñāna” is the “correct” or “authentic” reading of the sūtra, *’du shes* would very well fit into the context, better, in fact, than the very general “mind” (*sems / citta*) of the canonical versions. Suzuki might have been of the same opinion when he translated “… a

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47 On ālayavijñāna see, e.g., Schmithausen 2007 and 2018.

48 Suggested by Lambert Schmithausen in an e-mail communication from 5 March 2018.

49 lHag mthong 249b1 is the only canonical quotation that reads *’du shes* instead of *sems*.

50 Cf. ŠAT 236b6, quoted above (fn. 39).
mind making conscious efforts,” for which there is no support in the Sanskrit text. However, in this case one would have to expect saṃjñā in the original text, for which there is no canonical evidence in Sanskrit or Chinese, and in Tibetan it is supported by a sole quotation in the “Miscellaneous” (sna tshogs) section of the Tanjur.

Nevertheless, these few occurrences of ‘du shes (saṃjñā) instead of sems (citta) might suffice to assume at least the possibility that they reflect an earlier Tibetan translation, which could even be the one referred to in the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa, and was possibly made from another Sanskrit manuscript than the canonical translation.

This idea is, of course, very tempting, but it is not conclusive. It may very well be the case that these quotations do not directly depend on a distinct version of the sūtra, but merely on an entry in an anthology like the Sūtrasamuccaya, the rNal ’byor chen po bsgom pa’i don (mentioned above, p. 730), or a similar text. In fact, Phag mo gru pa’s text, the mDo lung rin chen spungs pa, itself belongs to this genre. Occasionally, the quotations in these texts are of obscure origin, even depending on what Otokawa (1999: 103, cf. 112‒117) refers to as “Chinese apocryphical text(s),” and with their deviations from the canonical versions they may reflect a distinct version or translation of the respective text, but they need not necessarily do so. In the present case it is easily possible that the compiler of an anthology shared the opinion expressed above and replaced sems by ‘du shes on his own account. This could have happened deliberately or by mistake, e.g., due to quoting from memory.

2.204c: citte tu vai parāvṛtte – sems ni shin tu gyur pa na –
“when a revulsion takes place in the mind”

Here, some doubt might arise as to the meaning of parāvṛtta. Does it simply mean “passed away, disappeared” in a general sense, or rather, in a specific Buddhist (Yogācāra) usage, “turning, radical change (revulsion)” or “transformation” as in the combination with āśraya (“basis”? In the context of LAS, one could easily think of the Yogācāra concept of āśrayaparāvṛtti (“transformation of the basis”). The sūtra, however, reads citte parāvṛtte; it does not mention āśraya. But does it mean āśraya (= ālayavijñāna), so that parāvṛtta can or even has to be taken as “transformation”?

As mentioned in the previous section, the commentators hold this

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51 This includes all known manuscripts (Toshio Horiuchi, e-mail communication from 4 July 2017).

52 See below, fn. 54.
opinion when they explain *sems rnams* by *kun gzhi* (*rnam par shes pa*). In addition, Jñānāśrībhadra, commenting on 204cd, explicitly takes up the term *parāvṛtta* (*shin tu gyur pa*), without, however, commenting on it:

\[
\text{de yang } \text{*shin tu gyur pa* na gnyis kyi rnam pas stong ste | theg pa dang 'gro ba'i rnam par rtog pa med do} \]

When it (= the ālayavijñāna) is transformed (*shin tu gyur pa*), it is free from the double aspect; it is without the concepts of a vehicle and one who rides it.\(^53\)

In contrast to the previous *pāda*, where *cit*am is apparently taken in the sense of *saṃjñā*, Suzuki’s translation, too, opts for this alternative. The āśraya cannot disappear, he argues elsewhere, but only undergo a radical change, a “turning.”\(^54\) Does this interpretation really and necessarily accord with the intension of LAS, or could it be that this line of the sūtra was meant in a more general sense? In this case, Jñānāśrībhadra and Jñānavajra might have commented in the way they did, because they knew that LAS is generally considered a Yogācāra sūtra, and they expected or wanted also this verse to convey a particular Yogācāra doctrine.

The Tibetan equivalent for *parāvṛtta*, *shin tu gyur pa*, could be merely an alternative to *yongs su gyur pa*, the term that usually translates it, in particular in combination with *gnas* (*āśraya*). In this form PJP and TR quote *pāda* 2.204c:

\[
\text{| } \text{sems ni yongs su gyur pa ni } \]

and

\[
\text{| } \text{sems nyid yongs su gyur pa na } . \]

In Chinese, the translation of Śikṣānanda (T 762) might reflect the ambiguity of the term *parāvṛtta*. Here it is rendered by 轉滅 (*zhuanmie*), with 轉 (*zhuan*) bearing the meaning of “to transform, change” and 滅

\(^53\) LAV 148b5; bold are *pratīka* from LAS 2.204cd.

\(^54\) See Suzuki 1930: 182f.: “The Vijñāna system is describable from three points of reference: its evolution (*pravṛtti*), its modes of being (*lakṣaṇa*), and its function (*karma*). By evolution is meant the rise (*utpāda*), abiding (*sthiti*), and disappearance (*nirodha*) of the Vijñāna,” with a note on “disappearance”: “But this does not mean that the Ālaya itself disappears as is maintained by some philosophers. If this should take place, the doctrine of Cittamātra would not hold good, and there would be no such spiritual event as is known as “turning” (*parāvṛtti*).”

Golzio 1996 gives “Umschwung,” but it has to be suspected that this is a translation of Suzuki’s “revulsion” rather than of the original Sanskrit.
(mie) that of “cessation” etc.\textsuperscript{55} From the other translations of 2.204c (T 670 and 671) it becomes obvious that \textit{parāvṛtta} was understood not as a transformation, but as the extinction or cessation of mind or rather mental activity. They render the term by the respective expression 滅盡 (miejin). In 10.458c the same idea is expressed by “extinct (and) also non-existent” 滅亦無 (mie yi wu, T 671).

Similarly, the Tibetan version B of LAS clearly expresses the idea of extinction by reading \textit{zad gyur} (“extinct, finished”):

\begin{quote}
\textit{gal te sms de zad gyur na}
\end{quote}

Also the non-canonical quotations support this interpretation. Rong zom and Phag mo gru pa give \textit{med par gyur (pa)} (“annihilated, vanished”), and mKhas pa lDe’u has \textit{yongs su spangs} (“completely removed, abolished”).

In addition, they give—just as in the previous \textit{pāda}, and this time also Rong zom shares this reading—\textit{’du shes (saṃjñā)} instead of \textit{sems (citta)}.

\begin{itemize}
\item Rong zom: \textit{’du shes med par gyur pa na}
\item Phag mo gru pa: \textit{’du shes med par gyur tsam na}
\item mKhas pa lDe’u: \textit{’du shes yongs su spangs tsa na}
\end{itemize}

The term \textit{āśrayaparāvṛtti} (“transformation of the basis”) implies to a large extent the idea of “extinction, annihilation,” i.e. the abolishment of the objective appearances (nimitta), environment (pada), objects (artha) and body (deha) together with their seeds (Schmithausen 1969: 96ff.). Nevertheless, these variants might suggest the assumption of two different lines of transmission, which possibly started already in Sanskrit: a more “general” one with “conception” (saṃjñā,’du shes) and “extinct” (parāvṛtta, shin tu gyur pa/zad gyur etc.) and reading \textit{theg pa’i mtha’} in \textit{pāda} b, and a “Yogacara” one with “mind(s)” (citta, sms [rnams] = ālayavijñāna) and “transformed” (parāvṛtta, shin tu/yongs su gyur pa) and \textit{theg pa dag}. These considerations apply, of course, to this particular verse only and cannot be generalized for the whole LAS.

These lines of transmission, however, are not pure, and conflation must have started at a rather early stage. Otherwise, it would not be possible to explain Maitrīpa’s (11th cent.) quotation in TR. By reading \textit{theg pa’i mtha’}, it follows the same tradition as Rong zom, Phag mo gru pa and mKhas pa lDe’u in \textit{pāda} b (fn. 39), while in \textit{pāda} c (sms nyid yongs su gyur ba na) it represents the other one.

\textsuperscript{55} Carré 2006: 155 takes the two parts as distinct terms and translates: “Ces pensées une fois renversées puis éteintes.”
2.204d: na yānaṃ na ca yāyinaḥ – theg pa med cing ’gro ba’ang med –
“there is neither a vehicle nor one who rides in it”

Version B offers the most elegant translation of this pāda, as it plays on
the etymology just like the Sanskrit yāna-yāyinaḥ does:

| theg pa med cing gdeg pa med |

Apart from that, this pāda gives a good example of how this game of
“Chinese whispers” might work.

F 86 gives it as:  | theg pa med cing ’grol ba’ang med |
F 87 and mKhas pa lDe’u as:  | theg pa med cing grol ba’ang med |

In a first step (represented by F 86) the scribe, probably with his mind
on liberation, turned ’gro ba’ang med by mistake into ’grol ba’ang med,
and in a second step (represented by F 87, mKhas pa lDe’u, and Z 276
[10.458d]) this misspelling was “corrected” to grol ba’ang med, although
the reading “there is neither a vehicle nor liberation” appears strange in
the context given.

A similar confusion of these two verbs can, however, also be observed
in Jñānavajra’s commentary on this verse. In the edition of Peking (THA_q
213b2) it reads:

de la brten nas ’gro ba’i gang zag la sogs pa’i spros pa nye bar zhi ba’o ||

Accordingly, proliferations like a person who rides [the vehicle] are
thoroughly pacified

while Derge (THA 186a6) reads:

... sgrol ba’i gang zag (“... a person to be liberated”).

For the readings of Phag mo gru pa: brjod du med (“... nor can it be
expressed in words”) and of 10.458d (F 86): ’grib ba’ang med (“... nor
obscuration/hindrance”) I can offer not even the attempt at an explanation.

2.205: yānavyavasthā naivāsti yānam ekaṃ vadāmy aham |
parikarṣaṇārtha bālānāṃ yānabhedaṃ vadāmy aham ||

| theg parnam par gzhag med kyang || sems can rnam srid rang ba’i phyir |
| theg pa tha dad ngas bshad de || theg pa gcig tu ngas bstan to |

There is really no establishment of various vehicles,
and so I speak of the one vehicle;
but in order to carry the ignorant
I talk of a variety of vehicles.
The message seems to be quite simple and perfectly clear in the form in which this verse is transmitted in 10.445 and in 2.205 of version B:

| theg pa rnam par gzhag med de/pas || theg pa gcig tu ngas bshad do/ bstan to |
| byis pa/sems can rnams ni drang ba’i phyir || theg pa tha dad ngas bshad do/de |

Because [distinct] vehicles are not established, I have taught one vehicle.  
In order to lead the sentient beings, I have taught different vehicles.”

Apparently, this represents the most authentic form of the Tibetan translation. With 2.205 of version A, however, something must have gone wrong already at an early step of its transmission. PT 608 and all canonical editions preserve a version where, for some reason or other, the sequence of the pādaś has changed, and pāda b, yānam ekam vadāmy aham, slipped to the very end of the stanza. In this form, it would not be easily understandable any more:

Because [distinct] vehicles are not established, in order to lead the sentient beings,  
I have taught different vehicles. I have taught one vehicle.

Accordingly, med pas / med de in pāda a had to be changed into med kyang in an editorial intervention:

| theg pa rnam par gzhag med kyang || sems can rnams ni drang ba’i phyir |
| theg pa tha dad ngas bshad de || theg pa gcig tu ngas bstan to |

so that the whole verse could be read as:

Although [distinct] vehicles are not established, in order to lead the sentient beings, I have taught different vehicles. [But actually] I have taught one vehicle.  

Quite a different solution of “correcting” this verse and making it logically coherent is represented by the Kanjurs of gLang, rNam rgyal, Basgo

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56 A quite different but problematic interpretation of the first two pādas is offered by Carré 2006: 155 (translating T 672, where pāda a reads: 無有乘建立 wuyou sheng jianli):

“C’est l’affirmation d’aucun véhicule  
Que j’appelle ‘véhicule unique’.”

57 The same idea is expressed in Suzuki’s translation: “... but in order to carry the ignorant ...,,” which is directly supported only by the Tibetan, but not by the Sanskrit.
(X and Ba), and Hemis. They keep *med kyang* in *pāda* a, but instead of implying an amendment like “[but actually]” in *pāda* d, they add a negation. This makes good sense in the context of the individual verse, but in order not to be understood as denying the doctrine of *ekayāna* and, thus, being in contradiction to the other passages of LAS, more amendments are required:

```
| theg pa rnam par gzhag med kyang || sems can rnams ni drang ba’i phyir |
| theg pa tha dad ngas bshad de || theg pa gcig tu ngas ma bshad |
```

Although [distinct] vehicles are not established, in order to lead the sentient beings, I have taught different vehicles [in various sūtras]. [At that time] I did not [yet] teach [the profound doctrine of the] one vehicle.\(^\text{58}\)

A divergence between the Sanskrit and the Tibetan that immediately catches the eye is rendering *bāla* (“foolish, ignorant, childish”) in *pāda* c by *sems can* (“sentient”). All the canonical editions of version A agree on this term in verse 2.205, and the Mongolian translates *qamuɣ amitan* (“all sentient beings”). In 10.445, however, they concurrently give the term that one would expect in the first place, properly matching Sanskrit *bāla*: *byis pa*, and the Mongolian faithfully renders it by *köbegüged nöküd* (lit. “little sons”).

Version B, too, has *sems can* in all editions. Here, this has to be expected, as it translates *zhongsheng*,\(^\text{59}\) the basic meaning of which is “living beings” and which is attested as a translation of terms like *sattva*, *bhūta*, *loka*, *jagat*, etc., but also of *bāla*.\(^\text{60}\)

R.A. Stein gives the example of *bāla* being translated into Tibetan by *byis pa*, and by 凡愚 (*fanyu* “ordinary and stupid men”) into Chinese, which, in turn, is rendered in Tibetan by *blun po* (“fool”) (Stein 2010:

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\(^{58}\) This interpretation was suggested by Lambert Schmithausen in an e-mail communication from 5 March 2018.

As an editorial intervention of this kind can hardly be expected to happen twice independently, this variant has to be taken as strong evidence for a close direct relation of these Kanjurs and for the “Mustang group” postulated in Tauscher/Lainé 2015.

\(^{59}\) T 670 and 671 agree on this translation, only T 672 gives 愚夫 (*yufu* “fool, ordinary, unenlightened being”), but this should not have had any influence on the Tibetan version(s).

\(^{60}\) It is, however, not clear to me whether the respective entry in DDB does not refer exclusively to this very verse of LAS.
The term *sems can* does not appear in this context, nor does the *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary* of Lokesh Chandra list *bāla* among the terms translated by *sems can*. Nevertheless, the present divergence obviously does not reflect a “real” textual discrepancy.

Of course, the question remains—and most probably it will have to remain unanswered—why and on account of what *bāla* was translated by *sems can* in one case, and by *byis pa* in the other. Generally speaking, however, these two are synonyms, at least in the context given. The term *byis pa* does not denote “foolish, childish” in a general sense, but very specifically “unenlightened.” Equally, the emphasis of *sems can* is not on “sentient,” it is rather opposed to Buddha-hood. This becomes quite evident in, e.g., *Mahāmudrā* sayings like:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ngo shes na sangs rgyas} & \quad \text{ngo ma shes na sems can} & \quad \text{shes ma shes gnyis su med par chos nyid} \\
\end{align*}
\]

In the case of realization [we speak of] the Buddha, in the case of non-realization [we speak of] sentient beings; without either realization or non-realization is *dharmatā*, ...

A very concise resume of this paper would have to be: “I cannot tell.” It abounds in subjunctive formulations with could, may and might, and similar expressions of uncertainty, and it is full of questions to which no answers can be offered. Despite a comparatively large number of textual testimonies available, only for a few variant readings the attempt at an explanation could be made, others remain mysterious, and the majority of them doubtful; alternative explanations are possible in almost every case. On a theoretical level, one could argue that textual research, maybe all research, is generally concerned with possibilities rather than with facts. One only calls it a “fact” when, on the basis of all evidence available, no plausible alternative can be thought of. Obviously, the plausible alternatives that one can think of depend on the available textual testimonies, and an increasing amount of evidence can both limit and increase the number of such alternatives, and so it might be not despite but because of the amount of testimonies available, together with an insufficient analysis thereof, that no answers with a satisfying degree of certainty can be given. Further studies will have to make up for that and arrive at conclusions that are less hypothetical, analysing the material more thoroughly that it was possible here. The history of the two commentaries, for example, could not be

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61 Unidentified quotation in an unidentified manuscript fragment (11th/12th century) from Matho, Ladakh.
investigated, and for the canonical quotations only the Tanjur edition of Derge was consulted. Moreover, the context of the quotations within these texts has not been taken into due consideration.

It is not the claim of this paper to study the transmission of LAS; this would certainly not be possible on the basis of only two or three verses. It only aims at illustrating with a few examples what can happen in the course of the transmission of any text. Nevertheless, the variant readings within these few verses suffice to assume the possibility of at least two distinct lines of transmission of LAS that might have existed already in Sanskrit. One of these lines might have been represented by a Tibetan translation which has not come down to us. There is, however, not enough evidence to prove these assumptions right or wrong at the present stage of research.

**Sigla**62

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62 The photographic material of Ba, Lg, Ng, He, X, Z, Bd, Cha, and Go has been collected in the years 2000–2019 by research projects at the University of Vienna, financed by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): “Tibetan Manuscripts,” a sub-project of the National Research Unit “Cultural History of the Western Himalaya” (Project S 9803), and “Buddhist Kanjur Collections in Tibet’s Southern and Western Borderlands” (Project P 30356).
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Avant que d’entrer dans la recherche difficile de l’origine du beau, je remarquerai d’abord, avec tous les auteurs qui en ont écrit, que par une sorte de fatalité, les choses dont on parle le plus parmi les hommes, sont assez ordinairement celles qu’on connaît le moins; et que telle est entre beaucoup d’autres, la nature du beau. Tout le monde raisonne du beau: on l’admire dans les ouvrages de la nature: on l’exige dans les productions des Arts: on accorde ou l’on refuse cette qualité à tout moment ; cependant si l’on demande aux hommes du goût le plus sûr et le plus exquis, quelle est son origine, sa nature, sa notion précise, sa véritable idée, son exacte définition; si c’est quelque chose d’absolu ou de relatif; s’il y a un beau essentiel, éternel, immuable, règle et modèle du beau subalterne; ou s’il en est de la beauté comme des modes: on voit aussitôt les sentiments partagés; et les uns avouent leur ignorance, les autres se jettent dans le scepticisme. Comment se fait-il que presque tous les hommes soient d’accord qu’il y a un beau; qu’il y en ait tant entre’ux qui le sentent vivement où il est, et que si peu sachent ce que c’est?1

— D. Diderot, Encyclopédie, s.v. ‘beau’

καλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ
Beautiful things are difficult.

— Plato, Hippias Maior

1 “Before delving deeper into the difficult research what the origin of the beautiful is, I would first bring to the attention, with all the authors who wrote on the subject, that by a sort of fatality, the topics most addressed among men are rather ordinarily these least known to them; and that such is, among many others, the lot of the beautiful. Everybody reasons about the beautiful: it is admired in Nature’s works: it is demanded in the production of Arts: its quality is conferred or denied at any time; however, if one were to ask men with the surest and most exquisite taste what the origin of the beautiful is, or its nature, its precise notion, its true idea, its exact definition; whether it is something absolute or relative; whether there is an essential, eternal, unchanging beautiful that would be the rule and the model for a subaltern beautiful; or whether it is for beauty as it is with fashions: one would witness different feelings; and ones would confess they know nothing of the matter, others would throw themselves in skepticism. How is it that almost all men agree that there is a beautiful; that some of them can experience it strongly where it lies, yet so few know what it actually is?” (trans. Bonin 2006)
Helmut was my guest at Rocca Priora for a few, very pleasant, days. We alternated walks on the hills nearby, full of pre-Roman historical remains, food preparation at home, endless talks on the most varied subjects. A recurring one was beauty (to be honest, particularly female beauty...). It is so sad that now I am dedicating these thoughts to his memory, to a friend (and brilliant colleague) who for sure would have liked to take up again our discussions on the subject, and cannot.

After outlining his very refined and ‘aristocratic’ view of the path to liberation according to non-dual Śaivism (cf. Torella 2020), with a certain discouragement Abhinavagupta adds:

\[
\text{keta}\text{kikusumasa}\text{aurabh behr\text{'}sam beh\text{'}rga eva rasiko na mak\text{"}ik\text{"}} | \\
bhairav\text{'}yaparam\text{\-}\text{advay\text{\-}arcane ko}\ '\text{pi raji}\text{\-}\text{yati mahe\text{\-}sacodita} \text{\text{\-}h} ||
\]

By the smell of the ketaki flower only the tasteful bee is attracted, not the fly. Analogously, only some very special (ko ‘pi) man, driven by the supreme Lord, might feel attraction to the supremely non-dual worship of Bhairava. (TĀ IV.276)

Here, almost casually, one more element has been added to the portrait of the ideal recipient of these teachings: he must be ‘rasika’, that is, aesthetically sensitive, or to use a cognate term, which holds a central position in the philosophical and aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta, sahrdaya (lit. ‘endowed with heart’).\(^2\) This ‘aesthetic susceptibility’ (Rastogi 2016: 142) is linked to camatkāra ‘inner deep savouring’, another key term of Abhinavagupta’s philosophy, and prior to him, of Utpaladeva’s, being in its turn an intensified form of of any vimarśa ‘reflective awareness’ by which the knowing subject appropriates the object.\(^3\) This aesthetic attitude is not limited to the sphere of art, but

\(^2\) On sahrdaya and cognate terms, see Gnoli 1968: XLIII–XLIV; Masson-Patwardhan 1985: 78; Smith 1985: 46; Cuneo 2013: 64–65; Rastogi 2016: 142, 160, etc. Cf. the beautiful definition given by Abhinavagupta in TĀ III.209cd–210. Less common, but also important, is the other meaning of the term: “sharing the heart with...”.

\(^3\) Once again Utpaladeva proves to be the very centre of Pratyabhijñā philosophy. The centrality of camatkāra, usually associated to Abhinavagupta’s aesthetic and philosophical teaching, had already been established by Utpaladeva: Vṛttī on ÍPK 1.5.11: tām vinā arthinahittākārasāpy asya svacchatāmadram na tv ajāyam camatkrīter abhāvāt. “In the absence of this reflective awareness, light, though objects make it assume different forms, would merely be ‘limpid’, but
is expected to embrace life itself in its entirety. This is well expressed in Bhoja’s Śṛṅgāraprakāśa, independently of Abhinavagupta whom he never quotes.

Aesthetic experience achieves the uneasy task of making one accept and deeply taste the emotional lines of everyday life, while at the same time creating a feeling of ineffable distance from them with the result of preventing the subject from being overwhelmed by them. On many an occasion, Abhinava carefully distinguishes aesthetic experience from religious experience (see below)—the latter allegedly belonging to a higher order—but at the same time he includes aesthetic experience (rasāsvāda is ‘similar’ to brahmāsvāda) in a wider horizon with respect to mere not sentient, since there is no ‘inner deep savouring’ (camatkṛter abhāvāt); cf. Torella 2002: 118 (with changes). See also Torella forthcoming.

Ali 2004: 193: “[…] the assumption in courtly circles was that rasa was experienced by men and women of rank not merely in art but in their worldly dealings—that the capacity to experience rasa was a way of experiencing the affective world around them. […] In short, the rasika was at once a moral and aesthetic category. […] Rasa was a sort of ‘meta-disposition’ which aestheticised every aspect of an individual’s experience”; Cuneo 2013: 52: “On the other hand, Abhinavagupta uses the term rasa having especially in mind the idea of ‘extract’ or ‘essence,’ in the sense that the aesthetic experience is, in other words, the sublimated counterpart of ordinary experience.” A similar atmosphere is that of the roughly coeval Heian period in medieval Japan, aptly depicted by Ivan Morris (1964: 205): “The ‘rules of taste’ applied not only to the formal arts but to nearly every aspect of the lives of the upper classes in the capital. It was central to Heian Buddhism, making […] religion into an art and art into a religion.” This attitude, outlined in the Trika literature, will become central in later thinkers, like Rūpagosvāmi and Viśvanātha (Gerow 1977: 285).

Cf. Raghavan 1963: 466: “[…] this is an attribute referring to some excellence in man’s personality which goes to make up the grace that distinguishes his behaviour in society from that of another who is called Nīrasa. This quality which makes Rasikas of men must be one single Rasa and cannot differ with each man. If analysed, it is found to be the very Ego of man himself […].”

A “disengaged engagement,” as Pollock aptly puts it (2010: 155). This may remind us of the power of the ‘vague’ in Giacomo Leopardi’s thought and poetry, where the indefinite is seen as a kind of surrogate of the infinite for those who are still trodding through human paths: “(472) Non solo la facoltà conoscitiva, o quella di amare, ma neanche l’immaginativa è capace dell’infinito, o di concepire infinitamente, ma solo dell’indefinito, e di concepire indefinitamente. La qual cosa ci diletta perché l’anima non vedendo i confini, riceve l’impressione di una specie d’infinità, e confonde l’indefinito coll’infinito […]” (Leopardi 1937: 382). “(472) Neither the faculty of knowledge, nor that of love, nor even that of the imagination is capable of infinity, or of conceiving infinitely, but only of the indefinite and of conceiving indefinitely. Something delights us because our soul, unable to see any limits, receives the impression of a kind of infinity, and confuses the indefinite with the infinite […]” (trans. Caesar/D’Intino 2013: 266)

However, the term āsvāda is common to both of them. The first to make this
rejoicing for an intense poem or a moving theatrical representation: as he
acutely remarks, *rasa* manifests itself as ‘fluidity, dilatation, expansion’,
is a state of ‘intensification’ (see below). In a crucial passage, Abhinava-
gupta sharply distinguishes aesthetic gustation both from emotions we
experience in everyday life and from yogic perception (in its turn divided
into lower and higher). Here we are finally confronted with the theme at
issue in this paper: what is essentially present in aesthetic gustation and
especially missing in everyday emotions, and in yogic cognition as well,
is ‘beauty’ (*saundarya*).

But what is beauty? Seeking help in defining beauty one is immediately
reminded of the famous article by Ingalls (1962), which however sets
out with a caveat: “There is no word in Sanskrit for the English word
‘beauty’” (p. 87). This is followed by a few remarks worth taking into
consideration, however problematic some of them may seem:

Many of the foregoing particulars may be explained by realizing that
the Indians never developed a Platonic division of the universe into
beautiful and non-beautiful. It has been the fashion in Europe for two
and a half thousand years to assign everything to one or another of
these mutually exclusive classes, just as we assign everything to either
good or bad. (p. 106)

It has no word for spiritual beauty; it speaks instead of spiritual truth.
(p. 107)

In Western civilization it follows from the all-inclusive nature of the
classes beauty and non-beauty that those classes have been assigned
high meta-physical importance. And the realists among us, who have
usually been stronger than the nominalists, have reified and objectified
beauty as though it were something quite apart from the men on whom
it works: a power high above us, as unitary and permanent as truth.
This of course is nonsense, but it has been deeply felt and has had its
effect on our language. Such notions have played no part in Sanskrit.
Beauty is conceived by the Sanskrit poet far more subjectively than
in the west. His words for beauty are words for something he himself
reacts to and that would be impossible without the reaction. Indeed,
the very same word is sometimes used for both power and reaction.
Since beauty is conceived of so subjectively it is also thought of,
by most Sanskrit authors at least, as multifarious, residing in many
objects, appealing in different ways to many men. And so it is not
permanent. Finally, since the fashion in Indian philosophy in the
classical period was for monism, it will be apparent that to authors
who were philosophically inclined it must have seemed that there was
something unreal about beauty. (p. 107)

statement was Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, followed also in this by Abhinavagupta (Gnoli 1968:
A few words on beauty in the West

We can start our inquiry with the acknowledgment that in most of early Western aesthetic speculation, beauty is considered a feature of the object, which may be either present or not. Its presence may generate love, desire, appreciation in the onlooker, stimulate in him a wish for appropriation or even mere contemplation, or, more in general, act as a dynamizing factor. If we turn to the question that very naturally comes next—in what does such ‘beauty’ consist?—we are faced with a sense of impotence, well outlined in the passage from Denis Diderot’s entry ‘beau’ in the Encyclopédie, put in exergo:

Comment se fait-il que presque tous les hommes soient d’accord qu’il y a un beau; qu’il y en ait tant entr’eux qui le sentent vivement où il est, et que si peu sachent ce que c’est ?

One of the oldest replies—Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristoteles, Stoics, etc. (with slight variations)—links beauty to symmetry and harmony of the various parts of the object, thus giving prominence to the visual and auditory faculties of the subject. Plato (and after him Plotinus, Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite, etc.) is keen on saying that appreciation of the beauty of the manifested world is only the first step for tuning with higher spiritual beauty.

Beginning from obvious beauties he must for the sake of that highest beauty be ever climbing aloft, as on the rungs of a ladder, from one to two, and from two to all beautiful bodies; from personal beauty he proceeds to beautiful observances, from observance to beautiful learning, and from learning at last to that particular study which is

8 Or, as M. Mendelssohn (1729–1786) put it: “Beauty vanishes away as soon as we try to analyze it” (cf. De Wulf 1909: 447). Hume 1854: 259: “To seek the real beauty, or real deformity is as fruitless an enquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter.”

9 Renaissance thinkers, like Marsilio Ficino, even inclined to link beauty to sight alone (Tatarkiewicz 1980: 122). On the primacy of sight and hearing as aesthetic senses, see also Abhinavagupta’s PTV p. 202. According to Abhinavagupta, in this sharing the general alamkāraśāstra view (cf. Gnoli 1985: 31, n. 88), only visual and auditive objects lend themselves to the ‘generalization’ presupposed by the aesthetic experience, while the objects of the other senses do not possess such dynamic power, since they are bound to “implode in themselves (svātmany evocchalanā)” It is to be noted that in other contexts Abhinavagupta (and Śaiva religious speculation in general) extends such power also to the other senses, taking their more intimate and less ‘public’ nature as a specially effective means to free the self from its limitations (see e.g. Vijñānabhairava-tantra, Spandakārikā and Svabodhodayamañjarī).
concerned with the beautiful itself and that alone; so that in the end
he comes to know \(211d\) the very essence of beauty. ‘In that state of
life above all others, my dear Socrates,’ said the Mantinean woman,\(^{10}\)
’a man finds it truly worth while to live, as he contemplates essential
beauty.’ (Symposium 211c-d, trans. Fowler 1925)

The so-called objectivist thesis is well represented by Thomas Aquinas’
statement: “Something is not beautiful because we love it, but rather we
love it because it is beautiful” (Tatarkiewicz 1980: 132). Well known
is his statement in the Summa Theologiae regarding the components
of beauty: “In fact, three conditions are required for beauty. First,
wholeness or completeness […]; second, due proportion or harmony; and
then, clarity […].”\(^{11}\) Starting from the fourteenth century, the ‘objectivist’
thesis started to fade: beauty is too complex and subjective a concept to
lend itself to whatsoever definition. As Hume says in his essay Of the
standard of taste (1768: 259): “Beauty is no quality in things themselves:
It exists merely in the mind which contemplates them; and each mind
perceives a different beauty.” One of the most widespread expressions
used to ‘define’ beauty, being in fact a non-definition, comes to be the
famous nescio quid found in Petrarch’s work, probably derived in turn
from the Confessiones of St. Augustine. The term soon started enjoying
a widespread fortune first with the Italian ‘non so che’, quickly followed
by the French ‘Je ne sais quoi’ (cf. Montesquieu 1831: 82–86) and English
‘I know not what.’\(^{12}\) Parallel to the eclipse of the objectivist thesis was
the progressive eclipse of the primacy of visual and auditory senses as
aesthetic faculties in respect to a more intimate and ineffable sense—
taste—along with related terms, like gustation,\(^{13}\) etc. Of taste, one of the

\(^{10}\) The “Mantinean woman” (or to be more precise “the Mantinean stranger” \([ξένη]\))
is of course Diotima.

\(^{11}\) Summa Theologiae I, q. 39, a. 8: Nam ad pulchritadem tria requiruntur. Primo
quidem, integritas sive perfectio […]. Et debita proportio sive consonantia. Et
iterum claritas […].

\(^{12}\) On the history of non so che/je ne sais quoi, see Croce 1922: 219–223; Scholar 2005.

\(^{13}\) Cf. Agamben 2017: 24: “It is Campanella, too, who in the preface to Metafisica
(1638) opposes a form of knowledge by tactum intrinsecum in magna suavitate
[inward touch of great sweetness] to reason, ‘that is almost an arrow through
which we reach towards a faraway target without tasting it (absque gusto).’” See
also Agamben 2017: 31: “Let us now examine the other face of this excessive sense:
the beautiful which constitutes its object. In seventeenth- and eighteenth-century
treatises we find the latter constituted, in a perfectly symmetrical manner to the
concept of taste, as an excessive signifier that can neither be adequately perceived
by any sense nor produce any knowledge.” About gusto, see the remarks of Croce
1922: 208–211.
most elegant and insightful definitions is due to Montesquieu in his *Essai sur le goûт* (1831: 63–64): “Mais le goûт naturel n’est pas une connoissance de théorie; c’est une application prompte et exquise des règles mêmes que l’on ne connoît pas.” [“But natural taste is not a theoretical cognition; it is the quick and exquisite application of the rules themselves that [however] we do not know.”] More or less the same happens with Indian aesthetic terminology, where terms like *rasa*, *camatkāra*, *āsvāda*, *carvanā* abound, this making V. Raghavan nicely speak of a derivation from the Pākaśāstra ‘science of cooking’ (Raghavan 1973: 293). These cursory remarks about the concept of beauty in the West only aim at preparing us some way to the highly original position held by Abhinava. In this connection, we should add a few words concerning one of the deepest and most influential thinkers on the subject—Plotinus—who in some respects looks rather close to Abhinavagupta. According to the testimony of Porphyrius, the oldest treatise in his *Enneads* was precisely that *On Beauty* (Περὶ τοῦ καλοῦ), which now occupies the position I.6. For Plotinus, beauty is in everything (but is not perceived by all; cf. *Ennead* V.5.12). In a sense, it is the only principle in the multiform manifested universe enabling us to perceive its interconnection as the manifestation of the One. “Sensible beauty,” says Margaret Miles, “provides the impetus and the energy for a deeper and more concentrated look, not beyond, but within visible beauties, for they are an image of the great beauty.” (Miles 1999: 37) The beauty of things (καλόν, κάλλος) acts as a device to ascend to the ‘hyper-beautiful’ (ὑπέρκαλος I.8.2; ὑπέρκαλον V.8.8, VI.7.33) of the Spirit (νοῦς, the first manifestation of the One). This culminates with *De divinis nominibus* by Pseudo-Dionysius Aeropagite, where one of the names of God is precisely ‘beautiful’ (καλόν) and ‘beauty’(κάλλος):

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14 Cf. Miles 1999: 34: “Plotinus began his authorship with the suggestion that no one can adequately understand the world who has not been startled and instructed by its beauty (*Ennead* 1.6). For Plotinus, beauty was not an aesthetic category, in the usual sense of the word. To notice beauty is not to make a judgment about a particular object. To perceive beauty is to experience the universe as gift.”

15 It is to be noted that Plotinus devoted the entire *Ennead* II to attacking the Gnostics for their contempt of the world and the body.

16 Plotinus (then followed by Dionysius) uses the rare and archaic word καλλονή (πρῶτη) as a designation of the One itself (VI.2.18). See also μέγα κάλλος (I.6.9). Plotinus oscillates between connecting beauty with the Spirit or the One. This crucial point does not make problem in Dionysius, for he makes these two principles merge into the unity of God.

17 See also *superpulcher* in Thomas Aquinas (derived from Dionysius). This literally coincides with the *atisaundarya* of Śiva (see below).
This Good is described by the Sacred Writers as Beautiful and as Beauty, as Love or Beloved, and by all other Divine titles which befit Its beautifying and gracious fairness. [...] But the Super-Essential [Dionysius uses the term υπερούσιον] Beautiful is called “Beauty” because of that quality which It imparts to all things severally according to their nature, and because It is the Cause of the harmony and splendour in all things, flashing forth upon them all, like light, the beautifying communications of Its originating ray; and because It summons all things to fare unto Itself (from whence It hath the name of “Fairness”), and because It draws all things together in a state of mutual interpenetration, eternally, unvaryingly, unchangeably Beautiful; incapable of birth or death or growth or decay; [...] It is, in Itself and by Itself, uniquely and eternally beautiful, and from beforehand It contains in a transcendent manner the originating beauty of everything that is beautiful. For in the simple and supernatural nature belonging to the world of beautiful things, all beauty and all that is beautiful hath its unique and pre-existent Cause. From this Beautiful all things possess their existence, each kind being beautiful in its own manner, and the Beautiful causes the harmonies and sympathies and communities of all things. And by the Beautiful all things are united together and the Beautiful is the beginning of all things, as being the Creative Cause which moves the world and holds all things in existence by their yearning for their own Beauty. And It is the Goal of all things [...] (DN IV.7, trans. Rolt 1920: 61)

Symmetry is not beauty, rather beauty is the light that shines in symmetry:

It is as if it was in the presence of a face which is certainly beautiful, but cannot catch the eye because it has no grace [χάρις] playing upon its beauty. So here below also beauty [κάλλος] is what illuminates good proportions [συμμετρία] rather than the good proportions themselves, and this is what is lovable. For why is there more light of beauty on a living face, but only a trace of it on a dead one, even if its flesh and its proportions are not yet wasted away. And are not the more lifelike statues the more beautiful ones, even if the others are better proportioned? And is not an uglier living man more beautiful than the beautiful man in a statue? Yes, because the living is more desirable; and this is because it has soul [...] (VI.7.22, trans. Armstrong 1988: VII.157–9)

The legacy of the teachings of Dionysius on beauty (in his turn greatly indebted to Plotinus) will be—several centuries later and through the Latin translation of the Corpus Dionysiacum made by Johannes Scotus Eriugena in the ninth century—fully accepted by Thomas Aquinas

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18 Cf. the concept of lāvanyā in DhĀ I.4 and svavṛtti. On ‘grace’, see Milani 2009.
(through his master Albertus Magnus), one of whose early works was precisely a detailed and insightful commentary on DN (In librum Beati Dionysii de Divinis Nominibus expositio). Through Thomas Aquinas it will enter into the main stream of medieval philosophy. Beauty is understood as the divine perfection by which God manifests himself in the universe. Being such, beauty is assigned a special anagogic power: through the experience of beauty the individual can gradually rise to God himself.

**Beauty in Abhinavagupta**

Looking for a definition of beauty in Indian culture exposes us to the same sense of discouragement as that expressed by Plato at the very end of his paradoxical *tour de force* in search of what beauty is in the *Hippias Maior*: καλεπὰ τὰ καλὰ “beautiful things are difficult.” Not even the monograph by V. Raghavan *The concept of the beautiful in Sanskrit literature* (1988) is of much help. (By the way, for the criticism of one of the possible candidates for the essence of beauty—aucitya ‘appropriateness’, dealt with at length by Raghavan [1973: 214–281]—we can avail ourselves precisely of the arguments that the *Hippias Maior* applies to the cognate concept of πρέπων).

The term most used for ‘beauty’ by Abhinavagupta is no doubt *saundarya*, just as the favourite term for Ānandavardhana is *cārutva*, but I looked in vain for a direct definition of *saundarya* in Abhinavagupta’s works. Thus, we are obliged to broaden our search and try to build this missing definition through what are the effects and causes of beauty. Inevitably, the discourse on beauty in Abhinavagupta refers us to aesthetic experience (*rasa*): there is no *rasa* without *saundarya*. Such...

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19 The word καλόν (and κάλλος, etc.) is made by Thomas (preceded in this by Dionysius and Plotinus) to derive from καλέω ‘to call’.

20 This ‘*subhāṣita*’, which also occurs in two passages of Plato’s *Republic*, is ascribed by Plutarch to Solon. Apparently, the failure in finding a rational definition of beauty directs Plato towards attempting a more emotional and existential approach, such as that in *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*.

21 See the statement discussed in the Appendix: there can be no aesthetic experience whatsoever if there is no beauty (*saundaryaviraha*). On *saundarya* and other words for ‘beauty’ in Sanskrit, see Ingalls 1962; Smith 2010.

saundaryā-based aesthetic experience has a more specific qualification than mere ecstatic contemplation: it is a transformative experience. As Abhinavagupta acutely remarks (see below), rasa has the capacity of removing from the consciousness of the subject the thick obstruction caused by his innate nescience, and such an experience is in its essence ‘fluidity, dilatation, expansion’, is a state of ‘intensification’. Once again, let our understanding of the matter be supported by our confrontation with Plotinus’ teachings. The destabilising effect caused by the meeting with beauty is poignantly analysed in many a passage of the Enneads, among which the following one stands out:

Here are the emotions that must occur whenever there is contact with any sort of beautiful thing: amazement (θάμβος), sweet shock (ἐ’κπληξιν ἦδειν), longing (πόθον), desire (ἐ’ ρωτα), dismay mingled with pleasure (πτόησιν μεθ’ ἣδονής) (I.6.4, my translation).

“Beauty,” says Plotinus elsewhere (V.5.12), “brings wonder (θάμβος) and shock (ἐ’κπληξιν) and pleasure mingled with pain (συμμιγην τῷ ἀλγύνοντι ἣδονήν).” (Trans. Armstrong 1988: vol. V, 193.) In the same vein, many centuries later Rilke will say: “Denn das Schöne ist nichts als des Schrecklichen Anfang, der wir noch grade ertragen.” [For beauty is nothing but the terror’s beginning, that which we can still bear.]

Another passage from Rilke, this time the close of Archaiker Torso Apollos (“Du musst dein Leben ändern” [You must change your life]) is behind Gadamer’s considerations in one of his latest writings, referring in particular to artistic beauty:

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23 AbhBh vol. I, p. 271: raso ‘nubhavasmrtyādīvilakașanena [...] drutivistāravikā- salakașanena [...] bhogena param bhujyate. Cf. Gnoli 1968: 47. In fact, the concepts of druti-vistāra-vikāsa come from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka whose relevant passage is quoted (or paraphrased) in full by Abhinavagupta in his Locana on DhĀ II.4 (p. 83); later in the commentary on the same stanza, he refines this conception by saying that the mention only of these three experiences cannot be accepted, for they are in fact numberless (p. 85): sattvādīnāṃ cāṅgāṅgībhāvavaicitryasyānanyād drutyaḍitvenāsvadagaṇanā na yuktā, “But it is wrong to think that the varieties of relishing are fully enumerated by melting, expansion and radiance, because there are innumerable possible variations on account of the endless variety [of human character] created by the varying degrees of predominance among the components of character, sattva, rajas and tamas.” (trans. Ingalls [ed.] 1990: 226) On the ‘fortune’ of the druti-vistāra-vikāsa conception, see Ingalls (ed.) 1990: 228, n. 15; Gnoli 1968: 46–47.


26 From Neue Gedichte.
The work of art that says something confronts us with ourselves. That is, it expresses something in such a way that what is said is like a discovery, a disclosure of something previously concealed. The element of being struck is based on this. “So true, so filled with being” [So wahr, so seidend] is not something one knows in any other way. Everything familiar is eclipsed. To understand what the work of art says to us is therefore a self-encounter. But as an encounter with the authentic, as a familiarity that includes surprise, the experience of art is experience in a real sense and must master ever anew the task that experience involves: the task of integrating it into the whole of one’s own orientation to the world and one’s own self-understanding. [...] The intimacy with which the work of art touches us is at the same time, in enigmatic fashion, a shattering and demolishing of the familiar. It is not only the impact of a “This means you!” [“Das bist du!”] that is disclosed in a joyous and frightening shock; it also says to us: “You must change your life!” (Gadamer 2007: 129–131)

Likewise, Abhinava attributes to aesthetic experience a transformative power, in that it is able to create a crack in the wall of everyday life, thus opening the way to liberation.27 The following passage of the AbhBh, representing in fact the position of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka that Abhinava makes his own, is very explicit: “Aesthetic experience (rasa) [in poetry or theatre] is realised by a capacity of evocation being the agent of removing from the consciousness of the subject the thick obstruction caused by his innate delusion (bhāvakatväyāpāreṇa [...] nibiḍanijamohasaṃkatatānivārinā; AbhBh vol. I p. 271). Thus, the experience of beauty as a means to evade from saṃsāra is put essentially on the same plane as the explosion of any human emotions, according to the teaching especially of the already mentioned Vijñānabhairava-tantra, Spandakārikā, and Svabodhodayamañjarī (Torella 2000).

Emotional states, whether sexual excitement or fright, joy or terror, not only should not be obliterated, any more than they should be merely accepted, but they should also be cultivated, skillfully intensified, and then exploded and spread in order to create subtle rents in the veil of ordinary existence, through which we can make contact with the magma of universal consciousness/energy. (Torella 2015: 68)

So far we have attempted to put up with the lack of a definition of beauty by investigating the nature of its effects. A valuable additional help could come from delving into its cause(s). However, since the texts do not show

27 The theme of ‘aesthetic shock’ in India has been treated (in fact, in a quite cursory and disappointing way) in Coomaraswami 1943.
either any direct indication of what are the cause(s) of its coming into being, we have to make do with what are the causes of its absence. This subject is dealt with in an emblematic passage of the AbhBh, whose philological and hermeneutical problems will be treated in the Appendix. There are three possible causes of the absence of beauty (saundaryaviraha), each of them characterizing ordinary emotional experience, lower yogic perception and higher yogic perception, respectively. They are: 1) The arising of a painful urge for appropriation, avoidance, etc., occurring in ordinary emotions; 2) non-involvement, which marks lower yogic perception—i.e. the yogin’s indifference by vis-à-vis the feelings he is ‘reading’ in the other’s mind; 3) total dissolution of the difference between the self and the other, which characterizes higher yogic perception with the yogin’s total merging into absolute bliss. This amounts to saying that saundarya presupposes an ‘intermediate’ state in which the object has lost its heaviness, but at the same time has not altogether waned. In the case of emotions, this task is accomplished by ‘generalization’ (sādhāraṇībhāva) of bhāvas, a concept that Abhinavagupta largely derives from Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka (along with many other important features of his aesthetic thought; see Pollock 2010). Such ‘generalization’, Abhinavagupta adds, is not limited (parimita), but expanded (vitata); in it, however, the I has neither disappeared (tiraskṛta) nor is well outlined (ullikhita), the former corresponding to the state of liberation, the latter to ordinary life. (Another essential requirement for beauty, and aesthetic experience, is ‘vividness’, sphuṭatva). What happens with theatre (or poetry)? On the scene, the spectator looks at the actor who is representing an emotion not belonging to himself, but following the footsteps of the author who in his turn has represented an emotion belonging to somebody else (the character) he has never seen before and foreseeably will never see at all in

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28 Cf. AbhBh vol. I p. 279: sakalavaiṣayikopārāgaśūnyaśuddhaparayogigatasvānandaikaghanānubhavāt, “[different] from the compact and exclusive experience of one’s own bliss, taking place in the supreme yogin—a ‘pure’ experience inasmuch it is exempt from any colouring by the objective world.” See Appendix.

29 AbhBh vol. I p. 273: tathāvidhe hi bhaye nātmātyantatiraḥkrto na viśeṣata ullikhitaḥ | evaṃ paro ’pi | tata eva na parimitam eva sādhārayam, api tu vitatam |

30 These remarks occur with reference to the rasa of fear, but can obviously be extended to any rasa.

the future (e.g. Rāma). No wonder if this bhāva, being alive merely due to the power of imagination and made at the same time both lighter and lighter and more and more intense—like in the process of distillation—may lend itself to the sublimation (cf. Cuneo 2013: 70) by the spectator in the form of rasa. This may be compared to the use of strong emotions as a device for the Śaiva adept to come into contact with the ultimate spanda principle. As Kṣemarāja clarifies, the emotions, described as goddesses (devatā, devī) taking hold of the subject, are indeed intensely felt, but the subject is at the same time required to be constantly intent in discerning the spanda principle inside them. Rāmakaṇṭha’s remarks bring the matter even closer to aesthetic experience as described so far:

For the enlightened adept these [emotional states] suddenly act as means to the firm perception of the spanda, but only to the extent that they are the object of inner reflective awareness, that is, not if they are [merely] experienced. For the latter condition would be marked by pain, etc.

Being at same time in this world and not fully coinciding with it is precisely the ideal proposed to the kaula adept. One might object that this is precisely the lower kind of āsvāda, the aesthetic one (rasāsvāda), destined to be overcome by the religious āsvāda of the absolute (brahmāsvāda). I am not so sure that this is how things stand. Just as beauty needs the interference of the object, so the Śaiva absolute needs the continuous dissolving of the other into higher and higher unity. Thus, brahmāsvāda should not be seen as a higher state with regard to

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32 This may be linked to the importance of μίμησις in Aristotle’s Poetics, whose complex signification can hardly be reduced to mere ‘imitation’ (cf. Gallavotti 1974: 227–240). Significant passages of the AbhBh are devoted to investigating the nature of anukaraṇa ‘imitation’ to which Abhinavagupta prefers the more nuancé anukīrtana ‘re-narration’ (cf. Gnoli 1968: 98–101).

33 As Shulman notes (2012: 38), the spectator or the reader is every now and then reminded that what is seizing him so strongly is in fact a fiction.


35 pratyavamrṣyamāṇa, for which we might easily substitute the corresponding aesthetic term rasyamāṇa or carvyamāṇa.

36 SV pp. 74–75: etāś [daśāḥ] ca prabuddhasya pratyavamrṣyamānāḥ sadyah pratiṣṭhitaspandopaladhyupāyatāṃ bhajante, na tu anubhūyamānāḥ. sā hy avasihā duḥkkhādīmayy eva.
rasāsvāda, but only as its enlargement and universalization; in other words, saundarya is not a provisional step destined to be abandoned, but the prelude to a so-to-speak hyper-saundarya. Let’s keep in mind that Utpaladeva in ŚŚĀ XVIII.21b (tvayi na stutiśaktir asti kasyāpy athavāsty eva yato ’risundaro ’si), quite unusually in Trika literature, addresses Śiva precisely as atisundara. Admittedly, in other contexts Abhinavagupta appears as sharply contrasting rasāsvāda with brahmāsvāda, the most explicit being perhaps the passage of his Locana on Dhvanyāloka III.44 in which he comments on a verse by Ānandavardhana himself. Abhinava says: tadānandavipṛṇmātrāvabhāso hi rasāsvādaḥ, “For the gustation of aesthetic flavor is the manifestation of just a drop of that bliss [i.e. bliss deriving from repose in the Supreme Lord].” While in principle the ‘ontological’ primacy of brahmāsvāda is beyond discussion, we could gather additional information on Abhinava’s personal leanings from an AbhBh passage (first mentioned in Gnoli 1968: 82–83, n. 4). Here, it is again a question of aesthetic relish contrasted with yogic cognition (yogapratyaya) and ordinary cognition (laukikapratyaya). Even though I am far from being convinced that the transmitted passage be correct in all its parts, the gist is quite clear: Abhinava is distinguishing between pre-eminent ‘pleasantness, charmingness’ (hrdyatātiśaya) of consciential gustation (saṃviccarvaṇā) and ‘harshness, stiffness, roughness’ (paruṣa) of yogic perception, a stiffness deriving directly from its being deprived of gustation of the objective world. It is hardly assumable that Abhinava might conceive of brahmāsvāda in the terms of stiffness of yogic perception, however high.

37 The adjective will become popular only a few centuries later, in the Vaiṣṇava bhakti songs.
39 The full passage (p. 286) reads: sakalapramāṇapariniścitadrṣṭādṛṣṭaviśaya-viśeṣajam yat sukham, yad api vā lokottaram rasacarvanātmakam tata ubhayato ‘pi paramesvaraviśrāntyānandah prakṛṣyate tadānandavipruṇmātrāvabhāso hi rasāsvāda ity uktaṃ prāg asmābhiḥ, “Above the joy that comes from having determined the nature of all objects by every valid means of knowledge, above the joy that is found in relishing transcendent aesthetic flavour, is put the bliss of repose in God the all-highest” (trans. Ingalls [ed.] 1990: 655).
41 Evidently referring to the higher kind of yogic perception; see above.
Conclusion

Abhinavagupta’s position regarding beauty does not lend itself to be included in the objectivistic approach—this is quite evident—but not even in the subjectivistic approach as outlined above. To him, saundarya is not a vastudharma, accessible to everyone’s experience indiscriminately, nor is it a hidden, undefinable, quality of the thing itself requiring from the perceiving subject a special kind of insight which only happy few can possess. Rather, he maintains that it is only a special way of approaching reality that alone ‘creates’ beauty in the object. Thus, only our spiritual refinement is responsible for the emergence of beauty, and in turn the beauty-based experience—i.e. aesthetic experience (rasa, etc.)—nourishes our spiritual refinement, helping us evade from saṃsāra.

\[^{42}\] In this regard, Abhinavagupta is close to Plotinus: not everyone has this ‘aesthetic susceptibility’ as a native gift. However, neither of them bars the possibility of cultivating and enhancing such a capacity.
Appendix

On a crucial passage of the AbhBh

AbhBh, GOS IV Ed. vol. I p. 279 (GOS II Ed. vol I p. 285): sā ca pratyākṣānumānāgamopamānādilaukikāpramāṇajanitārājādīyavabodhatas tathā yogipratyākṣajātaśabhaparasamvīttijānāt sakalavaisyikoparāgāsūnyaśuddhaparayogigatavānandaikaghanānubhavāc ca viśiṣyate 
eteṣām yathāyogam arjanādivighntāraro
dayatāṭasthāyāsphutatvatvāsisvayaśaivaśaivaśaivakrtasaundaryavirahāt | atra tu svātmānupravesāt paraśaratvaniyāmābhāvāt 45 svātmānupravesāt paragatatvaniyāmābhāvāt 46 tadvibhāvādidasādhāryavāvasasamprabuddhiscitaniyādīvāsanāvāvāsvāsac ca na vighntārādīnām sambhavah.47

The first part of this passage (up to viśiṣyate) presents no particular textual or hermeneutical problems: “This [carvaṇā ‘aesthetic gustation’] is different from: a) the experience of feelings such as amorous enjoyment,

43 In fact, I am quoting according to Gnoli’s edition (1968: 21), which furnishes the most readable text; regrettably, his emendations with respect to the GOS edition are not always clearly indicated. To make things more complicated, there are four GOS editions (from 1926 to 1964 (1992); Gnoli refers to the II) each claiming to improve on the previous ones (while it is often not so). Furthermore, these editions very freely include the parallel passages of the Kāvyānuśāsana in the very text of the AbhBh (sometimes between commas, sometimes even without!). 44 (u)dayāttāṭasthāyāsvahānāsphutatvena GOS IV Ed. 45 I delete the additions: (na viśayāvēśavaśaśam) GOS II Ed., na viśayāvēśavaśam GOS IV Ed. 46 I delete the additions: (na tāṭasthyāsphutatvam) GOS II Ed., na tāṭasthyā(hetukā) sputatvam GOS IV Ed. 47 Due to the great use of KĀ for checking or restoring AbhBh’s text I will quote in full the part which paraphrases the passage under examination: Parikh-Kulkarni II ed., p. 102 (corresponding to Kāvyamāla [KM], ed. 1901, p. 65) sā ca pratyākṣānumānāgamopamānādilaukikāpramāṇajanitārājādīyavabodhatas (bodhas KM ed. 1901) tathā yogipratyākṣajātaśabhaparasamvīttijānāt sakalavaisyikoparāgāsūnya (sūnyaš ca KM ed. 1901) svātmānupravesāt svātmānupravesāt paraśaratvaniyāmābhāvān na viśiṣyate | eteṣām yathāyogam arjanādivighntāraro
dayena tāṭasthyāhetukāsvahānāsphutatvam viśayāvēśavaśayena ca saundaryavirahāt | atra tu svātmānupravesāt svādmānupravesāt paraśaratvaniyāmābhāvān na tāṭasthyāsvahānāsphutatvam (tāṭasthyāsvahānāsphutatvam KM ed. 1901) | tadvibhāvādidasādhāryavāvasasamprabuddhiscitaniyādīvāsanāvāsvāsac ca na vighntārādīnām sambhavah (curiously, the portion from vadī to 5sambhavah has disappeared from Parikh I ed. 1938 and Parikh-Kulkarni II ed. 1964; I quote the text given by KM ed. 1901).
etc., produced by ordinary means of cognition such as direct perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, etc.; b) the cognition [exempt from personal involvement] of others’ mental states, as born out of the special perception of the yogin (yogipratyākṣa); c) the compact and exclusive experience of one’s own bliss, taking place in the supreme yogin, a pure experience exempt from any colouring by the objective world.”

The second part (from arjanādi-) is much less smooth. The passage has been translated three times (Gnoli, Cuneo, Pollock), with minor differences. The first section (up to virahāt):

Indeed, these three forms of cognitions, being in due order subjected to the appearance of obstacles (practical desires, etc.), lacking evidence and at the mercy of the (adored) object, are deprived of beauty. (Gnoli 1968: 82);

[It is distinguished from these three,] because they lack beauty on account of the intervention of obstacles such as desire of acquisition, etc., the absence of fullness due to unconcern and the powerlessness due to the immersion in the [transcendental] object respectively. (Cuneo 2008–2009, I: 300);

The difference lies in the fact that those three forms of consciousness are all devoid of beauty: the first because of the presence of this or that hindrance (such as the desire to actually possess the woman one sees); the second because of the indistinctness that accompanies the indifference; the third because one is possessed by the blissful object and thereby overpowered. (Pollock 2016: 202).

In my (earlier) understanding, the phrase viṣayāveśavaivaśya (and its translations), if connected with the experience of the parayogin (as all the translators assume), sounded doubtful.48 In order to dispel these doubts not even the comparison with Hemacandra’s KĀ, which follows the text of AbhBh very closely, is of much use, since it adds only very few explanations to Abhinava’s text quoted almost verbatim (and confirms the reading viṣayāveśavaivaśya); Hemacandra's contribution amounts to just explicating the connection of arjanādivighnāntarodayatāṭasthyāsphuṭatvaviṣayāveśavaivaśya with the subsequent passage of AbhBh introduced by atra tu. The phrase viṣayāveśavaivaśya deserves a closer look, also owing to the various translations it has occasioned. I have not been able to find any other occurrence of it in the texts; nonetheless it cannot be doubted as it is invariably present in all the testimonia of the AbhBh and in the KĀ. In themselves, the three terms are essentially unambiguous: viṣaya ‘object

48 Some perplexity had already been expressed in Pollock 2016: 389, n. 154.
[of cognition], domain’, āveṣa ‘occupation by, invasion by’, \(^{49}\) vaivaśya ‘total dependence, surrender’. The combination āveṣa-vaivaśya is common enough (see e.g. TĀV vol. II p. 150 ratisaukhyasamāveśavaivaśyenā; ŚŚĀV p. 101 samāveśavaivaśyāt, p. 109 samāveśavaivaśyām, etc.); less common is viṣayavaivaśya (see Kṣemarāja’s Uddyota on SvT X.60 viṣayavaivaśyābhāvāt suhṛṣṭātmā; ĪPVV I p. 25 bhaktīyā hi tatparameśvaraviṣayavaivaśyasamāveśarūpayā).\(^{50}\)

In my opinion, while in the earlier part of this passage Abhinava mentions three different kinds of cognitions (deriving from laukikapramāṇas, and belonging to the (lower) yogin and the parayogin, respectively), the three features he subsequently mentions are not to be mechanically connected with these three cognitions and their order. In particular, the third feature (viṣayāveśavaivaśya) is not to be associated with the third cognition (the one by the parayogin). This assumption has induced the three translators to take \(^{°}\)viṣaya\(^{°}\) in the sense of “adored object” (Gnoli), “[transcendental] object” (Cuneo), “blissful object” (Pollock). To my mind, instead, two elements militate against this hypothesis. The first is the phrase sakalavaiṣayikoparāgaśūnya\(^{°}\), occurring in the same passage, for which a meaning different from “exempt from any colouring by the objective world” can hardly be figured out. In support of the translation “object, objective world” we can refer to the aforementioned Svacchanda-uddyota passage (viṣayavaivaśyābhāvāt suhṛṣṭātmā) where the absence of ‘total dependence’ (vaivaśya)—having as a result the state of suhṛṣṭātmā—cannot but be on “the objective world.”\(^{51}\) However, a (seeming) counter-evidence could be adduced (also Pollock pointed it out to me in a personal communication), i.e. the already quoted passage from ĪPVV, containing a definition of bhakti in the light of non-dual Śaivism. To my understanding,

\(^{49}\) While the double (transitive-intransitive) meaning of the root āviś- (and derived words, āviṣṭa, āveṣa) is well known, with significant impact on its use as a philosophical-religious term (cf. Torella 2002: XXXIII–XXXIV), its current meaning in literary, or non-technical, texts is ‘to be entered, to be possessed’ (e.g. bhūtāviṣṭa ‘possessed by evil spirits’). This also holds in aesthetic literature, etc., when total occupation of the individual by a certain feeling is meant (e.g. krodhāviṣṭa ‘furious’).

\(^{50}\) However, the meaning of viṣaya in the two sentences is obviously different (see below).

\(^{51}\) The full passage reads: śānto dāntaḥ suhṛṣṭātmā tv anahaṅkāravān samah || X.60 || ddyota: śāntojitacittah, dāntojitendriyah, ataś ca viṣayavaivaśyābhāvāt suhṛṣṭātmā, nirahaṅkāraś ca.
however, by *tatparameśvaraviṣayavaivaśyasamāveśarūpayā* Abhinavagupta did not mean “consisting of being occupied by the total dependence on the [adored, transcendental blissful] object that is Parameśvara,” but “[…] total dependence which has Parameśvara as its object,” which is just a śāstric analytical way of expressing the simple “total dependence on (i.e. surrender to) Parameśvara.” This interpretation would fit better Hemacandra’s gloss, clearly connecting *svātmaikagatavaniyamāsamāveśavāvasthāvāt* with *viṣayāveśavaivaśya*, for which I propose the translation: “there is [no] surrender to the invasion by the object, because [in *rasa* experience] there is not the restriction of [the feelings’] being referred solely to one’s own empirical ego.”

The intended meaning is that we come to be overwhelmed by the objective world if we link its experience directly to our individual ego, that is, without the screen of *sādhāranībhāva* “generalization, universalization.” This helps us understand better the apparently conflicting *svānupraveśāt* which immediately follows (its position in the AbhBh passage makes its meaning rather ambiguous—an ambiguity that the KĀ dispels by grouping together *svānupraveśāt* and *paragatatvaniyamābhāvāt*). What we can gather from the above considerations is that *rasa* experience—which has beauty as its inner core—is different from the yogic cognition of others’ feelings, because, unlike the latter, the former does possess vividness and involvement due to its not being restricted to something felt as belonging exclusively to others, for it is able to make the feelings enter somehow into one’s own self and affect it (*svānupraveśāt*). In other words, *rasa* experience presupposes the entrance of the object into the self, but at the same time the object’s not becoming the ruler of a self subjugated by it. Thus, my own translation of this *vexatus* passage is as follows: “For in the just mentioned experiences there is absence of beauty—an absence deriving from: a) the arising of specific obstacles [to aesthetic experience], such as the desire of appropriation [of the object which has aroused a pleasant emotion], etc. [or the desire to avoid it, if it has aroused an unpleasant emotion], b) lack of vividness caused by non-involvement [the case of yogin

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52 I cannot exclude that °vaivaśyasamāveśa° might be the result of a scribal inversion of an original °samāveśavaivaśya° (this, however, would hardly affect the overall meaning).

53 This is definitely the meaning that *svātmaikagatatva* has in other passages of AbhBh (e.g. vol. I p. 274: *svaikatatanām ca sukhaduḥkhasaṃvidām āsvāde [...] paragatatvaniyamābhājām api suḥkhaḥduḥkhaṇām samvedane [...]*)
reading emotions belonging to others], c) surrender to the invasion by the object.” The difference in the understanding of this passage has obvious repercussions on the understanding of the following passage, introduced by *atra tu*. Here are its available translations:

Here, on the contrary, because of the absence [of sensations of pleasure, pain, etc.] as inhering exclusively in our own person, of an active participation in our own self, of the absence [of the aforementioned sensations] as inhering exclusively in other persons and the immersion in the latent traces of our own sentiments of delight, etc., reawakened by the corresponding determinants, etc., which are generalized—because, I say, of all these causes, the appearance of obstacles is impossible. (Gnoli 1968: 84).

In the [experience of *rasa*], on the contrary, other obstacles, etc. cannot intervene because there can be no limitation such as the mere reference to one’s own Self, because one is personally involved, because there is no limitation such as the reference to other persons and because one is immersed in the latent impressions of one’s own appropriate emotions of delight, etc. awakened by the state of generality of their Determinants, etc. (Cuneo 2008–2009: 300)

In the theater, however, because the aesthetic event cannot possibly be restricted to oneself alone, such overpowering cannot take place; because the event cannot be restricted to someone else alone, given one’s own participation, that imprecision cannot arise; and because one’s congruent predispositions of desire (or other stable emotion) take possession of one when activated by force of the ‘commonization’ of the aesthetic elements], none of the hindrances can come into play […] (Pollock 2016: 202)

The translation I propose is:

In the aesthetic experience, instead, there is no possibility for the arising of obstacles and other [shortcomings listed above], because: a) there is not the restriction of [the feeling’s] being referred solely to one’s own empirical ego; b) there is not the restriction of [the feeling’s] being referred [solely] to other subjects due to the capacity of the feeling to enter into one’s own self [and affect it]; c) in it [i.e. the aesthetic experience], the corresponding latent traces of [past] emotions, like love passion, etc., when awakened by the state of ‘generalization’ of their determinants, etc., take possession of the subject.
References

AbhBh  


Agamben 2017  

Ali 2004  

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Bonin 2006  

Caesar/D’Intino 2013  

Coomaraswami 1943  

Croce 1922  

Cuneo 2008–2009  

Cuneo 2013  


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author/Title</th>
<th>Reference</th>
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<td>Leopardi 1937</td>
<td>G. Leopardi, <em>Zibaldone di pensieri</em>, vol. I. Tutte le opere di Giacomo Leopardi, a cura di Francesco Flora. Milano 1937 (1898–1900; the original text was composed between 1817 and 1832).</td>
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<td>SK</td>
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Inscription 2 in the entrance area of the Lha khang chen mo at 'Khor chags Monastery: Edition and annotated translation*

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The inscription that forms the object of the present study is one of two historical inscriptions found in the entrance area of the Lha khang chen mo at 'Khor chags monastery (figs. 1–3). I was made aware of them by Christian Jahoda, who carried out anthropological fieldwork in 'Khor chags in February/March 2010 and later kindly provided me with detailed photos of the two highly fragmentary texts. These photos were taken by Patrick Sutherland, a professional photographer who was part of Jahoda’s field research team. In September 2010, I visited 'Khor chags myself within the framework of the Austrian Science Fund project “Tibetan inscriptions” (S 9804–G08 and S 9804–G21). This allowed me to check a number of readings in situ and to video-record selected sections of both inscriptions. However, my recordings did not constitute an improvement over Sutherland’s excellent photos.

The two epigraphs are very similar in their general appearance and their script, and they may actually have been written by one and the same person. Hence, I initially thought that they might constitute a single continuous historical text distributed over two panels. But while preparing a first transcription of the two documents, it soon became clear that this was not the case, since parts of the inscriptions run chronologically parallel with one another. Their tolerably legible portions respectively cover events from the eleventh to at least the sixteenth century CE (inscription 1), and from the third century BCE to at least the fifteenth century CE (inscription 2).

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It is merely for practical reasons that I refer to the two epigraphs as inscription 1 and inscription 2; this designation does not in any way indicate the attribution of a particular order with regard to their dates or importance. It may be pointed out, however, that the extant text of inscription 1 is considerably longer than that of inscription 2, and this is also one reason why they are not published together here. If inscription 1 had been included,¹ this article would have exceeded the space limitations set for the contributions to this volume.

**General description and date of the inscription**

The exact dimensions of the inscripational panel are difficult to establish because only a short segment of its original right margin can be made out clearly. In more recent times, the lower, left and right margins were painted over rather crudely, and much of this new boundary on the left side was subsequently covered with plaster (see fig. 1). In addition, damage to the upper part of the panel is such that one cannot discern even remnants of text and thus it is unclear where the inscription started. Assuming that the present framing on the lower and left margins does not cover any text and that the writing started more or less just below the ceiling, the inscripational panel could have covered an area of ca. 170 x 130 cm (height/width), with its lower edge situated some 80 cm above the ground. Extrapolating from the fragments that are still extant, this would roughly amount to 60 lines with ca. 160–165 ‘letters’² per line.

² For the distinction between letters and ‘letters’, see n. 14.
Inscription in the Lha khang chen mo at 'Khor chags Monastery

† Fig. 1: Inscription 2 on the north-facing wall of the entrance area in the Lha khang chen mo (inscription 1 is located on the opposite, south-facing, wall; for detailed plans of the temple, see Feiglstorfer et al. 2012: 75 and 85)

← Fig. 2: Frontal view of inscription 2

↓ Fig. 3: Detail of line 7 (... las∙ 'das∙ nas /)
The first remnants of text are found about 90 cm below the ceiling, i.e., slightly below the middle of the panel. My edition renders 15 consecutive lines and I have numbered them 1–15, but one should be aware that this almost certainly does not correspond to their original status. For all practical purposes and intents, the writing becomes completely illegible below line 15, but there are traces of a few isolated letters, indicating that the text continued for at least another 17 lines.

Since the preserved fragments are rather short and, in places, unclear, I refrain here from summarizing their contents. The (annotated) translation will allow a quick impression to be gained. It might be of use, however, to list the names and toponyms that can be read or conjectured with some degree of certainty. Here, they are given in the order they appear in the text, with the respective lines provided in (round) brackets:

3 [Aśoka(?)] (l. 4), Kun ba na (l. 5), [Jālandhara] (l. 5), the Rgyan drug [mchog] gnyis (l. 7),\(^4\) [Indrabhūti] (l. 7), Saraha (l. 7), Virupa(?) (l. 7), [Ka (ba Dpal brtsegs)] (l. 8), Cog (ro Klu’i rgyal mtshan) (l. 8), Zhang (Sna nam Ye shes sde) (l. 8), Kamalaśīla (l. 9), Heshang (Moheyan) (l. 9), Rin chen bzang po (l. 9), Dam pa rgya gar (l. 11), [Rong ston] Shes bya [kun rig] (l. 12), (Ngor chen) [Kun dga’ bzang po] (l. 12), and [Thub bstan] rgya mtsho (l. 13).

The final name is of potential interest with regard to the date of the inscription, since it possibly refers to the 13th Dalai Lama (1876–1933). In fact, Ngag dbang thub bstan 2009: 67f. reports a passage, unspecified and, as yet, unidentified, in the 13th Dalai Lama’s “Rnam thar rin po che’i phreng ba,” according to which he “thoroughly supported whatever renovations and new constructions were suitable” (zhig gso dang gsar skrun gang ’os legs par bskyangs), inter alia at the “(’Khor chags) Jo khang (in) Spu hreng” (spu hreng jo khang). Thus, if the inscription’s [Thub bstan] rgya mtsho refers to the 13th Dalai Lama, the late nineteenth or early twentieth century would constitute an obvious terminus post quem for the inscription. However, the reading/conjecture is not perfectly certain and there are, of course, other people of that name also. Moreover, since the end of line 12 mentions [Rong ston] Shes bya [kun rig] (1367–1449) and (Ngor chen) [Kun dga’ bzang po] (1382–1456) (see above), a reference to the 13th Dalai Lama after only about half a line would constitute a big leap in time and the inscriptive text would be chronologically rather unevenly spaced. For the time being, I thus feel it is preferable to refrain from using the passage for dating the inscription. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that it dates from the fifteenth century or later.

\(^3\) For the meaning of the brackets and the editorial signs, see below.

\(^4\) See n. 92.
may be added that the local population could not provide any information in this respect either.

**General remarks on the edition and translation**

The edition is mainly based on the photographic documentation that was prepared by Patrick Sutherland in early 2010 (see above) and it presents the text as it appeared at that time.\(^5\) The inscriptional text is given in the form of a diplomatic transcription, with all conjectures\(^6\) and emendations\(^7\) relegated to the footnotes. There, the reading of the inscription is first repeated and then the respective conjecture or emendation is given after a colon\(^8\); slightly doubtful cases are followed by a question mark in brackets\(^9\); in more speculative instances the brackets are omitted.

In the translation, conjectures are given in square brackets within the text. As in the edition, the text of slightly doubtful cases is followed by a question mark in (round) brackets.\(^10\) In more speculative cases (i.e., conjectures that are followed by a question mark without brackets in the edition) the translation of the suggested text is provided in a footnote (with a question mark)\(^11\) and the running text shows an ellipsis (...).

As mentioned above, the inscription’s state of preservation leaves much to be desired and the limitations in studying such fragmentary documents have already been pointed out in earlier publications.\(^12\) Suffice it to point out here that the time needed to edit and translate such poorly preserved epigraphs often increases exponentially with the degree of damage. In the present case, the preserved fragments mostly consist of

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\(^5\) The photos can be viewed at [http://www.univie.ac.at/Tibetan-inscriptions; links: Ngari → Khorchag → Lha khang chen mo → Inscription 02](http://www.univie.ac.at/Tibetan-inscriptions; links: Ngari → Khorchag → Lha khang chen mo → Inscription 02). Note that most segments of the panel were photographed several times, with varying lighting conditions and a certain amount of overlapping. In cases of doubtful readings, the reader is advised to look at *all* the photos of the passage in question.

\(^6\) I.e., proposed readings where text had become illegible by 2010.

\(^7\) I.e., proposed changes for text still legible in 2010; mainly corrections of obvious scribal mistakes and adjustments of “irregular” spellings to “classical norms” (here, for the sake of convenience, spellings that are not attested in Das 1985, Jäschke 1992 or Zhang *et al.* 1993 are considered “irregular”). No emendations are provided for “irregular” *sandhi*-forms like “ba· pa”, etc.

\(^8\) E.g., “-ul· yul·” or “rgyud· brgyud”.

\(^9\) E.g., “dagongs=gre· dagongs· grel(?).”

\(^10\) E.g., “[books(?)].”

\(^11\) E.g., “Read: ‘the red-faced (people),’?”

disjointed syllables, words, and short phrases, and I am not sure if the findings justify the invested effort. For what it is worth, I am nonetheless making my results available here, and it may well be that they serve some purpose in future research. Notably, the names and toponyms found in the inscription might be useful for subsequent studies on the history of Western Tibet in general and the monastery of 'Khor chags in particular.

Editorial signs

{1}, {2}, {3} etc. beginning of a line

ʃad

tsheg ʃad curved to the left

tsheg (only used in the edition and in quotations from the inscriptive text)

d uncertain reading (underlined){13}

= illegible ‘letter’{14}

- illegible letter(s) that formed part of a partly legible ‘letter’, with one hyphen representing up to three letters{15}

=30=, =70=, etc. ca. 30/70/etc. illegible ‘letters’ (used for large lacunas)

In the annotations to the translation, conjectures for quoted inscriptive text are marked with pointed brackets, e.g.:

sha<\(\text{r\cdot gyr\cdot}\) conjecture for \(\text{sha=}\_\text{gyr\cdot}\)

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13 Following Tauscher 1999: 50, a letter is marked in this way even in those cases where it is “‘partly damaged’, but the reading is obvious and quite certain from the context.”

14 Cf. Steinkellner/Luczanits 1999: 15 (n. 12), where ‘letter’ is defined as “any combination of letters in the Tibetan alphabet that occupy in vertical arrangement of the letter sequence the space of a single grapheme”, while letter “refers to the single signs for consonants or vowel modification only.” Thus a ‘letter’ can be composed of up to four letters. E.g., =d\(\cdot\) (partly damaged spyod\(\cdot\)) or rna=s\(\cdot\) (partly damaged rnams\(\cdot\)).

15 E.g., -o\(\cdot\) (partly damaged lo\(\cdot\)), -rub\(\cdot\) (partly damaged sgrub\(\cdot\)), -od\(\cdot\) (partly damaged spyod\(\cdot\)) or s-rin\(\cdot\) (partly damaged sprin\(\cdot\)).
Inscription in the Lha khang chen mo at 'Khor chags Monastery

Edition

{1} =70= b--; =90=
{2} =70= khri: ==nas; 'phags· pa: -u=80=
{3} =65= pa· dang· b==sl16 / gnas==n();=80=
{4} =35= u===-on· bda=17=20=ngs· nas / -o18====bcu· lon=55=· mya· ngan· -e=19=25=
{5} =30= bcwo· brgyad· gyes· =30= ul20· gyi· ye· -rag21· kun· ba· na· zhes· pa'i· sgo· nas /=n.22 dha· rar=20= dgra· bcom· pa· mang· ==bzung· ste· ==rgya= / bya= -u=23 =18=
{6} =25= ma· 'ongs· pa'i· skye· bo· blo· rmongs· pa / lta· spyod· mi=un24· pa· -u==-yur=15= bam25· la· yi· ger· bris· so / bka'· bsdu· ba· gsum· pa'o / =25= tu· bslabs· sbyangs / legs· pa· rtogs / slob· dpon· r-m26· kyis· bka'=d.27 -ra=12=
{7} =20= rgyan· drug· =-og28· gnyis / dpal· ldan· i· d·· b--; =ti29 = sa· ra· ha / bi· ru· =20=30 bstan· pa· rin· po· che'i· gnam· langs· nys· ma· sha==gyur31· pa· lags / =15=32 can· gyi· yul· du; ston· pa·

---b==sl: bcas· pas?
---on· bda=: yon· bdag?
-o· lo?:
-e=: med·(?)
-ul: yul·.

gyi· ye· -rag: gyi· bye· brag·.

The remaining traces allow for the conjecture dza· lan·.

bya= -u=-e==: byang· chub· sens.
mi=un: mi· mthun·.
===· bam· : glegs· bam·(?)
===r-m: rnams·.

bka'=d·: bka'· khrid·(?)
=og: mchog·.

The letters following dpal· ldan· most likely provided a (more or less garbled) phonetic rendering of the name of Mahāsiddha Indrabhūti.

While one would expect bi· ru· to be followed by pa·, the remaining traces at the beginning of the damaged passage are somewhat difficult to align with this conjecture and rather suggest that the root letter of the syllable was an s. Thus bi· ru· may have been used as a short form of bi· ru· pa· here.

sha==gyur: shar· 'gyur·.

The remaining traces suggest that the last letter of the damaged passage was either a d, n or r, and thus it may have ended in gdong· dmar·. By contrast, the conjectures gangs· and kha· ba· can hardly be justified. In any case, the context makes it seem very likely that the following yul· refers to Tibet.
The damaged passage may have ended in \( \text{gyur} \). The end of the damaged passage most likely read \( \text{byung} \). The remaining traces allow for the rather speculative conjecture (\( \text{jam} \)) \( \text{pa'i} \). The vowel sign could also be read as \( e \).

The end of the damaged passage most likely read \( \text{chen} \).

The damaged passage may have ended in \( \text{rgyud} \). The damaged passage may have ended in \( \text{brgyud} \) or \( \text{rgyud} \).
Inscription in the Lha khang chen mo at 'Khor chags Monastery

\[ r=\text{s}\] la=phan  \[ po\] mdzad: \[ pa=\text{s} / \text{rgyal: sras: rigs: gsum: mg=} \]

12 =s\text{t} \[ s\text{n}\text{gag} = \text{do}\]

\[ m=(-)\text{n} \[ bde'i: s=-, \text{khod: par: mdzad: pa} / \text{mkhas} = 12 \[ \text{bzhang: po:} \]

m  \text{dri: ma: med: pa / mi: nub: pa'i: rgyal: mtshan: dzin:}

pa / ches: khyad: par: du: phags: pa ; \[ \text{chos: kyi:}

\[ \text{chang: chen: po:} -u====\text{.} -o=12 \]

13 =40 =m\text{. med}  \[ \text{shā kyāi:} \text{r} \text{gyal: =.} \]

\[ \text{ba'=d} \text{i=} \text{b-i= d: pa:} \text{r-ms} \text{. la ;} \text{thub=stan} \text{. rgya: mtsho'i:}

\[ \text{khur=} \text{ch-n:} \text{po:} \text{r} \text{nams=} \text{10=} \text{. gnyis: grub: che==.}

\[ \text{po=78 rim: pa byon: pa: r} \text{nams: dang: / rmad: b-ung: bkod.} \]

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55 \[ r=\text{s:} \text{rnams:} \]
56 \[ la=phan: la: 'phan: (i.e., irregular for la phan)? \]
57 \[ pa=\text{s:} \text{pa: lags(?)} \]
58 \[ mg=\text{.} \text{mgon:} \]
59 \[ \text{phr-l:} \text{phrul:()} \]
60 \[ =d\text{o:} \text{mdo:} \]
61 \[ s\text{nagag=} \text{snags:} \]
62 \[ r\text{ten=} \text{s:} \text{ten: khams:()} \]
63 \[ n=\text{s:} \text{sa: la:} \]
64 \[ s=\text{.} \text{la:} \]
65 The remaining traces allow for the rather speculative conjecture da: ma: ru ;.
66 ==-ton: rong: ston:.
67 -u=ig: kun: rig.
68 snyig=du=\text{s:} \text{snigs: dus:}.
69 rd: rj: rdo: rje:.
70 The remaining traces suggest the conjecture kun: dga: bzang: po:.
71 The damaged passage probably ended in mnyam: med:.
72 ==-: pos: or po'i:()?
73 r-ms: \text{rnams:}.
74 thub=stan: thub: bstan:.
75 khur=ch-n: po: khur: 'khri: chen: po:?
76 The remaining traces of the last seven ‘letters’ allow for the rather speculative conjecture rang: gzan: don:.
77 The passage could also be read as tshe==, tsho== or cho==.
78 The syllable could also be read as go:.
79 b-ung: byung:.
Translation

{1}  ... .
{2}  ... throne / ten thousand ... noble ... 
{3}  ... with ... site(?) ... 
{4}  ... ... after/from ...( )te(e)n ...[Aśoka(?)] ... 
{5}  ... eighteen ... split ... via [the part] of [the land] ... called Kun ba na, ... in/at/to [Jālandhara] ... many(?) ... Arhat(s) ... took(?)...[Bodhi]... 
{6}  ... ignorant being(s) of the future ...[inconsistent] (in) views and

\[80\ \text{pa-i} : \text{pa’i}(c).\]
\[81\ \text{gy-} : \text{gyi}.\]
\[82\ \text{Read: “together”?}\]
\[83\ \text{Read: “donor(s)”}\]
\[84\ \text{Read: “year(s)”}\]
\[85\ \text{bcwo- bgyad- gyes: almost certainly refers to the division into the 18 early Buddhist schools. See n. 86.}\]
\[86\ \text{Cf. Chos ’byung 131f. and Rgya gar chos ’byung 78–81, where the division into the 18 early Buddhist schools is mentioned in connection with their respective descriptions of the third Buddhist council (referred to in line 6 of the inscription). Chos ’byung relates a tradition according to which this council took place in the monastery of “Kun pa na” in the land of Kaśmīr (kha che’i yul kun pa na zhes bya ba’i dgon par) and was sponsored by “Jālandhara’s King Kaniṣka” (sbyin bdag dza landha ra’i rgyal po ka ni kas byas). Rgya gar chos ’byung reports that the council was held in the Gtsug lag khang of Jālandhara’s “Ku pa na” monastery (dza landha ra’i dgon pa ku pa na’i gtsug lag khang du). In Obermiller 1986: 97 and in Chimpa/Chattopadhyaya 1990: 93 both kun pa na and ku pa na are rendered by “Kuvana”.}\]
\[87\ \text{See n. 86.}\]
\[88\ \text{The three ‘letters’ following dgra∙ bcom∙ can be read in a number of different ways, including bsad-, bsang-, pa∙ mad-, pa; sad- and pa; sang- (note, however, that the conjecture pa∙ sangs- (rgyas-) is not supported by the remaining traces). Considering that in the two accounts already mentioned in n. 86 it is stated that 500 Arhats and 500 Bodhisattvas (cf. n. 89) were present at the council, I favour the reading pa∙ mang-}.\]
\[89\ \text{Read: “Bodhisattva(s)” or “Bodhicitta”?}\]
\[90\ \text{Read: “,”}?
conducted ... was/were put into writing in [books(?)].91 (It/This) was the third compilation of the word (of the Buddha). ... studied (and) trained (...), properly gained realization, ... [the instructions(?)] (...) by the preceptor[s] ... 

{7} ... the six ornaments and the two [supreme ones].92 the glorious [Indrabhūti], Saraha, Virupa(?))93 ... was / is / will be94 the daybreak of the precious teaching, the sun [coming to rise], ... in the country of ...95 two thousand and five hundred years after the teacher attained nirvāṇa, the noble dharma [will be(?)]96 spread.

{8} ... composed/started(?) .... ... of the noble dharma ...97 provided with the eye [of] the dharma, [Ka.] Cog (and) Zhang,98 the three, ... translate[d(?)] the three [baskets] together with [the

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91 Cf., again, Chos 'byung 133 (de ltar bsdu ba gsum pa byas nas ... bka’ ... glegs bam yi ger bkod) and Rgya gar chos 'byung 80–81 (bsdu ba gsum pa'i ishe ... 'dal ba yi ger bkod la / mdo sde dang mngon pa sngar yi ger ma' khod pa rnams kyang yi ger bkod la).

92 The rgyan drug mchog gnyis are also mentioned in verse-line 35 of the historical inscription in the 'Du khang of Dgung 'phur monastery. According to the most common tradition, Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are designated as the “six ornaments”, and the two Vinaya-masters Guṇa prabha and Śākyaprabha as “the two supreme ones”. Cf. Tropper 2016: 26 and 53.

93 For the Mahāsiddhas Indrabhūti, Saraha and Virupa, see Dowman 1988: 35–39, 45f., 137f., and Schaeffer 2005.

94 See n. 96.

95 Read: “the red-faced (people),”? See n. 96.

96 Cf. the following passage in Chos 'byung me tog snying po 165: lha mo dri ma med pa'i 'od kyis zhus pa'i mdo las / nga mya ngan las 'das nas lo nyis stong lnga brgya na 'am / brgyad brgya na galong dmar gyi yul du dam pa chos kyi dbu brnyes shing srol gdod de dar zhieng rgyas par 'gyur / brian zhiing mi g.yo bar 'gyur ro / zhes gsungs pa yin no / . „In the Vimalaprabhā(devi)paripṛcchāsūtra it is said: ‘Two thousand and five hundred or (two thousand and) eight hundred years after I have attained nirvāṇa, the noble dharma will commence in the land of the red-faced (people) and its tradition will be established; it will prosper and it will be spread. It will be steadfast and unwavering.’” The prophecy allegedly contained in the Vimalaprabhā(devi)paripṛcchāsūtra is also referred to (with variations) in numerous other Tibetan historiographical texts. Some of these sources and the (Skt.) title of the sūtra are discussed in Sørensen 1994: 154 (n. 433) and in Linnenborn 2004: 347ff. At any rate, the likeness of the quoted passage in Chos 'byung me tog snying po with the preserved passage of the inscription suggests that the latter contained (the quotation of) a similar prophecy and that rgyas: par-<'gyur ro (and perhaps also the preceding sha<r-'gyur pa-: lags) thus must be taken in a future sense.

97 Read: “;”?

98 I.e., the early translators Ka ba Dpal brtsegs, Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan and Zhang Sna nam Ye shes sde.
commentaries]. Due to(?) the origin of the apparitional image ... secret(?) ... 99 ...

{9} ... empty/devoid/thousand(?) ... established the course/exposition ... . Kamalaśīla ... 100 the view(s) of Heshang ... 101 The/the venerable Mañju... 102 ... [The/the great translator] Rin chen bzang po ... [all four tantra classes(?)] 103 ...

{10} ... of the Jina(?) ... 104 through (his/their) sublime knowledge ... made [the teachings] of the scholastic lineage spread ... 105 ... [yoga (practitioner(s))] ... invited ...

{11} ... [again,] (...) the (...) spread[ing of] the (...) religious system of [pacifying (zhi byed)] by the venerable Dam pa rgya gar 106[, etc.], the worthy ones [were helpful to(?)] the sentient being[s] in accordance with the river [course] of the sādhana lineage(?) [The emanations] of [the protectors of] the three families of jinaputras, 107 (that is,) the great bla ma(s) of Sa skya, father and (spiritual) son(s) 108 ... [śūtra(s) and mantra(s)] ...

99 Read: “the doctrine of non-action (i.e., Rdzogs chen)”?

100 Read: “stopped” or similar? The passage obviously relates to the famous debate of Bsam yas (792–4), in which Kamalaśīla defeated Heshang Moheyan (和尚摩訶衍).

101 Read: “.”?

102 Read: “Mañjuvajra”? Khri Srong lde btsan, who invited Kamalaśīla to Tibet, is generally considered to be an emanation of Mañjuśrī/Mañjughoṣa (cf. Tropper 2016: 53, n. 487). Since Mañjuvajra is an esoteric form of Mañjuśrī, the passage may, in one way or another, refer to Khri Srong lde btsan.

103 Cf. Deb ther sngon po 430, where it is stated that Rin chen bzang po “in general knew and also expounded all the Prajñāpāramitā and tantric texts” (spiyi pha rol tu phyin pa dang snags kyi gzung thams cad mkhyen cing bshad pa yang mdzad). As can be conveniently gleaned from the index entries in Suzuki 1962: (195), he also translated numerous tantric texts.

104 ch<e>n- <rd>r<e>, ri<e>: could have been part of a name, but the missing context makes this a rather speculative supposition.

105 Read: “lineage(s)” or “tantra(s)”?

106 On the various Tibetan and Sanskrit names of this Indian master, the descriptions of his extended travels (including a sojourn at Mnga’ ris) in the various sources and his establishment of the Zhi byed school in Tibet, see, e.g., Martin 1996: 31ff. and Kollmar-Paulenz 1993: 42–69.

107 I.e., Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāni and Avalokiteśvara.

108 This may refer to the “five forefathers” (gong ma [rnam] Inga, i.e., Sa chen Kun dga’ snying po, Bsod nams rtse mo, Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal mtshan, Sa skya paṇḍi ta Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan, Chos rgyal ’Phags pa) and their successors, who are generally considered to be emanations of Mañjuśrī, Vajrapāni and Avalokiteśvara (cf. n. 107). The idea goes back to Atiśa, who, on visiting what was to become the site of Sa skya monastery, is said to have predicted that, first, seven emanations of Mañjuśrī, one of Vajrapāni, and one of Avalokiteśvara would
appear there and that, later on, the stream of emanations of the protectors of the three families would not cease. See, e.g., Don grub phun tshogs et al. 1992: 1–2: ma 'ongs pa'i dus su 'jam dbyangs kyi sprul pa bdun / spyan ras gzigs kyi sprul pa gcig phyag na rdo rje'i sprul pa gcig ste dgu thog mar 'byon zhing / gzhan yang rigs gsun mgon po'i sprul pa rgyun mi chad par phyogs 'dir 'byon.

Read: “in/on a state/level/place”?

109 Read: “benefit and”?

110 Read: “,”?

111 Read: “(the) da ma ru”?

112 Read: “,”?

113 Also known as Rong ston Shākya rgyal mtshan (1367–1449), the teacher of Shākya mchog Idan and founder of Nālendra monastery in 'Phan yul.

114 As already evidenced by the titles of the six rnams thars listed in Heimbel 2011: 84ff. (e.g., Rdo rje 'chang kun dga' bzang po'i rnam par thar pa legs bshad chu bo 'dus pa'i rgya mtshe), Ngor chen Kun dga’ bzang po (1382–1456) was considered to be an emanation of Vajradhara. For his three visits to Western Tibet, see Vitali 1996: 391ff., 488, 508–511, 520ff., and Heimbel 2011: 55 (n. 25).

115 Most likely referring to Buddha Śākyamuni.

116 Read: “the great responsibilities”?

117 Cf. the introduction.

118 Read: “own and others’ benefit”?
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Bhāviveka, Dharipayāla and Dharmakīrti
and their criticism of a Sāṅkhya theory*

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Introduction

Sāṅkhya theories regarding the soul and causality were long the target of severe criticism from Indian Buddhists. In an earlier article, I examined Dharmakīrti’s criticism as found in the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya, of the Sāṅkhya causal theory called satkāryavāda—the doctrine stating that effects are already latent within their causes. His criticism of the theories of transformation (parināma) and manifestation (abhivyakti), which support the Sāṅkhya satkāryavāda, basically follows the same line as the arguments of Vasubandhu (ca. 350–430 CE). Dharmakīrti, however, overcomes certain weak points in Vasubandhu’s arguments by applying newly developed concepts, such as non-perception (anupalabdhi) and causal efficacy (arthakriyāśakti). However, a close examination of the Sāṅkhya arguments mentioned by Dharmakīrti and his criticism of them reveals that Dharmakīrti’s description has certain parallels with those of his two Buddhist predecessors—or possibly contemporaries—Dharipayāla (ca. 530–561?) and Bhāviveka (ca. 490/500–570).

On the basis of certain passages in which Bhāviveka seems to accept Dharmakīrti’s and Kumārila’s ideas, Helmut Krasser proposed, as a working hypothesis, the time of activity of Dharmakīrti to have been

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1 Watanabe 2011.

the mid-sixth century. In memory of my dear friend and guru Helmut, I would like to re-examine his hypothesis and present the possibility that Dharmakīrti was influenced by Bhāviveka—indeed, contrary to the direction suggested by Krasser—or at least question Dharmakīrti’s influence on Bhāviveka.

For reconsidering the chronological relationship between Dharmakīrti and Bhāviveka, I will first compare Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory to that found in works by Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka, namely, the Dacheng guang bailun shilun (大乘広百論釈論) and the Prajñāpradīpa, respectively.

1. Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory of causality

Dharmakīrti examines the Sāṅkhya theory at various places in his works: in the first and fourth chapters of the Pramāṇavārttika (PV, along with his auto-commentary Svavṛtti on the first chapter, PVSV), in the third chapter of the Pramāṇaviniścaya (PV in 3), and in the Vādanyāya (VN). Of these, PV in 3 is most significant when examining the relationship between Dharmakīrti and other Buddhists. His criticism in PV in 3 consists of three parts:

i) PV in 3 1,8–4,3 (explanation of the word svadrṣṭa in Dignāga’s definition of parārthānunmāṇa)

ii) PV in 3 40,10–42,9 (explanation of the pseudo-thesis called anumānanirākṛta)

iii) PV in 3 92,9–95,2 (explanation of the pseudo-logical reason called asiddha)

Of these, the first and last sections contain a few arguments that are parallel to the criticisms of the Sāṅkhya theory by Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka. Dharmakīrti’s criticism in the first part begins as follows:

[DhK 1: PV in 3 1,8–2,2] yathāhur eke: parasya pratipādyatvāt svayam adṛṣṭam api parair drṣṭam sādhanam, yathā—acetanāḥ sukhādayo buddhir vā, upatther anityatvād vā, rūpāddivad iti. tad ayuktam, anumāṇaviṣaye vīcāḥ prāmāṇyābhāvāt, prāmāṇye vā nānumānapravṛttīḥ syāt, vacanamātreṇārthasiddher hetvādivaiyarthāt.

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2 Krasser 2012.
Some (i.e., the Sāṅkhya) say: Since it is the other (i.e., the opponent) who is to be convinced [through a proof put forth by the proponent], that which is understood by others, even if it is not understood by [the proponent] himself, [can] be a logical reason (sādhana), like [the logical reason in the following proof]:

⟨Prayoga 1⟩

[Thesis] Pleasure, etc., or the intellect (buddhi) do not have consciousness (acetana).

[Reason] For they come into being (utpatti) or are impermanent (anityatva).

[Example] Like form, etc. (rūpādi)

[Dharmakīrti:] This is incorrect because the statement [not accepted by the proponent] does not have validity with regard to the realm of inference. Or if [its] validity [were accepted], inference would not occur because, since [in this case] that [which is to be proved] would be established by a mere statement, the logical reason, etc., would be pointless.\(^3\)

In explaining the phrase svadṛṣṭārtha in Dignāga’s definition of the inference-for-others (parārthānumāna),\(^4\) Dharmakīrti refers to “some” (eke) who insist that even something whose existence is not accepted by the proponent himself can be used as a logical reason insofar as it is accepted by his disputation. He also adduces the ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ as an example of their view. This ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ is first presented completely here in PVin 3, although already in PV 2.17 a similar Sāṅkhya proof with the logical reason “impermanence, etc.” (anityādi) has been mentioned. There, however, no example is given.\(^5\) As PV 2.17 and NB 3.62 show, this ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ is ascribed to the Sāṅkhya by Dharmakīrti himself.\(^6\) And according to his explanation in PV 4 and PVin 3, this ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ of the Sāṅkhya has been put forth in order to refute the validity of Buddhist scriptures stating that pleasure, etc., and the intellect, have consciousness.\(^7\)

\(^4\) PS 3.1ab (Katsura 2009: 157): parārthānumānaṃ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprapkāśānām.
\(^5\) PV 2.17abc: etena kāpiḷādīnāṃ acaitanyādi cintitam | anityādeḥ ... || “By the above [argument against the existence of the God], we have already thought of the non-consciousness [of pleasure, etc., which is advocated by] the adherents of Kapila [i.e., the Sāṅkhya] on the basis of impermanence, etc.”
\(^6\) NB 3.62: acetanāḥ sukhādaya iti sādhyā utpattimattvam anityatvam vā sāṅkhasya svaṃ vādino ‘siddham.
\(^7\) PV 4.3: bāḍhanāyāgamasyokteḥ sādhanasya param prati | so ‘pramāṇaṃ tad-āsiddham tatsiddham akhilāṃ tataḥ ||; PVin 3 2,7–8: tadāgamabāḍhanāya
Dharmakīrti criticizes this Sāṅkhya reasoning by pointing out its incoherent reliance on Buddhist scriptures: while they accept the logical reason “utpatti,” etc., as a property of pleasure, etc., on the basis of Buddhist scriptures, at the same time they do not concede the consciousness of pleasure, etc., which is also acknowledged in Buddhist scriptures. For sound reasoning, Dharmakīrti says, the logical reason should not be arbitrary. In other words, only something whose existence is accepted by both the proponent and the opponent can be regarded as a proper logical reason. In turn, if something whose existence is accepted by only one of the discussants is used, it is classified as the fallacious logical reason called “unestablished” (asiddha).

However, does the Sāṅkhya really not accept the logical reasons utpatti and anityatva in ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ as a property of pleasure, etc., or the intellect? This would be the case if pleasure, etc.—i.e., pleasure (sukha), pain (duḥkha) and delusion (moha)—refer to primordial matter (pradhāna/prakṛti), since according to the Sāṅkhya tenets reported in the SK 10–11, non-manifest (avyakta) primordial matter does not have any cause and is eternal. As for the intellect (buddhi), however, the same passage

\textit{param prati sādhanoktes tadāyāprāmāṇyāt tatsiddham asiddham.} “Since [the proponent, i.e., the Sāṅkhya] states the proof to the other (i.e., the Buddhist opponent) in order to invalidate his scripture, this [Buddhist scripture] does not have validity in that case (i.e., when he proves the invalidity of Buddhist scripture). Therefore, that which is established by it (i.e., the opponent's scripture) is [in fact] not established.” See Tillemans 2000: 12–13, Tani 1987: 7 and Iwata 1995: 162–163.

\textit{An argument of this kind can also be found in PVSV 13,5–9 (≈ PVin 2 96,2–5). For translations of this passage, see Gillon and Hayes 2008: 343–344; Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: 127–129; Steinkellner 2013: I 33.}

\textit{See PVin 3 91,6–7: tasm āt pratipādya pratipādakayor asiddhasandighadharmi sambandhānvavyayatirekā dharmā hetvābhāsāḥ. “Therefore, for the one who is convinced (pratipāda) and the one who convinces (pratipādakā) [his opponent], the properties whose relation to the subject and whose association (anvaya) and dissociation (vyatireka) [with the property to be proved] are either unestablished or doubtful are pseudo-reasons.” Based on Dharmakīrti’s argument, Sāntarakṣita also cites (Prayoga 1) with a small modification and criticizes it in TS 303–304: acetanātmikā buddhiḥ śabdaagandharasādāvāt | utpattimattvanāśitvahetubhyām iti cē hetum | naitau hetā dvayoh saddhau svatantre sādhane mate | na viparya-yabādāhāt prasango -py abhidhitāte } See Naito 1983: 13–14 and 24.

\textit{According to SK 11–12, the three constituents of primordial matter are not sukha, etc., but sattva, rajas and tamas; sukha, etc. are described as the nature of sattva, etc. However, not only do certain Buddhist texts, including works by Dharmakīrti, regard sukha, etc., to be constituents of primordial matter, but also some fragments of the Śaṣṭiṭantra. See Watanabe 2011: 566, n. 38.}

\textit{SK 10–11: hetumad anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritam liṅgam | sāvayavāṁ}
in the SK states that anything manifest (vyakta), including the intellect (buddhi), comes into being and is impermanent. Therefore, at least if the intellect is put forth as the subject of the thesis, the logical reasons utpatti and anityatva can be accepted by both the Sāṅkhya proponent and the Buddhist opponent as a property of the intellect, i.e., the subject of the thesis, and hence they can be considered a proper logical reason.

In the above-mentioned section (iii) of PV in 3, in which Dharmakīrti explains the fallacious logical reason “unestablished,” he states that the logical reason “impermanence” (anityatva) in ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ is not accepted by the Sāṅkhya proponent as a property of the subject of the thesis (pakṣadharma). In this section he deals with two key Sāṅkhya concepts supporting the theory of transformation: (1) the disappearance (tirobhāva) of a property (dharma) and (2) the cessation (nivṛtti) of the state (avasthā) of an entity. Of these two, the first discussion is relevant for considering the relationship between Dharmakīrti and Dharmapāla.


From the [above discussion, i.e., the discussion against the Jaina proof of the consciousness of trees] it is explained that [the properties] such as impermanence (anityatva) and special arrangement (saṃsthānaviśeṣa) [put forth as] logical reasons [in the following proofs of the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣikas, respectively,] are [pseudo-logical reasons:] [Sāṅkhya:] The intellect (buddhi) does not have consciousness (acetana), and [Vaiśeṣika:] The world, etc. presuppose someone who has a superior knowledge. For, with regard to them (buddhi and the

### Footnotes

12 See Watanabe 2011: 560–566.

13 PV in 3 92,2–8.

14 A similar proposition is mentioned in VN 20,7–8: yathā puruṣātiśayapūrvkāṇi tanukaraṇabhuvanādīnīti pratiṣṭhāya tanukaraṇabhuvanadvikhyāvyājyajena sa-kalavaiśeṣikāsāstrārthāvājhoṣanām. “For example, after being put forth the proposition that the body, organs, and the earth, etc., presuppose a superior person, [the Vaiśeṣika proponent] declares whole the meaning of the Vaiśeṣika
world, etc., that is, the subject of each thesis), too, what is established [as their logical reason] is mere words but not a real state of affairs (artha). For, others (i.e., Buddhists) do not recognize dissolving [into primordial matter] (upalayana) without abandoning its nature as [the meaning of] impermanence.

According to the Śāṅkhya theory of transformation, a thing merely changes its mode of existence but never ceases to exist. Therefore, for the Śāṅkhya the word “impermanence” means something like “becoming invisible.” This meaning of impermanence is not acceptable for the Buddhists, however, because they consider the word “impermanence” to mean “cessation” in a very strict sense, i.e., cessation without leaving any trace (niranvayavināśa). Since there is no consensus between the Śāṅkhya and the Buddhists on the meaning of the word “impermanence,” this logical reason is classified as asiddha. In response, the Śāṅkhya argues against this differentiation of the meaning of “impermanence.”


[Sāṅkhya:] A general [meaning of anityatva, i.e., impermanence in general] (sāmānya) in which no particularity is intended is definitely established [for both of us]. If [impermanence in general] is established, [your] censure [of our logical reason being] unestablished, which is done by conceptually constructing a particular [meaning in terms of impermanence], is exactly a false rejoinder (mithyottara).

[Dharmakīrti:] It would be a false rejoinder, if for both [of us] some common (sāmānya) thing (vastu) were accepted as a basis of the word “impermanence,” as [in the case of the word] kṛtakatva.

Here the Śāṅkhya points out that Dharmakīrti’s criticism is a type of false rejoinder. That is, if an opponent aims to invalidate a proponent’s reasoning by assuming a particular meaning (such as “cessation”) in terms of the logical reason (such as “impermanence”), although its general meaning has already been established, this objection is considered a false rejoinder. Dharmakīrti also accepts this rule. He says, however, that the general meaning of the word “impermanence” cannot be established unless a common phenomenon or entity is accepted for both the

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system under the pretext of explaining [the meaning of] the body, organs, and the earth [in order to confuse the opponent].”

15 See e.g. VN 11,12: tasya niranvayopajananavināśopagamād iti cet.
proponent and the opponent as this word’s object. Since the Sāṅkhya has not shown a common thing of this sort, Dharmakīrti’s criticism should not be regarded a false rejoinder. In response to this, the Sāṅkhya tries to show the common thing upon which the word “impermanence” is based.


[Sāṅkhya:] There must be [a common thing, and it is] disappearance (tirodhāna).

[Dharmakīrti:] The other (i.e., the Buddhist) never calls it impermanence, but [calls] cessation (vināśa) [impermanence].

[Sāṅkhya:] For both [the Sāṅkhya and the Buddhist], non-manifestation (avyakti) is the common [phenomenon] (tulya) between what has ceased to exist and what has disappeared. Therefore there must be a common thing (sāmānya).

[Dharmakīrti:] Then what is this “non-manifestation?”

[Sāṅkhya:] It is imperceptibility (adṛśyātmatā).

[Dharmakīrti:] According to this definition [of “impermanence”], even things such as primordial matter and the soul (puruṣa) would also be impermanent.

Here, the Sāṅkhya first explains the meaning of “impermanence” as “disappearance” (tirodhāna). But this is not accepted by the Buddhists because it does not mean the cessation of its existence. The Sāṅkhya’s next alternative is “non-manifestation” (avyakti). To this, Dharmakīrti replies by examining the meaning of non-manifestation. If this non-manifestation were to mean imperceptibility, then primordial matter and the soul (puruṣa), contrary to the Sāṅkhya tenets, would be impermanent because they are not perceptible by definition. As a result, the Sāṅkhya cannot accept imperceptibility as a common thing for both the Buddhists and the Sāṅkhya. If the word “impermanence” were to mean imperceptibility, this logical reason would be inconclusive (anaikāntika) since it can be found both in things that have consciousness, such as the soul, and in

16 See Sāṅkhyaśāstra 6ab: sāmānyatas tu drṣṭād atindriyānāṃ prasiddhir anumānāti | “On the other hand, imperceptible things are established by means of inference [called] knowledge from commonality”; GBh 8,6 on SK 6: pradhānapuṇaḥśaḥ atindriyau sāmānyatodṛṣṭānāmānaḥ sādhyeteva “Primordial matter and the soul, both of which are imperceptible, are proved by means of inference [called] knowledge from commonality.”
things that do not, such as primordial matter. To avoid this difficulty, the Sāṅkhya presents the following slightly modified explanation.

[DhK 2–4: PVin 3 93,7–8] prāg anyadharmano ‘vyaktir anityateti cet. anyadharma ca prāg apracyutātmeti ca suvyāhrtam.

[Sāṅkhya:] Impermanence means the non-manifestation of a thing that previously possessed a different property (i.e., perceptibility) [, but this does not mean mere non-manifestation].

[Dharmakīrti:] But it is very nice to say that [one and the same thing] previously possessed a different property and [at the same time] it has not yet abandoned its nature!

Here the Sāṅkhya explains impermanence by using the notion of dharma. However, since from an ontological point of view there is no difference between dharma and its possessor, that is, an entity, the difference of dharma therefore means the difference of this entity. If in the process of transformation an entity differs from a previous entity, the previous one must cease to exist. Therefore, only “cessation” is accepted as the meaning of “impermanence,” and hence the Sāṅkhya, who cannot accept cessation, cannot use the word “impermanence” as a logical reason.

2. Similar passages presented by Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka against the Sāṅkhya theory

2.1. Dharmapāla

In his Dacheng guang bailun shilun (大乘廣百論釈論), which is preserved only in the Chinese translation of Xuanzang (玄奘, 600/602–664), done in 650, and which is a commentary on the last half (i.e., chapters 9–16) of Āryadeva’s (ca. 170–270) Catuḥśataka, Dharmapāla (ca. 530–561?) criticizes the Sāṅkhya theory of the soul (puruṣa). Here, he refers to the following reasoning ascribed to certain Sāṅkhya adherents.

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17 See Endo 1932: 144.

18 Ui 1928: 128–130, and Frauwallner 1961: 8, n. 21 questions these dates. Funayama 2001: 10, fn. 52 offers another possible date of Dharmapāla as ca. 530–590.

19 This part of the third chapter of the Dacheng guang bailun shilun (201a18–201b3) is cited by the Japanese monk Genshin (源信, 942–1017) in his Inmyōronshō shishusōi ryakuchūshaku (因明論疏四種相違略註釋, T69.314b4–19). After citing the Dacheng guang bailun shilun, Genshin, with his own comments, cites the commentaries of the two masters Wengui (文軌, 7th century) and Huizhao (慧沼, 648–714). Of these, the latter (315a5–14) is a citation from the Yinming ru zhengli lunyi zuanyao (因明入正理論義纂要, T44.173c3–21). The former (314b20–314c4) seems to be a fragment of Wengui’s Guang bailun shu (廣百論疏), a
Dharmapāla's criticism that the logical reason “impermanence” is the pseudo-logical reason of being unestablished is also found in Dharmakīrti's discussion. To this, the Sāṅkhya raises the following objection.

[DhP 2–2: DGBS 201a25–27] 若言因義不應分別，但就總說。此亦不然。若別俱成，可就總說。如其別見，總顯為因。別既不成，總依何立。

commentary on the Dacheng guang bailun shilun, of which only the first chapter is extant. Although an examination of these interpretations would be important for understanding certain developments in East Asian Buddhism, this is beyond the scope of this paper.
[Objection:] The meaning of the logical reason should not be conceptually constructed. Only the general [meaning should] be stated.

[Dharmapāla:] This is also not correct. If particular [meanings] are established for both [the proponent and the opponent], it is possible to speak of the general [meaning]. Such an [establishment of] a particular view [on the meaning of “impermanence”] is the cause for making known [its] general [meaning]. [As long as] a particular [meaning] has not yet been established, on what basis is the general [meaning] established?

Here Dharmapāla states that the establishment of the general meaning must be preceded by the establishment of a particular meaning. Although the Sāṅkhya does not mention the theory of false rejoinder and hence, Dharmapāla’s response to the Sāṅkhya objection is different from Dharmakīrti’s, this Sāṅkhya objection is very similar to that of [DhK 2–2], cited above. Both Sāṅkhya opponents insist that the meaning of the logical reason “impermanence” should be understood in a general sense (sāmānya) and that any particular meanings should not be conceptually constructed. Following this argument, Dharmapāla shows another failure in the logical reason.

[DhP 2–3: DGBS 201a27–29] 又依作用說有隱顯。依此立為無常因義。汝立我思亦有作用。故有因義不定過失。

Besides, relying on the [notion of] “function” (作用), [the Sāṅkhya opponent may] refer to [the idea of] disappearance after[/and] appearance. Thus [the disappearance after/and appearance can] be established as the meaning of the logical reason “impermanence.” You (i.e., the Sāṅkhya) insist that [not only the intellect or primordial matter, but] also the soul [characterized by] consciousness (思*/cetanā or caitanya) has a function. Therefore, with regard to the meaning of the logical reason [“impermanence”], the fallacy of being inconclusive (不定*/anaikāntika) would occur.

Here, by using the notion of “function,” the Sāṅkhya is probably trying to explain that “disappearance after[/and] appearance” can be understood not only by the Sāṅkhyas but also by the Buddhists as the meaning of the word “impermanence.” Although what is meant here by this “function” (作用) is not clear, a close similarity can again be seen in the responses of Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, since both of them point out that if the

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20 If Dharmakīrti’s description in [DhK 2–3] can be regarded as a kind of explanation or comment on Dharmapāla’s [DhP 2–3], this “function” means “non-manifestation” or “imperceptibility.” If this is the case, then the content of these two parallel passages is exactly the same.
Sāṅkhyas’ interpretation of “impermanence” is accepted, it causes the inconclusiveness (anaikāntika) of the logical reason due to its being seen both in the primordial matter (or intellect) and the soul.

From these parallel passages, it seems possible that with regard to the criticism of this Sāṅkhyā theory, Dharmakīrti was influenced by Dharmapāla.

2.2. Bhāviveka

Bhāviveka also criticizes the Sāṅkhyā theory of the soul in his Prajñāpradīpa on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 18.1cd. Here Bhāviveka mentions the reasoning of certain Sāṅkhyā followers for establishing the distinctive characteristics of the soul. The argument he presents shares some elements with both ⟨Prayoga 1⟩ and ⟨Prayoga 2⟩, but is more similar to the ⟨Prayoga 2⟩ cited by Dharmapāla.

[BhV 1–1: PP D182a4–5, P226b5–7]22 gal te gzhan dag ‘di skad ces

For a Japanese translation of the relevant part of Bhāviveka’s Prajñāpradīpa (PP), see Kajiyama 1978: 301–303.

It must be noted that in the Chinese translation of the PP, there is no part corresponding to the passage in the PP’s Tibetan translation (D182a4–b4, P226b5–227b1) which will be examined in this section. Akahane (Akahane 2013 and 2014) has re-evaluated the Chinese translation, done by Prabhākaramitra between 630 and 632, and suggested that the two translations were based on different Sanskrit texts of the PP and that the Sanskrit text used for the Chinese translation was older and shorter. As for the passage in question here, there are two possibilities for explaining the difference between the two translations: (1) this part did not exist in the Sanskrit text(s) used by Prabhākaramitra but did in the text(s) used for the Tibetan translation (done by Jñānagarbha and Klu’i rgyal mtshan in the early 9th century), or (2) this part did exist in the Sanskrit texts used for both the Chinese and Tibetan translation, but was not translated by Prabhākaramitra. At this stage, it is not possible for me to say with any certainty which was the case. However, since a parallel argument of [BhV 1–1] can be found in MHK 6.9cd–10, and since part of the argument presented in [BhV 2–1] is not found in Dharmapāla’s and Dharmakīrti’s criticism, I think it highly probable that this part of the PP was written (or orally taught) by Bhāviveka himself, but that for some reason, Prabhākaramitra did not see this part or did not translate it.

As mentioned in the previous footnote, this part of PP has a parallel discussion in MHK 6.9cd–10: bodhād anyan na caityanyam kim tad anyat prakalpyate || 9 || caityaniyam na matir yukāt hetumattvād yathā ghaṭah | ato na buddhiś caityanyam ity evam cen matir bhaiver || 10 || “[Buddhists:] Consciousness is not distinct from cognition (bodha). Why is it regarded to be different [from cognition]? [Sāṅkhyā:] It is correct that cognition (mati) is not consciousness; because it is caused; like a pot. Therefore, the intellect (buddhi) [which is not distinguished from cognition] does not have consciousness. If this were so (i.e., cognition were identical to consciousness), then [a pot, since it is also caused,] would be cognition [and hence would have consciousness].” Cf. Qvarnström 2015: 121–122.
Others (i.e., Buddhists) may say: consciousness (*shes pa yod pa nyid/*cetanā or caitanya) has the same meaning as cognition (*shes pa*). [And] cognition [means] intellect (*blo/*buddhi). Therefore, *consciousness* is not the nature of the soul.

[Sāṅkhya:] But this is not correct [as the following reasoning shows]:

**Prayoga 3**

[Thesis] The intellect does not have consciousness (*shes pa yod pa nyid/*acetana or na caitanya).

[Reason] For [it] comes into being (*skye ba/*utpatti).

[Example] Like a pot (*bum pa/*ghaṭa).

The thesis of *Prayoga 3* is the same as that of Dharmapāla’s *Prayoga 2*. But the logical reason and example of *Prayoga 3* differ from those in *Prayoga 2*, and the vyāpti relation is not mentioned. The logical reason “coming into being,” however, is the same as the alternative logical reason in *Prayoga 1* cited by Dharmakīrti.

Bhāviveka’s criticism of the logical reason “coming into being” is also very similar to the arguments found in Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti.

[BhV 1–2: PP D182b1–3, P227a4–8] skye ba’i phyir zhes bya ba’i gtan tshigs de’i don kyang gang yin  | gal te ma byung ba las ’byung ba’i phyir ro (D: ro || P) zhe na ni rang la gtan tshigs ma grub bo || gal te rang la gtan tshigs ma grub pas kyang ‘dod pa’i don ston par byed de | gzhan gyi phyogs la grub pa’i phyir phyogs gnyi (D: gyis P) ga la grags pa’i chos bzhin no zhe na | gzhan gyi phyogs ‘ba’ zhig la grags pa’i phyogs kyi chos kyis ni bsgrub par bya ba’i don bsgrub mi nus par nges par gzung (D: bzung P) ste | gang yang rung ba la ma grub pa’i phyir gzhan gyi phyogs la ma grub pa bzhin pas blo shes pa yod pa nyid ma yin par ston pa’i rjes su dpag pa ‘gal bas bzlog pa’i phyir gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid nyams pa med do ||

[Bhāviveka:] And what is the meaning of the logical reason “because of its coming into being?” If [it means] “because of its coming into being after not existing,” then the logical reason is not established for [the Sāṅkhya proponent] himself.

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Naito 1983: 24, n. 39 points out the equivalence of the logical reason utpatti in the PP and in NB and PV 2.
Bhāviveka first points out that if the logical reason “coming into being” is interpreted as “coming into being after not existing,” this results in the fallacy of the logical reason being unestablished for the proponent himself, because the Sāṅkhya, who insists on the theory of transformation, does not accept that something arises from non-existence. This argument is almost the same as that of Dharmapāla in [DhP 2–1]. But to be noticed here is the subsequent Sāṅkhya objection presented in the form of a proof. This view of the Sāṅkhya is not referred to by Dharmapāla, but is mentioned by Dharmakīrti in [DhK 1]. This clearly shows a close relationship between Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti.

The rest of Bhāviveka’s criticism runs as follows:

[BhV 2–1: PP D182b3–4, P227a8–227b1] skye ba’i phyir zhes bya ba’i gtan tshigs kyi don gsal ba nyid yin par rtog na yang gtan tshigs kyi don ma grub pa nyid dang | dpe la bsgrub pa’i chos med pa nyid kyi skyon du ‘gyur te | gsal ba dgag pa smras zin pa’i phyir ro ||
Suppose that the logical reason “because of its coming into being” means “manifestation.” Even in this case, the fallacy of the non-establishment of the meaning of the logical reason and that of the non-existence of the proving property in the example would occur, because [we] have already refuted [the Sāṅkhya notion of] manifestation [in the first chapter24].

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Here, too, Bhāviveka’s criticism of the Sāṅkhya logical reason is along the same lines as Dharmapāla’s, although they are different in that [BhV 2–1] also refers to the fallacy of the example called sādhanavikala.

3. The chronological relationship between Dharmapāla, Bhāviveka and Dharmakīrti

Various factors can be used for reconsidering the chronological relationship between Bhāviveka, Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti. First, it seems that the two Buddhists Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka lived at almost the same time. For one, Dharmapāla, when writing his commentary on the last chapter of the CŚ, knew Bhāviveka’s argument on śūnyatā as presented in the PP. Moreover, Xuanzang reports that Bhāviveka applied to have a debate with Dharmapāla, but since the latter had retired, the debate was not granted. Their dates as presented in earlier studies also indicate that they were contemporaries: 530–561 for Dharmapāla and 490/500–570 for Bhāviveka.

3.1. Criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory

Taking this information into account, there are three possibilities for the chronological order of these three philosophers:

(a) Dharmakīrti was preceded by both Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka.
(b) Both Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka were preceded by Dharmakīrti.
(c) The time of activity of all three was almost same.

Of these three possibilities, the second (b) is not likely; Dharmapāla’s precedence to Dharmakīrti is accepted by most scholars and no negative evidence for this has yet been offered. As for the third possibility (c), there are several arguments against it.

First, as the passages examined above show (and see also Table 1 below), the theory of the Sāṅkhya opponent mentioned by Dharmakīrti includes almost all of the components found in the Sāṅkhya theory mentioned by Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka: (1) the Sāṅkhya view that what is accepted only by the opponent can be a proper logical reason is mentioned by

26 See Datang xiyu ji (大唐西域記) T51.930c26–931b4.
27 For a summary of earlier studies on the dates of Bhāviveka and Dharmapāla, see Krasser 2012: 581–582.
Dharmakīrti and Bhāviveka, although not by Dharmapāla; (2) (Prayoga 1) cited by Dharmakīrti includes both utpatti and anityatva as logical reasons, and these are seen in (Prayoga 3) (*utpatti) cited by Bhāviveka, and in (Prayoga 2) (*anitya[tv]a) cited by Dharmapāla, respectively; (3) (Prayoga 1) and (Prayoga 2) share the example “rūpādi,” while (Prayoga 3) has “ghaṭa.”

If one supposes that all three Buddhists flourished in almost the same period, there are two alternatives: (c-1) both Dharmapāla and Bhāviveka, or one of them, knew Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the Sāṅkhya theory, or (c-2) neither knew his discussion. In the former case, we face the following difficulties: why do (Prayoga 2) and (Prayoga 3) adopt only one of the reasons in (Prayoga 1); why is the different example “ghaṭa” used in (Prayoga 2)? Although first and second questions are not crucial, omitting the Sāṅkhya view of a proper logical reason omitted in (Prayoga 2) amounts to quite an oversimplification of Dharmakīrti’s argument. And it is also difficult to explain why some of Dharmakīrti’s criticisms of the Sāṅkhya theory are omitted or modified in Dharmapāla’s and Bhāviveka’s arguments (see Table 2 below). Thus the possibility (c-1) is improbable.

The possibility of (c-2)—all three Buddhists flourished in the same period but Dharmakīrti’s discussion of the Sāṅkhya theory was unknown by the other two—cannot be eliminated. In this case, however, Krasser’s working hypothesis that Bhāviveka was influenced by Dharmakīrti would no longer be applicable.

In the case of possibility (a), too, the same alternatives can be assumed: (a-1) Dharmakīrti knew both Dharmapāla’s and Bhāviveka’s discussions of the Sāṅkhya theory, or one of them, or (a-2) he did not. Option (a-2) is certainly conceivable. However, if we accept option (a-1), we can easily explain the differences and similarities of the Sāṅkhya theories as mentioned by the three Buddhists: Dharmakīrti consulted Dharmapāla’s and Bhāviveka’s descriptions of the Sāṅkhya theory, each having been based on a different source, and based on their descriptions he created a kind of hybrid version.

In the end there are three possibilities: (a-1), (a-2) or (c-2). However, since (a-1) presupposes Dharmapāla’s and Bhāviveka’s influence on Dharmakīrti, and since (a-2) and (c-2) presuppose no relation between Bhāviveka, Dharmapāla and Dharmakīrti, the direction of influence proposed by Krasser—Bhāviveka having been influenced by Dharmakīrti—cannot be upheld as far as the criticism of the Sāṅkhya theory is concerned.
3.2. The logical reason sattva in the proof of impermanence

There is another passage that argues against Krasser’s suggestion concerning the direction of influence. One of the decisive points for Krasser’s hypothesis that Dharmakīrti influenced Bhāviveka is his having accepted Dharmakīrti’s so-called sattvānumāna in Madhyamakahrdayakārikā (MHK) 9.45ab. This reads as follows:

\[
\text{sattvād anityaḥ śabdo 'yaṃ kriyāvat kim na grhyate}
\]

Why do you not accept that this word is impermanent, because it exists, just like an action (such as walking or washing)\(^{29}\)

In this verse, Bhāviveka uses the logical reason sattva to prove the impermanence of sound. It is true that this vyāpti relation between sattva and impermanence is very similar to the vyāpti relation employed by Dharmakīrti in his sattvānumāna, i.e., the vyāpti relation between sattva and kṣaṇikatva (momentariness). However, prior to Dharmakīrti, the same or a very similar vyāpti relation was already mentioned by Dharmapāla, who is anterior to Dharmakīrti, in his commentary on CŚ 9.2.\(^{30}\)

DGBS 187b8–9: 此若有性、應從縁生。若從縁生、滅必隨逐、無容常住。

Thus, whatever exists is originated dependently. Whatever is originated dependently is necessarily accompanied by cessation. [And it] cannot be permanent.

Here Dharmapāla explains the vyāpti relation between existence (有性/*sattā or astitā) and cessation (滅/*vināśa) through independent origination and also indicates the vyāpti relation between existence and impermanence. From this, it can probably be said that the vyāpti relation between sattva and anityatva was already known by some Buddhists before Dharmakīrti. For this reason, Bhāviveka’s description cited above cannot be a proof of Dharmakīrti’s chronological precedence to Bhāviveka.

Although the result of my examination with regard to the direction of influence between Dharmakīrti and Bhāviveka differs from that of Krasser, I do agree with him that there is a close relationship between these two Buddhist philosophers. Indeed, for this reason I am inclined to

\(^{29}\) Krasser 2012: 556.

\(^{30}\) CŚ 9.2: apratītyāstītā nāsti kadācit kasyacit kvacit | na kadācit kvacit kaścid vidyate tena sāśvataḥ | “There is no independent existence for anything at any time anywhere. Consequently, there is nothing permanent at any time anywhere” (trans. Lang 1986: 89). The Chinese translation (DGBS 187b5–6) renders this as follows: 無有時方物 有性非縁生故無時方物 有性而常住.
accept Krasser’s working hypothesis that Dharmakīrti’s time of activity can be pushed back to the mid-sixth century. It is of course true that to arrive at a more defensible conclusion regarding the dates of Dharmakīrti, more research is needed on the relationship between Dharmakīrti and still other thinkers, such as Sthiramati, Candrakīrti and so on. However, at this point I believe it safe to adopt ca. 550–650 as Dharmakīrti’s dates, as has been provisionally proposed by Eltschinger,\(^\text{31}\) or a bit later, namely 560/570–650.

### Table 1: The Sāṅkhya proofs

<table>
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<th>Dharmakīrti (PVin 3)</th>
<th>Dharmapāla (Dacheng guang bailun shilun)</th>
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<tr>
<td>The Sāṅkhya view of the condition for a proper logical reason</td>
<td>parasya pratipādyatvāsva syaṃ adṛṣṭam api parair dṛṣṭāṃ sādhanam. ([DhK 1])</td>
<td>___</td>
<td>rang la gtan tshigs ma grub pas kyang ‘dod pa’i don ston par byed de</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sāṅkhya proof</td>
<td>acetanāḥ sukhādayo buddhir vā, upatār anityatvād vā rūpādivat. ([Prayoga 1] in [DhK 1])</td>
<td>觉慧非思、是無常故、諸無常者皆非思慮、猶如色等。 ([Prayoga 2] in [DhP 1])</td>
<td>blo ni shes pa yod pa nyid ma yin te</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{31}\) Eltschinger and Ratié 2013: iv.
The logical reason is *asiddha* for the opponent (i.e., Buddhists)

- ✓ ([DhK 2–1])
- ✓ ([DhP 2–1])
- ✓ ([Bhv 1–2])

The logical reason is *asiddha* for the proponent (i.e., Śāṅkhyas)

- ✓ ([DhK 1] and implicitly in [DhK 2–4])
- ✓ ([DhP 2–1])
- ✓ ([Bhv 2–1])

The problem of the general meaning of the logical reason

- ✓ ([DhK 2–2])
- ✓ ([DhP 2–2], but slightly different from [DhK 2–2])
- —

The fallacy of *anaikāntika*

- ✓ ([DhK 2–3])
- ✓ ([DhP 2–3], but slightly different from [DhK 2–3])
- —
The explanation of the process of transformation with the notion of dharma and dharmin

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<td>✓ ([DhK 2–4])</td>
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CŚ

D
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A. Naito 内藤昭文, TSP ni okeru ātman setsu hihan (I): Sāṃkhya gakuha no kōsōsuru ātman setsu wo megu tte (3) TSP におけるアートマン批判 (1)−サーベンキョ学派の構想するアートマン説をめぐって (1)−(3) [A Criticism of ātman according to the Sāṃkhya Doctrine in TSP, (1)−(3) Ryūkoku daigaku Daigakuin kiyō 龍谷大学大学院紀要 (The Bulletin of the Graduate School of Ryūkoku University) 5 (1983) 1–21.

NB  


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PV 4  


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Reconsidering the characterization of the Bhagavant Buddha as *pramāṇabhūta* by Dignāga in the *ārambhaśloka* of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*: An overweening Indologist’s attempt to intrude into hereditary Buddhological territory*

Albrecht Wezler †
University of Hamburg

The eventual aim of this contribution is to demonstrate that Dignāga consciously chose *pramāṇabhūtāya* and not *pramāṇībhūtāya* as a (first) element of the Buddha’s characterisation in the *ārambhaśloka* of his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.¹ A meticulous analysis of the two adjectives reveals that the corresponding formations are not only morphologically, but also semantically entirely different from each other. In the whole of section 1, the formation of *x + cvi* is closely investigated on the basis of the pertinent teachings of the *trimuni*, Pāṇini, Kātyāyana, and Patañjali, as well as Kaiyāta’s *Pradīpa* and Nāgeśa’s *Uddyota*. In turn, section 2 is devoted to a very carefully conceived line of argument, following which the reader is led step by step to an insight into the true nature and meaning of -*bhūta* as final element of a compound—and that it can only be regarded as being used *upamārthe/ivārthe* if the word constituting the first member is itself used figuratively. These results are finally (in section 3) applied to Dignāga’s *ārambhaśloka*.

I am sure that I would have been forgiven by Helmut² any kind of “Übermut”, and not only because he was a close friend of mine—a constant

---

1 I am deeply indebted to my former student and friend Małgorzata Wielińska-Soltwedel for entering my almost unreadable handwritten version of this paper into the computer, for logistical help, and for many suggestions and corrections regarding the content. For correcting my English, I sincerely thank Mr. Christian Riches.

² Which—a *vaṃśastha*—reads thus:

```
pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣine praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine 
pramānasiddhyai svamatiḥ samuccayāh kariṣyate viprasṛtād ihaikataḥ ||
```

(quoted from Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 304).

² Whatever the correct etymology of the first part of his name may be.
and reliable one, always ready to come to one’s help at all times—but also because what connected us was more than just the “M/mut” that let him openly express critique even of his gurus when he did not agree with them. Convinced that he would have weighted nothing but the argument, I too may not accept an idea of his in what follows, although I wished I would have been able to commit to paper the following reconsiderations when Helmut Krasser was still alive and to discuss my proposals with him directly.

1.
My reflections are based on the premise that all pramāṇavādins, or to use a more cautious expression, the pramāṇavādins at large, had complete command of Sanskrit, and that Dignāga also knew what he was doing when he used pramāṇabhūtāya in the ārambhaśloka of his PS.

1.1.
It is evident that this premise does not by any means call for a substantiation. For the conceivable objection that the premise is clearly counterfactual insofar as whenever pramāṇavādin X in his work uses “wrong”, un-Pāṇinīyan forms a, b, c and so forth, among the commentators of X, there is also at least one who, besides explaining the meaning of words and the sense of sentences/verses, also pays attention to grammatical correctness and himself deals with the problem of those irregularities—for this objection could quite easily be refuted by the rhetorical question: Is it legitimate to expect the pramāṇavādins to observe the grammatical norms more strictly, i.e. perfectly, than for instance the Hinduistic kavis, among whom even the best, beginning with the towering figure of Kālidāsa, as is well known, have allowed themselves grammatical liberties? Most of their commentators may even be said to have reached their top form when they address issues of this type and take recourse to different “methods” of arguing away solecisms or justifying them in one way or another.

Yet this rhetorical question would be of little argumentative weight, because as evinced by works such as the last chapter of Vāmana’s Kāvyālāṁkārasūtravṛtti, Śaraṇadeva’s Durghaṭavṛtti, Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa’s Apāṇinīyaprāmāṇyasādhana, the anonymous Mukhabhūṣana, as well as

3 Other Buddhists are not really relevant in the present context.

4 “Pāṇini” is used here “jātau” to include other grammarians whose work was regarded as normative in particular regions, by particular religious groups, or in certain circles.
the Sāhityakaṇṭakoddhāra, etc., which are also much later than Dignāga—this sub-genre deals exclusively with problems of kāvya literature. It is therefore necessary to look out for other arguments; these could be the Buddhists’ adoption of Sanskrit, which took place relatively early, a process that still calls for a wider study, and which was certainly motivated by the wish to profit from this language’s supraregional, nay international, status and esteem, also in matters socio-political. To all appearances, permanent competition with the religions taught by the Brahmins—and Jains—was perhaps reason enough for Buddhists writing in Sanskrit not to compromise themselves by making grammatical mistakes.

Hence it is reasonable to assume that Dignāga was fully aware of what he was doing when he used the qualification pramāṇabhūtāya in PS 1.11 and definitely not pramāṇībhūtāya. That these two formations must be kept strictly apart for morpho-semantic reasons should by now be clear. This was highlighted apparently first by Seyfort Ruegg 1994, a colleague whose wide erudition in things Indian and Tibetan includes a remarkable familiarity with Pāṇini and the tradition based on the Aṣṭādhyāyī (henceforth A) as well as with Indian linguistic philosophy. The—formally—main point of difference is that the latter formation is taught by Pāṇini, that is to say it was considered by him, as an element of the object language (lakṣya) that had to be described in a corresponding rule (vidhi) of his grammar (lakṣaṇa), whereas the former formation is not so by any means.

1.2.

Pramāṇībhūta would be a taddhita formation according to A 5.4.50: krābhvastiyoge sampadyakartari cviḥ. Katre 1989: 625 translates: “[The taddhita 4.1.76 affix 3.1.1] Cv[i] is introduced [after 3.1.2 a nominal stem 4.1.1] which is the agent of the verbal stem sam-pad-ya ‘become’, co-occurring with (the verbal stems) kṛ- ‘make’ (VIII 10), bhū- ‘become’ (I 1) or as- ‘be’ (II 56).”

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5 A more recent study on the cvi-formation is Balles 2006. The author is, however, particular interested in diachronical developments and speculations about the origination; Sanskritists familiar with the Pāṇinīyan tradition will not learn much from her.

6 I prefer the translation of Katre to that of Renou, which is cited in Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 303, n. 1.

7 Note that Katre uses capital letters for anubandha, marks the accents, and adds the number of sūtra in which what he has just stated is taught in A.

8 This group of numbers and the following two are references to the DhP.
The affix \textit{cvi}^9 belongs to the large class of \textit{taddhitas} (“secondary affixes”). A linguistic element ending in \textit{cvi} is by A 1.4.61 called \textit{nipāta}, and the latter is, in turn, by 1.1.37 called an \textit{avyaya} (“indeclinable”). The \textit{v} of \textit{cvi}, which in fact represents the affix as such, is elided (6.1.67) since it is (also) an \textit{apṛkta} (“an affix consisting of one sound only”) (1.2.41). Finally, the \textit{aṅga} (6.4.1) final (1.1.52) phoneme \textit{a} (if \textit{cvi} is added to an \textit{a}-stem) is replaced by \textit{i} (7.4.31) according to A 7.4.32. Because \textit{x + cvi} is a \textit{gati}, \textit{ṣuklīkaroti}, etc., are \textit{nitya-}(=\textit{asvapadavigraha}-)\textit{samāsas}:

\begin{verbatim}
asuklam ṣukla-cvi karoti / bhavati / syāt → ṣuklīkaroti / -bhavati / -syāt “he makes something not-white white / something not-white becomes white / something not-white might/should become white”.
\end{verbatim}

1.2.1.

Rather than giving direct examples of its correct application in his discussion of A 5.4.50 (MBh II 436.13–437.3), Patañjali usually discusses the scope of its validity, that is to say, what he actually brings up are complementary restrictions and additions to the \textit{sūtra}, as well as counter-examples.

Kātyāyana, in his first \textit{vārttika} (MBh II 436.14), demands that the expression \textit{abhūtatadbhāva} (of course in the locative) should be added to 5.4.50, “if that [process of] becoming something which it has not been [before] is to be denoted”. In his notes on 5.4.50, Katre 1989: 625 calls attention to the fact that the “Kāśikā accepts this as part of the \textit{sūtra} itself”, but he could have mentioned in this connection also Cāndravyākaraṇa 4.4.35\textsuperscript{10} or Bhoja’s Sarasvatīkanṭhābharaṇa 5.4.64. Candragomin may also be the person referred to by Kaiyāta’s remark: \textit{abhūtatadbhāvagrahaṇam vārttike drṣṭvānaih sūtre prakṣiptam} (\textit{Pradīpa}, NSP IV 414 r 10f.). The reason adduced by Patañjali, further elucidating the first \textit{vārttika}, is that the affix \textit{cvi} should not be added if one says \textit{sampadyante yavāh, sampadyante śālayah},\textsuperscript{11} “the barley [plants] are emerging, the \textit{śāli}-rice [plants] are emerging”. Kaiyāta, followed by Nāgeśa (\textit{Pradīpa} and \textit{Uddyota}, NSP IV 414 r 15–20), is right when he states that the examples to be expected are of course \textit{bhavanti yavāh, bhavanti śālayah}, the sequence of words being irrelevant. What the counter-positive Patañjali has in view is naturally a sentence like \textit{yava-}\

\textsuperscript{9} The vowel \textit{i} is added to the consonant cluster \textit{cv} to make it pronounceable (\textit{uccāraṇārtha}).


\textsuperscript{11} It does not matter here whether \textit{śāli} denotes “(wet) rice” as such, or a particular species or sort of such rice.
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śālibījāny ankurībhavanti. The next point discussed in the MBh on 5.4.50 (MBh II 436.16–17) is the question—rightly determined by the editors as vārttikāvataranabhināsya—of why, contrary to expectations, the affix cvi is not added to the agent of the action expressed by sampad, or rather bhū, in the sentence sampadyante/ bhavanty (')smin kṣetre śālayaḥ, in spite of the fact that the condition abhūtatadbhāva is fulfilled. Vārttika 2 (prakṛтивivakṣāgraṇaḥ ca) gives the answer—even though the conjunctive ca connects it syntactically with the first, preceding one, “and the expression/explicit statement if [the speaker] wishes to denote the starting material or material cause [has been added as second condition for the application of the sūtra]”. This amounts to the proposition: the affix cvi is added if the process of becoming something which it has not been before is to be denoted and if the speaker wishes to denote the starting material, i.e. if the grammatical subject expressed either by the finite verb form or additionally and more explicitly by a noun in the nominative case denotes the prakṛti, the substance that undergoes a process of pariṇāma. For it is quite evidently a transformation which forms the topic of A 5.4.50, as is also made clear by Kātyāyana vārttika 1 and 2, Patañjali, as well as by Kaiyaṭa and Nāgeśa commenting on the latter, but is to be sure grammatically a special type limited as it is to the co-occurrence with the three roots mentioned by Pāṇini. To quote from Kaiyaṭa’s Pradīpa (NSP IV 414 r 26–35):

12 Cf. Nāgeśa’s Uddyota (NSP IV 414 r 38–415 l 3).
13 The text reads atha kriyāmāne ‘pi vai abhūtatadbhāvagrahaṇa iha kasmān na bhavati—sampadyante ‘smin kṣetre śālaya iti? (MBh II 436.16–17); note the interesting use of vai if it is really text-critically to be preferred.
14 Nāgeśa explains (NSP IV 414 r 36) prakṛter upādānakāraṇasya ...
15 I have taken over the sandhis and non-sandhis as found in the editions.
16 Typically the ātmanepada participle—which additionally governs an accusative—follows the word it refers to and hence is used as a praedicativum (“as obtaining” > “when / insofar as it obtains”).
17 On the problem of the reading, cf. Nāgeśa (Uddyota IV 414 r 41–415 l 14); cf. below.
18 This is another postponed praedicativum.
Even though the term *parināma* is not attested in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, in view of *sūtra* 5.4.50, among others, there is no denying that its author was aware of the phenomenon of “transformation” and the (various) means available in Sanskrit to indicate it. However this may be, the terms *prakṛti* and *vikṛti/vikāra* are certainly old, although some scholars may hesitate to subscribe to the hypothesis that they were coined by Vedic ritualists.19

Students of Bharṭṛhari, the philosopher of language, will, of course, remember his definition of *parināma*, namely kārikā III sādhanasamuddeśa 118 (374) of the *Trikāṇḍī/Vākyapadiya*20 (henceforth TK/VP).

\[
\begin{align*}
pūrvavasthām avijahat sansprśan dharmam uttaram | 
saṃmūrchita ivārthātmā jāyamāno ‘bhidhiyate ||
\end{align*}
\]

What is being born is something which does not give up the previous condition (cause) and is about to attain the next condition (effect) and is thus something which is a combination of both (Iyer 1971: 217f.).21

When reading or hearing this kārikā,22 Indologists familiar with other *darśanas* can hardly avoid remembering the verse (in this case an explicit definition):

\[
\begin{align*}
jahad dharmāntaram pūrvam upādatte yadā param | 
tattvād apracyuto dharmī pariṇāmaḥ sa ucyate ||
\end{align*}
\]

quoted, e.g., twice in the *Yuktidīpikā*23 (Wezler/Motegi 1998: 111.21f. and 163.12f.), first in the context of the discussion of the *satkāryavāda* and later in reply to the question: *kāḥ punar ayām pariṇāmo nāma*. The *Yuktidīpikā*’s paraphrase of the verse clearly shows that the contradiction between Bhartrhāri’s *avijahat* and *jahat* in the quote in the *Yuktidīpikā* is only an apparent one.

Returning to the *Mahābhāṣya*, i.e. Patañjali’s critical discussion of A 5.4.50, attention should finally be called to *vārttika* 3 (MBh 436.20):

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19 Cf. e.g. Freschi and Pontillo 2013: 2f. *et passim* (see “Index” s.v.).
20 As regards the title of Bhartrhāri’s work, I follow Ashok Aklujkar.
21 I find W. Rau’s translation decidedly better, because it is closer to the text: “Was seinen vorigen Zustand nicht aufgibt und einen nächsten Zustand [schon] berührt wie ein gerinnendes Agens, wird als ein geboren-werdendes bezeichnet” (Rau 2002: 225).
22 It would be tempting to take a closer look at the subsection on *kartr* in the *sādhanasamuddeśa*, including Helārāja’s commentary, but limited space forbids any such excursions, however instructive and fascinating they may be.
23 By the way, Motegi and I have been preparing a “revised second edition” of this text for a couple of years.
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samīpādibhya upasamkhyānam,24 which is, however, refuted by the Bhāṣyakāra on the grounds that it is not non-nearness (asamīpa) that becomes (bhavati) “nearness”, but “something that is not near/is not situated in the vicinity which becomes something that is near/is situated in the vicinity” (asamīpastham samīpastham bhavati, MBh II 437.2) and, to wit, “because the being-something-near of this something not being near is given, the affix [cvi] is correctly added in accordance with the sūtra [5.4.50 without the complementary addition to it]” (asamīpasthasya tasya samīpasthatvabhāvāt siddhāḥ sūtreṇa prayāya (ity arthaḥ) [Pradīpa, NSP IV 415 l 28f.25]; interestingly, the aforementioned clarification of Kaiyaṭa is further explained by Nāgeśa thus (Uddyota, NSP IV 415 l 30f.):

samīpasthatvabhāvāt iti | samīpasthatvasādṛśyabhāvād ity arthaḥ | mukhyasamīpasthatve tu neyate prayāya iti bhāvah ||. The expression sādṛśya (“likeness, similarity”) has been used several times by Nāgeśa already in his rather lengthy exposition on Kaiyaṭa’s explanation of vārttika 2, namely, first when he comments on the—in his view “not suitable” (anucita)26—reading vikārabhedena instead of vikārābhedena in the Pradīpa27 by paraphrasing it bhedaghaṭitasādṛśyenety arthaḥ “what is meant is ‘[when a speaker wants to express...] on account of its similarity brought about by its being (i.e. imagined as) different’.” By way of further explanation he adds (Uddyota, NSP IV 414 r 40–415 l 1): anena vikāraśabdasya svaradṛśaprakṛtiparatvaṃ gauṇyā vrtyetyi sūcitam “by this (the variant at issue) is being indicated that the word ‘product of transformation’ ultimately means the ‘material cause that is similar to it’ by secondary function [of the word]”; secondly Nāgeśa seems to resume the final part of the compound vikārābhedena allegedly used by Kaiyaṭa again by the pratīka (Uddyota, NSP IV 415 l 4) abhedeneti | sādṛśyamūlakābhedeneti vyākhyeynam | “[this] should be

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24 Kaiyaṭa explains (NSP IV 415 l 19f.): prakṛtivikārabhāvābhāvān na prāpnotīti vacanam ||

25 Cf. the last sentence of Patañjali’s discussion on A 5.4.50 (MBh II 437.2f.): (tat tarhi vaktavyam | na vaktavyam | tāsthyāt tācchabdyām bhaviṣyati || “... the having [that form of a] word(228,118),(364,129) because [that which is primarily denoted] is in/on it”’. Even more patently obvious is the fact that what Patañjali has in view with his final remark on A 5.4.50 is his non-differentiation of metonymy—as the central constituent of secondary meaning (gaunārtha) [cf. e.g. TK/VP II 250ff.]; see MBh II 218.13–15: nāvaśyam ayam evābhīsambandho bhavati tasyedam iti | ayam apy abhisambandho ’sti so ’yam iti | katham punar atasmin sa ity etad bhavati | caturbhīḥ prakāraṁ atasmin sa ity etad bhavati tāsthyāt täddharmyāt tatsāmipyāt tāsāhacaryād iti | Cf. Ogawa 2013: 243–248.

26 See NSP IV 414 r 39f.; cf. also section 1.2.2. below.

27 See n. 26 above.
interpreted on account of the non-difference whose root is similarity”, after correcting the word order of Kaiyaṭa’s statement (Pradīpa, NSP IV 414 r 35) (prakṛtvikārabhedavigavāyāṃ) prakṛtau vikāravasthāṃ prāpnuvatvāṃ vartamānāt svārthe cvipratyayaḥ to Uddyota (NSP IV 415 r 11ff.) vikāravasthāṃ prāpnuvatvāṃ prakṛtau vartamānād ity anvayaḥ | (gaunyā vṛttyeti bhāvaḥ), he continues (Uddyota, NSP IV 415 r 12 f.): evam ca cvyante prakṛter eva kartṛtvam ity uktam bhavati | ‘brahmībhūtaḥ’29 ityādi ca cchāndasam | ‘kāraṇībhūtaḥ’ ityādi tv asādhv eveti bodhyam ||.30

Nāgeśa was apparently inspired to draw the distinction between a difference (bheda) of a vikāra from its prakṛti, on the one hand, and the opposite, the nondifference of a vikāra from its prakṛti, on the other, by observations and reflections expounded by Bhartrhari in the sādhanasamuddeśa of his TK/VP III. For the present purpose it will, I think, suffice to refer the readers to Aklujkar’s excellent summary of the relevant part (Aklujkar 1990: 164–166)31 and to limit myself to quoting just the pivotal introductory passage from this part (Aklujkar 1990: 164): “Realization of this phenomenon, namely, that different cognitive stances toward the same thing are reflected in linguistic usage, provides a key to the understanding, for example, of sentences speaking of the birth or creation of something…”, and the directly pertinent passage (Aklujkar 1990: 166): “Sometimes, as in ‘the seed becomes the sprout’ the cause (specifically the material cause, prakṛti) is presented as the agent; sometimes, as in ‘a sprout comes into being,’ the effect (the product, vikāra) is presented as agent.”

The most important result of the foregoing examination of the Bhāṣya on A 5.4.50 are the three direct and positive examples of the application of this rule, namely samīpībhavati, abhyāsībhavati and antikībhavati all of which mean, as highlighted by Patañjali, “somebody/something [not being in the vicinity] becomes/is becoming near”.

28 Note the strange parallel in the Uddyota (NSP IV 415 l 10ff.).
29 Cf. e.g. Monier-Williams (1899) 1982: 741 left column cites brahmībhūta m. N. of Śaṃkarācārya from Gal(anos).
30 As for the formation of brahmībhūta or rather brahmībhavati cf. Bālamanoramā on Siddhántakaumudi 2118 (p. 939). According to the “Vedic Word-Concordance” brahmībhūya is attested once in the Adhyātmopanisad, brahmābhūta, however, quite often.
31 Not to forget the “Notes” belonging to these pages.
1.2.2.

Before returning to the first (sūtrapūraka-)vārttika,\textsuperscript{32} that is to say the extension of 5.4.50, regarded as necessary by Kātyāyana and evidently accepted not only by the last of the trimuni, but also most if not all of the later Pāṇinīyas, as well as e.g. Candragomin,\textsuperscript{33} the expression sampadyakartari in the sūtra in question calls for some words of explanation. Jayāditya who is usually considered to be the author of the first five adhyāyas of the Kāśikā(vṛtti) restricts himself to the remark: sampadyatekartā sampadyakartā | (sampadyakartari vartamānāt prātipadikād abhūtatadbhāve gamyamāne kṛbhvastibhir yoge cvih pratyayo bhavati |). Whether he simply followed Bharṭṛhari or not is an open question. In any case the same explanation—or is it just a paraphrase?—is found in the verse TK/VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 116:

\begin{quote}
vākye sampadyateḥ kartā saṅghaś cvyantasya kathyate | vṛttau saṅghībhavantīti brāhmaṇānāṃ svatantratā
\end{quote}

The lack of unambiguousness is not only irritating, but also rather irksome.

Later Pāṇinīyas, like Bhaṭṭojidīkṣita and Nāgeśa, seem to propose a different interpretation of the expression, but to wit, without mentioning an alternative. Nāgeśa, for instance, explains (Uddyota, NSP IV 414 r 20f.): ‘sampadyakartari’ ity atrāsmād eva nipātanāt kartari pāghrādi-[3.1.137] tvābhāve ‘pi śaḥ | divādi-[3.1.69]tvāc chyan |. That is to say, according to him—if I understand him correctly—sampadya goes back to an irregular adjective denoting the agent (kartr)—which has nevertheless to be regarded as correct because Pāṇini himself presupposes it in sūtra 5.4.50—and then the suffix śyan is added, i.e. substituted for śa because the root pad belongs to the 4th present class. This is tantamount to stating that sampadya- is a noun denoting the action (bhāva), i.e. process of ‘becoming’ and the compound as a whole is a ṇaṣṭhitatpuruṣa.

I myself cannot help confessing that in my opinion this is not really acceptable as a historically convincing interpretation; for in my view it is equally well compatible with Pāṇini’s technique(s) of describing the lakṣya and perhaps more natural to assume that sampadya- is the present stem of the compound verb/root sampad (DhP 4.6), used by the sūtrakāra as a means to designate the verb/root sam-pad as such. This is

\textsuperscript{32} NSP IV 414 r 5.

\textsuperscript{33} His sūtra 4.4.35 reads: abhūtatadbhāve kṛbhvastiyoge vikārāc cvih |; cf. also Dharmadāsa’s Vṛtti.

\textsuperscript{34} That is to say, the sentence brāhmaṇāḥ saṅghībhavanti can be formed.
similar to the nominalized 3. sg. Parasmaipada *sampadyati* by Bhartṛhari and Jayāditya: *sampad+kartṛ* would have resulted in a particularly ambiguous *sampatkartr*!

1.2.3.

If one looks into the “Erklärung der grammatischen Elemente” (= “explanation of the grammatical elements”), attached to Böhtlingk’s edition of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, s.v. *cvi* (Böhtlingk 1887: 163*), it is the following statement by which the reader’s attention is particularly riveted: “Andere Suffixe in derselber Bedeutung” (= “other suffixes with the same meaning”, scil. as *cvi*) “3,1,12. 3, 2, 56 fg. 3, 4, 62 fgg."

The first of these *sūtra* (3.1.12 *bhṛśādibhyo bhuvy acver lopah ca halah*) forms part of the rules about the affixes which form various classes of denominative roots (3.1.8–24), in that it teaches another function of the suffix *kyañ* introduced in 3.1.11. Katre 1989: 183 renders 3.1.12 thus: “[The affix KyaṄ is optionally introduced after] the word-class beginning with bhṛśa- ‘powerful’, i.e. gaṇa 174, provided the stem is not followed by (affix) Cvi and (the derived form) denotes becoming (bhuv-i) and the substitute lopa replaces the (stem-final 1.1.52) consonant.”

Katre’s first explanatory remark (“‘Becoming’ here is defined as becoming something which it was not before”) goes back to *vārttika* 1 (MBh II 21.23: *bhṛśādiṣv abhūtatadbhāvagrahaṇam*) and Patañjali’s explanation of *vārttika* 2–4 and his following own discussion (II 21.24–22.17); his illustrations come down to confronting *abhṛśaḥ bhṛśaḥ bhavati* = *bhṛśāyate* (7.4.25) “becomes powerful” with *bhṛśībhavati*, that is to say the *acvi*-formation according to A 3.1.12 with the *cvi*-formation taught

35 For the references, see above.
36 Explained by Kaiyata (NSP III 42 r 25f.): *ye rātrau bhṛśālokap [variant bhṛśā alokap] nakṣatradayas te divase kva pradeśe bhavanti*.
37 Kielhorn’s 1888: § 483 rendering of *bhṛśāyate* by “it becomes frequent” is too literal and evidently too influenced by the meaning of the adverb *bhṛśa*. My friend Harunaga Isaacson has drawn my attention to two literary attestations, namely, Jinaratna’s “The epitome of Queen Līlāvatī” (Fynes 2005: 52): *sā [= Līlāvatī] śrīŚimhakumārāya varāya nu bhṛśāyate* (“...passionately longs for...”), and Anargharāghava 4.35:

\[
\text{phanibhayabhṛtām astūcedakṣamas tamasām asau} | \\
\text{visadharapanāratnāloko bhayaṃ tu bhṛśāyate} ||
\]

(“Although the light of a jewel may be able to destroy darkness together with the fear of snakes one experiences in the dark, it increases fear if it comes from a hood of a cobra” [Törzsök 2006: 243]). The last example is particularly telling because of the parallel *vivrddhaye* in the preceding stanza.
in 5.4.50. Both of them express the same thing, they are indeed “optional” (vā valid due to \textit{anuvṛtti} from 3.1.7, but of course only with regard to the nominal stems enumerated in \textit{gana} 174).\textsuperscript{38}

The \textit{Kāśikā}, that is to say, Jayāditya draws attention to the fact that the “prohibition of \textit{cvi}” (\textit{cvipratiṣedha}),\textsuperscript{39} i.e. the abl. sg. form \textit{acveḥ pratyekam abhisambadhya}, “is to be syntactically connected with each [item of the said \textit{gana]}”—as indicated by Pāṇini by putting it in the singular in spite of its attributive function and the obvious question whether this “prohibition” is at all necessary, the reply being: \textit{tatsādṛṣyapratiṝppanyarthaṃ tarhi cvipratiṣedhaḥ kriyate | abhūtatadbhāvavischayebhyo bhrśādibhyah kyaṅpratyayah | ... | acver iti kim | bhrśībhavati ||; “hence the prohibition\textsuperscript{40} of the suffix \textit{cvi} is being made in order to [make] understood that [the semantic function of the suffix \textit{kyaṅ} forming denominative verbs] is similar to that (i.e. that of the formations with \textit{cvi})....”

This semantic similarity\textsuperscript{41} is brought out even more clearly in the two remaining cases, viz. 3.2.56f. and 3.4.62f., insofar as in both of them the expression \textit{cvyartha} is used (\textit{cvyartheṣu} in the first case, and \textit{cvyarthe} in the second) in order to emphasize (?) that the words undergoing the respective grammatical operation do have “the meaning of a \textit{cvi}[-formation], [even though they are not actually such formations].”

It is the Bhāṣyakāra who, obviating a possible misunderstanding, identifies that what is “similar” in this case(s) as \textit{abhūtatadbhāva} (MBh II 22.17). Notably here, too, this expression is not elucidated by Kaiyata or Nāgeśa, in spite of being used by Kātyāyana for the first time in the critical examination of \textit{sūtra} 3.1.12 just as in the first \textit{vārttika} on 5.4.50. And it is no wonder that this compound proved an excellent coinage, as can be deduced also by its being taken over by later non-Pāṇinīyan grammarians such as Bhojadeva. In addition, it represents a witty invention, albeit of a basically well-known type, characterized by the coincidence of \textit{definitio} and \textit{illustratio}\textsuperscript{42}; \textit{abhūtatadbhāva} is not only a remarkably clear definition of the \textit{cvyartha}, but at the same time is also an example of a \textit{cvi}-formation (\textit{tadbhāva})\textsuperscript{43}—though one of those where on the phonological level the

\textsuperscript{38} Patañjali explains the first \textit{vārttika}’s aim to prevent the application of \textit{A} 3.1.12 in the case of the sentence \textit{kva divā bhrśā bhavanti}, because in this counter-example the \textit{abhūtatadbhāva} is absent by contrast.

\textsuperscript{39} Cf. MBh II 22.1f. (paraphrase of \textit{vārttika}).

\textsuperscript{40} It is more exactly determined to be a \textit{paryudāsa}—on which see, for instance, Scharfe 1961: 63f.

\textsuperscript{41} Cf. MBh II 22.11–17.

\textsuperscript{42} Particularly frequently found in works on metrics.

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. also Monier-Williams (1899) 1982: 434.
suffix, or rather what is substituted for it, is not comprehensible. The common semantic function of the various morphemes taught in 5.4.50 and 3.1.12, etc. is, to repeat, to express “the act of x’s (i.e. a person’s or a thing’s) becoming something which it has not been [previously]”, or to put it simply, “that a person/a thing assumes/is given a quality other than the one which it had before”, that is to say, undergoes/is made to undergo a process of “transformation”.

1.3.
Because the assumption that Dignāga erroneously chose pramāṇabhūta instead of pramāṇībhūta—what he allegedly in reality intended to say—is entirely baseless, all translations of the first qualification of the Bhagavant Buddha by “what has become...”, “der... geworden ist” (quoted by Seyfort Ruegg 1994: fn. 8; cf. also Krasser 2001: fn. 1) are clearly wrong and thus unacceptable. As has already been stated, there is no evidence that this Buddhist philosopher was not a competent speaker or writer of Sanskrit. This might be the right place to add that he did not want to excite the suspicion of belonging to those authors who had to be reminded of the fundamental principle of verbal communication—formulated by Helārāja thus: na hy anyad abhidhitsatānyad abhidhāniyam (on TK/VP III sādhanasamuddeśa 121).

2.
However, the line of argument would remain regrettably incomplete if I did not now turn to the central question: What does or may pramāṇabhūta mean as used by Dignāga in his maṅgalaśloka?

2.1.
Already above (section 1.1.), it was observed that no rule is found in Pāṇini’s work which directly covers the formation of compounds with -bhūta as their second member. In a formal sense, these formations therefore fall into the category of what Pāṇinīyas call anukta. Yet the reason for Pāṇini’s “not teaching [those formations]” is not by any means that he overlooked or simply forgot them, or that they are limited to a

44 Cf. the expression abhūtapūrva used by Kātyāyana vārttika 13 on A 1.1.56 (MBh I 137.7).
45 Cf. also Yagī’s rendering of itthāṃbhūta (Cardona 2013: “Preface” X and 133–145).
region of the linguistic particularities of Sanskrit about which he had no information, or, finally, that they are a later, post-Pāṇinīyan development of the “sacred language”. This is not just a bold contention, but there is clear evidence for these conclusions. It consists in the fact that Pāṇini himself uses at least one such compound, and, to wit, as a matter of course. This indicates that he, as well as later Pāṇinīyas or other authors of grammar of Sanskrit, did not regard these formations as calling for a (special) rule.

2.2.
What I am aiming at is the compound itthambhūta used by Pāṇini three times, viz. 1.4.90, 2.3.21 and 6.2.149. Space being limited, attention must be focussed on the second of these sūtras, which is also the best known. A 2.3.21 reads itthambhūtalakṣaṇa [18: trīyā], “Ferner das Merkmal, wodurch Jemand gerade so und nicht anders erscheint (d.i. woran man Jemand erkennt)” (Böhtlingk 1887: 58) = “Moreover the mark/characteristic by which someone appears (i.e. is seen, that is to say: by which he is recognized as) just like that and not different.”

In this case, Böhtlingk’s translation seems to be preferable to that of Katre, because the former gives the impression of having understood itthambhūta somewhat more correctly than the latter.

Patañjali’s brief discussion of this sūtra (MBh I 453.15–23), as usual closely following Kātyāyana’s—two—vārttikas, culminates in the emphatic analysis of the three-membered compound (of which 2.3.21 consists):

\[
(tathā hy ayam prādhānyena lakṣaṇam pratinirdiśati) itthambhūtasya lakṣaṇam [=] itthambhūtalakṣaṇam[,] tasmin [i.e.] itthambhūtalakṣaṇa iti
\]

In other words, Patañjali, in order to avoid too wide an application, determines the compound as a sāṣṭhītatpurusa, which is explained by Nāgeśa (Uddyota, NSP II 503 r 1f.) when he discusses the difference

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47 Whether he used more than one is irrelevant in terms of the logics of proof, but in fact he does not.
48 That is to say, in addition to what has already been taught as to the denotative function of the endings of the third case.
49 Which reads (Katre 1989: 143): “[The third sUP triplet is introduced 18 (after a nominal stem) denoting the characteristic of a state realized (itham-bhūta-lakṣaṇa).]” On this function of the instrumental, see Yagi 2013: 139–143.
50 Implicitly referring to A 6.2.149 and in agreement with vārttika 2.
between the sentences *api bhavān kamaṇḍalupāṇīṃ chātram adrākṣīt* (example of *ativyāpti*) and (the correct) *kamaṇḍalunā chātram adrākṣīt*⁵¹ in the following way: *ithambhūtās [=] chātratvaṃ prāptaś chātras[,] tasya lakṣanaṃ kamaṇḍalur (iti bhāvah)|. The paraphrase of *bhūta* by *prāpta*, albeit quite “normal” in such cases when explained by later Pāṇinīyas, is admittedly problematic, but will be discussed below (section 2.6.). For the present moment it is sufficient to register that Nāgeśa—and he does not deviate from Kātyāyana, Patanjali and so forth in this regard—takes *ithambhūta* to refer to the *laksya*, “the person or thing (to be) marked or characterized [by the *lakṣaṇa* denoted by the word in the instrumental]”, being derived from the pronominal base *i* which is demonstrative, i.e. has a deictic/anaphoric or cataphoric function.⁵² And there can indeed hardly be any doubt that the adverb *itham* of *ithambhūta* in A 3.2.21 cannot but refer to the bearer of the mark, and not by any means to the mark (*lakṣaṇa*) itself. Whether a particular compound, the second member of which is -*bhūta*, or -*kṛta*,⁵³ represents a *cvi*-formation or just the opposite, not a *cvi*-formation, is sometimes not easy to decide whenever there is no phonematic, phonetic mark (substituted for the elided affix *cvi*). However, in such cases one can of course take recourse to a semantic method, viz. asking oneself the question of what the speaker/author—most probably—means to say. With regard to *ithambhūta* this question would run: “Does Pāṇini intend to say ‘[to denote] a mark of someone who has become so’ or [rather] ‘[to denote] a mark of someone who is so (i.e. like the person representing the *laksya*)’”?⁵⁴

All readers will agree that the first interpretation does not make sense since it is counterfactual, that it to say, it is not at all in conformity with the general meaning of this type of the adnominal instrumental. As for the second and certainly correct interpretation, I cannot help but already spill the beans.

I am meanwhile firmly convinced that -*bhūta* as second member of a compound to whatever class of words its first member belongs has the function of the copula Pres. ind. 3. p. sg. or pl. ("is"/"are"⁵⁴), that is to say, that it is equivalent to a relative clause, but significantly much shorter in terms of linguistic economy and easier to generate.

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⁵¹ On this example, see also Kaiyaṭa (NSP II 503 l 29–33).
⁵² Wackernagel/Debrunner III: § 248b; cf. also § 247b) δ.
⁵³ As there is no PPP of √*as*.
⁵⁴ Naturally, as in other cases in Skt., the copula can be translated by an appropriate form of "to serve, to function, to constitute, to represent" and so forth.
2.3.

I said “meanwhile” because this type of compound started to interest me long ago and I have not only been collecting pertinent materials (examples, often together with their translations by Indologists, and theories about them) for a number of years, but also started writing a comprehensive study on them. Relying on this foundation—which unfortunately can only be briefly outlined here—let me start a series of justifying remarks by looking first at itthāṃbhūta. Sanskritists are naturally reminded of adjectives derived by the taddhita affixes -tana- and tna (A 4.3.23f.) and others from temporal adverbs, but also from local adverbs\(^{55}\) such as nātana, adyatana, etc., and adhastana, agretaṇa, etc. These suffixes, however, quite evidently serve to form adjectives (German: “jetzig”, “heutig” and so forth). Yet the adjectives such as śvastana\(^{56}\) and śvobhūta are not, to be true, interchangeable. The former is used by Kātyāyana in vārttika 1 on A 3.3.15 (MBh II 143.17 paridevane śvastanī bhaviṣyantyarthe, “[it has to be taught that] lal, (i.e.) the periphrastic future, [is used] to denote the future other than today (German: ‘die nicht heutige Zukunft’), i.e. the general future (lṛḍarthe bhaviṣyatsāmānye: Nāgeśa, Uddyota, NSP III 222 r 6) if a complaint/a regret [is expressed]”, one of the examples being iyam tu kadā gantā yaivaṃ pādau nidadhāti, “but when at last will she go who sets down her foot in this manner (i.e. so slowly)”\(^{57}\). And śvobhūta on the other hand, is attested e.g. not in Gautama- but in Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, viz. 1.9.27.1, 2.1.1.10 and 2.4.9.1.\(^{58}\) In the first two places, śvobhūta is preceded by the loc. ahani in 2.1.1.7, from where it may be regarded to be still valid in the subsequent sūtras or the name of a particular day of a lunar month, i.e. the full-moon day (śrāvaṇyāṃ paurnamāsyām) (1.9.27.1); only in the last case, sūtra 2.4.9.1, the situation seems to be different, but in reality it is almost the same, except that not just the context, but also the sentence is being interrupted by the end of a kandikā (between 2.8 and 2.9) and that the preceding part of the sentence (2.3.8.14) does not contain a word denoting “day” or “x day”, yet nothing more than an indirect reference to a day. The tatra of tatragate (bhojane) could in my opinion be taken as referring to what is taught in 2.4.1.2 about the right time and dish(es) to be eaten by the svadharmayukta kuṭumbin;

\(^{55}\) Wackernagel/Debrunner II,2: § 444 (= p. 592ff.).

\(^{56}\) Also śvastya (A 4.2.105).

\(^{57}\) Or “with such delay” (vilambitam, Uddyota, NSP III 222 r 7).

\(^{58}\) The name of the source is wrong in Monier-Williams, which follows the PW. I thank Patrick Olivelle for correcting this oversight.
the concept of temporality is also indicated by *upoṣya*, the final word of the preceding part,\(^59\) which is echoed and simultaneously limited by the initial *śvobhūta* of the remaining part.\(^60\)

The outcome of a closer look at the three occurrences of *śvobhūta* in the Āpastamba hence fully confirms the correctness of Patrick Olivelle’s translation (Olivelle 2000: 65, 75 and 87) “on the following day”/“on the next day”\(^61\)—which by the way is found already in the *PW* and *pw*.

The more important result, however, is that it will hopefully now be possible to explain why *śvastana* and *śvobhūta* are in fact, as stated above, not interchangeable.

As for the part of speech which they represent, both are adjectives and can therefore be substantivized, yet neither *śvastanī* nor *śvobhūte* are used as substantives, for the grammatical term is rather to be determined as an abbreviated two-membered syntagma (*śvastanī[kriyā/vibhaktiḥ]*) and *śvobhūte*, which is syntactically similar to an attributive *participium coniunctum* in Latin\(^62\)—such as qualifying the word *ahani* “on x-day” that is directly or indirectly present from a preceding sentence in the mind of the speaker. A look into e.g. Monier-Williams (1899) 1982: 1106 (cf. also *aśvastana* 116), however, suffices to recognize that there also exists a neuter substantive *śvastana* “next day, the future”, in addition to the adjective *śvovasīyasa* “bestowing future welfare” and the substantive *śvovasīyasa* n. “future welfare, auspiciousness, good fortune”. Palpably different are the two words under discussion only semantically, namely, insofar as *śvastana* may refer to a “general future” or the “future as such”, whereas *śvo bhūteḥ/śvobhūte* is clearly restricted to “the following day”.

None of the observations of the two preceding paragraphs are contradicted in Wackernagel/Debrunner 1896-1957—though the *Altindische Grammatik* contains details not mentioned by me—save the remark made just now about the semantic difference between *śvastana* and *śvobhūta*, apart from the small area of semantic overlapping. Now the question is how to account for this difference. Anticipating linguistic facts to be more fully elucidated only in the following, I should like to answer: because *śvobhūta* in reality is to be rendered “[the day/the point

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\(^59\) Haradatta, however, reads *yatra* (gate) and explains: *yad avasthāprāpte bhojane smaret...atraiva bhojanād viramya tasmin ahany upoṣya*.

\(^60\) Should the original meaning of *śvah* be “tomorrow”, one would have to assume that this was understood as equivalent to “the day following today”, and that the preceding “day” would be regarded as “today”.

\(^61\) Haradatta explains the expression twice by *aparedyuḥ* (on 2.1.1.10 and 2.4.9.1).

\(^62\) On which, see Menge 2009: 713–4 (§ 498).
Reconsidering the characterization of the Bhagavant Buddha

in time/the point of time] that is tomorrow/the next day”. The relative clause is used with an eye for “good style” rather than for literalness. For the literal meaning of the compound śvobhūṭa would be “tomorrow/the next day being a [day]”. Is the translation with a present tense participle justifiable?

Debrunner appears to disagree; for in his “Nachträge” (“Supplement”) to vol. II, 1 of Wackernagel’s *Altindische Grammatik*, viz. p. 58 with reference to p. 195,24, he remarks⁶³: “bhūta- hinter Subst. dient zur Adjektivierung; häufig ep. kl., z.B. R. [Rāmāyaṇa]1, 45, 3a ksanabhūṭeva nau rātrīḥ ‘die Nacht ist uns sozusagen ein Augenblick geworden’, aber mit subst. bhūta- ŚvetU. 4, 10c tasyāvayavabhūṭaiḥ ‘durch die Wesenheiten, die dessen Teile sind’.” (“bhūta- behind substantives, is used as an adjectivizer, frequently epical and classical, e.g. Rāmāyaṇa 1, 45, 3a ksanabhūṭeva nau rātrīḥ ‘the night has become for us so to speak/as it were a moment’; but with substantivized bhūta ŚvetU. 4, 10c tasyāvayavabhūṭaiḥ ‘by the elements which are its parts’.”)

Unfortunately, Debrunner is not as clear as one would wish. In any case, when checking this passage in the critical edition of the Rāmāyaṇa, where 1.44.5a corresponds to the *pāda* cited⁶⁴ (vol. I [253]), rātrīḥ is immediately followed by *saṃvṛtteyaṁ* at the beginning of the next quarter,⁶⁵ which may underlie or rather most probably underlies Debrunner’s “has become”.

2.4.

The function and meaning of the suffix called *kta* by Pāṇini is still controversial, and Indologists and particularly Indo-Europeanists are divided: some of them determine the corresponding formations as participles, i.e. past participles passive⁶⁶ (=PPP), but others see them as verbal adjectives.⁶⁷ I, on my part, am firmly convinced that the matter has meanwhile been finally settled by Carlos Albino in his habilitation thesis “Außerparadigmatische Bildungen auf -to- im Griechischen und im Indogermanischen” submitted to the University of Jena on 29 June 2002, and which I was permitted to read through. His arguments against the opponents and for the proponents are so strong and the discussed

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⁶³ In his “Nachtrag zu Komposita in -ta”.
⁶⁴ Debrunner used the Bombay edition.
⁶⁵ Cf. also verse 959*.
⁶⁶ Cf. e.g. Müller 1866: 206ff.
⁶⁷ For instance, E. Tichy.
pieces of evidence taken together, so clear that there can no longer be any doubt that the formations in -to- represent indeed a past participle passive of frequently resultative function—comparable with the function of the Indo-European perfect. Once Albino’s study has been published most fellow scholars, I believe, will accept his conclusions and join me in regarding it as a significant breakthrough, to say the least. Admittedly it is rather unfortunate that I am referring to a work which is not yet generally available. But this does not form a major obstacle—and hence I do not really have to make a captatio benevolentiae—because Albino’s central thesis, mentioned just now, is not entirely new. On the contrary, it is already taught in the Aṣṭādhyāyī (3.2.187f.), and was advanced by other vaiyākaraṇas and e.g. Kielhorn 1888: § 506ff., 602f.

For this reason it is not only legitimate to render -bhūta as final member of a compound by “being”, or the copula if one prefers a relative clause, but it is also advisable to first start from the assumption that it is used in this sense whenever it is preceded by a substantive, as rightly stressed by Debrunner, or by an adverb, as ought to be added to his observation. But he is equally right in drawing attention to the existence of the substantivized participle bhūta n. that does, however, have in addition to “a being”, “an element” a series of other meanings, not to forget bhūta m. and the quasi-substantive bhūta, “(the) past [time (kāla)]”, which is not only met with in grammatical texts. “No rule without exception”, however, holds good in the case of compounds whose first member is an adverb, an excellent example being yathābhūtam “how it [in reality] happened/taken place” as used by Kalhan, recently highlighted by W. Slaje (2017: 401), to express his claim to full historical authenticity of the events described in the Rājatarāṅgiṇī.

2.5.
Debrunner’s citation from the Rāmāyaṇa, as I said, is particularly instructive, namely insofar as the topical compound kṣaṇabhūtā is followed by the particle iva. To be sure, the addition of iva would be

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68 Cf., e.g., Tichy 2009: 90ff.
69 He is still preparing it for publication.
70 Note that Patañjali adds a list of other verbal roots belonging to this group, and that Jayāditya (Kāśikā on A 3.2.188)—apart from explaining that the ca at the very end of the sūtra is anuṭasamuccayārtha—enlarges the list further and concludes his comment by stating ity evādayo ’pi vartamāne draṣṭavyāḥ.
absolutely redundant were the/a “comparison”—or utprekṣā (“as it were”)—expressed by the -bhūta compound itself. What is evidently true of this particular case is true in general of -bhūta as final member, although not a few people, vaiyākaraṇas, commentators and Sanskrit scholars seem to be or really are of the opposite opinion. The undeniable fact that commentators explain compounds of this type as x-iva in certain cases and indigenous grammarians sometimes speak of upamārthe or ivārthe does not by any means indicate, let alone “prove”, that all of them want to intimate that precisely this, i.e. upamā or iva, is the meaning of -bhūta. Indeed, pitṛbhūta, if attested already in Maheśvara’s commentary on the Nirukta 1.1 (Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 319), may even have to be translated “like a father”, etc., to wit, not because of its second member, but because of the fact that the compound refers, as is/must be clear from the context, to a person who is not the biological father, the begetter of the “son” at issue, yet is similar to a/the father in the primary sense of the word, no matter whether he is an elder male relative or (with regard to the Indian socio-cultural background) an adoptive father, or a teacher, or a worldly ruler, and so forth.

Interestingly, Kaiyaṭa makes use of the same example in his commentary on the fourth attempt to define śabda at the beginning of the Paspaśāhnika (MBh I 1.9–10: yat tarhi tad bhinneṣv abhinām chinneṣv acchinnaṃ sāmānyabhūtam sa śabdaiḥ), for he explains:

\[
bhinneṣv abhinām iti | anena sāmānyasya ‘ekatvam’ kathyate | ‘chinneṣv acchinnaṃ’ ity anena tu ‘nityatvam’ || sāmānyabhūtam iti || sattākhyaṃ mahāsāmānyaṃ gotvādeḥ sāmānyaviśeṣasyopamānaṃ nirdiṣṭam | sāmānyam iva—sāmānyabhūtam | bhūtaśabda upamārthe, yathā pitṛbhūta iti || [Pradīpa, NSP I 16 l 13–17].
\]

... sāmānyabhūtam: What is specified here is the widest generality called being as a means of comparison with a specific generality such as cowness.72 The word (i.e. second member of the compound) [has/is used in the sense of] comparison as in the case of pitṛbhūta [“like a father”].73

In other words, Kaiyaṭa takes a position that is diametrically opposed to mine, or the other way round, I (almost) entirely disagree with the Kashmirian commentator. But I am in more than good company, namely insofar as Nāgeśa who does not simply express his critical attitude by an iti kaiyaṭotkam cintaniyam or a similar stock phrase, but, as it were, goes

72 The question to be answered is atho gaur ity atra kah śabdaḥ | (MBh I 1.6).
73 I follow the translation in Joshi/Roodbergen 1986: 16.
out of his way to meticulously disprove his interpretation and ultimately plays him off against himself. Nāgeśa’s reaction must, however, be cited almost completely because it consists of a whole series of most important arguments (NSP I 16 r 1–10): ... bhūtaśabdaprayogānupapattim pari-
harati sattākhyaṃ iti , “[by the last but second sentence] he avoids (i.e. refutes) [the possible objection that Patañjali’s] use of the word bhūta [in sāmānyabhūta] is not reasonable”. This formulation, in my opinion, speaks volumes: it indicates that Nāgeśa on his part regards the/a pariḥāra as not at all necessary and the road entered upon by Kaiyaṭa to be wrong. And in fact what follows is a series of causal ablatives, all meant to support the concluding statement nedaṃ yuktam. The sentence reads thus:

\[
\text{evam hi 'vrkṣavad āṃraḥ' ityādyāpatteh, sāmānyaśruteh sarvasāmān-
yaviṣayatvena pravṛttayāh samkoce kāraṇabhāv ca, upamāka-
thanasya prakṛte 'nuprayogāc ca, adhyāhāre gauravāc ca—nedaṃ}
\text{yuktam [Uddyota, NSP I 16 r 4–6].}
\]

This (i.e. the opinion expressed in the last but second sentence of the Pradīpa) is not right for [1.] if [it were] so [as contended by Kaiyaṭa] the consequence unwished for would be that [in order to express that a thing, characterized by a differentia specifica as distinct from the next higher genus (genus proximum) falls under the latter one would have to form clauses] such as “the/a mango-tree is like a tree”, and because [2.] there is no reason [for assuming] that the [word] sāmānya actually uttered [by Patañjali and] used as referring to what is common to all/ the widest generality [denotes] a semantic contraction (i.e. a special generality such as gotva, etc.), and [3.] because the twaddle about the comparison is in the present context not helpful [at all] and [4. finally] supplying the necessary element(s) [would imply] infringing the laws of the economy of exposition.

Now, one could, of course, ask the question: If -bhūta does not express comparison, what else is its denotation? Nāgeśa’s answer is (NSP I 16 r 6f): kim tu svarūpavacī sah, “this (i.e. the second member -bhūta of sāmānyabhūta) denotes/conveys directly its own form”. And he continues:

\[
\text{vrddhisamjñāsūtrasthabhāṣyasaprayogasya 'pramānabhūtaḥ' iti asya}
\text{svayam karisyaṁāṅavyākhyāna-rītīśyāpi vyākhyānasambhavāt ||}
\text{pīrṛbhūtaḥ 'ity atrāpi 'anyatrānyasaabdapravogyah sāḍṛśyaparāḥ'
\text{iti sāḍṛśyapraśiṭṭhā, na tv asya sāḍṛśyavacakatve mānam asītī dik ||}
\text{[Uddyota, NSP I 16 r 7–10].}
\]

For this (i.e. the expression sāmānyabhūta), too, can be interpreted in the manner in which the expression pramānabhūta used [by Patañjali] in the Bhāṣya on the sūtra [introducing] the technical term vṛddhi (A 1.1.1) will be interpreted [by Kaiyaṭa] himself. —And as
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for *pitṛbhūta* [presented by Kaiyāṭa as an alleged parallel], [in this case] in its turn, [the hearer/reader] understands that similarity [is expressed in accordance with/the rule of language]: “The use of a word to denote something different ultimately aims at [expressing] a similarity [between the two *denotata*], but there is no proof/does not exist [any] proof that [expressions such as *pitṛbhūta* themselves] denote similarity. Into this direction one has to go further [in order to reach full understanding of this matter].

2.6.

What exactly Nāgeśa has in mind is clear to a Pāṇinīya and becomes clear to anybody when looking through the *Bhāṣya* on A 1.1.1 (*vrddhir ādaic*), together with the *Pradīpa* and *Uddyota*. In the explanation of and the discussion following upon vārttika 7 (liṅgena vā) (MBh I 39.1-13), two preceding vārttikas (viz. 1 and 2 *saṃjñādhikāraḥ saṃjñāsaṃpratyayārtha, itarathā hy asampratyayo yathā loke*) are re-used as an argument which is, however, immediately rejected: *na yathā loke tathā vyākaraṇe*, which in its turn is followed by the famous and often cited passage: *pramāṇabhūta ācāryo darbhapavitrapāṇih śucāv avakāše prāṃmukha upaviśya mahatā yatnena sūtram praṇayati sma | tatrāśakyam varṇenāpy anarthakena bhavitum kim punar iyatā sūtreṇa (...)*

My guru Paul Thieme translated this sentence as follows (Thieme 1982: 19f. = R. Söhnen-Thieme 1995: 1186): “The teacher (Pāṇini) functioning as an authoritative means of cognition, used to produce the *sūtra* with great effort: holding a cleansing bunch of *darbha* -grass in his hand, being seated on clean ground, his face turned towards the east. This being so, it is impossible that even one sound be without purpose....” Today I am almost irritated by Thieme’s rendering of *pramāṇabhūta*, because if *pramāṇa* indeed means “(valid) means of cognition”, *bhūta-* would have to be rendered “like, similar” > “of the same cognitive power as...”. Therefore I now prefer Filliozat’s translation (Filliozat 1975: 376): “Le Maître qui possède l’autorité, ayant une herbe *darbha* purificatrice sur la main, assis dans un endroit pur, tourné vers l’Est, au prix d’un grand effort, a composé le *sūtra*. Dans ces conditions, il est impossible qu’il y ait même un phonème qui n’ait pas de sens, à plus forte raison un *sūtra* aussi long.”

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74 Also by Seyfort Ruegg 1994.

75 In fn. 2 Filliozat adds the important information: “De nos jours quelques brins d’herbe *darbha* que l’officiant de presque tout rituel noue autour de son annulaire, sont appelés *pavitra*...”
The initial syntagma pramāṇabhūta ācāryo may syntactically be considered as a substantive (nom. sg.) with preceding participial attribute/agreeing with the substantive, or else as a substantive preceded by a praedicativum. That is to say, two schematical literal renderings are possible: a) “the p.-being ā.” or “ā. as p.-being”, i.e. “ā./the ā. insofar as (whence) he is [for us] p.” It is rather difficult to find an equivalent of a least middling appropriateness for ācārya (= Pāṇini) in the present context. What I should like to propose is “(most distinguished) professor-scholar”. To my mind, the interpretation as an attribute is more natural; hence my tentative translation “the (most distinguished) professor-scholar who is [for us] the p./p.”.

Remarkably, what Kaiyaṭa has to say on pramāṇabhūta is not more than:

\[
\text{prāmāṇyaṃ prāpta ity arthaḥ | ‘bhū prāptau ity asya ‘ādṛśād vā’}
\]

\[
itī nijabhāvapakṣe rūpam | vruttivisaye ca pramānasabdāḥ prāmāṇye vartate | [Pradīpa, NSP I 160 r 9–11].
\]

... what [Patañjali] means to convey is: “one who has attained/obtained the state of being (a/the) p.”-[bhūta] is [not a form of the root bhū (sattāyām “in the sense of being”) but] a form of the [homophone] root bhū (prāptau “in the sense of obtaining” (DhP 10.300) if with a view to [the fact that up to DhP 10.306] dhṛṣa (prasahane “in the sense of assailing/attacking”) vā the alternatively possible position is taken that the suffix nic (forming verbal stems) is not added [but its function is nevertheless given]. And with regard to [this] compound (pramāṇabhūta), the word pramāna is used to denote [its bhāva, i.e.] prāmāṇya ["the fact of being p."].

Nāgeśa, commenting on the cited section of the Pradīpa, does not disagree, but limits himself to bringing the reflective background to the fore (Uddyota, NSP I 160 r 16–161 l 3): nanu bhavater janmārthatvenābhūtatadbhāvapratītyā cvau sati pramāṇībhūta itī syāt, tadavivakṣāyām tu pramāṇam ācāryah prakārānta renā bhūta ity arthaḥ syād ata āha—prāmāṇyaṃ iti | ‘vruttivisaye’ iti prakṛtābhīprāyam ||. The preparatory deliberations are disguised, as it were, as the objection of a pūrvapakṣin (nanu...). Their gist is that if bhūta of pramāṇabhūta were formed from the root bhū “to become”, the speaker would have two possibilities, namely either to add the affix cvi in order to express the idea of an abhūtatadbhāva77 (pramāṇībhūta), “[being a non-p.] he has become a p.” or, if he does want to express this idea, to say that a/the ā. has

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76 A monograph on the praedicativum in classical Sanskrit is under preparation.

77 See above, section 1.2.1.
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become \( p. \) in some other way, i.e. not by \( \text{pari\text{"n\text{"ama}} \), and use the compound in this sense. Since the first of these possibilities is clearly not given and the second is unacceptable in the sentence at issue, there remains only the solution that this \(-\text{bhūta}\) is a form of the other root \( \text{bhū} \) that means “to obtain”. The final remark of Nāgeśa makes clear that Kaiyaṇa’s statement \( \text{vr̥tti}	ext{viṣaye} \) should not be misconstrued as a general observation about the word \( \text{pramāṇa} \) when used as a member of a compound. It is, however, possible that there is a little more involved in this remark. Nāgeśa’s student Vaidyanātha Pāyagunḍa is of the opinion\(^{78}\) that the particle \( ca \) after \( \text{vr̥tti}	ext{viṣaye} \) is just a meaningless (?) sound, that it should be moved “to the end”, that is placed after the verb \( \text{vartate} \)—and that it be taken as expressing (an) \( \text{avadhāraṇa} \) (“... is indeed/really used...”). However, this is probably first of all an attempt at reconciling Nāgeśa’s interpretation with that of Kaiyaṇa and at taking the sting out of Nāgeśa’s harsh critique. It is hence not worth scholars’ while to further dwell on Pāyagunḍa’s note.

Notwithstanding, attention must be drawn here to the fact that Kaiyaṇa himself not only knew of the “other” interpretation, as evinced by his \( \text{Pradīpa} \) (NSP I 160 r 9f. quoted above) on the characterization of Pāṇini as \( \text{pramāṇabhūta} \), but also that he avails himself of alternative possible interpretations, namely in his explanation of \( \text{kartrabhūte} \) (\( \text{karmaṇi} \)) (MBh II 66.7), which reads as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{kartrabhūta iti} & | \text{cver vikalpena vidhānād atrābhāvah} | \text{kartari sampanna ity arthaḥ} | \text{athavā bhū prāptā ity asyādṛṣād veti nico vikalpanād rūpam etat} | \text{tena kartṛtvam prāpta ity arthaḥ} | \text{vr̥tti}	ext{viṣaye}^{79} \text{ kartṛśabdah kartṛte vartate | kartṛkarmāvasthābhēdāc caikasyā api kriyāyā bhedāśrayaṃ sādṛṣyaṃ upapadyate} || [\text{Pradīpa, NSP III 117 l 35–39}].
\end{align*}
\]

Since [the affix] \( \text{cvi} \) is prescribed as optional, it is not added here (i.e. in \( \text{kartrabhūta} \)): [despite the absence of the affix \( \text{cvi} \) the compound] means “when [an object] although it has not become an agent ...” or rather this \( [\text{bhūta}] \) is a form of [the other root] “bhū denoting obtaining” because the affix \( \text{nic} \) (i.e. the form of any of the roots of the 10th present class) is added [only optionally] in accordance with [the \( \text{gaṇasūtra} \] “up to [the root] \( \text{dhrs} \) (Dhp 10.306\(^{80}\)) [to all roots starting with \( \text{yu} \) the affix \( \text{nic} \) is added optionally”. Therefore, [\( \text{kartrbhūta} \) means “having attained (the) being-an-agent”. [That is to say], the word \( \text{kartr} \) is used in the case of this compound [used by Patañjali] in the sense of [the abstract secondary noun] \( \text{kartrtvā} \), and because the states of agent and

\(^{78}\) Quoted in NSP I 16 at the bottom of No. 2.

\(^{79}\) Note that there is no \( \text{ca} \) here.

\(^{80}\) Its numbering is sometimes different.
object. It is logically in order that an action, even though [in reality only] one should exhibit a similarity, is based on (a) difference.

Regarding Nāgeśa’s commentarial remarks on this part of the Pradīpa (Uddyota, NSP III 117 3–18) it will suffice to draw attention only to the most important statement. This is, I believe, nanu cver abhāve ‘akartari kartari bhūte’ ity evocitaṃ prakrtivikrtibhāvapratītaye ata āha—athavā by which he suggests that Kaiyaṭā himself was aware of the weakness of his first proposal and that athavā therefore means “rather”. The implication is that Nāgeśa agrees with Kaiyaṭā’s second interpretation, as was to be expected.

In another case (Pradīpa on MBh on A 3.3.133), the situation appears to be different insofar as the first part of what Kaiyaṭā says on vārttika 4 (MBh II 160.3: hetubhūtaṃkālasampreksītatvād vā) is clearly divided into two parts. Its first part (Pradīpa, NSP III 241 r 32-36: kāraṇasambandho kālāh kāryasya vyavasthāpyate kāraṇāntarāpeksābhāvapratītāpyaṃ arthāḥ | hetubhūtasya varṣāder yaḥ kālaḥ sa eva kārye sampreksītah kāraṇasyaiś ca kāryarūpatayā vivaksītatvāt | kāryakāraṇayor abhedā-dhyavasāyād ity arthah |) constitutes Kaiyaṭā’s own, independent interpretation of the vārttika—over which I have to pass on, except for mentioning that the discussion here is centred on the question of which of the two sentences is correct: devaś ced vṛṣṭaḥ sampatsyante śālayaḥ versus ... sampannāḥ śālayaḥ (MBh II 160.1f.). The second part of the Pradīpa on vārttika 4 (and to Patañjali’s elucidation) is introduced by the remark (NSP III 241 r 36f.): bhāṣyakāras tv etad eva ca vastv anyathā vyācaṣte—hetubhūtaṃkālaṃvarṣam (recte: hetubhūtaṃkālaṃ varṣam) iti | “the author of the Bhāṣya, however, interprets this very matter (i.e. statement) differently”. How exactly is shown by Kaiyaṭā in what follows (ibidem 241 r 37–242 l 1f.): hetubhūtaṣya[=] hetutvam prāptasya meghāder yaḥ kālaḥ sa eva varṣasya | varṣasya ca yah kālaḥ sa eva nispatkriyāyā ity arthah | “the time of the clouds, etc., that are hetubhūta, that is to say, have attained the state of being-a-cause, this same time is that of [the season of] the rain(ing); and the time of rain(ing) is exactly the time [of the process] of sprouting. This is the meaning [of what Kātyāyana says in Patañjali’s view].”

As far as Nāgeśa is concerned, he does not deal explicitly with Kaiyaṭā’s reading of hetubhūta in his own interpretation of vārttika 4, even though

81 I.e. a karmakartr.
82 The sūtra reads: ksipravacane lṛṭ.
he explains two other elements of this first part of the Pradīpa. Instead, he starts his (sub)commentary by stating (Uddyota, NSP III 241 1 3–4):

bhāṣye hetubhūteti | hetubhūtasya kāraṇatvaṃ prāptasya kāraṇasya kālaṃ kārye āropya prayoga ity arthah |

Does he not silently set right Kaiyaṭa’s own reading of hetubhūta-, that is, his irritating “paraphrase” by kāraṇasambandho kālaḥ?

However that may be, this much can be seen from the Uddyota sentence quoted just now: Nāgeśa is by no means irresolute in his view about the meaning and function of -bhūta- as the final member of a compound. A last piece of evidence will conclusively prove this: his independent\(^{83}\) explanation of the expression samjñābhūta of the MBh on A 3.3.19 (akartari ca kārake samjñāyām), viz. II 145.11–12: asti cedānim kaścit samjñābhūto bhāvo yadari bindhiḥ syāt |, “and does there now exist some samjñābhūta being for which (i.e. for the sake of which) [this limiting] rule should exist (i.e. be taught)?”

Without further ado, Nāgeśa states (Uddyota, NSP III 225 1 321–33): samjñābhūta iti | samjñāvam prāpta ity arthah || bhāvah | bhāvaprtyayānta ity arthah || yadartho vidhir iti | niyamavidhir ity arthah ||.

Nāgeśa, to repeat it briefly, is of the opinion that a two-membered word-group, of which the second part consists of -bhūta [x-bhūta-], denotes (vācakatva) the attainment (prāpti) of the state-or-being $x$ (x + abstract affix + acc-ending + prāpta), certain cases apart where the word-group is understood (pratīti) as “like $x$”, “as it were $x$”. I find the kernel of his explanations highly useful and in a particular regard convincing, but I do not, of course, want to conceal that I hesitate to accept some of his ideas. I simply do not believe in the—“real”\(^{84}\)—existence of the “other” root bhū classified together with approximately fifty other roots as constituting a separate subgroup of the 10th present class (curādayaḥ). The Dhātupāṭha is anyway notorious for containing non-existing roots, wrong or even whimsical inventions of which it can at best be conceded that they lead an ephemeric artificial secondary life as more or less shadowy figures.

2.7.

The Reverse Index of Old Indian (Schwarz 1978: 195) lists 24 compounds with -prāpta as second member. Among them there are two whose first member is formed by an abstract noun: aucityaprāpta, “having reached/

\(^{83}\) Kaiyaṭa does not say anything about this part of the MBh.

\(^{84}\) The single quotation marks are meant to indicate that what is meant is “forming an element of the Skt. vocabulary from early/earliest times”.
attained suitableness/congruity”, and vaiśāradyaaprāpta-，“having reached/attained skill/clearness of intellect/confidence in oneself”. More significantly, none of the remaining compounds that have a non-abstract noun as first member is, as far as I can see, used in a way similar to the one assumed by Nāgeśa in the cases of pramāṇabhūta, hetubhūta-, etc., that is to say, used to denote or mean its own abstract concept. More signifi-
cantly, none of the remaining compounds that have a non-abstract noun as first member is, as far as I can see, used in a way similar to the one assumed by Nāgeśa in the cases of pramāṇabhūta, hetubhūta-, etc., that is to say, used to denote or mean its own abstract concept. The main reason for my disagreement with Nāgeśa, however, is that not only for the causative/factitive bhāvayati, but also for the simplex bhavati, among others, the meaning “to attain to”, “to obtain” is given in the dictionaries (PW etc.). The semantic development is particularly easy to understand with regard to the causative-factitive “to cause [something] to be/to become”, “to call into existence or life”, [eventually] “to obtain [this now existent] something” [in whichever ontological status]. Yet I should avoid the perils of the thick jungle of speculations about the motives and reason(s) for inventing the “other” root bhū, but rather continue my statement that I do not believe in its real existence by adding that I also fail to recognize any substantial necessity not to operate with the basic “etymological” meaning of the root bhū (1st class) when trying to come to terms with the compounds ending in -bhūta.

As soon as -bhūta- is understood as the copula “in disguise”, so to speak, that is, as past participle of bhū “become” with—almost always—(resultative) present tense meaning, everything falls into place: there is no need for fuzzy ideas, too complicated and improbable assumptions, or for counterfactual linguistic inventions. As I happened to realize only a short time ago, I am basically doing nothing but rehashing old observations that one finds clearly expressed in the pw IV 275. For s.v. bhūta d) Otto Böhtlingk writes “geworden, seiend in Comp. mit dem Prädicat, insbes. mit einem Subst., wodurch auch in Geschlecht und Zahl übereinstimmende Attribute oder Prädicate gewonnen werden.”

This type of compound—of a samāsa the second part of which is -bhūta—-is similarly quite clear now: it is not, to be sure, a tatpuruṣa

85 A special case is vaśībhāvaprāpta.
86 Has the “other” root bhū perhaps been ‘discovered’ just because of those usages of bhāvayati?
87 It is perhaps the source of Debrunner (see above).
88 [=] “become, being when compounded” [i.e. at the end of a compound] “[it is joined] with the predicate, in particular with a substantive by which [process] attributes or predicates are obtained that agree [with the word denoting the person / thing to be qualified and with the predicate] also in gender and number. Compounded with an adverb, a corresponding adjective is formed.”
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Reconsidering the characterization of the Bhagavant Buddha (in the narrower sense of the term) where the first member would have to stand in the accusative like Kielhorn’s 1888: § 547.1 krṣṇaśrita(ḥ) “one who has resorted to Kṛṣṇa” or duḥkhāt(ī)ta(ḥ) “one who has overcome pain”—as assumed by Nāgeśa, who has been shown as regularly replacing -bhūta- by -prāpta- and the first member, when a substantive, by the corresponding abstract noun in the accusative (hetubhūta- = kāraṇatvāṃ prāpta-etc.), but it is—as explained by Pāyaguṇḍa (NSP I 16 r 25f.)—a karmadhāraya (sāmānyaṃ ca tad bhūtam ca) or rather “something that is a/the (highest) generality” (yat [mahā-]sāmānyam bhavati), hetubhūta- (yo hetur bhavati), etc.

2.8.1.

It is not necessary to point out that compounds with the second member -bhūta- are adjectives and can therefore like all adjectives be substantivized, but it might not be superfluous to call the readers’ attention to the fact that the problems of textual interpretation caused by the absence of proper articles (definite or indefinite) in Skt. must be taken into consideration when confronted with substantivized compounds of the subtype examined here. A good example, I believe, is Mallavādin’s (NC I 222.4) (kaṇṭakādi | tad eva) tīkṣṇādibhūtam, (na puṣpādi tādṛgguṇam | ...) insofar as the context shows that what is meant is—not “eines, das scharf usw. ist” but rather—“that which is pointed, etc.”.90

Next to strictly distinguishing between formations with the affix cvi and formations without this affix, but derived from root bhū such as -bhūta-, -bhāva-, -bhavana- and so forth, what is of almost equally great importance is to keep asunder, within the wide area of compounds with -bhūta as second member, the “common” type, so to speak, from the “uncommon” one. The latter type has been discussed already above (section 2.5.f.), a discussion triggered by Kaiyāṭa’s interpretation, or rather the example pitṛbhūta, “like a father”, and Nāgeśa’s merciless refutation. Since the failure to keep asunder the two latter types seems to have led to some confusion which to all appearances has been caused by grammatical and semantic analysis lacking in depth and precision, it is in order to dwell on this “uncommon” type for a while. After all, it would be a step forward if some means were available for basing the decision with

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89 Or [mahā-]sāmānyam yad bhavati resp. hetur yo bhavati [tasya].
90 Cf. Siṃhasūri, NĀA I 222 14f.: ...punas tad eva kaṇṭakādi tiṣṭṇādībhūtam tiṣṭṇam tiṣṭṭnātaram kunṭham kunḍhātaram saviṣam nirviṣam ityādi na puṣpādi tādṛgguṇam sukumārādīsuvahāvam... |.
which of the two types one is dealing, the “common” or the “uncommon”,
on a solid, strong and good ground. The decision should be rational and
thus one which can be substantiated rather than being prejudiced or pure
guess-work.

2.8.2.
Quite evidently Kālidāsa knew the compound *pitṛbhūta*—it may even
have become lexicalized by this time—but he gave it a special turn,
enhancing the idea poetically. In verse 1.24 of his *Raghuvaṃśa*, he says
of Dilīpa:

\[
prajānām vinayādhānād rakṣanād bharaṇād api |
\]

\[
sa pitā[,] pitaras tāsāṃ kevalaṃ janmahetavāḥ ||
\]

Vallabhadeva (Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 14, see also the note on p.
272)\(^{92}\) happens to explain: *prajānāṁ pitaro by jananasya kāraṇabhūtāḥ
kelavam āsan ||*, “were [merely] those who were/represented the cause of
[their biological] begetting”.

Yet Kālidāsa has also himself used what I call (not really felicitously)
the “uncommon” subtype, though apparently only rarely—and thereby
created or helped in creating the wrong idea(s) about the principal function
of *bhūta*- as second member of compounds. Space being limited, it is
not possible to cite more than one example, namely *Raghuvaṃśa* 5.34
(Goodall and Isaacson 2003: 190, see also note on p. 367). Kautsa, the
pupil of the *ṛṣi* Varatantu, is speaking:

\[
āśāsyam anyat punaruktabhūtam śreyāṃsi sarvāny adhiṣṭhunās te |
\]

\[
putraṁ labhasvātmagunānurūpaṁ bhavantam īḍyo bhavataḥ piteva ||
\]

Vallabhadeva simply paraphrases the compound at issue as *punahkathitam
iva... “like something that has been/is repeated/said a second time”*,
because all that is already achieved.\(^{94}\) If Raghu, who because of his *acintanīyāḥ prabhāvaḥ* (5.33) has already obtained all blisses (*śreyāṃsi

\(^{91}\) Stenzler 1832: 3 translated: “Cives ad bonos mores dirigens, protegens atque
alens, ille pater eorum erat, patres vero solummodo natalium causa.”
\(^{92}\) Mallinātha draws attention to the popular saying *sa pitā yas tu poṣakaḥ* |
\(^{93}\) “Quodvis alid beneficium tibi datum supervacuum foret, quia omnigem
felicitatis particeps es: quare filium adipiscere, virtutibus suis tibi similem, sicut
pater tuus te celebrandum accepit!” (Stenzler 1832: 33).
\(^{94}\) Mallinātha, after explaining *punaruktabhūtam, sarvam siddham ity arthaḥ* |
sarvāṇī), were to wish\textsuperscript{95} for something/anything else—be it expressedly or in thought—then that would be like saying something again a second time, that is to say, to make the great mistake of redundant speaking. Soliciting something that one has already gotten because of one’s prabhāva is not, to be sure, a real punaruktam\textsuperscript{96} but only similar to an act of saying something again. Therefore punarukta cannot here be used by the poet in its primary sense: punaruktabhūtaṃ\textsuperscript{97} is to be understood as “something which is a repetition in speaking in the secondary meaning of the word” > “which is as it were a repetition in speaking

2.9.

Patañjali distinguishes between the mukhyā and gaunī vṛtti, lit. “main” and “subordinate”, and he formulates a paribhāṣā, viz. gaunamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratayāh (MBh I 71.17–19 et passim)\textsuperscript{98}

Yet this is not a general hermeneutic principle but a “rule of interpretation” for a particular text, namely the Aṣṭādhyāyī\textsuperscript{99}

Alaṃkārikas frequently use the expression bādha (“obstruction”, “driving away”, “abolishing”, “suppression”) when they describe the fact or rather the mental process of a hearer’s/reader’s lack of understanding of a sentence as long as he/she starts from the erroneous assumption that a particular word is or must be used in its primary meaning. It is therefore no wonder that this expression is met with also in definitions of secondary meaning (lakṣanā, etc.) such as Mammaṭa’s (Kāvyaprakāśa 2.9):

\[
mukhyārthabādhe tadyoge rūḍhito ‘tha prayojanāt | \]
\[
anyo ‘rtho lakṣyate yat sā lakṣaṇāropitā kriyā ||
\]

Indication is that superimposed word-activity whereby another meaning is conveyed either through usage or because of a motive when there is incompatibility of the primary meaning and there is a connection [with the primary meaning]. (Leaning on R. C. Dwivedi 1966: 26f)\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{95} I take āśāsyam as a gerundivum expressing potentiality.

\textsuperscript{96} See, however, Patañjali on A 3.3.44.

\textsuperscript{97} Note the sequence of vowels in this compound.

\textsuperscript{98} Cf. Wezler 1969.

\textsuperscript{99} Helārāja, on his part, seems to have a particular liking for the syntagma askhalad-vṛttitvaṃ prayogasya to express the fact that a word is being used in its primary meaning (mukhyārtha), despite knowledge of course of (the) other terms.

\textsuperscript{100} Cf. also the prose commentary on this verse, i.e. the Svopajñavṛtti.
In his *Svopājñavṛtti* on his *Sāhityadarpaṇa* IV 172, Viśvanātha Kavirāja quotes a line from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, namely 3.15.13 (in the critical edition Baroda vol. III):

\begin{verbatim}
  ravisamkrānten saubhāgya
tusārārunamandalah

  niḥśvāsāndha
 ivādarśaś
candramā
 na prakāśate
\end{verbatim}

As for the moon all its appeal has passed to the sun. Its disk is misty gray and its glow has vanished, like that of a mirror clouded over by breath. (Pollock 2006: 121).

Given the context in the *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, that is, the subtleties of distinguishing so many varieties of vyañjanā, I confine myself to citing only the introductory statement of Viśvanātha Kavirāja’s prose commentary: atrāndhaśabdo mukhyārthe bādhite ‘prakāśarūpam arthaṃ bodhayati’, “in this [śloka] the word ‘blind’ obstructed with regard to/in its primary meaning lets one recognize that its meaning [here] is ‘consisting in non-brightness’.” Indeed, a mirror being acetana can never become “blind” in the primary sense of the word; only human beings or other animals can be born blind or go blind. The upamā in pāda c is a particularly nice and convincing example, since the same metaphor is found in many European languages as well, even together with the particular cause of “breathing upon”.

If it were necessary, but it is not necessary at all, to learn that the use of words in a secondary meaning is a common feature of natural languages, Patañjali’s paragon gaur bāhīkaḥ would demonstrate it. The “blind mirror” quoted above, as well as the bāhīka compared to a go, are at the same time illustrative examples to show that the hearer/reader is apt to, or rather will automatically, first operate with the primary meaning and only in a second step, when confronted with the bādha, recognizes that andha and go are being used figuratively, but that this does not, however, hold good when metaphors have become popularly accepted, commonplace, clichés, or widely used sayings.

In other words, the “uncommon” use of compounds in -bhūta represents, on the one hand, a special case within this (sub)type of

\[101\] I have the impression—it is not more—that Pollock prefers the reading -āruna- over āvṛta.

\[102\] In later times, the predication of a/the bāhīka as go (m.) seems to have been generally or always expressing the dullness for which members of the bovine species are ill-famed till the present day (“dumme Kuh”, “dummer Ochse”). Bhojadeva (*Śrīgaraprakāśa*, ed. Raghavan 1998: [I] 139, 353 *et passim*) still associated with the sentence also the lack of civilized brahmanical manners in the bāhīkas; he is said to urinate standing (*tiṣṭhan mūtrayan*).
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karmadhāraya compounds, but forms only one of the many possibilities for Sanskrit speakers to use words figuratively. In andha ivādarśa, it belongs to the syntactical category of an attribute, in the clause gaur bāhikāh, it is the nominal predicate of a short nominal sentence. There is no need to continue this revue of examples.

2.10.
Most, if not really all, Sanskritists are familiar with compounds in -bhūta. They are legion, especially in śāstric texts. Pāṇini uses at least one, Kātyāyana more, Patañjali approximately thirty, and for Bhartrhari they are a matter of course, not worth counting. To mention just a few from Mallavādin’s NC (a)tathābhūta, (a)vinābhūta, (a)prthagbhūta, etc. antarbhūta (almost permanently), but pradhānabhūta, “[something] that is the chief, the most important [thing]”, and gunabhūta, “[something] that is subordinate/of secondary importance/subsidiary to” seem to come conqueror with regard to frequency.

2.11.
In the first paragraph of his seminal article, Seyfort Ruegg 1994: 303 remarks: “Some commentators have taken up the grammatical question as to why we have [in the ārambhaśloka of the Pramāṇasamuccaya] the form pramāṇabhūta rather than the at first sight perhaps more normal form pramāṇībhūta.” In spite of the two qualifications, I am not able to let this statement pass without briefly commenting on it. The two forms, to adopt Seyfort Ruegg’s expression, are grammatically and semantically, as has been emphasized above (section 1.1.), totally different; one cannot hence hope of achieving any advantage by asking (oneself) which of the two is more normal. Both are linguistically, that is grammatically, equally “normal”! One might at this point consider consulting the Reverse Index of Old Indian (Schwarz 1978), but after carefully looking through the corresponding columns (Schwarz 1978: 179f., as well as 181ff. [-bhāva]) one feels rather disappointed.

What is listed in this index are understandably types and not tokens; moreover, Schwarz’s admirable and highly useful work is based on the existing Sanskrit dictionaries, in hardly any one of which the vocabulary of śāstric texts has been taken into account to a sufficient extent. I am not against the application of mathematical methods to solving linguistic or

103 Note also (a)tathābhāva ibidem.
philological problems, daring to underscore the truism that if it comes to semantics, real word counts, etc., must be carried out first; to be sure, the attribute “normal” makes sense only if the observation is related to a justifying empirical investigation. Nevertheless frequency of the use of a particular word/form or compound is one track, determining the function of morphemes, forms, etc., an entirely different one.

3.

To conclude, it is methodologically necessary to return first to Patañjali’s pramānabhūta and thereafter to Dignāga’s use of this compound. Since the problem of the meaning of -bhūta can now be regarded as having been solved, the focus will be on the first member of the compound. The most pressing problem arising then is, of course, what or who can be predicated of as “being (a/the) pramāṇa”. Is it things/objects only or also persons, or perhaps both?

3.1.

Occurrences apart where the word is used in its “etymological” (yaugika) meaning of “measure (in general)”, pramāṇa is used by Patañjali several times with regard to a piece of a text (ślokāḥ MBh I 3.1f., 5) or to a rule of Pāṇini (nirdeśa “clear designation”, MBh III 356.3, 407.22f.).

The famous dictum śabdapramāṇakā vavam | yacchabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam | (MBh I 366.12–13), however, forms the semantic intermediary stage: “word”, that is to say, certain statements in verse or prose, represent (a/the) pramāṇa: From this idea, it is only a small step

104 It would be absolutely superfluous to comment on the fact that the word pramāṇa at issue here is a kṛt derivation from pra-√mā, Ā—mimīte “to measure” etc., would not Bhartṛhari TK/VP III jātisamuddeśa 4 happen to touch upon its homonym pramāṇa derived from pra√mī, mināti / mīnāti “to kill, to slaughter” and explained by Helārāja to mean hiṃsārambhā.

105 This holds also good for A except for two rules (see below); as for (one) of the etymological meanings of MBh II 344.1.

106 On this term cf., e.g., Abhyankar 1961: 208.

107 This dictum is cited comparatively frequently by Siṃhasūri in his NĀA, for instance NC I 130.9, 134.22, 180.28 et passim, though mostly in the shortened form yac chabda āha tad asmakāṃ | tan nāḥ pramāṇam |

108 The context of MBh I 11.1f. shows that the reference is not to language as such, but to particular statements in verse or prose quoted in the foregoing part of the Paspaśāhnika. Noteworthy is also the fact that this dictum forms but one possibility of interpreting vārttika 9 (MBh I 10.21). Nevertheless—and Nāgeśa agrees by explaining pramāṇam to mean prāmāṇikam (NSP I 75 I 11)—what
to regarding those human beings who speak the language, the community of Sanskrit speakers, viz. the loka (MBh I 8.2, 241.9, III 145.7f. to refer to the most important passages at least) to be meant as pramāṇa. The final step, so to speak, leads to the predicating of an individual person himself as pramāṇa, and this is clearly done by Patañjali when he argues (MBh II 79.7f.): nanu ca ya eva tasya samayasya kartā sa evedam apy āha | yady asau tatra pramāṇam ihāpi pramāṇam bhavitum arhati | pramāṇam asau tatra ceha ca | or contends (MBh III 174.10f.): yadi tarhi śiṣṭaḥ śabdeṣu pramāṇaṁ kim aṣṭādhīyāyā kriyate |. In this last case, Patañjali, to be sure, does not have in mind a fictional “creator of a [linguistic] convention”, but a carefully defined group of brāhmaṇas, albeit anonymous members of the first social order (in Āryāvarta).

Kaiyata (on MBh I 3.2 and 5 [śloka, (a)pramattagītai]) does not explain pramāṇa, while Nāgeśa, on his part, confines himself to justifying the syntax (of Patañjali’s last sentence) by stating (Uddyota, NSP I 36 r 4–37 l 3): bhāṣye—yas tv apramādena gīto kasyāpi tat pramāṇam iti pratinirdeśaliṅgam || “because [the sentence is in reality to be read as] ... [the correlative pronoun] has/takes the gender of the repeated nominal predicate (pramāṇam).”

This reminds one to some extent of the clause vedāḥ pramāṇam, which is cited rather frequently, not because of its content, but because of its noteworthy “exemplary” syntactical structure (lack of agreement of number and gender).

But what is the meaning of pramāṇa in the examples quoted from the A and the MBh? Böhtlingk 1887 renders the word by “das Maassgebende” (“standard”, “decision”, “authentic”) (tran. of A 1.2.53–55 and 56), whereas Katre 1989 decided in favour of “base”, “basic”, “is dependent”. In my opinion, Böhtlingk’s equivalent is clearly much more appropriate, confirmed as it is by corresponding entries in Apte 1978: 1101: “3 Scale, standard”, “6 Authority ... one whose word is an authority; śrutvā devaḥ pramāṇam Pt. [Pañcatantra] 1 ‘having heard this your Majesty will decide (what to do)’; āryamiśrāḥ pramāṇam M. [Mālavikāgnimitra] 1; Mu. [Mudrārākṣasa] 1.1... vyākaraṇe pāniniḥ pramāṇam Ms. [Manusmṛti]

is at issue here is practically the śabda-pramāṇa, “word as a means of valid cognition”.

109 Not to forget the many attestations of lokataḥ.
110 Cf., however, A 1.2.55 and 56 (-pramāṇatvāt) and the Kāśikā on this pair of sūtras.
112 Note that this holds good for A 5.4.116, too, with the sole difference that Böhtlingk does not translate pramāṇi used there.
Finally, readers will recall formulaic polite expressions such as *(atra) atrabhavān (eva) pramāṇam* from spoken Sanskrit. The semantic development from “measure” over “unit of size” and “instrument for measurement”—and maybe other intermediary steps—to the abstract “standard”, “authoritative/authority”, “decisive” is also per se small wonder. Hence my conclusion that *pramāṇabhūta ācārya*... *(MBh I 39.10)* should literally be translated “the teacher who is [for us?] an/the authority...”.*

3.2.

As for Dignāga’s use of the same expression, I regret to have to say that I do not fully agree with Helmut Krasser when he writes (2001: 174): “In order to account for this problem”, i.e. Dignāga’s and Dharmakīrti’s conceptions of *pramāṇa* (only two and, in fact, considered to be *pramāṇa-phala*, on the one hand, and Dignāga’s calling the Bhagavant a *pramāṇa-bhūta*, on the other) “roughly two kinds of solution have been proposed: 1) *pramāṇa* should be understood either in an extended sense, as authority, or metaphorically or 2) *bhūta* should be understood in the sense of a comparison.”

The second “or” appears to be a typographical error, and it is not clear why “authority” should be “an extended sense” of *pramāṇa*. If one starts from the assumption that the expression at issue is used in the sense of “authority”, “that which is [for us?] authoritative/decisive”, a meaning well attested in Sanskrit literature,* then there is no *bādha*, for, as has been shown, persons, human individuals, albeit of an extremely high intellectual (and moral) rank can—and, to wit, as a matter of course—be predicated of as *pramāṇa*. However, if one starts from the opposite assumption, namely that Dignāga cannot but use the word *pramāṇa* in his introductory stanza in the sense it has, or rather is proved and defined to have in the body of his PS, then there is a really obvious *bādha*—because a person, however extraordinarily qualified, cannot be or function as the result of valid cognition, be it a perception or be it an inference. Indeed, -bhūta would then have to be interpreted as “like” or “as it were”.

It undoubtedly behoves me to let (the) Buddhologists take the final decision of this problem. My own impression is that if they decided for

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113 This is quoted by Apte 1978 from the edition by J. M. Gurjar, Bombay 1894. The verse is not found in Olivelle’s critical edition (2005).

114 See above.

115 And I could present dozens of pertinent quotations from a vast range of texts.
the second alternative, they would have to pursue Seyfort Ruegg 1994 and 1995 but not forget to reconsider the (theoretical) possibility that Dignāga had a particular conception of (the) buddhavacana, that is to say, they should rather confide in Jinendarabuddhi, who sees expressed in pramāṇabhūta an iva not used (ivasabdāntarenāpi tadartho gamyate), the sādrṣya being that the bhagavant is “like perception and [other] valid cognition (i.e. anumāna, inference)” (yathā prakāśako 'visaṃvādakaś ca pratyaksādipramāṇam) of a particular anadhigata artha (Steinkellner/Krasser/Lasic 2005: 1,12–2,8). In case of the contrary decision, my dear fellow colleagues are being asked—in saying my farewells—to bear in mind that Dignāga may have deliberately used pramāṇa in two different senses, not, of course, in order to dupe his hearers, to pull his readers’ leg, but perhaps even with the intention to resume the thread of the Mahābhāṣyakāra, but simultaneously also to highlight the vastly different pramāṇatva of the (historical) Buddha as he saw him. The differences begin with the place in the work and the genre and end with the masterly drawing with a few but vigorous highly impressive lines—of the founder of Buddhism “who is [for me like for my fellow monks and all lay followers] the Authority, who seeks for the well-being of the world of living beings, who is the Teacher, the Sugata, the Protector...”. He is the object of Dignāga’s namaskāra (in both senses of the word), whose intention it is to bring together a compendium from his own widely spread philosophical, epistemological positions in one place (i.e. in a single work) with the purpose of successfully achieving correct cognition [for myself and of making other people also achieve it (?)]. In other words, what Dignāga does is that he mentally respectfully bows—not before a picture or sculpture or a similar artefact showing the Buddha, real or imagined, but—to the spiritual personage of the Buddha characterized by or indicated through the enumeration of his central qualities, i.e. to a mental image of the Buddha as had been developed over the centuries after Gautama Buddha’s death. And this pranāma is carried out by the philosopher with a view to securing his success in writing and accomplishing the PS thanks to the benevolence, help, anugraha (?) of the pramāṇabhūta.

Patañjali, on his part, offers an impressive “description” of the process by which Pāṇini, highly concentrated and similar to a yogin, composed with great care sūtra by sūtra in order to derive and/or indicate the conclusion that “not even a single sound in a rule is without specific purpose”, that is to say, in order to establish the most important hermeneutical principle to be followed in the interpretation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī.

Looking back on the preceding paragraph, one of the optional
interpretations clearly must, by necessity, be set off against the others and not just mentioned in passing: it is the possibility that “[the] term ‘pramāṇa-bhūta’ is used in a double sense”, regarded by Hattori (1968: fn. 74) as a fact. “First, it means ‘authoritative’ or ‘standard’...”. “Second, it has the more technical meaning, ‘to have come into existence’ (bhūta) as a ‘means of valid cognition’ (pramāṇa).” [sic]. In his translation, however, he renders the compound at issue by “who is the personification of the means of cognition” (Hattori 1968: 23) only, thus giving -bhūta decidedly more semantic weight than it has, and leaving out the other part of the double entendre. Nevertheless Hattori’s proposal, it appears to me, deserves to be re-examined before all the other interpretations, and with particular care.

References

A


Anargharāghava See Törzsök 2006.

Āpastamba Āpastambadharmasūtra. See Olivelle 2000.


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DhP  Dhātupāṭha. See Böhtlingk 1887.


Kāvyaprakāśa  See Dwivedi 1966.
NĀA  *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*. See NC.
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Ogawa 2013 H. Ogawa, Bhartṛhari on three types of linguistic unit-meaning relations. See Cardona 2013: 217–279.


Pradīpa Kaiyāṭa’s Bhāṣyapradīpa on the MBh. See NSP.

PS Pramāṇasamuccaya.


Uddyota Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa’s Bhāsyapradipoddyota on the MBh. See NSP.


T. Yagi, On the so-called predicative instrumental. See Cardona 2013: 133–145.
The negation of arising from other in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* and beyond

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**Introduction**

The idea that things arise from other things is dismissed by Nāgārjuna (2nd cent.) in the first verse of his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (hereafter MMK) as one of four possible originations:

Not arisen from self, nor from other, nor from both or without a cause
Do any things ever exist anywhere (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 48).

According to the commentators Buddhapālita (ca. 500 CE), Bhāviveka (6th cent.) and Candrakīrti (7th cent.), not only the first verse but also the third verse of MMK I teaches the negation of things’ arising, particularly the negation of their arising from something else. Commenting on MMK I.1:

\[na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyaṁ nāpy ahetutah | utpannā jātū vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana||\]

The earliest Indian commentaries on the MMK, the *Zhonglun* (中論) attributed to Qingmu (*Piṅgala*) and the *Akutobhayā* (hereafter ABh), present this verse as the second verse of MMK I and interpret it as explaining MMK I.1’s negation of the four possible originations. See *Zhonglun* (中論) 2b20–27: 諸法自性不在眾縁中。但眾縁和合彼得名字。自性即是自體。眾縁中無自性。自性無故不自生。自性無故他性亦無。何以故。因自性有他性。他性於他亦是自性。若破自性即破他性。是故不應從他性生。若破自性他性即破共義。無因則有大過。有因尚可破。何況無因。於四句中生不可得。是故不生。 “An own-being of things does not exist in conditions. It obtains a designation merely by virtue of the collection of conditions. The own-being is [the thing] itself. An own-being [of things] does not exist in conditions. Because an own-being does not exist, [things] do not arise from the self. Because an own-being does not exist, [things] do not arise from the other either. Why? An other-being exists depending on the own-being. The other-being is also an own-being for [something] other. When the own-being is refuted, the other-being is refuted. Hence, [things] do not arise from an other-being. When the own-being and the other-being are refuted, the manner of being both is refuted. [Arising] without a cause is largely at fault. [Arising] with a cause must be refuted, and all the more, [arising] without a cause [must be refuted]. Arising cannot be obtained in four alternatives. Therefore, [things] do not arise.”; ABh 253, 10–19, D33b4f., P39b4–6 (cited in MacDonald 2015a: 303, n. 560): gang gi phyir dngos po rnams kyi rang
I.1 in his *Prasannapadā* (hereafter PsP), Candrakīrti quotes MMK I.3 as follows:

Nor do things arise from [something] other, simply because [something] other does not exist. And [Nāgārjuna] will explain this here [in the MMK]:

An own-being of things of course does not exist in conditions and such;
When own-being does not exist, other-being does not exist (MMK I.3).
And thus, just because other does not exist (*parābhāvāt*), [things] do not arise from other, either (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 139).³

The three commentators all agree on the interpretation that the refutation of “arising from other” is embedded in this verse, although Nāgārjuna himself does not say this explicitly. In their view, the intention of the verse is to negate the view attributed to earlier Buddhists in MMK I.2 that things arise from something else, such as the four kinds of condition (*pratayādi*)⁴ (viz., *hetu-*; *ārambana-*; *anantara-*; and *ādhipateya-*).

³ PsP I: 191, 4–7: *parato ‘pi notpadyante bhāvāḥ parābhāvād eva | etac ca na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratayādiṣu vidyate | avidyamāne svabhāve parabhāvo na vidyate |* (MMK I.3 according to BP, PP, and PsP, MMK I.2 according to Zhonglun and ABh)

⁴ According to the ABh and Buddhāpālita, the word *ādi* refers to the conditions taught by non-Buddhists, whereas Bhāviveka explains it as referring to the collection of causes and conditions other than the four (ABh 252, 20–253, 2, BP 12, 17–19, see also Ames 1994: 96 and 124, ns. 26 and 27, 2019: 42, 44, and 331, ns. 226 and 227, and MacDonald 2015a: 304, n. 561). The Tibetan commentator
Candrakīrti takes the last part of the verse (I.3d), “other-being does not exist” (parabhāvo na vidyate), as an argument against the arising from other by saying, “because other does not exist (parābhāvāt), [things] do not arise from other.”

Whereas the other three alternative originations, viz., origination from self, from both self and other, and without a cause, were generally not accepted by Buddhists, origination from something other was approved by most Buddhists at that time (see fn. 5). Therefore, Nāgārjuna and his followers were obliged to refute the view of arising from other in order to validate the teaching of non-arising that qualifies dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) in accordance with the homage (maṅgala) verses of Zhang Thang sag pa understands it as including the collection of conditions and individual conditions. See dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ka Part II: 63 (37a2): sogs kyi sbsd u bya ni rkyen ’dus pa dang so so ba la sogs pa’o.

“There are four conditions: the cause [condition], the object [condition], the immediately preceding [condition]. And similarly, the dominant [condition]. There is not a fifth condition” (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 296). The opponent here is identified as “fellow Buddhists” (svayūṭya, rang gi sde pa dag) by Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti (PP D53b2, P64b2, PsP I: 276, 2). Avalokitavrata specifies them as “all the Śrāvakas, Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas and so forth” (PPT [wa] D156b1f., P180a5f., indicated in Ames 1994: 122, n. 1, 2019: 329, n.201, and MacDonald 2015a: 295, n. 545). The Zhonglun (2b27: 阿毘曇人言。諸法從四縁生。云何言不生。) and the ABh (2b27: chos mngon pa shes pa dag) attribute the assertion to Ābhidharmikas (cf. further MacDonald 2015a: 296, n. 552). The Tibetan commentator Pa tshab Nyi ma grags identifies them as two groups (sde pa gnyis) [of Śrāvakas, i.e., Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntikas] and Cittamātravādins (sems tsam pa) (dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka 14b17–18), whereas Zhang Thang sag pa says that they are all fellow Buddhists, mainly Śrāvakas (dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka, Part II: 60 [36b1]: rang gi sde pa thams cad yin te gtsor nyan thos so).

They claim that things arise in dependence on causes and conditions, following some scriptures which teach, for instance, the causal chain of dependent origination with twelve members (dvādaśāṅga). From a soteriological perspective, the idea is also widely accepted that, since ignorance (avidyā) causes karmic existence or saṃsāra, its cessation leads one to liberation. In his PsP I (198–201), Candrakīrti cites this kind of scriptural teaching as the basis of an opponent’s assertion that the MMK’s qualification of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) as non-arising, non-cessation, and so on (see the maṅgala verses cited below in fn. 7) contradicts these scriptures. Candrakīrti defends Nāgārjuna’s tenet of non-arising by distinguishing scriptures of this kind that teach provisional meaning (neyārtha) and those which teach emptiness (śūnyatā) or definitive meaning (nītārtha) (PsP I: 201, cf. also MacDonald 2015a: 158f.)
the MMK. This was actually the beginning of their long-lasting challenge to the establishment of causal relations between mutually different real existents.

In this paper, I will first present the various arguments against arising from other which Indian commentators, namely, Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti, attribute to Nāgārjuna’s verses. Then, I would like to examine the arguments employed by Kamalaśīla (8th cent.) in his Madhyamakāloka (hereafter MĀ), as well as by the Tibetan commentators Pa tshab Nyi ma grags (ca. 1055–1145) and Zhang Thang sag pa ’Byung gnas ye shes (alias Ye shes ’byung gnas) (12th cent.). My aim is to depict the historical development of the argument against arising from other in the commentarial tradition of the MMK and its expansion beyond the context of the MMK. The negation of arising from other was undoubtedly one of the most important tasks for all Madhyamaka thinkers throughout the history of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism.

**Arguments against arising from other**

With regard to the negation of arising from other taught in MMK I.1, Buddhapālita makes a short statement of consequence (prasaṅga):

> Things do not arise from other, because of the consequence that everything would originate from everything (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 142).

Bhāviveka, who discredits any prasaṅga reasoning, instead formulates two inferential proofs (prayoga) drawing on the logical reason “otherness” (paratva):

1. It is not the case, ultimately, that the inner bases arise from their conditions, which are other [than the inner bases], because [they] are other [than their conditions] (paratvāt), just as a pot [does not arise

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8. *na parata utpadyante bhāvāḥ sarvataḥ sarvasambhavaprasyaṅgāt* | (citation in PsP I: 192, 7).

The negation of arising from other in the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*

from the conditions for the inner bases which are other than the pot].

Or,

2. It is not the case, ultimately, that the others, the alleged (*vivakṣita*) [conditions] that bring forth inner bases such as the visual faculty, are admitted (*pratīyante*) as conditions, because [they] are other [than the inner bases] (*paratvāt*), like threads, etc. [which, other than the inner bases, are not conditions for the inner bases] (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 119, cf. also Kajiyama 1963: 51, Ames 1993: 223 and 2019: 30f.).

Bhāviveka’s point here is that causal relation cannot hold between mutually different things.

Candrakīrti paraphrases Buddhapālita’s *prasaṅga* statement cited above in his *Madhyamakāvatāra* (hereafter MA) VI.14 as follows:

If depending on [something] other, another were to come to be, then from fire thick darkness could arise,

And there would be the birth of everything, and [that] indeed from everything, because being other [than the effect] is the same for every non-producer as well (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 140).

In this manner, the commentators construct *prasaṅga* or inferential reasonings on the basis of MMK I.1. Their argument is that a cause and its effect are mutually different (*paratva*) (hereafter this argument is referred to as *argument I*). Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti draw absurd consequences from the premise that they would be other, whereas Bhāviveka accepts it conventionally and negates its ultimate establishment.

The state of “being other” or “other-being” (*parabhāva*) is, however,

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10 Citation in PsP I: 181, 4–9: *na paramārthaḥ parebhya tatpratyayebhya ādhyātmikāyatanajanma paratvāt tadyathā ghaṭasya || atha vā na parē para-mārthena vivakṣitās caksuradyādhyātmikāyatananirvartakah pratīyayā iti pratī-
yante paratvāt tadyathā tantvādayah ||; PP D49b4f., P59a7–59b1: *don dam par nang gi skyê mchêê nhnams de dag gi rkyen gzhân dag las skyê ba med de | gzhân yin pa’i phyïr | dper na bum pa bzhin no || yang na don dam par gzhân brjod pa ‘dod pa mig la sogs pa nang gi skyê mchêê ‘grub par byed pa dag rkyen ma yin par nges te | gzhân yin pa’i phyïr dper na rgyu spun la sogs pa bzhin no ||.


negated by Nāgārjuna in the last part of the third verse (*parabhāvo na vidyate*, MMK I.3d). Therefore, in his commentary on MMK I.3, Buddhapālita disproves things’ arising from other anew by saying, “if other-being does not exist, who can say that things arise from others?” In his view, the negation of arising from other is unstated but implicitly embedded in the verse. Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti make it explicit by interpreting the word *parabhāvo* as *parebhya utpādaḥ* (PP D54a3, P65a6, PsP I: 279, 5). Based on this reading, Bhāviveka constructs the inferential proof that, ultimately, things do not arise from other things (*parabhāvo na vidyate* [MMK I.3d] = *nāsti parebhya utpādaḥ*) because they do not exist in conditions. Here, Bhāviveka adopts the non-existence of an own-being of things that are effects in conditions from MMK I.3ab (*na hi svabhāvo bhāvānāṃ pratayādīṣu vidyate*) as a logical reason and proves that things do not arise from other things as, in his reading, is stated in MMK I.3d.

In his PsP, Candrakīrti employs both arguments in presenting alternative elucidations of MMK I.3. First, he negates things’ arising from other in the same manner as Bhāviveka on account of “the non-existence of an own-being of effects in conditions” (hereafter this

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13 BP 13, 15–20 (trans. Saito: 1984: 13), D162b6ff., P183b4ff.: gan rtvon las sogs pa la yod ma yin pa de ni bdag gi dngos po yod pa ma yin pa ste | de dag las gzhon du yongs su btag tu med pa'i phyir ro | * bdag gi dngos po yod min na | * gzhan gyi dngos po yod ma yin | | * gzhan gyi dngos po med na su zhig dngos po rnam gzhan las skye ba'o zhes smra bar rigs |. “What does not exist in conditions and so forth has no own-being, because it cannot be imagined apart from them. ‘When own-being does not exist, other-being does not exist’ (MMK I.3cd). If other-being does not exist, who can say that things arise from others?” *The PsP T reads: * bdag gi dngos po yod min na | * gzhan dngos yod pa ma yin no | |. Regarding the variants in Tibetan translations of MMK I.3, see Ye 2011: 12 and MacDonald 2015a: 480ff.

14 PP D54a4ff., P65a7ff. (trans. Kajiyama 1964: 102, Ames 1994: 95, cited and translated also in MacDonald 2015a: 305, n. 563, 2019: 43): don dam par mig la sogs pa skye mched rnam las chu chu dang khrag la sogs pa rkyen rnam las skye ba med de | de dag la med pa'i phyir dper na bum pa bzhin no | |. This proof is followed by another proof: de bzhin du don dam par khu chu dang khrag la sogs pa'i rkyen rnam las skye pa'i skye mched rnam skyed par byed pa ma yin te | de dag gis stong pa'i phyir dper na thag bzcangs la sogs pa bzhin no | |. The second proof negates the ability of the conditions to produce an effect through the non-existence of things that are effects there.

argument is referred to as argument 2).\textsuperscript{16} Then, following Buddhapālita, he makes the same negation resorting to “the non-existence of other-being” (hereafter this argument is referred to as argument 3) that is also the reason he introduced as parābhāva in his commentary on MMK I.1 cited above.\textsuperscript{17} He identifies “other-being” (parabhāva) with paratva or otherness (gzhan nyid).\textsuperscript{18}

The main point of argument 3 is that otherness is established in mutual dependence only between two different things that exist simultaneously, such as Maitra and Upagupta, but it does not hold between a cause and its effect because they do not exist at the same time. For instance, a seed and the sprout that will eventually arise from that seed do not exist simultaneously.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} PsP I: 278, 10–279, 6 (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 304f.): yadi hi hetvādiṣu para-bhūteṣu pratyayēṣu ... kvacīd bhāvānāṃ kāryānāṃ utpādāt pūrvāṃ sattvam syāt, syāt tebhya utpādāḥ | na caivaṃ yad utpādāt pūrvāṃ sadbhavah syāt | yadi syāt, grhyeta cotpādavaiyarthyaṃ ca syāt | tasmān nāsti bhāvānāṃ pratyayādiṣu svabhāvah | avidyamāne ca svabhāve nāsti parabhāvah | bhavanam bhāva utpādāḥ parebhya utpādāḥ parabhāvah sa na vidyate | tasmād ayuktam etad—para-bhātebhya bhāvānāṃ utpattir iti ||.

This explanation follows Buddhapālita to some extent, who argues that if an own-being existed in conditions or somewhere else, arising as well as conditions would be pointless because something existent neither arises nor needs conditions for arising (BP 13, 4–12, D162b4–6, P183a8–183b3, trans. Saito 1984: 13): dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin ni rkyen nrams la yang yod pa ma yin | rkyen nrams las gzhan pa la yod pa ma yin | gnyi ga la yang yod pa ma yin no || ci'i phyir zhe na | skye ba'i rkyen du brtag pa don med pa nyid kyi skyon du 'gyur ba'i phyir te | 'di ltar gal te dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin rkyen nrams la 'am rkyen nrams las gzhan pa 'am | gnyi ga la yod par gyur na | yod pa la skye ba ci zhig bya ste | dngos po rang bzhin gyes yod pa rnams la yang skye bar brtag pa don med pa nyid du 'gyur ro || yod pa la rkyen nrams kyi ci zhig bya ste | rkyen du brtag pa yang don med pa nyid du 'gyur ro ||). Here Buddhapālita is just aiming to negate the existence of things’ own-being in conditions by means of prasaṅga reasoning. Candrakīrti goes one step further and asserts that the existence of things’ own-being prior to arising in conditions would enable them to arise (syāt tebhya utpādāḥ). Therefore, its non-existence proves their non-arising from the conditions that are others.

\textsuperscript{17} Cf. PsP I: 191, 4–7 cited above in the body of the paper. Candrakīrti paraphrases the reason parābhāvād eva in PsP I: 191, 4 and 6 by paravyapadesābhāvād eva in PsP I: 280, 2–4 (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 306, cited below in fn. 27).

\textsuperscript{18} PsP I: 279, 9 and 280, 2 and MA VI.17 cited below in fns. 20 and 27.

\textsuperscript{19} PsP I: 279, 9–280, 4 (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 305f.) cited below in fn. 27. Cf. BP 11, 22–12, 2 (trans. Saito 1984: 12), D162a4–162b1, P182b8–183a5 (cited partially in MacDonald 2015a: 306, n. 565): gal te khyod kyi sogs pa rkyen bzhin po gang dag gzhan yin par tha snyad btags pa de dag dngos po rnams las gzhan yin par gyur na ni dngos po rnams gzhan las skye bar yang 'gyur ba zhig na | de dag ni gzhan yin par mi 'thad do || (citation of MMK I.3) ... 'di la dngos po rnams
Candrakīrti already used both arguments 2 and 3 for rebutting possible objections in his earlier works Madhyamakāvatāra and Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya (hereafter MA and MABh, respectively). The MABh on MA VI.17\(^\text{20}\) sets forth argument 3 as follows:

> Here [in daily life], the mutually dependent otherness (*parasparāpeksam paratvam*) of Maitra and Upagupta is seen of course (*hi*) only when they both exist. But a simultaneity like this of seed and sprout is not observed (*na ... yaugapadyam upalabhyate*)\(^\text{21}\) since the sprout does not exist when the seed [remains] unmodified (*bīje avikṛte*). And when in this way a sprout is not possible at the same time as the seed, the seed is not other than the sprout. When there is no otherness [of the seed], this [idea, namely,] that a sprout arises from other (*parato*) is wrong. Therefore, the position that [a thing] arises from other should be relinquished.\(^\text{22}\)

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\(^{20}\) MA VI.17 (Li 2012: 5, 2015: 6):

> asty aṅkuraś ca na hi bījasamānakālo bījaṃ kutaḥ paratayāstu vinā paratvam |
> jannāṁkurasya na hi sidhyati tena bījāt saṁtyajyatāṁ parata udbhavatīti paksāḥ

> “And a sprout does not actually exist as something [existing] at the same time with a seed [that is its cause]. Without otherness, how can the seed exist as something other? The arising of a sprout from a seed is not actually established. Therefore, one should abandon the position that [things] arise from other.”

\(^{21}\) I follow the Sanskrit manuscript. The Tibetan translation reads *cig car dmigs pa yang ma yin* (see below, fn. 22). I am deeply indebted to Anne MacDonald for information about the readings in the MABh Sanskrit manuscript.

\(^{22}\) MABh 92, 16–93, 4 (cited in MacDonald 2015a: 305, n. 564): *di na byams pa dang nyer sbas yod bzhin pa dag kho na phan tshun bltos nas gzhans nyid du mthong gi | sa bon dang myu gu dag ni de ltar cig car dmigs pa yang ma yin te | sa bon rnam par ma gyur par myu gu med pa'i phyir ro | gang gi tshe de ltar sa bon dang dus mnyam du myu gu yod pa ma yin pa de'i phyir sa bon la myu gu las gzhans nyid yod pa ma yin la | gzhans nyid med na gzhans las myu gu skye'o zhes bya ba 'di yod pa ma yin no | de'i phyir gzhans las skye'o zhes bya ba'i phyogs 'di btang bar bya'o*. Cf. MABh 94, 10–13: *de'i phyir sa bon 'gag pa dang myu gu skye ba gnyis dus gcig pa'i phyir sa bon dang myu gu dag kyang dus mnyam par 'gyur la | de'i phyir gzhans nyid yin no zhes bstan pa'i phyir smras*
Then, citing MMK I.3, Candrakīrti construes the verse in the following manner:

Here, when “conditions and so forth” (MMK I.3b: *pratyayādisu*), which may mean conditions, cause, the collection of the cause and conditions, or something else (*tadanyasmin*), have an unmodified form (*avikṛtarūpe*), the own-being of effects cannot exist, because it has not arisen (*annutpannatvāt*). When there is not the [own-being of effects] (*tasminn asati*), the conditions and so forth certainly cannot be other (*paratvam pratayādīnāṁ naiva sambhavati*). This seventh [case, i.e., *pratyayādisu* that have an unmodified form (*avikṛtarūpeśu*)] is [specified] by way of the [following statement] (*ity anevenyaṃ saptamī*): “by the action of whatsoever, [the time of another] action is indicated” (*yasya ca bhāvena bhāvalakṣaṇam, Pāṇini II.3.37*).

Here Candrakīrti is adducing Pāṇini’s statement in order to explain a locative case in the sense of locative absolute or *satsaptamī*, which could be either *pratyayādisu* in MMK I.3b, or *tasminn asati = avidyamāne svabhāve* in MMK I.3c. In other words, “this seventh” (*iyam saptamī*)

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23 Cf. PsP I 279, 8 cited below in fn. 27 (*bījādiṣu pratyayeṣu satsv avikṛtarūpeṣu*).

24 According to the Kāśikā (Sharma et al. 1969: 142), Pāṇini II.3.37 means “a seventh case occurs after a stem whose implied action characterizes another action” (*yasya ca kriyāyā kriyāntaraṃ lakṣyate tato bhāvavataḥ saptamī vibhaktir bhavati*). The Kāśikā adds the examples: “He went while [someone] is milking cows. He came while cows were milked. He went while [someone] is putting [oblations] into fires. He came while [oblations] were put into fires” (*goṣu duhyamānāsu gataḥ, dugdhāsv āgataḥ, agniṣu hūyamāneṣu gataḥ, huteṣv āgataḥ*).

25 MABh 93, 9–14: 'dir rkyen la sogs pa zhes bya ba ni rgyu’am rkyen dag gam | rgyu dang rkyen gi tshogs pa’am de las gzhан yang rung ste | rang bzhin rnam par ma gyur pa na ’bras bu rnam kyi rang bzhin yod pa ma yin pa kho na ste ma skyes pa’i phyir ro | de med na rkyen la sogs pa rnam la gzhăn nyid yod pa ma yin no || gang yod pas na yod pa’i mtsan nyid do zhes bya ba ’di ni bdun pa yin no ||. Cited in MacDonald 2015a: 306, n. 564.
refers to either of them. The first interpretation is supported by the commentator Jayānanda. In the PsP also, Candrakīrti construes pratyayādiṣu in the sense of locative absolute by saying, “when the conditions such as a seed and so forth exist in an unmodified form” (bijādiṣu pratyayesu satṣv avikṛtairūpeṣu). This locative phrase seems to suggest that the conditions’ state of being unmodified determines the non-existence of the own-being of effects, for Candrakīrti gives the reason, “because of the consequence that the effects would be without a cause.” Unless a seed changes its form, one cannot say that the seed produces a sprout, or that the seed is the cause of a sprout. Candrakīrti asserts the same in the MABh. He specifies that the conditions are in an unmodified form also in the previous passage, cited above: “A simultaneity like this of seed and sprout is not observed, since the sprout does not exist when the seed [remains] unmodified (bijē avikṛte, sa bon nman par ma gyur par)” (see fn. 22).

Although the second interpretation that “this seventh” refers to tasminn asati = avidyamāne svabhāve is possible, I would tentatively propose that Candrakīrti quotes Pāṇini’s statement to explain the locative absolute pratyayādiṣv understood as avikṛtarūpeṣu (or more precisely, satṣv avikṛtarūpeṣu as the PsP indicates). This seems to suggest that “the effects’ action of arising” is characterized by “the conditions’ action of being modified.”

26 MAT D134b7: gang yod pas yod par mtshon pa zhes bya ba la gang yod pas zhes bya ba ni rkyen la sog pa yod pas so || yod pa mtshon pa zhes bya ba ni 'bras bu yod par mtshon pa'o || “The statement, ‘by the action of whatsoever,’ [means] ‘by the action of conditions and so forth.’ [The time of another] action is indicated” [means] that the action of an effect is indicated.”

27 PsP I 279, 7–280, 4 (trans. MacDonald 2015a: 305f.): atha vā bhāvānāṃ kāryāṇāṃ ankurādiṇāṃ bijādiṣu pratyayesu satṣv avikṛtairūpeṣu nāsti svabhāvo nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt | tat kim apeksya paratvam pratyayādināṃ | vidyamānayor eva hi maitropaguptayoh parasparāpeksam paratvam | na caivaṃ bijāṅkurayor yugapadyam | tasmaid avidyamāne svabhāve kāryānāṃ parabhāvah paratvam bijādināṃ nāstiti paravyapadesābhāvāvād eva na parata utpāda iti || “Alternatively, [the kārikā may be understood as meaning that] there is not an own-being of things, [that is,] of effects such as a sprout and so forth when the conditions such as a seed and so forth exist [but are still] in an unmodified form [i.e., having not started to germinate], because of the consequence that [the effects, i.e., the sprout and so forth] would be without a cause [because the seed had not reached the state of causal efficacy]. In reliance on what, then, would there be the otherness of conditions, etc.? For only when two things exist [at the same time, for example the persons] Maitra and Upagupta, is there otherness with regard to each other; but there is not similarly the simultaneity of seed and sprout. Therefore, when an own-being of effects is not existing, there is not other-being, [i.e.,] the otherness of seeds and so forth. Thus, precisely on account of [the fact that] a designation as ‘other’ is not [possible], there is not arising from other.”

28 In other words, “the effects’ action of non-arising” is characterized by “the
This interpretation is closely related to the reading of the following segment, where argument 2 is introduced as an alternative. The first sentence can be read in two ways according to [1] the Sanskrit manuscript and [2] the Tibetan translation, respectively:

Alternatively, the verse means (ity arthah) that [1] when [the conditions] have no modification (yadā tv avikaraṇe [*ne / Ms.] tadā) [or] [2] when [the locative prayayādiśu means] locus [i.e., adhikaraṇasaptamī] (gang gi tshe gzhi yin pa de′i tshe, *yadā [tv] adhikaraṇe tadā), the own-being of effects does not exist in conditions and so forth in the manner that a jujube fruit [does exist] in a bowl (kuṇḍe badaranyāyenā). And whatever does not exist in a certain place does not arise from there (yac ca yatra nāsti na tat tasmād utpadyate) like sesame oil [which does not exist] in sands [does not arise from sand] (yathā sikatāḥhyah tailam).

The formula “whatever does not exist in a certain place does not arise from there” explains the inevitable connection between the reason or argument 2, “the non-existence of an own-being of effects in conditions,” and the conclusion that things do not arise from the conditions that are others. Thus, it is apparent that here Candrakīrti reads the locative prayayādiśu in the sense of locus. The translators Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and Tilakakalaśa must have read the Sanskrit word adhikaraṇa in its locative form (i.e., adhikaraṇe) in the manuscripts they used, or intentionally replaced avikaraṇe with gzhi (*adhikaraṇe). Jayānanda also has gzhi (*adhikaraṇe) and reads it in the sense of adhikaraṇasaptamī.

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29 I interpret the Sanskrit word tu in yadā tv avikaraṇe (or *adhikaraṇe) tadā, which has no correspondence in the Tibetan version, as introducing an alternative reading of MMK I.3.

30 MABh 93, 14–18: gang gi tshe gzhi yin pa de′i tshe′bras bu rnams kyi rang bzhin rkyen la sogs pa dag la ′khar gzhong dang rgya shug ltar yod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba′i don to || gang zhiq gang na med pa de ni de las skye ba ma yin te | dper na bye ma dag la til mar bzhin te ′

31 MAT D135alf.: gang gi tshe gzhi yin pas de′i tshe ni zhes bya ba ni rkyen la sogs pa rnams la bdun pa′i tshig ni gzhi ston par byed par ′dod na′o zhes pa′o || ′di′i don ni ′di yin te ′bdun pa′i don gnyis te | de yod na yod par mthson pa dang | rten gyi don to || de la dang po′i dbang du byas pa′i bshad pa ni sngag ma bzhin no || rten gyi dbang du byas pa′i bshad pa ni phyi ma bzhin no ||. “[The sentence] ‘when it is locus’ means that when one admits that the seventh case ‘in conditions and so forth’ shows locus. This means the following: There are two meanings of the seventh, ‘by the action [another] action is indicated,’ and ‘support.’ Of the
Hence, it seems natural and plausible to adopt the second reading with *gzhì*, by which the alternative reading of the verse could be smoothly introduced.\(^{32}\)

Candrakīrti cites MMK I.12 in order to confirm the correctness of his formula, “whatever does not exist in a certain place does not arise from there”:

[Nāgārjuna] says [in MMK I.12], “But if the effect, while not existing [in conditions], originates from conditions, why does [it] originate from non-conditions too?”\(^{33}\) Accordingly, the view of locus (ādhārapakṣa) is very well explained by the teacher [Nāgārjuna] in the verse[s]. Hence, [I] do not explain [this here].\(^{34}\)

The verse can be construed as a *prasaṅga* reasoning for indicating an absurd consequence that an effect would arise from non-conditions. Candrakīrti is demonstrating that with this *prasaṅga*, Nāgārjuna already explained the position that the effect which does not exist in a locus does not arise from there.

Now I would like to briefly mention Kamalaśīla’s discussion in his MĀ, where he adduces MMK I.1 and thoroughly refutes various possibilities that ultimately things arise from something other—whether it

\[^{32}\text{If one adopts the Sanskrit manuscript reading with \textit{avikaraṇe}, it may imply that the conditions’ non-modification precludes the existence of the own-being of effects in conditions. However, unlike \textit{avikṛta}(rūpa) in other passages in the PsP and MABh (see fns. 22, 24 and 27), the word \textit{avikaraṇe} can hardly qualify \textit{pratyayādiṣu}, which appears just after \textit{tadā} (yadā tv avikarane tadā pratyayādiṣu kūnde badaranyāyena svabhāvaḥ kāryāṇāṃ na sambhavatiḥ arthāḥ). On the other hand, one may further emend the reading \textit{avikaraṇe} to \textit{adhikaraṇe}, for, according to Anne MacDonald, when –\textit{dh} in this manuscript is written with a minimal upper opening, it is easily mistaken for –\textit{v}; –\textit{dh} in the exemplar relied on by the manuscript’s scribe may also have occasionally had only a minimal opening. If this was the case for the \textit{akṣara}dhi (of adhikarane) in the exemplar, it could have easily been read and copied into the extant manuscript as \textit{vi}.}\]

\[^{33}\text{Cf. trans. MacDonald 2015a: 338 and n. 616.}\]

\[^{34}\text{MABh 93, 19–94, 5:} \]

\begin{verbatim}
ci ste de ni med par yang || rkyen de dag las skyes ’gyur na ||
rkyen ma yin pa dag las kyang || ci yi phyir na skye mi ’gyur ||

(MMK I.12: athāsad api tat tebhyaḥ pratyayebhyah pravartate |
phalam apratyayebhyo ’pi kasmān nābhīpravartate ||)
zhes ji skad gsungs pa yin no || de’i phyir rten gyi phyogs ’di ni slob dpon nyid kyis tshigs su bcad pa sbyangs kho nas ches legs par rnam par phye bas nye bar ma bkod do ||.
\end{verbatim}
The negation of arising from other in the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā* is permanent or impermanent. It is a long discussion, but he consistently emphasizes that the origination is impossible because neither in the past, future, nor present is a cause capable of producing an effect that exists in reality. The underlying idea is apparently Dharmakīrti’s (7th cent.) definition of a real entity (**paramārtha**) as being capable of producing an effect (**arthakriyāsamartha**). Kamalaśīla accepts this idea as worldly convention but ultimately rejects it. Moving beyond the context of the MMK and the MMK’s commentarial tradition, he devotes a large portion of his argument to refuting the causal relation between momentary entities.

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35 *MĀ* D192a6–198b7, P210b7–218b6. I am indebted to Akira Sato of Waseda University for valuable suggestions concerning the reading of this section. A similar discussion is found in the twenty-first chapter called *Traikālyaparīkṣā* of the *Tattvasaṃgraha* and *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. Cf., e.g., Shiga 2015 and 2016. In the following I summarize Kamalaśīla’s argument in his MĀ: First, things do not arise from a permanent other because something permanent is capable of producing an effect neither gradually nor simultaneously (**rim dang rim ma yin pa dag gis don byed pa mi nus pa**, i.e., *kramākramenārthakriyāsamartha*) (**MĀ** D192a6–193b2, P210b7–212a7: *gzhan las kyang ma yin te* | *di ltar de las dngos po skye bar ’gyur na rtag pa’am* (P) | *mi rtag pa’i ngo bo zhig las ’gyur grangs* (P grang) na | *re zhig rtag pa las ni tha snayad du yang de rigs pa ma yin te* | *de ni rim dang rim ma yin pa dag gis don byed par mi ’ihad pa’i phyir ro* | ...). Second, things do not arise from an impermanent other, because neither an impermanent other in the past nor that in the future is capable of producing an effect, for they do not exist (**MĀ** D193b4–194b7, P212b2–214a1: *de la re zhig ’das pa las zhes bya ba ni rigs pa ma yin te* | *’das pa ni med pa’i phyir ro* | ...; **MĀ** D194b7–195a4, P214a1–6: *ma ’ongs pa las kyang ma yin te* | *de yang ’das pa bzhin du med pa’i phyir te* | *’di ltar bdag nyid du ma red pa’i phyir ma ’ongs pa zhes bya ba na de lta bu nam mkha’i padma dang ’dra ba gang yin pa de las ni ’bras bu skye bar rigs pa ma yin no* | ...). Third, things do not arise from the present impermanent other either, because, if the cause exists at the same time (**dus mnyam pa**) as its effect, the cause that did not exist before the effect is unable to produce the existing effect, and because, if the cause exists at a different time (**dus tha dad pa**) than its effect, it is either in the past or in the future that does not exist (**MĀ** D195a4–197a4, P214a6–216b5: *da ltar gyi las zhes bya ba’i phyogs kyang ma yin te* | *’di ltar de las ’bras bu dang par skye na dus mnyam pa’am* | *dus tha dad pa zhig tu skye bar ’gyur grang na* | *re zhig dus mnyam pa ni ma yin te* | *’bras bu skye ba’i sngon rol na rgyu yang ri bong gi rwa bzhin du med pa niy kyis nus par mi rung pa’i phyir ro* | ...; **MĀ** D197b4–198a3, P217a1–2: *ma ’ongs pa las yod pa yin na de lta na ma ’ongs pa kho na las ’byung bar ’gyur te* | *de yang rigs pa ma yin par snagar bstan zin to* | *’on te skad cig ma gzan gyis chod pa’i ’og tu yin na ni de’i tshe de ’das pa kho na las ’gyur te* | *de yang rigs pa ma yin no zhes snagar bshad zin to* | *ji (P ci) ste ma chod pa yin na ni de gnyis bdaq nyid thams cad kyis ma chod pa’i phyir dus mnyam pa niy du thal bar ’gyur ro* | ...). Concerning the present impermanent cause, Kamalaśīla argues at length against various ideas of causal relation between momentary entities. See also Yoshimizu 2021.

36 Cf., e.g., PV I.166ab: *sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamāḥ* |; PV III.3ab: *arthakriyāsamarthaṃ yat tad atra paramārthasat*.
(kṣaṇīka) that are considered to be real. This was definitely a new stage in the negation of arising in the history of Madhyamaka thought, which encouraged later interpreters to further expand the scope of the discussion.

Just before closing his argument, Kamalaśīla cites MMK I.3 (MĀ D198b3, P218b1f.). Although he expresses his own Madhyamaka position that neither existence nor non-existence (dngos po, dngos po med pa, *bhāva, abhāva) are ultimately established, on the conventional level, he accepts things’ arising from something other. Therefore, he insists that MMK I.3 was taught for the purpose of refuting non-Buddhists who considered otherness as a real entity. Namely, following Bhāviveka, Kamalaśīla accepts argument 3 only in the sense of the non-existence of ultimate otherness. He also defends Bhāviveka’s inferential proof with the logical reason of otherness or argument 1, noting that otherness is established on the conventional level. It seems that, for Kamalaśīla, the non-existence of otherness is not the best argument against arising from other; the best argument is rather the non-existence of a real cause, which annihilates any kind of arising.

Summarizing the arguments against arising from other that Indian Madhyamaka interpreters constructed from Nāgārjuna’s verses, there are three:

**Argument 1** (otherness) from MMK I.1 used by Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti

37 MĀ D197a4f., P216b5f.: kho bo cag la ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa la sogs pa ’di thams cad don dam par ma grub ste | de ni dngos po dang dngos po med pa la sogs pa spros pa’i dri ba (P dra ba) mtha’ dag dang bral ba’i phyir ro ||

38 MĀ D198b3–7, P218a8–218b6: mu stegs can gzhan rnams (D mu stegs can rnams) gzhan la sogs pa’i tha snyad kyi rgyu ni dngos su gzhan nyid la sogs pa’i dngos po de lta bu kho na yin par brjod pa de dag la slob dpon gys | dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin ni | rkyen la sogs pa yod ma yin | (MMK I.3ab) zhes bya ba la sogs pa sun dbyung bar bshad de | de’i phyir de gzhung lugs kyi gzhan nyid ma grub pas gzhan las mi skye’o zhes bstan par ’gyur ro | gang dag gzhan la sogs pa’i sgra brtags pa’i sphyod yul gyi don can yang brgyud pas dngos po mthar thug pa kho na rjod (P brjod) par byed pa de dag kyang dngos po’i rang bzhin du rkyen la yod na skye ba ma yin no zhes sgongs nas sun dbyung (P phyung) ba yin te ji litar rkyen la sogs pa la yod na don dam par dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin skye ba med pa de bzhin du rgyas par bstan ma thag pa yin no | de’i phyir gang gi tshe dngos po thams cad don dam par gzhan las skye ba mi ’thad pa kho na yin pa de’i tshe rkyen la sogs pa yang ma skyes pa’i phyir ma grub pa yin pas yang dag par na gang la sgra’ ’di mthar thug par ’gyur pa gzhan du gyur pa’i dngos po ni ci yang med do | de’i phyir yang dag par de lta bu’i tha snyad ma grub (P grub) tu zin kyang | ’on kyang dngos po la ni gnod pa med pa kho na’o zhes smras pa gang yin pa de’i rigs pa ma yin pa nyid do ||

39 Kamalaśīla quotes Bhāviveka’s first inferential proof, cited above in fn. 10, and defends it by confirming that it has no logical fault (MĀ D198a6–198b3, P218a4–8).
in the form of *prasaṅga*, and Bhāviveka in the form of [*svatantra*] *anumāna*, and accepted by Kamalaśīla.

**Argument 2** (the non-existence of an own-being of effects in conditions) from MMK I.3 used by Bhāviveka in the form of [*svatantra*] *anumāna* and Candrakīrti in the form of [*paraprasiddha*] *anumāna* for refuting other Buddhists.

**Argument 3** (the non-existence of other-being) from MMK I.3 used by Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti in the form of [*paraprasiddha*] *anumāna* for refuting other Buddhists, and accepted by Kamalaśīla only for the purpose of refuting non-Buddhists.

With regard to their logical formulations, it may be possible to distinguish between the Buddhapālita–Candrakīrti line and the Bhāviveka–Kamalaśīla line, which correspond respectively to the so-called Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika lineages of the Madhyamaka tradition. In an additional but very important step, Kamalaśīla integrates his own criticism of the causal relation between ultimately real entities into this Madhyamaka context.

**Zhang Thang sang pa on the negation of arising from other**

Referring to the Indian sources, the first Tibetan interpreters of the MMK, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags and his student Zhang Thang sang pa 'Byung gnas ye shes, worked on the negation of arising from other drawing on a broader perspective. I would first like to introduce Zhang Thang sang pa’s *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, because he systematically constructs his discussion based on Candrakīrti’s analysis of MMK I.3.

Zhang Thang sang pa proposes two arguments against arising from other, i.e., “things do not arise from something other because they do not exist [in conditions]” (*med pas mi skye ba*) (*argument 2*), and “things do not arise from something other because the other does not exist” (*gzhan med pas mi skye ba*) (*argument 3*). This is in accordance with the two-way reading of the locative *pratyayādiṣu* in MMK I.3 which Jayānanda and presumably Candrakīrti also advanced.\(^{40}\) Zhang Thang

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\(^{40}\) *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, Part II: 62 (37a1f.): *tshig bcad ‘di la bshad pa gnyis ste* | *med pas mi skye ba dang* | *gzhan med pas mi skye ba’o* | *dang po ltar na phyed dang pos phyogs chos bsgrub ‘og mas gzhann grags byed pa’o* | *dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhi ni* | *rkyen lasogs (la) (Ms. pa) yod ma yin* | *ces pa’o* | *dngos po ni ‘bras bu’i dngos po’o* | *sogs kyi bsdu bya ni rkyen ’das pa dang so so ba lasogs pa’o* | *la ces pa ni gzhi’i bdun pa’o (“adhikaranāsaptam”)* | “There are two [ways to] explain this verse: [1] [Things do] not arise [from something other] because they do not exist [in conditions]. [2] [Things do] not arise [from
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Sag pa’s interpretation is remarkable because he elaborates on the logical structure of the verse along with the rule of the Buddhist logicians Dignāga (5th–6th cent.) and Dharmakīrti: The first half of the verse (i.e., MMK I.3ab) presents a logical reason’s being in the subject (phyogs chos, pakṣadharmatā), and the second half (i.e., MMK I.3cd) makes an other-acknowledged inference (gzhan grags, paraprasiddha).  

For the pakṣadharmatā of argument 2, he makes the following thesis statement (dam bca’, pratijñā):

It is said [in the first half of the verse] that the own-being of things that are effects does not exist in/on conditions. A thesis statement is [given as follows:] It is not [the case] that effects exist in/on conditions like a jujube fruit’s being in a copper bowl.

something other] because there is not something other. Following the first [explanation], the first half [of the verse] establishes [the logical reason’s being] a quality of the subject (*pakṣadharma) and the second half makes an other-acknowledged [inference] (*paraprasiddha). It is said that ‘an own-being of things does not exist in conditions and so forth.’ ‘Things’ are the things that are effects. That which is integrated by [the words] ‘and so forth’ is the collection of conditions, individual conditions, and so forth. [The word] ‘in’ is the seventh [case in the sense of] locus.”; ibid. : 64 (37a8–37b1) : *bshad pa gnyis pa ltar yang rkang pa dang pos sngar dang ’dra | gnyis {pa’i} la ni yod pa’i don gyi bdun pa ste | rkyen yod pa’i tshe na yod pa ma yin ces pa’o || [...] des phyogs chos bsgrubs nas phyed ’og mas gzhan grags te | ’bras bu’i bdag gi dngos po rkyen yod pa’i tshe na yod pa ma yin te med na | gzhan nyid yod pa ma yin no ||. “Following the second explanation as well, the first quarter (*pāda) [establishes] the same [pakṣadharmatā] as in the previous [explanation]. [The word] ‘in’ in the second [quarter] is the seventh [case in the sense of] existence (*satsaptamī), which means that when conditions exist, [the effect] does not exist. [...] After thereby establishing [the reason’s being] a quality of the subject, the second half [makes] an other-acknowledged [inference]. Own-being of effects does not exist when conditions exist. If there is not [an own-being], an other-being does not exist.”

Zhang Thang sag pa apparently applies Candrakīrti’s explanation of the locative absolute on the grounds of Pāṇini II.3.37 in the MABh to the locative pratayādīsu in MMK I.3b. Curiously, he suggests the third interpretation in the sense of object (i.e., yul gyi bdun pa, viṣayasaptamī). He simply comments that this interpretation is correct, but it is a repetition of argument 2, “non-arising [from other] because of the non-existence [of things’ own-being in conditions]” (med pas mi skye ba), such that he does not make another head line (sa gcod) for this (ibid.: 64 [37a8]: *la yul gyi bdun par byas pa’i bshad pa de legs mod kyi | sag gi med pas mi skye zhes ston pa dang zlos so || des na ‘di la sa gcod kyi ming ma byas so ||).  

41 Ibid.: 62 (37a1f.) cited above in fn. 40.

42 Zhang Thang sag pa uses the expressions steng na and theg na (37a2), which matches the English preposition “on” rather than “in,” supposedly to indicate the locative in the sense of locus (gzhi, adhikarana).

43 Ibid.: 63 (37a2f.): ’bras bu’i dngos po rnams kyi rang bzhin ni rkyen gyi steng na yod pa ma yin ces bya ba’o || dper na ‘khar gzhong gi nang na rgya šug yod pa liar rkyen gyi theg na ’bras bu yod pa ma yin ces dam bcas pa’o ||.
“The non-existence of an own-being of things” (i.e., argument 2) is the logical reason that qualifies the subject, “conditions.” This pakṣadharmatā is confirmed for two reasonings (‘thad pa, upapatti) in the form of prasaṅga as taught by Candrakīrti in his PsP: If own-being existed in conditions, it would be apprehended, and its arising would be pointless.44 Thus, having established pakṣadharmatā, the second half of the verse states the consequence (thalmabrisjodpa), which he formulates as follows:

According to the Prāsaṅgika, [MMK I.3cd] teaches an other-acknowledged [inference]:

Whatever does not exist does not arise, like a rabbit’s horn. [This sentence states a pervasion (khyab pa, vyāpti) with an example (dpe, dṛṣṭānta)].

Because things that are effects do not exist [in conditions] either, they do not arise [from them]. [This sentence states a logical reason (gtan tshigs, hetu) and consequence].45

Here, Zhang Thang sag pa follows Candrakīrti in reading the word gzhan (para) in MMK I.3d in the sense of the ablative (gzhan las, parebhaya) and dngos (bhāva) in the sense of “arising” (‘byung ba, utpāda).46

This is an other-acknowledged inference (paraprasiddhānumāna) because Candrakīrti or the Prāsaṅgika disproves “arising” on account of “non-existence” (med pas mi skye ba) just for the purpose of negating


45 Ibid.: 63 (37a6): thal ’gyur ba ltar na gzhan grags te | gang dang gang med pa de dang de mi skye ste ri bong gi rwa bzhin ‘bras bu’i dngos po yang med pas mi skye ces bstan to ].

46 Ibid.: 63 (37a4f.): phyogs chos bsgrubs nas thal ba brjod pa bdag gi dngos po yod min na | gzhan dngos yod pa ma yin no zhes so || bdag gi dngos po ni ‘bras bu’i bdag gi dngos po’o | yod min ni rkyen gyi steng na yod pa min pa’o || gzhan dang dngos po’i bar na las ces pa’i tshig ma mngon pa yin pas | gzhan las dngos po yod ma yin ces so || dngos po ni bha ba na bha ba ces pa’ byung pas na dngos po yin pas gzhan las ’byung pa ma yin no ces pa’o ||. “Having established [the logical reason’s being] a quality of the subject, a consequence is stated: ‘When own-being does not exist, other-being does not exist.’ ‘Own-being’ is the own-being of effects. ‘Own-being does not exist’ [means] that it does not exist on/in conditions. Since the [ablative] word ‘from’ is not explicit between the [words] ‘other’ and ‘being,’ it reads that ‘being/dngos po is not from others.’ dngos po is [explained] as bhavanam bhāva, that is, ‘because of arising it is being.’ Hence, it is said that it does not arise from something other.” Cf. PsP D26b1, P29b5: ’byung bas na dngos po ste skye ba’o; I: 279, 4: bhavanam bhāva utpādaḥ.
the other’s assertion, not to establish his own position.\(^{47}\) The Prāsaṅgika does not even intend to establish mere negation (*dgag pa tsam*) as his own probandum (*sgrub bya, sādhya*).\(^{48}\) Zhang Thang sag pa contrasts such a Prāsaṅgika position with that of the “three masters from the East” (*shar gsum pa*, i.e., Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla),\(^{49}\) for they prove the negation as their own thesis via an independent inference (*svatantrānumāna*).\(^{50}\) Zhang Thang sag pa seems to have been well versed in Kamalaśīla’s MĀ. He even uses it as a support. Regarding the other-acknowledged inference cited above, he says that the pervasion—whatever does not exist does not arise—is established because the MĀ has refuted the objection that a non-existent thing arises from a cause.\(^{51}\)

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\(^{47}\) In Zhang Thang sag pa’s view, the Prāsaṅgika employs *prasāṅga* and *paraprasiddhānumāna* when *pakṣadharmatā* as well as pervasion (*vyāpti*) of a logical reason are established for the opponent and hypothetically accepted (*khas blangs, abhyupagata*) by the Prāsaṅgika proponent. See *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, Part I: 58f. (13a7–13b4), cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2006: 85f.

\(^{48}\) Zhang Thang sag pa says (ibid.: 64f. [15a2f.]): *shar gsum pa gcig dang du bral gyis gcig dang du ma’i dngos po bkag nas dngos po bkag pa’i bkag pa zhig ’dod la / dbu ma pa ’di ni bkag pa de lta bu yang mi ’dod de | ci yang ma yin par ’dod pas khas blangs gang yang med do | ran ma pa gcig du na khas blangs pa tsam gyis dam bcar mi ’gyur te | sgrub byar khas blangs na dam bcar ’gro la | dbu’ ma pas sgrub byar khas ma blangs pa’i phyir nyes pa med do |. “After negating single and many entity/entities by means of [the logical reason of] being neither one nor many (*ekānekaviyoga*), the three [masters from] the East accept the negation [in the sense] of negating entities. However, this Mādhyamika [i.e., Prāsaṅgika] does not even accept this kind of negation. [He] has nothing to be accepted (*abhypagata*), because he asserts that it is nothing. Alternatively, a mere acceptance does not become a thesis (*pratijñā*). Although it becomes a thesis if one accepts something as probandum (*sādhya*), the Mādhyamika has no fault because he does not accept anything as probandum.” A similar idea is stated by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags in his *dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka* 11a9 cited in Dreyfus/Tsering 2010: 402, n. 25, and in Yoshimizu 2013: 421, n. 19.

\(^{49}\) These three masters are generally regarded as the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika. However, Zhang Thang sag pa does not regard those who employ an independent inference (*svatantrānumāna* as genuine Mādhyamikas (*dbu ma pa*). See Yoshimizu 2006: 79–83 and *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, Part I: Introduction, xviii.

\(^{50}\) *dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka*, Part II: 63 (37a5f.): *don ’di yin te shar gsum pa ltar na yod med skye ’gag gi med pas skye ba ’gog pa ston pa yin te | med pas mi skye ces ston pa’o |. “The meaning [of MMK I.3cd] is as follows: According to the three [masters from] the East (i.e., Jñānagarbha, Śāntarakṣita, and Kamalaśīla), it teaches the negation of arising on account of the non-existence that is the non-existence [as the negation of] existence, [and] the arising [is the negation of] perishing.”

\(^{51}\) Ibid.: 64 (37a8): *yang na med pa rgyu las skye zer na dbu ma snang pa’i chod ma chod kyi lhag pas bkag pas khyab pa grub pa’o |. “Moreover, if one says that a non-existent [thing] arises from a cause, it is refuted by residual [force of the refutation of] the interrupted and uninterrupted [arisings of an effect] in the MĀ.
Moreover, explaining the non-existence of other-being (i.e., argument 3), he employs the example of a pair of right and left horns as simultaneous existents, which does not appear in the earlier Madhyamaka commentaries but appears in the MĀ.\textsuperscript{52}

In this manner, on the one hand, Zhang Thang sag pa closely follows Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the verse, but on the other hand, he incorporates Dharmakīrtian logic in the framework of Madhyamaka.

Hence, the pervasion [of being non-existent by non-arising] is established.”
This might refer to Kamalaśīla’s following discussion, where he refutes the opponent’s assertion that a cause and its effect are not simultaneous because the effect arises with the non-existence of the cause uninterruptedly after the cause has perished (MĀ D197a5f., P216b–8): gang la ma chod pa la sogs pa yang dag par 'gyur pa dngos po med pa zhes bya ba ni tha snayd du yang ‘gai’ yang med do || ‘on kyang dus phyi mar dngos po’i rang gi ngo bo dga’ pa tsam la gdags pa de ltar byas te | de yang bar med par ci yang mi ‘byung ste | med pa ‘ba’ zhig tu zad do | dga’ pa tsam ni ci yang ma yin pa’i phyir de dang lhan cig don dam pa’i (P don dam pa bri’i) ma chod pa la sogs pa’i bsam pa mi ’jug pa’i phyir ro || ‘[You] assert a non-existent real thing that uninterruptedly succeeds something [else, i.e., a cause] and so forth. It does not even conventionally exist at all. However, the mere perishing of a thing’s own nature is later named as such [i.e., a non-existent thing]. That is, nothing can arise uninterruptedly; it is only a mere non-existent. Because an idea that an ultimate [thing arises] with [an effect] uninterruptedly and so on cannot occur, for a mere negation is nothing [existent], [for us, neither existence nor non-existence is ultimately established.]’’ Cf. also MĀ D196b7–197a1, P216a8f.: gang gi tshe rgyu ma zhig pa de’i tse ’bras bu med pa’i phyir de ji ltar ma zhig pa las ‘byung bar ‘gyur ||. “When a cause has not perished, [its] effect does not exist. Therefore, how is it possible that the [effect] arises from the [cause that] has not perished?”

\textsuperscript{52} dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka, Part II: 64 (37a9): dus gcig na rigs pas kyang gnod de | ‘bras bu rgyu med du thal | dus gcig pa’i phyir ro | rwa g.yas gyon ltar yod na ‘bras bu la rgyu phan ma btags pas rgyu med du ’gyur ro ||. “If [one considers them to] be simultaneous, it is refuted by a correct argument (rigs pa). Namely, it follows that the effect would have no cause, because they are simultaneous. If they existed [simultaneously] like [a pair of] right and left horns, the effect would have no cause because the cause does not assist the effect.” However, one should note that Kamalaśīla uses the example of a pair of right and left horns for simultaneous existence in order to show the pervasion that those which have no intervening time in between are necessarily simultaneous. Kamalaśīla is arguing that an effect does not arise from the other which is present because they are simultaneous. See also his inferential proof based on svabhāvahetu in MĀ D196a4f., P215b2f.: sbyor ba ni gang dag dus gzhans gyis bdag nyid thams cad ma chod pa de dag la (P) snon gyi dus nyid dang phyi ma’i dus nyid med de | dper na rwa gyas pa dang gyon pa dag lta bu’o | rgyu dang ’bras bu dag kyang dus gzhans gyis bdag nyid thams cad kyi ma chod pa rang bzhin gya gni tshigs yin no ||. “Any [two things] which are uninterrupted in their entirety (bdag nyid thams cad kyi, *sarvātmanā) by another time have neither preceding time nor succeeding time, [that is, they are simultaneous], like right and left horns. Cause and effect are also uninterrupted in their entirety by another time. [This is] the nature as logical reason (*svabhāvahetu).”
commentaries and broadens the range of his discussion by making good use of Kamalaśīla’s MĀ. Hence, one should say that his interpretation is built on the complex foundation of three different scholastic systems—Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika, Kamalaśīla’s Svātantrika, and Dharmakīrti’s logic. The negation of arising from other became a topic that was discussed using diverse Buddhist philosophical approaches.

Pa tshab Nyi ma grags on the negation of arising from other

Compared with his student Zhang Thang sag pa, Pa tshab Nyi ma grags conducts a much freer exploration in his earlier work, dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka. In contrast, in his later work Tshig gsal ba’i dka’ ba bshad pa, he only provides a concise discussion that introduces argument 2 and argument 3.

Further investigation is required for clarifying Kamalaśīla’s influence on Zhang Thang sag pa’s discussion. In his commentary on MMK I.1, Zhang Thang sag pa also cites a variety of arguments for negating the arising from other, but his sources are unknown (see dBu ma tshig gsal gyi ti ka, Part I: 109 [24b4f.]).

Tshig gsal ba’i dka’ ba bshad pa 66a20–22 [159]: lan la gsum | rgyu la ’bras bu med pas rkyen gzh an las byang ba dgag pa dang | rgyu ’bras bu mnyam pa yin pas gzh an nyid dgag pa dang | don bsd u ba’o | dang po ni bshad par bya ste (=PsP I: 278, 6: [atra] ucyate) ces pa lasogs pa’o | gnyis pa ni rnam pa cig tu na (=PsP I: 279, 7: atha vā) zhes bya ba lasogs pa’o | gsum pa ni de’i phyir gzh an du zhes bya ba (=PsP I: 280, 2f.: tasmād ... paravyapadeśa- ...) lasogs pa’o |. “There are three [topics] with regard to the answer [to the objection presented in MMK I.2]. [1] The negation of arising from other conditions on the grounds that effect does not exist in cause. [2] The negation of otherness on the ground that a cause and [its] effect are simultaneous. [3] Summary. [Candrakīrti explains] the first [by the sentences] ‘to be explained’ and so on. [Candrakīrti explains] the second [by the sentences] ‘alternatively’ and so on. The third is [explained by the sentences] ‘Therefore, as other’ and so on.’

With regard to the negation of arising from other taught in MMK I.1, the Tshig gsal ba’i dka’ ba bshad pa also gives a similar explanation (62b7–12 [152]): gzh an las skye ba myed pa’i ’thad pa la gnyis te | dam bca ba dang | ’thad pa sbyar ba’o | dang po ni dkyus ma nyid (=PsP I: 191, 3: prakṛtam eva) ces pas bsnyad de | dpe ni nyes sbas las byams pa gzh an yin zer ba ni dngos po’i chos yin la | ’brel bar byed pa rgyu’i gnas skabs na ’brel ba ’bras bu med la | gal te yod na rgyu don med par ’gyur ro | de’i phyir rgyu dang ’bras bu dngos po so sor ma grub pa’i phyir na gzh an myed do zhes bya ba’o | gnyis pa ’thad pa sbyar ba las ’chad par ’gyur ba’i ’thad pa sbyar ba ni ’di yang (=PsP I: 191, 4: etad ca) zhes bya ba lasogs pa’o | thams cad las thams cad skye bar ni mi ’gyur te | ’on kyang rgyu’i nus pas ’bras bu skye’d pa’i nus pa yod pa las ’bras bu skye’o zhe na | de ni mi rigs te rgyu ’bras bu las gzh an yin pa de bzhin du thams cad la (read: las) yang gzh an yin pa’i phyir ces pa’i rgyu mtshan mthungs pa’i phyir ro |. “There are two [topics] with regard to the argument for the non-arising from other: Proposing a thesis and applying an argument. [Candrakīrti] states the first [by the sentences] ‘just the main topic.’ An example is that Upagupta
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The *dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka* is said to have been composed under the guidance of the Kashmiri paṇḍit Hasumati/Mahāsumati, presumably when Pa tshab studied in Kashmir. His manner of writing gives a strong impression of it having indeed been a record of an Indian teacher’s oral instructions. It is exciting to see that the author collects various ideas from Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, Candrakīrti, Dharmakīrti, Kamalaśīla, and even non-Buddhists. First, he introduces four essential points (*don bzhi*, 14a4) with regard to MMK I.1. I summarize this as follows:

A. Negation by *prasaṅga* in accordance with Nāgārjuna’s original intention: “If there were arising from other, it follows that a non-existent thing (*med pa*) would arise. [However, a non-existent thing cannot arise. Therefore, there is no arising from other.]”

B. Criticism of Bhāviveka’s independent inference (*rang rgyud, svatantra-[anumāna]*): [Bhāviveka:] “Ultimately, the inner bases (*nang gi skye mched rnams, ādhyātmikāny āyatanāni*) do not arise from something other, because they are other (*gzhan yin pa’i phyir*), just as a pot that is other does not arise from visual faculty (*mig, cakṣus*) and so on.”

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55 For details, see Yoshimizu 2016: 648–650.
56 Since Pa tshab’s discussion is too extensive and requires further careful investigation, in the present paper, I will confine myself to summarizing his points. The texts will be cited in footnotes.
57 *dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka* 14a4–6 [55]: *dang po gzhan las skye ba that ’gyur gyi sgo nas ’gog pa slob dpon gyi khungs dang sbyar te bshad pa ni | gzhan las skye na yod pa skye ba’i phyogs yin la | de yang gal te gzhan las skye ’gyur na | de med pa skye bar ’gyur ces that bas dgag go*.
[Criticism:] “It is not contradictory that visual consciousness (mig gi rnam shes, cakṣurvijñāna) arises from the visual faculty but a pot does not, because the visual faculty has the ability to produce a visual consciousness.”

C. Buddhápālita’s prasaṅga: “The inner bases do not arise from something other, because they do not exist (med pa yin pa’i phyir). If they would arise even though being non-existent, it follows that a pot and so on would also arise from the visual faculty.”

D. Candrakīrti’s rejoinder to Bhāviveka’s criticism of Buddhápālita’s prasaṅga: “Even though it remains as prasaṅga without being reversed, there are no such faults. This is not a proof (bsgrub pa, sādhana) but a refutation (sun ’byin, dūṣaṇa).”

Of these four points, we can trace the sources of Bhāviveka’s inference in point B and the dispute between Bhāviveka and Buddhápālita-Candrakīrti stated in point D back to the PP and PsP. Point B contains argument 1
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(otherness) from Bhāviveka’s inference. Although points A and C contain argument 2 (the non-existence of effects in conditions), it is hard to literally identify the prasāṅga formula in the Indian texts. It is also unknown who criticized Bhāviveka in point B. Pa tshab sets forth four similar points in the same order with regard to the negation of arising from self (13a12–14a4). Since he knew the chronological order of the Indian commentaries on the MMK, these four essential points do not explain the historical sequence of the debate among the early Madhyamaka masters, but rather show the important phases of the debate and difference in argument between the Svātantrika master Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgikas including Nāgārjuna himself.

Pa tshab characterizes the statement of MMK I.1—where he incorporates these four essential points—as the presentation of probandum (bsgrub pa, sādhya, 14b16) or thesis (dam bca’, pratijñā, 5b1). Other verses (MMK I.2–14) provide reasoning (’thad pa, upapatti, 14b17) for refuting the objection stated in MMK I.2. MMK I.3 and 4 negate collective conditions (’dus pa rkyen yin pa dgag pa, 15a7), and MMK I.3 particularly negates arising dependent on things that are conditions other than effects (rkyen gzhan gyi dngos po la ltos pa dgag pa, 15a7). Pa tshab elucidates the meaning of the words (tshig gi don) of MMK I.3 as follows:

A thing that is an effect does not exist when a cause [exists]. Therefore, because the effect itself, which is dependent [on the cause], is not established, the condition itself is—as long as [it is a condition] in dependence on this [effect]—not established. Consequently, arising from other is not tenable.

His point is that arising from other does not hold because effect and condition are not established as such.

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61 See dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka 3b6–9, cited and translated in Yoshimizu 2016: 650.

62 According to Pa tshab, this is the objection from the Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika and Cittamātravādin (14b17f. [56]: sde pa gnyis pa dang sems tsam pa na re), and MMK I. 3 is the refutation of the Cittamātravādin and Sautrāntika, whereas MMK I. 4 is the refutation of the Vaibhāṣika (15b17–19 de ni sems tsam pa dang mdo sde pa rkyen gzhana dngos po ltsos pa dgag pa’o | bya brag smra ba na re | mig shes lla bu ni rkyen las mi skye ba’i skye ba zhes bya ba ‘bras bu dang rkyen bzhi las dngos (Ms. rungs) po tha dad pa skye ba zhes bya ba gcig las skye’o zhe na | zhes ’dod pa ‘gog pa’i sgo nas bya ba gzhana gyi dngos po las skye ba ‘gog pa ni | bya ba rkyen dang la sogs pa [= MMK I. 4]).

63 dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka 15a9f. [57]: ‘bras bu’i dngos po ni rgyu’i dus na med pas | ltsos pa ‘bras bu rang ma grub pas de la ltos na ni | rkyen rang ma grub pas gzhana las skye bar mi ‘thad ces pa’o |.

64 This is somewhat closer to the statement of MMK I.5 than what commentators
His discussion is then expanded in the next section entitled “explanation through sentences” (ngag gi sgo nas bshad pa, 15a9). Although Pa tshab uses the term ngag (*vākya), he is actually formulating epistemological inquiries in relation to the theory of causality that have no direct connection with the statements of the MMK. Pa tshab first demonstrates that there is no valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) that proves the existence of cause and effect, and then he shows that there are valid cognitions that negate (gnod byed kyi tshad ma, bādhakapramāṇa) arising from other (15a10). Here are his arguments, which I have extracted from the text:

1a: Neither a single direct perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) nor many (du ma, or repeated) direct perceptions establish cause and effect.65

1b: The conceptual cognition that occurs after a direct perception (mngon sum gyi rjes su 'brang ba'i rtogs pa) does not establish cause and effect because the direct perception is not established as a valid cognition.66

Cause and effect are established neither by perception (mngon sum, pratyakṣa) nor by non-perception (mi dmigs pa, *anupalambha) from the viewpoint of the Madhyamika. Cause and effect are postulated as mere linguistic usage (tha snyad tsam du) by means of perception and say about MMK I.3, because MMK I.5 speaks of the non-establishment of conditions as conditions when the effect that should arise in dependence on them has not arisen. utpadyate pratītyemān itīme pratyayāḥ kila | yāvan notpadyata ime tāvān nāpratyayāḥ katham || (MMK I.5, trans. MacDonald 2015a: 317f.)

For the reading of this verse and the meaning of the word kila, see MacDonald 2015a: 318, ns. 583 and 584.

65  dbu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka 15a10–16 [57]: sgrub byed mngon sum pa med pa [...] | de la dang po rgyu 'bras mngon sum gyis mi 'grub pa ni 'phags pa nyid kyi stong nyid bdun cu pa las | rten 'brel shes pa gcig gis kyang mi 'grub | du mas kyang mi grub ces bka'g pa'i rigs pa ste | de la rgyu 'bras mngon sum gyis 'grub pam | 'on te du mas 'grub | dang pos ma yin te du pa lta bu'i 'bras bu 'dzin pa'i mngon sum gyis ma yin te | rgyu me lta bu la ma bzung pas so || me lta bu'i rgyu 'dzin pas kyang me yin du 'bras nas ma bzung pas so || du mas 'grub ste rgyu 'bras gnyis ka 'dzin pa'i mngon sum gnyis kyi 'grub po zhe na | ma yin te mngon sum gnyis la so sor rgyu 'bras snang yang me'i stobs kyiis du ba 'byung la [me log na du ba log ces pa'i 'brel pa mngon sum gnyis ka la mi snang bas so || de mi snang zhing ma rtogs kyang rgyu 'bras su 'grub na | mngon sum gnyis kyi bum pa dang snam pu so sor bzung pa na de gnyis kyang rgyu 'bras su thal bas so ||.

66 dbu ma rtsa ba'i shes rab kyi ti ka 15a16–18 [57]: mngon sum gyi rjes su 'brang ba'i rtogs pa rgyu 'bras grub po zhe na pam | tshad ma'i rjes su 'brangs pas grub dang pos ma yin te | smig sgyu la chur 'dzin gnyis kyang chur grub par thal bas so | gnyis pas ma yin te snga ma ltar rgyu 'bras 'dzin pa'i mngon sum tshad ma nyid ma grub pas na | de'i rjes su 'brang pa'i rtog pa mi 'thad pas na'o ||.
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1c: The absence of effect (idog pa, *nivṛtti/vyāvṛtti*) or non-perception (mi dmigs pa, *anupalambha*) of the effect that arises from a particular collection of conditions does not establish that it depends on other conditions.

2a: Arising from the permanent other and impermanent other is refuted by the author of *Ornament* (rgyan mkhan'), Kamalaśīla, and so on.

2b: The establishment of conditions as others is refuted by Buddhapālita.
The background of his discussion is apparent: Arguments 1a, 1b and 1c show that Pa tshab, as a Mādhyamika, excludes any means of valid cognition proving the existence of cause and effect or their connection (kāryakāraṇabhāva) about which the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila and Buddhist logicians such as Īśvarasena and Dharmakīrti initiated controversies and the Mādhyamikas Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla also disputed. Argument 1a seems to reject both Kumārila’s view that causal relation is known through repeated perceptions (bhūyodarśana) and Dharmakīrti’s view that it is determined by a single observational cycle of perception and non-perception. Hence, the appellation “substantialists” most likely refers to both the Dharmakīrtian logicians and non-Buddhist thinkers.

Argument 2a is found in Kamalaśīla’s MĀ as mentioned above. “The author of Ornament” could be his teacher Śāntarakṣita, who composed the dBu ma rgyan or Madhyamakālāṃkāra, although it is not possible to identify the argument in that work. The source of argument 2b ascribed to Buddhapālita is unclear. Buddhapālita actually negates the

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71 Cf., e.g., Steinkellner 1997 and Inami 1999. Kumārila maintains that causal relation between a particular cause and its effect is known through repeated perceptions (bhūyodarśana), whereas Īśvarasena is said to have insisted that their joint absence (vyatireka) is established by a mere non-perception (adarśanamātra). Dharmakīrti says in his PVSV that causality is determined through perception and non-perception and by one observational cycle (PVSV 24,3–5, cited and translated in Inami 1999: 132f.: tasmāt sakṛd api darśanādarśanābhavyām kārya-kāraṇabhāvasiddhāh bhavai tatas tatpratipatiḥ | nāyayathā | 22, 6f.: sakṛd api tathādarśanāt kāryaḥ siddhaḥ | akāryatve kāraṇāt sakṛd api abhāvāt |). Whether the one cycle consists of five cognitions (i.e., one prior non-perception of effect, two perceptions of cause and effect, and two non-perceptions of them) or three sets of perceptions and non-perceptions became a controversial issue among later logicians, which Pa tshab advert to elsewhere (7a18f.). Cf. Kajiyama 1963b and Inami 1999.

72 Kamalaśīla’s analysis of “other” that is conceived as a cause in past, future, and present is quoted by Pa tshab, and these temporally divided three causes are integrated by him into the four conditions presented in MMK I.2, because the verse states that there is not a fifth condition (dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka 14b20–15a4).

73 The possibility should be considered that the argument is discussed in the Tattvasamgraha, or that the author of the Pramāṇavārttikālāṃkāra, Prajñākaragupta, is being referred to.
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establishment of otherness in conditions, but what Pa tshab introduces as Buddhapālita’s discussion is greatly expanded. This could be Pa tshab’s own amplification.74

Now it is clear that those playing the main roles on this stage are not the early Mādhyamikas such as Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, but Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who even assign non-Buddhists a role.75 The negation of arising from other was transformed into the negation of the ultimate establishment of causality. This must have been an issue that the Mādhyamika considered necessary to demonstrate to the entire scholarly circle.

Pa tshab is supposed to have been the first Madhyamaka scholar who claimed himself to be a thal ’gyur ba (*Prāsaṅgika) (nged thal ’gyur ba, dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka 13b19, 47a22, 488a4), and who directly applied the descriptions thal ’gyur ba (10b18) and thal ’gyur smra ba’i dbu ma (6a7) to Nāgārjuna. This self-awareness of his scholastic identification and his wide knowledge of diverse philosophical systems might have been the result of growing up in an environment where scholars comprehensively studied Buddhist and non-Buddhist tenets, and determined controversies and differences between their philosophical systems.76

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74 The dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka contains some ambiguous information. This could suggest that this work is actually a record of oral instructions, and thus contains misinformation due to inaccurate memory, incorrect transmission, or intentional or unintentional modification. For instance, Pa tshab ascribes a verse of Dharmakīrti to Nāgārjuna when examining the negation of arising without cause (14b12–4): gsum pa bu ta pa li ta nyid kyi ‘dod pa brjod pa ni | thal ’gyur gyis rgyu med du skye ba ’gogs te | rgyu med gzhon la mi ltos phyir | rtag tu yod pa ‘am med par ’gyur | ces klu grub kyis gsungs pa ste | de chos kyi grags pas bsdus nas bris pa’o |. “Third, it represents the opinion of Buddhapālita himself to negate arising without cause by prasaṅga. Nāgārjuna says, ‘Because it does not depend on others, there would be permanent existence or non-existence.’ Collecting [the arguments], Dharmakīrti wrote it down.” This verse is identical with Dharmakīrti’s PV I.35ab (nityāṁ sattvam asattvam vā ’hetor anyathānapeksaṇāt | apekṣāto hi bhāvānām kādācitkātvasambhavaḥ ||).

75 It is notable that here Pa tshab does not use Candrakīrti’s writings. This fact may allow us to assume that Pa tshab had not closely studied the MA/MABh or even the PsP when he composed or recorded this dBu ma rtsa ba’i shes rab kyi ti ka, although it is a work which demonstrates that Nāgārjuna’s position implicit in his verses accords with that of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.

76 Regarding Pa tshab’s distinction between Prāsaṅgika and Śvātantrika as well as his definition of prasaṅga, cf. Yoshimizu 2020. Focusing on Pa tshab’s sources for the distinction and particularly for his understanding of svatantra inference in Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s works including the Tattvasamgraha, Vose 2020 provides extensive and valuable discussions.
Concluding remarks

To conclude, I would briefly like to outline the historical development of the argument against arising from other. The rejection of arising from other in Nāgārjuna’s MMK and its commentaries aimed to validate the ultimate Madhyamaka doctrine of non-arising, as taught in MMK I.1, by refuting the Ābhidharmika Buddhist view that a thing arises from its conditions. As epistemology and logic developed and debates took place between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, the theory of causality or the question of how to establish a causal relation became a point of interest for scholars. The Madhyamikas thus faced the new task of disproving any means of establishing a real causal relation in order to defend their ultimate tenet of non-arising. Tibetan Madhyamaka interpreters also undertook this task, integrating the logic of the Buddhist epistemological school into their commentaries on the MMK, and expanding the scope of the discussion to cover the investigation of causality. What the Madhyamikas attempted to deny was the causal relation between mutually other real cause and effect, which is essentially different from the causal relation they accepted as dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) that is qualified by non-arising at the very beginning of the MMK.77

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77 See the maṅgala verses of the MMK cited in fn. 7 above.
The negation of arising from other in the *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*

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Zhonglun  
*Piṅgala/青目（羅什訳）『中論』大正新脩大蔵経*
Differences in the exegetic attitude to scriptures between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta*

Kiyotaka Yoshimizu
Toyo Bunko

Introduction: The Vedānta claim of the unity of two Mīmāṃsās

In all Vedānta schools, knowledge of Mīmāṃsā exegesis was generally accepted as indispensable for understanding the Upaniṣad. Moreover, medieval Vedānta scholars, especially Viśiṣṭādvaitavādins, called Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta “Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Uttaramīmāṃsā,” and even claimed that these two Mīmāṃsās form a single scholastic tradition (aikāśāstrya/sāstraekatva), constituted by the Mīmāṃsāsūtra (MmS) and Brahmasūtra (BS), being the first and the last part of an extensive treatise (sāstra) of exegesis. Since the 1980s, Parpola (1981, 1994),

* The present paper is an expanded English version of Yoshimizu (2016b). I abbreviate the Mīmāṃsāsūtra as MmS, and use MS for the Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā.

1 This pair of appellations was, as far as it is confirmed today, first used by Yāmuna (10th–11th cent.). See Mesquita (1988: 62); Bronkhorst (2007: 64); Freschi (IEP).


3 According to Rāmānuja (11th–12th century), Bodhāyana wrote an extensive (visāṭrīṇa) commentary (Vṛtti) on the BS, and scholars in succeeding generations abridged it (ŚrBh 2,1; cf. Bronkhorst 2007: 18). Moreover, the Prapañcāchārdya (PH), an anonymous medieval compendium, states that the entire Mīmāṃsāśāstra consists of twenty volumes, comprising the MmS, the Samkarsakāṇḍa, and the BS (PH 38,14–15; Parpola 1981: n. 4; Bronkhorst 2007: 20), and Bodhāyana wrote a commentary that ranges from the beginning to the end of these twenty volumes as its title, Kṛtakoṭi, suggests (PH 39,4–5). The unity of these twenty volumes was inherited by Upavarṣa, who abridged Bodhāyana’s commentary but kept its scope (PH 39,5–6). After that, however, Devasvāmin and Bhavadāsa omitted the last four volumes, that is, the BS, in their commentaries, and finally, Śabaravāmin commented only on the first twelve volumes, that is, the MmS (PH 39,6–11; cf. Parpola 1981: n. 37; Bronkhorst 2007: 21). Because the author of the PH respectfully calls Śaṅkara “bhagavatpāda” (PH 39,11–12; cf. Hacker 1947: 5–6), and the term advaita is used (PH 24,18: –advaitabrahmahāva; 42,8: –
Bronkhorst (2007), and Aklujkar (2011) have argued whether or not this Vedānta claim concerning the unity of the two Mīmāṃsās reflects their historical origin. To examine this controversial issue from a new angle, the author of the present paper shall elucidate the affinity and difference between the MmS and the BS by paying special attention to the third chapter (pāda) of the third volume (adhyāya) of the BS.

Referring to several testimonies in Vedānta texts and resorting to an analogy with the structure of the Sāmavedasamhitā, which consists of two parts, the Pūrvārcika and the Uttarārcika, Parpola argues that it is historically true that the MmS and the BS, which he calls PMS and UMS respectively, were “the two portions of one single work called Mīmāṃsāsūtra” (Parpola 1981: 148); he further states that the quotation of Bādarāyaṇa in the PMS and that of Jaimini in the UMS are “natural if they form just two parts of one work” (Parpola 1981: 157), granting that Bādarāyaṇa “has intruded into the [one single, KY] Mīmāṃsāsūtra after its original composition” (Parpola 1981: 158) and “has reworked the UMS originally composed by the latter [i.e., Jaimini, KY]” (Parpola 1981: 151).

Against this perspective by Parpola, Bronkhorst (2007) mounts a comprehensive objection. Approximately at the beginning of the early medieval era, many philosophers, such as Gauḍapāda, Ādiśeṣa (the author of the Paramārthasāra), Bhartṛhari, the author of the Mokṣopāya, etc., advocated Vedāntic ideas, that is, the monistic worldview and the quest for liberation (mokṣa), but they did not rely on the Veda as the absolute authority, even if they occasionally quoted some phrases from the Upaniṣads. According to Bronkhorst, however, an “innovation” was made “at some time … in certain Vedāntic circles” (Bronkhorst 2007: 34): some Vedāntins began to proclaim their discipline as based on the orthodox tradition of the Veda by adopting Mīmāṃsā exegesis.

Bronkhorst’s criticism of Parpola’s perspective prompted Aklujkar (2011) to defend the historical unity of the two Mīmāṃsās by confuting Bronkhorst’s arguments (§§2–3), and revisiting the discussions of this problem by preceding scholars (§4). Accepting that Belvalkar assumes Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa to be “not only contemporaries but fellow-workers” (Belvalkar 1920 quoted by Aklujkar 2011: 852) at face value, Aklujkar (2011) comes to the conclusion that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa carried out a joint project for compiling the MmS and the BS in cooperation (§5.12). In his confutation, Aklujkar opposes Bronkhorst negating the creditability of Sureśvara’s testimony that Jaimini wrote a Vedānta treatise (sārīraka) in the sūtra style (asūtryat) including “athāto brahmajijñāsā; janmādy asya yataḥ” (BS 1.1.1–2) (Naiṣkarmyasiddhi [Nks] 52,2–6; cf. Parpola 1981: 150 and n. 22; Bronkhorst 2007: 13–15). Bronkhorst (2014) responds to Aklujkar (2011), but the two sides remain far apart.
Differences in the exegetical attitude to scriptures

1. “Integration” (upasaṃhāra) in Brahmasūtra 3.3

1.1. BS 3.3 and its first section

Among the sixteen chapters of the BS, BS 3.3 is unique, both in its topic and methodology. This chapter discusses how to use the Upaniṣads as a manual for “meditative veneration” (upāsana), which is the meditation on the esoteric identification of a phenomenal object with absolute being. In the Upaniṣads of different Vedic corpora called “branches” (śākhās), there are many portions that are traditionally regarded as teaching the same meditative insight (vidyā) with more or less different descriptions. The main topic of BS 3.3 is to examine whether, in meditating on an object described in a portion of an Upaniṣad, one can integrate (upasaṃhāra) details (guna) about the object from similar portions of other Upaniṣads.

Before arguing about upasaṃhāra, the first section (BS 3.3.1–4) establishes the criteria for judging whether different Upaniṣads of similar descriptions teach the same veneration. The first sūtra (BS 3.3.1) declares “[One and the same veneration] has evidence from all vedāntas (that is, Upaniṣads), insofar as they are not differentiated with regard to injunction and so on” (sarvavedāntapratyayaṃ codanādyaviśeṣāt). According to Śaṅkara, in the expression “injunction, and so on” (codanādi), it is implied

5 For upāsana in the sense of the Upaniṣadic meditation on esoteric identification, see Schayer 1927: 58–61.

6 In Mīmāṃsā, each corpus of Vedic scriptures is called a “branch” (śākhā) because it is imagined as a branch spreading from one and the same tree of the Veda (vedavrksā). Cf. ŚBh 639,5–8; Tantravārttika (TV) 639,18–19; Yoshimizu (2016a: 308).

7 In BS 3.3, the term “vidyā” is used in the sense of upāsana. See BS 3.3.24 and 47.

8 For the term pratyaya used in the sense of textual evidence, see MmS 2.4.33: … sarvakarmapratyayah syāt (see fn. 21 below); Śābarahāṣya (ŚBh) 635,4–5 (on MmS 2.4.9) and ŚBh 646,5–6 (on MmS 2.4.33): sarvasaṅkhāpratyayaṃ sarvabrāhmaṇapratyayaṃ caikam karma. Pratyaya has already been counted among the five kinds of criteria for ritual construction (kalpa) in Baudhāyanaśrautasūtra (BaudhŚS) 24.1:185,1–2: “One should consider ritual construction in terms of five kinds of criterion, namely, formula, prose, evidence, exegesis, and the appropriateness for closing.” (pañcatayena kalpam aevæṣeta chandassā brāhmaṇena pratrayena nyāyena samsthāvaśeṇeti). Pratyaya is briefly explained as yatho etat pratrayayeneti chandogabahuvṛcchadhvarupratrayayeneti (BaudhŚS 24.1: 185,12–13). Chakrabarti (1980: 116) comments on this pratyaya as follows: “When one Veda is not sufficient for the knowledge of a particular rite, the evidence of the other Vedas should be taken into consideration.” Pratyaya is a subordinate criterion to be applied when no testimony of the rite at issue is found in the mantra portions (chandās) and the prose portions (brāhmaṇa) of one’s own sākhā.
that the BS adopts the criteria adduced in MmS 2.4.9, that is, connection (saṃyoga), form (rūpa), injunction (codanā), and name (ākhyā). The main topic of the second volume (adhyāya) of the MmS is how to exegetically distinguish (bheda) one sacrifice from another described in a Vedic text. The second section of MmS 2.4 (sūtra 8–33) argues about the question of how to exegetically ascertain that one and the same sacrifice is described in the texts of different branches (śākhās) of the Veda. Rejecting the opponent’s view, advanced in MmS 2.4.8, that texts of different branches describe different sacrifices even if there are some similarities in their descriptions, MmS 2.4.9 presents the view of the proponent that they describe one and the same sacrifice, if they coincide with each other on the above-mentioned four criteria. In the same manner, according to BS 3.3.1, if texts of two different Upaniṣads coincide with each other on these criteria, they are recognized to serve as manuals of one and the same veneration.¹⁰

MmS 2.4.9: ekam vā saṃyoga-rūpa-codanā-ākhyā-aviśeṣāt.

In Brahmāsūtra-rabhāṣya (BSBhŚ) 376,16–22 (on BS 3.3.1), Śaṅkara states that both ChU 5.1 and BĀU 6.1 tell the same allegory about the contest among vital functions and the victory of breath (prāṇa), by demonstrating that both texts coincide with each other on these four criteria. The first four sections (BS 3.3.1–9) of BS 3.3 are studied in detail by Strauss (1931). BS 3.3.2 “If [the opponent argues that the same meditation is] not [described in different Upaniṣads] because of the difference [of the form of the meditation, we answer]: ‘no.’ Even with regard to the same (meditation, vidyā) [a difference in its form is possible.],” (bhedān neti cen naikasyām api) deals with the case in which two texts of the Upaniṣads teach the same meditation, although its form (rūpa) differs slightly from one text to another. As an example of this case, Śaṅkara remarks that the ChU (5.4.1–9.2) and the BĀU (6.2.9–14) teach the same pañcāgni-nividyā (BSBh 377,13–14), although the ChU enumerates only five fires (ChU 5.10.10), making the fire in woman the fifth agni (ChU 5.8.1), whereas BĀU 6.2.14 additionally refers to the funeral fire in the next life as the sixth agni (BSBhŚ 377,3–7). Strauss (1931: 259–260) points out the parallelism between BS 3.3.2 and MmS 2.4.13 “ekatve ‘pi param,” and notes that “param” is to be supplied after “ekasyām api” in BS 3.3.2. Śabarasvāmin construes MmS 2.4.13 to admit the case in which the form of one and the same sacrifice differs (rūpaḥeda) in different śākhās.

BS 3.3.3 refers to “head-vow” (śirovrata), a special rite required to perform in the Mundakopaniṣad (MuU) 3.2.10 (cf. Cohen 2008: 179–180). For the vows for Veda learning (vedavrata) recorded in Grhyasūtras, including the aupaniṣadavrata, see Kajihara (2005). In his commentary on the BSBhŚ, Nyāyanirnaya (NN), Anandagiri remarks that śirovrata is an ascetic rite of carrying fire on the head (NN 677,41: śirovrataṃ śirasy agnidhāraṇam). As this vow is not mentioned in other Upaniṣads, the opponent insists that the meditation of the teachings of the MuU, which belongs to the Atharvaveda, is different from the meditation of the Upaniṣadic teachings in other Vedas. In BS 3.3.3, the proponent retorts that śirovrata is necessary for the learning (svādhyāya) of the MuU, but not for
1.2. BS 3.3.5–8: the second and third sections

The second section is formed by BS 3.3.5 alone, which presents the main topic of BS 3.3, “integration” (upasamhāra): one can integrate a detail (guna) that is lacking in a passage of one Upaniṣad from a passage of other Upaniṣads, if both passages are proved to prescribe the same veneration.

BS 3.3.4, the last sūtra of the first section, briefly states, “also [the Veda] shows” (darśayati ca). Quoting a few passages from different Upaniṣads, Śaṅkara construes these passages to show the same meditation (vidyaikatva) on the basis of the sameness of the object to be meditated upon (vedyaikatva) (BSBhŚ 378,18).

We can construe this remark of Śaṅkara to say that these passages coincide with one another in indicating the connection (samāptivacana) of a sacrifice; different descriptions of expiatory rites (prāyaścitta); and the indication of other purposes (anyārthadarśana). However, the four criteria given in the first sūtra of the proponent (MmŚ 2.4.9), namely, samyoga, rūpa, codanā, and ākhyā, are not the same as the nine points given in MmŚ 2.4.8. Moreover, MmŚ 2.4.9 is followed by the proponent’s sūtras that refute each of the arguments about the nine points adduced in MmŚ 2.4.8. Taking the isolation of MmŚ 2.4.9 into account, Strauss (1931: 259) assumes that MmŚ 2.4.9 was not included in the original compilation of this section. Although Strauss does not explicitly say, we may safely assume that the first section of BS 3.3 was compiled after MmŚ 2.4.9 was inserted into MmŚ 2.4.8, because BS 3.3.1–4 refer to codanā (only MmŚ 2.4.9), rūpa (MmŚ 2.4.8 and 9 in common), dharmaviśeṣa (only MmŚ 2.4.8), and samyoga (only MmŚ 2.4.9).

BS 3.3.5: “In the [veneration] common [to different Upaniṣads], [the details] are integrated due to the non-difference of their purpose, similarly to the subsidiaries of the [main] injunction.” (upasamhāro 'rthābhedādā vidhiśeṣavat samāne ca.)

Strauss (1931: 265–266) explains the final portion of this sūtra, “similarly to the subsidiaries of the [main] injunction” (vidhiśeṣavat), as follows: In Vedic texts,
BS 3.3.6–8 forms the third section, which argues about whether one and the same veneration is prescribed in Chandogyopanishad (ChU) 1.2 and Brhadāranyakopanishad (BĀU) 1.3. Both texts tell a similar allegory that teaches the supremacy of oral breath (mukhya/āsanya prāna) over other vital functions: In the middle of the battle against the Asuras, the gods planned to defeat them by means of udgītha, the main part of a chant (stotra), as a weapon. They, however, failed to have this maneuver executed by five vital functions, one by one, because the Asuras made a counter-attack and succeeded in mixing each function with evil. Finally, the gods committed udgītha to the oral breath. As the Asuras could not mix the oral breath with evil, they were defeated and the gods won the battle.

In the BS, the opponent claims that ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 teach the same veneration in spite of small differences in the words (BS 3.3.6). The proponent retorts that the veneration is different because the two texts are embedded in different contexts (prakaraṇas) (BS 3.3.7), adding that the sameness of the name of veneration, udgīthavidyā, does not guarantee the sameness of the veneration itself (BS 3.3.8). According to Śaṅkara, there is a crucial difference in context between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3. In ChU 1.2, what is depicted as the object on which to meditate is the sacred syllable Oṃ, not a whole udgītha, because the preceding ChU 1.1

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a prototype sacrifice (prakṛti) is fully described from its beginning to the end, whereas modified sacrifices (vikṛtis) are described only with regard to the rituals particular to them, and many subsidiaries (śeṣas) common to the prototype sacrifice are omitted in their description. The seventh and the eighth volume of the MmS argue about how to transfer (atidesa) these omitted details of vikṛtis from their own prakṛti. Strauss calls upasamhāra “the Vedānta-equivalent to the atidesa of Pūrvvimāṃsā.” However, we should not fail to notice that BS 3.3.5 adduces vidhiśeṣa merely as a simile of upasamhāra. In Mīmāṃsā, the transfer of a detail of a prakṛti to its vikṛti is admitted only within the same sākhā. There is no case in which atidesa occurs between two different sākhās, for example, from a text of the Taītiriya sākhā to that of the Vājasaneyā sākhā, or vice versa. Therefore, the relationship between prakṛti and vikṛti sacrifices in Mīmāṃsā cannot sufficiently account for the upasamhāra in Vedānta. Śaṅkara also considers this, because he calls BS 3.3.5 “a sūtra that tells the motivation [of the remaining portions of BS 3.3]” (prayojanasūtra), and states that the detailed explanation (prapañca) of upasamhāra begins later from BS 3.3.10 on (BSBh 379,12–13).

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13 BS 3.3.7: “Or rather, [the veneration is] not [the same] on account of the difference of context, just as [the veneration of udgītha as] the supreme being (ChU 1.9.2) [is different from the veneration of udgītha as the golden person within the sun and the eye (ChU 1.6.6–8; 1.7.7; cf. BSBhŚ 381,13–14)].” (na vā prakaraṇabhedāt parovartyastvādāt.)

begins with the order to meditate on Oṃ as *udgītha*. Śaṅkara concludes that this section is an explanation of Oṃ (BSBhŚ 380,15–22). In the context of BĀU 1.3, in contrast, no phrase indicates the identification of Oṃ with *udgītha* itself, and therefore BĀU 1.3 should be construed as teaching meditation on *udgītha* as a whole (BSBhŚ 380,23–24).

15 ChU 1.1.1: *om ity etad akṣaram udgītham upāsīta.*

16 ChU 1.1.10: *iti khalv etasyaivaśarasasyopavyākhyaṇam bhavati.*

17 Strauss (1931: 276) states that *udgīthavidyā* is scrutinized in Vedānta from an orthodox-systematic standpoint, and distinguishes this from the critical-historical standpoint applied in modern philological studies. From this philological standpoint, Strauss criticizes Deussen for assuming ChU 1.2 to be posterior to BĀU 1.3 (see Deussen 1921: 385–386). Taking into account an earlier Upaniṣad, the *Jaiminiyopanishadbrāhmaṇa* (JUB), Strauss holds that the difference between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 is “unerheblich” (insignificant/negligible) for the reason that all characteristics of these two texts are scattered in four portions of JUB (1.60, 2.1, 2.3, and 2.10). He concludes that there is no evidence to determine the chronological order between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 (Strauss 1931: 246–249), and even evaluates the opponent *sūtra* (BS 3.3.6), which insists the sameness of veneration, as being closer to his opinion (Strauss 1931: 276). However, Fujii (2000) criticized Strauss by conducting a thorough comparison of all relevant portions. He clarified that the four above-mentioned portions of the JUB developed in the same order as the present text, and BĀU 1.3 borrowed the most enlarged version of story in JUB 2.10, whereas ChU 1.2 presents an abridged version of BĀU 1.3. As a result, Deussen’s assumption that ChU 1.2 is posterior to BĀU 1.3 has turned out to be more plausible than Strauss’s opinion as far as chronological order is concerned.

Nevertheless, the difference between the two standpoints—the orthodox-systematic, and the critical-historical standpoint drawn by Strauss—remains in force. In the third section of BS 3.3, the BS adduces the difference between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 as an example of the exception (*apavāda*) to the general principle (*utsarga*) of the sameness of veneration defined in BS 3.3.1: although ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 appear to tell the same plot in terms of the four criteria adduced in MmŚ 2.4.9, their plots are different on account of their different contexts (*prakaraṇa*). In order to demonstrate the originality of the Vedānta exegesis, the third section of BS 3.3 affirms the ChU 1.2 to be different from the BĀU 1.3 and attaches great importance to *prakaraṇa* in addition to the four criteria adduced in MmŚ 2.4.9. From the critical-historical viewpoint however, it is undeniable that ChU 1.2 was formed under the influence of the JUB and the BĀU (see Fujii 2000: 59).

Śaṅkara himself is not consistent: in his commentary on BS 3.3.7, Śaṅkara adduces another point of difference (BSBhŚ 380,25: *prasthānāntara*) between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3: in ChU 1.2.7, it is said that the gods made the veneration of the oral *prāṇa* imaging it as *udgītha* (ya evāyaṃ mukhyaḥ prāṇas tam udgītham upāsāṅcakrire) (BSBhŚ 380,18–19), whereas in BĀU 1.3.7 the gods are said to have engaged the oral *prāṇa* as a priest (*ṛtvij*), the performer (*kartṛ*) of the *udgītha*-chanting, with the order “sing *udgītha* for us!” (*tvam na udgāya*) (BSBhŚ 380,24–25). Here, Śaṅkara insists that one would make an exegetic failure by unnecessarily resorting to metonymic expression (*lakṣanāca prasajyeta*) if one assumes ChU 1.2 depicts the oral *prāṇa* as the Udgāṭ-
2. Differences between upasāṃhāra and the Mīmāṃsā attitude to scriptures

2.1. How to assume one’s attitude to other śākhās

As examined in the preceding section of the present paper, BS 3.3 is deeply indebted to Mīmāṃsā exegesis for arguments about how to use the Upaniṣad for meditative veneration (upāsana). Nevertheless, in spite of

In his commentary on ChU 1.2.2, however, Śaṅkara describes vital organs as the performer of the udgīthā-chanting by explaining the phrase “tam udgītham upāsāṃcakrire” to say that “they (i.e., the gods) made the veneration of the vital function equipped with consciousness, in this case, the olfactory sense that resides in the nostril, as the performer of udgīthā, that is, Udgāṭa, figuratively (bhaktyā) by [the word] udgīthā” (ChUBh 358,6–7: nāsikiyām nāsikiyām bhavam prānām cetanāvantam ghrāṇām udgīthakartāram udgāṭāram udgīthabhaktypōṣāṃcakrire upāsanam kṛtavantah). Two alternative possibilities may account for this inconsistency: commenting on ChU 1.2, Śaṅkara either imposes BĀU 1.3 upon ChU 1.2, or follows the earlier commentary (Bhāṣya) of the ChU written by Draviḍa (cf. ChUBh 351,9–10; Nakamura 2004: 108). In any case, in the ChUBh Śaṅkara does not emphasize the difference between ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3, insofar as the ChUBh is an authentic work of Śaṅkara.

In addition to their studies on BS 3.3.1‒5, Clooney (1992 and 1994) and Andrijanić (2011) examined the indebtedness of BS 3.3 to Mīmāṃsā in further sections. Clooney (1994: 290–291) adduces BS 3.3.11–13 and 3.3.58 as the sections that warn against drawing an overgeneralized uniformity by ignoring the distinctions in each text. The topic of the second volume (adhyāya) of the MmS is how to distinguish different sacrifices prescribed in Vedic texts. Beginning with a “different word” (śabdāntara) in MmS 2.2.1, MmS 2.2 and 2.3 argue about six criteria for exegetically distinguishing sacrifices. We can say that Śaṅkara construes “because of the distinction of word, etc.” (śabdādibhedā) in BS 3.3.58 as a reference to these six criteria, because he quotes MmS 2.2.1 in his commentary on this sūtra (BSBhŚ 429,9–10).

Andrijanić (2011) studies how the BS applies the topics of the third volume of the MmS, that is, the six criteria for applying (viniyoga) a subsidiary element (śeṣa) to a principal element for which the former is used as a means. These are direct assertion (śruti), indicative mark (liṅga), syntactical connection (vākya), context (prakaraṇa), place (sthāna), and name (samākhyaṇa). Andrijanić (2011: 18–20) pays special attention to BS 3.3.44–52, in which it is argued whether the mental (manomāya) firealter with 36,000 rays described in Śatapathabrāhmaṇa (ŚB) 10.5.3.1–3 is to be used in the Agnicayana-sacrifice or considered as the object of meditation. The proponent sūtra 3.3.44 adopts the latter for the following reasons: despite its being in the context (prakaraṇa) of the Agnicayana, ŚB 10.5.3 has many indicative marks (liṅgabhūyastva) that suggest the meditation of the mental fire-alter; the superiority of liṅga over prakaraṇa as an exegetic criterion is established in MmS 3.3.14 (cf. fn. 28 below).

Furthermore, Andrijanić (2011: 29) points out that Śaṅkara explains the term “context” (prakaraṇa) as other words, namely, the pair “beginning” (upakrama) and “end” (upasamhāra). According to Śaṅkara, the context of udgīthavidyā in the ChU begins with 1.1, which praises Om, and ends in 1.2, which tells the
its close relation with Mīmāṃsā, the *upasamḥāra* in BS 3.3 also shows a feature that is not shared by the MmS.

In the second section of 2.4, the MmS acknowledges that one and the same sacrifice is prescribed in different śākhās. This acknowledgment, however, does not allow one to freely choose the śākhā to be followed when performing a sacrifice, because every Brahmin is, in principle, required to master the particular śākhā that has been inherited in his family over many generations. Historically, the texts of most śākhās, including Upaniṣads, were compiled more or less under the influence of other śākhās. In the position of Mīmāṃsā, however, each śākhā is an eternal revelation (*śruti*) that depends on nothing else, including other śākhās. Kumārila warns that if one would boast to have mastered more than one śākhā of the same division of the Veda, the efficacy of the sacrifice one performs would be lost owing to it being a mixed performance. In his commentary on MmS 2.4.33, Śabaravāmin holds it possible to

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19 For example, see Keith (1914: lxxxv–ciii) about the *Taittirīyasamhitā* (TS), and Caland/Vira (1983: 91–108) about the SB. Among the Śrautasūtras of the black Yajurveda, Baudhāyana faithfully follows the Taittirīya scriptures, whereas younger Taittirīyas, especially Āpastamba, eclectically incorporate ritual details from the scriptures of other śākhās of the Yajurveda as well as those of other Vedas. Cf. Gonda (1977: 498–499, n. 21); Thite (2016). For the close affiliation of the earliest Upaniṣads to their śākhās and the trend toward fusion of different śākhās among the middle Upaniṣads, see Cohen (2008), especially, pp. 6–9, 76–83, 103–105, 169, 187, 200–201, 261–262, 269, 291–292.

20 TV 636,14–15; Yoshimizu (2016a: n. 26).

21 MmS 2.4.33: “However (against the opponent’s *sūtra* 2.4.32: ‘Or rather, injunctions should be held to differ for each (śākhā) because they are connected in order,’ *api vā kramasamyoṣgad vidhiprthaktvam ekasyāṃ vyavatisṭheta*, no connection of incompatible (injunctions) follows as far as the same action is concerned [between different śākhās]. Because of the connection of injunctions
integrate a ritual prescribed in other śākhās into the performance of a sacrifice insofar as the integration is not incompatible (virodhin) with one’s own śākhā. However, he merely approves of integrating a ritual in the exceptional case that one’s own śākhā lacks its injunction although it is inferred from an indication in the śākhā; he does not directly

in that (order), the action of all (śākhās) is to be considered as evidence” (cf. fn. 8 above) (virodhināṃ tv asamyyogād aikakarmye tatsamyyogād vidhināṃ sarvakarmapratyayāḥ syāt). Arguing about the authority of Śrautasūtras, Kumārila says that in the compilation of a Śrautasūtra the author selectively adopts injunctions of other śākhās (TV 178,23–24). Kumārila notes that this is accepted by Jaimini (TV 178,25: sarvasākhopasaṃhāro jaimineś cāpi sammatuh), probably alluding to MmS 2.4.33.

22 ŚBh 646,3–5 (on MmS 2.4.33): “As far as the same action is concerned, it is not true that the rituals prescribed in different śākhās become incompatible with each other if combined [in order]. In fact, [even if integration is made,] the order [among rituals] would not become incompatible with the syntactical connection because the former is weaker and the latter is stronger (cf. MmS 3.3.14; fn. 28 below), and [injunctions of] other śākhās are integrated due to their syntactical connection” (naiṣa śākhāntaravihitānām aikakarmye sati virodhināṃ saṃyogaḥ. na hi kramo vākyena virudhyate, durbalo hi kramaḥ, balavad vākyam, vākyena ca śākhāntarīyāṇām upasaṃhāraḥ).

23 In his commentary on MmS 2.3.31, “[the Veda of other śākhās] also points out an evidence” (pratyayam cāpi darsāyati), Śabarasvāmin adduces an example of Vedic scripture in which the injunction of a ritual is absent and needs to be supplied from other śākhās: “If the action evidenced in all śākhās were not the same, how is it possible that [the injunction of] the action has passed down in one (śākhā) whereas [only] its detail (guna) is laid down in another? In the Maitrāyaṇīya tradition, for example, the fore­offerings to kindling­sticks (samidh) and so on have not passed down in the scripture, but some details [of fore­offerings] are recorded in such a manner as ‘ṛtavo vai prayājāḥ samānīya hotavyāḥ’” (ŚBh 645,9–12: yadā na sarvasākhāpratyayam ekam karete, katham ekasyām śākhāyām samāmnāyate ‘nyasyāṃ guṇo vidhiyate. yathā maitrāyaṇīyānāṃ samidādayaḥ prayāja na samāmnāyante, atha ca gunāḥ śrīyante, ṛtavo vai prayājāḥ samānīya hotavyā iti). The fore­offering (prayāja) is the offering of ghee to be performed five times in advance of the main offerings of the new and full moon sacrifices and their modifications. In prayāja, ghee is offered to five deities, that is, samidh, tanūnapāt, id, barhis, and śvāhākāra, which are compared to the five seasons (ṛtus) (cf. TS 2.6.1; Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa [TB] 3.5.5; ŚB 1.5.3). In the Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā (MS), however, no basic injunction of prayāja is found in the brāhmaṇa sections for the offerings of the new and full moon sacrifices and their modifications. In prayāja, ghee is offered to five deities, that is, samidh, tanūnapāt, id, barhis, and śvāhākāra, which are compared to the five seasons (ṛtus) (cf. TS 2.6.1; Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa [TB] 3.5.5; ŚB 1.5.3). In the Maitrāyaṇī Samhitā (MS), however, no basic injunction of prayāja is found in the brāhmaṇa sections for the offerings of the new and full moon sacrifices (cf. MS 4.1.14; Dharmadhikari 2008: 386–387), but MS 1.4.12 (61,6–15; Dharmadhikari 2008: 106) prescribes the various ways of how to perform prayāja according to what the Adhvaryu priest wishes for the sacrificer (yajamāna). Śabarasvāmin quotes a variant of the phrase, rtāvo vai prayājāḥ samānātra hotavyāḥ rtūnām prātiṣṭhitītai (“Seasons are certainly fore­offerings; they are to be offered on the same spot so that seasons become steady”), which explains that the priest should offer ghee five times standing on the same spot if he wishes the sacrificer to become neither rich nor poor (MS 1.4.12: 61,12–15). For the restricted use of the textual evidence (pratyayā) from other śākhās in the śrauta tradition, see fn. 8 above.
recommend the unrestricted integration of the rituals of other śākhās. Besides, unlike in the BS, the term “upasamḥāra” does not appear in the MmS.\textsuperscript{24}

In Vedānta, on the contrary, insofar as the meditative veneration at issue is proved to be the same, integration (upasamḥāra) is positively acknowledged as a standard way to make use of Upaniṣadic texts for meditation. This is explicitly declared in BS 3.3.10 “Those [qualities attributed to an object of meditation in one branch (śākhā) are [to be integrated into its meditation] in other (śākhās), because [the meditation of that object] is not different in all (śākhās)” (sarvabhedād anyatreme).\textsuperscript{25}

In particular, when a ritual component is chosen as the object of meditative veneration in an Upaniṣad, it is stated that this veneration is not restricted to the Vedic branch of that Upaniṣad in BS 3.3.55: “However, [the veneration that are] connected with ritual components are not restricted to the Vedic branches [in which the components are prescribed], because [they recur/belong] to every Veda” (aṅgāvabaddhās tu na śākhāsu hi prativedam). In his commentary on this sutra, quoting the opening phrase of the ChU that gives the order to meditate on Oṃ as udgītha, “[om ity etad aḵṣaram] udgītham upāsīta,” Śaṅkara calls this phrase “direct assertion in a universal form” (sāṃnyaśruti), and points out that its universality would come to be damaged (pīḍita) if the injunctive force issued from “udgītham upāsīta” were restricted (vyavasthāpyamāna) to the veneration

\textsuperscript{24} See the index of the MmS in Kevalānandasarasvatī (1948). Śabaravāmin’s and Kumārila’s use of the term “upasamḥāra” (see fns. 21 and 22 above) may have been influenced by BS 3.3.

\textsuperscript{25} At the end of their commentaries on BS 3.3.10, Śaṅkara concludes: “Therefore, [it is said in BS 3.3.10] that properties connected with a principal object [of meditation] are, even if mentioned only in [the Upaniṣad of] one branch (śākhā), to be integrated into [the meditation of the object in the Upaniṣads of] all (śākhās)” (BS BhŚ 384,21–22: tasmād ekapradhānasambaddhā dharmā ekatrāpy ucyamānāḥ sarvatraivopasaṃhartavyā iti), and Bhāskara concludes: “Moreover, meditative insight is not restricted to one (śākhā), because all people are eligible for [the Upaniṣadic medition of] all branches. It does not matter at all that [the property at issue] is not mentioned in [the Upaniṣads of other branches].” (BS BhBh 179,4–5: na caikāṃ praty avaśisyate vidyā. sarvaśākhāsu sarvapurūśādhiḥkārāt. aṣrutatvam akimeṭkaram). According to both Śaṅkara and Bhāskara, BS 3.3.10 argues that the details of the vital functions, for example, speech being the most excellent (vasiṣṭha, ChU 5.1.2; BĀU 6.1.2), can be integrated into the meditation based on the Kauśītakayupaniṣad (KauU) 2.14, which also relates a corresponding allegory about the contest among the vital functions.

\textsuperscript{26} BS BhŚ 426,11–12: api tu sarvaśākhāsv anuvartaran; Śr Bh 918,2: api tu prativedam sambadhyeran.
that follows a particular śākhā (viśeṣa), in the present case, the Kauthuma and Rāṇāyanīya of the Sāmaveda. Applying a Mīmāṃsā theorem, he adds that the direct assertion (śruti) of an injunction is stronger than its being in the vicinity (saṃnidhāna) of other sentences of the ChU as an exegetical criterion.

2.2. The chanting of udgītha as kratvartha, and its meditative veneration as puruṣārtha

Then, why does the order issued at the beginning of the ChU have the pan-śākhā universality that extends the eligibility for venerating udgītha beyond the Kauthuma and Rāṇāyanīya śākhās? In the BSBhŚ on BS 3.3.42, Śaṅkara explains the difference between the chanting of udgītha and the veneration of udgītha as follows. Being an Upaniṣad of the

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27 BSBhŚ 426,12–14: “Why? Because the direct assertion of [the veneration of] udgītha, and so on, has no distinction [as to its affiliation to a Vedic branch]. In fact, if the direct assertion [in ChU 1.1.1] ‘one should venerate udgītha [as the syllable Om]’ were restricted to its own branch, then this assertion, after being indiscriminately activated in a universal form, would be damaged due to its restriction to a particular (branch) on account of its being in the vicinity [of other portions of ChU 1]; but this is not reasonable.” (kutaḥ. udgīthādiśrutyaviśeṣāt. svasākhāvyavasthāyāṃ hy “udgītham upāsīte”ti sāmānyaśrutir aviśeṣapravṛttā satī saṃnidhānavaśena viśeṣe vyavasthāpyamānā piḍitā syāt. na caitan nyāyyam.)

28 BSBhŚ 426,14–15: saṃnidhānāt tu śrutir balīyasī. Cf. MmS 3.3.14: śruti-linga-vākyaparakaṇa-sthāna-samākhyaṃ samavāye pāradāurbalyam arthe-vipra ṛkasat. Saṃnidhāna (vicinity) is a synonym of the criterion called sthāna (position) and krama (order).

29 BS 3.3.42: “This ascertainment (nirdhāraṇa, cf. BS 1.3.37) [of the nature of udgītha in ChU 1.1] is not restricted to that, (that is, the sacrifice in which udgītha is chanted) because this is seen [in ChU 1.1.10]; in fact, [in the phrase of ChU 1.10 ‘vīryavattaraṃ bhavati,’] the result [of the veneration of udgītha is said] to be the freedom from obstacles, separately [from that of the chanting of udgītha]” (tannirdhāraṇa-aniyamas taddṛṣṭeḥ, pṛthag ghy apratibandhaḥ phalam). With “apratiḥbandha,” this sūtra refers to the portion of ChU 1.1.10: yad eva vidyayā karoti śraddhayopaniṣadā tad eva vīryavattaram bhavati. Commenting on ChU 1.1.10, Śaṅkara compares one who has mastered udgīthavidyā to a merchant (vaṇij), and one who is simply chanting udgītha without udgīthavidyā to a wild mountaineer (śabara); owing to the knowledge about markets, the former makes much more profit selling precious stones than the latter (ChUBh 356,26–357,1).

30 BSBhŚ 416,7–10: “Why? Because this is seen. That is to say, the revealed scripture shows that those (ascertainties of the nature of udgītha such as ‘the ultimate essence’ [ChU 1.1.3: rasatama] and so on) are not restricted [to the sacrifice], inasmuch as ChU 1.1.10, ‘Those who know this and those who do not both perform these rites using this syllable’ (trans. Olivelle 1998: 171), allows one who does not have the knowledge [of udgīthavidyā] to perform [the chanting of udgītha]” (kutaḥ–taddṛṣṭeḥ. tathā hy aniyatatvam evaṇjāṭīyatāṃ darśayati
Sāmaveda, the ChU begins with an illustration of a deepening process of meditation: it begins with the enumeration of nine kinds of things, namely, beings (bhūtas), earth, water, plant, man, speech, ṛc, sāman, and finally, udgīthā, declaring that in each of the eight combinations of two kinds that are adduced in a sequence, the latter is the essence (rasa) extracted from the former (ChU 1.1.2–3). ChU 1.1.3 concludes that udgīthā is the ultimate essence (rasatama) of all kinds of essence. However, ChU 1.1.10 declares that this meditative transition from a phenomenal thing to a more essential thing is not necessary for performing the udgīthā chanting. Although the chanting of udgīthā is the most important action among the rituals to be performed by the Sāmaveda priests, the veneration of udgīthā does not count among the rituals that form a sacrifice. Therefore, ChU 1.1.10 states that even one who has not mastered udgīthavidyā is allowed to perform the chanting of udgīthā; that is to say, the acquisition of udgīthavidyā is not a necessary condition for the chanting of udgīthā in a sacrifice.

One may also assume that the latter is not a necessary condition for the former either; that is to say, the performing of udgīthavidyā is not limited to those who are chanting udgīthā. That being the case, it comes to be allowed that the veneration of udgīthā can be performed outside srutiḥ. "tenobhau kuruto yaś caitad evam veda yaś ca na veda" (ChU 1.1.10) ity aviduo 'pi kriyābhyanujñātāḥ). Also Bhāskara and Rāmānuja use the same explanation quoting ChU 1.1.10 (BSBhBh 192,11–17; ŚrBh 902,5–11).

In BS 3.4.21–22, “If [the opponent insists that the phrases such as ChU 1.1.3, which asserts udgīthā to be the ultimate essence (rasatama) are mere eulogies [of ritual acts] because they describe [a component of the sacrifice, we answer] ‘no,’ because [the veneration of udgīthā is] something unprecedented (apūrva); moreover, there are words that denote action (bhāvaśabda) [such as ‘upāsīta’ (ChU 1.1.1)]” (stutimātram upādānād iti cen na. apūrvatvāt; bhāvaśabdāc ca), it is stated that the veneration of udgīthā is an action newly enjoined in the Upaniṣad, alluding to MmŚ 2.1.1 “bhāvarīthāḥ karmasabdāḥ ...” and 2.1.5 “covanā punar ārambhāḥ.” Śabaravāmin glosses this codanā as apūrva in the sense of that which is enjoined to be done only by the very injunction in question (ŚBh 390,1: codanety apūrvam brāmah). Note that this apūrva is the typological originality/ novelty of action, not the temporal apūrva, that is, the disposition (samskāra) or potency (sakti) assumed in the Bhāṭṭa school to be newly produced by the performance of a sacrifice. See Yoshimizu 2021a.

In ChU 1.10.9–11, Uṣasti Cākrayāṇa, after having intruded on three Sāmaveda priests who were chanting in a sacrifice, drew their attention to his knowledge by startling them with a warning that their heads would be shattered if they performed the chanting of their parts of stotra without knowing the deities linked to them. In BSBhŚ 416,10–13, Śaṅkara construes this portion of the ChU to say that not only Udgaṭ, but also his two assistant priests, that is, Prasthār and Pratihartṛ, could carry out their duties as priest (yājanādhyavarṣāna) without any knowledge about the esoteric meaning of their own parts of stotra.
a sacrifice. Moreover, *udgīthavidyā* turns out to be open to any person irrespective of whether he or she is affiliated to a śākhā of the Sāmaveda. In order to prove this, the Vedānta school makes use of the exegetical distinction in Mīmāṃsā between *kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha*, although these paired terms themselves are not used in the BS.

According to Mīmāṃsā, every ritual act in a sacrifice is classified into either those that are performed for the sake of the sacrifice (*kratvartha*), or those performed for the sake of a human being (*puruṣārtha*). In addition to the main action (*pradhāna*) of the sacrifice, that is, the offering of an oblation to deities, what is called *puruṣārtha* includes the ritual acts that are performed in a modified way for the sake of accomplishing a special wish of the sacrificer. For example, for fetching a vessel filled with the water called *prāṇītāḥ* eastward in the sacrificial hall, the Adhvaryu priest usually uses a cup with a handle (*camasa*). When the sacrificer wishes an increase of cattle, the Adhvaryu uses a bucket for milking (*godohana*), and this special way of fetching water (*prāṇītāpranayana*) is considered to directly contribute to the increase of cattle, and is therefore regarded as *puruṣārtha*.

As examined in the third section of BS 3.3, ChU 1.2 and BĀU 1.3 are regarded as teaching different meditations, although both portions deal with the same topic, the veneration of *udgītha*. Insofar as two Upaniṣads teach different venerations (*upāsanas*), one cannot integrate the details mentioned in one Upaniṣad into the meditation based on the other. However, because a Vedic sacrifice is performed in such a way that priests of different divisions of the Veda perform their own ritual tasks together, one might suppose that the meditation based on ChU 1.2 and that based on BĀU 1.3 can be combined (*samuccaya*), inasmuch as in both meditations the mind is equally concentrated upon a component (*aṅga*) of the sacrifice, that is, the chanting of *udgītha* as their support (*āśraya*). The last section of BS 3.3 (*sūtra* 61–66) deals with this topic. The opponent’s *sūtra* (3.3.61) asserts the necessity of a combination,

33 *Kratvartha* and *puruṣārtha* are discussed in the fourth Adhyāya of the MmS. *Puruṣārtha* is defined in MmS 4.1.2: “If pleasure occurs to man when a ritual is performed, the desire to perform that ritual is characterized as being for the sake [of a human being] because of its inseparability [from pleasure]” (*yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya tasya līpīrthalakṣaṇāvibhaktavāt*).

34 See ŚBh 1241,12–13 (on MmS 4.2.27): *kim tat pradhānam yasyaite šeṣā iti. ucyate. yajati dadāti juhotīty evaṃlakṣaṇam.*

35 See ŚBh 1194,12 (on MmS 4.1.2): “godohanena paśukāmasya pranayet” *ityevamādīni.*

36 BS 3.3.61: “As regards [the venerations] of components of [a sacrifice], [whether
whereas the proponent’s sūtra (3.3.65) rejects it. Commenting on this sūtra, Śaṅkara explicitly says the meditative veneration of udgītha is puruṣārtha, whereas he admits that its object, the chanting of udgītha, is kratvartha. That is to say, how to perform ritual acts is strictly controlled by the Veda for the sake of accomplishing a sacrifice, but this control by the Veda does not determine how to meditate upon these acts, because meditation is made for one’s own sake. At the end of the last section, Śaṅkara declares that it is left to one’s discretion (yathākāmam) whether one performs the meditation on a ritual element by combining (samuccaya) different venerations or by selecting (vikalpa) one of them.

they are to be combined] corresponds to whether their supports are [the same]” (angeṣu yathāśrayabhāvahāvah).

BS 3.3.65: “[Venerations of the same component of the sacrifice are] rather not [to be combined] because the revealed text (Upaniṣad) does not declare that they should be brought about together” (na vā tatsahabhāvāśruteḥ).

BSBhŚ 432,9–12: “We say that [they are] not [to be combined] because venerations are for the sake of a human being. That is to say, the Vedic injunction of performance may make one understand that those which are for the sake of a sacrifice, in this case, [the chanting of] udgītha, and so on, should be brought about together. However, the venerations of udgītha, and so on, are for the sake of a human being even if they have recourse to something that is for the sake of a sacrifice, in the same way that [the fetching of the prāṇītāḥ water by means of] a bucket for milking [is for the sake of a human being], as we argued in BS 3.3.42” (see fn. 29 above). (neti brāhmaḥ. puruṣārthatvād upāsanānām. prayogavacano hi kratvarthānām udgīthādīnāṃ sahabhāvam prāpayet. udgīthādyupāsanānī kratvarthāśrayāṇy api godohanādīvat puruṣārthānity avocāma “pṛthag ghy apratibandhah phalam” ity atra.)

BSBhŚ 432,23: tasmād yathākāmam upāsanānāṁ samuccayo vikalpo veti. Concerning the meditation on brahman, BS 3.3.59, “vikalpo 'viśiṣṭaphalatvāt,” orders selecting (vikalpa) one form of brahman to be meditated. Śaṅkara exhorts one to concentrate on the selected form until it vividly reveals itself. BSBhŚ 430,14–16: “We reply. Among these [venerations of various forms of brahman] only one should be selected, and they should not be combined. Why? Due to the non-difference in their result. That is to say, their result is the same, namely, to make the object to be venerated plainly visible. Moreover, when an object to be venerated, for example, the God, has been made plainly visible by means of one veneration, the second [veneration of another form of brahman] would be meaningless,” (ucyate. vikalpa evāsāṁ bhavitum arhati na samuccayah. kasmāt. avīśiṣṭaphalatvatvāt. avīśiṣṭam hy āsām phalam upāsyaavīśyasasyasākṣātkaranam. ekena copāsanena sākṣātkṛtya upāsye viśaya īśvarādu dvītiyam anarthakam.); BSBhŚ 430,16–17: “If one combines [different venerations], moreover, the plain visualization would even become impossible because it is the cause of the mind’s distraction.” (api cāsambhavah sākṣātkaranasya samuccayapakṣe cittaviksepatvāt); BSBhŚ 430,21–22: “Therefore, among the meditations that have no difference in their result, one should adopt one of them and be concentrated on it until its result comes to be attained by making the object of veneration plainly visible” (tasmād avīśiṣṭaphalānāṁ vidyānāṁ anyatatamāṁ
Concluding remarks

Considering that BS 3.3 allows a meditator to modify the description of the object to be meditated upon by means of integration (upasamhāra) from other Upaniṣads, and even to select the meditative veneration described in other Upaniṣads, we may surmise that from the early period the Vedānta school encouraged one to collect and synthesize various phrases of different Upaniṣads. Conjointly with the circumstances of medieval society, this tendency to transcend the differences between Vedic branches may have contributed, on the one hand, to the development of individualism that came to fruition in the life of monks in monasteries who have no personal affiliation to a particular lay community, and, on the other hand, to the development of inclusivism that strengthened the influence of Vedānta in Hindu society. Because these two developments are not confirmed in medieval Mīmāṃsā, we may say that there was a substantial difference in attitudes toward scriptures between Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta in their early stages.\(^\text{40}\) It is, therefore, difficult to assume the historicity of the Vedānta claim that the MmS and the BS were two portions of a single work, as Parpola (1981: 148) holds, or to assume that Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa compiled this single work as a joint project, as Aklujkar (2011: §5.12) argues.\(^\text{41}\)

As Bronkhorst (2007: 23–33) points out, several treatises of monistic philosophy that, unlike the BS, do not rely on the authority of the Veda nor use Mīmāṃsā exegesis were written at the beginning of the early medieval era.\(^\text{42}\) However, the existence of these treatises does not

\[\text{ādāya tatparah syād yāvad upāsyavisayasākṣātkaraṇena tatphalaṃ prāptam iti.}\]

For one who meditates on something aiming at secular benefit (kāmya), BS 3.3.60 approves the combination of different meditations.

\(^{40}\) In contrast to the Vedānta “integration,” the Mīmāṃsā attitude to other śākhyās may be called “tolerance,” because tolerance means the willingness to acknowledge the existence of divers opinions or behaviors, keeping distance from them without changing oneself under their influence. See Yoshimizu (2016a).

\(^{41}\) The traditional saying that Bodhāyana wrote an extensive commentary on the MmS, the Samkarsakāṇḍa, and the BS (see fn. 3 above), even if historically true, is not conclusive evidence for their original unity. A counterexample: Alexander of Aphrodisias (ca. 200 CE) wrote commentaries on several works of Aristotle, namely, those on logic, natural sciences, and metaphysics; however, Aristotle himself stresses the difference among these sciences in their object and methodology (Metaphysica 6.1).

\(^{42}\) See fn. 4 above. For the recent studies of the monistic philosophies that differ from the BS in the Vedāvādadvātrīṁśikā, the Vedāntatattvaviniścaya chapter of the Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, the Vākyapadiyavrūti, and the Puruṣavāda chapter of the Dvādaśāranayacakra, respectively, see Quarnström (2003), Quarnström (2016), David (2016), and Timalsina (2017). Vedānta is coupled with Sāmkhya
Differences in the exegetic attitude to scriptures

Differences in the exegetic attitude to scriptures corroborate their chronological precedence to the BS, because the BS in its present form exhibits a multi-layered structure. The first volume of the BS investigates the coherence (1.1.4: *samanvaya*) among different Upaniṣadic passages in revealing the absolute conscious being, *brahman*, by different names. BS 1.1–3 most frequently refers to a passage of the ChU as the topic of discussion, and even the order of the passages referred to is rigidly preserved as they occur from the first to the last chapter of the ChU.\(^{43}\) Therefore, one may be allowed to assume that BS 1.1–3 was first

\(\text{in } \text{Niśvāsatattvasamhitā (NTS) 1.9ab: vedāntam viditaṃ deva sāṃkhyaṃ vai pañcavimśakam}\)

\(^{43}\) BS 1.1.20–21 refers to ChU 1.6.6 and 1.7.5; BS 1.1.22 to ChU 1.9.1; BS 1.1.23 to ChU 1.11.5; BS 1.1.24–27 to ChU 3.12–13; BS 1.2.1–8 to ChU 3.14.1–2; BS 1.2.13–17 to ChU 4.15; BS 1.2.24–32 to ChU 5.11–24; BS 1.3.8–9 to ChU 8.12.3; BS 1.3.41 to ChU 8.14.1. This frequent and sequential reference to the ChU in BS 1.1–3 was noticed by Deussen (1906: 130–131; 1912: 121–122). An exception is BS 1.1.5–11, which criticizes an opponent who interprets the “being” (*sat*) expounded in ChU 6.2 as primordial matter (*prakṛti*). The reason why this has become the keynote section of the BS, breaking the order of the passages in the ChU, may be that the entire BS 1 in its present form, including BS 1.4 that mainly criticizes the opponent who interprets Upaniṣads in keeping with the Śāṃkhya theories, was compiled in the period when the dualism of Śāṃkhya was widely influential. Even the proponent calls *brahman* “*prakṛti*” in the sense of material cause (BS 1.4.23) and the world its “transformation” (*parināma*) (BS 1.4.26). In the Arthaśāstra (AŚ), Śāṃkhya comes first on the list of the philosophies systematized by “inquiry” (*ānvīkṣikī*) (AŚ 1.2.10: *sāṃkhyaṃ yogo lokāyatam cety ānvīkṣikī*). In contrast, Śāṃkhya is not included in the fourteen or eighteen kinds of “knowledge” (*vidyā*) or “abodes of knowledge” (*vidyāsthānas*) enumerated in Purāṇas and Dharmaśāstras, namely, four *vedas*, six *vedāṅgas*, mīmāṃsā, nyāyavistara, *purāṇa*, and dharmaśāstra (and four additional *vidyās*) (Vāyupurāṇa [VāyuP] 1.61.78; Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa [BrahmāṇḍaP] 1.2.35.87cd–88ab; Viṣṇupurāṇa [ViṣṇuP] 3.6.27; Yājñavalkyasmitṛ [Y] 1.3; cf. TV 201,23–25). As noted by Hacker (1958: 16–17), the number fourteen in reference to *vidyā* or *vidyāsthānas* is attested in the Raghuvamśa of Kālidāsa (Raghu 5.21: *vittasya vidyāparisamkhyaśya me kotī catasro daśa cāhara*) and an inscription of 518 CE (Bethul Plates of Saṃkṣobha, Epigraphia Indica 8, p. 287: *chaturddaśa-vidyāsthāna-vidita-paramārthasya*). Therefore, we may be able to assume that BS 1 in its nearly present form was compiled by the fourth century at the latest (cf. fn. 46 below), but the contemporary scholars of Śāṃkhya may have ignored the BS because they were occupied with rationally proving their dualism without relying on the unconditional authority of *śruti*. The absence of a Śāṃkhya response to the BS does not indicate that the BS was not yet compiled. The possibility also cannot be excluded that the Śastitandtra referred to an early version of the BS in its *paravāda*, “the theories of others,” which Iśvarakṛṣṇa says is omitted in his Sāṃkhyaakārikā (SK 72: *paravaḍavivarjitaś cāpi*). Even Śaṅkara’s criticism of Śāṃkhya in his BSBhŚ seems to have gotten no written response from the Śāṃkhya side. Larson (2011: 211) affirms that “there are no extant classical Śāṃkhya texts which contain the Śāṃkhya response to Śaṅkara’s critique,” and reconstructs what the classical...
compiled mainly by the Brahmins of the Kauthuma-Rāṇāyaṇiya śākhās and became the core portion to which other chapters were added later.\footnote{Based on Sureśvara’s testimony (see fn. 4 above) and Deussen’s observation mentioned above, Belvalkar (1920; 1927) assumed that Jaimini wrote his Śārīraka Śūtra arguing only about the ChU, and that this work gave place to Bādarāyaṇa’s BS later. However, Kane (1960: 136) criticized Belvalkar’s assumption by pointing out that BS 1.1.2, which Sureśvara includes in Jaimini’s śārīraka, alludes to the cosmogony of Taittirīyopaniṣad (TU) 3.1.1, not to that of the ChU. The relation of Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa to the MmS and the BS as well as the formation of the BS remain to be more precisely investigated. See Yoshimizu 2021b.}

Whereas both BS 1.1–3 and 3.3 equally examine whether the passages of the Upaniṣad at issue refer to the same object, BS 1.1–3 has recourse to Upaniṣadic co-reference, for an ontological understanding, and BS 3.3 does the same for the practice of meditation. In this sense, BS 3.3 is complementary to BS 1.1–3.\footnote{Cf. Clooney 1992: 55.} Therefore, although BS 3.3 in its present form is the most voluminous chapter with 66 sūtras arranged in a complex structure, the compilation of its original form may have synchronized with that of BS 1.1–3.\footnote{Taking into account that the Buddhist Vijñāna-vāda is attacked in BS 2.2.28–32, Nakamura (1983: 436) takes the year 400 CE to be the earliest date of the BS’s compilation in its present form, whereas he holds that many parts of BS 1.1–3 and 3.3 were compiled before the Christian era.} Accordingly, it seems unlikely that a certain Vedānta circle that originally had nothing to do with Mīmāṃsā created the entire BS within a short period, demonstrating their knowledge of Mīmāṃsā for some external reason such as a longing for “respectability” (Bronkhorst 2007: 76).\footnote{If the formation of the BS did not begin before the Gupta empire began to decline, the individual sūtras in the BS that record the views of Mīmāṃsā teachers with their names (cf. Parpola 1981: 156–157) would have been made up later for the sake of the archaic appearance of the BS. However, one and the same person could be occupied with two different systems on different occasions out of different concerns, unless the two systems are incompatible. Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta are not incompatible with each other, but the former is a methodology presupposed in the latter.} Instead, long before the early medieval era began, the BS may have been gradually compiled by many generations of Brahmin scholars who studied the Upaniṣads using Mīmāṃsā exegesis, but this compilation of the BS remained unknown or did not attract the attention of other schools of philosophy.
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BS  Brahmāsūtra. See BS BhŚ.

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MmS  Mīmāṃsāsūtra. See ŚBh.


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TV  Tantravārttika. See ŚBh.


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